Radical Islamic Anthropology: Key to Christian Theologizing in the Context of Islam

In outlining the possibilities of Christian thinking in relation to Islam I had in a paper attempted to present my views on the reasons for the lack of enthusiasm about the importance of Christian-Muslim interface for theologizing.1 I had introduced the idea of the different purposes of the Bible and the Qur’an as an approach to the common material. but also interjected that, while there is much that appears as common, there is also much that is distinctively Christian or Islamic. For instance, though Christian-Muslim ideas converge, at least apparently, on the notions of God as transcendent and man being his servant or worshipper, any suggestion of God-man association apart from these polar categories is found suspect in Muslim-Christian dialogical situations.

Islam is understood to be as old as humanity. It is therefore, understandable that the Qur’an presents a vindication of its focal point in the ideas of the prophetic role of ‘warning’ and leading people to the right path of the worship of one God from Adam to the last prophet Muhammad. This larger structure of prophecy beginning from Adam and ending in Muhammad incorporates a particular objective of showing how from the time of the father of Judaism and the spiritual father of Christianity, Abraham to the time of the last prophet, Muhammad through the line of Ishmael, prophets fulfill the fundamental purposes.

The accounts of the prophets in the Qur’an are presented as those who support Muhammad’s call against sin of associating others with the transcendent God who alone is worthy of worship and the warning of punishment to those who do not heed their warnings. These prophets remain fixed in their historical contexts and their stories are assumed to be relevant only because they serve as illustrations of what might happen to those who do not heed the warnings of Muhammad. Jesus in this context, features as one of the Major Prophets. His story however, differs a bit from the stories about the other prophets. He does not appear to match this type of prophets in the Qur’an, entirely. We know that the conflict of Muhammad with the Jews in Medina was largely political in nature, whereas the conflict with Christians had a doctrinaire dimension in that it centered on the nature and being of God.

The specific issue between Muslims and Christians during Muhammad’s time and now continues to be Christological. The image of God as the Transcendent Other appears to be sacrificed by the Christian notion of Jesus as the ‘Son of God’, and Trinity. Thus the dominant image of Jesus in the Qur’an is not as one of the prophets who serve to illustrate the message and the ministry of Muhammad and also serve as a warning to those who do not listen to him, but as one who corrects Christians of exceeding the bounds "the Islamic structure of prophecy".

We know that certain Mystical traditions of Islam attempt to transcend "the traditional structure of prophecy" to create space for the parallel institution of sainthood. This trend within Islam appears to correspond to the image of Jesus in the Qur’an where he is represented as critiquing Christians of transcending the prophetic structure. Here the emphasis shifts from the literal, esoteric understanding of the texts to ‘direct’ and unmediated knowledge of God notionally explicating the contents of the Qur’an. It will not be possible to elaborate these liberative hermeneutical trends in Islam in this paper, but I shall attempt to present the idea of sainthood as an aspect of the notion of al-insan al-kamil (the Perfect Man) and point to some broad Christological reflections.

Further, the Qur’anic insistence on the transcendence of God and ‘polemics’ against Christian idea of the coming together of God and creature in a sort of ontological relations was simply beyond the known categories of thought during Muhammad’s time, for the Greek thought had not yet impregnated Islam. There is therefore, a possibility of Christological thinking in the context of sources in Islamic tradition that we know have been impregnated with Greek ideas.

I am in this paper attempting to make a beginning in these directions.

The Notions of Absolute Transcendence of God

Fundamental to the Qur’an is the image of God being the absolute creator, master, king, deity, majesty who stands as an antithesis to humanity as creature, servant, worshipper, lowly-humble creature full of awe of the Other. In this context the Christian idea of Jesus being the son or trinity might have sounded blasphemous; for how could one suppose Creator-creature, Master-servant, King-subject, Deity-worshipper disjunction ever disappearing.

Common sense and the experience of ‘growing up’ with my own daughter has taught me something that I think is fundamentally true. All parents find their children exceptional. I am no different. But I would like to qualify this confession a bit. As a young child of twelve, my daughter is exceptionally clever,2 but this appraisal of her needs qualification lest my readers think of me as just another naïve parent being carried away by the warmth of feelings. With all her endowments, the reason why I still think she has to grow up is because she associates things, events, people and actions in neat categories of good-bad, wrong-right, true-false, warm-cold and so on. Experience has taught me that though it is tolerable to describe the bath water in the simple categories of warm-cold, it would be disastrous, in practice, if I failed to comprehend the possibility of the degrees of coldness and warmness. Just as the water can be found in degrees of heat and cold as [again simplified] hot stream, scalding hot liquid, warm liquid and temperate, cold, freezing cold and solid ice, things, people, events and actions are likely to be found in a variety of states and valence. One of the first signs of the growth is the awareness of the reality of polarity. But if one remains at the level of simple polarities it is easy to say that there is some problem. This is the case, for instance with most resurgent or reactionary movement and that is the reason why such movements are described by the term [loaded now with negative connotation] fundamentalism. The essence of fundamentalism is in that it views complexities simplistically in mere polarities of truth-falsehood, good-bad, God-devil, we-they, heaven-hell and so on. An evidence of such simplistic positioning is also in the way movements are described through terms such as ‘rightist’ ‘centrist’ and ‘leftist’.

It is acceptable in ordinary speech to simplify complexities and use a language that is least encumbered by intricacies. But not so when one is attempting to address matters that concern deep human consciousness of God; for one needs to exercise utmost caution and rigor in speaking as accurately as humanly possible. Not all complexities are possible for human language to capture and describe; in such cases it is important to recognize the complexity, and then proceed with the best possible narration.

Fundamentally, Christianity, Islam and Judaism think of God and humanity in polar terms. To a large extent, the dominant traditions of Judaism and Islam have remained at a plane where the rigor in speaking or thinking of God in terms that may truly reflect the mystery of the divinity, transcending the polarity of God and humanity, is almost lacking.

The Qur’an, for instance, is full of references, which under shore the simple polarity as pointed out above. For instance, it speaks of the earth and heaven, Lord-men, Hell and heaven,3 good deeds and by implication its opposite the bad deeds, righteous soul and by implication the unrighteous soul, at the judgment day4; Light-darkness, believers-unbelievers;5 God-creation;6 servant-master;7 Good-evil.8 There also the repetitive emphasis on the otherness of God as in the notions of "the Lord of the Throne of Glory Supreme",9 "Lord of the Throne of Honor;"10 emphasis on His power "Lord of Power;"11 His reach "The Lord of the two Easts and Two Wests,"12 and so on.

I have pointed this out in a publication before that the sovereignty and the otherness of God was one of the fundamental principles of the political ideology of one of this century’s greatest Muslim thinkers, namely, Mawlana Mawdudi’s (d. 1979).13 Raja Ram Mohan Roy (1772-1833) is credited with the distinction of being one of the first Indian to have written seriously on Christian theological themes. He is known to have studied Persian and Arabic. He not only was well versed in Islam. but was also to a large extent influenced by it. A clear evidence of this influence is in his acceptance of the doctrine of virgin birth. God to him was totally transcendent and had no ontological relations with any of his creation, not least especially Christ.14

Christianity speaks of the possibility of a more complex state of affair than assumed by the notion of radical separation between God and humanity -- so that there is no possibility of doing theology without Christology. An evidence of the notion of ‘shades’ or ‘degrees’ in the complexity of world-human-God relationship is modeled in the way Christ has been perceived in Indian Christian Theology. I am attempting to furnish a very broad sketch of the variety of Indian Christian perception of God-Christ relations as a background for a more detailed appraisal of insights on the same subject from a mystical tradition of Islam.

The Idea of Theo-Anthropos

The notion of God-man is widespread in world religions. Almost every religion has in it the presence of the idea that the divine is borne in some inexplicable ways by the human. Sometimes it is clearly metaphorical as when one assumes that certain characteristics are divine, sacred, or holy. For instance, when these characteristics are perceived as exhibited in an individual enduringly and in a sense in which these are understood to affect the world around in a favorable fashion -- either in an objective sense of effecting something concrete outside such a person [like effecting healing, foretelling, acting as medium in a non-rational manner or simply doing good or saying good to help the people selflessly], exhibiting personal traits, conditions and states which are known to be ‘abnormal’ [like going into trances, hearing voices, seeing visions, or just the simple unconventional behavior, which proceed from such an individual’s horizon to affect, influence, impact others’ horizons] -- or is subjectively perceived to be extra-ordinary -- such an individual is said to be godly, god-bearing, pious or saintly.

The elemental notion of god-bearing individuals may be spoken of in an ontological sense when one perceives a sense in which the individual’s personality appears to alter or fuse in those ‘abnormal’ ‘eccentric’ phases to effect specific outcomes for "the individual in a community of faith" or for the community of faith extraneous to the individual.15 When the fusion of the individual’s personality with the alleged divine being is complete and permanent, such an individual may be said to have actualized the ideal state of union with the divine, which may be reversible or irreversible state of being.

Two basic terms have been used to describe the degrees of union of the divine-human poles in Indian Christian theology, namely, avatara and incaro [incarnation from the Latin verb incarnari]. The word avatara is loosely translated in English as ‘incarnation’, but is a compound of ava (down) and tr (save). Thus the term avatara literally means ‘one who comes down to save’ or simply ‘descent’. The term incaro is also a compound of in (in or into) and cam (flesh). Thus incaro or incarnation means ‘enfleshment’. There are important differences between the two terms, which must be noted. An avatara is one who assumes the form of a creature or man for a specific purpose and once the work is accomplished the reversal occurs; an avatara comes to save the righteous and destroy the sinful; the assumption of creaturely form may be complete or partial. On the other hand, incarnation involves a complete fusion of the ‘contraries’; like avatara the sense of purpose is dominant in the mission and work, but the ‘enfleshment’ affected is irreversible; the underlying purpose of incarnation is to save the sinners, the lost, the oppressed and the poor. The term avatar and incarnation therefore, must be used with these qualifications.

In informal Buddhism the veneration offered to the Buddha and Bodhisatva borders on ‘worship’ according the status of ones in whom the divine is ‘enfleshed’ or the divine ‘descended’ to guide the followers to the desired goal of Buddhism.16 Similarly in Jainism the veneration accorded to the Thirtankaras is similar in its features to the way in which the devotees relate to the Bodhisatvas. Chinese, Japanese religions, Zoroastrianism, Preliterary religions also contain such ideas.17

Indian Christian theologians recognized the centrality of the notion of incarnation as God bearing man or God-man and have given it due consideration in their theologies. Some in their attempt to show the nature of the fusion go on to the extreme of completely idealizing Christ or reducing him to the predominantly universal, cosmic, nirguna or infinite role, while the others radically delimit deity in the historical finitude and particularity of the man Jesus.

1. Indian Christian Theology and God-man/Christ Relationship

Let me begin with a provocative assertion. It sounds cruel, but it is true. The majority within Indian Christianity does not exhibit theological creativity. This means that a large number of Christians follow the traditional beliefs of their antecedents, churches or mission bodies that led them to Christianity. The indigenous theological/christological thinking has largely been the initiative of individual theologians -- lay or theologically trained -- and not the pews. Theological creativity has not been a broad-based movement. It has largely been an elite function. It therefore, lacks a widespread critique of traditional theology.

Christians by and large have remained aloof to the challenge of reviewing or re-conceiving their faith in God and Christ in terms of the local or ambient faiths. But this is not to suggest that there is no Indian theology. There have been and still are outstanding individuals in all the major traditions of Christianity who have contributed and are contributing to theological thinking in the context of the religious traditions of India.

These theologies have ranged from the traditional absolute and exclusive positions to relativised image of Christ in the context of the plurality of faiths. I am, below, reviewing the understandings of a few selected theologians on the idea of God-man.

The chalcedonian formula (CE 451) emphasized the idea of ‘fully God and fully man’.18 Generally speaking thus, Christology has been viewed in Christianity from two extremes ends humanity/particularity and divinity/universality. Alexandrian and Antiochian positions representing these positions were concerned to show Christ’s authentic divinity by stressing that he was both fully God and fully man and yet was an integrated personality. The former conceived of the ‘priority’ of the pre-existing Christ as logos descending. The latter begins with the true human aspect and posits an ascent Christology. Both of these trends are visible prominently or faintly in Indian Christology.

i) Priority of Humanity: Ascent Christology

Samartha represents Indian theology and Christology done in the context of the Hindu philosophy19 and the global trend toward some sort of relativity.20 He thus predictably presents the relativised image of Christ in pressing for a sense of mystery about God. Samartha raised three basic questions:21 i) Is Christ Lord of all? ii) Is not the manner in which we use the word Lord, developed in the west, where religious pluralism was not a significant factor? He finds a basis for a paradigm suited for religiously plural milieu in the concept of "the Mystery".22 The image of God as the eternal Mystery always remains larger than any local conception of God.

Christ of Samartha, therefore, is not to be made Out to be absolutely singular manifestation of the Mystery and thus his caution against "Jesuology" and "Christomonism". A "theocentric Christology," is to him desirable for it gives the rightful priority to God.23 The priority of the Mystery over particular manifestations may be identified with the priority of God over Jesus in Biblical theology where Christ appears functionally subservient to God through the unity of will, purpose and obedience.24 Such a Christ then becomes a model of Christian unity of will, purpose and obedience of God.

P. Chenchiah (1886-1959) presents a unique image of Christ as the Product of Theo-Anthropos (God-Man)25 Jesus Christ is the starting point of theology and not Mystery. It is hardly surprising that Chenchiali’s fundamental concern chronologically prior to Samartha, however, is not to address the problem of pluralism, but rather to attempt to understand the mystery of Christ-God relationship in the background of the dominant evolutionary theory.

Essential to Chenchiah’s idea is the notion that man is evolving towards Christic perfection. Christ is the model first fruit of a new order of beings; a being that had not been in existence before. This being cannot be bound by sin, karma, and death and essentially participates in the nature of God. But he is not God himself; he is God in relation to man. He is not God or man, the son or the Son of God, or a God-man, but is the result or the outcome of God and man. Man also following Jesus can become like him, a product of the coming together of God and man through the Holy Spirit.

ii) Priority of Divinity: Descent Christology

K C Sen (1838-1884) spoke of God in aspects of God in Himself and God for us. The latter was identified with the logos, the agent of creation, Lord who was born as Jesus in the fullness of time. Brahmabandhab Upadhyaya (1861-1907) speaks of the transcendent Brahma, the sat, and Eternal logos, the cit. The former is nirgun and infinite and compare with the idea of God-in-Himself and the latter is sagun and allows relations and is identifiable with the idea of God-for-us. The cit as a pre-existential reality is actualized in the God-man Jesus Christ.

Though his exegesis of the brahma sutra 1:1.2, Panikker (b. 1918) appears to present an idea similar to Upadhyaya and Sen. But the balance between pre-existential cit and actualized God-man experiences a tilt in favor of the absolute priority of the cosmic, universal Christ in Panikker’s later writings. Panikker clearly rejects the idea of trinity in favor of theandric (divine-human) to refer to the actuality of ontological unity modeled in Christ Jesus. Humanity on their part, ascend to realize this ideal theandrism from ‘below’.

Conceptually though, the ideal Christology would be one which balances the cosmic, infinite, pre-existential logos [word/thought] with the historical, particular, finite actuality [of man Jesus]. Demonstration of such a complex fusion could only be made if this is done in the context of a framework that will enable the polarities and contradictions to remain without sacrificing the ontological integrity of the notion of God-man.

Though, Islam is generally understood to be anti-incarnational the ideas of the imam in the Shia sects, the idea of the Mahdi in Mahdawism, the ideas of sainthood, poles, pirs, mujawirs and murshids, and places such as tombs of the saints and dargahs are deemed to be infused with certain amount of the sacred. But above all, the idea of alinsan al-kamil in theoretical mysticism smacks of the internalization of the notions of God bearing-man or God-man, indeed an idea that transforms the very notion of God. Divine. Being.

2. The Promise of Christological Thinking in the Context of the Idea of al-insan al-kamil

I have observed that one way to approach the issue of Christology in Islamic context would be to seek out sources in Islam as it grew beyond the sanitized environs of Arabia and came in contact with peoples from other lands, religions and philosophies. In particular one must look for evidence of thinkers and writers who upon their encounters with Greek philosophy represented Islam in newer philosophical terms and whose legacies were continued by theoretical mysticism. One must ask the question as to whether these newer systems of thought and Islam as it got filtered through them perceived God-man; theology-anthropology poles differently than did their conservative antecedents living within the sterile Semitic environments.

a) Relation between the Divine-human Realms in Arab Philosophy: The Emerging Possibility of the Idea of al-insan al-kamil (the Perfect Man)

Aristotelian worldview dominated Arab philosophy primarily because it provided an apparatus to doubt the prophetic-mystical routes to knowledge and to shore up the rational epistemology. Arab philosophy was essentially Islamic and so it could not have remained purely Aristotelian. The Aristotelian worldview was closed and posited fixed boundaries around the universe. It had no space for the supposed intelligible or divine world apart from the sensible and rational world of humanity. Thus there was no possibility of conceiving of the a real objective and truly existent transcendent God and the ‘potential’ realities existing in transcendent region of the Divine for the simple reason that ‘potential/ subtle/cognitive realities’ apart from the form, shape or body were inconceivable.

Arab philosophy after al-Kindi26 [al-Farabi,27 Ibn Sina28 and Ibn Rushd 29] gradually adopted a synthetic worldview incorporating Platonic idea of the existence of the intelligible world existing separate from the sensible world for three reasons: i) To make space for the possibility of preserving the transcendence of the Divine: ii) To create a notional space for the prophetic-mystical epistemology; iii) To make the philosophers’ rational knowledge of the entire reality possible. Subscription to the first two purposes was basic to the Islamic identity of the Arab philosophers, while the third purpose was fundamental to philosophical epistemology. The Platonic worldview distinguishing the Intelligible and sensible worlds made space for the realization of the first two purposes. while the Aristotelian worldview conceiving the reality as existing within the purview of human rationality in a synthetic framework of form and essence made the rational epistemology possible. The Aristotelian strain in Arab philosophy conceived of the reality as being essentially synthetic and preserved the possibility of rational perception of such a reality occurring in layers or degrees of causes and their effects with in the delimited universe. The Platonic strain however, preserved the Islamic idea of the transcendent in relation to the ontologically different world of humanity.

The famous Islamic philosopher, traditionalist and mystic. al-Ghazzali critiqued Arab philosophers for their pretense in assuming that the reality could be known by humanity through their faculty of reason30 Arab philosophical epistemology was to al Ghazzali radically reductionistic, for it involved a low view of the human nature and the human potential for knowledge of and relations with the transcendental realities beyond what the rational aspect of man allowed. He posited a multi-faculty human soul mirroring a multi-layered reality possessing multi-layered epistemic value. In his view of humanity, rational faculty of man was radically relativised as a lower faculty that linked with a reality that was lower than the transcendental object of knowledge. In a simplified scheme, his multi-faculty humanity possessed broadly speaking three layered faculties that connected with the three broad divisions of the entire affair, namely, sensible, rational and transcendental -- the highest being the transcendental spirit of humanity that was capable of connecting with the Other by virtue of being in possession of a core that corresponded to the Other.

This model relativized the philosophers and philosophical systems. They were legitimate ways of acquiring knowledge, but of the reality that was lower in its truth/ reality-value in relation to the transcendental object, namely God. Prophets and saints assumed a higher place in relation to the philosophers, as those who shook off the encumbrance of rationality and their lower selves to rise higher to link with the source of their transcendental spirit in an ascending fashion, as it were.

b) The Idea of al-insan al-kamil

Al-Ghazzali is known to be the most important thinker prior to Ibn Arabi who attempted to explain the tradition of the prophet, which is believed to be speaking of human correspondence with God. Masataka Takeshita has in his work examined some of the works of al-Ghazzali to recover his thinking on this issue of correspondence.31 The tradition in question is as follows: "whoever knows himself knows God." Takeshita examines some of the major works of al-Ghazzali like ihya’ ulum al-din, imla’ asma’ allah al-husna, mishkat al-anwar and al-madnun al-saghir and concludes that: There are two types of correspondences:

i) Moral or ethical correspondence -- where it is possible to find certain similarities in God and man since like God man also possesses the qualities of ‘goodness’ and ‘mercy’ etc. and;

ii) Correspondences that cannot or are not allowed to be spoken out -- these lie in the spirit breathed into man by God and thus belongs to the transcendent locus; this then is the reason why mystical knowledge and union with God becomes possible. Al-Ghazzali also presents man as a miniature of the universe [universe itself is deemed to be perfect]. Man relates to the universe as a microcosm relates to the macrocosm. This is so because man combines in himself both the characteristics of the transcendental world and the phenomenal world. Man is therefore, a synthetic being.

