The Origin of Jesus Christ: Matthew 1:1-25

Unlike the other evangelists Matthew introduces his gospel with a table of ancestry.(1) Certain features distinguish it as a novel presentation of a family tree.  In contrast to Luke 3:23-38, the only other genealogy of Jesus in the New Testament, it begins with Abraham, the grand patriarch of Israel, and moves forward through the individual generations to its culmination in "Jesus who is called Messiah."  Forty names succeed each other in unbroken father-son relationships; the forty-first is Jesus, but his link to this chain of successive generations is ambiguous.  The verb egennesen ("he generated") is used 39 times to connect these father and son pairs, but at the crucial point in verse 16 it does not relate Jesus to Joseph.  Instead Joseph is identified as "the husband of Mary," and Mary is designated as the one "from whom Jesus who is called Messiah was born."  Four other women of different reputations have been included previously among the male descendants through whom the family line moves, even though they are not to be counted separately as individual generations.  Finally, in contrast to Luke's register of names - and most others - Matthew's genealogy is numerically structured according to a pattern, which seems to demarcate three divisions each consisting of fourteen names (1:17). 

All of these distinctive features have something to do with the origin of Jesus.  He is the climactic goal and termination of Israel's history, and yet he does not appear to be directly or immediately linked to it.  The ambiguity of verse 16, which in spite of the textual variants in the manuscript tradition that seek to resolve it, raises the question of Jesus' relationship to Joseph.(2) Is he his son or not? If he is, what is the purpose of 1:18-25?  If he is not, how can he belong to the genealogy and be regarded as its culmination? 

To comprehend this unusual table of ancestry it is necessary to recognize its arbitrary character.  This becomes more apparent through a comparison of its content with its Old Testament sources.  The first fourteen generations from Abraham to David correspond to those named in various lists recorded in the Old Testament, especially 1 Chron. 1:28-2:15.(3) There are, however, gaps in the second division of fourteen.  Three successive kings of Judah:  Ahaziah, Joash and Amaziah, listed in 1 Chron. 3:11-2, have been excluded.  Jehoiachim who succeeded Josiah and who was the father of Jehoiachin or Jechoniah, is also missing.  Various reasons for their omission have been offered, but none has been especially convincing.(4) Why certain ones and not others may no longer be ascertainable.  What matters is that verse 17 indicates an imposed limit of fourteen generations to each division, and that requires the exclusion of some names. 

This arbitrary employment of the number fourteen, however, is called into question by an apparent deficiency in the third and final section of the genealogy, which lists only thirteen generations.  That might be accounted for by the inadequacy of the extra-biblical source from which most of these names have been derived, for only two of them, Salathiel and Zerubbabel, appear in the ancestry tables of 1 Chron. 3:17-24.  But such reasoning from silence is groundless.  On the other hand, at this point it might seem more cogent to dismiss the entire genealogy with all of its idiosyncrasies as the work of earlier tradition.  Matthew simply adopted it and without critical revision placed it at the head of his gospel.(5)

Nevertheless, in spite of these difficulties verse 17 must not be set aside too quickly; it provides the key to the genealogy.  A correct counting of its individual generations is crucial to an under-standing of its numerical schemes and their theological purpose.  According to verse 17, "… all the generations from Abraham to David (are) fourteen generations and from David to the Babylonian deportation fourteen generations and from the Babylonian deportation to the Messiah fourteen generations."  David is mentioned twice; he ends the first division of names and begins the second.  An enumeration indicates that he is the fourteenth generation and so the end of the first section of the genealogy.  If he is counted a second time, the number of names in the second group totals fifteen.  Obviously, if verse 17 is to be observed, this cannot be correct, unless Jechoniah were omitted at the end of the second division and counted at the beginning of the third.  That would furnish an additional name for the final section and happily bring the total to fourteen.  But at the same time it would distort the reckoning for David would be counted twice, but Jechoniah, representing the transition of the Babylonian exile, only once.(6) If, however, each name represents one generation and is reckoned accordingly, the correspondence with the numerical scheme of verse 17 is almost perfect.  David and Jechoniah stand at the end of the first and second sections of the genealogy respectively.  Although they are named twice, they are only to be counted once.  As a matter of fact, since verse 17 substitutes an historical event, the Babylonian deportation, in place of Jechoniah as the conclusion of the second division of generations and the beginning of the third, it is evident that Matthew's genealogy is more than a table of ancestry.  Its structure, as indicated by verse 17, presents an historical outline. 

Both David and the Babylonian deportation mark an end as well as a beginning in this procession of people and events.  David closes that era of history which had been opened by Abraham, a time of "beginnings." But he also inaugurates a new epoch, "an age of kings," as the second division of the genealogy might aptly be called.  He is referred to in 1:6 as "the king," and as such he is the founder of the dynasty that follows.  The Babylonian deportation serves the same purpose in this historical scheme: it is an event of transition that terminates the age of kings and ushers in a new period of Israel's history as Jechoniah is carried into captivity with the Jewish people.  This third epoch, which is closed by Jesus the Messiah, might appropriately be designated "a time of exile." 

However, as already noted, this third division of the genealogy appears to be incomplete: only thirteen names are listed.  This deficiency may be attributed to the carelessness of Matthew's redaction(7) or the inaccuracy of his sources.(8) It may also be resolved by counting Jesus as the thirteenth generation and the risen Christ as the fourteenth.(9) But neither explanation corresponds to the character and purpose of the evangelist's work.  On the one hand, as will become evident, Matthew is a masterful literary artist and is in control of his writing as well as his use of the materials of tradition that are available to him.  On the other hand, he presents Jesus as the Christ already from the time of his birth. 

The incomplete number of generations in the third section of the genealogy is deliberate and is clarified by the origin and significance of the number fourteen which, according to verse 17, is the basis of the author's schematization of Israel's history.  The best clues are provided by the Messiah Apocalypse of 2 Baruch 53-74.  Matthew could not have utilized this millennial writing, for it was composed after his Gospel. But he appears to have been familiar with its pattern of fourteen or twelve plus two.  His scheme matches the apolocalyptist's organization and interpretation of Israel's history. 

The pattern which this visionary sees in the history of Israel is analogous to an enormous cloud that has emerged from "a very great sea . . . full of waters white and black" (53:1).  "Now this was done twelve times, but the black were always more numerous than the white" (53:6).  The first waters that fall upon the earth are dark because they symbolize the sin of Adam, and they become darker because of the sin that results in the waters of the flood (56:5-16).  The bright waters that follow are "the fount of Abraham" and the births of his son and grandson (57:1).  They are succeeded by the dark waters of slavery in Egypt (58:1).  Bright waters usher in the fourth period, the time of Moses and the Exodus (59:1-12).  But the fifth waters soon fall to make an end of this through the evil works of the Amorites (60:1).  The sixth waters are interpreted to be the illustrious reigns of David and Solomon (61:1-8).  Jeroboam's sin of the two golden calves, however, brings back the dark rains (62:1-8).  The eighth waters are bright again because righteousness flourishes in the time of Hezekiah's rule (63:1-11).  Manasseh's wickedness represents the murky ninth waters (64:1-10).  The bright tenth waters signify the restoration that takes place under Josiah (66:1-8).  "And the eleventh black waters which thou hast seen: this is the calamity now befalling Zion," namely Jerusalem laid waste by the king of Babylon (67:1-6).  The bright twelfth waters are interpreted as a time of restoration when Zion will be rebuilt, the Temple offerings reinstituted and the priests reinstated (68:4-8). 

Twelve episodes of epochs have occurred, but the goal of history has not yet been reached.  "For the last waters which thou hast seen which were darker than all that were before them, those which were after the twelfth number which were collected together belong to the whole world" (69:1).  Although this final rainfall is not numbered, it is to all intents and purposes the thirteenth.  As such it is the unluckiest, the most tragic period in history: "And it shall come to pass that whoever gets safe out of the fire shall be destroyed by famine . . . for all the earth shall devour its inhabitants." 

At the consummation of this darkest rainfall a lightning bolt flashes across the sky which is identified as the messiah: "… he shall summon all nations, and some he shall spare and some of them he shall slay" (72:2).  After he has carried out the great judgment, the fourteenth and final age is inaugurated, "the beginning of that which is not corruptible" (74:2).  "Then healing shall descend in dew, and disease shall withdraw, and anxiety and anguish and lamentation pass away and gladness proceed through the whole earth" (73:2). 

Matthew's numerically structured genealogy parallels this arbitrary schematization of Israel's history.  Moreover, the supposed discrepancy between the statement of verse 17 that there are fourteen generations from the Babylonian deportation to the Messiah and the actual number thirteen names listed in the table is resolved by it.  Indeed, it is in the third division of the genealogy that the scheme of twelve plus two or fourteen has its real application.  That is, there are twelve ancestors and Jesus the Messiah who, in contrast to all the other individuals in the family tree is to be counted twice.  He represents two generations, not consecutively, but simultaneously from the beginning of his life. 

His birth marks the end of the age of exile.  He is "the king of the Jews" who draws the Magi from the east, and "they rejoice with exceeding great joy" when they arrive at his home in Bethlehem in order to pay him homage.  But his birth also elicits the dreadful response of Herod the Great who dispatches his soldiers to slaughter all the infant boys in Bethlehem and the surrounding regions.  Jesus as the sole survivor of this massacre becomes the bearer of this holocaust character and will embody its judgment at the end of his life when this sequence of the new age and death will be reversed.  His abandonment by God at death will constitute the darkest moment in history for it will be accompanied by the return of the creation to its primeval chaos: "…and the earth was shaken and the rocks were torn apart" (27:51).  The awakening of the saints which immediately follows signals the beginning of this new creation: "And the tombs were opened and many bodies of the saints having been asleep were raised; and coming out of the tombs after his resurrection they entered the holy city and were manifested to many" (27:53-3).  Because Jesus' life is the ground on which the consummating events of history occur, he is the bearer of two generations.  His death not only relates him to the thirteenth episode in the scheme of the Messiah Apocalypse; the resurrection of the saints effected by the emission of his final divine breath of life (27:50), links him to the fourteenth, the beginning of a new time. But an ambiguity arises at this point.  If Jesus represents two generations, in as far as he is the fourteenth (as well as the thirteenth) he is also a figure of transition like David the king.  He ends the third period, the age of exile, and inaugurates a new era.  That implies that the genealogy is not terminated by Jesus.  Jesus is not the end of history and the beginning of a new creation.  He upholds the continuity of history which, according to Jesus' discourse on eschatology is consummated by the Parousia of the Human Being and the ingathering of his community (24:29-31). 

But numerical patterns govern the construction of Matthew's genealogy.  Both appear to have been derived from apocalyptic millennialism.  Twelve plus two or fourteen, as it is specified in verse 17, parallels the schematization of history in the Messiah Apocalypse of 2 Baruch.  The four ages implied in the division of the generations correspond to the plan of history conveyed by Nebuchadnezzar’s dream of a giant image composed of four precious metal (Dan. 2) and Daniel's vision of four chaos monsters emerging from the sea (Dan. 7). 

But these numerical arrangements, which the evangelist combines in 1:17, are eschatological interpretations of history, which cannot be reconciled with each other.  According to the number fourteen or twelve plus two, Jesus is the end of history and the agent of a new creation.  According to the number four, he belongs to the history of salvation.  He is an arching figure who bridges two epochs, the one he has terminated with the one he inaugurates.  In contrast to Daniel's millennial vision, Jesus is "the one like a human being" who brings the kingdom of God in history, not at the end of it.  Matthew makes no effort to resolve this discrepancy.  The numerical schemes and their incipient eschatologies are united with two different christologies and held in tension throughout the gospel. 

