What’s New in Interpreting Genesis

While some of the best known and most loved stories are found in the book of Genesis, congregations can often tune out a sermon or lesson on Genesis with the thought that they are travelling well worn paths. On the other hand, Bible readers regularly find much that leaves them surprised, shocked, or wondering about how some of these stories (the rape of Dinah and Tamar's seduction of Judah) have anything to say about God's ways in this world. A number of recent studies have been published that offer help to readers and communicators who wish to hear the stories of Genesis as they were intended to be heard and to discover their significance for life at the threshold of a new century.

Commentaries and Expository Guides

The first of three commentaries to be completed in 1994 is Gordon Wenham's, Genesis 16-50 (Word Biblical Commentary Series, Waco: Word, 517 pp., $27.99) a companion to his 1987 work on Gen 1-15. The introduction to the first volume included an extended discussions of both source criticism that seeks to describe how the text came to be and literary studies that explain how the final form of the text reads. He offered a detailed yet clear review of the recent challenges to the classic JEDP hypothesis and posited his own theory that J was an editor who drew together earlier sources (including P, a reversal of typical critical theory) into the narrative of Genesis somewhere between 1250-950 B.C.E.

Wenham is a careful commentator who sets out the interpretative options before offering his opinion. For example he lists five alternatives for understanding the "knowledge of good and evil" in Gen 2:9 before offering his decision that it is a reference to wisdom. A five page excursus reports on attempts to deal with the great ages of the early inhabitants. The introduction to the ancestral narratives observes a number of parallels between the stories of Abraham, Jacob, Joseph and their families: all leave their homeland, quarrel with their brothers, move south to or toward Egypt, receive God's blessing and are buried in the cave of Machpelah.

The introduction to the second volume treats the issues of historical setting, patriarchal religion, and the roles that history and theology play in commenting on the text. Although the narratives are written from a suprahistorical perspective that is prophetic (the writer knows the mind and intentions of God, which ordinary humans and historians do not), the events and figures must have some historical basis, otherwise the theological claims have no basis. Radical arguments for and against historicity are balanced out with a careful review of the ways that the story does fit with the early second millennium, 2200 to 2000 B.C.E.

Again, Wenham skillfully balances the competing claims of historical and literary analysis, holding up neither as primary. Some observations are especially helpful, such as the three-fold bowing or meeting Joseph as a companion to Joseph's three-part rise to power. Wenham's command over relevant literature is outstanding. He can describe the cup Joseph placed in the sack by reference a monograph The Tabernacle Menorah. Yet the commentary does not suggest a larger purpose for the Joseph story; the analyses are faithful to the details but lack an overall synthesis.

The commentary follows the Word format of bibliography (Wenham's are extensive), translation, notes on text and translation, form/structure/setting, comment, and explanation. The arrangement allows readers to select the issues they will engage, but also points to the necessity of all the steps for a proper exegesis.

Victor P. Hamilton has also completed the companion to his 1990 Genesis 1-17 (Genesis 18-50, New International Commentary on the Old Testament Series, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1994, 800 pp., $39.95). The first volume offered a 100 page introduction that traced the rise of the documentary hypothesis, the challenges of Van Seters, Rendtrorff and Tengström and the fields of rhetorical and literary criticism. Other sections treated the theology of Genesis, the historicity of the patriarchs, canonicity and text, with a twenty-five page bibliography that handily put in one place all the major secondary sources. This is a valuable introduction, but Hamilton did not say much directly about his own commitments and approach. Given the diversity of methods that populate biblical studies these days, a word or two would have been welcome.

The familiar format of the NIOTC of translation, commentary and technical footnotes also help the user to choose the level of the discussion. The notes on the translation of Gen 1:3-5 take up most of the page! Following each section of commentary is a small section on New Testament appropriation of the Old Testament texts. The first shows how Genesis 1:1-2:3 was used in John 1:1-5, Col 1:15-20, Matt 19:4/Mark 10:6 , Galatians 3:28, Heb 4:4 and in general New Testament terminology. This is a very appropriate way to help preachers and teachers to develop a biblical theology. For example, Harrison's argument that the Old Testament does not explicitly link Adam and Eve's sin with the sin and death of all humans is followed by Paul's use of Genesis 3 in Romans 5:12-21 that does.

In treating the Joseph story, more emphasis is put on fine points of translation (often a boon for the preacher) than on the problems of reading that the many literary studies have raised. Ambiguity is glossed over, the man at Dothan is simply noted, Reuben intervenes because he is oldest brother, and Hamilton makes his own argument for the literary unity of Gen 37, only footnoting the literary studies that support the position. The now complete commentary offers a wealth of information that makes it a valuable resource, yet more theological synthesis of major sections would have been welcome.

The Genesis commentary of Terrance Fretheim in the New Interpreter's Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994, $65.00) takes up 355 pages of volume I. (The NIB deserves a review of its own as a commentary for pastors and teachers, supervised by a consultant team of pastors.) Fretheim discusses methods for study of Genesis, stating his own preference for literary study with an emphasis on "theological movement" within the texts. He covers the use of narrative and genealogical forms, the literary unity of the text, its structure and theme, and the issue of faith and history. He concludes that while it is not possible to demonstrate the historical existence of the figures in Genesis, we may understand that the ancient writers were able to recall authentic memories and to retell them with a theological intent. Fretheim rightly observes that alongside the theme of divine blessing goes a stress on "the role of the human in the divine economy," thus holding a certain tension between God's plans for "good" and human cooperation and resistance with that plan.

The Bible text is reproduced in both NRSV and NIV versions; this allows for comparison and communicates an interest in serving both mainline and evangelical christians. Hebrew words are printed and transliterated when they are important to the comments, but Hebrew is not used to engage in extended exegetical discussions. Emphasis is placed on the major point of the texts. For example, the image of God is judiciously explained, not as a distinguishing quality, but as a description to the whole human as a mirror of God's dominion in the earthly sphere. This view is similar to that of ancient kings, who thought themselves to be such reflections of deity. Genesis democratizes the image by claiming it for all.

Issues current in the debates on Genesis interpretation are raised and answered in non-technical jargon for the non-academic but informed reader. For instance, Fretheim calls the scholarly reliance on "chaos" forces into question in the light of God's sovereign will. His comments also show how a narrative like Gen 2-3 is open to interpretation and misinterpretation depending on the narrative signals and method one uses to read. Fretheim notes that the woman does not tempt the man or lead him into temptation in any way, but both succumb to the serpent's logic.

Each commentary section is followed by a series of reflections that usually answer readerly questions like the nature of the serpent, the language of a fall and original sin (with reference to Romans 5). The near-sacrifice of Isaac can be viewed as child abuse in modern eyes, but Fretheim notes that Isaac's questions show both his and Abraham's unwavering trust in God. Therefore, parents should be attentive to their own children's questions whenever the text is read and heard. Jacob wrestles with God, but this story does not symbolize repentance and character change; it is rather a test, as was God's test of Abraham. Would Jacob continue on with God, even when the going gets tough? In this way, Jacob's experience is like our own.

Many of the comments overturn traditional readings. When our tendency is moralize, Fretheim will stress God's activity, and when we will overtheologize, he will point out the human side of the story. The balance between human and divine effectiveness is most skillfully woven into his treatment of the Joseph story. Each reflection section concludes with a word on what has been said by or about God, stressing the theological nature of a story in which God seems hidden. Joseph's words of consolation to his brothers, "God sent me before you to preserve life" (Gen 45:5) are described as theophany based upon formal similarities to the speech of God (26:24 and 46:2-4) that eases fear and announces what God has done or will not do.

This is the first commentary to take seriously the point that the Joseph story is a story about God (by the way, "God" is the last word in the commentary) and God's work in the world, but not at the expense of the importance of human action as a response to that world involvement. The fresh and profound reading of the Joseph story serves as the capstone of Fretheim's stated approach. I was not always happy with the revisions of old readings- they sometimes seem to excuse human responsibility- but in the end evil is called evil and good is called good while an overly simple generalizations are avoided. This is literary reading with an eye to theology and a method to be emulated.

Donald E. Gowan in Genesis 1-11: From Eden to Babel (International Theological Commentary series, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988, pp. 125, $10.99) says little about his approach other than his conviction that the narratives of Genesis can proclaim theological truth when its reports are historically or scientifically inaccurate. He prefers the term "archetypal stories" over the traditional "saga," explaining that the stories explain what is typical about human nature, not what is unique to one time and place.

The theory of archetypal story is brought in to explain the appearance of the flood story in many ancient literatures, water being an archetypal metaphor for the chaos of life. Rather than explaining the repetitions in the Genesis flood story by reference to literary art, as Wenham and followers do, he compares the P and J versions. He concludes that P emphasizes the corruption of the whole creation, while J is more concerned with the sin of humanity. If so, then the pattern is similar to the movement of Gen 1 and 2-3, from creation as a whole to a focus on humankind. But whereas Gen 1 and 2-3 form two distinct literary units, the flood story does not. What Gowan does not discuss is how the different agendas of J and P coalesce into one whole telling of the story.

Gowan's work is cautious and meticulous, yet he is able to clearly lead the reader along his lines of argument. He works to remove a lot of underbrush of misunderstanding and moralizing of the text, seeking to listen to it on its own terms. By preferring to speak of archetypal stories and to point out what the text does not say or teach, I find his approach to be sometimes negative, especially when he chides readers for asking questions the text does not mean to answer.

David Atkinson's devotional interests come to the fore in the first sentence of , The Message of Genesis 1-11: The Dawn of Creation (The Bible Speaks Today Series, Downers Grove: InterVarsity Press, 1990, 190 pp., $12.99): "The poem of beauty and grandeur which forms the opening chapter of our Bibles is a hymn of praise ot the majesty of God the Creator." To say this is not to imply that he is not interested in understanding the text as an ancient document. Atkinson suggests that its portrait of God would be a rock of stability for people in exile who would be tempted to succumb to the religious ideas of their conquerors.

Atkinson, like Gowan, explains that the theological interest of the writer is not the same as our interest in how it happened, but his tone is gentler, adding that creation is not "a scientific category." Even so, he notes that the orderly style of Gen 1 reflects a mind that is "not far from the interests of science." The exposition engages issues of environment, time, and sabbath, quoting from C. K. Chesterton, Peter Berger, Arthur Peacocke, Fritjof Capra, Julian of Norwich, Augustine, Barth, and Moltmann- and all this for Genesis 1!

Probably the strongest section is the discussion of Noah and the flood. It is here that Atkinson finds a challenge to confront the problem of a creation that will either explode (the nuclear crisis has changed since 1990 but has not disappeared) or die of environmental poisoning. While not as thorough and penetrating as Gowan's commentary, Atkinson's work does satisfy by stating conventional positions without requiring dated applications of them. The many references to his reading show this to be an exposition compassionately connected to the world and its need to hear a message of good news.

J. Gerald Janzen's Genesis 12-50: Abraham and All the Families of the Earth (International Theological Commentary series, Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993, pp. 215, $17.99) uses a method of analysis that is literary and theological. He rightly claims that literary work itself is not enough; it must be used in service of theology.

The overall result mixes literary and theological concerns in a way that not only gives preachers something to preach, but also gives them some clues as to how. Narrative preachers especially will appreciate suggestions for fresh retelling of the old, old stories. For example, Janzen suggests that Joseph was not a spoiled brat, but one who suffered persecution in ways similar to Jeremiah and the Psalmists.

Some interlacings are overread. Even if the Samaritan woman in John 4 makes a few allusions to Deuteronomy (mentioning the prophet to come and the right place to worship), this does not mean that this woman is following Tamar's example (Gen 38) in trying to raise offspring for her first husband in line with Deut 25. The reading is ingenious, but based on a few links that could lead in a number of directions. Even if Janzen stretches too far at points, his feel for the richness of language as a tool to inform, but also to evoke, makes this commentary a pleasure to read and an experience in rediscovering the ancestral stories. It is well worth the price.

In seeking to answer the introductory questions about date and setting, Joyce G. Baldwin in Genesis 12-50: From Abraham to Joseph (The Bible Speaks Today Series, Downers Grove, InterVarsity Press, 1986, 224 pp. $12.99) makes reference to the ongoing debate on the historicity of the ancestral figures. Through many footnotes, readers will become familiar with the content of Essays on the Patriarchal Narratives, (IVP, 1980, presently available from Eisenbrauns) and its argument that Abraham was a living figure.

The readings stress faith and its tests, but sometimes at the expense of the questions that readers might have in response. Abraham should have trusted God instead of passing off Sarah as his sister on the assumption that God would have protected him just as he protected Sarah (from Abimelech at the least). How do readers appropriate this affirmation of divine protection in the light of martyrdom or holocaust? Lessons of faith will also raise questions of faith, and Baldwin most often skirts these.

Baldwin's comparison of the sale of Joseph to other examples of suffering servants (Isaiah 53 :3-6; Zechariah 11:12-13, 13:7-9) echoes some of the typology used in early Christian interpretation and it is good not to overlook this part of the history of exegesis. However, the lessons often veer toward easy moralization. Judah's deception of Tamar is condemned (Gen 38), but nothing is said about Tamar's commitment to her rights and the survival of the family that motivated her deception of Judah. Joseph forgets his father's house and acknowledges that God made him fruitful (Gen 42-50-52), but this is no disloyalty to his family and heritage; it is a refusal to linger on past hurts in bitterness and establishes Joseph as a moral model. In sum, the commentary is strong on historical background and individual faith lessons, but does not penetrate beyond these to an appreciation of the ambiguity of faith in the midst of life, or the social responsibilities of the person of faith.

D. Stuart Briscoe's, Genesis: The Communicator's Commentary, (Word Books, Waco, Texas, 1987; also available in paper in the Mastering the Old Testament Series, 414 pp., $12.99.) seeks a middle road between a preacher/teacher's need for explication of the biblical text and application to daily life. Briscoe states his preference for application. He offers an outline of Genesis that breaks each chapter into three or more parallel points- "Faith's High Point: Gen 22:1-34" lists "The Incident as a Test, The Incident as a Triumph, The Incident as a Type." Each section opens with the text taken from the New King James Bible.

The writing style is friendly and vivid; in speaking of the believer's response to creation he writes, "This sense of wonder makes created people worshippers." Interspersed with the comments are illustrations, often taken from Briscoe's experiences and encounters with others. The readings are conventional; the tower represents human pride and independence, Abraham is a model of faith despite his failings, Jacob learns virtue through the school of hard knocks, and Joseph is a boy with some growing up to do, just like those boys Briscoe recalls from his days as a youth worker.

The emphasis is on relationships, faithful dealings with God and other people. Judah's speech before Joseph is commendable because it does not evade responsibility. Some of the proverbial wisdom is striking: "Man is free to make his choices but he is not free to determine the consequences of his choices." We may wish for inclusive language and may shy from such "moralizing" of the text, but coupled with Briscoe's lessons on theology and God's ways with people, such moral teaching does not seem out of place. Thus the commentary models one version of biblical exposition, that which organizes the exposition around the lessons of the text. It would serve well for examples of how the text could be taught and preached, and would remind those who read it to remember the needs and questions of the people who will be listening. The book could also be used as a devotional guide.

Allen P. Ross, in Creation and Blessing: A Guide to the Study and Exposition of Genesis (Grand Rapids: Baker, 1988, 744 pp., $29.99) states that his book is not a commentary of Genesis, but a guide to help teachers and preacher appreciate the richness and complexity of the narratives and to organize the theological teaching for presentation to a contemporary audience. He divides Genesis into over 60 sections. Each section's treatment includes a short introduction, a summary of theological ideas, an analysis of structure and synthesis into an exegetical outline followed by a development of the exposition. A bibliography concludes each section. Although Ross confesses his skepticism about historical-critical methods, he acknowledges that one can learn much from reading these studies, so the bibliography ranges widely across the theological landscape. Like Briscoe's work, the book is helpful in modeling an expository approach to exegesis and biblical preaching with a focus on individual application.

Monographs and Specialized Studies

The survey of commentaries and expository guides gives some indication of the diversity of method at work in biblical studies today. Even though they have made their way into the commentaries, literary and social-scientific approaches are still "what's new" in biblical studies. The following works use and refine one or both of these methods to answer new questions posed by careful reading of the texts.

Sharon Pace Jeansonne has used a literary method that attends to point of view, plot, pace, dialogue, and character development in The Women of Genesis: From Sarah to Potiphar's Wife (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990, 152 pp., $12.00). Jeansonne's goal is to bring the overlooked women of Genesis 12-50 into the spotlight by reading the stories from their perspective. A helpful introduction helps readers understand the storytelling techniques of narrative gaps, ambiguity, repetition, combination and sequence of narratives, names and epithets, type scenes, and setting. Some interesting insights appear; what many interpreters have overlooked or excused, Jeansonne calls abuse. Thus we feel Sarah's shame and fear when she is taken into Pharaoh's household and are horrified that Lot would offer his daughters to the men of Sodom to protect his guests. Tamar is used sexually by Onan and Potiphar's wife is a plot device who is given no character of her own.

It is therefore puzzling that Jeansonne concludes with a brief reference to the narrative's function to define Israel's relation to its neighbors; this is clearly not her agenda in reading. She assumes that the narrative method will expose how the text would have itself read and does not recognize that her empathic stance is a concern she brings to the narrative. Some of her readings are taken from cues the narrator provides, while others are inferences she draws from the text. Reader response criticism is fine when it is acknowledged that that is what one is doing. Many of the insights generated are powerful and would enhance the teaching and preaching of these stories, but they should be used with a clear statement of the reader's stance, something like, "How do we encounter these stories? What do we feel when we see what happens to these women?"

Other literary studies do not take the general approach to narrative that Jeansonne does, but narrow in on some aspect of it. Laurence A. Turner in Announcements of Plot in Genesis (JSOT Supplement 96, Sheffield Academic Press, 1990, 210 pp., $37.50) argues that the narrative of Genesis offers four "Announcements" that not only give the reader a foretaste of what is to come, but provide signals for how the story is to be read. God's command to the first humans in Gen 1:28, God's promise to Abraham in Gen 12:1-3, God's oracle to Rebekah in Gen 25:23 and Joseph's God inspired dreams all signal a course of events and create an expectation in the reader that will either be satisfied or frustrated.

Turner uses contemporary literary theory to shape his definition of plot and chooses not to answer questions of authorship, date and composition. He concludes that the plot of Genesis does not follow a fixed pattern of promise and fulfillment, especially as humans carry out God's instructions. God told Abraham to go and leave his family, but he took Lot because, Turner argues, he hoped Lot would be his heir. He did not live his life as a blessing for others, and at the end of the story Abraham has only one legitimate son, and has only seen the land that he does not own. Why? Abraham's stumbling obedience is in part to blame. Likewise, Esau never serves Jacob as was promised in the oracle, and Joseph's father and mother never bowed down to him as he dreamed, because both father and son tried to make the foretold events happen through their own efforts.

In sum, by reading the announcements very strictly, Turner goes against the "predestinarian" mainstream of Genesis interpretation and sees God's commands and promises only partly fulfilled. His observations come together in an interesting formula: "human attempts to frustrate the Announcements tend to fulfil them; human attempts to fulfil the Announcements tend to frustrate them." This conclusion bears great theological significance for an understanding of human nature, obedience, and faith, but Turner seems content to state that it calls into question the idea that God's will overcomes all obstacles in Genesis. His comments do force readers to look closely and to ask if more is said about human resistance to God's will in Genesis than is typically assumed. While I wonder if Turner is using too tight a definition of fulfillment, his attempt to point out some unexamined assumptions about the text are well taken.

Hugh C. White, in Narration and Discourse in the Book of Genesis (Cambridge University Press, 1991, 312 pp.), examines the distinction between the speech of the narrator and that of the characters to see what light can be shed on Genesis. He observes that characters such as Adam and Abraham are introduced as recipients of the divine Word; little is said about their appearance or character traits and nothing is said about the source of the divine Voice. This divides the narrator's function and alters the typical relation of the narrator to the characters. The voice of God cannot be treated as simply another character, because it shares elements with the voices of both story-teller/creator and those whose stories are being told.

Speech-act theory informs his treatment of the divine promise, promise being a clear example of a word that does something for the listener (creates hope, doubt or questioning) even as it signifies. However, Genesis opens not with a promise, but divine Command ("Let there be light.") that is followed by words to the created humans of permission and prohibition (Gen 2:16-17). The material description of the scene in Eden sets the stage for a humanity motivated by desire, and sets up a contrast between the world inside and outside, again presaging the expulsion.

If inordinate desire was expelled by prohibition and punishment in the garden story, desire is introduced again in the promise to Abraham along with a new mode of living in relationship to desire. By receiving land, offspring and blessing from God in the form of a promise, Abraham's desire is satisfied in part and a new relationship is established with the promisor, a relationship of faith. Divine promise replaces divine prohibition.

The transmission of the promise to more than one son is the center of the Joseph story as the divine Voice recedes into the background. Joseph's dreams of greatness are a new form of divine promise and Joseph, in reporting the dreams, becomes a quasi-narrator who is caught up in the action. His theocentric words at the end of the story, "God sent me... God meant for good" writes a new story on top of the one told by the narrator, one in which God is the "primary acting subject." At the end of the story of Genesis God declares his purposes through a human voice.

This is a very sensitive and perceptive reading in which interpretations are grounded both in immediate context and in the context of the whole book. Modern narrative theory (which White surveys in the first third of the book) provides tools to help White observe what is going on, and so his larger conclusions are very solid, while some of the details seem overworked. Preachers and teachers would appreciate this book if they read it for an eye-opening account of the communication processes at work in narrative and for a renewed vision of the rhetoric of Genesis, but it will not offer quick help with Sunday's sermon or tonight's Bible study. White opts for richness and complexity over easy accessibility.

In The Voice of Jacob (Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature Series, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, 122 pp., $22.50) Leslie Brisman attempts to redefine the earliest of the modern biblical approaches, source criticism. Rejecting the traditional theory that the Pentateuch is the product of independent strands, Brisman postulates a multi-voiced text that resulted from the effort of one writer to reinterpret the viewpoint of another. The earlier foundational writer is not J, as Wellhausen suggested, but rather the voice of pious obedience and transcendent understanding of God (found outside the J texts in E and P). Brisman calls this voice Eisaac, joining the E of the Elohist strand with the name of the famous figure of faith and obedience. The earthy and irreverent style of J is revisionary, not pristine, and so J is called Jacob after Isaac's wily son.