The idea of man as the microcosm imaging the macrocosm is significant. The macrocosm is naturally differentiated since there is the idea of the ‘higher’ or spiritual world and its symbol, the ‘lower’ or the visible world. Man as the microcosm likewise contains within him the differentiation of aspects that correspond to the lower and aspects that correspond to the higher worlds, just as illustrated through the idea of the multi-faculty soul of man above.

Al-Ghazzali clearly subscribed to the view that there was something special in man, namely the image or spirit that corresponded with God. This image could be enhanced by the human ascent involving the transcendental spirit to the transcendental realms through hierarchically appropriating the characteristics or the attributes of God. The end of this ‘upward’ movement was posited to be the experience of the mystical union with God -- described by the term fana’ (loss of self-consciousness) or fana’ al-fana’ (loss of the consciousness of fana’). After this experience of the realization of the unity of human spirit with the transcendental object, the saint or the mystic returned or descended to the world of phenomena.

Al-Ghazzali also addressed the question of the source and the nature of the transcendental spirit in humanity. The source was clearly identified with the process of the divine inbreathing, which effected the formation of man. The nature of the spirit was thus such that it naturally inclined towards its source namely God. It knew itself and its creator because it was the ‘spirit of God.’

AI-Ghazzali however, rejected the idea of descent of God. If mystics like al-Hallaj made such claims, they were not necessarily wrong; they were simply in illusion or were confusing an upward movement of man with the downward movement of God. This was an important point for al-Ghazzali, for as a Muslim he had to reject any suggestions of the acceptance of the Christian idea of incarnation (hulul)32

The idea of al-insan al-kamil however, was developed far beyond its antecedent ideas of ‘spirit’, image etc. in al-Ghazzali. To generalize one may say that al-insan al-kamil was a synthetic being. He combined two diametrically opposite aspects of the divine reality -- the sensible and spiritual worlds; sensible/rational and spiritual faculties. This means that the divine reality is made up of such a synthesis, which is reflected in the al-insan al-kamil. This metaphysical being is the model and also the object of the saints’ emulation and indeed the archetype of the awaited world restorer, the eschatological Messiah (mahdi) whose task will be to vitalize the religion in preparation for the coming of Jesus of the Qur’an in the final hour.

The questions now are: Who is the metaphysical-pre-existent and eschatological-future messiah? What is the role and purpose of the al-insan al-kamil -- is his role to do with descent, ascent or both? What then could be the nature of Christological confession?

i) The Model of the Entire Affair and the Images of al-insan al-kamil

Ibn ‘Arabi employed the term al-amr (entire affair) to refer to the totality of wujud (existence/being). He posited that al-amr had normative polarity within it, namely al-haqq (the Truth) and al-khalq (Creation).33 He described al-haqq by the term al-wujud al-mahd (sheer being [SB])34 SB paralleled the idea of God described by Michael Sells as ‘God-in-himself’ or that aspect of God that is absolute and unconditional essence -- remote and mysterious; wrathful and majestic.35 This idea equals the notions of sat in Upadhyaya. brahma in Panikker, "mystery" in Samartha. SB does not allow any differentiation; it is impossible to say anything meaningful or positive concerning it. It was important to hold on to this supposition in order to preserve the notion of tawhid (unity) of God. But to make space for the possibility of creation the following supposition was necessary.

The notion of al-khalq, unlike al-haqq, had a polarity within it, namely, al-imkan al-mahd (sheer possibility [SP]) and al- ‘adam al-mahd (sheer non-existence [SN]).36 SN was a mere conceptual category to refer to objects that might not exist in SP as fragments of thoughts or intentions of the divine to create or actualize. It was the idea of SP that was central to his ontological model.37

SP contained in itself a tension between already and not yet; actualized and possible; knowledge or thought of what could, should and would exist as a concrete image of the prior thought. SP as the state of being harboring the thoughts of existences to be transmuted from possibilities to actualities may be compared to the notion of God-for-us, the ishvara of Hinduism in Panikker, and the notion of cit in Upadhyaya. The limitation of S J Samartha’s position however, is that he does not posit any ‘middle being’ like the kind Upadhyaya and Panikker posit and is inherent in the idea of SP. This lands his system into all sorts of philosophical problems. He jumps from the Absolute Unconditional Mystery to a notion of ‘fragmented particular manifestations’ of the mystery -- Jesus Christ being one among many. The philosophical problems in not assuming a ‘middle reality’ like SP, cit or ishvara are: that the unity and transcendence of the Mystery or SB or sat cannot be fully preserved; one will of necessity suppose that the Mystery, sat, or SB contains all the differentiation that one encounters in the universe -- a position that would jeopardize the notion of absolute unity. The idea of SP, cit or ishvara was therefore, a philosophical necessity. In the case of Islamic philosophical mysticism it was also a religious necessity to suppose a ‘middle reality’ in order to safeguard the notion of tawhid (Unity of God).

The idea of SP is therefore, significant. Its nature and coming into being may now be discussed in more details in relation to its connection with humanity and not least with Jesus. SP is as Ibn ‘Arabi has noted in one of his shorter treatises, the aspect of the God which faces the world. It is the face described by the term al-jamal (beauty) in contrast to the face that is described by the term al-jalal (utter majesty [transcendence supposed in the Arabic word al-haqq and the compound al-wujud al-mahd (SB)]. SP as the jamal aspect of God is also supposed to be the facet of God that is potentially and actually immanent. This is so because SP denotes two states:

• The state of the immanent God-for-us which contains within it the thought of the totality of existents prior to their creation. It is the ‘pregnant’ God ‘bearing’ the worlds to be in his intention, thought or the spirit. This may be said to be al-khalq in potentiality from the ontological point of view.

• The state of immanence where the spirit, thought of the God-for-us is actualized or individuates through receiving concrete independent being through the spirit’s all comprehensive activity. This may be said to be al-khalq in actuality from the ontological perspective.

The Qur’anic language of the form-spirit is used with reference to the cosmic becoming of al-khalq in Ibn’ Arabi.38 The point is that al-khalq as pure thought of the worlds to be [SP] receives its being as the actualized worlds in the same way as Jesus came into being. The spirit/word/thought that made the actualization of Jesus possible is not just a supreme microcosmic example, but indeed to be identified with the SP, God-for-us, as the ultimate cause of the entire creation.

In the Qur’anic reference to the creation of Adam, spirit [breath] infused the form of Adam created by God. Breath only brought life to a ‘thing’ that had already been formed. The radical mystical perspective assumes that the form is never independent from the spirit. Concrete being of Jesus and the worlds is another state of the spirit which actualizes from ‘nothing.’ effects that existed as thought or intention, but now receive concrete shape. Jesus is the actualization of the same Jesus in thought of the worlds to be and the thought of the historical-particular being.39

The Spirit was Jesus as Thought who received actualization in the form of a particular historical human kind, "a living being from clay". This Jesus as the form of the human kind was the intangible thought existing as SR symbolized by the clay mold in existential perspective. It was this thought that in some mysterious way became a living tangible existent. The conception of Jesus was neither sexual nor asexual. It was unique. He was the Spirit come into being. The material that brought intangible thought of Jesus’ form Into tangible existence was "Imaginary or Spiritual".

ii) Al-insan al-kamil as the logos, Seal of the universal Sainthood

Jeffrey in his translation40 suggests that in the shajarat al-kawn (the Tree of the Universe),41 Ibn ‘Arabi was trying to make a contribution to the general trend towards the glorification of Muhammad and was attempting to enhance his image beyond the Christian doctrine of logos.42

The treatise itself posits Allah as uniquely single and absolutely whole. This is an idea that corresponds with the idea of SB explicated above. In this light, the seen and the unseen universes of the plural existents were posited in two senses: i) In their primary objectification as the word kun (the creative command ‘Be’). Kun was pictured as the ‘exhaled breath’, which was the objectification of the ‘inner essence’ called the spirit or thoughts of the existents of the worlds to be. The idea of kun is, as suggested by Jeffrey, corresponds with the Christian notion of logos, the Word of God, the agent of creation, the pre-existential Christ. This logos is Islamized through the use of the name Muhammad.

The name Muhammad here is at best a mere traditional label referring to the pre-existential archetype containing the intention or thoughts of the possible existents.

It is known that an attempt to raise Muhammad’s status above the other prophets had been underway from the beginning of the development of the Muslim Creed. Thus for instance, we know that Muslim exegetes, traditionalists, popular preachers and storytellers contributed to the growth of the prophet’s veneration.43 It appears impossible to demonstrate it. given the constraints of space here, but I think it is plausible that Jeffrey’s position was informed by Wensinck’s work.44

The central place accorded to Muhammad and the use of theological-traditional language and structure in Sufism is hardly surprising. The presence of traditional role models, conventional vocabulary and structure is perhaps essential to determine the identity of any religio-spiritual movement. A Christian mystic is most unlikely to see a vision of Muhammad or is least likely to use Islamic symbols to convey the secrets of the world of experience. While Muslim mystics may have visions of Adam, Jesus, Abraham and Muhammad, since these are part of their conventional theological structure, they will naturally think or speak of Muhammad, at least apparently, in more familiar terms.

It appears that embellishing the radical worldview with conservative elements was perhaps necessary if. Ibn ‘Arabi wished to remain a Muslim.45 Early Muslim thinkers defined the essence of Islam and the borders of the Muslim community to help decide who could be counted as a Muslim. Thus the emphasis was placed not on the infidels outside Islam but heretics or freethinkers within Islam. The open form of freethinking existed only for a relatively short period between the 9th - 10th centuries. From the 11th century onwards it is harder to find radical ideas being expressed in clear prose. Radical ideas are rather presented in poetry, philosophical parables, sufi-metaphysical ideas and so on; for these modes of communication were safer for the writers. Ibn ‘Arabi’s style of intermixing radical elements with traditional language, models and theological structure could perhaps be explained in this background as an echo of freethinking controlled by a rigorous interpenetration of the old and the new.

How does one delineate the elements of ‘freethinking’ or ‘liberation’ in Ibn ‘Arabi? The conservative, Mu‘atazili and Zahiri critique of interiority, anthropomorphic tendencies and the idea of incarnation (hulul). notwithstanding. Sufism proceeded to develop beyond an ascetic cast, in order to integrate more conceptual dimensions involving the notions of divine immanence, human nearness with the divine (uns) and mystic union. The suggestion that Ibn ‘Arabi, in the 12th-l3th century, was making a Sufi contribution to the trend towards the glorification of Muhammad may be partially true. He also might well have intended to show as part of his ‘freethinking’ or liberal design, how humanity. among all creation was capable of gaining perfect knowledge in his attempt to carve out an alternate to the traditional idea of prophecy which ended with Muhammad.

The alternate to the traditional idea of prophecy was thought possible through the ‘transcendental spirit’ identified also with the faculty of the heart (al-qalb).46 He employed two terms -- fu’ad and qalb in this treatise, which have both been translated into English as ‘heart’. Al-fu’ad refers to the physical organ called the heart [of man or animals]. The term contains the idea of pulsation, inversion, and transmutation and in this sense, is similar to the root idea of al-qalb. Al-fu’ ad can also refer to the pericardium in contrast to al-qalb as the core. Metaphorically then, al-fu’ad points to the intellect issuing from the soul and is more akin to the faculty to which Arab philosophers gave primacy and hence symbolizes an aspect of man corresponding to a lower reality. In contrast, al-qalb, was identified with the site containing and indeed corresponding to the very divine qualities.

While it appears that Ibn ‘Arabi conceptually held that knowledge was possible in all human beings, he could not say that that was true actually. He thus, needed to show that whilst the most intimate knowledge was a preserve for all humanity, there were degrees of knowledge, exhibited by the prophets and most importantly in the saints. The doctrine of sainthood is complex and it is not my purpose to discuss that here, because such works have already been done generally to explicate the idea of sainthood 47 and the idea of sainthood in relation to Jesus in particular by Andreas D’Souza. We know also that one of concerns of Ibn ‘Arabi was to show how knowledge gained by the saints was of higher order than that gained by prophets. Ibn ‘Arabi got around the problem of traditional reaction by positing that Muhammad also had two levels of knowledge -- one, prophetic -- for the umma; two saintly -- for the saints. This then makes it possible to speak of an alternate and a ‘superior’ way to God [though veiled], whose leadership is not in Muhammad the historical prophet, but in Jesus the seal of the universal sainthood.

The problem is that Ibn ‘Arabi is using the name Muhammad within the structure of his ‘liberalism’ -- i.e. when speaking of the idea of sainthood. Why does he use the name Muhammad where he should have used the name Jesus, the seal of the universal sainthood?

Firstly, in answer to this question we may say that the name Muhammad is used in the treatise in a notional sense only; for anthropology and its relations with the divine or the idea of sainthood is the focus of the work. Couched in the treatise is the concern to show how sainthood is a higher category than prophecy. That is to show that the saints possess truer knowledge because of their proximity with divinity and indeed their pre-existential identity with the divinity. We know from the work of Andreas D’Souza that Jesus was identified with the ideal state of sainthood -- the perfect goal of all the saints. Thus Jesus is called the "Seal of the universal Sainthood".

In being the Seal, Jesus is the end and plentitude of perfect knowledge of God. In a system of thought where ‘knowledge’ and ‘being’ cannot be differentiated, then this means that Jesus was identified with that aspect of the perfection of God called Beauty (Jamal) or God-for-us.

Secondly, as pointed out above, though Jesus like Muhammad is the part of the traditional structure of role models, for any input to be accepted as Islamic it was important to show it in relation to Muhammad. I am suggesting therefore, that the name Jesus was deliberately replaced by the name Muhammad in order to seek legitimacy for this new and liberal input. In speaking of Muhammad here it is his sainthood or the supposed hidden connection with the idea of sainthood that is being referred to and not his prophet-hood. The name Muhammad is thus used in a non-sectarian, trans-religious and symbolic sense to refer to a higher, deeper and essential God-man correspondence exhibited by sainthood. The seal of this alternate system is not Muhammad, but Jesus.

iii) Al-Khidr 48 the Supreme Saint-instructor

The Qur’anic account of Moses and his mysterious companion is undoubtedly, the source of Muslim traditions about Moses and al-Khidr.49 Traditionally the mysterious teacher has been identified with one al-Khidr.50 The accounts of al-Khidr, the hidden saint-instructor abounds in Uwaysi hagiography as well.51 Ibn ‘Arabi includes this tradition of Moses-al-Khidr to support the idea of the superiority of the knowledge of the saints over the prophets. In the story therefore, al-Khidr, the quintessence of sainthood [a traditionally lesser position in relation to the place of the prophets in esoteric Islam] assumes the role of the primary interlocutor contributing to the cognitive development of Moses the prophet.52

History of al-Tabari indicates a number of versions of the story of al-Khidr and its connection with the Qur’an 18:61-83.53 Contrary to Ibn Ishaq, al-Tabari favors the story where al-Khidr is believed to be in existence from before Moses. Thus, certain uniqueness is claimed for al-Khidr and it is easier to speak of the superiority of sainthood over prophecy.

The root of the word khdr contains the idea of being fresh, sweet, pleasant, delicate, refreshing and green. The term khadir for instance, refers to a place having young green crop; al-khadiir, al-khadira and al-khudra likewise means "a green and rough herbage or leguminous plant . . . it rises to a height of a cubit and fills the mouth of a camel". It may also be a reference to a hardy variety plant which does not dry up in extreme dry summer but a plant that scurvies the summer and provide sustenance to life in hard times.54 In mystical Islam, the road to the stage of intimacy (uns) with God-for-us is reckoned to be lonely, for not many undertake this journey prior to death in a voluntary sort of way. Al-Khidr is that aspect of God-for-us who accompanies the murid, disciple and constantly instructs them in a way that appeals to their heart.

Concluding Remarks

I have observed that Jesus of the Christian faith does not appear to match the recurring types of ‘warning’, ‘leading people to the right path’, ‘leading people to the worship of one God’ entirely. The conflict between Christians and Muslims is historic in that it goes back to the times of Muhammad with the Christians of his time. The nature of the conflict unlike in the case of the Jews-Muslim conflict was not political but dogmatic. It concerned the nature of God.

It will be superfluous to show how impertinent these Christian dogmas of ‘the son of God or trinity’ have been and continue to be so. It appears to me that Christians who continue to use these symbols in Muslim contexts have not yet internalized the meaning and the purpose of the cross.

The cross is not a symbol of conquest, but rather a means by which Jesus, the man actualized the highest possible state of intimacy (uns) with his pre-existent or creation-generating state. Jesus sets the model of the human ‘ascent’ to God -- prior to death in the heart or spirit and after death in an involuntary sort of way. This ascent necessary involves being first swallowed by non-being [SN]; for no one can approach God-in-himself and preserve one’s sense of individuality. Uns is realized therefore, in relation to Jesus as SP and not SB. The prospect of meeting the Majesty of the divinity touches off an involuntary sense of awe, which increases in intensity until one loses a sense of one’s independent self. The self fades, but does not cease, in the aura of the divine Majesty.

On the other hand, Jesus’ ascent through the resurrection and new immortal life truly re-enacts the miracle of the primordial act of the actualization of existents in a sort of ‘upward’ or ‘backward’ sense -- that is just as creative aspect of Jesus who brought humanity into being through ‘the Spirit or the Thought’, the word kun -- out of the recesses of the darkness of non-being [SN], his return through resurrection, potentially leads humanity back to the state of uns in him. It exhibits that Jesus as the ‘Thought’ or ‘Spirit’ or SP of the worlds, beings and existents remains immutable despite the obvious flux, decay, death and passing away. The immutability of Jesus as the SP harbors primarily a message of hope of life and not judgment. Jesus who is proclaimed as living through his experience of non-being [SN] is the pre-existent SP and the eschatological mahdi -- as one who pre-exists, he actualizes existence, but as one who functions in the capacity of the eschatological mahdi, he actualizes the ascent of humanity.

Islamic Mysticism interestingly conceives of the pre-existential and eschatological state of SP in ‘human’ terms. Here humanity receives a radical reification. True humanity is not that of ‘living in flesh’ but ‘living as Spirit’. True humanity is realized, reached, or received in human ascent after the model of Jesus who first ‘descended’ and then ‘ascended’. It has to do with cognition, but not that of the rational and intellectual kind, but one that is located in the seat of being -- the heart or the transcendental spirit. Jesus as the SP is therefore, not just the God-for-us, but al-insan al-kamil. He is the source of life of all beings, a model of the saints who seek to become like him. This Jesus outstrips the close-minded domestication of the institutional Christianity and breaks from the shackles of dogmatic caricatures. He is truly God-man or theo-anthropos -- not, in the sense of combining the ‘flesh’ and the ‘spirit’, but in showing that the true theo-anthropos is Spirit or Thought of its actualization manifesting as concrete beings in time, history and space. Al-insan al-kamil is therefore, truly universal.

I pointed out above that Jesus was viewed as the quintessential saint because he harbored in him the end and plentitude of divine knowledge and thus in an external or esoteric sense stands perpetually as a yardstick of perfect knowledge of God and since knowledge and being are inseparable in the system of thought examined, he is the embodiment of divine perfection in relation to humanity and the rest of the creation. He is the God-for-us who effects the creation by virtue of the externalization of his breath/ thought/spirit expressed in the word kun and also remains the face of SB, the divine essence or mystery that stands facing humanity and the rest of the creation effected by him in all his jamal (beauty).