In this light the meaning of the gospel's opening Words: "Book of the origin of Jesus Christ" can more adequately be understood.  It is not immediately apparent whether they are intended as a superscription of the whole composition or only the introduction to the genealogical table, which follows. The latter seems more logical since the genealogy presents the origin of Jesus as the culmination of the historical process of Israel's begetting.  Although such a continuity is implied, verse 18, which clarifies the ambiguity of verse 16, discloses that there is no immediate link between Joseph and Jesus.  The progression of father begetting son moves forward uninterrupted for forty generations.  At the forty-first the continuity is broken.  Jesus who was generated by the holy Spirit introduces a disjunction.  In this respect he is like Abraham who stands at the beginning of the genealogy as the grand patriarch of Israel, the originator of a new people and their unique history.  As a result, the superscription: "Book of the origin of Jesus Christ" cannot apply only to the genealogical table.  It reaches beyond it to 1:18-25 which explains the origin of Jesus and his relationship to the preceding generations.  Yet as soon as these closing verses of the prologue are connected to the opening words of the evangelist, the body of the gospel that follows must necessarily be included because the subsequent content of Jesus' life elucidates the disclosure of 1:18b as well as the discrepant eschatologies that are conveyed by the two numerical schemes of verse 17. 

While the origin of Jesus was linked initially to the progression of father and son generations in the genealogy, it is subsequently connected to Mary in verses 16 and 18.  Like the four women: Tamar, Rahab, Ruth and "the wife of Uriah" who precede her, she is another irregularity in the history of Israel.  The differences in the evangelist's syntactical constructions, however, hint that her pregnancy is the greatest anomaly of the entire genealogy.  The four who serve as her forerunners were presented as the objects of the preposition ek ("from"): " . . . Solomon generated Boaz from Rahab;" "Boaz generated Obed from Ruth;" "David generated Solomon from the wife of Uriah."(10) In contrast Joseph did not generate Jesus from Mary, although she is identified as his wife and Jesus' mother. 

The ambiguity of 1:16 demands clarification, and scribal revision has attempted to furnish it by unequivocally specifying Mary in advance as "a virgin" and thereby removing the vagueness of Jesus' relation to Joseph. But the clarification is provided by the evangelist himself in verse 18, "But the genesis of Jesus Christ was thus." "Genesis" or origin is a repetition of the word that appears in he superscription of 1:1.  Some ancient scribes substituted gennesis, a word that is similar in sound but is spelled differently and means "birth."  Although "genesis" is the textual reading preferred by most authorities, the word "birth" is nevertheless used in many English translations of 1:18.  But Matthew is interested in Jesus' origin, not his birth; and the immediate purpose is the clarification of the important ambiguity of verse 16.  The adverb "thus" indicates that this will now be done. 

Without reluctance or uncertainty Matthew ascribes Jesus' origin to the generating activity of the holy Spirit: "While his mother Mary was betrothed to Joseph before they had sexual intercourse she was found pregnant from the holy Spirit."  By its position at the end of the sentence the phrase "from the holy Spirit" receives special emphasis; it is curiously similar to several previous prepositional phrases in the genealogy which call attention to various irregularities in the history of Israel: "from Tamar," "from Rahab," "from Ruth," "from the wife of Uriah." 

The conceptualization of the relationship between Mary and the holy Spirit which Matthew intends to convey is crucial to a proper understanding of Jesus' origin: "Mary was found pregnant from the holy Spirit;" "for that which has been generated in her is from holy Spirit" (1:20).  The verb gennan ("to generate") which was used 39 times to link father and son pairs and which therefore carries the meaning of "fathering by an act of sexual intercourse" is also used of Jesus' origin.  This and the phraseology of procreation which the evangelist employs, "before they had sexual intercourse" (1:18b), "… he did not know her … " (1:25a), might suggest that the holy Spirit is the male partner of Mary and that Jesus' generation is to be conceived as the result of their sexual union.  Such an understanding of Jesus' origin is often attached to a certain uniqueness that is ascribed to Mary.  In contrast to the four women who precede her in the genealogy she is construed to be a virgin.  The tradition of 1:18-25 often serves as a proof text of the so-called virgin birth of Jesus.  But there is no such identification of Mary by the evangelist except in the fulfillment quotation of 1:23 which interrupts the narrative; and then it is the designation "the virgin."  In spite of its absence in many English translations the definite article is purposeful and should not be overlooked.  Mary is "the virgin," and as such she plays a distinguished role in the origin of Jesus. 

Moreover, the generation of Jesus is not to be interpreted as the result of a sexual union.  The preposition ek ("from"), as in "from the holy Spirit" may simply denote origin without the accompanying connotation of male impregnator.  Mathew's use of the clause en gastri echousa in verses 18b and 23 seems to be chosen carefully and, as in the Septuagint text of Gen. 38:18, 24, 25 and 2Sam. 11:3 simply expresses the condition of being pregnant.  It has been substituted by the evangelist in his fulfillment quotation (1:23) in place of the clause en gastri lempsetai ("she will conceive") that appears in the Septuagint version of Is. 7:14 and implies a conception originated by the agency of the male principle when it is followed by the preposition "from." (11)

In the New Testament the combination of the verb "to generate" (gennan) and the accompanying prepositional phrase, "from the (holy) Spirit" is limited to the Johannine tradition where it seems to have the character of a formula.  In John 3:5 John tells Nicodemus that one must be "generated from water and Spirit."  The Spirit is an inexplicable reality which "blows where it wills and you hear its sound, but you do not know where it comes from or where it goes to. So is everyone who has been generated from the Spirit."(12)

Such a divine origin by the creative activity of the Spirit is attributed to Jesus by the evangelist Matthew.  Mary has no husband.  She is only "betrothed to Joseph" who "did not know her until she bore a son."  There is no possibility of her conceiving and bearing a child.  It is entirely the work of the Spirit who generates Jesus by a direct act of creation. 

By reason of this unusual genesis Jesus is a second Adam who like his prototype is thoroughly human but who, in view of his divine generation, may also be called "the Son of God."  That in fact is one of the christological titles conferred on Jesus in the course of the gospel: by Simon Peter in 16:16 and by the centurion of the crucifixion in 27:54; and it is implied in the identification of the virgin's son as Emmanuel in 1:23.(13)  But the epithet that conveys the identity of Jesus in terms of his "having been generated in her (Mary) from the holy Spirit" as a new human being is the one that appears consistently on his lips as a self-designation: "the Son of Man". 

Although the maternity of Mary is accentuated in the ambiguity of verse 16 and its elucidation in verse 18b, the narrative of 1:18-25 is told from the point of view of Joseph.  This has often been noted but unfortunately interpreted as an apologetic motive.  The shift back to Joseph in Matthew's explanation of Jesus' origin is based on his decisive position in the genealogy.  For if Jesus is the climax of the history of Israel, at least in terms of his identity as the Son of David, he is that by reason of his relationship to Joseph and not to Mary.(14) Although Joseph is not physically involved in the generation of Jesus, he is betrothed to Mary, and the irregularity of her pregnancy must be explained to him.  For as a "righteous" Jew, as he is characterized in verse 19, and therefore as one who is obedient to the law, he is obligated to dissolve this betrothal in view of Mary's apparent unfaithfulness.  While contemplating a quiet divorce he is approached by the angel of the Lord, addressed as "Son of David" and commanded to make Mary's child his own by adoption.  Only as a result of this obedience is Jesus linked to the history of Israel. 

Joseph belongs to the substance of tradition available to the evangelist.  Although not mentioned in Mark or Q and appearing only in the first two chapters of Matthew's gospel, he can hardly be the invention of the evangelist.  In Luke he is named both as the man to whom Mary was engaged (1:27) and as the father - "as was supposed" - of Jesus (3:23, 4:22).  The fourth gospel refers to him twice as the father of Jesus (1:45, 6:42).  Matthew's Joseph is unique in gospel literature.  Nowhere is he sketched more concretely, nowhere does he play a more active role in relation to the birth of Jesus.  Only the first evangelist characterizes him as "righteous" and then proceeds to show how this basic trait is manifested in his conduct both toward Mary and Jesus.  While he wants no part in Mary's seeming unchastity, he has no desire to shame her publicly.  Moreover, making Mary his wife also involves adopting her child and relating to it as a father.  Joseph not only acknowledges his fatherhood by naming the boy; he assumes the responsibility of his safety by taking mother and infant to Egypt in order to escape from the murderous designs of Herod the Great and subsequently by moving his family to Nazareth in order to avoid the jeopardy of living under the rule of Archelaus. 

This representation of Joseph seems to be invested with certain Old Testament features and allusions, which contribute to the evangelist's theological interpretation of Jesus' beginnings.

The prototype that most readily suggests itself is the Old Testament patriarch Joseph.  Not only is the name the same; both Josephs have a father named Jacob.  It is not certain whether Matthew's designation of Jacob as the father of Joseph in 1:16 is intended to evoke the reader's memory of the Old Testament figure.  But it is noteworthy that the last four members of the genealogical table of the first gospel are identical to those of the third gospel's catalog except for the name of Joseph's father.  Matthew lists "Jacob;" Luke "Heli."  Joseph is like his Old Testament counterpart in at least three other respects; (1) he is chaste and refuses to be involved in immorality; (2) he has dreams in which the future is revealed to him and (3) he rescues Jesus by adopting him and by carrying him to safety in Egypt.  These are of course superficial similarities, secondary to the cardinal events of Joseph's career in the Old Testament: slavery, imprisonment, and enthronement.  Nevertheless, it is specifically these three qualities which are eulogized in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs.  The more momentous incidents of Joseph's life have receded, perhaps forced into the background by the messianic expectations surrounding Levi and Judah.  At any rate, the messianic character of Joseph's life is absent; here he is acknowledged by the other patriarchs as a model of virtue: "Now Joseph was a good man and had the Spirit of God in him" (Test. of Sim. 4:1).  Again, ". . . Joseph, my brother, the true and good man" (Test. of Dan. 5:1).  In almost every instance chastity is the basis that is given for this evaluation.  Joseph's life exemplifies the keeping of God's commandments, above all in his triumph over fornication, the sin most confessed and condemned by the other patriarchs.(15) In his own testimony the patriarch vividly narrates the agonizing temptations he endured at the hand of Potiphar's wife.  Little is said of his imprisonment, and almost nothing of his elevation to vice-regent of Egypt; but the experience with the Egyptian woman has been expanded and embellished to the point of completely dominating his last will and testament.(16)

At least two other traits are acknowledged by Joseph: love and long-suffering, and they are combined with humanity.  Noteworthy is his claim, "You see, therefore, my children, what great things I endure that I should not put my brothers to shame" (17:1).  And this is coupled with the exhortation, "You also love one another and with long-suffering hide one another's faults" (17:2).  In the light of these qualities Joseph presents himself as Jacob's successor in caring and providing for his brothers and their children.  Only Joseph can assume this position because he is the only son among the patriarchs who "was like Jacob in all things" (18:4).  The words attributed to him are important in this respect for they represent him as the grand patriarch: 

And after the death of Jacob my father I loved them more abundantly, and whatever he commanded I did for them.  And I did not permit them to be afflicted in the least matter; and all that was in my hands I gave them.  And their sons were my sons and my sons as their servants.  And their life was my life, and all their sufferings were my suffering and all their sicknesses were my infirmity.  My land was their land, and their counsel my counsel. And I did not exalt myself among them in arrogance because of my worldly glory, but I was among them as one of the least (17:5-8).

Dreams are not explicitly mentioned, but a vision is included which offers an apocalyptically colored glimpse of the final events of the age.  More significant is Joseph's reference to a revelation received through an angel of God which warned him of the devices of Potiphar's wife: "Now therefore know that the God of my father has disclosed your wickedness to me by his angel" (6:6).  Throughout the Testament of the Twelve Patriarchs the angel of God reveals what has been done or what will happen. 