Although Brisman's stated intent is to bring some sense of relationship between what are often viewed as separate literary strands, his reading fails to present a compelling vision of Genesis. The interplay between Eisaac and Jacob does produce a number of fresh insights into isolated features of the text, but what lacks is a clear notion of Jacob's purpose in re-reading the stories. Brisman does little to explore the motivation behind Jacob's revisionary spirit; therefore little insight is gained into the significance of this revised work for ancient or modern readers. We are left with a behind the scenes look at the making of a film without the film itself. While seeking to unify the texts (by pointing out their interaction), he has driven Eisaac and Jacob apart.

Another book in the same series, King and Kin: Political Allegory in the Hebrew Bible by Joel Rosenburg (Indiana Studies in Biblical Literature, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1986, 254 pp., $10.95) speaks of the interaction between certain texts as political "midrash." Genesis is a commentary of sorts on the Davidic history in II Samuel, a political allegory. Key words in the account of Amnon's rape of Tamar remind the reader of the temptation in the garden, but the story is more than a moral fable; it also criticizes David's political strategies. Absalom's murder of Amnon resembles Abel's death at the hand of Cain, especially when interpreted by the woman of Tekoa (2 Sam 14:5-7). Most importantly, the garden story sets out a pattern that can also be seen in the lives of Abraham and David: a protagonist leaves home and kin behind, suffers scandal and exile via a woman (note the assumptions concerning the woman's role), allows one son to be preferred and experiences the death of that son (Isaac was as good as dead in Abraham's eyes) and sees a another son exiled. Engaging and provocative, Rosenburg's treatments of the stories take these patterns and hold them forth, not as something imposed on the text, but as an underlying schema that urges one to read broadly and deeply. What readers may think to be forced patterning may turn out to be the subtle allusion that the narratives place before them.

The social scientific approach is best seen at work in Naomi Steinberg's Kinship and Marriage in Genesis: A Household Economics Perspective (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1993, 162 pp., $12.00). Her thesis is that, "the stories in Gen 11:10-50:26 are concerned with genealogical continuity and inheritance." (p. 5) Against the anthropological system typified by Levi-Strauss, she holds that marriage establishes descent and not the formation of alliances. Her analysis of the narratives leads her to the conclusion that the issue of where the men of these stories find their spouses is central, since only patrilineal collateral marriage within the line of Terah establishes a claim to the land of Israel. Children born to marriages outside of that marriage system are ineligible.

Steinberg observes that three genealogies (Gen 11:10-32; 25:12-26; 36:1-43) introduce three major narrative cycles (Gen 12:1-25:11; 25:27-25:29; 37:1-50:26) that depict issues of reproduction and inheritance. The Sarah-Hagar cycle depicts polycoity, the practice of raising offspring through a woman who is not a wife. Ishmael is not to inherit because he is not a son of a female descendant of Terah, as is Isaac. The birth of Jacob and Esau to Rebekah shows how inheritance is resolved when a monogamous marriage with a female from Terah's line produces more than one candidate as heir. Jacob buys the birthright for lentils and Rebekah helps him steal the blessing, but between the two incidents is a report that Esau married a Hittite woman, one who is outside the line of Terah. Rebekah sends Jacob to her brother Laban to save Jacob from Esau's wrath, but also to make sure that he marries within the proper line. But Jacob marries two of Laban's daughters; which will produce his heir? In this situation of sororal polygyny, cross-cultural studies report multiple heirship. Multiple heirship is helpful in understanding the prominence given to two sons, Joseph and Judah, in the narrative and in the poetic blessing off Jacob in Genesis 49. In addition, all twelve sons may be also be considered heirs. Thus the problems of lineal descent is dissolved and a horizontal system is set in its place; in this system, descent from Terah can be traced through any of the twelve tribes.

The approach does not account for everything, however, especially the break in the pattern that appears as Judah and Joseph take wives that are not from the patrilineal heritage. It is simply observed with an explanation in narrative terms, that Jacob accepted the sons of Joseph. The issue of inheritance in general also carries theological overtones which Steinberg does not discuss, but her focus allows for a clear reading of the narrative that puts many confusing details in their place.

Literary concerns come into Steinberg's work, and they are present as well in two other studies that employ methods from the social sciences. Terry J. Prewitt's The Elusive Covenant: A Structural Semiotic Reading of Genesis (Advances in Semiotics Series, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1990, 160 pp., $20.00) integrates the study of literary form, sign theory and kinship structures to demonstrate unifying structures in the narrative. He examines genealogical patterns, the depiction of polity and history, narrative structural patterns and the resultant mythos and ethos represented. He posits a chain of chiastic structures for each cycle of stories, but does not mention Gary Rendsburg's similar work in The Redaction of Genesis. As one would expect, there are many complex charts and explanations; therefore, the book is valuable as an analysis of the cultural and organizational dynamics at work in the text, not as a commentary.

Devora Steinmetz's title, From Father to Son: Kinship, Conflict, and Continuity in Genesis (Louisville: Westminster Knox, 1991, 224 pp., $15.95) reflects her interest in the tension between inheritance and aggression that is present in father-son relationships. After reviewing the theories of Malinowski, Freud, Girard and others on the role of fatherhood, Steinmetz uses the story of Oedipus to illustrate the problem; a father wants to insure immortality by passing on all of his "self" (both material and cultural) to an heir, but in so doing insures his own mortality and displacement. Hence the father-son conflict that must find resolution. The family relationships depicted in Genesis 12-50 both seek that resolution and model a social system for Israelite society in which members can live together without conflict. While violence between father and son does not arise as it does in other ancient stories, violence does threaten whenever blessing is about to be transmitted.

The book rightly notes the presence of violence and sacrificial images in the narratives (The ram at Moriah, the goat slaughtered to deceive Isaac, and the goat slaughtered to deceive Jacob) but the explanations derived seem far removed from the concerns of the text. The book is especially strong at pointing out links between the stories, especially the parallels between the pairings of Isaac and Rebekah and Judah and Tamar; both women covered their faces before meeting the men, both meetings occured near a well with a name that puns on the act of seeing, and both have twins who struggle in the womb, with one twin associated with the color red.

Steinmetz also rightly observes that the actions of characters in Genesis prefigure events in the later history of the nation; Abraham goes to Egypt and returns to Canaan and there fights with inhabitants of the land, just as Israel will do later. More importantly, key words related to the covenant show up in the stories of Abraham and Jacob. In sum, the book is strongest at pointing up links and connections and sensitively observing the use of these links to forge a typology of the nation in the patriarchal stories. It is less effective in handling the theme of intergenerational violence, something that seems to be more of a concern of modern psychological and sociological theory than that of the biblical narrator.

This survey of commentaries and books on Genesis is not exhaustive, but it should show that the practice of interpretation has continued to move away from concerns for the history of the composition of Genesis as it moves toward the study of the way the narratives tell their stories. This move places a new emphasis on the narrative's purpose to shape audiences' perceptions of the world around them and to instruct them in how to live in this world and relate to its God. To say this is not to say that historical concerns are unimportant to interpreters, but that these interpreters are becoming more and more aware of their role as readers of the historical and theological reality that is presented to them in the texts. In my opinion, this is a good development as long as the new emphasis on reading is matched by a concern for the theological teaching of Genesis. If the discovery of that theology is the goal, then attention to the communicative strategies of the texts ought to be able to help us to teach and preach with greater competence, sensitivity and power.

Reading Scripture with Kenneth Burke: Genesis

For over a decade the work of Robert Alter, Adele Berlin, and Meir Stemberg1 has offered biblical interpreters and preachers new paths into the narratives of the Hebrew Bible. They have taught us to look closely at characterization, plot, and setting, and, when there is nothing left to see, to look for significance in what is not there in the gaps. Their names have made their way into the preaching textbooks.2

Two of the three call their work the study of poetics, defined by Berlin as looking "not only for what the text says, but also how it says it."3 Yet it is generally agreed that preachers are not only interested in what texts say, or even how, but also in their function-what is a given text supposed to do?

To speak of the function of a text is to speak of its rhetoric. Three recent works on rhetorical criticism of the Hebrew Bible discuss function in terms of effect on a reading or listening audience. Alan Hauser speaks of rhetorical criticism as one color in the spectrum of literary approaches to Old Testament interpretation. He explains that "a rhetorical critic will basically do two things in studying a unit of text: analyze the literary features of the text, to the maximum extent possible, from the perspective of literary style discernible in the works of ancient Israelite writers; and articulate the impact of the literary unit on its audience."4

Phyllis Trible takes her definition of rhetorical criticism from James Muilenburg’s famous address to the Society of Biblical Literature,5 which she summarizes as "A proper articulation of form yields a proper articulation of meaning." Her study of the book of Jonah concludes with a catalog of persuasive moves YHWH takes toward Jonah and the reading/listening audience: "In teaching rhetoric as the art of composition, the book of Jonah unfolds rhetoric as the art of persuasion."6

Dale Patrick, another of Muilenburg’s students, and Allen Scult, a rhetorician, believe that the rhetorical study must not be limited to matters of structure and style, but must consider the intention of writers to influence audiences. They broaden "the means by which a text establishes and manages its relationship to its audience in order to achieve a particular effect."7 The inspiration for this view of rhetoric comes not only from Muilenburg, but also from the late Kenneth Burke. Burke’s earliest writings were concerned with the effects writers meant to create in their reading audiences. Over time his focus turned from literary effects to what he began to call rhetorical effects, that is, what literary works are supposed to do for their creators and readers.8 His work sought to give attention to both poetics and rhetoric without imposing hard and fast boundaries on either.

 This essay will show how Burke’s recommendations for literary and rhetorical analysis can direct the reading of a biblical text in preparation for preaching. Preaching here is understood to be the communication of a text’s message for the purpose of achieving the same rhetorical effect that was intended for the original audience,9 or, in the case of a radically different contemporary audience/situation, one that corresponds closely to it. If a Scripture text was designed to encourage, convict, or move to action, the sermon based on that text should do the same.

Reading with Kenneth Burke

Throughout his career, Kenneth Burke sought to establish a balance between extrinsic and intrinsic types of criticism through his focus on literature as a "strategy for encompassing a situation."10 Burke’s commments on method were based on his theory that every literary work, as a work of language, has its own network of symbolic action that links the work to the environment within which it was created. II He described the internal analysis of the work in terms of poetics, but added that questions about symbolic action" do involve the relation of the work to the author and his"12 environment, insofar as such information is available.13

Burke’s idea of the symbol as a link that is forged between writer and reader appeared in his first book of criticism, Counter-Statement (1931). "The symbol is the verbal parallel to a pattern of experience," and the appeal of the symbol is strongest when the artist’s and the reader’s pat, terns of experience closely coincide."14 Burke’s list of symbolic appeals stressed what the symbol, as the basis of a larger work of art, "does" for the writer and the reader. A symbol can interpret a situation, favor the acceptance of a situation, correct a situation, or liberate from a situation. "In sum, the symbol appeals either as the orienting of a situation, or as the adjustment to a situation, or as both."15

In order to determine the rhetorical function of a narrative, then, questions concerning the intention and design of the work as a form of symbolic action must be addressed. Burke stressed this function of communication when he defined rhetoric as "the use of language as a symbolic means of inducing cooperation in beings that by nature respond to symbols."16 Here is an answer to the question, what is the interpreter to look for? The next question is how to look for it, and Burke cautioned that one should not ask one question without the other.

Burke made one of his first attempts to articulate his method in The Philosophy of Literary Form (1941), and suggested the following guide lines: First, the critic is to watch for dramatic alignments, or "what is versus what." Then one lists the equation, "what equals what." Attention is given to the beginnings and ends of works as well as the location of the peripety, noting the development "from what through what to what."17

Elsewhere, Burke has called this statistical analysis the "principle of the concordance."18 The critic notices key terms for acts, attitudes, ideas, images and relationships, beginnings and endings of sections, the significance of names, and details of the scene that may stand "astrologically" for motivations affecting character. By focusing attention on the words of a text and their use in their contexts, the interpreter discovers the symbolic function of those terms in relation to the work.19

The charting of "what leads to what" reveals the structure of the work, which in turn reveals the function of the work. Burke’s method begins with an internal analysis in order to discover the effect the work is meant to have on its author and audience. Acknowledging that much of the poet’s work does things for the poet that it does not do for the reader, he believed that, in general, by discovering what the poem does for the poet, one may discover "a set of generalizations as to what poems do for everybody" (Burke often referred to writers as poets).19

The main point is to note what the poem’s equational structure is. This is a statement about its form. But to guide our observations about the form itself, we seek to discover the functions which the structure serves. This takes us into a discussion of purpose, strategy, the symbolic act.21

In sum, the basic strategy underlying Burke’s method is a charting of the work’s structure in order to uncover its "medicine," that is, what it is supposed to do for the writer and the reader. Underlying the method is his primary assumption that an intrinsic analysis of the work will reveal its structure, which in turn will reveal its function or "medicine." Burke’s methods of analysis have been summarized as a series of four interpretive steps: 1) cluster analysis: what goes with what? 2) agon analysis: what is opposed to what? 3) analysis of progressive form: from what, through what, to what? and 4) analysis of transformations: what is changed into something or someone else?22 The four steps and their questions can help us discover the rhetorical strategy and purpose at work in the story of Judah and Tamar and their dealings with one another.

Genesis 38

While most modern interpreters of Genesis have viewed the story of Judah and Tamar as an unreldted intrusion into the Joseph story," a growing number are following the suggestion of Alter that this chapter is central to the story of Joseph and his family."24 If one reads the story as part of the larger narrative concerning the family story (toledot) of Jacob (Genesis 37:2), then the verbal links with Judah’s suggestion to sell Joseph in chapter 37 and his later pledge and appeal for Benjamin in chapter 44 come to the foreground.25 The figure of Tamar can recede in such a reading; it can be forgotten that the story can function on its own, centered on a woman’s clever solution to a serious problem when it is read as an independent short story, Tamar, not Judah, becomes the main character and hero. 26

 

CLUSTER ANALYSIS: WHAT GOES WITH WHAT? Cluster analysis identifies key terms, noting either the frequency or the intensity of their use. Symbols and terms that are associated with key words indicate the meanings of those key words and their functions. One can then chart and look for patterns in associational clusters."27

The descriptions and associations narrated in verses I and 2 of chapter 38 are predominantly masculine. Judah separates from his brothers and settles (Hebrew nth, "he turned") near an Adultamite named Hirah. He then sees and takes as a wife the daughter of a Canaanite man whose name, Shua, is given; the woman’s is not. The narration of verses 3, 4, and 5 uses descriptions that are predominantly feminine. The wife of Judah builds up a family; she conceives, bears, and names the sons at least two, if not three, times (some scholars emend the Hebrew masculine "he called" in verse 3 to agree with "she called" in verses 4 and 5).28 The sequence of feminine active verbs, coming after a string of masculine verbs, sets up a distinction between the worlds of men and women that bears watching. Does it continue throughout the story?

In verses 6-11, the verbs are almost all masculine again. Judah "takes" for his firstborn son a wife named Tamar, just as he "takes" a wife for himself in verse 2. When Er’s evil moves YHWH to put him to death, Judah directs his second son, Onan, to fulfill the duty of the brother-in-law to father offspring to perpetuate the name and memory of his dead brother (see Deuteronomy 25:25). Onan only pretends to comply and is also put to death for the same reason as his brother: his deeds were "evil in the eyes of YHWH." This time Judah speaks to Tamar. He tells her to go to her father’s house until his third son, Shelah, grows up, but the storyteller reveals that Judah blames Tamar for the deaths. Tamar is silent in all of this. No verbs describe her action until she goes to her father’s house and stays there."29

The separate verbal worlds of men and women continue throughout the story, with the exception of the interaction between Judah and the disguised Tamar in verses 16-18. Judah is not said to be present for the births of his twins in verses 27-30. We might speculate that the separation of the worlds of males and females was thought to be normal, but we cannot be certain. However, we also see that the actions of Er, Onan, and Judah have left Tamar childless and isolated. She is a woman without a place.30

The separation breaks down in the scene that begins in verse 12. When Tamar hears that the widowed Judah is going up to shear the sheep at Timnah, she begins to act and speak. First, she disguises herself and sits by the road. The Hebrew word for "sit" (ysb) is the same one used for "remain" or "live" at the father’s house in verse 11; Judah sent her to live at her father’s house, but no one directed her to sit by the road. Second, Tamar speaks to Judah and bargains with him.31 He does not "take" her, as he took wives for himself and his son; he must tell her what he will give"(nm), three times (vv. 16,18). Judah later sends a goat to "take" the pledge back, but when she is not found, he decides to let her keep (again laq, "take") it. In her disguise, Tamar has entered the man’s world. She belongs to no one, and she directs her own actions, even negotiating for herself.32 It may be significant that the masculine and feminine verbs describing the sex act occur together for the first time in verse 18: "He went into her and she conceived by him."

So far the study of significant terms and their clusters has supported the reader’s notice that the actions of Tamar crossed the boundaries of propriety, not just in taking the role of a prostitute, but in taking the active role that had previously been unavailable to her. Tamar’s actions become even more significant when another cluster of key terms is charted. Words about seeing and recognition are clustered in verses 14-26. Tamar disguised herself because she "saw"(r ‘h) that Shelah had grown and she had not been given to him (v. 14). Judah "saw" her and took her for a prostitute (v. 15), for he did not "know"(yd’) that she was his daughter, in-law (v. 16). Judah heard that Tamar was pregnant and ordered her execution, but she set out his personal effects and said, "By the man who owns these I have conceived. Identify [or recognize, nkr] them; whose are they?"(v. 25). Judah identified them and revealed a new insight: "She is more in the right than I am, because I did not give her to Shelah my son" (v. 26).

Tamar acted because she "saw." As a result, Judah finally saw and ackowledged that he had acted unfairly toward his daughter-in-law. The idea is echoed in the name of the place where Tamar set herself, petah ‘enayim can mean "opening of the eyes."32 Yet Tamar and Judah are not the only ones who see; YHWH also sees that the acts of Er and Onan are evil (literally, "evil in the eyes of YHWH," vv. 7-10), and that moves YHWH to swift judgment. Judah is also judged for withholding offspring from Tamar, but much more gently. His death is the inner death of self-mortification that recognizes his injustice, and it ultimately leads to life. Are we encouraged to compare these different instances of seeing?

AGON ANALYSIS: WHAT IS VERSUS WHAT? The cluster of words related to seeing also has within it a pattern of opposition, much like the contrast between the worlds of men and women observed earlier. The agon analysis looks for words, themes, images, and principles that stand against one another. Agon analysis completes the work of cluster analysis by discovering the conflicts that may have motivated the work under study.34

Certainly there is opposition between the actions of Er, Onan, and Judah that would deny life and the steps Tamar took to give life. There is also opposition between the life-taking judgment of YHWH in verses 7 and 10 and the life-saving intervention or "judgment" of Tamar. Not only did Tamar’s actions bring new life to the family (two sons for the two that were lost), but her exposure of Judah gave him the opportunity to mortify or "slay" himself and thereby avert the possibility of a deadly judgment from YHWH.

Why was YHWH merciful to Judah and not to Judah’s sons? Perhaps part of the answer is to be found in Tamar’s initiative on behalf of the family. The contrast may also be suggested by the use of the idiom "evil in the eyes of YHWH" (VV. 7 and 10), which, as mentioned above, becomes another term in the cluster of seeing. Nothing is said about YHWH seeing or judging judah’s actions, yet Tamar could see what Judah was doing. Judah was spared the judgment that had fallen on his sons when Tamar "saw" his wrong, acted to win her right, and caused Judah to see the injustice for himself The tragedy that begins the story is turned around so that it ends in comedy.

ANALYSIS OF PROGRESSIVE FORM: FROM WHAT, THROUGH WHAT, TO WHAT? Is the story over? Not until the second set of sons is born; and so we may look at the third step in Burke’s method, that of progressive form.35 Burke also spoke of the "entelechial" test: "Look for moments at which, in your opinion, the work comes to fruition." The critic is here to attend to the terminology of these moments and then "spin from them."36

The story ends not with Tamar’s exoneration, but with her delivery of twins. Two birth narratives form a frame around the story that begins with characters described as evil and ends with one who is called righteous, or at least "in the right" (sdkh). We can observe that verses 1-11 constitute a story of birth and succession that turns for the worse, while verses 12-30 tell another that ends in joy and uplift. One is filled with death and judgment, while redemptive mercy is at work in the other.

Tamar’s bearing of twins completes the cycle of two birth narratives, so comparison between the two sets of brothers seems to be in order. Strife between brothers runs throughout the stories of Abraham and Sarah’s descendants and appears in Onan’s mistreatment of his deceased older brother’s wife and memory. Yet we have seen that the sin and judgment of the first narrative (vv. 1-11) are answered with grace and redemption in the beginning of the second (vv. 12-26). Does this comic frame extend into the second birth narrative (vv. 27-30)? Perhaps so, for there is novelty, surprise, and perhaps even delight in the strange birth of the twins.

It is generally assumed that Perez "breaks out" (prs) violently and pulls his brother back in order to crawl over him.37 Yet the brother’s hand is withdrawn, not pulled back, and there are no other indications of strife or violence. Could it be that the one marked as firstborn yields his position?38 Perhaps this is to say too much about a sketchy narrative, but we should notice that there is no clear indication of brotherly strife or of twins fighting in the womb as Jacob and Esau did. The younger rises over the older, just as Joseph sees his youngest blessed first by Jacob (Genesis 48:8,20) and accepts the father’s favoritism, just as Judah learned to accept Jacob’s love for Joseph and Benjamin. Is there a foreshadow of that resolution here?

ANALYSIS OF TRANSFORMATION: WHAT IS CHANGED INTO SOMETHING ELSE? A number of changes have been noted throughout this analysis, especially in the persons of Judah and Tamar, but perhaps the most significant transformation is the transformation of the story itself. The second narrative parallels the first in structure, word choice, and theme, but it does so to rewrite the story. Tragedy becomes comedy, a widow gains her right, and a wrongdoer begins to see.

Tamar’s actions foreshadow those of Joseph, who also hides behind a disguise, uses personal effects to incriminate, and moves Judah to acknowledge guilt and act sacrificially.39 By framing his brothers with the silver cup and claiming Benjamin as a slave (Genesis 42:6-44:17), Joseph recasts the scene of his own sale, hoping for a better outcome the second time around. In the same way, the second narrative of Genesis 38 begins in verses 12-16 with a second mention of Shua’s daughter, the man Hirah, and a journey in which Judah "saw" and "turned" (echoing the vocabulary of vv. 1-2), to indicate that this scene is a replay of the scene in verses I -II.