Humanity on their part can emulate the model sainthood of Jesus through receiving his ever-flowing effusion of al-jamal in al-qalb or the faculty of the ‘transcendental spirit’. Theoretically, man may be conceived of being the only creature capable of ‘exhausting’ the immense range and wealth of al-jamal, but in as much these graces process into the heart in an ever changing and ever transforming energy, even the perfect hearts may not hold the entirety of these graces. Thus the goal of intimacy (uns) and developmental knowledge (ma‘rifah) remains perpetually unfulfilled. Jesus, the supreme Saint,. everlastingly remains near and yet distant; friend/brother -- master/lord, which is the logic our unending devotion of him.

The Qur’anic story of the mysterious instructor of Moses, identified as al-Khidr in Islamic tradition is revolutionary in the sense that al-insan al-kamil is experienced as the Supreme Saint, al-shaykh al-akbar engaging with the saints or disciples (shaykhs or murids) as their instructor, murshid. He sensitizes their hearts (al-qalb) and enables them to transcend the boundaries of the sensible, the rational and the literal to deeper, hidden or higher objects of knowledge and states until one reaches the state of utmost intimacy (uns) and union with Jesus, the insan al-kamil. This Jesus is not just one who ‘descends’ but is also the one who leads the murids in their ascent.

This paper raises several relevant questions. Some of them pertain to hermeneutics, while the others more directly to the relationship of Christian faith with Islam or visions within the pale of Islam, such as theoretical mysticism. For instance, there are the hermeneutical questions of whether the image of Christ emerging through the glasses of Islamic mysticism is what the Bible or Biblical authors ‘intended’; If the purpose of the crystallization of the supposed authorial intention or purpose is to connect the ancient and the present ‘viewpoints’ or the worldviews, one may ask if such a possibility of a pure state of intention possible to extract at all, or is it not that the reader often always creates’ at least some elements of the supposed ‘intentions’. If the reader has some role in creating the authorial ‘intention’ then why must one suppose that such an extraction originates fully from the authors/Bible and not from the readers?

Could then one say that the images of Christ that the readers perceive form the authentic meanings for them? This is a problematic suggestion. A way around this problem would be something that Christian theologians need to solve. That is, having made one’s image of Christ for instance, in a given context, the theologian then needs to show how this image reconciles, in broad terms, with the mainline ‘conservative’ or traditional’ components of Christianity. This is crucial not because the theologians have the fear of being branded as a heretic, but because they need to work against ‘freethinking individualism’. They need to bring their conclusions before the community, lay their arguments bare and clear, and enable the community to see how their thinking matches with the ‘traditional’ and the key ongoing components of the faith. Theological creativity must never be allowed for the sake of creativity.

One way to show continuity between the traditional and creative; ongoing and newer components would be to suggest criteria for estimating the new inputs. For example, one might suggest that if the creative inputs follow that broad theological/ontological structure of the Christian faith, integrate the key role models of their faith in the new structure and their inputs can be shown to be informed directly or indirectly by their own ‘conservative’ tradition and the text, the Bible, they could be understood to be in line with Christianity.

This is where therefore the role of hermeneutics becomes significant. For instance, one might ask if the image of Christ presented in this paper corresponds with the image of Christ in line with the mainline theological structure and whether it is seen to be directly or indirectly issuing from the Bible or being informed by the it. All of these questions and issues need a full-length paper. But, just as an instance, one might suggest with regard to the first question of whether the image of Christ corresponds with the broad theological/ontological design of Christianity that for the image of Christ to be recognized as authentic the following components of the traditional theological structure will need to be taken seriously:

i) That, God has created the world and that one is not supposing an absolute identity between the creator and the creation;

ii) That, the creation was brought about Out of nothing; God is not the material cause of the creation;

iii) That, Christ as the Word of God has the key role in the bringing about of the creation.

How does the theological structure of the theoretical mysticism I have taken as the context for reflections in this paper correspond with this Biblical worldview? How do the Biblical and Islamic mystical horizons meet? How does one show that the conservative resources of the theologians inform contextual theological creativity? These questions as well the question of relevance of such creativity will need to be addressed separately.

 

End Notes

1. David Emmanuel Singh, "Islam as a Context for Christian Theologizing: A Preliminary Search", in Ban galore Theological Forum. UTC, Bangalore, Vol. XXXII. No. 2. December 2000, pp. 60-72.

2. If the term means being skillful, quick, witty, self-aware, gifted, ingenious proactive.

3. Suras 39:71-72:40:47-50:43:74; 55:43-44; 79:35-39; 2:9-11 and 57:12; 69:21-24; 78:31-35; 89:30 and so on

4. Sura 89:21-30

5. Sura 24:35 ff.

6. Sura 13:12-13; 17:44; 24:41-46

7. Sura 25:63; 18:23-24

8. Sura 4:79, 85

9. Sura 9:129

10. Sura 23:16

11. Sura 51:58

12. Sura 55:17

13. David Emmanuel Singh, "Integrative Political Ideology of Mawlan Mawdudi and Islamization of the Muslim Masses in the Indian Subcontinent" in South Asia, vol. XXIII, no. 1 (2000), pp. 129-148.

14. See Robin Boyd, Introduction to Indian Christian Theology. (Delhi: ISPCK, 1989), pp. 15-23.

15. Outside the community of faith such ‘spiritually endowed’ persons would be considered ‘mad’.

16. See Har Daynl, The Bodhisattva Doctrine in Buddhist Sanskrit Literature. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidas. 1975).

17. Ishanand Vempany, Krishna and Christ: In the light of Some of the Fundamental Concepts and Themes of the Bhagavad Gita and the New Testament (Anand: Gujarat Sahitya Prakashan, 1988), pp. 236-7.

18. J. Neuner and J. Dupuis, eds. The Christian Faith, pp. 437.

19. S.J. Samartha, "The Lordship of Christ and religious pluralism" in Christ’s Lordship and Religious Pluralism (New York: Orbis Book, 1980), pp. 19-36. See also "the Kingdom of God in a religiously plural world" in Ecumenical Review, WCC. vol. 32, no. 2, 1980 and "Indian realities and the wholeness of Christ" in Missiology, vol. X, no. 3 July, 1982. See also "commitment and tolerance in a pluralistic society" in NCCR. February 1986. For Samartha’s Earlier Position on Pluralism. see "Unbound Christ: Toward a Christology in India Today" in Asian Christian Theology: Emerging Themes, ed. Douglas J. Elwood (Philadelphia: The Westminster Press, 1980). pp. 145-160.

20. Ibid. p. 23.

21. Ibid.

22. Samartha’s doctoral work was on the great Hindu philosopher. Radhakrishnan. S. 3. Samartha. "The Cross and the Rainbow: Christ in a Multi-religious Culture" in Christian Response to the Multiform Faith in India in India (Bangalore: UTC), p. 30.

23. Christian Response to the Multiform Faith in India in India p. 37.

24. John 3:16:2 Corinthians 5:19

25. Indian Christian Theology, pp. 144-164,

26. Al-Kindi ‘s Metaphysics - A Translation of Ya ‘qub Ibn Ishaq al-Kindi’s Treatise ‘On First Phylosophy’ (fi al-falsafa al-‘ula). Introduction and comments by A. L. Ivry, (Albany: State University of New York Press. 1974).

27. Al-Farabi, The Existence and Definition of Philosophy, trans. D. M. Dunlop, repr. Iraq vol. XIII, part 2, (British School of Archaeology in Iraq. 1951).

28. Avicenna and the Aristotelian Tradition: Introduction to Reading Avicenna’s Philosophical Works, Dimitri Gutas. (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1988).

29. Ibn Rushd’s Metaphysics. A Translation with Introduction of Ibn Rushd’s Commentary on Aristotle’s Metaphysics. Book lam, Charles Genequand, (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1984). See translated text in pp. 59-210.

30. Al-Ghazzali’s Mishkat al-Anwar, [The Niche for Lights], trans. H. T. Gairdner, (London: Royal Asiatic Society, 1924). The Arabic source has also been consulted, mishkat al-anwar (Cairo: 1383/1964), pp. 41-90 [henceforth mishkat].

31. Ibn ‘Arabi’s Theory of the Perfect Man and its Place in the History of Islamic Thought (Tokyo: Institute for the study of languages and cultures of Asia and Africa, 1987).

32. Mishkat, pp. 61-62.

33. Ibn ‘Arabi, Futuhat al-Makkiya, (Cairo: 1274H) [henceforth futuhat], II., p. 426.

34. SB may be understood in three senses explained by M. Sells. SB is ‘Being’ beyond human language thus necessitating silence, or ‘Being’ in Itself as opposed to It being in creatures or as ineffable being causing an un-resolvable dilemma of transcendence. That is, though it is beyond names, in order to say that It is beyond names, It must be given a name.

35. Michael Sells, Mystical Language of Unsaying, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1994).

36. The term mahada means to be sincere or to manifest purity of intention; the term mahuda means to be of pure descent or to be pure. The term ‘sheer’ is used to refer to the quality of something it describes. Thus for instance, al-wujud al-mahd is pure, simple and unmixed being.

37. Ontology in philosophy is "the branch of metaphysics that deals with the nature of Being." In Logic it indicates "a set of entities presupposed by a theory." See Collins English Dictionary, ed. P. Hanks (London/Glasgow: Collins, 1979). The possible things are those that exist as being’s knowledge of them in an undifferentiated form.

38. futuhat II, p. 426. See Sura 2:30-39. Sura 15:29.

39. See for details David Emmanuel Singh’s Foreword to Olaf Schumann’s Jesus the Messiah in Islam forthcoming (Delhi: HMI/ISPCK).

40. Trans. Arthur Jeffrey, studia Islamica (Leiden), 10, 1959, pp. 43-77; 11, 1959, pp. 113-160 [reprinted Lahore: Aziz Publishers, 1980] [henceforth S.].

41. Ibn ‘Arabi, shajarat al-kawn (Cairo: al-Halaby and Sons, 1968/1388) [Henceforth cited as SK], see unpublished translation by David Emmanuel Singh, HMI Library, Hyderabad, India.

42. See S. 44&52. Jeffrey has attributed the motive for the veneration of the prophet "to interpret the significance of their prophet as unique not only in his own community but also in cosmic history." See Ibid. p.45 and 46.

43. See T. Andrae’s Dei person muhammeds in lehre und glauben seiner gemeinde, (Stockholm: 1918) for more details. See also A. 3. Wensinck, The Muslim Creed. Its Genesis and Historical Development, (Cambridge: The Cambridge University Press, 1932). (Henceforth cited as Muslim Creed). Art. 8 pronounces equality of apostleship in general and prohibit the exalting of any one apostle over the other. (Ibid. p. 114. Cf. FA II art. I). Despite this the sects developed their own distinctive preferences, until by the 5th century A. H. when the majority of the Muslims seem to have agreed on Muhammad’s priority over the others. The most prominent evidence for this general consensus is in the doxological statement or the shahadah. (Ibid. See its form being followed by FA II; see arts. 2-7 and 8-10).

44. Muslim Creed

45. Sarah Stroumsa, Freethinkers of Medieval Islam: Ibn al-Rawandi, Abu Bakr al-Razi and their impact on Islamic thought, (Leiden: E. 3. Brill, 1999).

46. The notion of the heart plays an important part in the history of the evolution of the concept of mystic union. The idea that the science of the heart ( ‘ilm al-qulub) produces in the soul, knowledge (ma ‘arifa), which is dynamic [in that it involves the growth of knowledge in a ‘journey’ of the heart to stages (maqamat) and states (ahwal), finally meeting the Truth (al-haqq)] and real [a point rejected by Mu ‘atazilites who presumed a theoretical psychology]. See "tasawwuf" in the shorter ER, p. 581.

47. While Ibn ‘Arabi appears to democratize religious knowledge by identifying humanity as a whole as the site of perfect knowledge, the umma is especially chosen, and within the umma a select few as the perfect earthly example of the archetypal perfect man. The evidence of his claims about himself and his theory of ‘sainthood’ (walaya) [see G T Elmore, Islamic Sainthood in the fullness of time: Ibn al-’Arabi’s book of the Fabulous Gryphon, (Leiden: Brill, 1999). [‘anqa’ mughrib (Cairo: 1954)]

48. See The History of al-Tabari. vol. III, "The Children of Israel," trans. W. M. Brinner, (New York: State University of New York Press, 1991), pp. 1-18, contains the Tale of al-Khidr, the saint and his relation with Moses, the prophet. AI-Khidr oral-Khadir means ‘The Green man’ or ‘the Green’. In the Islamic folklore and also in al-Tabari’s account there is a connection between him and Moses. The idea is based on Surah 18:61-83. In the Qur’an he is called ‘one of Our worshippers, servants’. The sources of the folk-lore and the basis of al-Tabari ‘s account is perhaps to be found in the epic of Gilgamesh, the Alexander Romance and Jewish legend of Elijah. See for further details, n. 1, p. 1 in al-Tabari. For details on the epic of Gilgamesh see-The Epic of Gilgamesh; The Babylonian Epic Poem and Other Texts in Akkadian and Sumerian, Tr and Introd. by A George, (London: The Penguin Press, 1999), pp. 1-100. The story of Moses and al-Khidr parallel with Gilgamesh and Enkidu, Gilgamesh’s counterpart in many respects - see especially pp. 12-21 [competition, conflict and reconciliation-Enkidu accepting Gilgamesh’s supremacy]; pp. 22-29 [expeditions to the forest of Cedar]; pp. 30-38 the dreams]; Pp. 70-100 [wanderings of Gilgamesh, reaching the edge of the world].

49. The Qur’anic reference in Sura 18:65 is as follows: "Then found they one of Our slaves, unto whom We had given mercy from Us. and had taught him knowledge from Our presence." It is this knowledge, which Moses in the Qur’anic account requests the mysterious teacher to teach him. See verse 66.

50. Sahih al-bukhari trans. Muhammad Muhasin Khan (Delhi: Kitab Bhavan, 1984), vol. 4, pp. 402 ff. Text 613.

51. See also Imaginary Muslims, chapters 1-40, pp. 59 if.

52. See also futuhat, III: 70.

53. The History of al-Tabari III. pp. 1-18.

54. E W Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Beirut: Librairie du Liban, 1968) p. 755.

An Ecological Reading of the Qur’anic Understanding of Creation

Introduction

We are on the brink of a frightening ecological disaster. The earth is being destroyed at an alarming speed. It can no longer sustain the rate of our use of its resources. So our relationship with the rest of creation is seriously out of balance. The manifestations of this situation include air, water and soil pollution through toxic, chemical and radioactive waste, soil erosion and salinizaton, desertification, deforestation, extinction of plant and animal species, global warming, exorbitant energy consumption and nuclear obliteration. If this process is not controlled effectively, the next generation of living beings will have no livable earth to inherit. Also, as there is an organic link between destruction of environment and socio-economic and political injustice, even though all are affected by the ecological crisis, the life of the poor and marginalized is further impoverished by it. Thus there has been a growing concern, expressed globally, to address the issues of environmental degradation.

There are various responses to the growing ecological crisis. Scientists, sociologists, philosophers and anthropologists made various responses from different perspectives. The ecological crisis as a complex issue includes various problems such as poor technology, economic and developmental model. So any response to the ecological crisis depends on the problem, which is being addressed. For instance, for a scientist, if poor technology is the reason for the ecological crisis, then it can be solved with the right use of technology. The various responses to ecological crisis are important because it address various dimensions of the crisis.

The perception of creation is a major factor, which decides the attitude of people towards nature. So perception of creation is an important issue in the ecological discussions. On the one hand, if nature is understood as created only to serve human beings, then it may justify exploitation of nature without any limitation. On the other hand, if the nature is understood as having its own value, then it may be respected and used properly. Since I am a student of comparative religion and of Islam, the intention of this work is to formulate an Islamic response to the growing ecological crisis, by taking the issue of perception of creation seriously.

Doctrine of Creation in the Qur’an

The Qur’an uses a number of words for ‘creation’ such as khalq, bara, sawwara, ja ‘ala, bada ‘a and farara. Khalq is the noun form of the verb khalaqa2 and it is used 249 times in the Qur’an3. According to Lane’s Arabic-English Lexicon, the word khalq indicates the act. of measuring; determining, estimating and calculating.4 This word is used in the Qur’an to denote the act of creation and creation in its entirety. In the classical language of Arabs, khalq is considered as an act of God and Al-khaliq, the Creator, is one of the names of God in the Qur’an5. The word khalq also carries the meaning of making smooth and polishing without cracks and fracture6. Thus the act of creation, according to the Qur’an, is a process and not a momentary activity. God is always active and continue the act of creation by developing all beings from one stage to another7.

Bara is another word used in the Qur’an for creation and it means, "to form, to fashion or to shape."8 Arabs generally use this word to denote the act of shaping of a reed for writing, or of an arrow, or of a stick or of a piece of wood.9 Al-ban, one who shapes, is one of the names of God in the Qur’an10. This word has similar meanings as that of khalaqa, such as fashioning and shaping. Sawwara is used in the Qur’an11 to denote creation and it means "to form, to shape, to fashion, to sculpture, to picture" etc.12 Al-musawwir, ‘the Fashioner’, is one of the names of God in the Qur’an. He fashions the creation by giving it form and colour and bestows each creature with "every details of its complicated spiritual and physical existence"13. Everything is being fashioned uniquely so that each fits perfectly into the rest of creation.

The word Ja‘ala is used 345 times14 in the Qur’an to denote creation and its meaning is "to make, to render, to form, to create, to prepare" etc.15 It is used in the Qur’an with the sense of giving new shapes, forms, dispositions etc. So according to the Qur’an, the act of creation also includes the process of giving colours, form, physical stature, assigning specific roles and conditions to fulfil these roles16. The word Bada’a occurs fourteen times in the Qur’an17 and it means "to originate a thing, or to bring in to being or existence, or to make or to produce for the first time"18. Thus this is used in the Qur’an to designate the creation of a thing after no pre-existing similitude. Al-badi’, which means the Originator, is another name of God in the Qur’an19. The word fatara is used twenty places in the Qur’an.20 Like bada‘a, it also means to bring or to produce something for the first time.21

According to the Qur’an, all things have their origin by the command of God, "Be" (kun)22. God’s commands are the expression of His will, plan and intention and so it is part of His being. It implies that creation is originated not in accidence but by the definite purpose of God. He never created anything in vain or in "play"23 but with a serious purpose (haqq)24. It brings value and importance to creation.

In the Qur’anic perspective there is a definite relationship between God and His creation. The doctrine of tawhid, the belief in the oneness of God, is a cardinal principal in the Qur’an.25 Tawhid affirms and acknowledges that God is one and the only Reality. Then creation is part of the Essence of God and it manifests Him. It "teaches that all life is essentially a unity as the creation which proceeds from the Divine oneness".26 This affirms the wholeness and holiness of the creation and thus it brings value to creation. It also rejects all forms of dualism, which separates human beings from nature, so nature is considered as evil and to be subjugated, that have contributed to the ecological crisis27.

God is described in the Qur’an as muhit, which means all encompassing, all pervading, and that which surrounds all.28 This term also used in Arabic to denote ‘environment’.29 So as muhit "God Himself is the ultimate environment which surrounds and encompasses man."30 So Nasr believes that since the environment is not an ontologically independent order of reality, which is divorced from the Divine Environment, the environmental crisis "has been caused by man’s refusal to see God as the real Environment."31

According to the Qur’an, God made provisions for the sustenance and growth of countless varieties of creatures from microorganisms to the largest animals. These provisions are made available to meet their needs in every situation and stages of life. As we have seen earlier, God created everything for a specific purpose. So there is nothing that exists which does not serve some purpose or other. It means that everything fits into one supreme scheme of life32. Everything is put together in wisdom and unity. It emphasizes that everything has its value to life.33 Existence of each and every thing, whether it is small or big, is important for the continuation of life. So each species is unique and makes its own specific contribution to the totality of life. This negates the superiority or importance of one species over against the other. Thus in the holistic perspective human being is "not a supreme being but a part of the web of nature coexisting with other denizens of the cosmos"34

Dignity of Non-Human Creation

According to the Qur’an the world is tilled with signs (ayah) of God35. The Arabic word ayar means "a sign, token, or mark, by which a person or thing is known or can be perceived."36 The word ayah is used almost four hundred times in the Qur’an37 and every creature is referred as ayah of God (ayat allah).38 The above meaning of ayah is relevant for our discussion because if nature is ayah of God, then those who perceives it perceives God39.