Matthew's portrayal of Joseph bears a resemblance to the Old Testament patriarch, but the corresponding features have not been derived from the original narrative in Gen. 37-50.  He seems rather to have been invested with a character that parallels the more contemporary image of Joseph presented in the Testaments of the Twelve Patriarchs, particularly the Testament of Joseph. 

Chaste, righteous and kind, Joseph is called to adopt Mary's child in order to engraft him into his family tree.  He does so by giving the boy a name and thereby publicly declaring himself to be his father (1:25b).  He is called Jesus, "for he will save his people from their sins" (1:21).  This saving work is primarily nationalistic in character and scope: he is to be the savior of his people, the Jews.  Joseph, therefore, by adopting Jesus upholds the continuity of the Davidic line and the divine promises, which have accompanied it for many generations. 

At the same time, however, Jesus is more than the Son of David.  His commission reaches beyond Davidic messianism.  He is to save his people from their sins.  Nowhere is such a function ascribed to the Old Testament king or his promised heir.  It is said in 2 Sam. 3:18 that by David's hand God would save Israel from their enemies.  To save from sins is a work, which is restricted to the Lord, as is evident from Ps., 130:8, the Old Testament parallel closest to 1:21b, "And he will redeem Israel from all his lawlessness."  Such an irregularity, however, is in keeping with the ambiguity of Jesus' origin.  According to 2 Sam. 7:11-4 and Ps. 2:7, David's heir is to become God's son by adoption.  The very opposite takes place in the first gospel.  Jesus, a new creation of the holy Spirit and as a result the divine Human Being is adopted by David's descendant Joseph in order to fulfill the promises made to Israel, "… and he called his name Jesus." 

As Joseph upholds the continuity of Israel's history and the fulfillment of the Davidic promise, Mary is the bearer of this eschatological event of a new creation and the radical discontinuity it interposes.  In the fulfillment quotation, as already indicated, she is identified as "the virgin."  According to the introductory formula of 1:22, this whole thing happened in order to fulfill God's word spoken by the prophet.  But that cannot include the virgin birth for Matthew does not seem to have known such a theologoumenon.  It is not the doctrine of the virgin birth that led the evangelist to Is. 7:14.  There is another meaning and purpose to Matthew's abrupt interruption of the narrative and his identification of Mary as "the virgin." 

In its reference to "the virgin" the fulfillment quotation of verse 23 corresponds to the Septuagint version of Is. 7:14.  The original Hebrew text, however, does not convey such a designation for it does not utilize the technical term for virgin, bethulah, but simply the word almah ("young woman").  It is very likely that the Septuagint translation interpreted this young woman to be the corporate motherhood of Israel that had already found expression in such forms of address as "Daughter of Zion," "Rachel" and "Virgin Israel."(17) Israel is "the virgin" because she has not defiled herself through unfaithfulness and idolatry; and she will give birth to the messianic king. 

Matthew appropriates this Septuagint version of Is. 7:14 in order to identify Mary in the light of her extraordinary maternity as the incarnation of Mother Israel.  She represents the corporate motherhood of God's people giving birth to this incongruous Messiah. 

Jesus therefore is the integration of both discontinuity and continuity.  As the child of Mary he is a new creation generated by the holy Spirit.  As the adopted son of Joseph he is a descendant of David and Abraham.  The ambiguity of his origin corresponds to the two generations of the third division of the genealogy, which he simultaneously fills, as well as the eschatological tension between the two numerical schemes of verse 17 that serve as the framework of his table of ancestry. 

This dual origin and its concomitant identities: the Son of the Human Being and the Son of David, explain Matthew's strange account of Jesus' triumphal entry into Jerusalem.  In contrast to Mark's version, Jesus rides on two beasts, an onos which is a coronation animal, and a polos huios hypozygiou, a pack animal. This is not, as is often thought, a misunderstanding of the poetic parallelism of Zech. 9:9 but rather a dramatic reminder of the christological identities which Jesus bears and the dialectical eschatology which they express. 

Although he represents two generations and wears two christological hats concurrently, he is one person and has one name, Jesus.  This is the name, which the angel commanded Joseph to give Mary's child because "he will save his people from their sins."  Since the verb sosei ("he will save") is an etymological pun on the Hebrew meaning of the name of Jesus, and since it is not explained as, for example, Immanuel is in 1:23, it must be assumed that Matthew's readers were familiar with it.(18) The Septuagint translation of Ps. 130 (129): 8 appears to be quoted here.  The differences between it and its rendition in Matthew can be accounted for on the basis of the evangelist's purposeful alteration.  The substitution of the verb "he will save" for "he will redeem" is his work and not the result of an adoption of pre-Matthaean tradition.(19) There can only be one reason for it; it is the verb that coveys the meaning of the name Jesus. 

He is to be called Jesus because he will save.  His life will manifest a direct correspondence between his activity and his name, between his person and his work.  That is why his naming is so important.(20) It anticipates what is yet to be told in this "Book of Origin." 

 

NOTES

 1. See Marshall D. Johnson's excellent study, The Purpose of Biblical Genealogies, with Special Reference to the Setting of Genealogies of Jesus, Cambridge: at the University Press, 1969, esp. pp. 153, 176ff. Unfortunately Johnson reads the peculiarities of Matthew's genealogy in the light of a polemical setting of Jewish slander rather than the evangelist's design of numerical schemes, which are eschatologically oriented. See H.C. Waetjen, "The Genealogy as the Key to the Gospel according to Matthew," JBL 95 (1976), pp. 205-230. Also C.T. Davis, "The Fulfillment of the Creation: A Study of Matthew's Genealogy," JAAR 41 (1973), pp. 520-535.

2. Waetjen, op. cit., pp. 216-218.

3. G.F. Moore, "Fourteen Generations: 490 Years," HTR 14 (1921), p. 98.

4. Johnson, Genealogies, p. 180. G. Kuhn, Die Geschlechtsregister Jesu bei Lukas und Matthäus, nach ihrer Herkunft untersucht," ZNW 22 (1923), pp. 221-222, suggested the common denominator of a violent death which the three kings shared but recognized that this included Amon (Matt. 1:10) who was not eliminated from the genealogy. E. Lohmeyer, Das Evangelium des Matthäus. Kritisch-exegetischer Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, arranged & edited by W. Schmauch,

Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 3rd ed. 1962, p. 3, suggests the omission is due to the inexactness of the LXX.

5. G. Strecker, Der Weg der Gerechtigkeit. Untersuchungen zur Theologie des Matthäus, Göttingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht, 1962, p. 38, n. 3. Also R. Bultmann, History of the Synoptic Tradition, New York: Harper & Row, 1963, p. 356.

6. Rodney T. Hood, "The Genealogies of Jesus," Early Christian Origins: Studies in Honor of H. R. Willoughby, ed. by A. Wikgren, Chicago: Quadrangle Books, 1961, p. 10.

7. J. Jeremias, Jerusalem in the Time of Jesus, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975, pp. 293-295.

8. Lohmeyer, Matthäus, p. 3.

9. K. Stendahl, Matthew. Peake's Commentary on the Bible, rev. ed. ed. by M. Black and H.H. Rowley, London: Thomas Nelson and Sons, 1962, pp. 770-771, para. 674c. This possibility, as far as I have been able to determine, was first posed by von Hofmann, Weissagung und Erfüllung im Alten und Neuen Testamente, Nördlingen: C.H. Beck, 1841-1844, vol. 2, p. 42, who considered it at least probable that Jesus was intended by Matthew to be the thirteenth generation and the risen

Christ who would come again as the fourteenth. See also T. Zahn, Das Evangelium des Matthäus. Kommentar zum Neuen Testament, Leipzig: A. Deichert, 2nd ed., 1905, p. 53, n. 19.

10. See the summary in Johnson, Genealogies, pp. 152-179.

11. See also 2 Kings 8:12, 15:16; Hos. 14:1; Amos 1:13; Is. 40:11.

12. Also 1 John 3:9 and 5:1.

13. Although "the Son of God" is a significant title, it is subordinate to "the Son of Man." Contrast J.D. Kingsbury, Matthew: Structure, Christology, Kingdom, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975, who argues for the primacy of "the Son of God" title in Matthew's christology.

14. T.H. Robinson, The Gospel of Matthew. Moffat New Testament Commentary, New York: Harper & Row, 1951, p. 3.

15. T. Reuben 4:6-9, 11 and 6:1-4; T. Sim. 5:1-3; T. Jud. 14:2 - 15:6 and 18:2; T. Jos. 3-10. Also CD 2:14-21 and 4:17; Sirach 9:2-9 and 19:2.

16. T. Jos. 10:2-4.

17. W.H. Brownlee, The Meaning of the Dead Sea Scrolls for the Bible, New York: Oxford University Press, 1964, pp. 274-281.

18. Strecker, op. cit., p. 54 and especially his reference to Philo, de mut. nom. 121, which shows that the meaning of Jesus could be presupposed in Hellenistic Judaism.

19. Against Strecker, ibid., p. 29.

20. Hans Kosmala, "The Conclusion of Matthew," Annual of the Swedish Theological Institute, 4 (1965), p. 142, "Matthew describes the name-giving and its significance in greater detail than the other evangelists."

 

Shakespeare in the Bush, and Encountering the Other

Understanding is not simply a way of knowing; it is a priori a way of "being-in-the-world". This, in essence, is the paradigm shift that hermeneutics has undergone during the past seventy years as a result of Martin Heidegger's unveiling of the ontological conditions of understanding. The fundamental reality of human existence is not "being with", an orientation that would imply the question of the other and move the problem of understanding in the direction of epistemology.(1) It is instead the reality of being-in-the-world, a condition that involves "the power to be" which makes understanding possible. "Dasein", with its Heideggerian characterization of "being thrown" into a particular historical context with all of its traditions, norms and conventions, "has already projected itself and it remains in projection as long as it is."(2) Understanding is primordially this projection of Dasein, of being-in-the-world, and its basic function is to orient the self as it inhabits the world with its fundamental sense of "belonging to" (Zugehörigkeit). As an ontological reality, therefore, understanding is not the result of interpretation; rather understanding precedes interpretation and indeed makes interpretation possible.

Formerly, however, hermeneutics in its revolutionary 19th century development under Schleiermacher and Dilthey was established with an orientation toward "being with" that implied a dialogical relationship between an interpreter and a subjectivity that had externalized itself in a text. The hermeneutical objective was the reconstruction of the other's thought expressed in the text. The operations of understanding in relation to the interpretation of the text was determined by a technology of methodology which, according to Age of Enlightenment ideology, was substituted in place of prejudice, tradition, and authority and therefore guaranteed the objectivity of the enterprise and the truth of its results.

But the epistemology of Cartesian dualism with its foundational purification of the mind, even in its Kantian reconstitution, is unable to establish an ultimate grounding for the human sciences. No Kantian or neo-Kantian critique can provide an epistemological foundation for the operations of a hermeneutics that is oriented toward an understanding of the other on the basis of "being with" for the simple reason that the recovery of the mental life of an other by psychological explanation is scientifically impossible.(3) Moreover, methodology is unable to operate neutrally because prejudices and preconceptions cannot be bracketed in the preunderstanding, and in fact they determine the questions addressed to the text as well as the methodology employed for interpretation.(4)

The hermeneutics of "being with" an other ironically required the arbitrary distanciation of neutrality. With a priori alienation (Verfremdung) from the text as the starting point, the intelligibility of mind, laboring in and through methodology, would transport the interpreter into the realm of another time and place and by the determination of meaning in relation to a specific historical context would illuminate the obscure text. Understanding would finally be achieved by means of the technology of interpretation.