Here is no lightness in the first narrative, but in the second, the picture of a man leading a goat, looking for a prostitute that no one admits to having seen,40 is quite comical. Judah realizes this and decides to cut his losses before he and Hirah become a laughingstock, yet the reader is already laughing at the thought that Judah has been beaten at his own game of deception.41 The laugh signals a brighter ending for this story, and for the larger story of Joseph and his family. Judah has been transformed, not killed; this transformation points to a greater one. Joseph will see God at work, not only in the life of Judah, who offers himself for Benjamin (Genesis 44:33), but in the entire constellation of events: "You meant to do evil to me, but God meant it for good" (Genesis 50:20). The story of Judah and Tamar recommends to the reader the work of God, sometimes hidden, but sometimes revealed to those with eyes to see.

 

Conclusion

Kenneth Burke’s body of work left many approaches to reading that readers and rhetorical critics have used with great profit.42 Yet more significant than the methods is the perspective that generated them. Richard B. Gregg writes, "Without taking anything away from Burke’s concrete methodological advice, his most valuable contribution to the rhetorical critic is his insight into the nature of human symbolic behavior and the potential effect of symbolic inducements."43

The above analysis was written to show that Burke’s close reading of texts is different from, yet complementary to, the poetics of Alter, Berlin, and Stemberg. His focus on the rhetoric of symbolic action can help the preacher see the effects the writers of Scripture hoped to evoke in their audiences, thus unlocking their persuasive appeal. Preachers may want to highlight the associations and agons in a story-based sermon on Genesis 38, or they may choose to teach the biblical storyteller’s point that the injustice done to Tamar is corrected when the scene is replayed with a more active heroine. There ought to be plenty of freedom for invention in sermon writing. Preaching may or may not mirror the form of the biblical text, but it must recapture its function.

In sum, the analysis of clusters, agons, progressions, and transformations has helped us to chart not only the structure of Genesis 38, but its function, the effect it was intended to create. The chapter was written the way it was, the second story rewriting the first, to make us laugh and to make us glad that our own stories are also being written and rewritten by the same divine hand.44

 

 

Endnotes

1. Robert Alter, The Art of Biblical Narrative (New York: Basic Books, 1981); Adele Berlin, Poetics and Interpretation of Biblical Narrative (Sheffield: Almond, 1983); Meir Stemberg, ee (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1985).

  1. Sidney Greidanus, The Modern Preacher and the Ancient Text: Interpreting and Preaching Biblical Literature (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), 188-227; John C. Holbert, Preaching Old Testament: Proclamation and Narrative in the Hebrew Bible (Nashville: Abingdon, 1991); Thomas G. Long, Preaching and the Literary Forms of the Bible (Louisville: Westminster John Knox, 1989), 66-86
  2. Berlin, Poetics, 20.
  3. Alan J. Hauser, "Rhetorical Criticism of the Old Testament," in Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible: A Comprehensive Bibliography u4di Notes on History and Method, ed. Duane E Watson and Alan J. Hauser (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 1, 14.
5. James Muilenburg, "Form Criticism and Beyond," JBL 88 (1969): 1-18.

6. Phyllis Trible, Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method and the Book of Jonah (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1994), 224-25.

7. Date Patrick and Allen Scult, Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation, JSOT Supplement 82 (Sheffield: Sheffield Academic Press, 1990): 12. A similar idea comes from Jerry Camery-Hoggatt, Speaking of God: Reading and Preaching the Word of God (Peabody, Mass.: Hendrickson, 1995), 56: "By managing the reader’s responses, the evangelist (gospel writer) makes the text a vehicle of transformation."

8. His taxonomy of the "kinds of criticism" distinguished extrinsic criticism (concerned with causes and effects of the work) and intrinsic criticism (analysis of the work itself). Kenneth Burke, "Kinds of Criticism," Poetry 68 (Aug. 1946): 274-79. However, Burke meant to appreciate both modes of criticism while seeking to deduce from such analysis the principles of the work, the way a writer crafts a work to produce certain effects. "The Principle of Composition," Poetry 99 (Oct. 1961): 52.

9. Camery-Hoggatt, Speaking of God, 16, 162.

10. Kenneth Burke, The Philosophy of Literary Form: Studies in Symbolic Action, 3d ed. (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1973), 109.

11. Greig Henderson see symbolic action as a mediatory term: "Because of the ambiguity built into the transaction between text and context, there arises a need for mediation. Symbolic action is the principle of mediation." Literature and Language as Symbolic Action (Athens: University of Georgia Press, 1988), 18.

12. Burke’s earlier writings do not exhibit the inclusive language he used in his last years of writing and speaking.

13. Kenneth Burke, "Poetics in Particular, Language in General," in Language as Symbolic Action (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1966), 42. Burke also labeled the intrinsic approach as formalistic, while he called the extrinsic approach sociological. "Formalist Criticism: Its Principles and Limits," in Language as Symbolic Action, 495-99.

14. Kenneth Burke, "Lexicon Rhetoricae," in Counter-Statement (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1968), 152-53.

15. Ibid., 156.

16. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), 43.

17. Burke, Philosophy, 69-71.

18. Kenneth Burke, "Fact Inference and Proof in the Analysis of Literary Symbolism," in Symbol and Values: An Initial Study, Thirteenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy and Religion (New York: Harper, 1954), 283-306. Reprinted in Terms for Order, ed. S. E. Hyman with B. Karmiller (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1964), 145-72.

19. Ibid., 148.

20. Burke, Philosophy, 73-74.

21. Ibid., 101.

22. William H. Rueckert, "A Field Guide to Kenneth Burke-1990," in Extensions of the Burkeian System, ed. James W Chesebro (Tuscaloosa and London: University of Alabama Press, 1993), 16-17.

23. J. Alberto Soggin, "Judah and Tamar (Genesis 38)," in Of Prophets’ Visions and the Wisdom of Sages: Essays in Honor of R. Norman Whybray on His Seventieth Birthday, ed. H. A. McKay and David J. A. Clines (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1993), 281, citing the commentary of Claus Westermann, Genesis 37-50 (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1986), 49-57. Westermann’s most recent book does not include any discussion of Genesis 38. Joseph: Eleven Bible Studies on Genesis (Minneapolis: Fortress, 1996).

24. Alter, Biblical Narrative, 1-22. Judah Goldin, "The Youngest Son or Where Does Genesis 38 Belong," JBL 96 (1977): 27-44, notes that the problem was seen as early as Genesis Rabbah, par. 85.2, stating that the rabbi’s "approach of looking for idiomatic or thematic connection or association is sound," 3 1.

25. Robert Alter, Genesis: Translation and Commentary (New York: Norton, 1996), 217-23, 265. Significant repetitions include the directive to "recognize" or "identify" personal effects (Genesis 37:32 and 38:25-26), and the pledge, or offer of security (Genesis 38:17-18 and 44:32). See also Terence Fretheim, "Genesis," in The New Interpreter's Bible, Vol. I (Nashville: Abingdon, 1994), 604-5.

26. So also Harold Bloom, The Book of J (New York: Vintage Books), 220-23. The actions of Tamar also relate to the larger theme of the promise of nationhood in Genesis 12:1. Lawrence A. Turner, Announcements of Plot in Genesis (Sheffield: JSOT Press, 1990), 170; Gordon J. Wenham, Word Biblical Commentary, Vol. 2: Genesis 16-50 (Dallas: Word Books, 1994), 365.

27. Sonja K. Foss, Rhetorical Criticism: Exploration and Practice (Prospect Heights, Ill.: Waveland Press, 1989), 368-70, 374, citing Burke, Philosophy, 20.

28. Westerrnann, Genesis 37-50, 47; Victor P. Hamilton, The Book of Genesis: Chapters 18-50 (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1995), 430.

29. For a description of these events from Tamar’s point of view, see Sharon Pace Jeansonne, The Women of Genesis: From Sarah to Podphar’s Wife (Minneapolis: Augsburg Fortress, 1990), 98-106.

30. Susan Niditch, "The Wronged Woman Righted: An Analysis of Genesis 38," Harvard Theological Review 72 (1979): 143,48.

31. The change of costume and role may explain the repetition of the word nth in verses 1 and 16. It can be translated "turned aside" or even "spread the tent," in the sense of staying with someone. Soggin, "Judah and Tamar," 281, suggests that it be translated "to join in business" in verse 1, but says nothing about verse 16.

32. See Phyllis Bird, "The Harlot as Heroine. Narrative Art and Social Presupposition in Three Old Testament Texts," Semeia 46 (1989): 119-39.

33. Ira Robinson, "bepetah ‘enayim in Genesis 38:14," JBL 96/4 (1977): 509; Johanna W H. Bos, "An Eyeopener at the Gate: George Coats and Genesis 38," Lexington Theological Quarterly 27 (Oct 1992): 119-23; Hamilton, Genesis, 40.

34. William H. Rueckert, Kenneth Burke and the Drama of Human Relations, 2nd ed. (Berkeley: Univiversity of California Press, 1982), 86, 90. See also Carol A. Berthold, "Kenneth Burke’s Cluster-Agon Method: Its Development and an Application," Central States Speech Journal 27 (Winter 1976): 302-9.

35. Burke, Counter-Statement, 124-25.

36. Burke, "Fact, Inference, and Proof," 167.

37. Westermann, Genesis 37-50, 55; Hamilton, Genesis 18-50, 453.

38. Perez is listed before Zerah in Genesis 46:12 and I Chronicles 2:4-6.

39. Peter F Lockwood, "Tamar’s Place in the Joseph Cycle," Lutheran Theological Journal 26 (May 1992): 35-43. Lockwood observes that the transformation of Judah in Genesis 38 "provides a pointer to what will occur in the Joseph cycle at large."

40. Rosemarie Anderson, "A Tent Full of Bedouin Women," Daughters of Sarah 19 (Winter, 1993): 34-35. Anderson, citing anthropological research on the nomadic and tribal Bedouin, suggests that Tamar did not act alone, but received help from her village in carrying out the deception.

41. Bernhard Luther saw here an expression of the naffator’s friendly attitude toward Judah: "But mixed in with the laughter of the spectator is the joy that the catastrophe has been averted, and, in novelistic terms, that he now has three sons again. Blessing has finally come to him. So affection for Judah is linked with the laughter." "The Novella of Judah and Tamar and Other Israelite Novellas," in Narrative and Novella in Samuel: Studies by Hugo Gressmann and Other Scholars, 1906-1923, trans. D. E. Orton, ed. David M. Gunn (Sheffield: Almond Press, 1991), 114.

42. In addition to Foss, see Bernard L. Block, Robert L. Scott, James W Chesebro, eds., Methods of Rhetorical Criticism: A Twentieth Century Perspective, 3d ed. rev. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1990); and Roderick P. Hart, Modern Rhetorical Criticism (Glenview, Ill.: Scott Foresman, 1990).

43. Richard B. Gregg, "Kenneth Burke’s Concept of Rhetorical Negativity," in Extensions of the Burkeian System, 190.

44. An earlier version of this essay was presented at the Annual Meeting of the Academy of Homiletics, December 1996.

 

Rhetorical Identification In Paul’s Autobiographical Narrative

While most studies of Paul's autobiography in Galatians 1.13-2.14 acknowledge the importance of Paul's relationship with the Christians of Galatia, little attention has been given to the language Paul uses to describe relationships within the autobiographical narrative itself. This study will examine the relationships that Paul portrays and creates with the Jerusalem apostles, his opponents, and the Galatians as a means to depict symbolically the issues at stake in Galatia. The literary-rhetorical method of Kenneth Burke will be employed to this end, with special focus on Burke's idea of identification.

 Introduction

Until very recently, most studies of Galatians have followed the suggestion of Martin Luther that Paul's autobiographical remarks in Galatians 1 and 2 were 'boasting and glorying' that followed out of his divine calling. Paul defended himself in order to defend the Gospel.1

H.D. Betz took this tradition 2 one step further when he compared Paul's letter with the rhetorical handbooks of the time and concluded that the whole of Galatians took the form of an apologetic letter.3 Betz's commentary has not failed to attract criticism.4 New methods of rhetorical and literary study have challenged the apologetic model and have suggested alternative understandings. Three examples follow.

George Kennedy has argued that the presence of a hortatory section (5.1-6.10) indicates that Galatians as a whole functions as deliberative rhetoric (that which deals with future courses of action) and not as the forensic rhetoric of apologia.5 Kennedy understands the narrative of 1.13-2.14 to be proof of Paul's statement of the proem (1.6-10) that there is no other gospel; it is therefore not part of an apology. Kennedy also does not use the term autobiography for this narrative. It is rather a proof, a building block of Paul's argument.

Another rhetorical approach was taken by George Lyons, who found parallels between Galatians and Greco-Roman autobiographies (Cicero, Isocrates, and Demosthenes).6 Lyons claims that Paul's comments should be explained as an effort to demonstrate his ithos (character) to his readers .7

 

Beverly Roberts Gaventa presented a third challenge to the apologetic model. Gaventa concluded that Paul's reference to the revelation of Jesus Christ' in 1.1 5-17 is central to the text and places its focus on the manner in which Paul received his gospel.8 She thus argues that Galatians I and 2 cannot be confined to the category of apology. Further, Galatians is closer in form and purpose to the letters of Seneca and Pliny than to the autobiographical narratives cited by Lyons and the advice of Quintilian cited by Betz. Seneca and Pliny wrote with the purposes of moral exhortation and instruction in view. In a similar manner, Paul used his narrative to offer himself as a paradigm of the power of the gospel (Gal. 4.12).9

These new studies give some additional attention to Paul's orientation toward the Galatian audience and thus follow the advice of the classical writers.10 Emphases on Pauline exhortation, ithos, and example do turn the focus of study toward Paul's relation to the Galatians and away from Paul's answer to the charges of his opponents.11

 Yet these studies also cast Paul as an individual communicator who addresses his audience by means of a letter. Comparisons with classical examples and prescriptions only strengthen the emphasis on Paul's references to himself and overlook the statements he makes about others.12 To date, no study has paid particular attention to Paul's depiction of his relationships within the autobiographical narrative as a means to enhance further his relationship with the Galatians and to urge them away from circumcision.13

 In addition, no study has examined the narrative as a dramatization of the issues confronting the Galatians. Above all else, the autobiography is a story with a distinct rhetorical component. As Paul tells his story, he draws a number of symbolic parallels between his own past and the present situation at Galatia. In particular, Paul means to point out the exact parallel between those persons who opposed him by attempting to compromise the gospel and those who were putting pressure on the Galatians to be circumcised. By drawing clear lines between those who stood against him and those who stood with him, Paul intends to show the Galatians the results that their choice will bring. As he draws a narrative portrait of his past relationships, he at the same time invites them to affirm their present relationship with him by resisting circumcision. In order to study these relationships, a summary of Kenneth Burke's rhetorical-literary concept of identification will be outlined below.

 2. Kenneth Burke and Identification

Kenneth Burke began his career as a poet, a writer of fiction, and a literary critic. In the course of his thinking about literature, he noted that imbedded within all literary form was a rhetorical component. In time, he expanded his idea of rhetoric to embrace all of human communication. 'Wherever there is persuasion, there is rhetoric. And wherever there is "meaning" there is "persuasion."14

A central idea in Burke's approach to rhetoric is the principle of identification, which may be understood as the attempt to overcome human division through the establishment of some common ground. His description of human division often makes use of biblical terminology, as for example, his 'problem of Babel':

 'The theologian's concerns with Eden and the 'fall' come close to the heart of the rhetorical problem. For, behind the theology, there is the perception of generic divisiveness which, being common to all men, is a universal fact about them, prior to any divisiveness caused by social classes. Here is the basis of rhetoric.15

Traditional approaches to rhetoric have described the attempt to overcome division as 'persuasion.'16 In this view, a communicator seeks to persuade an audience by winning it over to a given position so that the situation becomes, in effect, a contest of opinions and wills. Through identification, however, a communicator seeks to elicit consensus and cooperation by demonstrating what Burke calls a 'consubstantiality' between communicator and audience. The depiction of consubstantiality points out where persons 'stand together' (from the etymology of the word) and shows how they share a similar concern or interest.17

Although Burke himself has said that the difference between persuasion and identification distinguishes traditional rhetoric from the 'New Rhetoric',18 he adds that in his mind, the two are not in conflict.

 As for the relation between 'identification' and 'persuasion': we might well keep it in mind that a speaker persuades an audience by the use of stylistic identifications; his act of persuasion may be for the purpose of causing the audience to identify itself with the speaker's interests; and the speaker draws on identification of interests to establish rapport between himself and his audience. So, there is no chance of our keeping apart the meanings of persuasion, identification ('consubstantiality') and communication ... 19

Identification is a two way process. As the communicator establishes rapport by identifying with the audience's concerns, the audience begins to identify with those of the communicator. The sharing of opinion in one area works as a fulcrum to move opinion in another. 20

A Burkean approach to the study of Paul's autobiographical narrative seeks to discover both the ways in which Paul sought to identify with the Galatians and the ways in which he asked them directly and indirectly, to identify with him and his message. One also watches for evidence of Paul's attempts to highlight relationships that are based upon a common understanding of the circumcision free gospel. By depicting these relationships, Paul creates a consubstantiality (a standing together) that he asks his hearers, the Galatians, to join by rejecting circumcision. Similarly, Paul also creates relational distance between himself and those who do not share that common understanding of the gospel. As the Galatians hear Paul tell his story of his past relationships, they are forced to decide whether they win stand with Paul and his understanding of the gospel, or with those who are urging them to be circumcised. What Paul makes clear to them is that they cannot have it both ways. In addition, the narrative also shows that Paul is really concerned for their welfare, while those urging circumcision are not.

3. Identification in Galatians 1.13-2.14

 Galatians 1.1-12

Burke recommends that the analysis of any written work should begin with the 'principle of the concordance'.21 The critic builds an index of significant terms: terms that recur in changing contexts, terms that occur at significant points in the narrative, terms that seem heavy with symbolic meaning. One also looks for oppositions, beginnings and endings of sections and subsections, and indications of hierarchies.22

One of Paul's most significant terms and oppositions occurs three times prior to his narration of his past life that begins in 1.13. After the opening introduction of his name and tide 'apostle' in 1.1, he states that his apostleship is not from or through any human agency . Rather, its source is Christ and God.

The same opposition between human terms and Christ/God terms occurs in vv. 10 and 11-12. In the questions and answer of v. 10, Paul seeks to win God over, not humans and wants to please Christ, not humans. The use of e t i ('still') in v. 10 suggests that Paul here refers to a human pleasing desire that was part of his own past .23 In vv. 11-12 Paul asserts that his gospel (like his apostleship in v. 1) is not a human gospel nor was it taught to him by any human. Rather it came by a revelation from Christ.

Here then, a pattern of opposition appears three times in the course of the first dozen verses of the epistle. The opposition of the divine and human terms and the orientations they represent structures Paul's thoughts about his apostleship, his motives, and his message.24

In addition, this opposition also gives shape to Paul's narrative, particularly as it aids him in his depiction of his relationships. Paul stands (identifies) with those who identify with the divine principle and stands against those who do not, claiming that they have embraced a human principle. The repetition of a n q r w p o x (seven times in vv. 1-12, four of them plural) highlights the contrast.25 In other words, Paul has introduced his narrative by stating simply and plainly, 'I did not receive my apostleship or my gospel from any human source, and I do not want to please any humans. I received my apostleship and gospel from God and Christ and God and Christ are the ones I want to please'. Every action and motive that follows is measured against Paul's basic statement, and Paul relates to every person as friend or foe for that same reason.

 

Galatians 1.13-24

 The structure of opposition continues throughout Paul's retelling of his past life in Judaism. He states that he advanced beyond his contemporaries and was zealous for his father's traditions (1.14), thus describing his experience of Judaism in human, not divine terms. The divine motive enters in when God chooses to reveal his Son and Paul's mission (vv. 15-16). Paul adds that he did not consult human authorities (flesh and blood, apostles) about this, but went away to Arabia.

 The above summary suggests that a large part of the motivation that Paul reveals in his narrative up to this point centers in his repudiation of his former way of life.26 The opposition between his old life and the new is patterned after the opposition between human and divine authority seen in vv. 1-12. There Paul defined his new life as a striving for God's pleasure over that of other men. Here he contrasts God's revelation of his Son with the traditions of his fathers.

 As for the apostles, he neither competed with them nor inquired27 of them (as compared with his relations within Judaism), but rather ignored them. His move away from the apostles to Arabia, therefore, signified his break from a bondage to human tradition and authority. The contrast between Paul's old and new relationships is clear. Whereas Paul described his former life in Judaism as focused on human relationships with his contemporaries and predecessors, his depiction of his new life is so centered on his relation to God that he as yet has no relationship to the other apostles.

 Paul then goes on to report that he did finally visit the apostles Cephas and James after three years (1.18). The only indication of his purpose for the visit is given in the verb i s t o r e w , which carries the sense of 'visit to inquire of or get information from'. 28 Paul stresses the brevity of the visit and the fact that he met with only two of the apostles. After his visit he returned to Gentile territory (1.21, Syria and Cilicia; in 1.17 he goes to Arabia and Damascus). Paul seems determined to emphasize that he was a stranger to Judea, for he adds that even the churches did not know him by sight (1.22).

 Yet even while Paul establishes this physical distance between himself and the apostles and churches, he declares a common purpose; the churches hear that Paul now preaches the faith he tried to destroy. Even while many miles separate him from the churches of Judea, he has become one with them through a common faith in the gospel. Paul has established a relationship, a consubstantiality, with Christians throughout Judea. Their praise of God on his account (1.24) indicates that Paul has become a success in his new vocation of pleasing God.

 The climax of the first portion of Paul's narrative does establish that he did not receive his gospel from a human source, but it does not imply that Paul worked apart from the Jerusalem authorities because he was a rebel or did not agree with them. In fact no reason is given for the departure to Arabia apart from the ongoing opposition of the divine and human motives. In reaction to his prior life, it seems he did not wish to be taught by humans any longer. The churches hear the report (perhaps through Cephas and James) that Paul preached the faith that he once persecuted among the Gentiles, the same faith that the apostles preached the faith that he once persecuted among the Gentiles, the same faith that the apostles preach.

 The chapter ends in a scene of harmony, the division between the old Paul and the church having been overcome through God's revelation of Christ to the persecutor. The source of division between Paul and the church (Christ and the gospel) has now become the source of a consubstantiality. Although Paul states that he has never met the people of these churches, he has used the principle of identification to build a relationship with them within the narrative.

 Paul has done much the same with the Jerusalem apostles. He shows that he is one in purpose with the apostles, although he is separate (but not independent) of them. They are joined in allegiance to the purpose of God, whom Paul is anxious to please (1.10). It is Christ, however, whom he serves, not the apostles.