According to the Qur’an everything -- inhabitants of the heavens (sun, moon, stars) and the earth (animal, trees, hills) -- praise Allah40. "There is nothing, but celebrates His praises"41. Everything that is created by God prostrates before Him and recognise their submission to His will and commands. Thus the whole creation is regarded in the Qur’an as ‘muslim’42. It perfectly obeys the will of God and behaves in accordance with the laws established by Him. But today nature is perceived as created only to serve human beings. This attitude justifies exploitation and domination of creation.

The spiritual life of a Muslim is in tune with nature. To perform ritual worship (salat)43, a Muslim must have a special relationship with his/her outer environment since the specific times of the ritual prayers are based on the position of the sun 44. Also, Islamic calendar follows the moon and it is utilised to determine the proper time for fasting and performing the pilgrimage to Makkah (Hajj). Thus a Muslim is forced to follow the movements of the sun and the moon as part of his/her religious practice. Nature is the sanctuary of God for the performance of salat and a mosque does not create a "super natural" space for prayer 45. Thus nature is an ally of human beings in their quest for God, not an adversary.

In the Qur’anic perspective, all things that God created are ‘communities’ (ummah) like (mithal) that of human community (6:38). Thus God is concerned about all communities and he preserves and provides for all creatures 46. As Yusuf Ali explains while commenting upon this verse (6:38), "In our pride we exclude animals from our purview, but they live a life, social and individual, like ourselves, and all life is subject to the plan and will of Allah" 47. So creation has value in itself without reference to human beings.

Subservience Of Non-Human Creation

According to the Qur’an, all things in heaven and on earth have been created for use of human beings. 48 The Arabic word Sakhkhara is used in the Qur’an to define the relationship between human and non-human.49 Sakhkhara means to constrain or compel a servant or a beast to do what it does not desire. Thus it also means to bring into subjugation, or to make manageable and tractable, or to make something unable to free from constraint. 50 The Qur’an considers Sakhkhara as an activity of God (14:33). As we have seen earlier, non-human beings have value in itself and there is no evidence in the Qur’an to prove that it is created only to serve human beings. So scholars reinterpreted the word Sakhkhara differently from its literal meaning, i.e., subservience.

According to Iris Safwat, the Arabic word Sakhkhara does not mean ‘to subject’ rather it means ‘to turn to profitable account’ or ‘to utilise’ 51 Abd-al-Hamid affirms this meaning and says that, the relationship between human and non-human is not of domination or exploitation but that of the trust (amanah) placed with human beings by God. If ‘subservience’ of everything to human is taken as a right to dominate and exploitation, then it is mockery to Allah. 52 Nasr explains the meaning of the term by seriously taking into consideration the responsibility of human beings as God’s vicegerents.

So according to him, Sakhkhara does not mean the conquest or exploitation of nature rather it should be a kind of relationship in accordance with God’s laws and responsibility of the human beings as vicegerents of God. 53

These insights imply that we cannot treat nature just as an object of human activity. So a subject-object relationship with nature is unjustifiable. 54 If nature is treated just as an Object, then it is likely to be appreciated "not for its intrinsic value, but for its instrumental value for humans."55 So a just relationship between human beings and other creatures is a subject-subject relationship. A subject-subject relationship with nature implies that we have to respect the nature, which will finally lead to protection and proper use of natural resources.

Freedom and Responsibility of Human Beings

According to the Qur’an, human beings are the highest form of all living creatures. "We have indeed created man in the best of mould (‘ahsani taqwim)."56 Taqwim is the Arabic word used to designate ‘estimation’ or ‘erection’ or ‘setting up’ 57. By using the superlative form ahsan, the Qur’an suggests that the estimation or stature of human being is the best. It includes both the internal and external composition of the human being.

In the Qur’an, three words such as Adam, bashar and insan are used to denote the human beings. According to Muhammad Iqbal, the Qur’an uses the word bashar or insan to denote the origin of human beings as living beings or social animals. The word Adam is used more as a concept than as the name of a concrete human individual and is reserved for the human beings in their capacity of God’s vicegerent on earth 58. Riffat Hassan, a Muslim feminist, used this insight to prove that in the Qur’an, the word Adam "is used as a symbol of self-conscious humanity" 59

According to the Qur’an, after fashioning Adam in the proper proportions God blew (nafakha) of His Spirit (ruh) into the human being 60 The breathing of the spirit made them so unique, with their faculty of knowledge and freedom of choice, that even angels are ordered to prostrate before them. It is the breathing of the spirit, which differentiates human beings from other creatures 61. This act gave them their ability to distinguish right from wrong, their power of reasoning and their faculty of speech 62. The gift of knowledge makes human beings more responsible towards other creatures. We have to use our knowledge in such a way that it is causing only a minimum damage to the environment. This is possible only when we develop science and technology, which accepts the value of creation and responsibility of human beings.

In order to get guidance, the Qur’an advises human beings to turn to the nature in which they are created (30:30). It implies that only the original nature of human beings (fitrah) can lead them to the straight path. According to Yusuf Ali. "just as the nature of a lamb is to be gentle and of a horse is to be swift", in true nature (fitrah), "man is innocent, pure, true, free, inclined to right and virtue, and educated with true understanding about his own position in the universe and about Allah’s goodness, wisdom, and power".63 In other words, God has created in human beings a natural bias towards good, and a bias against evil. A natural bias toward good and against evil demands promotion of good (ma’ruf) and elimination of evil (munkar) in all aspects of life. So according to Wyn Davies fitra implies a moral and ethical sense. Thus if it is exercised in full consciousness, human beings can organise different facets of life in to a harmonious balance. 64 Such a harmonious state also includes the right relationship with nature. The doctrine of fitra is important in relation to challenge posed by ecologists that we should live with an understanding of the interconnectedness of everything in the creation. 65

Quranic Understanding of Khalifah

The word khalifa and its plurals occur nine times in the Qur’an. 66 Khalifa is derived from the verb khalafa meaning, "he came after, followed, succeeded or remained after, another, or another that had perished or dead" 67 So khalifa is some one who succeeds another or who takes the place of another after him/her in some matter. Thus a ruler is called khalifa when "he replaces the one who was before him, and takes his place in the affair, and is his successor (khalaf)".68 There are many contemporary thinkers who opine that human beings are the vicegerents (khalifa) of God on earth. Abd-al-Hamid, 69 Muhammad Iqbal, 70 Mustansir Mir 71 , George Koovackal 72 Safia Anbir 73. Seyyed Hossien Nasr 74, Al-Birnni 75 and Soumaya Pernilla Ouis 76 are few who translated khalifa as God’s vicegerent or steward.

Human beings are vicegerents of God not in the sense that they succeed and replace God. They are vicegerents because God subjected (sakhkhara) everything to us and gifted us with free will, knowledge and a bias towards doing good. These gifts made human beings responsible towards other creatures. This power and responsibility of human beings is termed vicegerency on behalf of God and implies the prudent use of things but not their exploitation.

As khalifa, human beings are not proprietors or owners of creation, God is the owner and everything belongs to Him. Human beings are God’s vicegerents (khalifa’ Allah) and God’s servants (abd ‘Allah). Human beings should use their authority as khalifa within the limit of the servants of God. "Nothing is more dangerous for the natural environment than the practice of the power of vice-gerency by a humanity which no longer accepts to be God’s servant, obedient to His commands and laws." 77 So human vicegerency needs to be interpreted in relation to the sovereignty of God, not independently.

Conclusion

As God created everything by accurate measurement, there is a purpose behind every act of creation. Each species is having its own role to play in the over all plan of creation. Thus everything is interrelated and contributes to the whole life of universe. If one species is eliminated, it affects the whole creation and disturbs its balance. It implies that every creature should be protected. We have seen that non-human creation is part of the beings of God and continuously praises Him. As signs of God, they manifest God and as being in the state of ‘muslim’, they perfectly obey the will of God. By assisting human beings in their spiritual journey, they become part of a sacred activity. Also by creating them as communities, God is equally concerned about their providence and life as of human community. Thus non-human creation is having its own value and it implies that the Qur’an rejects an anthropocentric view of creation.

We have also noted that it is God who made everything subservient to the use and benefit of human beings. Thus the subservience of non-human creatures is part of the purpose of creation. So subservience cannot be interpreted as the right to exploit creation by dominating it. Domination goes against the purpose of creation. We have also noted that in their natural state (fitra), human beings have a bias towards good and against evil. Harmonious living with the rest of creation is the best thing human beings can do amidst the ecological crisis. Since God is the Creator, as one of the creatures, human beings do not have authority over creation except through God. Given that God, continues the process of creation by recreation, there is no possibility to think that God has granted authority to human beings to misuse it and thus to destroy it. Vicegerency does not make human beings owners or proprietors of creation. As vicegerents of God our responsibility is to protect creation and to be part of God’s recreation process. We cannot be idle while the creation is being destroyed. We have to eliminate all kinds of evil, which causes destruction of creation.

As a student of Religions, I want to note that various responses to the ecological crisis are already given from the perspective of different religious traditions. Even though the theological and philosophical bases of these responses are different, one can discern a common growing concern for our own home (universe) and brothers and sisters (non-human creation). This concern can lead us to have further dialogue between various religious traditions to see various theological and philosophical foundations for ecological concerns. To respond to the ecological crisis it may help us to go deeper into our own religious tradition to see different bases other than what we already found. The dialogue between religious traditions not only helps us to live peacefully with the rest of creation but also helps us to live peacefully with people of other faiths. Thus ecological discussions can lead us to new way of life.

I also want to notice that the ecological insights can lead us to a new spirituality. Since there is continuity between God and the creation, this spirituality will see the presence of God in creation. So it seriously takes into consideration the intrinsic value of creation. This spirituality is holistic and committed to protect and preserve creation. It is the result of gratitude and thankfulness to God for the strong felt presence and power of God in creation. It tries to understand creation as a blessing of God entrusted to human beings to take care of it. So it is less anthropocentric and does not justify domination over creation. Thus this spirituality resists any ideology, value or life style that distorts and destroys God’s creation. It is a spirituality that actively participates in upholding justice, freedom and life inherent in the created order.

 

End Notes

1. The author in his Master of Theology thesis, submitted to the Senate of Serampore College in March 1999, debates most of the things discussed in this article and it is available for reference at the libraries of the United Theological College, Bangalore and Henry Martyn Institute, Hyderabad.

2. R. Amaldez, "Kitalk," Encyclopedia of Islam, edited by Evan Dounzel, B Lewis and Ch.Pellet, Vol. 4(1978): 980.

3. Muhammad Fawad Abdul Baqi, ed., Al-Muajam-al-Mufahir’s Li-Alfazil Quranil Kareem (Shabb Press, 1945), 241-244.

4. E. W. Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon, Vol. 2 (Beirut-Lebanon: librairie du liban, 1968; Reprinted, Cambridge Islamic Text society, 1984). 799.

5. Ibid. p. 802.

6. R. Arnaldez op.cit.980, Halok is the corresponding Hebrew word.

7. See the Holy Qur’an 29:19; 10:4; 30:11.27.

8. E.W.Lane, VoL 1, op. cit., 197; See also 59:24; 57:22; 6:94,98: bara is its Hebrew equivalent.

9. Ibid

10. 2:54; 59:24.

11. 40:64 (two times); 64:3 (two times); 7:11; 3:6; 82:8; 59:24.

12. E. W. Lane, Vol. 4, op. cit., 1744.

13. Yunus Negus, "Science Within Islam: Learning How to Care for Our World," in Islam and Ecology, edited by Fazlun M Khalid and Joanne O’Brien (New York: Cassell Publishers Limited, 1992), 40.

14. Muhammad Fawad Abdul Baqi, ed., op. cit. 170-175

15. E. W. Lane, Vol. 2. op. cit., 430.

16. For details, see Abul Kalam Azad. The Tarjuman Al-Quran. Edited and translated by Syed Abdul Latif, Vol. 3. (Hyderabad: Syed Abdul Latif’s Trust for Quranic and Other Cultural Studies, 1981), 27f.

17. 12:76; 29:20; 32:7; 7:29; 9:63; 21:104;90:4;10:34 (two times); 27:64; 30:11; 30:27; 29:19; 34:49; 80:13.

18. E. W. Lane, Vol. 1, op. cit., 163

19. E. W. Lane, Vol. 1, op. cit., 166.

20. Muhammad Fawad Abdul Baqi, ed., op. cit., 522-523.

21. Ibid., 2415.

22. The creative command of God is explained eight places in the Qur’an. 36:82; 2:117; 16:40; 6:73; 19:35; 3:47, 59; 40:68.

23. 44:38; 21:16; 23:115; 38:27; 3:191; 45:22; 15:85: 44:39; 46:3; 10:5; 14:19; 16:3; 29:44; 6:73; 30:8; 64:3.

24. In Arabic, the word haqq is used primarily to explain the idea of permanence or fixity. Shorter Encyclopaedia of Islam, 1974 ed.. s.v. "Hakk", 126; Abul Kalam Azad. Op.cit. 66-68.

25. 112:1-4; 2:163; 6:19;16:22; 23:91-92; 37:1-5; 38:65-68.

26. Soumaya Perrilla Ouis. "Islamic Ecotheology Based on the Qur’an" Islamic Studies 37 (Summer, 1998): 153.

27. In the West, during the Age of Enlightenment, Cartesian (philosophy of R. Descartes, who was a 17th century French philosopher) dualism contributed to the development of ecological crisis. See. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 152. In 1967 Lynn white Jr., a professor of History, University of California, argued that by destroying animism (the belief in supernatural power that organises and animates the material universe.) Christianity made it possible to exploit nature. And in 1989 Alastair M. Taylor and Duncan M. Taylor tried to prove that dualistic nature of Semitic religions paved the way for ecological crisis. See. A. R. Agwan. "Introduction," in Islam and the Environment, edited by A. R. Agwan. (Delhi: Institute of Objective Studies, 1997), IX, X.

28. 4:108, 126; Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 163.

29. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Islam and the Environmental Crisis," in Islam and the Environment, op. cit., 18.

30. Ibid.

31. ibid.

32. Azad termed this as Takhliq-bil-Haq. See Abul Kalam Azad. Op.cit. 33.

33 Ibid.,

34. A.R.Agwan, "Introduction," Islam and the Environment, op. cit., XII.

35. 2:164: 3:190; 13:2-4; 16:10-13; 27:86; 29:44; 30:20-25; 41:37; 45:3-6.

36. E.W. Lane, Vol. 1, op. cit., 135.

37. Sachiko Murata and William C Chittick. The Vision of Islam. (New York- Daragon Home, 1994) ,52.

38. Ibid., 54.

39. Fazlur Rahman, Major Themes of the Qur’an. (Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica, 1994), 68-69; A.R. Agwan, "Toward an Ecological Consciousness;" in Islam and the Environment, op. cit.. 3; Roger. E. Timm, "The Ecological Fallout of Islamic Creation Theology," in Worldviews and Ecology: Religion. Philosophy, and the Environment. Ecology and Justice Series, edited by Mary Evelyn Tucker and John A Grim (Maryknoll. New York: Orbis Books, 1994), 86.

40. 22:18; 21:79; 55:6; 57:1; 59:1; 61:1; 62:1; 64:1:59:24; 24:41; 38:18,19; 13:13.

41. 17:44.

42. 3: 83

43. Ritual worship (salat) is one of the pillars of Islam and a Muslim has to pray five times a day.

44. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 170.

45. S. H. Nasr. ‘The Cosmos and the Natural Order" in Islamic Spirituality: Foundations. Edited by seyyed Hossein Nasr. (London: SCM Press Ltd, 1989), 349

46. Baidawi.Anwaral-tanzil-wa-asraral-Ta’wil. (Egypt: Maimaniya Press, 1340 AH) on 6:38: Zamakhshari, Al. Kashashaf (Mohd. Efendi Press. Nd.) on 6:38.

47. The Holy Qur ‘an: English Translation of the Meaning and Commentary. Revised and edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IPTA, 348.

48. 14:32-33; 16:5-8.

49. 45:12-13; 14:33-34.

50. E.W.Lane, Vol. 4. op. cit., 1324.

51. Iris Safwat, "Islam and Environmental Protection," Islam Today 12 (1994):80.

52. Abd-al-Hamid, "Exploring the Islamic Environmental Ethics" in Islam and the Environment. Op.cit. 47-48.

53. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Islam and the Environmental Crisis," in Islam and the Environment. op. cit., 22.

54. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis.,op.cit.. 162-163.

55. Roger E Timm, "The Ecological Fallout of Islamic Creation Theology," in World Views and Ecoolgy: Religion, Philosophy and the Environment. op. cit.. 85. 56. 95:4.

57. J.Milton Cowan, ed., A Dictionary of Modem Written Arabic, 3rd ed. (New York: Spoken Language Services, Inc. 1976), 801.

58. Muhammad Iqbal, The Reconsturction of Religious Thought in Islam. (Lahore: Javid Iqbal. 1960), 83.

59. Riffat Hassan, "Are women and Men equal Before Allah? The issue of gender justice is Islam." In Look at the World Through Women’s Eyes. Edited by Eva Friedlander. (NGO Forum on Women, Beijing ‘95 Inc., 1996.), 150.

60. 15:29, 32:9, 38:72. A similar action can be seen in 21:91 and 66:12 when God blew (nafaka) of His spirit (ruh) in to Maryam for the conception of ‘Isa.

61. Qur’an. op. cit., 1227, 979.

62. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 157.

63. The Holy Qur‘an: English Translation of the Meaning and Commentary. Revised and edited by The Presidency of Islamic Researches, IFTA. 1186.

64. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 158, cites M. Wyn Davies, Knowing One Another: Shaping an Islamic Anthropology (New York : Mansell Publishing, 1988), 89.

65. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 158.

66. 38:26:10:14; 2:30; 7:69:7:74; 6:165; 2:255; 7:169

67. . E.W. Lane, Vol. 2, op. cit., 792.

68. Abu Jafar Muhammad B Jarir Al-Tabari, The Commentary on the Qur‘an, edited by J Cooper and A Jones, Vol. 1 (Oxford : OUP, 1987), 208.

69. Abd-al-Hamid, op. cit., 41

70. Muhammad Iqbal, op. cit., 83.

71. Mustansir Mir, "Adam in the Qur’an." Islamic Culture 62(January, 1988): 4-5.

72. George Koovackal, "The Human Person According to Islam." Journal of Dharma 21(January-March. 1996): 62.

73. Safia Amir, "Man’s Place in God’s Universe." Islam and the Modem Age 26 (February, 1995): 42.

74. Seyyed Hossein Naser, Islamic Life and Thought (London: George Allen Y Unwin, 1981), 16.

75. Seyyed Hossein Naser, An introduction to the Islamic Cosmological Doctrines, (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1964), 150.

76. Soumaya Pernilla Ouis, op. cit., 154.

77. Seyyed Hossein Nasr, "Islam and the environmental crisis." op. cit.. 22.

Good Company (Gen. 11:1-9; Jn. 14:8-17)

George Macleod, founder of the Iona Community, said that in order to form community, people must be engaged in a "demanding common task." In his case the task was to rebuild the accommodation areas of Iona Abbey. The group that he led included people with considerable formal education (trainee ministers), who were used to working with the written and spoken word, as well as people with little education -- unemployed men from the most depressed parts of Glasgow who were manually skilled and practically minded. These men and women formed community out of purpose and in difficult conditions. In the late 1930s they shared what they had and learned from each other. They built with stone and with their lives, even though they could not know what the results of their work would be.

The people of the earth in Genesis 11 also joined together in a demanding common task; they, however, knew exactly what they were aiming for. They wanted to get to God, to make their way to heaven by building a tower that reached up to the sky. Why? What need drove them to this costly and time-consuming exercise?