The reality of being-in-the-world, however, is prior to "being with" an other, and the understanding it projects precedes interpretation. At the same time the condition of "belonging to" (Zugehörigkeit) ontologically supersedes alienating distanciation (Verfremdung) as a fundamental presupposition of hermeneutical theorizing. Understanding and "belonging to" are concomitant realities of the ontological ground of being-in-the-world. As Paul Ricoeur has expressed it, "History precedes me and outstrips my reflection; I belong to history before belonging to myself."(5)

Consequently the prejudices and traditions acquired in and through a pre-reflective belonging to history constitute the understanding, or rather the preunderstanding, which the self projects to orient itself in the world. This projection of the preunderstanding is an event, a happening; and it is universal.(6) No understanding is possible without the projection of the prejudices and traditions of the preunderstanding. Some of them are blinding and distort the subsequent activity of interpretation; others are berechtigt, justifiable, because they promote intelligibility and perspicacity.(7) Discriminating between them is a developmental process that occurs in and through the experience of testing them in the activity of interpretation.

While "belonging to" is the a priori hermeneutical condition, alienating distanciation is its dialectical opposite and, according to Gadamer, is engendered by the interpreter's "effective historical consciousness" (wirkungsgeschichtliches Bewusstsein). That is, "effective historical consciousness" makes the reader aware of the finitude of her or his horizon with its inherent limitations of vision and simultaneously therefore also of an alienating distance from the text.(8) Or, to use the words of Paul Ricoeur, "To interpret is to render near what is far (temporally, geographically, culturally, spiritually)."(9) Dasein naturally orients itself to any text and with its projection of preunderstanding initiates the interpretive process. "Belonging to" negates all neutrality and objectivity, but possibly also alienating distanciation, as the interpreter is drawn into the text and the play of interaction begins. The text's alterity will only be experienced if the dialectical dynamic of "belonging to" and "alienating distanciation" has been activated by "effective historical consciousness".

Distanciation, according to Paul Ricoeur, is a natural property of all speech events, oral and written.(10) At least two occurrences of this condition may be differentiated in the movement from oral discourse to the reading of a text. The first happens in the passage from language (langue) to speech (parole): "from the linguistics of a code to the linguistics of a discourse".(11) Someone makes an utterance, says something about something, sends a message to another person. As language is actualized in speech in order to express meaning, a linguistic event takes place. The event itself is transitory, and it is surpassed by the utterance that was spoken. In the difference between what is said (the message) and the saying of it (the event) the first distanciation occurs. The message with its fullness of meaning may linger on into the future, but distance will be constituted between the event and the message itself.

While this may be true, what is at least equally significant is the closed and determinate construal of meaning at the time of the speech event. The speaker and the hearer share one and the same context. No distanciation is experienced. The condition of "belonging to" and the projection of the prejudices and traditions of the preunderstanding engender immediate understanding facilitated by the constitutive elements of context, code, and contact.

The same appropriation of meaning may also occur in conjunction with the second kind of distanciation that Ricoeur identifies, the exteriorization of discourse in the inscription of a work - a written speech event. Sentences are joined together to form a composition whose identity is determined by the author's choice of a specific genre: poem, novel, letter, gospel, etc. This too is an event, an event of labor and production in response to a particular situation or circumstance, and it is individuated by the author's style and organization of material. A text comes into being, and as it leaves its author's control, it assumes an autonomy of its own, independent of authorial will. The work has surpassed the event of its composition. Yet before it transcends its original context and becomes subject to polysomy, its meaning is determinate and closed to its original addressees who share the same horizon with the author. In spite of the absence of authorial regulation and the distanciation produced by the intermediate contact with a written work, there is a genuine occurrence of rendering near what is far. While the message may be rejected, its meaning, the subject matter which the author intended to communicate, facilitated by the shared socio-cultural context and linguistic code, is appropriatable. Very little, if any, "effective historical consciousness" is required for the actualization of understanding. However, as distanciation increases in terms of time, socio-cultural contexts, and linguistic codes, the alterity of the text becomes opaque and therefore subject to polysemy. Accordingly, "effective historical consciousness" becomes indispensable in summoning explanation as primordial understanding extends itself into interpretation and by the fusion of horizons attempts to render near what is far.

"A consciousness formed by the authentic hermeneutical attitude will be receptive to the origins and entirely foreign features of that which comes to it from outside its own horizons."(12)

But what is the alterity of the text? It is not simply the fact of the text itself as an objective, autonomous reality.(13) Textual otherness consists in the message or subject matter which the text conveys. But that begs the critical question: what is the message of the text? Is it what the author intended to say or what the text is about? This is Ricoeur's dichotomy, and it is crucial to his hermeneutical synthesis. It correlates with his differen- tiation between the ostensive references of the text to its original context (Umwelt) and the non-ostensive references which are identified with "the kind of world (Welt) opened up by the depth semantics of the text".(14) The relationship of sign to referent and the relationship of sender and receiver respectively do not produce the meaning that Ricoeur identifies as "the world in front of the text". What the text is about is a possibility of being, and this is communicated both unconsciously and consciously to the reader, while engaged with the written discourse (parole) by the generational capabilities of the linguistic code (langue) through the relations of contiguity and the accompanying principles of combination as well as the accompanying principles of selection.(15) Depth semantics is "the product of perceptual structures which operate in the [author's] mind at an unconscious level rather than at a consciously artistic level."(16) Concomitantly the semantic universe of the reader is presumed to be "conditioned to receive and decode the message at this unconscious level".(17) The projection of preunderstanding perceives "the world of the work" which the text discloses and confronts the subjectivity of the reader with "figures of liberation", that is, a new possibility of being. Understanding, therefore, is realized by "exposing ourselves to the text and receiving from it an enlarged self", not "by imposing upon the text our finite capacity for under- standing".(18) At the same time, however, there is also a conscious movement "from sense to reference, from what the text says to what it talks about"; and this involves the movement from explanation to understanding. All the semiological systems, along with the linguistic system, must be decoded, and, as Ricoeur says, "that requires a special affinity between the reader and the kind of things the text is about"(19) What is appropriated is not a system of ideas but deep values of truth that are imposed "with such power that no further proof is needed to perceive their validity and reality".(20)

But is the alterity of the text to be identified only with depth semantics, with Ricoeur's "world in front of the text"? What has happened to the message which the author intended to communicate to the original addressees? Is the speech (parole) of the author, as a result of natural distanciation, to be completely identified with langue, the linguistic code of the text? If distanciation prevents the appropriation of every trace of affective affinity with the intention of the author,(21) that would indeed exclude the mental life of the author. But the intention of the author is also a textual reality, expressed in the message which continues to be embedded in the text by the design of the author.

The text may be presented to its readers at face value simply as the literary structure of a linguistic code (langue), but its otherness includes an authorially originated speech performance (parole). The fullness of its subject matter is conveyed as a dialectical textual reality of both the written discourse (parole) of the author and the linguistic code which the author has employed. Differentiating between them and determining their nascency is a hazardous subjective undertaking. Metaphorical, symbolic and allegorical meanings are attributable to both authorial will (parole) and linguistic sense (langue). Whether by authorial design or linguistic polysemy, Dasein's primordial conditions of Zugehörigkeit and its projection of its circular structures of preunderstanding naturally appropriate both, often simultaneously. Even in a circumstance involving two separate contexts or horizons, that of the text itself and that of its readers temporally, linguistically and culturally removed from it, distanciation cannot prevent appropriation from experiencing affective affinity with the fullness of the otherness of the text.

The dialectical textual reality of written discourse (parole) and linguistic code (langue) engenders the great irony of interpretation.(22) For, on the one hand, Dasein's primordial reality of being-in-the-world and its condition of "belonging to" will naturally be inclined to fix itself on the latter (langue) and to understand the sense of the textual signs in terms of the prejudices and traditions of its preunderstanding. Yet on the other hand, there is the textual reality of the author's discourse (parole) that conveys the subject matter of the authorial-willed message. All too often, however, the irony of interpretation remains unfulfilled. Dasein's condition of "belonging to" does not always activate "effective historical consciousness" and its attendant awareness of distanciation, and therefore the otherness of the text is never encountered.

"Shakespeare in the Bush" is a case in point, although in many ways of limited value.(23) Laura Bohannan, an anthropologist from the University of Illinois, offers a delightful account of a hermeneutical experience in the bush which illustrates the operation of Dasein's ontological reality of "belonging to". While studying Hamlet in the West African bush, she was invited to drink beer and share a story with a small group of elders of the Tiv people. Presupposing that there was only one possible interpretation of Hamlet, she decided to test her theory by narrating the story of Shakespeare's tragedy. Throughout her narration she was continuously interrupted by the elders who interpreted the story in terms of the prejudices and traditions which their preunderstanding projected without any apparent consciousness of alienating distanciation. One instance will perhaps suffice as an example. To quote Bohannan as she begins her recounting of that experience:

The old man handed me some more beer to help me on with my story-telling. Men filled their long wooden pipes and knocked coals from the fire to place in the pipe bowls; then puffing contentedly, they sat back to listen.

I began in the proper style. "Not yesterday, not yesterday, but long ago a thing occurred. One night three men were keeping watch outside the homestead of a great chief, when suddenly they saw the former chief approach them."

"Why was he no longer their chief?" "He was dead," I explained. "That is why they were troubled and afraid when they saw him." "Impossible," began one of the elders, handing his pipe to his neighbor who interrupted. "Of course it wasn't the dead chief. It was an omen sent by a witch. Go on!"

In this manner the story-telling continued with frequent inter- polations and corrections until the narrative ended. The entire episode, according to Bohannen, was closed by the old chief:

"Sometime you must tell us more stories of your country. We, who are elders, will instruct you in their true meaning, so that when you return to your own land your elders will see that you have not been sitting in the bush, but amongst those who know things and who have taught you wisdom."

Gabriele Schwab, in her analysis of this hermeneutical event in the bush, acknowledges that the elders "recreated their own cultural pattern within Shakespeare's plot" but concludes, "The Tiv people had to project their own cultural preconceptions in order to reduce the otherness that would have made Hamlet incomprehensible in their context."(24) But is the story so alien and strange that it has no affinity with the culture and experience of the Tiv people? Of course, the village elders, as guardians of the community's traditions and their interpretation, may be constrained to remain within the context of their Dasein and its project. Consequently, any "effective historical consciousness" that might have emerged from their primordial condition of "belonging to" to make them aware of their distinctive vantage point and to open their horizon to the otherness of the story may have been suppressed by the perspective of their hierarchical position in the Tiv polity. In any case, no sense of distanciation manifested itself to initiate an interrogation of the details of the story and to solicit explanation. The world of the text (Welt) did not explode the world (Umwelt) of the author. The preunderstanding of Zugehörigkeit simply projected its own determinate meaning on the linguistic code of the text, producing a vicious hermeneutical circle which resulted in "the recreation of their own cultural pattern".(25) Otherness was transformed into sameness.(26)

Understanding is not the reduction of a literary composition to congruency with one's own prejudices and traditions. It is rather a closure of meaning that has involved an encounter with the otherness of the text. In spite of the skepticism of decon- struction, Gadamer's characterization of the ontology of literary texts seems to be a principle that holds priority over the reality of Jacques Derrida's différance and its dispersion and deference of meaning. "Understanding belongs to the meaning of a text just as being heard belongs to the meaning of music. The meaning of all texts is realized when they are understood."(27) If understanding is a closure of meaning, how is understanding attained beyond the mere projection of Dasein's "belonging to"?