 Issues of circumcision and the inclusion of the Gentiles have not yet surfaced in the narrative; therefore, the Galatians are not yet drawn into the story. As they hear this portion, they may simply observe the contrast between Paul's old and new life and notice the harmony created by a common commitment to the faith (1.23). Most of all, they would see the contrast, drawn by Paul, between a commitment to the human traditions of Judaism and faith in the divinely revealed gospel.

Galatians 2.1-10

 Paul established that his mission to the Gentiles was greeted with favor in the first section of the narrative (1.1-24). In the second section (2.1-10) Paul adds that the gospel he preached to the Gentiles was circumcision-free. He reports that he went to Jerusalem and met with the apostles, but he laid out before them the message he brought with him; this was not a time for them to instruct him. The mention of revelation in 2.2, whatever else its purpose, clarifies that Paul's ultimate allegiance is to God, not the Jerusalem apostles. Yet Paul also states that he needed to lay out his gospel before the apostles for evaluation in order to forestall some problem, which he believed might cause his work to be in vain, or without lasting effect. 29

Here within the narrative Paul has defined his relationship with the Jerusalem apostles as a relationship between equals, not that of a subordinate to superiors .30 The meeting was intended to secure a common understanding of the gospel as circumcision-free. Therefore Paul is not seeking to invoke apostolic authority by appealing to Jerusalem; he has already established that he speaks with apostolic authority himself. Rather, Paul intends to show that the Jerusalem apostles stood with him in his understanding of the circumcision-free gospel and with God who revealed it to him.

Paul notes two major results of the meeting. Titus was not compelled to be circumcised and Paul's mission to the Gentiles was received warmly. Although the sentences of 2.2-5 appear to be incomplete and do not follow grammatical convention, the use of d i a with the accusative in v. 4 suggests that the false brothers were behind the push to circumcise the Gentile Christian. Paul's response was firm; Titus was not compelled (2.3) and Paul and his companions did not submit for a moment (2.5) because he saw that the false brothers wanted to bring them into bondage.

The use of the term 'bring into bondage' or 'enslave' also appears in 2 Cor. 11.20 in the context of false teachers. Here in the immediate context of Galatians 2, the term is set in contrast with 'freedom in Christ'. In the larger context of the epistle, it is also set in contrast with Paul's servant-bondage to Christ in 1.10. If the o i z o u x e is accepted as the original reading,31 Paul here claims that he did not submit to those who would enslave them. Paul uses the first person plural in 2.4 to indicate that enslavement of the Gentiles would mean enslavement to the principle of bondage for the Jewish Christians as well.

With this assertion Paul has set up another opposition between human and divine authority. Paul knew that he could only submit to one authority. If he submitted to the false brothers he would betray his loyalty to Christ and compromise freedom in Christ. The false brothers stand in relation to Paul as did his old life; they are both rejected as 'still pleasing humans' (1.10). No consubstantiality exists, therefore Paul stands against them rather than with them.

When Paul speaks of preserving the gospel for the Galatians in v. 5, he stands against the false brothers for the sake of the Galatians. In other words, the struggle at the Jerusalem meeting not only resisted the enslavement of Paul and his company, but, by extension, the enslavement of the Galatian believers as well. However, the Galatians are not enjoying their freedom, but are fighting the same battle with those who are urging them to undergo circumcision. The advocates of circumcision are like the false brothers who opposed Paul, and they too will bring the Galatians under bondage to human authority. Paul, on the other hand, represents a commitment to God's authority as revealed in the circumcision-free gospel.

The scene, as Paul depicts it, shows the two principles and parties in conflict in parallel situations. The same issue is at stake now in Galatia as it was then in Jerusalem. The Galatians cannot have it both ways; they must choose to identify with one principle or the other. If the Galatians stand with Paul they will stand with one who has fought for their freedom as well as the truth of the gospel (2.5). If they choose to undergo circumcision they will not only be trying to please humans; they will be enslaved to them.

The Galatians are also encouraged to identify with Titus, who, with Paul's help, responded to the circumcision-free gospel of Christ instead of the human desires of the false brothers. Like Titus, the Galatians have been affirmed as believers without the requirement of circumcision, and have avoided the enslavement of those who would require it. Finally, to identify with Titus, Paul, and the apostles is to identify with Christ who revealed the circumcision-free message that resists the threat of bondage. These are relationships of freedom.

When Paul turns again to the apostles (those reputed to be something), he states that their evaluation of his message suggested no revisions or additions (2.6). 7Me major implication of Paul's statement is that there is a basic relationship of equality between himself and the Jerusalem apostles in the sight of God.32 This is given explicit statement in 2.7-8; both Paul and Peter have been entrusted with the gospel. This recognition of grace led the 'pillars' to offer the right hand of fellowship so that the missions to the circumcised and to the uncircumcised are given equal standing. There is no submission to human authority, nor is there any of the competition that characterized Paul's former life (1.14). Rather, those who have been entrusted with the truth of the gospel submit together as equals under the authority of the one who entrusted it to them (2.7) and gave Paul grace (2.9). The apostles have joined Paul in a common desire to please God rather than any human authority (1.10).

 Paul's second section of the narrative, like the first, ends in harmony. For the second time a source of division has been dealt with through a realization of the grace of God that was at work in Paul (2.8-9; compare with 1.24). Once again divine action has brought about a consubstantiality as it is perceived by the church. The narrative does not establish Paul's independence from Jerusalem, but rather a relationship of cooperative interdependence based on the truth of the gospel that embraces Jew and Greek. The circumcision free gospel that Paul brought to Jerusalem now stands in consubstantial unity with the gospel preached by the Jerusalem apostles; therefore Paul's relationship with the apostles is also one of consubstantial unity.

In addition, the Galatians are welcomed with Paul in the narrative through his identification with the Gentiles. As Paul is granted the right hand of fellowship, the Gentiles he represents are welcomed into the fellowship of believers as Gentiles, not converts to Judaism. They will be treated as equals with the Jewish Christians and, like Paul's friend Titus, they will not be required to be circumcised. They can trust that in heeding Paul's apostolic authority, they are also in accord with the authority of the Jerusalem apostles.

 In opposition to this decision stand the false brothers who do not have apostolic authority based on the truth of the gospel, and would not grant equality to the Gentile believers. Instead, they would require circumcision, a status of bondage to their will. Paul has used his narrative thus far to force the Galatians to see the consequences of a decision to submit to circumcision by identifying the false brothers of 2.4 with those who are urging circumcision upon the Galatians. To choose their position over that of Paul, Titus, and the other apostles would be equal to pleasing humans and, worse yet, a relationship of bondage.

Galatians 2.11-14

The final portion of Paul's narrative does introduce division between himself and the apostles. As the climax of the narrative it demonstrates how the consubstantial principles of unity and equality are betrayed when one chooses to base one's actions on the desire to please humans rather than God. It is not, as James Hester argues, a digression from the narrative that brings the reader back to the conflict that might have gotten lost in the irenic settlement of 2.9-10.33 The conflict is a negative illustration following what has up to this point been a positive illustration of unity in the circumcision free gospel. As relations break down between Cephas, Paul, and the Gentile Christians at Antioch, the Galatians are given another picture of what lies before them should they choose to undergo circumcision.

Whatever the number and purpose of the party sent from James, its presence led Cephas to abandon the example of inclusion he had set by eating with the Gentiles. Paul interpreted his action according to the same opposition between the divine and human win that he has set up throughout the narrative. He states that Cephas withdrew because he feared the circumcised (2.12; compare with 2.7 and 2.9) and was not walking straight according to the truth of the gospel (compare with 2.5). In fearing the circumcised , Peter was seeking to please these men rather than God. As a result, his relationship with the Gentiles was broken.

Again, the revealed circumcision-free gospel is set in opposition to human authority. The choice of the human will over the divine suddenly brings division where there was once unity. In Paul's interpretation of the events, there is only unity in the gospel, which is both revealed and circumcision-free. Once that gospel is compromised, there will be no place for Gentiles and, by implication, the Galatians in the church unless they also circumcise.

Should the Galatians choose to enter the fellowship through what Paul calls the human principle of circumcision, there will be no equality either. In confronting Peter, he charged him with compelling the Gentiles to Judaize (live like a Jew, be circumcised). To Paul, Peter was doing the same as the false brothers tried to do in Jerusalem (the word for compel is used in both 2.14 and 2.3).34 Therefore, if the Galatians choose circumcision, they will no longer be servants of Christ; they will be servants of a human authority, namely those who require circumcision. They will be living as Paul did in his former life, trying to please humans instead of God.

Only here has Paul placed real relational distance between himself and the apostles in his retelling of the story, for only here has any apostle (Peter and perhaps James)35 chosen a human principle. If the Galatians had any concerns about Paul's relationship to the Jerusalem church, he has shown them that the apostles, Paul included, had been in harmony and equality until the revealed, circumcision-free gospel ceased to be the basis for fellowship.

For this reason the narrative portrait of Paul's relationship with the apostles is not simply meant to show that Paul was not taught by them; it is also meant to model the unity that is only possible in the fear of God and the revelation of Christ in the gospel. The incident at Antioch shows that any other principle of fellowship, based on subservience to human authority and distinctions, ultimately brings division.36

In contrast to his opposition to Peter, Paul continued his relationship of identification with the Gentiles in the Antioch incident by standing alone with them when all the Jewish Christians had withdrawn. As the Galatians heard this, they were still in a relationship of identification with Paul and the Gentiles that began back at the meeting with the Jerusalem apostles (2.1-10). Once again, they see Paul fighting for the right of the Gentiles (including the Galatians) to be included in the fellowship without the requirement of circumcision. Paul has shown them that the decision whether or not to be circumcised is not only a matter of freedom but is also a matter of community. The community of Christ and his circumcision free gospel is inclusive and egalitarian; the community of circumcision is no community at all.37

The Galatians must therefore choose, not only whether to be circumcised, but whether or not they will continue to identify with Paul who has identified with them. Will they choose to continue a relationship of identification with Paul, begun when they first believed and continued in Paul's narrative? Or, will they choose to please humans rather than God and withdraw themselves from Paul as Peter withdrew from them? Having placed the choice before them, Paul says, 'Brethren, I beesech you, become as I am, for I also have become as you are' (4.12).

4. Summary and Conclusion

The antithesis between pleasing God and pleasing humans in Gal. 1.10 and the corresponding antithesis between the gospel of Christ and that of humans in 1.11-12 are dramatized by Paul in his autobiographical narrative. While he demonstrates that his message was not taught to him by the Jerusalem apostles, this is not the sole purpose of his narrative. A Burkean approach has shown that Paul also depicts a community created by a common response to the gospel. The community remains intact as long as its members seek to please God on the basis of the revealed, circumcision-free gospel rather than seeking to please other humans. The community also is inclusive and egalitarian when the same principle is kept, since the gospel itself becomes the sole ground for consubstantuality. Circumcision, which Paul identifies as a desire to please human authority, divides.38

A Burkean approach also shows how the narrative forces the Galatians to decide with whom they will stand on this issue. If the Galatians wish to be in relationship with the larger church and the Jerusalem apostles, they must identify with Paul, for all the apostles are of the same fellowship in the gospel, the Antioch incident notwithstanding. The circumcision-free gospel and apostolic authority both come from God, not from any human standing. Therefore, in order for the Galatians to please God, they must continue in a relationship of identification with Paul and the other apostles (as portrayed in 2.1-10), and not enter a new relationship with those who tell them to be circumcised. To choose circumcision is to please human authority; indeed, it is to become enslaved to it.

Finally, a Burkean approach demonstrates that Paul also uses the principle of identification to enhance his relationship with the Galatians. He depicts himself as a defender of their interests, fighting for their freedom and their right to enter the fellowship without any requirement but faith in Christ. He brings the Gentiles into fellowship with the Jewish church and he alone stands with them when all other Jewish Christians withdraw. He has been an advocate for the Galatians and all Gentiles in the past; certainly his present stormings and pleadings have their interests at heart now.

No one model can appreciate the richness of Paul's autobiographical narrative. The model proposed here, based upon Kenneth Burke's literary-rhetorical method, is offered to show that Paul not only sought to strengthen his relationship with the Galatians through his autobiographical narrative, but that he used the depictions of relationships within the narrative to create a rhetorical community that the Galatians were forced either to join or reject. Thus to reject circumcision was to identify with the community of Paul and the Christ who sent him.39

 

 

. NOTES

 

1. Martin Luthcr, A Commentary on St. Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (Westwood, NJ: Fleming Revell, 1953), pp. 35, 87.

 

2. John Calvin, 7he Epistles of Paul the Apostle to the Galatians, Ephesians, Philippians, and Colossians (trans. T.H.C. Parker; London: Oliver & Boyd, 1965), pp. 4-5. See also J.B. Lighfoot, Saint Paul's Epistle to the Galatians (New York and London: Macmillan, 1905), pp. 64, 71; E.D. Burton, A Critical and Exegetical Commentary on the Epistle to the Galatians (New York: Scribners, 1920), p. lxxii; F.F. Bruce, 'Further Thoughts on Paul's Autobiography', in Jesus und Paulus: Festschrift.Pr Werner Georg Kammel zum 70. Geburtstag, ed. E. E. Ellis and E. Grasser (G6ttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1975), p. 22; Albrecht Oepke, Der Brief des Paulus an die Galater (THKNT, 9, Berlin: Evangehsche Verlags-anstalt, 1973), pp. 29, 53-54; J. Paul Sampley, 'Before God I Do Not Lie (Gal. 1.20): Paul's Self Defense in the Light of Roman Legal Praxis', NTS 23 (1977), pp. 477-82.

3. Hans Dieter Betz, Galatians: A Commentary on Paul's Letter to the Churches in Galatia (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1979@ pp. 14-15. Betz designates Gal. 1.12-2.14 as the narratio, a statement of the facts that serves as the basis for later argument (pp. 58-62).

4. Ronald Y.K. Fung, in his The Epistle to the Galatians (New International Commentary on the New Testament; Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1988), pp. 28-32, surveys the reviews that are critical of Betz's approach and concludes that 'apologia is not the most appropriate category to apply to the letter as a whole'. However, against Fung's assertion that no examples of apologetic letters exist (quoting Meeks and Russel, p. 30), see Klaus Berger, 'Hellenistische Gattungen im Neuen Testament', in Aufstieg und Niedergang der rdmischen Welt (Berlin/New York: de Gruyter, 1984), 2.25, pp. 1272-74. Berger upholds Betz's decision and also cites Plato's Seventh Letter as an example that merged the forms of letter, autobiography, and apologetic speech.

 5. George A. Kennedy, New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism (Chapel Hill and London: University of North Carolina, 1984) pp. 146-48. See Aristotle, Rhetoric 1.3.1358b, 1-20, for the distinction between three types of rhetoric: forensic, political, and ceremonial.

 6. George Lyons, Pauline Autobiography: Toward a New Understanding (SBLDS, 73; Atlanta: Scholars, 1985), p. 135. These autobiographies all recount the subject's (conduct), (deeds), (words), and make a (comparison) of the subject s character with that of another.

7. Lyons, pp. 102-104, 61. See also the similar comments by David E. Anne, The New Testament in its Literary Environment (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1987), pp. 189-90. Aristotle distinguished the ethical, logical, and emotional modes of persuasion (Rhetoric 1.2.1356a, 1377b-1378).

8. Beverly Roberts Gaventa, From Darkness to Light: Aspects of Conversion in the New Testament (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1986), p. 28.

9. B.R. Gaventa, 'Galatians 1 and 2: Autobiography as Paradigm'', NovT 26 (1986), p. 326.

  1. W. Rhys Roberts held that the focus of the entire second book of Aristotle's Rhetoric was on the audience (Greek Rhetoric and Literary Criticism [New York: Longmans, Green, 19281 p. 50). See also Cicero, De Oratore (trans. J.S. Watson; Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois University Press, 1970), li; 'That no man can, by speaking, excite the passions of his audience, or calm them when excited... unless (he is) one who has gained a thorough insight into the nature of all things, and the dispositions and motives of mankind.'
  2. See Lyons's critique of the 'mirror method' reconstruction of the opponent's charges, Pauline Autobiography, pp. 96-104.
  3. Studies on Greco-Roman biography and autobiography often single out a focus on the individual as the constituting feature of the genre. 'Biography, Greek, and 'Biography, Roman', in The Oxford Classical Dictionary (Oxford: Clarendon, 1949), p. 136; 'Biographie', in Der Kleine Pauly-Lexicon der Antike, I (ed. Konrad Ziegler and Walther Sontheirner; Stuttgart: Alfred Druckenmuller, 1964), pp. 902-903; Georg Misch, A History of Autobiography in Antiquity (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1950), pp. vii, 69; Duane Reed Stuart, Epochs of Greek and Roman Biography (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1928), p. 39. This approach has been criticized by Arnaldo Montigliano, 7he Development of Greek Biography (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), pp. 11-18.

13. Although Betz does note Paul's use of the friendship motif to enhance his relationship with the Galatians in Gal. 4.12-20, he does not treat Paul's depiction of relationships in Gal. 1-2 (pp. 220-37).

14. Kenneth Burke, A Rhetoric of Motives (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1969), p. 172.

  1. Burke, Rhetoric, p. 146.

 16. Aristotle gave this idea its clearest expression when he defined rhetoric as 'the faculty of observing in any given case the available means of persuasion' (Rhetoric 1.2.1355b, 25

 17. Burke, Rhetoric, p. 62; A Grammar of Motives (New York: Prentice Hall, 1945), p. 57.

18. Kenneth Burke, 'Rhetoric Old and New', 7he Journal of Education 5 (1951), p. 203.

19. Burke, Rhetoric, p. 46.

20. Burke, Rhetoric, p. 56.

 21. Kenneth Burke, 'Fact, Inference, and Proof in the Analysis of Literary Symbolism', in Symbols and Values: An Initial Study Tenth Symposium of the Conference on Science, Philosophy, and Religion; New York: Harper & Brothers, 1954), p. 283.

22. Burke, 'Proof, pp. 299-306.

23. Gaventa, 'Paradigm', p

Biblical Foundations of the Power and Politics

We find the most penetrating understanding of the power and politics in the biblical literature. Thus far we tend to suppress those biblical passages that expose radically the reality of the power such as Revelation 13. Churches have been preoccupied with Romans 13, which has often been misinterpreted.

There are three levels of power realities in the Bible: One is the Imperial powers, second is the power of kings in the history of Israel, and the third is the politics of the Messiah and politics of God(the Kingdom of Messiah and the Kingdom of God) among the people of God. The Sovereign Rule of God is a overarching theme of the Bible from beginning to end; and the imperial powers of the surrounding empires from Egypt and Babylon to Greece and Rome, is placed in the context of the govereignty of God. The powers of the kings in the history of the people of Israel was also set in the context of the Reign of God.

The people of God experienced the imperial power of the great empires as well as the rule of kings, in the history of Israel. They struggled to keep their faith in the Sovereignty of God, in the midst of their political experience of oppression and exile under the powers of the empires and kingdoms. The vision of the politics of the people of God emerged in the form of prophetic movement, priestly movement, and messianic movement.

Despotic Monarchy and Sovereignty of God

The establishment of monarchy in the life of the people of Israel was an ambiguous project, for its relationship with the Sovereignty of God could not be clearly spelled out and the only model of monarchy available was that of despotic rule, which was already established among the peoples surrounding Israel. There was a need for the security of the covenant community of the tribal people of Israel against the powers of the despotic kingdoms that threatened Israel militarily, as is recorded in Judges; but at the same time the establishment of a monarchy modelled after despotic rule or modified despotic rule subverted the very essence of the covenant community.
 
 

This is the reason why Samuel in principle opposed the establishment of a monarchy in Israel, for it would enslave the people, God's covenant would be broken, and the security and rights of the people would be violated.In God's Covenant with the people, the Sovereignty of God entails the sovereign rights of the people, which God has ordained, and which the kingdoms and empires are to protect.It is in this light that the kingship of David, the monarchy and the empires must be judged. This means that the Davidic kingship was understood as permissible only as he was the servant king of Yahweh, and as his kingship consisted of service to God and to the sovereign rights of the people. This is called the Davidic Covenant. The Davidic kingship was permissible only in the framework of God's Covenant with the people of God.

We quote here the full text of objections as it appears in I Samuel 8:10-18.

All that Yahweh had said, Samuel repeated to the people who were asking him for a king. He said, "These will be the rights of the king who is to reign over you. He shall take your sons and assign them to his chariotry and cavalry, and they will run in front his chariot. He will use them as leaders of a thousand and leaders of fifty; he will make them plow his plowland and harvest his harvest and make his weapons of war and the gear for his chariots. He will also take your daughters as perfumers, cooks and bakers. He will take the best of your fields, of your vineyards and olive groves and give them to his officials. He will take the best of your man servants and maid servants, of your cattle and your donkeys, and make them work for him. He will tithe your flocks, and you yourselves will become his slaves. When that day comes, you will cry out on account of the king you have chosen for yourselves, but on that day God will not answer you."

Historically David the King of the people of Israel violated the covenant code, as illustrated in the story of confrontation between David and Nathan over the "robbing" of Bathsheba, the wife of Uriah. The confrontation between Nathan and David reveals the nature of the Davidic rule, which followed the way of despotism and broke the covenant, At the same time it reveals the true nature of political leadership as preserver of justice, on the basis of the covenant(II Samuel 12:1-15).

King Solomon was a typical despotic ruler in violation of the covenant, due to his building of the kingdom along the lines of a despotic monarchy. Chaney's following description is very apt: "Solomon's attempts to finish the transformation of Israel into a typical agrarian nation-state, complete with his erection of the Temple as a royal chapel to house Yawehism as a state established and state-legitimizing religion, were minus that flow of booty. To finance ambitious building programs, the importation of military materiel and luxury goods on a grand scale, and the maintenance of burgeoning military, court, and cultic establishment, Solomon pressed his agrarian economic base to the breaking point."

Subsequently all the kings of the people of Israel are judged by the same covenant; and the Deutronomic assessment of monarchs in the history books of the Old Testament reflects this understanding of the relationship of kingship and the covenant. King Ahab became the symbol of the king who breaks the covenant, through his appropriation of the vinyard of Naboth.

Exodus and Prophetic Politics

The protest movement of Elijah rises against this background. When the covenant framework of political life for the people of God had been completely broken, there arose a the vision for the restoration of the covenant political community.

The covenant community emerges from the Exodus movement of the Hebrew people out of Pharaoh's Egypt. The story of the Exodus is the story of the Sovereignty of Yahweh in the political life of the Hebrew people. The covenant is that Yahweh is the Lord of the Hebrew people and they are the people of God; and that therefore, under the covenant the people can have loyalty to no one other than Yahweh. The Sovereignty of Yahweh means denial, rejection and resistance against the "sovereignty" of the Egyptian Pharaoh.