Maybe they were experiencing the need to have control over their surroundings and their future, to be safely gathered and protected against their enemies, to dominate. Maybe they thought that they should and could be as God, able to direct events, to protect themselves from unseen danger, to show others their cleverness and wealth. They built to reach up to the heavens, but maybe they should have built a place suitable for heaven to come down to them.

When I was in my early teens, I used to watch films and TV programs with romantic heroines. I particularly liked the actresses with luxurious dresses, especially as I wasn’t much of a dress wearer myself -- I found them too fussy and, as this was the ‘70s, usually too short. For a while after I’d seen a program, I’d find myself remembering particular mannerisms and turns of phrase that a character used, and even taking on some aspects of them myself. I would imitate a character’s walk, maybe, or practice turning my head gracefully or resting my hands on the banister rail coming downstairs. Until a new program came on, I inhabited one particular character, or, rather, it inhabited me. It lived in me and I took on some of its characteristics.

John records in his Gospel that Jesus describes the Spirit as coming to dwell with the disciples. Here is a word that has been used before, right at the beginning of the Gospel, describing Jesus, the word made flesh, coming to dwell with us, full of grace and truth. The Word comes into the created world and makes his home among us. A woman is willing to say yes to the purposes of God and to make a place of welcome in her body. The small family that is formed by this task offers hospitality to the Lord of all, while God offers all humanity hospitality by inviting us to join the household of heaven.

I am startled again as I remind myself that God likes my company. God seeks me and desires to dwell with me, to abide with me, to stay. The conversations that John remembered, meditated on, recorded for others, are a reminder that Jesus wanted to be with his friends in a community of mutual love. Being around and about was not enough. God wishes to be with those he loves, not hovering above in some high heaven. What God waits for is a welcome, the hospitality which says, "Come in, there is a place for you here." How do we welcome God? We keep, or observe, the commands that Jesus gave -- that is, we keep an eye on them, keep them in mind, at work within the heart. And what commands does Jesus give us? Love one another as I have loved you. Jesus always looks to the Father, knowing that God is gathering those around him into a household, a home, a community by the working of that same love. The dwelling place that we seek to build is constructed piece by piece from God’s longing for all of creation to be reconciled. The hospitality that we offer is a cup-full scooped from the ocean of God’s welcome home.

The people of Babel tried their hardest to get to God. But since their underlying motive was to protect themselves, to elevate themselves, to please themselves, they ended up being scattered as they separated themselves from all those round about them. They forgot that they were all creatures of God, who chose to seek welcome in the midst of an unsettled country, to build a dwelling place with the lives of ordinary people, to make whole the earth by seeding it with heaven. The Spirit will abide with us and stay with us. God-Still-with-Us will make a home.

So, what will this home be like? Last spring I decided to thin and trim the top off a large bush that was choked with dead wood and becoming quite ragged. I fought my way through the branches with my long-handled pruning shears and started cutting frantically while standing inside the bush. A neighbor, watching from a window, was intrigued to see a large plant shuddering violently for no apparent reason. He came out to investigate and, after realizing what was going on, stopped me, gently made some helpful suggestions, and took a turn with the shears until the work was done.

In God’s home, such "simple" love and hospitality will be available to all. The reconciling activity of God will be there in the lives of those whose eyes are open and whose hearts are filled with the commands of love.

Paul Tillich as Hero: An Interview with Rollo May

"I’m not afraid to admire Paul Tillich. He has been my spiritual father. I learned from him and loved him. Strangely, that seems to enrage many people."

Rollo May, the psychoanalyst and author who is well known in religious circles, sat in his Manhattan office discussing with me critics’ reactions to his Paulus, a small appreciative volume subtitled "Reminiscences of a Friendship," which was published (by Harper & Row) in October 1973. In the same month and year Hannah Tillich, widow of the theologian who died in 1965 at the age of 79. issued an autobiography, From Time to Time (Stein & Day), which presents a more ambivalent, perhaps bizarre, picture of her husband.

The interview he granted me was the first in which May talked about the background of Paulus, its contents in relation to Mrs. Tillich’s account, and his concern over what the reception of both books says about contemporary culture.

"My book has elicited so much anger," he said. "It seems to me it’s anger that one should present a man as a hero. Some people say that I thought too much of Paulus, that I don’t make him flesh and blood. One review complained that I compared Paulus’s death with Socrates’. Well, I must say that is a bit idealized. Yet it’s a very real thing which I felt. Hannah shows him at his death with his bowels erupting, which strikes me as typical of what we do with our great men: show them defecating, no different from you and me."

I

Paulus and From Time to Time were inevitably reviewed together. And practically all the reviews -- from the scintillating paragraphs in Time magazine’s October 8, 1973, issue to the impassioned piece in Psychology Today for April 1974 -- stressed the widow’s description of Tillich as "lover of myriad women" (to use a southern paper’s phrase). By comparison, many reviewers treated May’s interpretation of Tillich’s sensuality as demure.

"It saddens me to say this, but I must speak out: I don’t think Hannah’s book presents an accurate picture of Paulus," May declared. "It presents him as a kind of adolescent voyeur and implies there were actual sexual relationships between him and a long series of women. That’s not true.

"Now Paulus did greatly admire women and could be quite sensuous. He loved to hold a woman’s hand, talk intimately with her. . . well, one could call it a spiritual seduction that had little to do with sexual intercourse.

"Hannah also distorts Paulus’s life by saying almost nothing about his intellectual greatness, nothing about his being an impressive writer, nothing about his ecstatic reason. The things that make Tillich significant are left out. What this does, unless a reader already knows him, is to give a warped portrait; another dirty old man."

The Psychology Today review, written by John Wren-Lewis, says that Paulus "appears to be a hasty production, so much so as to suggest the nasty suspicion that it might have been rushed out in the hope of counterbalancing the possible scandal of Hannah’s revelations." A review appearing in Newsday last December said the same thing, but in the form of a question.

"Nonsense," May retorted. The truth is that he agreed to write the book only at the Tillich family’s request. He explained:

"Hannah actively urged me over several years to write what she called the ‘authorized biography.’ I had known her and Paulus since a month after they arrived in the U.S. in 1933, when I was a student at Union Seminary. As I began making notes, I saw ‘that I had neither the time nor the facts on the German period to write an ‘authorized biography.’ I decided to concentrate on where our two lives overlapped."

Records made available by Harper & Row show that May signed a contract for a Tillich book in 1967, and that by early 1969 the concept of a personal memoir had emerged. But May had to fulfill commitments on Love and Will and Power and Innocence to another publisher (Norton) before he could give full attention to Paulus. He began writing that in spring 1972. For six months after publication of Paulus, May declined to grant any interviews regarding it. But charges that his volume was "rushed" out and that, when compared with From Time to Time, it contains errors of fact, were one reason why he changed his mind. May cited two other reasons.

First, the Tillich Society in Germany issued a "warning" to German publishers not to issue any translation of Mrs. Tillich’s book, which the society said contains "weighty distortions" and "misrepresentations" of Tillich. Second, the British publisher of Paulus is asking May to write a special preface frankly stating the relationship between the two books.

‘‘I decided it is important to set the record straight in this country. May said.

II

What are your major concerns in light of the widespread attention ‘Paulus’ and ‘From Time to Time’ have drawn?

My major concern is that Paul Tillich has been presented in such a way that not only is he not given fair treatment in terms of the so-called "sexiness," but his ideas are neglected. I have chapters on Paulus’s ‘‘agony of doubt’’ and his great ability in logic. These are ignored.

You feel that Tillich, the theologian and philosopher, is being ignored?

Precisely. I think the most important issue in this whole thing is the anti hero mood of our society. We have a great need to scandalize, to gloat over the foibles of important figures. Nobody can rise above the mass. It’s a sickness typical of the present stage in our decadent era.

Moral decadence? Political decadence?

Spiritual and psychological decadence. Tillich used to say we are living in the last century of the modern period, which began at the Renaissance, and like the Middle Ages and the Greek era we are caught in the midst of radical change and its accompanying spiritual malaise. One symptom of the morass we are in is that we have no more heroes. Once we lose our heroes we also lose our morale. We have no one to guide us, no one to teach us.

You mean the teacher is a heroic model?

Partly. But essentially for a teacher to have any influence or power he must have listeners. Somebody must want to listen -- and that’s quite rare today. We mock our teachers: they don’t rate like men who enter the business world and make money. This is part and parcel of the loss of our sense of reverence lot persons. Watergate is just a minor symbol of the disintegration of our esprit de corps. Decadence is what is going on, and in odd but different ways Hannah’s book and my book fit right into it.

In what sense?

Here is part of the decadence movement, the scandalizing and cutting down of a giant to ordinary size. The anger my Paulus has aroused seems bent on leveling out a great teacher. An egalitarian society finds reassurance when a man of Paulus’s stature is shown with all the petty adulteries of everybody else. We have substituted conformism for democracy.

Would you expand on anger as a response to your book?

Yes. I had a difficult time understanding it because it isn’t anger over what I say or over disagreements on minor facts. It’s an irrational anger, expressing itself in such irrelevant things as holding me responsible for a printer’s error about Paulus’s birthday in the first copies off the press.

Questions have also come up as to whether the comment "today is dying day" should be attributed to Tillich on the morning of his last day or at some other time in his final illness.

That also seems to me irrelevant, though I might say that I took my information on the death from an account Hannah wrote and gave me back in 1966. What’s important is the way such details are used to support rage -- a rage, I believe, that anyone should have a hero.

III

Were you aware that Mrs. Tillich was planning a book when you were preparing yours?

At a point. Hannah has always written. Her travel diaries are quite good. She has also written poems and fables, and things about her sexual relationships with various people. A lot of that is in From Time to Time. I was not aware that she was thinking of publishing that material until 1972. During the early part of the year she kept saying I must read her manuscript, and I kept avoiding it because I knew the problem we would get into if I did. Remember, I have known Hannah for 40 years. That summer -- 1972 -- she brought the manuscript along when she visited us in New Hampshire, and I realized I would have to read it.

What was your reaction?

Like most of her and Paulus’s friends, I tried to persuade her not to publish it. I wrote her a long letter saying I thought it would give a distorted picture of Paulus and their relationship and would be most humiliating to her. It would appeal to that aspect of our culture that likes to see people flagellate themselves in public. I told her that if the manuscript was published it would be because she had happened to be Paul Tillich’s wife. All the publishers who read it in 1972 turned it down. Paulus was officially announced in January 1973. Then in February Hannah secured a publisher. I stopped work on my almost complete biography. It seemed obvious that both books would be coming out at the same time, and I did not want that to occur.

Why did you stop work?

I was sick about the whole thing. I felt . . . sick is the best word. As I look back. I don’t know whether it was a good idea to publish Paulus or not. But at the time my friends convinced me it was important to finish my biography and provide two versions of Paul Tillich.

And you think your version is the more factual on the sensual side of Tillich?

I do. An admiring student may not be the most objective judge of a teacher, but a wife is considerably less reliable. "No man is a hero to his valet."

Why would Mrs. Tillich want to misrepresent her husband?

Hannah is an emotional German woman who was made jealous many, many times by Paulus. She talks about her jealousy in her book. She felt his interest in other women was a threat to her. I have no arguments against taking revenge, if one wants it. Yet I feel it is unfortunate that Hannah waited until after Paulus’s death to take hers.

Did Mrs. Tillich cooperate with you, share documents and her reminiscences?

Certainly. She implored me to write the book in the beginning.

Did she read your biography before publication?

Oh yes, when it was put into proof by Harper. And she liked it. She described it as an affectionate and loving portrait of Paulus.

Some of the reviews treat her book as an exercise in women’s liberation.

Well, it is true that Hannah was married to a man who, regardless of his modern ideas on theology and art, was a product of the old Germany. So was she. Paulus expected her to get up and get his breakfast. She persuaded him to spend a little time with their two children, but like most German fathers he found our American way of dealing with youngsters -- the child ordering the adult around -- contrary to his training. Hannah had to take quite a bit of gaff, though no more than any woman out of Weimar, Germany, would have taken. She always drove the car, made the arrangements for travel. At times I felt sorry for her. Yet she seemed to enjoy it; she liked to meet the important people she met because she was Mrs. Paul Tillich.

It’s all to the good when a previously downtrodden woman speaks out, but I don’t think the thesis "a woman declares her freedom at last" can carry all the weight put on it in Hannah’s case. This woman speaking out is Paul Tillich’s widow. Remove that fact and I doubt that From Time to Time could sustain itself as a women’s liberation piece.

IV

Could we return to the issue of sensuality, which seems to be the most controversial subject in the two books?

Perhaps we should. Paulus was a very sensual man. He came from a Lutheran background, not the Puritan background we have in the U.S. and England. Like Luther, he believed in the robustness of the body. He was a great mountain climber, could walk forever, never wore a hat. His physical robustness was appealing and endearing. He loved food and drink. He liked nightclubs. Everybody knows those things about him. Paulus had a great joie de vivre, greater than Hannah’s. He could throw himself into a situation with a zest that was quite unusual. Hannah tended to be shy. Paulus loved parties and this reflected his joy in being with people. His relation to women is an epitome of that joy. Paulus thought every woman beautiful. He was loving and tender with them. But it was not an act; his emotions were real and women responded. I know many women who feel that his friendship was a great moment in their lives.

And sexual intercourse was not involved in these relationships?

To my knowledge, only a few times, and I knew Paulus intimately as well as a number of the women. And those few times, only when he had known the women over a period of time.

Was he sexually pursued by women?

Undoubtedly some women would have liked him to go further than he did. Not many, I think. By and large, they knew what Paulus was getting across. The Psychology Today review says for Paulus to relate to women as I say he did was ‘nastier" than to have actual sexual intercourse. That moralistic statement misses the point. The women knew and Paulus knew that they were not going to end up in bed. Paulus’s motivation was the glory of loving and appreciating women, not the glory of intercourse.

Hannah leaves the impression Paulus was a prurient person trying to get as many women as possible into bed. This is a distortion of fact and, more seriously, a distortion of his character. Yet people want to hear and see the prurient. I have the feeling that Sartre’s view of society in The Flies fits us today. The people in the play hold a great celebration of guilt. That fits Watergate and in some ways our whole society.

Was that not also the Weimar society out of which Tillich came?

Exactly. But, you see, Paulus had a "system" -- he called it Christian socialism -- that might have ameliorated the conflicts in the Weimar Republic had the people been in the mood to listen.

Do you think Tillich’s reputation as theologian has been permanently damaged in the past six months?

We can only wait and see. Some people tell me they are more interested in the man Paulus after reading about Tillichian sex-capades. But I don’t see much real interest in his significant writings. The theologian seems to get lost in all the publicity. I am afraid the depth and breadth of Paulus’s ideas and his sorely needed contribution to our culture will be forgotten in the mêlee.

Preaching as Subversive Activity

Every interpreter of the Christian faith is called to be a Hermes, one who brings a message of destiny, and to practice the science of Hermes, hermeneutics. He may not use the word, but his task is that of interpretation just the same. A question plaguing those who attempt to interpret the Christian faith in these times’ is, Which hermeneutic?

In a recent article in The Christian Century ("How Jacques Ellul Reads the Bible, November 29, 1972) Vernard Eller said that "regnant methods of interpretation simply are not communicating biblical-truth in a way that is moving or meaningful to most believers" and called for a new hermeneutic. Apparently he overlooks the comparatively new movement which goes by that very name. The new hermeneutic movement is a recent offshoot of the post-Bultmannian and Heideggerian heritage. Gerhard Ebeling and Ernst Fuchs gave life to it on the Continent, and James M. Robinson and Robert W. Funk announced its nativity to the American theological family back in 1964.

Dealing with this school of biblical interpretation through the analogy of a living organism, we recall Erik Erikson’s stages of growth, in which the crisis of middle age is one of generativity versus stagnation. How does the new (now middle-aged) hermeneutic fare? Has it generated a viable method of Christian interpretation, or has it stagnated into theoretical introspection and theological navel gazing?

I

The formal program of the new hermeneutic is for proclamation that has taken place -- i.e., Scripture -- to become proclamation that takes place (Ebeling). It is precisely a discussion of the route between text and sermon, if "sermon" means a situation in which the truth of human existence (its present state and essential possibilities) is disclosed. The type of sermon the new hermeneutic has in mind, however, does not begin with "eternal truths’’ that lead to answers to perennial religious questions. No, the new hermeneutic sermon begins instead with the human situation and results in a "word-event." A word-event is a rather surprising situation in which the very people who thought they were interpreting the text or hearing it interpreted get interpreted themselves -- the text interprets them (Funk)! This dialectic interaction between anticipated understanding and the kind of understanding that actually occurs is called ‘‘the hermeneutical circle." In a sense it represents a "fusing of horizons" (Gadamer); that is, the text’s horizon or view of life and that of the interpreter merge and overcome their subject-object separation. When the text thus interprets its interpreter, it does so not through re-engaging belief in ancient religious categories but by raising questions about the would-be interpreter’s existence -- his estrangement from himself and others, his experienced "fulfillment gap" between what he is and what be could be. As the one who represents the reunion of this separation, the Christ challenges the interpreter to decide between fragmentary, estranged existence and the possibility of "homecoming" (personal, societal and spiritual reunion).

In all this, language (including speech, sign, gesture and silence) plays a central role. For the new hermeneutic, language is one’s means of organizing the world; in fact, language creates the human world. Without language, one would not be able to make individual entities or forms stand apart and present themselves as distinguishable from the whole panorama of perceptual awareness (as is the case for certain tribes which, lacking the language for photography, cannot distinguish the images on a photograph). It is one’s use of language, then, that constitutes his world as either estranged and fragmented (inauthentic) or interrelated and united (authentic). Authentic words challenge one to consider another, more satisfying way of constituting his world. Language that is true to the potential for unity in existence (and unity is a condition in which love prevails) is, for the new hermeneutic, the Word of God.

II

Since the new hermeneutic made its debut in the United States around 1964, some significant conceptual progress has taken place. Much of this came between 1964 and 1968. Subsequently there was a period of silence (which in the Heideggerian view is a prerequisite to any meaningful talk). Now we are beginning to see some new work, which we shall call the "middle-age" contribution of the new hermeneutic.

One frequent criticism of the new hermeneutic’s "word-event" concept is that it is empty and contentless, something like the "blik" of language analysis. How can such a nebulous concept be linked to the Christ event of the Christian kerygma? Ten years ago Ebeling wrote "Towards a Christology" (in his Theology and Proclamation). In 1971 Peter Hodgson of Vanderbilt picked up this concern and issued Jesus -- Word and Presence, a programmatic essay on Christology from the new hermeneutic perspective. He argues that God is the one who has the world-creating power of language completely; that language is that which makes one present; that Jesus’ authentically liberating and authoritative word constitutes a fulfillment of human presence (in terms of decisive presence to self, world and God); that therefore Jesus is the Word of God. Hodgson goes on to say that Jesus’ continuing presence (for which the resurrection is the prototype) is the basis of the word-event today:

Wherever and whenever an authoritative, true, and faithful word comes to speech -- within the church or beyond its domain, in the form of preaching and the language of piety or in the parlance of the world -- there the one who was the word of faith is present and active [op. cit., p. 277].

This line of argument may remain unconvincing to the pragmatic demands of the American mind. Nevertheless, it represents an attempt on the part of the new hermeneutic movement to deal with the christological problem.

Another means of dealing with the problem of the content of the word event was recently proposed: a marriage between linguistic analysis and the Heideggerian language tradition found in the new hermeneutic. From the homeland of that hermeneutic, a Continental voice (Ebeling’s) cautions against this mixed marriage (in his Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language), while out of American independency another voice (Robinson’s) counsels that compatibility may be possible (cf. his "Language in a New World"). Such a union, he seems to feel, might move beyond Heidegger’s clairvoyant speculation that language functions to create world and so might lend a scientific parallel to Heidegger’s idea. Privately, Robinson has suggested that such a merger might well catapult the new hermeneutic movement into a more "scientific" theology.