Umberto Eco's maxim, "Stat rosa pristina nomine, nomina nuda tenemos", which stands as the closure of his novel, The Name of the Rose,(28) is as valid a starting point as any other. Construing meaning begins by recognizing that "we grasp the name empty". That is, the empty linguistic signs of a text are automatically filled by the projection of Dasein's preunderstanding. Being-in-the-world and its "belonging to" necessitate the orientation of the self, but this may be nothing more than reading the text as a code of linguistic signs (langue). If understanding is a closure of meaning that includes an encounter with the alterity of the text, how can the production of meaning comprehend the complexity of the text as both a "cultural speech performance"(29) and a code of linguistic signs?

The former, the text as parole or speech performance, bears its own set of difficulties. Schleiermacher's aphorism of his 1805 and 1809 lectures: "Each word has properly only one meaning - even particles - and one does not understand the variables without reduction to the original unity." Parole, the speech performance of an individual, is a delimiting use of language in which the linguistic signs that are employed bear a single, determinate sense regulated by the consciousness of the author. Nevertheless, at the same time, because of the dynamic relationship between the signifier and the signified, authors may say more than they intend, more than they are conscious of. Accordingly, authorial control cannot be exercised over the construal of meaning, even within a linguistic and socio-cultural context shared by both author and reader. When two contexts or horizons are involved, that of the text and that of the reader, the fusion of horizons becomes a formidable undertaking. Of course, to be repetitive, that fusion is not the assimilation of one horizon into another, but the extension of the preunderstanding's projection to construe the text as both a cultural speech performance and a dynamic code of linguistic signs. While otherness is concentrated in the former (parole), it is extended by the potency and instability of the latter (langue).

A text, therefore, is understood and its meaning is realized when it, the text, is interpreted ironically; that is, when the reader is engaged in a play with both textual realities, speech performance (parole) and linguistic code (langue) and through the process of interaction gradually experiences the otherness of the text. Alienating distanciation, vital to this process of interaction, can be evoked by Dasein's projection of "effective historical consciousness" if a sense of irony is appropriated as an a priori approach to all texts. That involves the acquisition of two sets of ears, one that hears the surface meanings of the linguistic code and one that penetrates the surface to listen to the voice of "the implied author", namely those marks of the actual author's subjectivity that have externalized themselves in the text.

For very likely the text, on a first reading - or more - does not mean what it says, if only because of a more immediate orientation of Dasein's condition of "belonging to" toward the text as a code of linguistic signs. Here is where a hermeneutics of suspicion can operate effectively, enabling the reader to read "against the grain".(31) The objective is to determine how the text as a linguistic code (langue) stands in the service of the speech performance. The richness of the relationship between the two, speech performance and linguistic code, with all the nuances and allusions which the latter provides, those by the design of the author and those by the creative interaction of the reader, can only be realized by an ironic discernment that is critical of Dasein's projection of its preunderstanding.

For, as Heidegger characterized it, human being is a condition of "thrownness", and the sense of finitude which it evokes generates the anxiety about being-in-the-world as well as the anxiety of being-in-the-world. That is, the fear of death and the fear of life. On the one hand, the determinism of finitude must be overcome; on the other hand, the infinitude of life and freedom must be controlled. The existential paradox of finitude and infinitude and its creative possibilities are negated by the narcissistic search for power and security. Defensive mechanisms are established to shut out the contingencies and threats of otherness and concomitantly to maintain the peace and safety of sameness.

Accordingly, the same irony of interpretation must be directed at the self's preunderstanding in order to expose those prejudices and traditions which maintain the mechanisms of insulation. The openness to otherness is a condition of inestimable possibility for self-affirmation and self-realization and therefore also the fulfillment of human destiny. That primordial understanding of being-in-the-world, by which human beings orient themselves as they inhabit the world, must be unmasked. Dasein's project must become critically conscious of itself; it must "read itself against the grain".(31) It is only a "reflected projection" that produces "a capacity for otherness" as otherness is encountered in both individuality and multiplicity.(32)

If understanding is a closure of meaning that requires the irony of interpretation to develop an openness to textual otherness, the text itself must not be regarded as a shell-like container from which its otherness can be extracted as a "thing". The alterity of the text, which is identifiable with the subjectivity that has externalized itself in the text in order to communicate a message, is a potentiality that is inherently present in the signs of the linguistic code the author has employed. Those signs or words designate the instructions to the reader for the production of the signified.

"The text itself simply offers 'schematized aspects' through which the subject matter of the work can be produced, while the actual production takes place through an act of concretization. From this we conclude that the literary work has two poles, which we might call the artistic and the aesthetic: the artistic pole is the author's text and the aesthetic is the realization accomplished by the reader. In view of this polarity it is clear that the work itself cannot be identical with the text or with the concretization, but must be situated somewhere between the two."(33)

The reader and the text are partners collaborating as co-creators in an aesthetic event of understanding that, by generating an experience of meaning, originate something that did not exist before.

If the play of interaction has occurred with an "effective historical consciousness" that has realized a "fusion of horizons", that something is a new "subjectivity"(34) that combines the subjectivities of the author and the reader. Consequently, if this is the valid result of understanding's projection of interpretation, no identical productions of meaning can ever be actualized. But this is not because the text is polysomous - although it is that if simply approached as a structured linguistic code (langue) - but rather because the text, with its authorial instructions, and the reader, with her or his distinctive Dasein and its project, have united in a collaborative effort to create something new.

Unlimited multisignification, however, cannot be justified. Not every production of meaning that may result from this aesthetic interaction is valid. Unless there is an exchange, a transaction with the textual realities of "the implied author" and "the implied reader", the otherness of the text will not be encountered.

The former, the implied author, is "a system of perspectives designed to transmit the individuality of the author's vision".(35) More concretely, it is the sum total of all the decisions an author has made to externalize his or her subjectivity in a literary work in order to communicate a message: choices of narrator, genre, plotline, characters and characterization, repertoire, and rhetorical strategies.(36)

"What they do is provide guidelines originating from different starting points (narrator, characters, etc.) continually shading into each other and devised in such a way that they all converge on a general meeting place."(37)

Anticipated by the author, of course, is a reader who is "offered a particular role to play, and it is this role that constitutes the concept of the implied reader".(38) As a textual construct laid down by the author, the implied reader "embodies all those predispositions necessary for a literary work to have its effects".(39)

The more acutely the actual reader can perceive that "network of response-inviting structures" of the implied reader and fulfill that role as designed by the author, the more adequate the construal of meaning will be. Indeed, validity in interpretation can only occur when the otherness of the text, as it is conveyed by the textual structures of the implied author and the implied reader, is realized by the structured acts of the actual reader.

The literary work itself, as a result of the author's creativity, is a "world" of its own, a construction of reality that to a limited extent mirrors the socio-cultural context in which it was created or a particular socio-cultural "world" determined by the choice of repertoire. Because of the selectivity involved in its construction, it is never a reproduction of the empirical world. The deliberate rearrangement of the social norms and traditions is aimed at producing defamiliarization and restructuring the preunderstanding's perception of reality.

"It is the way in which this world is constructed that brings about the perspective intended by the author. Since the world of the text is bound to have variable degrees of unfamiliarity for its possible readers (if the work is to have any 'novelty' for them), they must be placed in a position which enables them to actualize the new view."(40)

This new view is the essence of otherness which a competently created text intends to communicate and which in turn anticipates a competent reader for its realization.

"A consciousness formed by the authentic hermeneutical attitude will be receptive to the origins and entirely foreign features of that which comes to it from outside its own horizons. The hermeneutical attitude supposes only that we self-consciously designate our opinions and qualify them as such, and in so doing strip them of their extreme character. In keeping to this attitude we grant the text the opportunity to appear as an authentically different being and to manifest its own truth over and against our preconceived notions."(41)

The text as an authentically different being results from the author's creative and discriminating speech performance combining linguistic code, genre, style, repertoire and rhetorical strategies. Many or even most of these choices are, of course, time-bound, determined by the socio-cultural context in which the literary work was produced. A genuine fusion of horizons will require the utilization of methods and models derived from other academic disciplines to serve as extensions of Dasein's project. "Effective historical consciousness" operating in and through philological and historical investigation, augmented by the social sciences, will elucidate the horizon of the text and explicate the socio-cultural idiosyncracies of its repertoire.

The alterity of the text, however, is not to be identified with the socio-cultural, economic or religious realities which its linguistic code and repertoire reflect. Vital explanations and elucidations of these realities are produced by the utilization of the theories, models and methods of the social sciences, but, while they enhance the interpretation of the text, they do not represent the otherness of the text. Objectifications of textual and contextual reconstructions, resulting from the employment of the social sciences, are always a posteriori undertakings after the eventful experience of Dasein's "belonging to" has mediated alienating distanciation through "effective historical consciousness" and has constituted a fusion of horizons. The resulting representation of objects can be nothing more than probable conclusions and approximations, for the new subjectivity that has been produced through the interaction of text and interpreter can never become universally true. The knowledge or truth claims that have been constituted are valid for that moment in time(42) but will eventually be superseded by the generation of a new subjectivity produced by another interaction between the text and the interpreter.

However, the truth claims of any interpretation remain deficient and therefore invalid unless they have emerged from an encounter with the otherness, the subject matter, of the text. That implies the operation of a dialectical hermeneutical circle that rotates through "belonging to" and alienating distanciation while interrelating with the textual structures of the implied author and the implied reader and simultaneously incorporating the technology of methodology offered by the social sciences and rhetorical criticism. In this playful interaction with the text and in dialogue with its subject matter the reader/interpreter fulfills the being of the literary work by actualizing its potentiality of meaning. Having begun with a hermeneutics of being-in-the-world, the reader/interpreter culminates the interpretive project with a hermeneutics of "being with" an other in dialogue.

Paul Ricoeur, dissatisfied with the one-way street of Heideggerian ontology that prevents "repeating the epistemological question after ontology",(43) attempts to construct a return thoroughfare back to epistemology.

"With Heidegger's philosophy, we are always engaged in going back to the foundations, but we are left incapable of beginning the movement of return that would lead from the fundamental ontology to the properly epistemological question of the status of the human sciences."(44)

The ultimate objective of his hermeneutics, like that of E.D. Hirsch, Jr., is the attainment of validity in interpretation.(45) "A text is a limited field of possible constructions" and "...not all interpretations are equal."(46) Validation involves testing the projection of good guesses by determining the probability of the "verbal intention of the text". This is subject to judicial reasoning as all interpretations are brought before a public tribunal of judgment. But the procedures of appeal are never exhausted. "Neither in literary criticism, nor in the social sciences, is there such a last word."(47) Nevertheless, Ricoeur still insists,

"A text is a quasi individual, and the validation of an interpretation applied to it may be said with complete legitimacy to give a scientific knowledge of the text."(48)

Although a text may be considered as a quasi individual, Ricoeur, on his road back to epistemology, avoids any renewal of contact with the hermeneutics of "being with" which Schleiermacher had formulated. "Depth semantics constitutes the genuine object of interpretation..."(49) and this conducts the interpreter into a world of semiotic systems and structural analysis.

"...understanding has nothing to do with an immediate grasping of a foreign psychic life or with an emotional identification with a mental intention. Understanding is entirely mediated by the whole of explanatory procedures that precede it and accompany it. The counterpart of this personal appropriation is not something that can be felt, it is the dynamic meaning released by the explanation which we identified earlier with the reference of the text, that is, its power of disclosing a world."(50)

Ricoeur's "world in front of the text", which he identifies with the depth semantics of the text, is a world of logocentrism, a world in which the linguistic code of a text, functioning as a semiotic system, has the power to communicate apart from and even in spite of the author's intention.