The Exodus movement was the historical beginning of opposition to any despotic and imperial rule over the people of God; and the covenant community is the first political and socio-economic expression of the Sovereignty of Yahweh, who liberated the Hebrew slaves from the land of Egypt.

This covenant politics was expressed in the prophetic movment. The prophetic movement was the political resistance against all despotic or imperial rule, and it was the witness to the Sovereignty of God and its political expression, that is, the restoration of the covenant community.

The Deuteronomic view of kings and their rules is a manifestation of the covenantal view of the politics of God with the people of God. It is in this context that the prophetic movement of politics should be understood. Prophetic politics is not only the criticism of the despotic powers that have violated the covenant with God in oppressing the poor and the weak; but also and specially a projection of the shape of the Sovereign Rule of God, which does not allow any absolute despotic powers, but which subjugates the powers into the form of "Servant" to the Sovereign God. This is the only form of power allowed under the Sovereignty of God the Servant, who protects the rights of the poor and oppressed, as prescribed in the covenant with God.

In prophetic politics the Sovereign Rule of God is just, in that the poor and the weak are protected against imperial and despotic rule, both of which are rebellious against God the Sovereign. The prophetic movement was to restore the faithful relationship between God and the people of God, which means the restoration of the covenant community. Therefore, prophetic politics is not merely critical and negative politics. not merely transcendent politics, but politics for the concrete resoration of the covenant community. It is not legalistic but dynamic(Jeremiah 31:31-34). Nevertheless, the prophets reminder that the true Sovereign is God means that the people of God had to have concrete legal provisions of do's and don't's.

The people of Israel wanted the restoration of Davidic rule in its ideal form, not in its historical form. For the Davidic kingship was permitted in the form of Servant King to Yaheweh, not in the image of the despotic and imperial powers, which were by definition rebellious against the Rule of Yahweh. What this means is that there is necessarily a polity of the Davidic king as Servanthood to the Sovereign and to the sovereign will of the people. And this polity is radically different from the despotic and imperial polity, which is authoritarian and absolute.

Imperial Powers

The people of God experienced the various kind of imperial powers in tragic and dramatic waya. The imperial powers of Babylon, Egypt, Assyria, Greece and Rome are regarded as powers of darkness and chaos in the Biblical literature, especially in the Apocalyptic writings. Any reverence shown to these powers is seen as religious idolatry and politcal prostitution.

In Genesis chapter one, the chaos and darkness represent the rebellion against the Sovereignty of God by the empires; there is a rejection and absence of God's Reign in the imperial rule, under which there is no life, no justice and no shalom of God.

God's Sovereign Rule means the created order and the garden of God in it. In the garden there was the tree of life; and as the limit to human sovereignty there was placed the tree of knowledge of good and evil. Human rule violated the prohibition and claimed the place of God, who knows good and evil. The power that claims the knowledge of good and evil is in itself a rebellion against God, who is the very source of the Wisdom and knowledge of good and evil. But such is the truth-claim of the absolute powers.

The human power that is rebellious against God's Sovereign Rule, finds itself naked(self-knowledge of self-contradiction) and defends itself through its own rationalization before the Sovereignty of God.

This rebellion of human power is manifested in the vicious cycle of violence and enmity in human community, where the koinonia of Adam and Eve has been realized in their household. Not only Adam and Eve were chased out of the garden, but there were conflicts between the serpent and the woman, and later in Cain's killing of Abel. Adam and Eve and Cain defended themselves before God, for they could not stand naked before God. The naked power must hide itself with the veil of self-justification and rationalization, which is the ground of self-legitimation.

In the story of Noah the people of God were under the threat of the flood; and the Tower of Babel as the symbol of empire rose for the first time to defy God's sovereign rule. A monolithic language, the ideology of modern day power, was established for the erection of the Tower of Babel, the Babylonian Empire. The monolithic language and ideology of the Babylonian Empire did not create communication, but imposed the will of the power upon the people. The consequence was confusion between what the people wanted and what the imperial power wanted; and there was a contradiction between what God willed and what the empire willed.

In Daniel and Revelations, the principalities and powers are referred to as animals and mythical beasts which form a jungle of killing and death. These political perceptions show a profound understanding of history as is dominated by ruthless imperial powers that claim to be absolute. Historicism and rationalism in their understanding of this apocalyptic literature, have completely lost such a depth of understanding about power. We need to recover these apocalyptic stories as a way of understanding the reality of power today.

The stories of the victims of the oppressive political powers possess keen and penetrating political perceptions about the reality of the powers of domination. The apocalyptic literature should be regarded as the story of politically oppressed people about the dominating powers.

The author of the Book of Revelations sees the Roman Empire as Babylon and as Leviathan. Empires are described in a mythical and symbolic language, as Behemoth and Leviathan, which are monsters of evil and chaos. Several characteristics of the empires are shown in these symbolic and visionary descriptions: 1)The most important characteristic is their rebellious character against the Sovereignty of God. The religious character of the rulers of the empires as gods is the absolutization of political authority. The second most important characteristic is their power of violence. Behemoth and Leviathan are mystical powers, which are most violent against the people of God. These beasts are the main players in jungle. The third but most most significant reality of these powers is revealed by the suffering of their victims, the oppressed and persecuted people. These characteristics are not merely symbolic realities, but the very concrete, inner, dynamic realities of the imperial powers. It is noteworthy that the reality of the imperial powers is "revealed" rather than analyzed, although concrete facts about the powers are not lacking in the description of them. 


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Confessions of a Scientist-Theologian

BOOK REVIEW

Belief in God in an Age of Science. By John Polkinghorne. Yale University Press, 160 pp., $18.00.

I was living in Cambridge, England, in 1978-79 when the acclaimed physicist John Polkinghorne, a fellow of the Royal Academy, decided to leave the research lab and become an Anglican priest. Given the longstanding notion that there is a war between religion and science, journalists were eager for a story about a leader of one side crossing over to the other. Polkinghorne’s decision was front-page news.

On the whole, journalists are more interested in scientists who speak of faith, spirituality and God than in theologians who speak in a conciliatory way about science. The "man bites dog" headline is that a scientist has something friendly to say about religion. And since scientists have little to gain from such a turn—it can even represent a loss of cultural status—the move cannot be considered a matter of self-interest.

In the current flourishing market for books by scientists who are friendly toward religion, Polkinghorne stands out as perhaps the most celebrated scientist of his generation to have taken holy orders. His scientific credentials, his intellectual brilliance, his writing and speaking—both lucid and prolific—and his identification with the core elements of Christian belief and practice have enabled him to embody in his own person one of the most important cultural shifts in the last 50 years—the rapprochement between religion and science.

This volume, based on the Terry Lectures at Yale (Paul Tillich’s Courage to Be is among several well-known works that originated as Terry Lectures), presents serious arguments on a dozen important issues and expresses Polkinghorne’s personal opinion, without much argument, on two dozen more. This style renders the book difficult to assess, and the difficulty is compounded by the frequently offered advice to consult the author’s other writings for a fuller discussion. Of the six chapters, the book devotes one chapter to natural theology, one to divine action in the world, one to dialogue between science and religion, and three to methodological issues: commonalities of method in science and religion, critical realism, and the importance of mathematics.

The difficulty in placing the book is illustrated by the dominant notes of each of the first three chapters. Chapter one insists that it has "forsworn false attempts at demonstration and instead relies, on the persuasiveness of an intellectually satisfying insight." It is a "generous" reading of the physical world "as containing rumors of divine purpose." This chapter is a natural theology based on insights concerning "rational beauty, finely-tuned fruitfulness, a value-laden world, and human hopeful defiance in the face of mortality."

The second chapter includes a substantial discussion of Christology that argues vigorously for the author’s interpretation of what Christology, including the resurrection, has meant in the past and what it might mean today, with a fair share of polemics against alternative theological views. Chapter three sets forth Polkinghorne’s trademark proposal that God’s action in the world be modeled on the concept of human and divine agency through "holistic causal principles of a pattern-forming kind," summarized in the term "active information." He aggressively argues that theories of "chaotic indeterminism," "top-down causality" and "information" support a belief in a God who acts.

What we have in these chapters, in turn, is an almost gentle presentation of natural theology, a Christian theological proposal that is argued vigorously against alternative views, and a straightforward apologetic for a certain physics-based conception of God’s action in the world. The first chapter is appealing for its accessible and persuasive style; the second will be intelligible only to those who have studied the history of theology (and to them it will appear tendentious); the third defends a version of the faith in scientific argumentation that is difficult for nonscientists to grasp.

This ambiguity of purpose and style diffuses the impact of the book. More important is what this ambiguity tells us about the field of religion and science. Without wishing for a moment to denigrate the brilliant intellectual substance of Polkinghorne’s work or his intention to advance toward a cogent statement of truth, I would characterize his work (in this book and in much of his other work) and that of other scientist-theologians as a form of confession. Scientist-theologians do something very important when they confess—with the same brilliance that they exhibit in their scientific work—that their religious faith, the sense of the divine meaningfulness of life, and their moral resolve within a religious worldview are not weakened but rather flourish when brought into connection with their scientific commitment. As confession, their work tells us how a scientist looks at the world and how a scientist can appropriate traditional Christian faith.

Such a confession shows that the image of warfare between science and religions is misconstrued. It also shows that scientific modes of thought do not necessarily erode traditional religious belief. It suggests that even if we do not fully understand how religious and scientific responses to the world ought to be related, we do know that reality does not come to us divided in two parts, along the religion-science divide. The person and work of these notable scientists who have become theologians constitute a confession that we are living and thinking within a new paradigm of sensibility and rationality, even if we cannot clearly define what that paradigm is. This witness is especially significant since our culture possesses no publicly acknowledged alternative to the warfare hypothesis. There are many alternative voices to be heard today in the conversation between religion and science, but none is publicly authorized.

Given the situation I have just described, it is not surprising that Polkinghorne assumes a variety of genres in his writing: one moment appealing to natural knowledge of God, in another vigorously defending his personal theological vision, and in still another arguing about the possibilities for interpreting theories of chaos and information as openings for God’s action in the world. It is even less surprising that half of his book is devoted to exploring the way his methods for doing science and theology are not fundamentally different. In any case, I think we miss Polkinghorne’s cultural significance and intellectual-theological impact if we don’t see that his confession is more important than, say, the adequacy of his esoteric theory of God’s causality within the structures of "active information" or the cogency of his notion of how the resurrection is a reconstitution of our physical bodies.

The scientist-theologians may be quite unhappy with my assessment. After all, as scientists they do not aim at having cultural significance; they aim to give true descriptions of the world. They work on the realist assumption that their theories do not simply account for natural phenomena but provide "a more adequate (versimilitudinous) account of the nature of the world. It is the desire for ontological knowledge, and not functional success, which motivates the labor of scientists."

Polkinghorne himself seems to equate ontological knowledge with his hypotheses that locate God’s action in the world "in domains where there is flexible process," associated with the concept of the "strange attractor" of chaos theory. His notion of the resurrection of Jesus and of every believer as the act of God’s remembering the "information-bearing pattern" of our psychosomatic unity and "reconstituting" it at some point beyond the "cosmic death" of the universe may also be counted as a fragment of ontological truth. Other scientist-theologians propose comparable hypotheses of how God’s action in the world can be conceptualized at the level of quantum indeterminacy or in the processes of so-called "top-down" causality. All these thinkers emphasize the relation of the human mind to a "real" world that exists apart from the knower.

Though these proposals are brilliant and even useful, they do not constitute the most important locus of ontological truth in the work of these scientists-become-theologians. What is most important is what I have called their confession—their conviction that reality makes itself available under the conditions of an integrated scientific and theological probing, rather than one or the other.

In his recent book God, Creation, and Contemporary Physics, Mark Worthing calls attention to two kinds of thinkers in the world of religion and science: the scientist-theologians and the "ordinary" theologians who make no claim to scientific credentials. He considers the latter group to be an endangered species. Their presence is necessary, however, in order to assure that the theology-science conversation remains a dialogue between disciplines rather than a dialogue within individuals.

Polkinghorne also makes a plea for "ordinary" theologians to give more attention to the challenges and possibilities offered by science. But it would take a theologian with a strong ego to respond to Polkinghorne’s challenge, for he sharply, even scornfully criticizes some theologians who take science seriously. Although he names Thomas Torrance, Jürgen Moltmann and Wolfhart Pannenberg as "honorable exceptions to the policy of keeping theology at a distance from science," he really has nothing else positive to say about them. Torrance is taken to task for not engaging post-Einsteinian quantum physics, Moltmann for ignoring theories of relativity. He scorns Pannenberg for, among other things, his "old-fashioned concept of inertia." Strangely, Polkinghorne gives no attention whatsoever to the one school of theological thought that has given steady attention to science over the past 50 years—the process theology that rests on the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead.

Polkinghorne’s unfavorable view of ordinary theologians may be linked to the understanding of ontological truth that I described earlier. Most ordinary theologians today are impressed with the metaphorical, symbolic and mythical character of our language and our concepts. Whereas for ordinary theologians this character does not weaken the truth claims we make but deepens and enriches them, most scientist-theologians are skeptical of talk about myth and metaphor. While ordinary theologians cannot conceive that ontological truth would be accessible in forms other than metaphor, myth and symbol, scientist-theologians tend to be dissatisfied with anything less than relatively straightforward concepts that can claim truth. Theologians such as Friedrich Schleiermacher, Paul Tillich and Langdon Gilkey have given considerable attention to the sciences while clarifying the symbolic nature of language and concepts. This difference in perspective accounts for the fact that although most theologians are likely to pay utmost respect to Polkinghorne’s theories, they are unlikely to honor the kinds of realist claims that he and other scientist-theologians make for their theories.

An example of this difference in perspective is the differing approaches Polkinghorne and Pannenberg take to the resurrection. (Unfortunately, Polkinghorne does not engage Pannenberg at this point.) In his major work, Jesus—God and Man (1968), Pannenberg argues (more earnestly than almost any other contemporary mainline Protestant theologian) for the historical factuality of the resurrection. It really happened. He has, however, a complex and sophisticated notion of what it means to say that an event in history "happened" and how such events are verified by historians. Furthermore, he recognizes that the term "resurrected" must, by the very nature of its referent, be a metaphor and participate in the worldview-shaping character of myth.

Pannenberg goes on to describe the meaning of the resurrection claim in the first-century Jewish world in which it happened. He refers to its apocalyptic character, which means that it is a cosmic statement—it speaks of the beginning of the end of the world, it validates Jesus’ life and preaching, and it establishes Jesus as a reliable revelation of God. He includes a brief discussion of the significance of quantum theory for assessing the possibility of singular events.

Polkinghorne’s discussion of the resurrection focuses, in contrast, on general philosophical arguments to the effect that "in order to confirm... the claim that the integrity of personal experience itself, based as it is in the significance and value of individual men and women and the ultimate and total intelligibility of the universe, requires that there be an eternal ground of hope who is the giver and preserver of human individuality and the eternally faithful Carer for creation." The fact of the resurrection is consequently equated with a theory of the reconstitution of our psychosomatic nature in an eternity after the demise of the universe.

Whereas for Pannenberg the meaning of the resurrection is inseparable from the kind of claim it makes and the language which is appropriate to that claim, as well as inextricably rooted in the texts of the New Testament and in the Jewish world of the early first century, for Polkinghorne the resurrection is a conclusion that is required by logic and enabled by a theory of physical matter. To Polkinghorne and many scientist-theologians, Pannenberg’s presentation seems unnecessarily tortured and muddy. Conversely, many ordinary theologians look upon Polkinghorn’s proposals as unpersuasively speculative and narrowly pertaining to the future of physical reality.

Three important conclusions may be drawn from this discussion. (1) The older paradigms that view knowledge and reality as split along the lines of difference between science and religion are being called into question. The life and work of scientist-theologians like Polkinghorne embodies the fact that the times call for a grand paradigm shift. (2) The dialogue between theology and science must be more than a dialogue within the individual minds of brilliant scientist-theologians; it must be a genuine engagement between theology and science. (3) Alongside the relative ignorance of ordinary theologians about science and their lack of will to engage science is a problem of perspective: theologians and scientist-theologians differ on what constitutes truth, including ontological truth. Genuine engagement between theology and science must heed this difference and attempt to take measure of both perspectives.

There is more at stake in the religion-science dialogue, and in books like this one, than dialogue within individuals and between disciplines. All sectors of our culture must come to see the importance of the confession of Polkinghorne and his colleagues. The internal debates within the theology-and-science guild will finally be valuable only if they contribute to a realization throughout our culture that we are on the brink of new paradigms for understanding reality, and that those paradigms require the efforts of both scientists and theologians.

The Sacred and the Mundane: The Message of Leviticus

For Jewish homileticians, early spring is not a good time. According to the rabbinic cycle of Torah readings, this is when we come down from the great heights of Genesis and Exodus, with their breathtaking perspectives and sweeping visions, and enter the flat and seemingly arid plain of Leviticus. As my Protestant friends sympathetically remind me, Leviticus simply "does not preach."

And yet Leviticus is central, literally and figuratively, to what the Pentateuch is all about. The Pentateuch is the story of how the people of Israel came into being and came to receive their gift of the Promised Land. Genesis and Exodus introduce us to the story and bring us to its crucial turning point, the arrival at Sinai and the reception of the Revelation. Numbers and Deuteronomy complete the narrative, describing the experiences and lessons of the people as they leave Sinai and finally arrive at the edge of the Promised Land. In the middle stands Leviticus. Leviticus lets us pause and consider the content of the Revelation. It offers instruction in the technology of the holy—instruction that will shape the divine service in the temple and the rhythm and content of Israel’s holy life after it enters the land.

It is easy for us to skip over Leviticus because it appears so utterly foreign. The very institutions that Leviticus presupposes—the temple and its levitical priesthood—are completely alien to us, whether we are Jewish or Christian. To be sure, all Western religious traditions draw heavily on the vocabulary and symbolism of Leviticus: priesthood (whether clergy or "of the people"), sacrifice, offerings, uncleanness, purification, ablution/baptism, the redeeming power of blood, and on and on. But these are all bits and pieces of the levitical system taken out of their original context and transformed into the very different framework of church and synagogue. It is only in Leviticus that these elements come together naturally to form a comprehensive and coherent system.

Our challenge is to tease out what the book’s familiar-sounding terms and themes meant to people of another time and place. How did the priests, Levites and commoners of that time understand what they were doing, and what does their understanding mean for us today? Adducing and communicating this understanding is the job of modern critical commentaries like Erhard S. Gerstenberger’s. They take on the difficult if not impossible task of preserving the foreignness of Leviticus while still making it relevant.

There seems to be a scholarly consensus that the Book of Leviticus, more or less as we have it, is from exilic times. The generally agreed-upon context is the permission given by Cyrus of Persia (in approximately 538 B.C.E.) to the exiled Judeans to rebuild their temple in Jerusalem. We know from archaeological evidence that Cyrus allowed a number of conquered peoples to rebuild their homelands and local temples. In each of these cases he required the newly re-established priesthood to publish its traditional law. Leviticus, in this scholarly view, is the result of the Judean priesthood’s effort to do so. This is why Leviticus (and the "P" document generally) reads like a priestly handbook. It was composed to inform Cyrus and his officials about what the Jerusalem priesthood intended to do with its newly granted authority.

This historical context does not mean, however, that scholars think Leviticus was made up out of whole cloth by exiled priests in the sixth century B.C.E. No doubt the priestly writers brought to their task memories or traditions of what once had been and so should be again. It is also clear that the book was not written at one sitting by a single author. Leviticus has every sign of being a composite work.

It is best, then, to think of Leviticus as a complex document written over an extended period of time (the rebuilding of the temple took nearly 25 years) by a variety of authors. It should not be treated as an historically reliable description of how the temple actually operated. Whether or not the Second Temple ever followed this blueprint exactly is an interesting question, but one that goes beyond the purview of this essay. But it is evident that in its details, Leviticus offers remarkable insight into the priestly imagination of exilic and postexilic Judah. It tells us what the priesthood, or at least an influential part of it, thought temple ritual ought to be.

Leviticus can be divided into two major parts. The first (chapters 1-16) is concerned with the operation of the priesthood and proper disposition of the sacrifices and offerings brought to the altar. The second (chapters 17-26) has to do with the maintenance of a certain purity or holiness by the Judean community as a whole. This holiness is deemed necessary if the temple and its sacred altar are to abide in the land.

Historically there have been three ways of approaching the rather technical material in the portion of Leviticus that deals with sacrifice. The first is best exemplified in rabbinic writings, especially the Mishnab and Talmud. This approach tries to work out the legal intricacies of the rules for sacrifice, to fill in the gaps and reconcile the inconsistencies embedded in the text: for example, determining the status of an animal designated for one type of sacrifice but erroneously slaughtered for another; or determining what to do if an animal that has been properly slaughtered and its blood correctly sprinkled on the altar is then found to have a blemish that should have disqualified it.

The second method for understanding sacrifice rules is what we might call the "history of religions" approach. The focus here is on how such religious rituals work on a deeper structural level. In this view, Leviticus is one example among many. In all religions priestly rituals are designed to overcome basic contradictions. In biblical Israel the contradiction consists of the fact that the most virulent sources of impurity are diseased and dead bodies and things pertaining thereto: bones, blood and the like. But to do their holy jobs, the priests must slaughter animals, sprinkle their blood on the altar, and burn and eat various portions of the carcasses. In classic religious fashion, that which is most dangerous and polluting is transformed by the proper ministrations of members of a holy caste ("priests" in this case) into a potent source of sanctity and holiness. The object of scholarship is to uncover the logic according to which this transvaluation occurs. According to the history-of-religions school, Leviticus tells us how this mythic transformation was understood in biblical Israel.

The third approach is to treat Leviticus as a symbolic or allegorical system that has little or nothing to do with sacrifices per se, but everything to do with teaching important lessons. Early use of this allegorical approach may be found in the work of Philo in the first century of the Common Era. An exemplary expression of this method is the work of Samson Raphael Hirsch, a mid-l9th-century Orthodox rabbi. In his interpretation, the offering ("korban," in Hebrew) is a means of getting close ("karob") to God; the whole-offering is the offering that one gives wholeheartedly—that is, with complete devotion. It must be without blemish to stress that our efforts to approach God come from strength and certainty, not weakness or compromise. An advantage of this approach is that it allows the book to "preach." One can find in the minutiae of the ancient priests’ daily routine some guidance and inspiration for our lives today. This approach’s disadvantage is that it strips the text of any historical meaning.