III

A further conceptual problem within the new hermeneutic -- one which seems to have received the least of recent attention -- is the God problem. The God of the new hermeneutic appears to be so immanent that, were the human race and language to disappear, no God would be left. There is an insistence that the event of the word of God does not imply a being (God) who stands behind the event itself. Such is the existentialist position. Many can applaud this as a statement about the radical and irrevocable incarnation. Others find that it leaves an underdeveloped, religiously unsatisfying concept of God. Part of this problem grows originally out of Heidegger’s avoidance of God within his philosophical framework. He demonstrated that God could not be conceived of as a being (which would make him subordinate to the category of Being per se and merely one being among other beings), and he cautioned against identifying the traditional God with Being (for Being could have none of the attributes -- beneficence, love, omniscience, etc. -- that are applied to the God who is a being). Heidegger is correct; these are mistakes we should not repeat. But how are we to speak of God as somehow capable of relating (to all creation), present in his word, not self-identical with humanity, yet free from those inadequate conceptions of a personal being, etc.? This task remains before the new hermeneutic. Peter Hodgson has made some attempt at resolving it in the volume cited above, but much of the work lies ahead of us.

The concept of "world" is another category that has received recent development, notably at the hands of James Robinson. In his essay "Hermeneutic of Hope," Robinson declares that humankind’s linguistically constituted world is a point of optimism and hope in the midst of its tragedies, for such a world is relative and possibly subject to positive change. Indeed, the thrust of much Christian language (as authentic word) is toward a new world that is breaking in upon the present one. Robinson reminds us that even though an authentic word may seem out of joint with the inauthenticity and fragmentation of the times, it has a latent potential which continues to shape humanity’s present situation:

God’s word is not some doctrine God reveals, but God giving his word. When a person gives his word, he commits himself to a future; giving one’s word in the present does something in the present about the future, namely, it commits a future, if the person keeps his word [op. cit., p.528].

This process of word-shaping-the-future can be seen in many of the new idioms that first appeared in our language as a radical challenge to the present states of "world" and later came into popular usage as our world shifted under their influence. Consider the language and rhetoric of recent protest movements. "Power to the people" was originally a rather provocative phrase with what sonic considered anarchistic or socialistic overtones; today it predicates a middleclass, in-the-system attitude acceptable to 200,000 members of the citizens’ lobby Common Cause. Again, "socialized medicine" or "population control" would have created national hysteria in the early 50’s. Today these phrases are widely used as indicators of significant options for our future. Our perception of the world adjusts to our use of language, and language has the power to alter our world, for better or worse. Hence the word of God, as authentic language, has the potential for restructuring a world reconciled from estrangement, liberated from the language of bondage, and saved (as in salvus, to make whole) from the demonic threats of violent fragmentation.

IV

If indulged in isolation from the church, the American tendency to nurse the new hermeneutic into conceptual maturity is a dangerous introversion. In Germany, proponents of this hermeneutic speak more boldly and declare that its sole purpose is to be the advocate of the church’s decisive word-event, its representation of Jesus the Christ. If this purpose is forgotten in the American rush for conceptual consistency, the movement will veer toward middle-age stagnation.

But if the new hermeneutic is to make its contributions to the life of the church., a self-hermeneuting needs first to be undertaken. Decades ago Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911 ) argued that hermeneutics is understanding gained by reconstructing and reliving the material being interpreted. This reconstruction, while following many of the paths taken by the original author of the material, would also open up new paths. Were today’s "new hermeneuts" to reconstruct the thought of Martin Heidegger, whose philosophy largely undergirds the new hermeneutic, they could "retrieve" (wiederholen is the Heideggerian term) much that is immediately applicable to the task of the church. (Of course a thorough theological critique of what in Heidegger is usable and what is not is prerequisite. Omission of this precaution too often, leads to confusion of existential philosophical categories with those of Christian theology.)

For instance, Heidegger offers a basis for coping with the meaningless God-talk heard from so many pulpits today. Preachers informed by the new hermeneutic are in a position to speak convincingly to those for whom "God" is an empty word. New hermeneuts take the experienced absence of God seriously. However, they understand that the blame for God’s absence rests not on the death of God but on the death of language. The Christian tradition knows of a God who is present in his Word (in creation -- "And God said . . ." in redemption -- "the Word became flesh": in continuing reconciliation -- "our gospel came to you not only in word, but also in power and in the Holy Spirit" [1 Thess. 1:5]).

Where language fails, the medium of God’s presence fails. It takes no theological analysis to discern the failure of language in these times. The oppressed groups in our society -- women, racial minorities, the poor -- know well that current language is enslaving and insensitive to them as persons. Such language -- the kind that blocks and blurs humanity’s true identity and freedom -- is precisely what Heidegger calls inauthentic language. If Gods presence is to be experienced again, authentic language must be reborn.

V

Heidegger warns the would-be user of authentic language that it is not a matter of careful composition or clever rhetorical construction. No one can will to speak authentically, for he does not own his language. Perhaps Heidegger’s greatest contribution has been his demonstration that we do not invent language to name our world but that, on the contrary, language which discloses our world is given to us. The preacher who understands this assumes a more humble posture toward his important task. He can only look to a truly authentic word spoken in the past and attempt to retrieve it. If he understands the Christ as the Word, truly liberating and victorious over the powers that separate and estrange persons from each other and from God, he has a source to retrieve.

What is this "retrieval"? Heidegger offers a general suggestion about it -- one that we need to adapt to biblical hermeneutics: "By the re-trieving of a fundamental problem we understand the disclosure of its original potentialities that have long lain hidden" (translated by William Richardson: Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought, p. 93).

To retrieve a biblical text (or any other "text" which speaks an authentic word) we must find out how its original language cut across the world of its time. What new point did it make? What experience (word-event) did it evoke in its hearers? Biblical criticism of form, source, redaction, and cultural influences will help the preacher-retriever in answering these questions. Once the "hidden potential" of the text has been discovered, the retriever must discover the language that will express that potential again. Often that language will sound quite different from the original. It may be regarded as profane (secular) or offensive -- but that is precisely why the original language was a skandalon! Sometimes there may be no language capable of expressing the original potential of the text -- a situation that reminds the retriever of his dependency on the language given him. Theologian John Cobb and other participants in the new hermeneutic discussion have asked whether, considering the radical difference between first century and 20th century structures of thought and belief, this lack of language is not a constant problem. However, the retriever who lacks the language to express the point his text wants to score must witness to it in silence (which itself can be one mode of authentic language). Whether by silence, gesture or speech, the retriever functions an a poet who must assist the subtextual potential of his material to "language" itself once again.

In adopting this mode of ministry, the preacher becomes Heidegger’s "tracer of fugitive gods." Christ is not immediately accessible; he too is rendered hidden and fugitive by one’s inauthentic use of language. In hiddenness the fugitive Christ "hails" a retriever to trace his fugitive path and prepare for a new epiphany brought about by the renewal of language. Christian preaching, then, is not the denial of God’s or Christ’s hiddenness but the means by which God functions from his hiddenness to call people into responsible, authentic existence. When the preacher cooperates in this activity, he and his congregation participate in a word-event, an event of authentic language that speaks with authority. He begins with the godless presupposition of the estranged human world and the failure of language (a failure that even the greatest skeptic recognizes), but his speaking becomes a "God-ing," the making present of the fugitive God.

VI

Here the new hermeneutic leads to preaching as a subversive activity! Christian preaching demands subversive language-events that overthrow the present structures of language. Again, we are indebted to Heidegger for the analysis that supports this claim. His synonym for inauthentic language is "everyday" language. And subversive language, he says, is language that overthrows everyday language from underneath. This means that preaching cannot use "superversive" language: religious concepts from a world above everyday language. No, successful communication of the preacher’s message depends on "secular" language, which is underneath everyday, careless language and is attuned to the ground -- the ground of being (i.e., the disclosedness of humanity’s true nature).

Herein lies the greatest power of preaching. As subversive language-event it announces in the familiar context of secular language something that is utterly hidden: the fugitive God of the Christian tradition. When this event occurs, the fragmenting, destructive power of inauthentic language is smashed and subverted. The old is turned under, the new is turned up, and one is called to make a decision. Should he decide for the new, its authenticity (i.e., its sensitivity to the presence and distinctiveness of being) gives rise to a fourfold revolution in him. Heidegger said that authentic language brings together the quadrant of earth and sky, mortals and divinities. Hence authentic language restructures ones perceptions in such a way that he simultaneously experiences an ecological revolution, a cosmological revolution, a racial-sexual revolution and a spiritual revolution. And since language creates the human world, these are not just Inner revolutions"; they can be expected to express themselves in human social structuring and institutioning. No less than this is the potential for preaching as a subversive activity!

Bibliography

Dilthey, Wilhelm: Gesammelte Schriften. 14 vols. B. G. Teubner, Stuttgart, 1958.

Ebeling, Gerhard: An Introduction to a Theological Theory of Language. Fortress. 1973.

_______________ : Theology and Proclamation. Fortress, 1966.

Funk. Robert W.: Language, Hermeneutic, and Word of God. Harper & Row, 1966.

Gadamer, Hans-Georg: Wahrheit und Methode. J. C. B. Mohr, Tübingen, 1965.

Heidegger, Martin: Being and Time. Harper & Row. 1962.

_______________: Poetry, Language, Thought. Harper & Row, 1971.

Hodgson, Peter C.: Jesus -- Word and Presence. Fortress, 1971.

Richardson, William J.: Heidegger Through Phenomenology to Thought. Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967.

Robinson, James M.: "Hermeneutic of Hope." Continuum, VII (1970), 525-533.

_____________: "Language in a New World." Projections: Shaping an American Theology for the Future, edited by Thomas F. O’Meara and Donald M. Weisser. Doubleday, 1970.

_____________: and John B. Cobb, Jr., eds.: The New Hermeneutic. New Frontiers in Theology series. Vol. II. Harper & Row. i964.

Compulsive Gamblers: Reno’s Lost Souls

On a Saturday afternoon in a betting parlor in Reno, Nevada, Jack, a young mid-westerner, sips his second beer and rolls the cool bottle across his forehead. Cigarette dangling between his fingers, he peers eagerly at the flitting figures on the television screen.

UCLA and USC are playing football to determine which team will represent the Pacific Eight Conference in the 1974 Rose Bowl. Jack is nervous. He has bet heavily on UCLA -- and his team is losing. He folds his hands in a parody of prayer and mumbles, ‘Please, God, let them win this time."

Actually, Jack would prefer a more direct route to a win. He tells the crowd around him how he won a bet in Nebraska: a bribed official in the Big Eight Conference "misofficiated" an important football game, and Jack, who was privy to the official’s chicanery, won hundreds of dollars on the game. But cheating does not seem to be in the cards today. UCLA will lose and so will Jack.

Still, he has hopes for a Southeast Conference game. He tunes in on it by radio and finds that his luck there is better. Then he checks a ticker tape which is mechanically providing data on games throughout the nation. When the whole count is in, Jack will be a winner -- today.

All this time Jack has been "working." Gambling is his profession and his only means of support. He is employed by no club or casino. He comes to a Reno betting parlor each week, to fleece or be fleeced.

At Harrah’s Casino nearby, Wanette, a 50-year-old widow, busily feeds $5 tokens into a slot machine. Her arm and back are aflame with pain, a condition her physician warns her will worsen if she continues to play the slots. However, she won a $5,000 jackpot last night, and she intends to blow all of it before she leaves the casino. Why? She explains, "My psychiatrist in Europe told me that I have a need to punish myself."

I

Jack and Wanette are compulsive gamblers. Jack is young and self-confident. He is sure that he can consistently overcome the odds stacked against him. His experience tells him that he can go on winning forever. Wanette wants to stop, but she doesn’t know how. Expensive psychoanalysis in Europe did not cure her. And now that she is back in Reno she can find no one to help her.

Jack and Wanette are the products of a society that allows gambling to flourish. You will find their type in California card rooms or at Massachusetts dog- or horse-racing tracks. But these two express little interest in gambling in areas other than Nevada. That is where the action is. In Reno you can bet on anything you could bet on anywhere in the country, and in Reno everything is legal. In other words, Nevada actively encourages betting. According to William R. Eadington, assistant professor of economics at the University of Nevada at Reno, that state derives half its income directly or indirectly from gaming sources.

The U.S. Department of Public Health estimates the number of compulsive gamblers in the nation at nearly 6 million -- a figure that rivals the statistic for alcoholism. But in northern Nevada no one knows or seems to care how many compulsive gamblers reside there. Whatever the number, it appears that their hardship does not outweigh the $800 million in revenue the state generates each year from gambling. So lucrative is the gaming industry that Nevada has apparently decided to put its money on producing more gamblers instead of on programs for rehabilitating them. In fact, few Nevadans will openly admit that there are compulsive gamblers, for to admit as much would also be to admit that there is something inherently evil in their states major industry.

Nevada legalized gambling in 1931. Other states are now considering similar legislation. However, before they do so they should take a serious look at the price Nevada has paid for its experiment. They should note Harry S. Truman’s words:

If you want to be like Nevada. that’s your business. Nevada is the only black spot on the United States continent. So go ahead and do what you damn well please. . . . Legalized gambling is the worst thing in the world. I don’t believe in it. Too many people have jumped out of windows because of Nevada. It is a fever.

One consequence of Nevada’s action is that (according to the Federal Bureau of Investigation’s Uniform Crime Report) Reno’s crime rate today is far higher than that of most other American cities of comparable size. But perhaps the most damning consequence of legalized gambling, is that it tends to anesthetize the gambling state’s moral sense. Nevada, and Reno in particular, have totally forgotten about Jack and Wanette. The Reno community has failed to set up even one rehabilitative agency for the compulsive gamblers who want help. That failure is accounted for by a laissez-faire attitude toward gambling that permeates this growing community. It says in essence: "Do what you want so long as you can pay for it. Only the individual can decide what is right for himself. If he gets into trouble with his vices, then it’s his problem."

I asked Bob Brigham, a vice-president at Harrah’s, what the casino’s official policy is in this regard. He answered that Harrah’s felt no shame about its activities and needed no policy on compulsive gamblers. "We don’t think people who gamble too much are any of our business," he told me. "Wouldn’t you get angry if a restaurant waitress told you that you were too fat to have a second piece of pie? We feel the same way about so-called compulsive gamblers. If they want to lose their money, that’s their business."

II

Many Reno residents have adopted this "liberal" view of Harrah’s. Even Reno’s "enlightened" churches agree with it. Few of them are willing to rock the economic boat. After all, they profit from tithes paid by casino employees, and their budgets and building programs are enhanced by the depression-proof stability of the gaming industry.

One might say that many Reno churches suffer from a type of moral schizophrenia, a separation between belief and action. The United Methodist Church, for example, has a history of condemning gambling. Its "Social Principles" states specifically: ". . . gambling is a menace to society, deadly to the best interests of moral, social, economic and spiritual life, and destructive of good government. As an act of faith and love, Christians should abstain from gambling, and should strive to minister to those victimized by the practice." Yet no United Methodist Church in Reno has called the gambling industry to task, exhorted its members not to gamble or set up rehabilitation programs for compulsive gamblers.

Even so, United Methodism should not be considered ethically lazier than other denominations. The fact is that so far only one church in Reno has made a serious effort to deal with the problems of compulsive gamblers. That single church is Faith Lutheran, led by David Babcock. Pastor Babcock once tried to organize a Gamblers Anonymous group and failed. He blames the failure on Reno’s relatively small size: We keep trying to start groups, but we can’t keep a critical mass built up." However, he has succeeded in starting another kind of group an organization called Gam Anon. But this is not the same as Gamblers Anonymous; Gam Anon is designed not for the deviant gambler but for his or her spouse. On Thursday evenings Gam Anon members gather at Faith Lutheran to discuss their common problems. The women complain bitterly that their husbands are exploited by the casinos but get no help for rehabilitation. One of them, Janice, says; "Clubs extend limitless credit. They must! My husband has the worst credit rating in town and he still gets credit at the clubs. He’s tried to close his accounts at several clubs, but he goes back in the morning and has carte blanche. Nobody will help you when you’re down."

Wanette attended Gam Anon meetings for a brief period but soon left. She says Gam Anon is the only organization in Reno which recognizes her problem, but it could not help her, because it is not meant to help the gambler, only the spouse. Wanette is back playing the slots. She will not get help from the state government. No agency for the rehabilitation of gamblers exists within the state’s Division of Human Resources. The division’s chief assistant, Orville Wahrenbrock, says: "I’m not aware that a problem called compulsive gambling exists in Nevada. We do have programs to aid problem drinkers and drug abusers, but no program specifically designed to help gamblers." Anyway, Wahrenbrock insists, his experience has shown that compulsive gamblers leave the state because they can’t afford the gambling habit; hence there is no need for the state to institute programs to help them. He denies that such an agency would prove a political hot potato in a state which depends so heavily on gambling for its revenues. Another high official in the division disagrees. This man says: "Obviously there is a problem of compulsive gambling in the state. I think we’ve just swept the problem under the rug. How can the state government admit its major industry is creating a problem?"

III

One agency under the aegis of the Division of Human Resources is the Nevada Mental Health Institute -- a hospital which, however, has no programs for compulsive gamblers. I asked staff psychiatrist Dr. William Allport why not. "We are in a bad area to treat gamblers," he said. "We don’t get much encouragement from the casinos. We don’t have any programs to stop people from buying liquor. In Nevada, we don’t have a program to stop people from playing the slots. Anyway, how can you expect the state to bite the hand that feeds it?

Even those agencies which might logically be expected to help the gambler in Reno fail to do so. For example, Community Welfare, a private group funded by the United Way, will provide transients with enough food and gasoline to allow them to leave town -- but no other help. Dorothy Drew, director of this agency, has a motherly face that belies the businesslike attitude she takes toward transients seeking a handout. She says:

Most likely, the people we see are from the rural south or midwest. They cannot see casinos as hometown industries equivalent to general stores or mining companies at home. They don’t necessarily come to Reno no gamble. But it’s a fairyland to them and soon they’ve lost all their money. To the Reno elderly with, a fixed income, gambling often seems to be salvation. In the casinos they can stay as long as they want. They can dream of a big hit. For them gambling is a form of entertainment.

Community Welfare knows of no agency which might help gamblers. Nor does any group in Reno. Trinity Episcopal Church in the heart of the city contains the ecumenically funded offices of People, Inc., a family counseling service administered by a clergyman, Thomas Magruder, who has a degree in pastoral counseling. Dr. Magruder and his staff see something like 25 clients a week, and he estimates that 10 per cent of these have some gambling-related difficulty. "The problem," he says, "is that I really know very little about gambling therapy. . . . I would like to help, but I just don’t know anything useful about the problem. Nobody in town seems to."

The one agency in Reno that gamblers might turn to for help is the police department. But more often than not, if they use the police department it is only as an "alibi": having lost an intolerable sum of money, they will go to the police station and claim a false robbery in order to conceal the loss from a boss or a spouse. A Reno Police Department detective, Wayne Lucia, told me that within blocks of the police station he has seen people beating their heads against telephone poles and ripping their clothes to approximate the appearance of a robbery victim. Incidentally, Lucia, who is charged with investigating embezzlements, says that no one knows how much money is lost to Reno businesses at the hands of embezzlers, but that 75 per cent of the total is directly related to gambling; and that the only way in which the department can help the embezzler and the gambling addict is to sentence them to a lengthy but, hopefully, rehabilitative jail term.

IV

My point is very clear: Reno has not been interested in helping its compulsive gamblers. It is true that of the thousands of people who live in or travel to Reno every year most do not become addicted to slot machines or roulette tables; only a comparative few cannot say No to the urge to gamble. Thus the fact remains that Nevada has made its own bed and will probably continue to lie in it. Legalized gambling is there, probably to stay. But does the community have some responsibility for the human wreckage strewed in its green felt jungle? So far, where the question has been asked at all, the answer is No.

The Church and Social Responsibility: Where Do We Go from Here

Our years of warfare in Indochina and, more recently, the Watergate affair have ushered in a period of national self-examination and self-criticism. Not just radical critics but establishment types too have begun to ask, Where did we go wrong? So we sharpen our analytic tools and try to discover what those disastrous experiences tell us about ourselves as a people and a nation. But we in the church need also to ask what Vietnam and Watergate have taught us about ourselves. While it is true that many denominational bodies and leaders protested vigorously against our government’s Indochina policy, it is all too evident that by and large the local churches failed to confront the theological and moral issues of the war.