To what extent, then, has he succeeded in escaping Heideggerian ontology? Language for him, as for Heidegger, is the house of being which by a dialectical movement of the hermeneutical circle through understanding and explanation and explanation and understanding will disclose new possibilities of being.(51)

But the textual structures of the implied author and the implied reader continue to convey the presence of an author.(52) The author, therefore, cannot simply be abolished from the text on the basis of a hermeneutical theory that rejects the recovery of authorial will. While interpretation must legitimately begin with a hermeneutics of Dasein and its projection of preunderstanding's prejudices and traditions, ideologies and methodologies, it must eventually return to a hermeneutics of "being with" an other. Not the other as a psychic life that is to be re-experienced and reconstituted, but the other as a vision or a truth conveyed by the speech performance of an author in terms of a potentiality structured in the text that can only be actualized through the process of reading.

"It is in the reader that the text comes to life, and this is true even when the 'meaning' has become so historical that it is no longer relevant to us."(53)

In the dialectic of the hermeneutics of being-in-the-world and the hermeneutics of being-with-an-other there is a movement away from the individuality and isolation of the thrownness of being-in-the-world into a dialogical relationship with an other. Even if that other, materially speaking, is only a text, its subject matter establishes the possibility of a dialogue which not only marks the beginning of community and the collaborative and creative enterprise of generating something new. Moreover, that which is new - a new subjectivity!- poses the possibility of experiencing a defamiliarization of the reality structures of being-in-the-world and with it an actualization of a new self-awareness that is both liberated and liberating.

The truth that emerges in and through this new subjectivity, generated by the interaction between text and reader may be ephemeral, exerting its claim for but a moment. But if it should as objects for the contemplation of the intellect but its objectification in actions and deeds that become embodied in the flesh and blood life of the reader, it will in turn realize a new potentiality: the transformation of the reader's self and the world to which that self belongs. The ultimate objective of the otherness of texts is not merely the establishment of the truth of ideas and concepts constitute integrity and contribute to change in the world.

 

NOTES

 

1. See Paul Ricoeur, "The Task of Hermeneutics", From Text to Action: Essays in Hermeneutics, II. Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991, 65-66.

2. Heidegger, Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson. London: SCM Press, 1962, 185; Sein und Zeit, 7th ed. Halle: Niemeyer, 1927, 145.

3. As, for example, was attempted by Wilhelm Dilthey. See Ricoeur's analysis in "The Task of Hermeneutics", op.cit., 56-63.

4. Hans Georg Gadamer, "Problem of Historical Consciousness," in Interpretive Social Science. A Reader, ed. by Paul Rabinow and William L. Sullivan, Berkeley: University of California Press, 1979, 151-152. Truth and Method, tran. and ed.

by Garrett Barden and John Cumming, New York: Seabury Press, 1975, 269. Wahrheit und Methode. 4th ed. Tübingen: J.C.B.Mohr (Paul Siebeck), 1975, 285.

5. "The Task of Hermeneutics", 72

6. Ricoeur, ibid., 70-74.

7. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 247 ff. Wahrheit und Methode, 263 f.

8. Gadamer, Truth and Method, 269; Wahrheit und Methode, 286.

9. "Phenomenology and Hermeneutics", From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics II, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991, 35.

10. See "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation", From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics II, Evanston" Northwestern University Press, 1991, 75-88.

11. Ibid., 77.

12. Gadamer, "Problem of Historical Consciousness," 151-152.

13. Of course, there are some, like Stanley Fish, who deny the objectivity and therefore also the autonomy of the text. See Is There a Text in This Class? The Authority of Interpretive Communities. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press 1980.

14. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation", 87-88, and "The Model of the Text", in From Text to Action. Essays in Hermeneutics II, Evanston: Northwestern University Press, 1991,

15. Although Ricoeur does not state this explicitly, he does speak of structuralism's analysis of depth semantics, and this is generally the focus of structural analysis. See Susan Wittig, "A Theory of Multiple Meanings", in "Polyvalent Narration", ed. by J.D. Crossan, Semeia 9, Decatur: Scholars Press, 1977, 81.

16. Wittig, ibid., 82.

17. Ibid.

18. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation," op.cit., 88.

19. "The Model of the Text," ibid., p.164.

20. Daniel and Aline Patte, Structural Exegesis: From Theory to Practice, Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978, 101.

21. Ricoeur, "The Hermeneutical Function of Distanciation", op.cit., 87.

22. J.H. Hunter, "Escaping the Abyss: Beyond Deconstruction in Old Testament Studies", Acta Academica 24 (3) 1992, 69. See also his article, "The Irony of Meaning. Intertexuality in Hebrew Poetical Texts", Journal for Semitics 2, 229-243.

Hunter speaks of the "irony of meaning," whereas I prefer to speak of the "irony of interpretation". He focuses on the text's problematic of intentional and unintentional meaning; I focus on the attitude and approach to the text by the reader/interpreter in view of this textual problematic.

23. Laura Bohannan, "Shakespeare in the Bush", Natural History 75 (1966), 28-33. My thanks to my friend, Dr. Royce J. Truex, for introducing me to Bohannan's article.

24. Gabriele Schwab, "Reader-response and the Aesthetic Experience of Otherness", Stanford Literature Review 3 (1992), 127. My thanks to Gregg Lambert for calling my attention to this seminal essay.

25. Ibid., 110.

26. Ibid., 117.

27. Truth and Method, 146; Wahrheit und Methode, 156. What Gadamer has formulated as questions, I have taken the liberty on the basis of his own answers, to reconstitute as statements.

28. The Name of the Rose, London: Pan Books, 502.

29. Schwab, op.cit., 111.

30. See Schwab's application of Lacan's hermeneutical perspective to the problematic of encountering the otherness of the text, ibid., 121-122.

31. See G. Schwab's discussion of Lacan's analysis of "the Other", ibid., 121-122.

32. Ibid., 129.

33. Wolfgang Iser, The Act of Reading. A Theory of Aesthetic Response. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1978, 21.

34. G. Schwab, op.cit., 114.

35. W.Iser, op.cit., 35.

36. See W. Iser, ibid., 53-103. on "Repertoire" and "Strategies".

37. Ibid., 35.

38. Ibid., 34-35.

39. Ibid., 34.

40. Ibid.

41. H. G. Gadamer, "Problem of Historical Consciousness", op.cit., 151-152.

42. So also J. H. Hunter, op.cit., 65.

43. "The Task of Hermeneutics",op.cit., 70.

44. Ibid., 69.

45. See Ricoeur's discussion of the problem of validation vis a vis Hirsch in "The Model of the Text", op.cit.,158-162.

46. Ibid., 160.

47. Ibid., 162.

48. Ibid., 159.

49. Ibid. 164.

50. Ibid., 167.

51. Ibid., 156-167.

52. W. Iser, op.cit., 35. Wayne C. Booth, The Rhetoric of Fiction, Chicago: 4th ed. University of Chicago Press, 1963, 135ff.

53. W. Iser, op.cit. 19.

Intimations of the Year of Jubilee in the Parables of the Wicked Tenants and Workers in the Vineyard

The institution of jubilee and its economic regulations, detailed in Leviticus 25, may never been put into practice in the history of Israel. But the ideals of redemption and restoration, which it envisioned for the nation's covenantal relationship with God and its attendant establishment of justice, were appropriated and applied by Israel's prophets to the social, economic and political conditions of their times. Jesus' ministry also appears to have been oriented toward the fulfillment of these jubilary ideals. Indeed, the Evangelist Luke presents Jesus enunciating a programmatic vision of the work he has begun to fulfill based on the jubilee imagery of Isaiall 61. His inauguration and actualization of the eschatological reality of "the kingdom of God" expresses central aspects of the redemption and the ethics of the jubilee year. At least two of the parables, which the gospel tradition attributes to him, convey central features of this jubilee model and ascribe them to their referent, the rule of God. The parable of the Wicked Tenants functions as a mirror for the ruling elite confronting them with their eviction from God's vineyard and their replacement by the very pelple they oppressed and dispossessed, the poor. The parable of The Workers in the Vineyard subverts the world of the sub-Asiatic mode of production and its exchange value of labor.

Much of the confusion which scholarly interpretation has generated in its efforts to explain the parable of the Wicked Tenants has been dispelled by Klyne Snodgrass' investigation The Parable of the Wicked Tenants. Many, if not most of the difficulties, which the individual features of the parable posed, have been resolved. Above all the plausibility of the story has been established, and the parable is attributable to Jesus. The owner and planter of the vineyard may be identified as an absentee landlord. Whether he was a foreigner is not indicated; it is of no importance. The conflict in the story is an economic class struggle.

Historical records indicate that for many generations Galilee had been royal territory subject to the control of prebendal domains, that is "stipend" property or grants for income.

The land was awarded to officials of the state who derived their income from it by leasing it to the peasantry for a stipulated rent to be paid in the form of agricultural produce, money or labor. The Zenon Papyri of the third century B.C.E. disclose that the Hellenistic monarch of Egypt, Ptolemy Philadelphus (283-246 B.C.E.) had granted property in Bet Anat in Galilec to his finance minister Apollonius. The estate which he owned as an absentee landlord appears to have been a large holding of grainfields and a vineyard of 80,000 grapevines.. It is estimated that a workforce of at least 25 people was required to carry out the work that was involved in such a large operation, but this seems to be a minimal figure. Herod the Great furthered this kind of latifundialization during his reign in the first century B.C.E. by expropriating large tracts of farmland and selling them to wealthy landowners. Consequently the best agricultural lands of Galilee fell into the hands of a few landbarons who preferred to live in another part of Palestine or even abroad while their estates were managed by oikonomoi and worked by tenant farmer

Rostovtzeff offers a comprehensive view of land tenure in Palestine:
"Judaea, Samaria, and still more Galilee are studded with hundreds of villages
inhabited by peasants, Samaria, and still more Galilee are studded with hundreds
of villages inhabited by peasants, above whom stands a native aristocracy of
large landowners, who are patrons of the villages... Still more opulent are the
officials of the kings and tetrarchs, and the kings and tetrarchs themselves and
their families. Lastly, we find estates of the Roman emperor himself and the
imperial family, and even a military colony established by Vespasian at
Emmaus after the Jewish War. Such were the conditions of life in Palestine,
and in later times there was clearly no change, except that landed proprietors
of other than Jewish origin, like Libanius, increased in number."

Jusus' parable of the wicked tenants supports Rostovtzeffs socio-economic analysis, mirroring the institution of prebendal domains and its concomitant feature of absentee landownership which dominated Galilean agriculture. A landlord has established a vineyard: vines have been planted, a wall has been constructed, a vat has been dug, a tower has been built, the vineyard has been leased to tenants and the owner has withdrawn-most likelly to his place of residence in another area of Palestine or possibly even abroad.

Four of these six initial activities are attributed to the singer of the Song of the Vineyard in Isaiah 5 who is metaphorically identified with Yahweh: that is, planting vines, constructing a wall, digging a vat and building a tower. The leasing of the vineyard to tenants and the departure of the owner move Jesus' story directly into the realities of Galilean agriculture in his own time. Even though the vineyard would not be profitable for at least five years, peasant labor would be necessary to tend the vines and to carry on the continuous process of cultivation and weeding. The expenses that would be incurred during this period of time would be defrayed by growing grain and vegetables between the rows of vines. Rent might also be paid on this produce, but at least five years would elapse before a rent fund would be due on the fruit of the vines. Although no time period is specified in the story, the audience would infer a rather considerable period of tenancy before that first payment was required.