Although Gerstenberger’s commentary combines elements of all three approaches, he emphasizes the third. While he does attempt to indicate how the sacrifice laws of Leviticus operate, his real interest is in drawing larger religious conclusions from them. He does so by abstracting principles out of the specific laws of Leviticus and then associating those abstractions with other biblical passages. This approach has the advantage of rendering Leviticus immediately useful to the modern preacher, but it papers over the book’s special character and the uniqueness of its message. By privileging the Bible’s prophetic voice, Gerstenberger muffles the voice of the priests.

A good example of how Gerstenberger’s commentary proceeds can be found in his discussion of the sin- and guilt-offerings mentioned in Leviticus 4-5. After a brief discussion of how the sacrifices were carried out, Gerstenberger turns to his main concern, the larger religious meaning. He asserts that the point is "atonement"—that is, the need to "redress" a "disrupted relationship with God." This is an important theme, but it omits the context of Leviticus.

Gerstenberger virtually acknowledges as much when he notes that it "is difficult to explain rationally such ritualistic efforts at atonement. From biblical accounts of atonement situations, however, we are able to uncover the connection between rite and disrupted reality." Several paragraphs follow that ignore Leviticus but bring into the discussion citations from Genesis 4:10, Deuteronomy 2 1:1-9, II Samuel 21, Jonah 3:5-10 and so on.

This treatment illustrates some of the problems with Gerstenberger’s strategy. First is the generality of the terms he uses. Gerstenberger’s description of the situation calling for a sin- or guilt-offering as a "disrupted relationship with God" does not employ the phraseology of Leviticus. In fact, Leviticus seems to set forth the exact opposite meaning. It assumes that the proper offering will be efficacious just because the relationship with God is still functioning. Basically, a misuse of something has occurred and the illegitimate beneficiary has to make an appropriate gift to the altar. Within the covenant, a certain condition calls for a particular response.

A second and in some ways more problematic example is Gerstenberger’s use of the word "atonement." The Hebrew word "kapparah," although usually translated as "atonement," does not occupy exactly the same linguistic field as the English noun "atonement"—a word that has its own long theological history. Gerstenberger has subtly shifted the focus away from what the priests of Leviticus were talking about—namely effecting "kapparah"—and toward what is useful for Christian theological speculations, namely "atonement."

The problem goes deeper than simply substituting a word from one theological tradition for a word in another. Gerstenberger wants to explain what he has called Leviticus’s technology of "atonement" by associating it with other "atonement situations" in the Bible. There is no reason to suppose, however, that all biblical Israelites in all places and in all times held to the exact meaning of the verb "kipper." It is probable, for example, that the word has a different connotation in Jonah than it does in a technical priestly handbook such as Leviticus. Yet Gerstenberger writes as if all "biblical accounts of atonement situations" are the same and can be blended together to produce a single meaning, and that this meaning is fully captured in the word "atonement."

In his closing comment, significantly under the rubric of "theological content," Gerstenberger says, "In the ancient Orient and the Old Testament, atonement means the removal of detrimental elements, a re-establishment of disrupted order, a reconciliation with the deity, the elimination of anxiety among those who had incurred guilt, and the opening of new life possibilities." This is a huge claim. I grant that the word "atonement" in some modern Christian contexts might carry some, if not all, of these connotations. But I do not concede that "kapparah" and its equivalents meant all of this at all times in all the cultures of the "ancient Orient," and I am certain that Leviticus does not have these various meanings in mind. In short, Gerstenberger has gained preachability but lost precision. We learn a good deal about Gerstenberger and his theology, but less about the priesthood of biblical Israel.

The other part of Leviticus—the laws addressing the purity of the community as a whole—is called the Holiness Code. Among other themes, it describes the festival calendars, lists sexual taboos, deals with personal cultic purity and presents the Sabbatical and Jubilee cycles. It talks about the larger context within which the priests and the temple find themselves.

Gerstenberger adduces from these laws what he calls in some places the "theology of holiness." Again, as this label suggests, his interpretation addresses interests that are of more significance to Christianity than to Leviticus. Consider his summary remarks, for example: "Holiness, as we have said, is a sphere of power and purity unique to God. Yahweh’s person and his immediate surroundings, accordingly also the ‘house’ in which he dwells, are energy-laden to the highest degree. Every human infringement, every unauthorized encroachment into the holy sphere of necessity results in the death of the transgressor." These remarks do describe the effects of holiness, but I am far from convinced that they tell us what holiness means for the priestly writers of Leviticus.

The Hebrew word for holiness, "kedushah," carries with it a connotation of separateness or distinctiveness. The whole priestly enterprise of the Pentateuch is a matter of determining the natural divisions of creation and of ensuring that these are not violated. In terms of the altar, then, it follows that certain things belong in the realm of the community and certain things belong to the divine economy. The rules of sacrifice can certainly be read to indicate how we move things (such as sheep) from the one realm to the other. And it would follow that once an animal has left the human and entered the divine realm, it must be handled in special ways, in a special place by special people—i.e., in purity by priests within the temple compound. Holiness, then, is about treating in distinct ways that which is God’s. One who violates these boundaries earns punishment, but that punishment is a consequence of overstepping divinely ordained bounds, not of encountering an overwhelming energy field.

In this light, the Holiness Code functions to establish Israel itself as a holy entity, as a community different in certain ways from other peoples. This holiness is attained by the creation and maintenance of certain structures of time (the festival and sabbatical calendars), space (the temple and its component courtyards) and personal status (the sexual taboos). That these regulations have social benefits is beyond question; but for Leviticus they are important because they are divinely ordained, not because they serve utilitarian purposes. Thus Gerstenberger’s characterization of the holy times is, I think, beside the point. He notes, for example, that the "festival or sacred period often serves quite consciously to generate distance from the oppressive monotony of the workaday world, and through special presentations and rites to create the energy to experience a ‘different’ world, and possibly even to effect a thorough transformation of the burdensome circumstances of life." Though following the calendar might at times have resulted in such thoughts or emotions, there is nothing in the language of Leviticus to suggest that this was the reason these sacred times were commanded.

Leviticus presents us with a unique and detailed view into the mental world of a particular segment of biblical society. It speaks out of an institutional setting that is quite foreign to us, even if we have taken over much of its vocabulary. But the larger themes that Leviticus is working out through its minute "how to" instructions are universal religious themes. Leviticus tells us how to be holy not in emotion, intention or religious feeling, but in the details of everyday life. There are lessons here for us moderns, who often treat religion as an activity to be squeezed into a couple of hours on Friday nights or Sunday mornings. Leviticus suggests that everything we do can have a sacred quality if we pay attention to the details and perform each act properly. Although we do not have to do things exactly according to Leviticus, the book is not irrelevant.

It is this special meaning of Leviticus and its priestly authors that fails to come through in Gerstenberger’s commentary. But it is not a bad commentary. Much of Gerstenberger’s analysis is informed and sensitive, though he does not always ask the questions that are at the center of Leviticus’s concern. His commentary reminds us that not all of the Bible is prophetic. The Hebrew scriptures also express the Israelite priests’ deep concern for the sacralizing possibilities inherent in the mundane activity of everyday life.

This volume in the Old Testament Library series brings that other voice from our biblical heritage into our current religious discussion. The priests deserve a chance to have their own say on their own terms, rather than to be blended into some homogenous "biblical" view. Though Gerstenberger may not always have the right answers, he performs an important service in bringing the book and its voice to our attention.

 

Salvation by Trust? Reading the Bible Faithfully

The Protestant reformers of the 16th century proclaimed that God’s word in scripture must serve as the final judge of all human tradition and experience. Left to our own devices we are capable of infinite self-deception, confusion and evil. We therefore must turn to scripture and submit ourselves to it, the Reformers insisted, in order to find our disorders rightly diagnosed and healed. Only through the biblical writers’ testimony do we encounter the message of God’s grace; only the revelation of Jesus Christ, disclosed uniquely and irreplaceably through the testimony of the evangelists and apostles, tells us the truth about the merciful God and our relationship to that God. Without this word which comes to us from outside ourselves, we are lost.

Clearly, the climate in which we read the Bible has changed drastically since Luther and Calvin put pen to paper. Living as we do on this side of the Enlightenment, we cannot escape the intellectual impact of the great "masters of suspicion": Nietzsche, Freud, Marx and more recently Foucault, along with other purveyors of "critical theory." These thinkers have sought to demystify language and to expose the ways in which our linguistic and cultural systems are constructed by ideologies that further the interests of those who hold power.

The Bible has not been exempt from such suspicious scrutiny. One need only consider the book display at the annual American Academy of Religion convention. Anyone who spends time browsing there will find the stalls flooded with books that apply a hermeneutic of suspicion to biblical texts. Some portray the apostolic witnesses less as revelatory witnesses to God’s mercy than as oppressive promulgators of abusive images of God. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, for example, writes that "a feminist critical hermeneutics of suspicion places a warning label on all biblical texts: Caution! Could be dangerous to your health and survival" (in Feminist Interpretation of the Bible, edited by Letty Russell).

I’m not suggesting that suspicious interpreters categorically reject the Bible; most of them believe it can contain both liberating and oppressive messages. They insist, nonetheless, that the Bible be subjected to ideological critique. Elsewhere, Schüssler Fiorenza explains: No biblical patriarchal text that perpetuates violence against women, children, or "slaves" should be accorded the status of divine revelation if we do not want to turn the God of the Bible into a God of violence. That does not mean that we cannot preach. . . on the household code texts of the New Testament. It only means that we must preach them critically in order to unmask them as texts promoting patriarchal violence (Bread Not Stone: The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation)~

I welcome the moral passion of statements like Schüssler Fiorenza’s. Sadly, our common history is marked by epidemic violence, including violence against women, children and the powerless. Certainly this violence is to be condemned, and interpreters of the Bible have good grounds for proclaiming such condemnation. The difficulty in which we find ourselves, however, is this: If the Bible itself, the revelatory, identity-defining text of the Christian community, is portrayed as oppressive, on what basis do we know God or relate to God? A corollary question has crucial implications for biblical interpretation: If the Bible is dangerous, on what ground do we stand in conducting a critique of scripture that will render it less harmful?

For Schüssler Fiorenza the answer to the latter question is clear: a feminist critical hermeneutic "does not appeal to the Bible as its primary source but begins with women’s own experience and vision of liberation." Experience (of a certain sort) is treated as unambiguously revelatory, and the Bible is critically scrutinized in its light. Regrettably, many practitioners of the hermeneutics of suspicion, and by no means only feminist interpreters, are remarkably credulous about the claims of experience. As a result, they endlessly critique the biblical texts but rarely get around to hearing scripture’s critique of us or hearing its message of grace.

While the hermeneutics of suspicion—rightly employed—occupies a proper place in any attempt to interpret the Bible for our time, I want to argue that a hermeneutics of trust is also both necessary and primary. In order to get our bearings on the question of our fundamental attitude toward scripture I propose that we take our cue from the Reformers and return to scripture itself.

If we attend carefully to Paul’s treatment of trust and distrust in his Letter to the Romans, the apostle may lead us to suspect our own suspicions. We can gain a purchase on Paul’s thinking about trust and distrust by examining how in Romans he uses the words faith (in Greek, pistis) and its opposite, literally unfaith (apistia). According to Paul, those who stand in right relation to God are those who hear and trust what God has spoken. He laments Israel’s tragic failure to do this, and the name he gives that failure is apistis. The term refers both to the failure of the people of Israel to obey God’s Torah and to their failure to trust God’s covenant promises—and the two things are bound closely together. Their apistia has been brought into stark focus for Paul through their negative response to the proclaimed gospel of Jesus Christ. He addresses the problem explicitly in Romans 3:1-4:

Then what advantage has the Jew? Or what is the value of circumcision? Much, in every way. For in the first place they were entrusted with the oracles of God. What if some were unfaithful (epistesan)? Their apistia doesn’t nullify the pistis of God, does it? By no means!

Paul’s wordplay highlights the contrast between human infidelity and God’s fidelity. God’s faithfulness (pistis) to Israel is declared to Israel through the word of promise ("the oracles of God"). But Israel, failing to trust that word, is guilty of unfaithfulness—apistia. We might well translate the word here as "distrust" or "suspicion." Rather than trusting the scriptural oracles of God (which, in Paul’s view, point to Christ and the church), they have slid away into unfaithfulness just like the gentiles. Nonetheless, their unfaithfulness cannot negate the faithfulness of the God who has embraced them through the covenant promise spoken to them.

The paradoxical relation between Israel’s unfaithfulness and the divine faithfulness creates the problem that Paul wrestles with throughout the letter. His reflections on these issues culminate in chapter 11, where the theme of Israel’s apistia arises once again in Paul’s metaphor about the olive branches broken off the tree: "They were broken off because of their apistia, but you [gentiles] stand only through pistas....But even these, if they do not persist in apistia, will be grafted in, for God has the power to graft them in again."

Earlier in the letter, Paul has depicted Abraham, in contrast to unfaithful Israel, as the figural type of trust in God:

Hoping against hope, he trusted that he would become "the father of many nations," according to what was said, "So numerous shall your descendants be" [Gen. 15:5]. He did not weaken in trust (pistis) when he considered his own body, which was already as good as dead (for he was about a hundred years old), or when he considered the barrenness of Sarah’s womb. No apistia made him waver concerning the promise of God, but he grew strong in trust (pistis) as he gave glory to God, being fully convinced that God was able to do what he had promised (4:18-21).

This passage is particularly interesting because Abraham’s pistis is interpreted explicitly as his trust in God’s promise despite the promise’s incongruity with Abraham’s own experience of sterility and frustration. Abraham might have had good reason to exercise a hermeneutic of suspicion toward the divine word that had promised him numerous descendants; all the empirical evidence—his experience—seemed to disprove God’s word.

Nonetheless, according to Paul, Abraham wrestled with his doubts, discounted his own experience, rejected skepticism, and clung to the promise of God: "No apistia, no suspicion, made him waver Thus, Abraham becomes the prototype of the community of faith, which interprets all human experience through trust in God’s word. In short, Abraham exemplifies a hermeneutic of consent, a hermeneutic of trust.

A trusting hermeneutic is essential for who believe the word of the resurrection but do not yet see death made subject to God. The hermeneutics of trust turns out read to be, on closer inspection, a hermeneutics of death and resurrection—a way of seeing the whole word through the lens of the kerygma. Our reliance on God entails a death to common sense, and our trust is validated only by the resurrection.

For Paul the theme of trust—pistis—is also intimately related to the formation of right relations between God and humans. Another way of saying this is that for Paul the themes of trust and atonement are in-separable. But I must sound an important caveat here. We must not suppose that we can place ourselves in right relation to God through our own act of trust, as though faith were a meritorious work. Rather, Paul’s argument is that covenant relationship is restored by God’s initiative "through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ." Thus, for Paul, trust and atonement are inextricably linked, but they are linked in the person of Jesus Christ.

Paul’s view of the relationship between trust and atonement is most compactly articulated in Romans 3. The argument goes like this:

1. Israel’s apistia cannot nullify the pistis of God (3:3-6a).

2. Jews and Greeks alike are under the power of sin (3: 10-18).

3. The Law holds the whole world accountable to God but has no power to justify those who are under the power of sin—to set them in right relation to God (3: 10-18).

4. Therefore God’s justice has been manifested apart from the Law through the faithfulness of Jesus Christ (3:21-22)— through his obedient, self-sacrificial death on the cross.

Thus, according to Paul, God has overcome our apistia through a dramatic new act of pisti—the pistis of Jesus Christ whom God "put forward" as a definitive demonstration of God’s own covenant-faithfulness (3:25). That is the meaning of "the righteousness of God" (3:21). Our relationship of trust with God is restored through the faith of Jesus Christ.

Those who receive this good news respond to it in turn with trust. Their pistis, which is prefigured in the Old Testament story of Abraham, becomes shaped by the pattern of Jesus’ own faith-obedience. That is part of what Paul means when he says that those whom God calls are to be "conformed to the image of his Son" (Rom. 8:29), and when he calls on his readers to model themselves upon Christ Jesus who emptied himself and became obedient even unto death on a cross (Phil. 2:5-13).

Thus, atonement for Paul is not merely the forgiveness of sins through a vicarious blood sacrifice. Atonement also entails the transformation of God’s people into the image of Jesus Christ, who is the embodiment of trust in God. Because Jesus trusted, we are both called and enabled to trust.

Paul’s understanding of trust not only shapes his view of atonement; it also informs the apostle’s own hermeneutical theory and practice. Israel, he says, failed to trust the oracles of God (Rom. 3:2-3), but he is determined that this error not be repeated in the interpretative practices of the new community of faith constituted by the trust of Jesus. With his mind remade by the gospel, Paul goes back to scripture and reads it anew through a hermeneutic of trust.

Rereading scripture from a new perspective was as challenging a task for Paul as trusting God’s promise was for Abraham. The actual experience of Paul’s missionary preaching had created a serious difficulty for both Paul and the new community. As the scholar Paula Fredriksen has expressed it, among those who believed the gospel, there were "too many gentiles, too few Jews, and no end in sight." If God’s purpose was to overcome Israel’s apistia, what had gone wrong? Why did Israel persist in apistia even when it heard the good news proclaimed?

The Jews’ rejection and the gentiles’ acceptance of the gospel drove Paul back to scripture. The promises of God to Israel must be true, he reasoned, because "the gifts and the call of God are irrevocable" (Rom. 11:29). But how can this be true in light of his own experience? Jews refused to accept the good news, and God apparently had conferred grace upon those who had not even been seeking righteousness at all—the gentiles. Scripture must be true, but how can this situation be understood?

The problem comes to a head in Romans 9-11. "I say then, has God abandoned his people?" (11:1). Paul’s answer is a ringing "By no means!" Trusting that God had not abandoned Israel, he wrestled with scripture and found his way to a powerful new reading of God’s promises.

Romans 9-11 is a powerful example of the hermeneutics of trust in action. In these chapters Paul achieves a transformative rereading of scripture through the lens of the conviction he articulated earlier in Romans 5:8: "God shows his love for us in that while we were yet sinners Christ died for us." This conviction, applied to the problem of Israel’s apistia, leads Paul to discover in scripture both the prefiguring of God’s calling of the gentiles ("Those who were not my people, I will call ‘my people’"—9:25, quoting Hosea 2:25) and the prefiguring of God’s ultimate mercy on Israel ("’God has not abandoned his people,’ whom he foreknew"—11:2, quoting Psalm 94:14).

In Paul’s fresh reading of scripture the whole mysterious drama of God’s election of Israel—Israel’s hardening, the incorporation of gentiles into the people of God, and Israel’s ultimate restoration—is displayed as foretold in scripture itself, but this foretelling can be recognized only when scripture is read through the hermeneutics of trust. God’s oracles and promises are interpreted anew, in ways that no one could have foreseen, in light of the experience of grace through the death and resurrection of Jesus. (At the same time, the church’s experience in Paul’s own historical moment is interpreted in light of scripture, which leads Paul to warn gentile believers against being wise in their own conceits. Events are in God’s hands. Gentiles have no reason to boast.) The process through which experience is positively correlated with scripture is possible only through the hermeneutics of trust.

What consequences follow from this analysis of Paul’s hermeneutic of trust for our own work as interpreters of the word? At least three things can be said. First, in order to read scripture rightly, we must trust the God who speaks through scripture. As Schüssler Fiorenza rightly insists, this God is not a God of violence, not an abuser, not a deceiver. This God so passionately desires our safety and wholeness that he has given his own Son to die for us. "The one who did not spare his own Son but gave him up for us all, how will he not also graciously give us all things, along with him?" (Rom. 8:32). Like Abraham, like Mary, like Jesus, like Paul, we stand before God with empty and open hands. That is the posture in which the reading of scripture is rightly performed. The German New Testament scholar Peter Stuhlmacher says something similar when he speaks of a "hermeneutics of consent"—a readiness to receive trustingly what a loving God desires to give us through the testimony of those who have preceded us in the faith.

Second, if we adopt a hermeneutics of trust, what becomes of the hermeneutics of suspicion? Is all questioning to be excluded, all critical reading banished? By no means. Asking necessary and difficult questions is not to be equated with apistia. When we read scripture through the hermeneutics of trust in God we discover that we should indeed be suspicious—suspicious first of ourselves, because our own minds have been corrupted and shaped by the present evil age. Our minds must be transformed by grace, and that happens nowhere more powerfully than through reading scripture receptively and trustingly with the aid of the Holy Spirit.

Reading receptively and trustingly does not mean accepting everything in the text at face value, as Paul’s own critical sifting of the Torah demonstrates. Cases may arise in which we must acknowledge internal tensions within scripture that require us to choose guidance from one biblical witness and to reject another. Because the witness of scripture itself is neither simple nor univocal, the hermeneutics of trust is necessarily a matter of faithful struggle to hear and discern. Consequently, we welcome the readings offered by feminists and other interpreters whose experience enables them to hear the biblical texts in new and challenging ways.

At the same time, we should be suspicious of the institutions that govern and shape interpretation. That means not only ecclesiastical but also academic institutions. If our critical readings lead us away from trusting the grace of God in Jesus Christ, then something is amiss, and we would do well to interrogate the methods and presuppositions that have taught us to distance ourselves arrogantly or fearfully from the text and to miss scripture’s gracious word of promise.

My concern that distrust may impede our reading of the Bible leads me to my final point. The real work of interpretation is to hear the text. We must consider how to read and teach scripture in a way that opens up its message and both models and fosters trust in God. So much of the ideological critique that currently dominates the academy fails to foster these qualities. Scripture is critiqued but never interpreted. The critic exposes but never exposits. Thus the word itself recedes into the background, and we are left talking only about the politics of interpretation, having lost the capacity to perform interpretations.

Most of us in the academy are weary of these tactics of critical evasion. And perhaps the tide is beginning to turn. This past fall, Frank Lentricchia, who teaches English at Duke University, published a remarkable public recantation of his prior complicity with an approach to literary criticism that concentrates on theory and ignores literature. The piece, which appeared in Lingua Franca, is titled "Last Will and Testament of an Ex-Literary Critic."