As we probe the reasons for this failure, we must, I believe, shift the focus of our criticism from the rank-and-file membership of the churches to the clergy, professors and denominational bureaucrats. In the past decade church leaders often voiced cynicism or even a sense of futility about involving local churches in social action. Socially concerned clergy were encouraged to look elsewhere for support of their concerns -- the implication being that significant social action occurs almost anywhere but in the church. Local church silence on the issues of Indochina, then, was practically foreordained.

A Participatory Model

What I am saying is that church leaders have not given adequate attention to the local congregation as a significant context for addressing social issues. At the heart of their negligence is a misunderstanding or false estimate of the importance of education for social responsibility. They seem to view education in terms of setting up additional classes to provide members with more information about issues. If this is education, its influence will be minimal. However, if we accept the thesis of certain religious educators that it is the total church experience which is the chief educational influence on members, we have a crucial clue to development of various styles of social action within local parishes. For then education is not merely the function of the Sunday morning church school or the weekly study groups, but of all of church life. Worship educates, the budget educates, business meetings educate. The priorities and emphases that are embodied in the dynamics of congregational life educate members to a particular understanding of the Christian faith. A class may deal with U.S. policy in Indochina, but unless this issue is placed in the context of worship or of debate or the budget, members are effectively educated to regard it as relatively unimportant.

The constructive implication here is that we need to structure social issues and social action more organically into the life of the congregation. To do so will require special appreciation of the church’s subtle and symbolic influences on its members consciences. For example, in the heat of domestic uproar over the Vietnam war, one congregation in Denver set aside the hours 9:30 A.M. to noon on Memorial Day Sunday for a church community discussion of the war. Probably more important than anything that was said that Sunday morning was the symbolic impact of this event. By devoting prime time to a consideration of the issue, the church communicated to its members that this war was of central importance for Christians.

Grass-Roots Decision-Making

There are hopeful signs that local church members are of a mind to become more seriously involved. The rebellion of local churches against denominational programs and priorities certainly has its negative dimensions and implications, but it may also indicate that the members are ready and willing both to exercise greater initiative in developing their own programs and priorities and to participate in making decisions about the congregation’s life. In other words, the grass-roots mood evident in American society is affecting our churches too. It affords significant opportunities for the clergy to devise means by which members can deal with social issues in the local church context.

The key concept here is member participation. The local church must more intentionally structure its life so that it becomes a decision making community in which members have a large voice. This is hardly a utopian idea, because the local church already functions as such a community. Decisions -- about budgets, for example, or about organizational and programming priorities -- are constantly being made in committee and congregational meetings, and these determine the style of church life, for they crucially affect members’ perception of what the church is all about.

The first step in improving the church’s responsiveness to social issues, then, is to get them on its agenda. Introduce social issues into the planning phase of church life. Bring them before the congregational boards and committees. Include the social action dimension in the preparation of annual budgets. If social responsibility is indeed an area of the church’s mission, it should be reflected in the structures and processes of the church’s life.

The emphasis in this pattern is on the concrete rather than on the abstract or theoretical. Concrete proposals become the occasion for educating members about social responsibility. For example, they are not asked to deal with racism in general, but to deal with proposals for countering racism in their own communities -- not simply to react to denominational directives but to consider a specific course of action available to them where they live. Perhaps it is only through such experiences at the local level that members can become aware of the value of and the need far wider church initiatives. Unfortunately, pastors or boards sometimes attempt to write social causes into budgets in a surreptitious way. Instead, church leaders ought surely to open the doors wide to member participation in decisions about the church’s response to social issues. For members will hardly learn how to deal with social issues in light of the faith except through the experience of participating in decision-making in the context of the church.

In this participatory model, leadership is exceedingly important. Pastors must function not only as initiators and facilitators of member participation in decision-making, but -- even more important -- as interpreters of issues from the perspective of Christian faith and ethics. They need to be able to explain to members what is happening in processes of debate and resolution; and to do that in the midst of an often emotional give-and-take is much more difficult than preparing a sermon on a social issue. Hence this interpretive task requires leaders who have internalized theological knowledge in their own life style. It requires leaders who know how to show members the functional relation of Christian faith to the issues under discussion. It requires leaders who can view conflict among members as an occasion for growth rather than as a threat. Finally, this task requires leaders who are willing to risk the defeat of their own views. Not that I believe that a pastor, if he is to be an effective interpreter, must refrain from voicing his own convictions. I do believe, however, that parishioners will listen to and value the pastor’s direct expression of his views if he submits them in the context of honest dialogue rather than through pronouncements.

The Church as Moral Educator

There are good reasons to be hopeful that the church can function better than in the past as a community for the moral education of persons. For one thing, the church is a continuing community relationship for many members. Many group involvements are transient; people tend to move from group to group according to their shifting needs and interests. In the church, however, membership is more likely to be a cradle-to-grave affair. Hence the church enjoys a unique opportunity to exercise a moral influence on members through the priorities and experiences embodied in its own ongoing existence. If we want members to regard social responsibility as a crucial dimension of the Christian life, we should be willing to lay the groundwork for long-range influence on them as well as to respond to immediate issues. In part, local church people’s lack of responsiveness to immediate issues such as the Indochina war represents an earlier failure to provide for social issues in the dynamics of congregational life. The way to deal with dualism is not by attacking members’ stupidity or insensitivity, but by overcoming the dualism implicit in the way most members currently experience the church.

There is a second reason why the church is uniquely equipped to be a moral educator. In our society there are numerous groups and communities that are concerned with individual growth and interpersonal relationships, and also numerous groups that are concerned with social action in the community. But few are the groups and communities that are concerned with all these dimensions of human life. The church, however, is such a community -- at least potentially. The faith by which the church lives is centered in God who brings human beings to fulfillment through the fellowship of persons in a community of justice and reconciliation. The church is called to embody the concern for individuals, interpersonal relations and social justice, for in the Christian life these are not distinct and separate but integrally related dimensions. Their integration into the life of the church so they hang together is the challenge for church leaders, and the opportunity. It may provide the governing rationale for church planning and programming. The question is not one of either pastoral care or social action, but: How can the two be organically related in the dynamics of congregational life in faithfulness to God, for whom love and justice are inseparable?

A Community of Conviction and Concern

That membership in the local church today grows out of conviction (rather than out of the drive for conformity that prevailed a decade or so ago) is a hopeful sign. In reaction to the fragmented, depersonalized, hectic style of the secular city, people are seeking community and evincing interest in a chosen discipline for their lives. Here are profound opportunities for local churches. If the temptation is to look upon the church as a haven of togetherness in a hostile or indifferent society, the church need not succumb. Rather, it can become a community of conviction, participation, personal relationships and discipline, in which men and women can reorient themselves to the world through the rediscovery of its center in the gracious activity of God. Also integral to the life of this community is a reorientation to responsible participation in society through concrete opportunities for deliberation and action.

A single model for structuring social responsibility into the life of the local church is neither necessary nor desirable. The model will depend on particular church polities, on the size and nature of the community in which the church is situated, and on the distinctive characteristics of the congregation itself. The crucial need is to open up avenues for participation and to bring social issues to the center of the church’s agenda, together with its other vital functions. Thus members can actually experience the relation of the church to social issues.

An experiential base for all this is the task. The opportunity for learning about the church’s responsibility in society can be structured into the dynamics of congregational life. The short-range results may be disappointing to socially concerned clergy. But the groundwork is being laid for longer. range influence on the lives of members and on the local church itself. With social responsibility built into its self-understanding, the church need not again find itself so unprepared and ill equipped to respond to critically important issues like the Indo-china war. We need leaders who are willing to develop the expertise and accept the responsibility for working with a group of persons in the local church to cultivate patterns of decision-making that lead to a greater acceptance of the church’s mission in society.

Separate Unto God

In this age of integration and ecumenism, one hears a great deal of talk about black and white churches’ "getting together." But before black churches and black Christians allow themselves to be carried away by the idea that they are called to usher in a golden age of reconciliation in the church, they should examine the meaning of this call.

For too long black Christians believed that the reason they had their own churches and ministers was that white Christians barred them from their "houses of God." It is true that after the founding of the black church community, blacks were barred from white congregations. But that is far from being the whole story behind the existence of the black church.

I

As is well known today (at least in the academic circles of the black church), Richard Allen is commonly considered the father of the black church because of his refusal to be a member of a congregation where white Christians were making the house of God an instrument in the dehumanization of black people. Yet the black Christian must now begin looking more deeply into Allen’s simple act. The average black Christian who knows of this act is unable to grasp its significance -- unable to see that, with Allen, God and the Spirit of Christ were also walking out of the white churches of these United States. This is hard enough for black Christians to see; it is much harder, almost impossible, for whites to see.

How then can we speak confidently of God’s walking out? We can because that statement is consistent with the testimony of the early Christian church, and because the actions of white Christians in America were then -- and still are -- in radical contradiction to what God’s revelation in the Judeo-Christian faith has taught us: that God is universal and that his call is for all people to come unto him and into his house to partake of his love, his justice, his mercy -- indeed, of his very being. And the counsel of Jesus -- nay, the command of Jesus -- is that when the Christian testimony is rejected, his disciples are to depart from the place of the rejecters. It is this commandment, in obedience to which Allen refused to let white men make a mockery of the Christian faith, that stands today as the God-given birthright of the black church. For the establishment of the black church was not the work of a mere man; it was the work of Christ.

The revelation of God in the black church and in the lives and experience of black Christians has laid an obligation on black people: their task is to stand everywhere in the world as a Christian symbol of God’s opposition to oppression. White men must be made to realize that the black church is the instrument of God in this world, not just a group of nigger churchgoers who are separated unto themselves until the good graces of white men call them back into fellowship with white congregations.

The black church has a long history. Yet, because full apprehension of God’s revelation comes slowly, step by step, black Christians have been a long time discerning their purpose in the world. But now that purpose is being discerned, and those who have been enabled to discern it must tell the world about it.

II

The question confronting black Christians and white churches today, then, is not so much one of integration as it is one of ecumenism. And to me it appears that this is the question to which black Christians must direct their attention when they discuss black-white reconciliation in the church. Otherwise, they might ignorantly betray God’s purpose for them. For it is precisely God’s purpose that stands opposed to any deep ecumenical approach between the black and white churches of America. Integration is not the issue, because integration requires only that whites be tolerant when blacks become a part of their congregations (or vice versa, should such an unlikely thing ever happen). At most, integration only requires passiveness of whites. It has nothing to do with doctrine, it has nothing to do with theology, and it has nothing to do with God’s purpose as this relates to the mission of the black church. Ecumenism, on the other hand, has something to do with all these.

Ecumenism in the modern sense has to do with a union of all churches that fly the banner of Christianity. It involves a reconciliation of their "faith and order." It involves give-and-take -- indeed, a watering-down of that which is held to be true. And by this time we black churchmen should have arrived at such an understanding of God’s will and nature as will enable us to refuse the white man’s continued attempts to water down the things we hold to be true and dear.

Ecumenism also involves the question of order or church polity. As one examines the structures of black churches and white churches, it seems that this question presents few problems. But there is no telling ‘how soon and how much this area of the church’s life will begin to differ as between the black and the white churches.

God’s revelation in the black experience calls for continued development of, and continued commitment to, a theology that will counter oppression and uphold justice the world over. This development and this commitment began with Allen and were nurtured by black churchmen through the King era. Now they must be carried on by the black churchmen and theologians of our time. They are not the mission of the African Methodist Episcopals, the Baptists, or what have you; they are the mission of the black church as a whole.

III

This, then, is what ecumenism means for the black Christian: crossing those petty lines of division which we have patterned after white churches and denominations and entering into that broader area of the Christian faith which God has delivered into our hands. It means (to borrow Bonhoeffer’s phrase) that black Christians must now "come of age," must realize that the Baptist Articles of Faith and other such statements have nothing to do with the definition of the black church. The black church is defined by the very ideas which demand a new ecumenism among black Christians.

The black church is defined not by any or all of the traditionally accepted creeds but by the creed of liberation: the creed that one man does not have the right to oppress another, be the other black or white, baptized by immersion or by sprinkling, fashionably attired or running naked in the jungle. It is defined by the creed that the dehumanization of one man by another is in total contradiction to the way of Christ and must be opposed. And it is this creed which makes possible the black Christian or black church community -- one that some of the faith have hinted at over the years.

Recall the testimony of many an unlearned black churchman who stood before his people to declare to minister and layman alike that "it makes no difference what church or what denomination you belong to, as long as you have Jesus." This faith was affirmed time and time again by unlearned men of God. Obviously, it lacks the refinement of a school theologian’s statement of faith. But the learned black churchmen and theologians are only now ready to finish what the unlearned started. They are only now ready to put their theological tools to the right task: that of hewing out a refined theological or creedal statement of just what the black community of faith is all about -- what it is about above and beyond denominationalism. But it is precisely at this point that the ecumenical movement as it involves the black church comes to a halt. It cannot go beyond this point.

And why? Not because of any shortcomings on the-part of the black church, but because of the shortcomings of white churchmen. Where black churchmen were bound together across denominational lines by the spirit of justice which -- though at times only timidly -- opposed the oppression and dehumanization of others, white churchmen were united across those lines by a spirit of hatred for black people. This was their spirit of ecumenism, and it still exists in the white churches of this nation.

IV

In the past, some of those who have looked for theological and doctrinal differences between white and black churches have concluded that such differences, if any, were minor. But it should now be clear to white and black churchmen alike that the theological differences between them are very real, and that they form barriers which, in my opinion at least, are insurmountable for the present generation unless, of course, white churches are ready to make a radical commitment to the fight for justice on behalf of the oppressed. But that fight cannot be limited to the U.S.A.; it must be carried wholeheartedly into Rhodesia, into South and Central America, into all places where God’s people are ill-treated and held in bondage. But since, as it seems, white churchmen cannot deal boldly with the issue of integration, they can hardly be expected to take on the more challenging issue of justice.

To be sure, we shall be reminded that white churchmen have made "significant" contributions to the cause of justice and freedom. Well, what is the test of a Christian’s action? Certainly not the fact that, in a given situation, he took positive action when he could have chosen to do nothing or to act only negatively. Rather, a Christian’s action is to be evaluated (if at all) in the light of what he could have done (his potential commitment) as compared with what he did (his actual commitment). Whites have not elected to apply this principle to their dealings with black people; therefore, blacks are not impressed by their "significant" contributions to the cause of justice.

No doubt the charge will be made that we blacks are advocating hatred and discrimination in reverse -- that we are saying that people should be admitted to the church according to the color of their skin. We are saying nothing of the kind. Certainly I present no theological objections to blacks’ becoming members of white churches or to whites’ becoming members of black congregations.

As for the black church, it is the body of Christ and it is open to all people. So far as I know, the black church has always lived by the precept that, as the church of the living Christ, it has no authority to turn men and women from the doors of grace and salvation because they are of a different color. Nor is there any indication that the black church contemplates such an ungodly and unchristian practice. When we say No to a black-white ecumenical movement, we are not saying No to those whites who may wish to become committed through the black church to the work of Christ for the oppressed.

V

If we black churchmen are separated unto God, what should be our standards for discipleship? Obviously, if we are to take our church’s mission seriously, we cannot continue with our present procedures. We have opened the doors of the Lord’s church to people of all degrees of commitment, asking only, "Do you want to join the church?" If the answer is in the affirmative, the "transaction" is completed as quickly and as simply as a transaction between a child and a candy salesman.

But if the black church is to live up to its mission as a body separated unto God to do his work in the world, then it must give prominence to the question of commitment to Christ the Liberator. There are too many black churchmen and churchwomen who would not lift a finger or give a mite for the liberation of their oppressed sisters and brothers. How can they possibly claim a place in the black church?

This question of commitment becomes even more crucial when we say that the black church must be open to all people, whites included. How can the black church allow even one white man to become a part of its fellowship simply because he "wants to join the church," or because he "just likes the warm spirit of black churches"? Membership in the black church should be based upon commitment to Christ and the liberation of oppressed people. In the same way, the future of the black-white ecumenical movement must be based upon the commitment of the white church to Christ and liberation.

Is all this to say, then, that there is no hope of an ecumenical movement’s maturing between black and white churches? No. We cannot say what God’s revelation holds for the future in this regard; we can only affirm what it says for the present. And that is that black Christians should get on with the fight for justice and an end to oppression in the world. This is the real ecumenical call of the black church.

The National Rifle Association: Public Enemy No. 2

In our already bullet-riddled society, this summer’s gun-down of Mrs. Martin Luther King, Sr., was more numbing than shocking. While it dramatized once more our need for gun legislation, the ritual responses to it were as rote as consoling words at the funeral of an aged cousin. Gun buffs once more fired off a round of dour warnings against hasty action, while newspaper editors resurrected their stock columns calling for gun control. So it goes. Thanks to the powerful opposition of the National Rifle Association, nothing will change. The tragic shooting of Louis Sisler, the association’s Washington lobbyist, a few weeks after Mrs. King’s assassination is a sad and ironic monument to the association’s obduracy.

In an article I wrote several months ago ( America, March 23, 1974), I flippantly commented that "next to the Mafia the National Rifle Association surely ranks as the most dangerously irresponsible organization in the country." The statement drew sharp rebukes from outraged NRA members across the nation. They were right, of course; to level so serious a charge without further ado is sensationalist journalism. We need to look further into the kind of interest group the NRA exemplifies.

I

Many good things can be said for the association. Unlike the Mafia, it is aboveground and proudly legal. It encourages family life, outdoor recreation, conservation of endangered species and natural resources. It promotes sports and sportsmanship. It urges gun safety and pays its bills; and, while some may accuse it of paternalism, it recognizes a crack markswoman as quickly as her competitors do. Roughly 1 million citizens have joined the NRA’s ranks: and, if one may believe its projected image, they are primarily hardworking, law-abiding, taxpaying middle Americans. So far, so good.

The red flag which sends NRA leaders and members into rage is legal gun control. Here the image fades behind raw firepower. In its determination to kill all effective gun law, the NRA leadership, through the family mouthpiece, The American Rifleman, and such relatives as Gun Week, pursues the following irresponsible policies:

(1) The NRA paints a distorted picture of its opposition, labeling as "commies," "pinkos" or leftists citizens who advocate federal or state gun legislation. In fact, most of those advocates are religious or political leaders, college professors, businessmen, housewives, farmers, factory hands: hardworking, law-abiding, taxpaying middle Americans. One belief they share is in the right not to be shot; another is in the need for a sane gun law to protect the common weal. For the NRA to call the Washington Post the "uptown edition of the Daily Worker" is cheap journalism, cute but vicious. The stance of the Daily Worker is irrelevant to the virtue of any position.

(2) The NRA deliberately confuses the issues. No serious attempt is being made by anyone to ban all guns, yet NRA literature crackles with salvos against gun-banners. "When guns are outlawed, only outlaws will have guns." True enough, at least by definition. The objectives of the National Committee for a Responsible Firearms Policy, for example, are to limit gun sales and ownership to qualified citizens, to ban only the cheap "specials" and to identify the flow of ammunition. Senator Adlai Stevenson’s proposed amendment to the 1968 Gun Control Act would require every handgun to be registered and every handgun owner to obtain a federal license. It would ban only the cheap specials that are not fit instruments for sporting purposes or protection. Senator Edward Kennedy’s bill is more stringent; in addition to banning the specials, it would require all gun owners to register. Both bills make a careful and considered effort to protect the rights and privileges of sportsmen. To fight those efforts in terms of "banning" obscures the issues.

The NRA also blurs the meaning of "freedom." At 5:45 A.M. on July 5, 1974, Dale A. Bennin walked into Kugler’s Sport Shop in Manitowoc, Wisconsin, bought a .38 caliber pistol and ammunition for it, and walked out. Within two hours he had killed his estranged wife and her parents. Then, cornered by police, he blew out his own brains. One would hate to limit Mr. Bennin’s freedom to buy a gun at any time, at any place and for any purpose -- unless, of course, one also considers the right to life of the three victims. Registration, including a waiting period, will be no guarantee against such incidents, but it will allow time for passions to cool.