Klyne Snodgrass prefers the originality of Matthew's version of the parable over that of Mark because of the more authentic feature of the landowner's sending of a number of slaves to collect the rent: "Now when the season of the fruit drew near, he sent his slaves to the tenants in order to receive his (share of the) fruit. "A single slave, as stipulated in the Marcan account would thadly be adequate. Most likely several would be needed. However, their treatment at the hands of the tenants may reflect Matthew's allegorical intention to make the story correspond to the history of Israelite prophets: "One they beat, another they killed and another they stoned." Snodgrass denies such allegorical redaction of the story, but Jubilees I: 12-13 and Hebrews 11: 35-38 indicate that traditions of the sufferings of the prophets, even though not included in the Hebrew Scriptures, were circulating in pre-Christian Judaism. The treatment of th individual slaves in Mark's version of the story also appears to have been informed by prophetic histoory. It is generally agreed that the verb ekephaiaiosan refers to the fate suffered by John the Baptizer. Moreover, the great number of slaves sent by the absentee landlord may be intended to cover the entire history of Israel and hint at the immense patience of God. Of the Synoptics Luke seems to offer the most realistic account of the tenants' mistreatment of the woner's slaves: "And at the time he sent a slave to the tenants so that they should give him of the fruit of the vineyard. But beating him the tenants sent him off empty. And he sent another slave, but that one beating and dishonoring they sent off empty. And he sent a third, and wounding this one they cast him out." (Luke 20:10-12). The landlord's slaves are humiliated and wounded, but no one is killed. This feature in the Lucan rendering of the tradition is supported by the parallel account of the story in the gospel of Thomas: "They seized his servant, they beat him; a little longer and they would have killed him... He sent another servant; the tenants beat him as well." However, it is the absence of allegory, including the allusions to Isaiah 5:1-7 at the beginning of the parable, that convinces Crossan of the authenticity of the Thomas version over that of Luke.

"...its meaning is clear as a parable of action. It is a deliberately shocking of
successful murder. The story is certainly possible and possibly actual in the
Galilean turbulence of the period. It tells of some people who recognized their
situation, saw their opportunity, and acted resolutely upon it."

Nevertheless, in spite of the difficulties of the Marcan account, especially its allegorized features, it is probably closer to the original story of Jesus than any of the other versions. Unlike Thomas 93:1, the owner of the vineyard is not characterized as "a good man." He is an absentee landlord, and, like most absentee landlords in advanced agrarian society, he probably exploited the labor of his tenants by contracting for rent funds of 40 to 50 per cent of their agricultural produce. Frustrated by his slaves' unsuccessful attempts to collect the rent fund, he sends his son, most likely as his representative, to undertake legal action: "They will respect my son." All four editions of the parable attribute this expectation to the landbaron. Only someone who was involved in the ownership of the land could represent him and serve as a legal claimant. Perhaps, as Snodgrass and others conjecture, the landlord had "transferred a small portion of ownership to the son for this purpose."

To prevent any legal action from being taken and to assume possession of the vineyard the tenants kill the son. Perhaps the lapse of time between their entry into a contract with the owner and the murder of his son cover the period of tenure which the law requires for the acquisition of the land. The Mishnaic tractate, Baba Bathra 3:1, legislates that an individual who has no title deeds to lay claim to a property must prove three years of undisputed possession, but title to fields whose fertility is dependent solely on winter rain can be acquired in less time. However, Baba Bathra 3:3 forbids "tenants" as well as "jointholders and guardians to secure title by usucaption." Whether this prohibition was already law in Galilee during Jesus' lifetime is probably indeterminable. At the very least it hints that seizure of land by tenants was being perpetrated. Snodgrass adds another factor that may have influenced the tenants:

"In rabbinic law, if one abandoned hope of recovering lost or stolen property, he
renounced his claim to ownership. To this point the father had been unable to
come to the vineyard, and the tenants must have felt that there was some
chance that the owner would give up. If the father did come and could not
produce evidence evidence, the stronger of the two parties could take
possession."

How did the story originally end? The Thomas version, 93:1-4, closes with the murder of the owner's son, "...they seized him, they killed him," The son is killed because he is recognized as the heir, not in order to enable the tenants to take possession of the vineyard. Moreover, the question and answer of Mark 12:9, Matt. 21:40-411 and Luke 20:15-16, "What will the master of the vineyard do? He will come and destroy the tenants and give the vineyard to others," are not included. If the parable had been terminated with the murder of the owner's son, it would have ended inconclusively. There would be no surprise twist. There would be no subversion of world, no mirror of disclosure. The story would simply be an account of a violent act perpetrated by a group of oppressed and dispossessed peasants, as Crossan, Scott and Herzog have concluded. But the closing question and answer: "What will the master of the vineyard do? He will come and destroy the tenants, and he will give the vineyard to others!" are essential for the integrity of the story as a parable. To object on the basis that Jesus did not end his parables with a question and answer, as Crossan and others do, is to limit the creativity of Jesus in his story-telling and to overlook similar instances in Matt. 20:15 and Luke 12:20.

Jesus' concluding question and answer convey the unexpected reversal of the episode. Those who dispossessed the heir of the vineyard are dispossessed in turn by the owner, and the vineyard is leased to others. But this surprising twist must be understood in the light of the story's unusual beginning. While, on the one hand, the owner is an absentee landlord who is a member of the affluent upper class engaged in self-aggrandizement through the exploitation of the peasantry, the distinctive introduction of the parable indicates that Jesus is adapting a more the peasantry, the distinctive introduction of the prophetic allegory of the vineyard in Isaiah 5:1-7.

The opening sentence, "A human being planted a vineyard and constructed a wall and dug a vat and built a tower" would almost certainly have evoked the memory of the Isaiah's "Song of the Vineyard" in the minds of Jesus' audience. This in and of itself suggests an irregularity, for it links the identification of the absentee landlord of the parable with the vineyard owner of Isaiah's allegory. To imagine God to be like an absentee landlord would be a disturbing anomaly for Jewish peasants but not necessarily for those who would tend to identify themselves with the absentee landlord and approve of killing the tenants, namely the ruling elite.

But the introduction is all that Jesus' parable and the Isaiah's allegory of the vineyard have in common. The latter explicitly identifies Israel as "the vineyard of the Lord of hosts"(5:7), while the former focuses on the lease of the vineyard to tenant farmers, their contract with the ownrer to pay the rent fund, and the departure of landlord. Jesus' upper class audience would find itself drawn into a story in which they as landowners would be forced to identify themselves with the lower class peasants to whom they lease their lands. For them the absentee landlord would be metaphorically identified with God on the basis of the intended association of the introduction with Isaiah's "Song of the Vineyard," and the vineyard must necessarily symbolize Israel. The tenants therefore, can only be those to whom God has entrusted the vineyard, that is, the guardians of society. By being drawn into this identification with peasant farmers, the ruling elite ironically find themselves in an unaccustomed role. Jesus has lured them into an identification with that segment of the lower class which they exploit for the maintenance of their weath and power by appropriating a grossly unjust proportion of their agricultural produce through exorbitant rent funds. For a brief moment perhaps they may perceive the injustice of the socio-economic system which they themselves maintain. At the same time, they are obliged to see themselves as the tenants of God's vineyard who are not fulfilling the covenant to which they had bound themselves. This double disclosure which is conveyed to them through their participation in the story intimates a circular continuity of cause and effect: Their guardianship of Jewish society stands under divine judgment precisely because of their socio-economic exploration of the peasantry. By being naturally inclined, as members of the governing class, to condemn the peasants for their illegal withholding of the rent fund and their violence of murdering the landlord's slaves and especially his male heir, they would have no difficulty in justifying his revenge, but ironically at the same time they would be poonouncing judgment on themselves for the injustice and violence which they were perpetrating as the tenants of God's vineyard.

Ingeniously, Jesus has succeeded in confronting the guardians of society with their own injustice. The retribution which the tenants suffer at the hands of th landlord and which they readily affirm will be inflicted on them. As they have dispossessed, so they will be dispossessed: "And he will give the vineyard to others." Without this ironic conclusion the story is incomplete and therefore cannot function parabolically.

Jesus does not identify those who will receive the vineyard. Within the context of Mark's gospel they are suually considered to be the Gentiles. But while this is true for Matthew's gospel, the "others" may, in fact, imply the disenfranchised lower classes to whom the evangelist Mark addressed his gospel. Moreover, originally in the context of Jesus' own ministry, the "others" were probably intended to be the very people who were exploited by the ruling elite, the peasants whose agriculture produced the wealth with they were able to appropriate by their office and power. The promise of the jubilee year will be realized. The land will be restored to the dispossessed peasants who as tenants produced the agricultural wealth which the ruling class redistributed for their own aggrandizement.

The recovery of the original function of The Parable of The Workers in the Vineyard necessitates its extraction from its Mattean context. In its present location the parable seves as an illustration of the reversal which Jesus has enunciated to his disciples in 19:30, "But many (who are) first will be last and (the)last first." These words are repeated, but in an opposite order, as the conclusion of the parable; and it is generally agreed that it is a redaction of the evangelist and not the original ending of the story.

The parable of the Workers in the Vineyard reflects the same economic realities of Roman Palestine as the parable of the Wicked Tenants, but specifically the condition of widespread unemployment in Galilee. Large segments of the population had been dispossessed and reduced to destitution as a result of Pompey's reorganization of Palestinian territory. At the same time Herod the Great's expropriation of large tracts of farmland, sold to wealthy landwners or distributed to the officials of his court, had intensified the process of latifundialization. Consequently peasants and tenants, as well as the artisant who depended on them, had only their labor to sell to anyone who wished to hire them.

Jesus's parable, however, focuses on a landlord who goes to the marketplace at 6 a.m.in order to hire laborers, probably, it is speculated, to harvest the grapes of his vineyard. Because the harvest must be completed quickly, he returns to the marketplace several more times. At 9 0 clock and at 12 noon he finds others standing idle and waiting to be hired. He goes again at 3 o clock in the afternoon and finally at 5 0 clock, one hour before the end of the workday, to hire more unemployed people. The explanation of the workers is always the same, "No one has hired us."

All of them are sent into the vineyard to work, and at 6 o clock in the evening the landlord commands the manager to pay the wage. The law required such payment at the end of each day so that the workers could afford to buy food for their families. Those who were hired last are paid first. Herzog interprets this order to be an affront to those who labored twelve hours. "They have been shamed." "By reversing the order of payment so that the last hired receive a wage equal to that of the first hired, (the owner) has told them in effect that he values their daylong effort in the scorching heat no more than the brief labor of the eleventh hour workers. But the affront is not conveyed by the order of payment, but by the payment itself. It is aroused within those who have worked twelve hours and receive the same wage as those who labored only one hour. For the effect of the parable it is essential that those who were hired first will know what wage is being paid to the others. As a result, their expectation is that they will receive more. But all of them receive the same wage, one denarius. Indignant at what they perceive to be an injustice, they protest, but the landlord reminds them that they had contracted for one denarius.

What kind of a landlord is this? Like others of his kind, he owns the means of production, the land. But unlike others of his kind, he does not exploit his laborers by depriving them of the surplus value of their work. "...not only is he just, but most agree that he has acted with generosity toward those hired last." He is just because he has paid those who labored twelve hours the contracted wage. But he is more than generous! Unlike owners of the means of production, he has not extracted the labor surplus from these unemployed laborers in order to increase his profit. Moreover, he develops productivity by hiring more workers, thereby enabling more of the unemployed to earn a living for themselves and their families. But it is not necessary to identify God with this extraordinary landlord. It is the eschatological reality of God's rule that is like a landloord, who, by refusing to increase his own profit at the expense of his hired workers, subverts the exchange value of labor.

William R. Herzog sharply disagrees with this assessment of the landowner. He rightly recognizes that no elite would go to the marketplace to hire workers; that would be the responsibility of the estate manager. Evidently Jesus is ignoring this class reality in order to focus directly on the landlord himself. But is he doing that in order to expose him as "an exploitative and ruthless landowner." Of course, the wage of a denarius for twelve hours of work is minimal, indeed, a subsistence wage. But as Douglas Oakman has estimated, a denarius could supply food for a family from three to six days. It is, in face, the wage that has been agreed upon by both parties, the owner and the unemployed. Generally speaking, of course, the unemployed would have no bargaining power, but if it is harvest time - and the landlord's need for many workers is apparent in the story - those who are being hired would have a degree of leverage in negotiating with the owner. The text indicates that the landlord came to an agreement with the workers, not that the workers reached an agreement with the landlord.