Lentricchia, whose earlier work earned him the epithet "the Dirty Harry of literary theory, is the author of Criticism and Social Change (1983), which urges us to regard all literature as "the most devious of rhetorical discourses (writing with political designs upon us all), either in opposition to or in complicity with the power in place." But Lentricchia has grown impatient with having his own critical perspective parroted by graduate students who have no love of literature, no appreciation for the themes and content of great literature—indeed, who rarely read it at all because they are so enamored of "critical theory." So now Lentricchia repents publicly:

Over the last ten years, I’ve pretty much stopped reading literary criticism, because most of it isn’t literary. But criticism it is of a sort—the sort that stems from the sense that one is morally superior to the writers that one is supposedly describing. This posture is assumed when those writers represent the major islands of Western literary tradition, the central cultural engine—so it goes—of racism, poverty, sexism, homophobia, and imperialism: a cesspool that literary critics would expose for mankind’s benefit. ... It is impossible, this much is clear, to exaggerate the heroic self-inflation of academic literary criticism... . The fundamental, if only implied, message of much literary criticism is self-righteous, and it takes this form: "T. S. Eliot is a homophobe and I am not. Therefore, I am a better person than Eliot. Imitate me, not Eliot." To which the proper response is: "But T. S. Eliot could really write, and you can’t. Tell us truly, is there no filth in your soul?"

Lentricchia’s question, "Tell us truly, is there no filth in your soul?" reaches back, perhaps unwittingly, to the deeper roots from which the Western literary imagination springs—an imaginative tradition that owes much to Paul’s hermeneutic of trust in God and suspicion of ourselves. Precisely because there is filth in our own souls we come to the texts of scripture expecting to find the hidden things of our hearts laid bare and expecting to encounter there the God who loves us.

When I was an undergraduate at Yale University, students flocked to Alvin Kernan’s lecture courses on Shakespeare. Kernan’s work predated the academy’s current infatuation with ideological criticism. Even though it was the late 1960s and we were all living in an atmosphere charged with political suspicion and protest, none of this overtly impinged on Kernan’s lectures. Kernan was not a flashy lecturer. What, then, was the draw?

He loved the texts. His teaching method, as I remember it, was simply to engage in reflective close readings of the Shakespeare tragedies and comedies, delineating their rich texture of image and metaphor and opening up their complex central themes—moral, philosophical and religious. Often, Kernan would devote a significant part of his lecture time to reading the text aloud, not in a highly dramatic manner, but with sensitivity to the texts’ rhythms and semantic nuances. I would often sit in class thinking, "Oh, I hadn’t heard that in the text before." And I would leave the class pondering the problems that Shakespeare addressed: love, betrayal, fidelity, sacrifice, death and hope.

In Shakespeare’s Measure for Measure the self-righteous villain Angelo pronounces a death sentence on Claudio, who is guilty of committing fornication. Claudio’s sister Isabella comes to Angelo to plead for the life of her brother, but Angelo, who is trying to manipulate Isabella into bed with him, spurns her suit, saying,

Your brother is a forfeit of the law,

And you but waste your words.

Isabella’s reply alludes to the great theme of Romans and calls upon the hypocritical judge Angelo to see his life anew in light of God’s judgment and grace:

Why, all the souls that were were forfeit once;

And He that might the vantage best have took

Found out the remedy. How would you be

If He, which is the top of judgment, should

But judge you as you are? 0, think on that;

And mercy then will breathe within your lips,

Like man new made.

Isabella resists the oppressor by applying a hermeneutic of suspicion to his pose of righteousness and by appealing to a hermeneutic of trust in the biblical story of God’s mercy. Isabella is a profound interpreter of scripture. We should follow her example.

A Christological Hermeneutic: Crisis and Conflict in Hermeneutics

This is a test of the discipline of biblical hermeneutics, which deals with the principles governing the interpretation of Scripture, is presently in crisis. For some time it has been obvious in the academic world that the scriptural texts cannot simply be taken at face value but presuppose a thought world that is alien to our own. In an attempt to bring some degree of coherence to the interpretation of Scripture, scholars have appealed to current philosophies or sociologies of knowledge. Their aim has been to come to an understanding of what is essential and what is peripheral in the Bible, but too often in the process they have lost contact with the biblical message. It is fashionable among both theologians and biblical scholars today to contend that there is no one biblical view or message but instead a plurality of viewpoints that stand at considerable variance with one an other as well as with the modem world-view.

 There are a number of academically viable options today concerning biblical interpretation, some of which I shall consider in this essay. These options represent competing theologies embracing the whole of the theological spectrum.

 First, there is the hermeneutic of Protestant scholastic orthodoxy, which allows for grammatical-historical exegesis, the kind that deals with the linguistic history of the text but is loathe to give due recognition to the cultural or historical conditioning of the perspective of the author of the text. Scripture is said to have one primary author, the Holy Spirit, with the prophets and Apostles as the secondary authors. For this reason Scripture is believed to contain an underlying theological and philosophical unity. It is therefore proper to speak of a uniquely biblical life and "odd-view. Every text, it is supposed, can be harmonized not only with the whole of Scripture but also with the findings of secular history and natural science. The meaning of most texts is thought to be obvious even to an unbeliever. The end result of such a treatment of Scripture is a coherent, systematic theological system, presumably reflecting the very mind of God. This approach has been represented in Reformed circles by the so-called Princeton School of Theology associated with Charles Hodge, A. A. Hodge, and Benjamin Warfield.

 In this perspective, hermeneutics is considered a scientific discipline abiding by the rules that govern other disciplines of knowledge. Scripture, it is said, yields its meaning to a systematic, inductive analysis and does not necessarily presuppose a faith commitment to be understood. Some proponents of the old orthodoxy (such as Gordon Clark and Carl Henry) favor a metaphysical-deductive over an empirical-inductive approach, seeking to deduce the concrete meanings of Scripture from first principles given in Scripture.

 A second basic approach to biblical studies is historicism in which Scripture is treated in the same way as any worthy literature of a given cultural tradition. The tools of higher criticism are applied to Scripture to find out what the author intended to say in that particular historical-cultural context. Higher criticism includes an analysis of the literary genre of the text, its historical background, the history of the oral tradition behind the text, and the cultural and psychological factors at work on the author and editor (or editors) of the text. With its appeal to the so-called historical-critical method for gaining an insight into the meaning of the text, this approach is to be associated with the liberal theology stemming from the Enlightenment.

 Historicism is based on the view that the historicity of a phenomenon affords the means of comprehending its essence and reality (H. Martin Rumscheidt). It is assumed that meaning is to be found only in the historical web of things. The aim is the historical reconstruction of the text, in other words, seeing the text in its historical and cultural context (Sitz im Leben). Historical research, it is supposed, can procure for us the meaning of the Word of God.

 Ernst Troeltsch articulated the basic principles of historicism, but this general approach has been conspicuous in J. S. Semler, David Friedrich Strauss, Ferdinand Christian Baur, Adolf van Hamack, and, in our day, Willi Marxsen and Krister Stendahl. A historicist bent was apparent in Rudolf Bultmann and Gerhard Ebeling, especially in their earlier years, though other quite different influences were also at work on them.

 It was out of this perspective that the quest for the historical Jesus emerged, since it was believed that only by ascertaining by historical science what Jesus really believed in terms of his own culture and historical period can we find a sure foundation for faith. Albert Schweitzer broke with historicism when he discovered that the historical Jesus indisputably subscribed to an apocalyptic vision of the kingdom of God. Finding this incredible to the modern mind, he sought a new anchor for faith in the mystical Christ.

 A third option in hermeneutics is the existentialist one, popularized by Rudolf Bultmann, Ernst Fuchs, Gerhard Ebeling, and Fritz Burl, among others. This approach does not deny the role of historical research but considers it incapable of giving us the significance of the salvific events for human existence. It can tell us much about the thought-world and language of the authors, but it cannot communicate to us the inferiority of their faith. Demonstrating an affinity with the Romanticist tradition of Schleiermacher and Dilthey, these men seek to uncover the seminal experience or creative insight of the authors of the texts in question, the experience that was objectified in words. Only by sharing this same kind of experience or entering into the same type of vision do we rightly understand the meaning of the text. Drawing upon both Hegel and Heidegger, these scholars affirm that real knowledge is self-knowledge and that the role of the text is to aid us in self-understanding.

 In existentialist hermeneutics history is dissolved into the historicity of existence. The Word becomes formative power rather than informative statement. The message of faith becomes the breakthrough into freedom. Jesus is seen as a witness to faith or the historical occasion for faith rather than the object of faith. It is contended that we should come to Scripture with the presuppositions of existentialist anthropology so that the creative questions of our time can be answered.

 In contradistinction to the above approaches I propose a christological hermeneutic by which we seek to move beyond historical criticism to the christological, as opposed to the existential, significance of the text. The text's christological meaning can in fact be shown to carry tremendous import for human existence. I believe that I am here being true to the intent of the scriptural authors themselves and even more to the Spirit who guided them, since they frequently made an effort to relate their revelatory insights to the future acts of cosmic deliverance wrought by the God of Israel (in the case of the Old Testament)i or to God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ (in the case of the New Testament). This approach, which is associated with Karl Barth, Jacques Ellul, and Wilhelm Vischer, among others, and which also has certain affinities with the confessional stances of Gerhard van Rad and Brevard Childs, seeks to supplement the historical-critical method by theological exegesis in which the innermost intentions of the author are related to the center and culmination of sacred history mirrored in the Bible, namely, the advent of Jesus Christ. It is believed that the fragmentary insights of both Old and New Testament writers are fulfilled in God's dramatic incursion into human history which we see in the incarnation and atoning sacrifice of Jesus Christ, in his life, death, and resurrection.

Here the aim is to come to Scripture without any overt presuppositions or at least holding these presuppositions in abeyance so that we can hear God's Word anew speaking to us in and through the written text. According to this view, the Word of God is not procured by historical-grammatical examination of the text, nor by historical-critical research, nor by existential analysis, but is instead received in a commitment of faith

 This position has much in common with historical orthodoxy, but one major difference is that it welcomes a historical investigation of the text. Such investigation, however, can only throw light on the cultural and literary background of the text it does not give us its divinely intended meaning. Another difference is that we seek to understand the text not simply in relation to other texts but in relation to the Christ revelation. Some of the theologians of the older orthodoxy would agree but others would say that what the Bible tells us about creation for example, can be adequately understood on its own apart from a reference to the incarnation. With the theology of the Reformation and Protestant orthodoxy, I hold that we should begin by ascertaining the literal sense of the text— -- what was in the mind of the author— -and we can do this only by seeing the passage in question in its immediate context. But then we should press on to discern its christological significance— -- how it relates to the message of the cross of Jesus Christ.

 In opposition to liberalism, I believe that the text should be seen not simply against its immediate historical environment but also against the background of Eternity. To do this, we need to go beyond authorial motivation to theological relation Moreover, it is neither the faith of Jesus (as in Ebeling) nor the Christ of faith (as in Bultmann and Tillich) but the Jesus Christ of sacred history that is our ultimate norm in faith and conduct.

 According to this approach, God reveals himself fully and definitively only in one time and place, viz., in the life history of Jesus Christ. The Bible is the primary witness to this event or series of events. This revelation was anticipated in the Old Testament and remembered and proclaimed in the New Testament. The testimony of the biblical authors was directed to this event by the inspiration of the Holy Spirit. Yet this relationship is not always obvious and must be brought home to us and clarified by the illumination of the Spirit of God in the history of the church.

 The Word of God is neither the text nor the psychological disposition of the author behind the text but is instead its salvific significance seen in the light of the cross of Christ. The criterion is not the original intention of the author as such but the intention of the Holy Spirit. This can be found to some degree by comparing the author's meaning to the meaning of the whole; yet even here the dogmatic norm, the very divine word itself, can elude us.

 Although in the mystery of God's grace his Word is assuredly present in Scripture, it is nonetheless veiled to those who are perishing (2 Cor. 3:I4-I6; 4:I-6). It is not always obvious even to the people of faith, and this is why it must be sought in Scripture. This Word finally must be given by God alone and not until this bestowal of divine grace can we really hear or know.

 It is not only what the Spirit revealed to the original author but what he reveals to us in the here and now that is the Word of God. Yet what he teaches us now does not contradict what he taught then. Indeed, it stands in an unbroken continuity with what has gone before. A can never come to mean B or C, but it can come to signify A + or A + + .

 This is to say, a text can have more than one meaning in the sense that it can be used by the Holy Spirit in different ways. Certainly in his prediction of the birth of the child Immanuel in Isaiah 7, the prophet did not consciously have in mind the virgin birth of Jesus Christ; yet this text points to and is fulfilled in the virgin birth as this is attested in Matthew 1:23. The text had both an immediate reference and an eschatological significance, but the latter was, for the most part, still hidden at the time of Isaiah. The many texts about false prophets and antichrists in the New Testament have been used by the Spirit to refer to various adversaries of the faith in all ages of the church. The meaning of the text is thereby not annulled but expanded.

 Under the influence of the philosopher Gadamer, the new hermeneutic today is concerned to merge the horizons of the

 text and of contemporary humanity. But this fusion of horizons can take place not by a poetic divination into the language of the text, nor by a mystical identification with the preconceptual experience of the author of the text, but by the breaking in of the Word of God from the Beyond into our limited horizons and the remolding of them, in some cases even the overthrowing of them. I have in mind not only the horizons of the exegete also those of the original authors who may have only faintly grasped what the Spirit was teaching them to see (cf. I Peter 1:10-12 We should remember that some prophecies in the Bible were corrected or reinterpreted by further illuminations of the Spirit in later biblical history. To insist on a literal fulfillment of all the Old Testament prophecies, as dispensationalists do, is to contradict the New Testament assertion that the church is the New Israel and that at least some of these prophecies have their fulfillment in the church of Jesus Christ.

 The christological hermeneutic that I propose is in accord with the deepest insights of both Luther and Calvin. Both Reformers saw Christ as the ground and center of Scripture. Both sought to relate the Old Testament, as well as the New, to the person and work of Christ. Their position, which was basically reaffirmed by Barth and Vischer, was that the hidden Christ is in the Old Testament and the manifest Christ in the New Testament.

 Luther likened Christ to the "star and kernel" of Scripture, describing him as "the center part of the circle" about which everything else revolves. On one occasion he compared certain texts to "hard nuts" which resisted cracking and confessed that he had to throw these texts against the rock (Christ) so that they would yield their "delicious kernel."

 The orthodox followers of Luther and Calvin did not always retain this christological focus, although most of them remained fairly close to their heritage. Philosophical speculation was the source of some of the deviations. Among Lutherans there was a drift toward natural theology in which the existence of God and the moral law were treated apart from the special revelation of God in Jesus Christ In Reformed circles, there was both a fascination with natural theology and a concentration on the eternal decrees of God. Reprobation was located in the secret will of God, which stood at variance with his revealed will in Christ. Jesus Christ was reduced to an instrument in carrying out this decree rather than being the author and finisher of our salvation (Heb. 5:9; It:). Scripture was used to support the idea of a God of absolute power, thereby obscuring the biblical conception of a God of infinite love whose power was manifest in his suffering and humiliation in Jesus Christ.

 Christological exegesis, when applied to the Old Testament, often takes the form of typological exegesis in which the acts of God in Old Testament history as well as the prophecies of his servants are seen to have their fulfillment in Jesus Christ. Such an approach was already discernible in the New Testament where, for example, the manna given to the children of Israel in the wilderness was regarded as a type of the bread of life (John 6:31, 32, 49-50, 58). Typological exegesis differs from allegorical and anagogical exegesis in that it is controlled by the analogy of faith, which views the events and discourses of the Old Testament in indissoluble relation to Jesus Christ, to the mystery of his incarnation and the miracle of his saving work (cf. Acts 26:22; I Peter 1:10-12).

 There are other hermeneutical options which cannot be covered in a brief essay of this kind, but at least two should be mentioned here. The liberationist hermeneutic draws upon Scripture to support the current struggle of the dispossessed for justice and liberty. In this view there can be no meaning apart from praxis, and liberationist theologians endeavor to show that the theology of the Old Testament prophets was articulated in response to economic and political upheavals.

 Process theology tries to draw upon Scripture to undergird the modern world-view, which admits of only one reality, a world process in evolution. The language of Scripture is that of poetry and myth, but it needs to be given theoretical content if it is to have relevance for the "man come of age." It is held that the intuitive experiences of the prophets and Apostles, though not their limited understandings of God and the world can be reconciled with similar experiences of geniuses and prophets of all religions throughout history.

 In the case of both these hermeneutical approaches Scripture is no longer normative in any basic sense. Instead it is reduced to an aid in understanding either the unfolding cosmic drama (as with process thought) or the class struggle of history (as with liberation theology).

 An Exposition of Some Key Texts

 In this section I intend to illustrate the christological hermeneutic by showing how it bears on scriptural exposition My aim is not to give an exegesis of the texts in question but simply to show the kind of approach I would use in discovering the meaning of Scripture.

 (1) The curse of the serpent in Genesis 3:I4-15 must be understood first of all as belonging to the saga that purports to describe events in the primal history of humankind. Saga as a literary genre refers to the total historical recollection of a particular people, a recollection expressed in poetic form. It pertains not to history as a firsthand description or recording of actual events (Historie) but to history in the sense of the phenomenal life of humankind in the world (Geschichte). The narrator, whom biblical scholarship generally identifies as the Yahwist, is concerned to show that through sin both the lower and higher creation carry a divine curse. Drawing upon an aetiologicaI myth supposedly explaining both why snakes craw! rather than walk as other animals do and why, as it was thought, they eat dust, the author sees in the serpent a representation of prehuman evil, though very probably he does not have in mind the devil of later Hebraic speculation.

 The church through the ages has discerned in these verses a proto-evangelium, a primitive form of the gospel. From my perspective the Fathers of the church were basically correct, even though it is unlikely that the narrator had in mind the victory of the future Messiah of Israel over the demonic powers of darkness. Yet our task is to discover not only the intent of the author but also the way in which the Spirit uses this text to reveal the saving work of Jesus Christ. First of all, we seek to ascertain how the meaning of the serpent evolved in Hebraic history and how she serpent was regarded in the New Testament. Isaiah associated the serpent with Leviathan, the sinister monster of the sea, whose destruction will take place on the eschatological day of the Lord (Isa. 27:1; cf. Ps. 74:14). In Revelation 20 2 the serpent is expressly identified with the dragon, Satan and the devil, who is thrown into the Abyss by an angel from heaven. Thus it is in basic accord with the wider perspective of biblical faith to see in the serpent a primal symbol of the demonic adversary of God and humanity.

 The enmity between the seed of the woman and the seed of the serpent becomes apparent in the ongoing struggle between the devil and the human race. The prophecy in verse I S that the seed of the woman shall bruise the head of the serpent can be held to be fulfilled in the overthrow of the devil by Jesus Christ, through his atoning death and glorious resurrection from the grave. This victory is carried forward in the obedience of Christians to the gospel of Jesus Christ (cf. Rom. I6:20).

 (2) in Genesis 4:1-16 we are introduced to a related saga describing one of the most dreaded consequences of sin murder— which goes back to the very beginnings of humankind. Historical criticism tells us that Cain was considered the embodiment or ancestor of the Kenites who, though they worshiped Yahweh, were never included in the covenant community nor were they heirs of the promised land. The curse that fell on Cain is considered by some commentators to be a curse that fell on the Kenites.

 Some liberal scholars find the significance of this story in the tension between farmers (represented by Cain) and seminomads (represented by Abel). But this is a sociological or cultural-historical explanation of this ancient tale and certainly does not do justice to the theological concerns of the Yahwist.

 Theologically considered, the story has two points of significance. First, the fact that the Lord accepted Abel's sacrifice over Cain's is not to be attributed to any higher intrinsic goodness on the part of Abel. At the same time, this may have been the Spirit's way of showing that a blood sacrifice was necessary as an expression of true faith, and therefore Abel's sacrifice was honored by God (cf. Heb. II:4). Or it may underscore the truth that the sacrifices we offer to God are acceptable only on the basis of grace, not human merit. The saga itself does not indicate any reason other than God's good pleasure for the preference of Abel over Cain, though the wider Old Testament context gives priority to blood sacrifice as a means of countering the effects of sin. In the New Testament perspective only the blood of Christ cleanses from sin (I John I:7). Abel can be considered a Christ figure, since he offered the sacrifice pleasing to God. New Testament faith regards him as the first martyr (Matt. 23:35), and the epistle to the Hebrews likens his death to the death of Christ (Heb. I2:24).

 The second significant point of this saga concerns the sign that was placed on Cain to protect him from robbers and marauders. This sign is to be regarded as a type of the sign of the cross, as Wilhelm Vischer rightly points out,3 for the cross signifies that Christ died for the whole world, for both the Cains and the Abels. Those who choose the pathway of sin, as did Cain, are still protected by the grace of God, despite the fact that they do not deserve this.

 But the deepest christological significance of this story is that God's grace covers the sins of all people, for we are all Cains in the sight of God before whom we are all guilty of the murder of his Son. Yet despite our sin and guilt, we are accepted by God because his Son has borne the penalty of our sin in our place. The sign of the cross fulfills and renews the deepest symbolism in the sign of Cain. The sign placed on Cain points to the gospel of the justification of the ungodly.

 Unlike fundamentalist scholars whose primary concern is the historical veracity of this story rather than its christological significance, I am not troubled that the author employs a poetic narrative to convey deeper truth. Scholars who adhere to a more conservative persuasion are bent on explaining how Cain found a wife in a land where, so it is recorded, other people dwelt. [hey are intrigued by the question: how can this be if Cain was one of the three sons of the original first couple? I would be willing to entertain the possibility that both Cain and Abel were historical figures in one of the tribal ancestries of ancient mid eastern culture, but the intention of the author is not to convey Actual information on the first murder but instead to show how murder is endemic to sin and how grace is available even to the worst of sinners.4

 In relating this saga to the contemporary situation we can immediately see its christological relevance for such social issues as capital punishment and for such enduring psychic realities as the inner torment and rootlessness that sin fosters. It is interesting to speculate on what the Spirit of God would have us preach today on the basis of this passage, but because God's Word is always concrete and specific, in an essay such as this we cannot judge absolutely what God's Word might be in the existential situation of a particular congregation.

 (3) Isaiah is a prophetic depiction of the return of the exiles from Babylonia to Palestine. Scholars are uncertain as to its precise dating, but most agree that together with 34:I-I7 it probably belonged originally to chapters 40-66 and is therefore exilic rather than pre-exilic. At any rate, it was not the product of the hand of Isaiah of Jerusalem, though some might wish to contend that the reference is to the return of the people of the Northern Kingdom to their homeland from Assyria.

 Whatever the case, the context indicates that the author, who stands in the so-called Isaiah tradition, is envisaging a return of the chosen people of God to the land of Israel. The desert in verse I refers very probably to the wilderness area in the vicinity of the Dead Sea. The prophecy is eschatological in the sense that Isaiah is foretelling the ransoming of the people of Zion who are now in captivity.