(3) The NRA twists the Constitution, specifically the Second Amendment ("A well-regulated militia being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be infringed"). The overwhelming evidence as to the will, of the Founders, a common-sense reading of the words of the amendment and the consistent interpretation of the Supreme Court all indicate that this amendment refers to a well-regulated militia. It reflects the colonists’ fear of a central standing army, and the right it guarantees is a collective, not a personal, one. Gun owners, who are dispersed, leaderless, random and largely unwilling to be counted, are hardly the well-regulated militia which the amendment explicitly cites.

Even if the point is granted that the Second Amendment protects a personal right to bear arms, it must be recognized that no civil right is absolute. In fact, the "natural rights" that Madison and Jefferson were so concerned to put beyond the reach of government can be regulated, though not infringed. For example, no government can deny the right of its citizens to marry, but every state has certain marriage regulations: minimum age, one spouse at a time, opposite sex, blood test, a license.

A parallel can be found in a civil right as sacred as that of free speech, which cannot be infringed but does suffer some regulation: pornography, fighting words, and libel are not protected from state law by the First Amendment. Examples can be multiplied for every civil right. To claim that firearms alone are exempt from such regulation as might be judged necessary for the common good is to speak self-serving nonsense.

II

(4) The NRA exploits people’s fears. Communism serves the NRA well as resident bogy. Its scenarios of door-to-door battles between cowboys and commies not only prolong adolescent fantasies but betray a peculiar lack of confidence in the ability of the police, the press and the armed forces to meet any such threat.

The menace of criminals, likewise exploited, is as great as it is because criminals have ready access to guns -- thanks to the NRA. Even so, the danger is highly overplayed. It has been estimated that the average citizen has an infinitesimal 1-in-40,000-per year chance of becoming involved in a felony resulting in death. Since burglars try to avoid their victims and robbers to surprise them, the value of guns as a deterrent is problematic.

Finally, the Hitler argument ("he began with gun control") not only is historically inaccurate; it elicits real fear with a false metaphor. The United States of the 1970s is not Nazi Germany of the 1930s. The first line of defense against tyranny is free elections and a free press, not Saturday night specials. But when guns flood the country, the price of fancied foes is real danger: from accidents, from anger in moments of passion, from mental derangements, from muggings. Since failure to comply with the law is sufficient reason for corralling irresponsible citizens, gun registration would limit, not expand, the threat from lawless elements in society.

(5) The NRA misstates the problem. Its propagandists claim that the cause of random gun slayings is judicial softness toward criminals. In fact known criminals account for only a small percentage of gun murders and injuries. In 1972 there were some 18,520 murders. Of these, roughly 5,000 were committed by a stranger during the commission of a random crime; the others -- over 70 per cent -- resulted from spouses killing spouses, parents killing children or vice versa, lovers killing lovers, etc.

Further, a person becomes a criminal in the act of committing a crime. There is no infallible way to pick out such persons before they act. Even if there were, no person’s civil rights can be violated on the ground that he will probably commit a crime. Anyway, once a crime is committed it is too late for the victim. So blaming the criminal alone puts the problem on the real horns of a false dilemma.

An increasing percentage of gun crimes are committed by people with no previous police record and/or by the mentally deranged or the ideological fanatics. Dale A. Bennin had no record; upset by a faltering marriage, he became a criminal the first time he fired, at his wife’s father. Had he lived he could have been punished -- much, to the consolation of the victims’ ghosts, no doubt. The problem is the utter availability and accessibility of guns to whomever, whenever. "Guns don’t kill people. People do!" the bumper stickers pontificate. The truth is that people use guns to kill people. One can run from a knife and duck a bottle. Bullets are forever.

(6) The NRA blocks any reasonable solution. With one of the most sophisticated and well-heeled lobbies in the country ($8 to $9 million annual budget), the NRA fiercely stymies all efforts by legislators to pass gun laws, even though the results of local attempts have shown beyond reasonable doubt that such laws can be effective. Direct NRA lobbying on both federal and state levels, active letter-writing by members and personal pressure on legislators have proved so effective that we can count on roughly 25,000 gun murders being committed this year. It has been estimated that gun crimes cost taxpayers over $10 billion a year. This does not include the private cost and anguish of accidents and suicides.

The National Rifle Association could use its tremendous wealth and power to promote realistic laws that all citizens, including sportsmen and those genuinely needing protection, could live with in much greater safety. It will not do so -- and this is its crime against the nation.

III

Distortion, misstatement, exploitation, misrepresentation, equivocation, irresponsible use of power -- this is "business as usual" for the National Rifle Association in its anti-gun-control campaign. Judged by its activity, it operates on the same principle as less reputable and less legal organizations: the principle that the end justifies the means. The NRA is not as unmitigatedly evil as the Mafia, but neither is it as patriotic as it supposes. If the members I know personally are representative, they are good people afflicted with a peculiar blindness.

The Mafia takes no responsibility for the deaths and ruined lives caused by its traffic in drugs. The NRA takes no responsibility for the deaths and injuries caused by the traffic in guns. The crime of the Mafia is single: evil people doing evil deeds; the crime of the NRA is twofold: good people having the power to do good deeds and refusing, and raising clouds of dust around a problem the nation desperately needs to see clearly. The National Rifle Association is Public Enemy No. 2.

I Found the Lord in Jerusalem

Most Christians in Israel do not proselytize among the Jews; but a few high-keyed evangelists have created in the minds of Israelis the illusion that many Christians are actively seeking to convert Jews.

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Hardly a month goes by but that some article about Christian missions in Israel appears in the news media. Lately, for instance, we have read that Israel’s chief rabbi, Shlomo Goren, visited the heads of the Anglican and Roman Catholic churches in Great Britain to "ask them for support in stopping missionary activities in Israel, especially ‘the use of unreasonable means to persuade poor families to convert.’ " Again, under the caption "Israel May Attempt Missionary Ban," newspapers have reported that the conversion to Christianity of 5,000 to 6,000 Israelis yearly since the Six-Day War accounts for the activities of Jewish anti-missionary forces. Christian bookstores have been burned and the homes of church people fire-bombed. In both East and West Jerusalem, rocks were thrown through church windows, and Christian libraries and hostels were entered and damaged. On one night not long ago three Christian properties in Jerusalem were burned. But despite attempts on the part of substantial numbers of Israelis to end it, Christian proselytism is flourishing in the Holy City.

The Jerusalem Scene

"If you’re Jewish, I’d like to share my faith with you. I found the Lord Jesus as my Savior in Jerusalem": a resident of or visitor to certain parts of Jerusalem today is likely to be greeted with words to that effect by some young man or woman. But to suggest that Jerusalem Christians commonly or usually introduce themselves in this fashion would be to do injustice to many Christian groups and individuals in that city.

In the past few years I have spent a great deal of time in Israel, studying Jewish-Christian relationships there and, incidentally, learning Hebrew.

Having examined the more than 160 Christian religious and social service communities in Jerusalem, I can state that only about ten of them have even minimal interest in proselytism. Moreover, except for individual Anglicans and Baptists, this small proselytizing minority has no affiliation with any major denominational body; that is, the 5 per cent of all Jerusalem Christians who promote missions to Jews are neither Roman Catholic nor mainline Protestant, nor are they Eastern Orthodox. Rather, the missionaries who do give themselves labels are "Messianic Zionists," "Evangelists to the Jews," charismatics or Pentecostals, and their financial support comes from evangelical sectarians, rather than from representative Christian denominations.

Yet despite their small numbers, the zeal and vitality of these evangelists are not to be underestimated. They conduct as many as 50 worship services, Bible study sessions and prayer meetings per week. But, as I said, they are a minority. The majority of church personnel in Jerusalem live there in order to provide a religious life for its Christian residents and for tourists and to maintain the Christian shrines, not to carry on a ministry to Jews.

However, citing the proselytizing 5 per cent does not tell the whole story. Within this 5 per cent a distinction must be made between those missionaries who use high-keyed conversion tactics and those who offer low-keyed witnessing to Jews. To the latter, "evangelization of Jews" means sharing religious convictions with them. These missionaries present their beliefs, then "step back and allow God to assist the Jew in making his final judgment." Low-keyed witnessing groups are openly happy to welcome any Israeli who approaches them of his or her own accord; they do not exert pressure upon Israelis, nor do they actively seek recruits on the street or in private.

In contrast, the four or five energetic, high-keyed Jerusalem mission organizations that are fully committed to winning Jews to Jesus all share the same objective: that Israelis become "completed, Hebrew Christians through the saving knowledge of Jesus Christ." Their methods and approaches differ, however. Generally, these high-keyed missionaries work quietly, though their purpose and methods are such as to draw attention to themselves. They work on an individual basis, with one-to-one contacts. They distribute tracts, invite browsing in their bookstores, offer Bible courses by mail, sponsor student activities, approach Israelis who might visit Christian shrines, and conduct small home meetings. The missionaries express their convictions to all who will listen.

One missionary of this type, I discovered, devoted his Saturday afternoons to driving about Jerusalem in his auto, and whenever he saw Israelis out for a Sabbath stroll he slowed down and threw a copy of the New Testament in Hebrew translation at them. Another missionary, who managed a bookshop located on a street frequented by Hasidim walking to and from the Western Wall, scattered books and tracts on the sidewalk in front of the shop, in the hope that passersby would pick them up and read them. As a matter of fact, printed matter bearing the stamp of the Hebrew Evangelization Society and the American Board of Missions to the Jews can be found in all of Jerusalem’s public places, especially in hotel lobbies. But the zeal of one young man I encountered was even greater: he passed out Christian literature at the Western Wall during the Jewish High Holy Days of Pessah!

Since many Israelis are not able to tell whether particular Christians are Protestant, Catholic, Orthodox or sectarian, they blame all Jerusalem Christians for this high-keyed evangelism. Thus a few missionaries have created in the minds of Israelis the illusion that a great many Christians are actively proselytizing among the Jewish people.

Be that as it may, the results produced by the high. keyed missionaries are very limited. Israeli government statistics for 1948-68 confirm that reports of converts from Judaism to Christianity published by these missions are highly inflated. The government figures show that in the 20 years in question 201 Jews applied to have their religious status changed to "Christian," while 3,408 Christians applied to have their status changed to "Jew." The newspaper reports cited above (conversion of some 5,000 Jews to Christianity annually) are unsubstantiated. Since 1948, the Christian church has been a negligible spiritual force so far as Jews in Israel are concerned. One local missionary confided to me: "In the good old days, when we gave out food rations to Jews who converted, we had them sign for their gifts as proof of conversion. Also, when families brought their children to us for care because they were starving, we had converts who signed. We knew they converted to get the food, but that didn’t matter. We needed statistics. Things haven’t changed much -- we still need statistics. But now it’s harder to get converts. If you want to know the truth, I count everyone who comes into my bookstore and to my meetings as a convert."

Reaction to Mission Work

Though Jerusalem missionaries to the Jews are few and conversions just as few, missionary activities and tactics have angered and repelled both Jews and Christians. Agents of mainline denominations in the city point out that the evangelists are neither representative nor characteristic of Christianity. They remind us that many mainline churches and religious welfare organizations have been operating in Jerusalem for over 50 years and that, since the birth of the state of Israel, they have developed with its people positive relationships that exclude intentions to evangelize Jews. These church leaders believe that the missionary motive has no place in an atmosphere based upon respect.

But, Jerusalem church people are not alone in their opposition to missionary work. The news media have reported that the strongest objections to hyperactive missionaries come from "Orthodox and ultra-Orthodox Jews," who dislike Christianity on principle. That is to say, according to the media, it is religious Jews -- those who would not convert under any circumstances -- who voice the greatest opposition to the missionaries and resort to violence against them. But I doubt that Orthodox, Hasidic or religious Jews would use violence for such an end. It is significant that the persons recently apprehended for attacks on mission enterprises turned out to be members of political groups and university students. I think it an injustice to Orthodox and Hasidic Jewry to put them in the same category as those perpetrators of violence.

Jerusalem Jews have been accused of oversensitivity in their reaction to Christian missions. But their response to open proselytism is understandable. Christian persecution of Jews in Europe has left lingering suspicion of Christianity and its motives in Israel. Experience has taught Jews to consider any Christian activity around them as a threat. Swastikas, for example, have been painted on the Zion Messianic House in Jerusalem, thereby identifying the Holocaust with proselytizing Christianity. "Any Christian presence around me," one young Israeli said to me, "must be regarded as dangerous. Missionaries are certainly my cultural and religious enemies."

Another reason for Israelis’ objection to missions is nationalism. The new Jewish state naturally promotes values and a climate that are conducive to the growth and preservation of Jewry. Christian missionary work runs counter to those aims. Thus an Israeli dislikes any Christian activity which endangers his own or his children’s or country’s Jewishness. True, everyone in Israel enjoys religious liberty. However, when a Jew or a Muslim or a Christian tries to force his own views on another, many persons become incensed. In a recent interview Jerusalem Mayor Teddy Kollek said. ‘Missionaries are here and they are working. But we dislike their presence. The evangelists are a living reminder to Israelis that even in the Jewish state they have not escaped the Christian world: Christians are afoot seeking their souls.

A Problem of Understanding

Central to the conflict of interests between a handful of Jerusalem Christian evangelists on the one hand and Jewish and Christian antimissionary citizens on the other are basic Christian conceptions of Christianity, Judaism and the state of Israel.

First, many Christians today understand Christianity to be a mission-oriented religion. They see the conversion of non-Christians, especially Jews, as a critical step in preparing for the Messiah’s return. They insist that they "have an obligation to bring our Jewish brothers to Christ," and they believe that the duty to convert Jews carries with it the right to convert them anywhere and in any way. International Christian meetings -- the Jerusalem World Conference on the Holy Spirit, for instance -- announce that Christianity has the plan of salvation for all human beings. The embarrassingly arrogant proclamations issued by some Christian groups, who call themselves "Missionaries to the Israelites" or speak of "A Messiah for Israeli Believers," indicate clearly enough that in some parts of the church the conversion thrust has not ended.

A few Christian theologians have begun to question the assumption of many Christians that they have the right to present their faith to others and to work to convert them. They argue that it is exclusivistic Christian pride which allows missionaries to force their beliefs upon Jews and to assume that the Jews will gladly accept it. They point out that few Christians take seriously the Jewish conviction that Christian missions are an attempt to liquidate Judaism.

These same theologians are re-examining traditional Christian views of salvation and covenantal relationships in Judaism and Christianity. They stress, for example, that the concept of two covenants from one God (to Jews and to gentiles) recognizes coexisting means of salvation for both; and since neither group needs to approach the other for salvation from God, it follows that Christianity is no longer duty-bound to impose its faith upon Jewry.

A second problem is the Christian understanding of Judaism. Historically, Christianity has looked upon Judaism as an "incomplete" religion, a perverse faith to be tolerated only because it was the vehicle for bringing in the Christian era of universal salvation through Jesus. Indeed, the return of Jesus has been linked to the conversion of an Israel blinded by its own sinful, past. The Second Vatican Council, though it changed the form of prayers for the conversion of Jews, saw Jewry as still seeking the Messiah who had already come.

The church has always resented the continuing presence of Judaism and Jewry because it held that the Old Testament covenants were entrusted for safekeeping exclusively to Christians. To admit that Judaism was a religion as valid as Christianity was to question the status of Christianity. Did Christianity supersede the "Old Testament faith" or did it not? The answer for many Christians has been manifested in an intense, personal hatred of Jews, expressed even today by way of seeking their conversion, expulsion or annihilation.

Deeply rooted as such ideas are in the Christian psyche, they are changing. Some enlightened Christians are discovering that the existence of Judaism is by no means a scandal. They even assert that Judaism is a strong and vital religion and that its follower need not accept Jesus as Messiah. The living Judaism of today does not require the "solution" Christians have prescribed in the past.

Finally, a third problem regarding Christian missions to the Jews is Christian understanding of the state of Israel. To mission-oriented Christians, the Jewish state is as important as it is to Jews. In Contrast to Jews, however, evangelists strive to convert Jews to Christianity in the belief that their conversion will help to usher in the endtime. The evangelists are usually strong supporters of the state of Israel, for they consider its existence an eschatological sign that the eternal Israel is near. As one evangelist puts it in his sermons, the state of Israel is "God’s plan for the unfolding of prophetic and messianic truth." Accordingly, mission-minded Christians host international conventions on prophecy, the Holy Spirit and millennialism in Jerusalem, but do not evince even the slightest concern for the human needs of the Israelis. They and their evangelists fail to see the state of Israel as a real nation which, like every other nation, has shortcomings. This inability to relate to terrestrial Israel is evidenced in the epithets missionaries use in speaking of the Jews and their state. They refer to the Jews not as a people, but as "Children of the Bible," "Sons of Abraham," "Israelites," "Hebrews" or "the People of the Book"; and they call the state of Israel "the Promised Land," "the Holy Land," "the Land of the Bible" or "Zion." From the point of view of the evangelist, the Jews and their nation serve merely a utilitarian purpose: they prefigure the endtime.

Surveys on anti-Semitism among Christian denominations have shown that it is the Bible-oriented, evangelical Christian who exhibits the strongest anti-Semitic sentiments. He may support the Jewish state, but he is also the Christian most likely to translate the charge of deicide against the Jews into violent action. As for the fundamentalist missionary, he too may support Israel for eschatological reasons but at the same time be deeply anti-Semitic. He and his group are lions among the lambs, for in masking their real reasons for supporting the Jewish state they are a special danger to Israel,

The Future

What about the future of Christian missions in Israel? It is true that the extent of proselytism in Jerusalem today is minimal and its threat to Israelis small. Even so, those missions can and should be further reduced. And in that process both Jews and concerned Christians have a part to play.

First, the news media need to tone down their enthusiastic coverage of conversion activities and the Israeli retaliation that sometimes follows. These are, after all, comparatively minor events in the whole picture, but giving them such prominence can only encourage further excesses. So long as Israelis are concerned about mission efforts and fearful of their success, evangelists will assume that, they are getting results. As one evangelist proudly said, "I measure my effectiveness by the amount of hate mail and negative response my work stimulates!" Thus it should be clear that the media not only present a false picture but suggest the false conclusion that mission efforts are productive.

Second, evangelists commonly adopt the tactic of blurring the differences between Jewish ethnicity and the Christian religion. They attempt to convince secular Jews that they may remain ethnically Jewish while becoming religiously Christian; that is, Hebrew Christians. Religious Jews are more or less proof against such guile. They are not misled when they see the Star of David pictured with a cross in the middle. Yet the fact that Israeli Jews are viewed by missionaries as particularly ripe for conversion must be taken seriously.

One missionary instruction book declares: "Never be afraid of discussing the Bible with an Israeli. While he may know history and text, he will most likely be ignorant of the theological implications of the verses." We may do well therefore to question the idea that there is a significant lack of religious awareness among Israelis. That a few Jews fall victim to evangelical rhetoric says nothing about the value of the Christian message; rather, it speaks about ethnic Jews who seek to compensate for sociological deficiencies through religious change.

Christians who oppose mission work ought also to consider their relation to evangelists. The Israelis’ outcry against mission activities proves that they find evangelists offensive. Concerned Christians surely should prevent a kind of proselytism that evokes such negative Jewish reaction. The Christian in Israel who seeks to impose his faith upon Jews is guilty of the sin of arrogance.

Again, the mainline denominations might begin to undermine biblical literalism by bringing biblical criticism to bear. For example, they might seek to combat fundamentalist attitudes on the life and death of Jesus. An exclusivistic view of Christianity, which insists on the centrality of Jesus in the salvation of all humankind, fosters intolerant evangelism and perpetuates Christian anti-Semitism. The missionaries must be checked both theologically and practically.

The basic question is whether proselytism has a place in a religion which claims to be ecumenical. Certainly an ethical Christianity cannot proselytize and ecumenize at the same time. Christians have rarely shown openness and tolerance toward other religions. "We" were always right and "they" were always in error; and why tolerate error? Until Christian exclusivism subsides and tolerance toward all faiths increases, Jews everywhere must be on guard lest missionaries succeed in winning them to Jesus.