 From the perspective of the New Testament we see this prophecy fulfilled in the advent of Jesus Christ. He is the "holy way," and through him we enter into the glories of Zion.  Christ has opened to us a "new and living way" (Heb. 10:20). Jesus Christ is "the way, and the truth, and the life" (John 14:6). The "haunt of jackals" in Isaiah 35:7 now becomes the habita­tion of demons as Christians make their pilgrimage through the valley of the shadow of death (Ps. 23:4). The vision of the lame leaping like a hart and the tongue of the dumb singing for joy seems to prefigure the healing ministry of our Lord. Jesus' min­istry is also anticipated in Isaiah 29:18-19. It seems, moreover, that Jesus had in mind these very Isaiah passages in his an­nouncement of his mission (Luke 7:21-22).

To hear the Word that God wishes us to hear in this passage for today, we can surmise that the return of the ransomed of the Lord to Zion could refer to the gathering of the elect into the covenant community of faith. Or it might also be a portrayal of the journey of believers, living in the exile of a fallen world, to the New Jerusalem, their final destination. The New Jerusalem is depicted as coming down out of heaven at the second coming of Christ (Rev. 21:2, 10). The waters breaking forth in the wil­derness could well be a type of the living water, the outpouring of the Spirit of Christ at Pentecost (cf. John 3:5; 4:10-15).

When this passage is applied to the religious and cultural sit­uation today, we can perhaps hear a call to endurance and hope as we travel the holy way to the New Jerusalem, to the heavenly Mount Zion. This passage will have a different impact and sig­nificance for persecuted Christians behind the Iron Curtain and in the impoverished nations of the Third World than it has for affluent Christians in the West. Here again, we cannot presume to know what God will disclose through his Word to people today, but we can prepare ourselves to hear what he has to say to us as individuals and to our churches in our own cultural contexts. The one conclusion that we can safely draw is that God's Word in this Isaiah passage will be a word of hope and comfort, for its deepest intimations are fulfilled in the coming of Jesus Christ who personifies and embodies the light that shines in the darkness (John 1:5). Indeed, it is possible to use this passage for a sermon on the Gospel itself

(4) The prophecy in Joel 2:28-32 is incontestably a messianic one concerning the restoration of Israel and the coming day of the Lord. Joel undoubtedly did not consciously have in mind the coming of Jesus Christ, but his predictions about the sun turning to darkness and the moon to blood are associated in the New Testament with the glorious advent of Christ (Mark 13:24; Luke 21:25; Rev. 6:12). His prediction in vss. 28 and 29 about the sons and daughters of Israel prophesying and the old men dreaming dreams are regarded by the Apostle Peter as being fulfilled on the day of Pentecost (Acts 2:17-21). Joel envisaged a restoration of an earthly temporal kingdom, but in the light of the New Testament we see his prophecies concerning the resto­ration of the people of God being fulfilled in the inbreaking of the spiritual kingdom of Christ. Fundamentalists generally be­lieve that the present kingdom of Israel is foretold in these an­cient Old Testament prophecies, but this is to apply to these verses a dispensational as opposed to a christological hermeneutic.

When we read this passage in the light of the situation today, our eyes are opened to the amazing inroads of the church of Christ in the Third World nations, which may indicate a new Pentecost, a sign of the last times. Joel himself distinguishes be­tween the early rain and the latter rain (2:23; cf. Hos. 6:3; James 5:7-8), and it could be said that the early rain occurred at the first Pentecost while the latter rain is now or will soon be de­scending upon us. This is a common Pentecostal interpretation of Joel, and it may have some validity. It should be remembered that in biblical usage the Day of the Lord can refer to both the coming of Jesus Christ and the judgment of God upon the na­tions at the end of time.

The Apostles of the New Testament felt free on many occa­sions to expand the prophecies of the Old Testament on the ba­sis of the new light that was given to them. For Peter, on the day of Pentecost, all flesh included all nations (Acts 2:17). For Joel, on the other hand, all flesh (2:28) meant the Jews only.

 

As we try to relate this passage to the current situation, we are first reminded of the day of Pentecost, the second stage of the Parousia (according to K. Barth) when Jesus Christ came to dwell within his people by his Spirit and empower them for his service. But we are also called to contemplate on the renewal of Pentecost in our time as a sign of the coming again of Christ in power and glory to set up his kingdom that shall have no end. The signs and portents in the heavens can rightly be associated with both advents of Christ, and in every generation we should look for signs of the day when he will reveal his power and glory to all nations.

 

This passage might also be used by the Spirit in our time to extend the privilege of the public preaching of the gospel to women, since Joel says that both sons and daughters, both men­servants and maidservants will prophesy. In some situations God's Word may be that women should keep silent in the public services of worship (1 Cor. 14:34) but in others that they should preach and prophesy.

 

(5) As we move on to the New Testament, we find ourselves in a qualitatively different situation, for the Apostles were eye-and earwitnesses of God's self-revelation in Jesus Christ, the rev­elation that fulfilled the partial revelations of the divine mercy in Israel's history. Yet the sad fact is that even New Testament passages are often interpreted without any real reference to the saving work of Christ on the cross.

 

Turning to the beatitudes, we can understand how easy it is to interpret these sayings of Jesus in such a way that an ethical style of life takes precedence over God's work of reconciliation and redemption in Jesus Christ as the Son of Man. To ethicize Jesus' teachings is to make Jesus into a sagacious teacher, a spir­itual master, the greatest of the prophets, but this is not yet to acknowledge him as the divine Savior who rescues us from sin.

 

The beatitude as recorded in Matthew 5:9 reads: "Blessed are the peacemakers, for they shall be called sons of God." In exe­geting this passage I would first concentrate on grammatical-historical criticism, contrasting the meaning of makarios (blessed) with eudaimōn (fortunate or happy). I would also explore the meanings of the Hebrew shalôm and the Greek eirēnē  in an attempt to show that the pursuit of peace in the biblical perspective entails more than a spiritual or inner peace. It means to restore right relationships between people and between fallen humanity and the living God.

 

I would then move on to what is commonly called higher criticism and try to ascertain whether the beatitudes were spo­ken on a single occasion or whether they represent teachings of Jesus delivered on various occasions. I would also delve into the differences between the versions of the beatitudes in Matthew and Luke. Did the theological outlook or psychological dispo­sition of the two authors color their perceptions of these say­ings? Is this why Matthew's emphasis tends to be more spiritual and Luke's more social?

 

Now we are ready for a genuine theological treatment of the text in which we view it in the light of the wider message of Jesus and, even more, of the apostolic witness concerning the significance of his life, death, and resurrection. When we relate this text to Jesus' understanding of the kingdom of God, we see that the beatitudes represent guidelines for the style of life that is to characterize those who live in the new age of the kingdom. The way of the cross is the way of nonviolence, the way of suf­fering love, even nonresistance, whereas the way of the world is governed by the lusts of the flesh and the use of the sword.

 

When we proceed to relate this text to the apostolic testimony concerning the significance of the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus, we begin to see its christological import. The New Testament makes clear that there can never be peace in the world until people are in union with the Prince of Peace, Jesus Christ, a union effected by the Holy Spirit and realized in the decision of faith. The key to real peace is the preaching of the gospel of regeneration by which the spirit of peace is imparted to those who believe. The cross of Christ signifies not only the way of peace but the way to peace, for it is only as we grasp the meaning of the cross that we are enabled to die to the passions of the flesh and live and walk in the way of righteousness.

 

To be a peacemaker is a privilege granted by the free mercy of God, not a meritorious work entitling us to special rights in his kingdom. Our peacemaking is the evidence but not the ground of our adoption into the family of God, which rests solely on his grace.

 But we are obliged to say something more. It is Jesus Christ who by his atoning death and vicarious love reconciles a fallen human race to the God of infinite holiness and mercy. He alone is the perfect peacemaker, and therefore he alone is perfectly blessed. It is he who has torn down the walls that separate sinners from one another and from the holy God. We are all brought closer together by the shedding of his blood on the cross. "For he is himself our peace," declares Paul. "Gentiles and Jews, he has made the two one, and in his own body of flesh and blood has broken down the enmity which stood like a dividing wall between them (Eph. 2:14-15; To).

 To be at peace with our Maker as well as with ourselves is to know that our sins are covered by the righteousness of Christ. To know love in its supreme radicality is to experience the forgiveness of sins available to us through the death of Christ on the cross. It is only when we have this kind of peace that we can be peacemakers in the church and in secular society. To be a peacemaker is not only to walk in the steps of Christ, to be a reconciler where discord reigns, but it is also to direct people to Jesus Christ who alone imparts the peace that passes all understanding (Phil. 4:7). Our deeds of peacemaking will therefore be understood as signs and parables of the passion and victory of Jesus Christ. By paying the penalty for sin he made peace between God and sinful humankind. By putting sin to death in our own lives through the power of the cross of Christ we can be instruments of Christ's peace in the world.

 (6) The parabolic statement of the binding of the strong man in Mark 3:27 affords another opportunity to see Jesus Christ as the hidden and sometimes the explicit meaning of the scriptural text. In its immediate context it is clear that Jesus is referring to the overthrow of Satan by himself. It is Jesus who binds the strong man and plunders his house. A parallel image is the casting down of Satan to the earth (cf. Luke IO:I8; Rev. I2:9).

 The idea of the binding of the evil powers should be viewed in the context of the eschatological message of the kingdom (cf. Isa. 24:21-23; Rev. 20:1-3). This binding is already noticeable in Jesus' ministry of exorcism, but it becomes a cosmic reality when he dethrones the principalities and powers through his atoning death on the cross and his victorious resurrection from the grave (Col. 2:15). The New Testament pictures Jesus as leading a host of captives into the heavenly paradise by his resurrection from the dead (Eph. 4:8-IO; cf. Ps. 68:I8). The binding of Satan does not mean the destruction of the demonic force, but it does mean that his power is now significantly curtailed, since he is unable to block the advancement of the gospel in the world. He is like a barking dog that is chained (Augustine). He is able to inspire fear and thereby cause disruption in the world, but actually his real power has been taken from him. His "Titanic" scheme to gain mastery over the world has been irrevocably shattered, though he can still keep the world in confusion. By the gift of the Spirit we now come to realize that the power of the devil resides primarily in his ability to deceive. Only God has the power to cast into hell (Matt. IO:28), and Satan is an unwilling instrument in the hands of a holy God who uses evil to overthrow evil.

 To affirm the christological meaning of the binding of the strong man entails a belief in a personal demonic adversary of God and humanity, called in the Bible Satan, Leviathan, Beelzebul, and the devil. While acknowledging that much of the depiction of the devil and his activity in the New Testament is in the form of myth or picture language, we cannot deny the supernatural reality which is the focus of the myth. We deny the presuppositions of historical positivism in which the life of humanity is portrayed as a closed system of historical causation. We must be willing to learn what historical and literary criticism can tell us about the construction of the text and the psychology of the author, but it is Scripture itself or rather the Spirit acting within Scripture that gives us the theological significance of the text.

 When we deal with the question of the contemporary relevance of this particular text, we are reminded that the church continues its warfare against the principalities and powers. These powers have been dethroned, the dragon has been mortally wounded, but in his death throes he can be even more dangerous than before. Yet in the knowledge that his days are numbered, that his real power has been taken from him, we can, on the basis of this take heart that the church cannot be defeated in its mission to bring the whole world into subjection to Jesus Christ. Insofar as people continue to live according to the lie that the devil promulgates, they still need to be delivered. Exorcism should be part of the ministry of the church today. But we should bear in mind that it is the power of the gospel itself that frees people in bondage to the forces of darkness. It is not any special ritual of exorcism, though this may be appropriate in certain instances, but the preaching of the gospel itself that brings to a lost and helpless world the fruits of Christ's cross and resurrection victory.

 (7) A text that has lent itself to much controversy in recent years regarding the role of women in ministry is I Corinthians 14:33-34: "As in all the congregations of the saints, women should remain silent in the churches. They are not allowed to speak, but must be in submission, as the Law says" (NIV). A comparable injunction is found in I Timothy 2:II-I2, though the Pauline authorship of that particular epistle is questioned by many scholars, induding some conservatives.s What is perplexing about I Corinthians 14:34 is that in the same epistle Paul acknowledges the right of women to pray and prophesy publicly in the assembly of the congregation (II:5, I3). Some critical scholars have concluded that these verses are an insertion of a later writer and reflect a hardening of attitudes on this question in the Christian community. I believe, on the contrary, that Paul's remarks are best understood in the light of a particular problem in the Corinthian church of this time, namely, women glossolalists who were causing disturbances in suggests, it may well be that, as Paul was trying to bring to a close this particular portion of his letter, new reports came to him of further commotion caused by overzealous charismatics who happened to be mainly women. He then felt constrained to curb this growing anarchy in worship by issuing an injunction forbidding women to preach publicly and to be subordinate, probably to their husbands and perhaps also to the elders or pastors.

 Yet, that Paul was not making this an unconditional or universal command is obvious from the fact that in other epistles he speaks highly of Priscilla and Phoebe both of whom carried on an active teaching ministry. In Romans 16:2 Paul urges the entire Christian community in Rome to be at the disposal of Phoebe "in whatever she may require from you." In the same epistle he asks Roman Christians to greet "Andronicus and Junia, my kinsmen, and my fellow prisoners, who are of note among the apostles" (Rom. 16:7 KJV). (It is becoming more widely accepted in scholarly circles that Junta was a woman, not a man as suggested by the "Juntas" used in most translations.)

 Yet we still do not grasp the christological significance of our text until we view it in the light of Galatians 3 :26-29 where the essential equality of the male and female members of the body of Christ is affirmed.. Sexual differences are not annulled, but they are relativized by faith in Christ, for in Christ all are "sons of God" (Gal. 3:26).

 Further illumination is given to the Corinthian text when it is related to Ephesians 2:14-22 where Christ is pictured as breaking down the walls that divide Christians from one another by abolishing "the law of commandments and ordinances" (vs. I5). The promise of woman's call to ministry in Acts 2:I7-I8 will also figure in a fuller theological exposition of this passage.

 What our text seems to tell us is that in some situations women should keep silent in the church and let men assume control. In other situations, however, there may be a real place for women in the preaching and teaching ministry of the church. The barriers to women's ordination are sociological more than theological.

 We should also say something about the principle of subordination. This is not overthrown in the Pauline epistles but given a new meaning or thrust. This principle, too, must be interpreted christologically, as Paul does in Ephesians 5:21-33. Just as Christ gave himself for the church, so the husband must give himself to the wife. His headship is realized in service. Her subordination is realized in her respect for and loving assistance to her husband; together they work out a common vocation under the cross.

 Both men and women in ministry are called to practice subordination to one another and to the congregation which has called them. Subordination, indeed is the law of the kingdom of God, but it must now be understood not as servile submission to authority but as service in fellowship. This is how Paul understood the team ministry of Priscilla and Aquila (note that in Rom. 16:3 he places Priscilla first); this is also how he conceived of his own ministry in relation to Lydia, Phoebe, and Priscilla.

 The law of subordination is based on God's gracious condescension to a sinful humanity in the person of his Son Jesus Christ. It is also anchored in the subordination that Jesus practiced in relation to his disciples. It was he who washed their feet and not vice versa. It was he who suffered and died for them, not vice versa. He realized his headship in the role of a servant, and we are called to do likewise. His exaltation was manifest precisely in his humiliation, and this is true for his disciples in every age and race.

 Word and Spirit

 It can legitimately be asked whether I am operating with a canon within the canon. This is not the case if it means interpreting the whole from the vantage point of select books in the New Testament (in the manner of Kasemann). It is the case if it implies understanding the whole of Scripture in the light of the gospel of Jesus Christ, but this gospel is either explicit or implicit in every part of Scripture. I here concur with Luther who contended that every scriptural text can be law or gospel depending on how we relate it to Jesus Christ.

 The gospel of the cross is indeed the hidden and not so hidden meaning of all the Scriptures, but this gospel cannot be extracted from Scripture as something apart from or independent of its context. Forsyth has cogently observed:

 The Word is not in the Bible as a treasure hid in a field so that you can dig out the jewel and leave the soil. It grows from it like a tree. It breathes from it like a sweet savour. It streams up from it like an exhalation. It rises like the soul going to glory from its sacred dust. The Word of God is not to be dissected from the Bible, but to be distilled.6

 Because the gospel is basically a mystery of which we are stewards (I Cor. 4:I), we can point to it but we cannot possess it. Our formulations cannot be identified with the gospel itself, but they should be regarded as a sign and witness of the gospel. They become the gospel when God unites his Word with our broken words by his Spirit. This is not mysticism, for I insist that meaning shines through mystery. Though our understandings are always partial, they are nonetheless valid for they have their basis in the illumination of the Holy Spirit.

 The gospel as the transcendent Word of God will appear somewhat different to the church in every age, since the Spirit always has a fresh message for the churches. It is the same message, but it is revealed in a new way. For Augustine, at least in one stage of his ministry, the principal theme of the gospel seemed to be the vision of God (cf. Matt. 5:8; I Cor. I3:I2). Luther perceived the essence of the Word to be justification by faith alone. For Calvin it was the life of regeneration based on the remission of sins gained for us by the death and resurrection of Christ. In the theology of Karl Barth, it was the theme of reconciliation and redemption revealed and enacted in Jesus Christ. For the Pietists it was personal conversion through total surrender to the will of God. For Ritschl and the liberal theologians who followed him, it was the proclamation of the kingdom of God. For us today, it might well be the call to obedience and perseverance amid growing persecution. This call is always grounded in the perfect obedience of Jesus Christ which makes our partial obedience possible.

 Historical research can be used to discover the literary background and cultural context of the passage in question, but it cannot procure for us the meaning of the Word of God. What historical criticism can give us concerning the events of sacred history mirrored in the Bible is a knowledge of probability, not certainty. It can throw light upon the Sitz im Leben of the text, but it cannot lay hold of its theological and spiritual significance. Does this mean that we should then move from a historical to an existential understanding of the text? In one sense this can be affirmed if it implies that we must now discover what the text means for us personally. On the other hand, we dare not tread this path if it signifies that our goal is simply to arrive at a new awareness of human existence in the light of the text. Against existentialist theology, I contend that what the text conveys to us is not simply a new self-understanding but information about the will and purpose of God, knowledge of the plan of salvation.

 The revelatory meaning of the text cannot be procured by any technique, including that of existential analysis. It can only be conveyed by the action of the Spirit upon the text and within our hearts. The key to the mystery of the meaning of the text lies not in a poetic divination into the language of the text but in the gift of divine illumination. We must pray as Solomon did for an "understanding heart" (I Kings 3:9-I2; NKJ). We must ask the Spirit to teach us the mystery of his law (Ps. II9:I8, 130). We must pray that the eyes of our hearts might be enlightened so that we can understand the meaning of our hope in Jesus Christ (Eph. I: I 8).

 What I am advocating is not a pneumatic or devotional exegesis in which we simply read meanings into the text under the inspiration of the Spirit. Instead, we are called to discover the intent of the text by comparing it to other texts and relating it to the meaning of the whole— -- the proclamation of "the law of the Spirit of life in Christ Jesus" (Rom. 8:2). We rely ultimately upon the guidance of the Spirit in this task, but this does not lead us to substitute feeling for reason. On the contrary, we seek to use our reason in the service of the Word.

 Christological hermeneutics presupposes that Scripture was written within a community of faith. We cannot really grasp the various nuances of meaning that a text carries unless we stand in this community, unless we share in this faith. Our criterion is not the consensus of the community, but the Spirit of

God working both within the text and within the community enabling us to understand— -- dimly but truly (cf. I Cor. I3:I2). Our partial understandings will always be in continuity (though not necessarily in total agreement) with the basic understanding of the prophets and sages of the church throughout history.

 It behooves us to avoid the perils of both subjectivism and objectivism. We should neither seek a higher spiritual meaning divorced from the text nor rely on the common sense meaning of the text available even to the "natural man." The Word of God is not self-evident in Scripture; it must be sought, but it must be sought in Scripture, not beyond it.

 It is important to distinguish carefully between the culturally conditioned form of Scripture and its divine content. We should take pains to avoid both a fusion of form and content (as in the older orthodoxy) and a separation of form and content (as in liberalism). Our task is to penetrate through the form to the divine content, but this is not possible apart from a special divine illumination.

 The challenge today is to regain confidence that the living Word of God will manifest himself in and through his written Word. It is not whether we have the right tools to dig out the Word of God in Scripture but whether the Spirit of God is ready to act to reveal his Word to the searching heart. No amount of exegetical dexterity or theological acumen can give us the revelatory meaning of the scriptural text. This is a gift bestowed only on the basis of faith in Jesus Christ, and a simple believer may find this meaning before a hermeneutical expert. This is not to deny that those who are educated in biblical studies and at the same time enlightened by the Spirit are able to understand the cultural and theological ramifications of the revelation of the Word of God far better than those who are illiterate in these areas. What I am saying, however, is that we cannot take pride in our ability to master the text, for its revelatory impact is available to us only when the text masters us. The revelation of the Word of God is a matter of the free decision of God, not a matter of bringing to the Bible the right kind of pre-understanding or the latest findings in form and redaction criticism. God is still sovereign even in the science of biblical interpretation, and both liberal and conservative exegetes need to acknowledge this anew.

 

NOTES

 

I. In later Israelite history it came to be believed that Yahweh would complete his work of redemption through a Messiah figure whom Christians naturally associated withjesus Christ.

2. See Jaroslav Pehkan, From Luther to Kierkegaard (St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1950), pp. 24-75.

3. Wilhelm Vischer, The Witness ofthe Old Testament to Christ, trans. A. B. Crabtree (London: Lutterworth Press 1949), pp. 68-81. Vischer is adamant that the story of Cain and Abel refers not to the Kenites of the days of David but to "an event of primeval times-the original event which prepares the way for the special history of God's revelation within fallen humanity and for the election of one race of mankind to be the bearer of the special revelation of God" (PP. 79-8o). For Vischer this is an event in Urgeschichte (pre-history) and not Historie (the area of world occurrence accessible to historical investigation). It is a poetic elaboration of that which is hidden from the purview of historical research but which is kept alive in the memory of the race through the illumination of the Spirit of God.

 4. One might argue (as does Vischer) that the more specific intent of the text is to point out how the original fall or original sin gives rise to a primal murder, though it is impossible to ascertain what is genuinely historical in this saga, nor should this even be attempted if we are to remain true to the central thrust of this passage.

 5. To question the direct Pauline authorship of the pastoral epistles does not take away their divine inspiration, but it means that they have to be treated in a different manner. I believe that there are genuine Pauline fragments in these epistles, though they were probably written by a disciple or disciples of Paul.

 6. Quoted from Harry Escort (ed.), The Cure of Souls: An Anthology of P.T Forsyth's Practical Writings (Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, I97I), p. 70.