Those who were hired first are indignant. They believe that they have been treated unjustly, for, as they assert, "We have borne the burden and the heat of the day." Naturally they deserve more! Justice would appear to dictate that, in spite of the bargained-for denarius. But what they have forgotten is their own advantage of being hired at the beginning of the day. It is a stark reality that opportunity is not always equal for all people. Yet their needs are very much the same. The distribution of the housemaster is not according to opportunity and its advantages, but according to need. And among peasants needs are equal. They however, are not concerned about the advantages of opportunity. They insist on distribution according to merit or achievement, the merit of having worked all day or at least longer than those who labored only one hour.

Those who grumble and accuse the landlord of being unjust, in spite of the original contract, disclose that they have been infected with the values that come down from the top of the socio-economic pyramid, values which the rich and the powerful foster in order to "divide and conquer" those on whom they are dependent for labor. But the principle that is at work here in this story is the one that Karl Marx formulated, "From each according to ability to each according to need..." Self-interest is invalidated. The needs of each member of the community cannot be ignored in the eschatological reality of God's rule. No advantages of noble birth, inheritance, achievement or merit of any kind determine participation in the distinctive justice and equality of God's rule.

Jesus' parables violated the ordered system of land tenure and economic exchange in the world of his day. The rule of God, which his stories metaphorically disclosed, will undermine the ruling elite's self-serving systemic structures and institutions. Under the expansion of God's rule those who exploit, dispossess and marginalize the weak and the poor, will forfeit all their advantages of power and wealth. In spite of the continuation of the stark realities of the socio-economic pyramid benefiting the upper classes, the realities of redemption and restoration, which the year of jubilee envisioned, will be actualized, not only for Israel but for all the nations and peoples of the world.


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Adhering to Israel’s God

Theology and Old Testament: Testimony, Dispute, Advocacy, by Walter Brueggemann, Fortress, 777 pp., $48.00.

 

Walter Brueggemann's brilliant new book, the culmination of a lifetime of incisive theological work, embodies the transitional moment between one interpretive age and the creative stirrings of a new one. While he does not assume that new methods are always incompatible with those born of the Enlightenment, Brueggemann is certain that the past has to make room for new ways of interpreting scripture. He deftly guides us in new directions even as he continues to learn from earlier Old Testament theologians such as William Foxwell Albright and Gerhard von Rad. In so systematically and imaginatively ushering Old Testament theology into a new interpretive era, Brueggemann deserves to be listed among those few individuals who have decisively shaped this theology in the 20th century.

Brueggemann begins his study with a masterful survey of Old Testament theology's past and present and provides the background necessary for understanding his new insights. He divides the introduction into two parts: in the first he reviews the history of Old Testament theology; in the second he analyzes the contemporary situation

Over the past two centuries, Old Testament theology has been shaped by two countervailing forces: since the Reformation, the church has been reluctant to free the Bible from its doctrinal interpretations; but since the Enlightenment, the history-of-religions approach that prevails in the academy has refused to be limited by the constraints of faith. Furthermore, most Jewish scholars have not participated in Old Testament theology, choosing instead to live with the tensions of traditions that have shaped different expressions of Judaism.

J. P. Gabler first clearly differentiated historically oriented theological interpretation of the Old Testament from the dogmatic enterprise of church teachings in his famous 1787 inaugural address at the University of Altdorf. The scientific -- largely positivistic -- methodology of historical criticism remained independent of the church's claims and control, and consequently denied scripture a privileged position of interpretation. The Bible became one more piece of literature. In essence the academy replaced the church's doctrinal claims with the Enlightenment's claims of universal norms of reason. Echoing Hans Frei, a proponent of the narrative approach to the Bible, Brueggemann laments that the method first announced by Gabler ended by explaining away most of Israel's theological story and depriving it of its normative status for the church.

Karl Barth recovered the normative value of the Bible and, like Luther before him, argued that it has its own distinctive voice. Yet the rise of neo-orthodoxy only reasserted the unresolved tension between the assumptions of historical criticism and the neoevangelical affirmations of dogmatic theology. Brueggemann concedes that most Old Testament scholarship has elected not to choose between the two.

Although this tension within the history of Old Testament theology has not been solved, the terms of the debate are now different, Brueggemann claims. History no longer dominates Old Testament theology. Indeed, we have made something of an epistemological break with the past and are moving into uncharted territory where excitement and risk are inseparable. Pluralism is one feature of the contemporary situation. It is a feature of the biblical canon itself, with its diversity of literature and communities. Pluralism also characterizes approaches to the texts, which range from the sociological perspectives of scholars like Norman Gottwald to the rhetorical criticism of Phyllis Trible.

Perhaps most important for Brueggemann is that the Bible's linguistic character has come to the fore. Brueggemann argues that language helps to create reality. The God of the Hebrew Bible is to be found and known primarily not in history; beyond history or in creation but rather in the speech of Israel. True, God is transcendent; to think otherwise makes an idol of language. However, God is also "in the fray" -- in the texture of human life out of which the Bible's language takes form.

For Brueggemann the Hebrew Bible is governed largely by stories that generate "story-worlds." These stories are acts of human imagination. They are not limited by "what happened." He has long argued that the Hebrew Bible is a product of the imagination that creates a "counterversion (sub-version) of reality" that "deabsolutizes and destabilizes what 'the world' regards as given." The language of the Hebrew Bible does not often seek to legitimate an existing social order but rather attempts to undercut a debilitating power structure. Theologically this means that Israel's God is subject not to the norms of classical theology but to the rules of the drama itself.

Brueggemann acknowledges that in every social dispute some participants seek to maintain the status quo, others caution against hasty change, and still others engage in transformative action. All these positions are found in the Hebrew Bible and are often in dialogue and competition with one another. Nevertheless, he confesses: "The present writer is unflagging in his empathy toward that revolutionary propensity in the text." To a large extent, says Brueggemann, the Hebrew Bible responds to the crisis of the exile and thus proposes a "counter-reality." This means that modern readers should also read the Hebrew Bible as persons who are "displaced and as waiting for homecoming."

As part of his analysis of the contemporary situation Brueggemann considers three theological options that he judges to be inadequate. Foundationalism affirms that the epistemology of modernism should be used to take the declarations of the Hebrew Bible into the public arena for debate. Canon criticism, especially as practiced bv Brevard Childs, claims that the canon, approached and understood within the community of faith rather than the academy, and read through the categories of systematic theology, is the context for doing biblical theology. Brueggemann refers to a third option as a "seriatim reading," by which Hebrew texts are read one at a time without reference to the other The result is a variegated pluralism devoid of dialogue and critical engagement.

Brueggemann rejects each of these and instead opts for a "postliberal approach" commonlv associated with the ideas of Hans Frei, George Lindbeck and Stanley Hauerwas. This strategy seeks to understand and acknowledge the text, even in its often strange otherness, without making undue accommodation either to the rational discourse of the modern world or to the affirmations of classical Christianity. Thus, Brueggemann pays close attention to the "grammar and dialect of this textual tradition" that creates a "grammar of faith." This does not mean that the articulation of faith is merely a linguistic matter. He recognizes that "Israel's grammar was indeed impinged on by the vagaries of historical experience.Brueggemann also recognizes that old Testament theology exists in two historically and culturally distinct audiences. The first is the ancient communitv that begins its assent to this text. The second audience is the ongoing Jewish and Christian one that continues to affirm the validity of biblical theology and to harbor many alternative understandings. This means theology is "polyphonic"; the many voices of the text merge into one voice to achieve ongoing authority.

Brueggemann concludes his masterful introduction by raising four perennial questions. First, what of historical criticism? This method arose in the Enlightenment and aimed to be objective, scientific and positivistic. The ultimate goal was to remove the Bible from the interpretive control of the church. Brueggemann does not reject historical criticism, hut he seeks to counterbalance its claims. Second, how does Old Testament theology relate to church theology? Brueggemann does not agree with Childs that the church is the exclusive context for doing Old Testament theology. For Brueggemann, the Old Testament theologian must heed the text and its meaning whether or not it conforms to dogmatic teachings. Thus, Old Testament theology is as uneasy with church theology as it is with historical criticism.

Third, how does the Old Testament theologian, almost always a Christian, acknowledge and then deal judiciously with the Jewishness of the Old Testament? For Brueggemann, Old Testament theology must give an appropriate place to the Jewish character and claims of the text. Brueggemann cannot accept a supersessionist reading whereby the New Testament and the teachings of the church supersede the teachings of the Hebrew Bible. He affirms that there is not one construal but many, including Jewish ones. Finally, Brueggemann asks what "public possibilities" exist for the Old Testament. His primary answer is that Old Testament theology is part of a revolutionary struggle over goods, power and the survival of global communities.

The major components of Brueggemann's Old Testament theology now become clear. First, Brueggemann stands, though at times uneasily, within the boundaries of both the academy and the church. While he affirms the value of historical criticism, he rejects its elitism, some of its assumptions and its exclusive claims. However, he does not dismiss earlier scholarship. Second, Brueggemann stands firmly within the church. He recognizes that Old Testament theology is largely, but not entirely, a Christian enterprise. He recognizes the authenticity of other voices, especially those of Judaism. Third, Brueggemann rejects a systematic (or dogmatic) approach to Old Testament theology, not only because of the obvious pluralism of the texts within the canon and the cultures that interpret the Bible, but also because this approach tends to fall in line with the church's views of scripture.

Fourth, Brueggemann supports the voices from the margins who speak not only from within contemporary global realities but also from within the confines of the Hebrew Bible itself. Indeed, he argues that the major thrust of the Hebrew Bible is antielitist and subversive of the power structures that tend to oppress and dehumanize their victims. Fifth, Brueggemann advocates a postliberal theology that seeks to construct a "grammar of faith" for Old Testament theology. This means that Cod is construed largely by the language of the Hebrew text (verbs, nouns, direct objects, and adjectives), not by great acts in history or the constitution of divine being (ontologv). And sixth, Brueggemann does not shy away from acknowledging the impact of the Hebrew Bible on the New Testament and the later church. While the Hebrew Bible should not be abused by reading the faith of later Christianity into the text, its importance for shaping Christian faith should not be ignored.

Brueggemann presents his theology by using the theme of a trial or courtroom drama. He investigates the nature of God as revealed by Israel's testimony, countertestimony, unsolicited testimony and embodied testimony.

Testimony: The most important witness to Old Testament theology, contends Brueggemann, consists of the great affirmations of Israelite faith that center in verbs of action, verbs that speak of God transforming, intruding or inverting. In this type of "grammar," the subject of the verb is often God, and the verb has a direct object. These objects include Israel, primarily, but also humanity, the nations and the world.

One of Brueggemann's key examples of this "grammar of faith" is the thanksgiving genre. The thanksgiving speaks not only of the transcendence and sovereignty of God but also of divine participation in the world. Righteousness becomes the means by which the two polarities of divine action, those of sovereignty and pathos, are united: the sovereign God intervenes in situations of trouble and acts justly and decisively to address their challenges. These divine activities of sovereignty and participation include, first, creation -- God brings into being a world that is hospitable to life. The dark side of this affirmation is the way it can be used to support oppressive regimes that claim divine right to rule. Israel rejects this abuse of theological confession by countering that God is partial to the oppressed and seeks to undermine their oppressors.

The second rendering of the divine activities of rule and pathos is expressed in the affirmation of the God who makes promises. Especially important are the promises to the ancestors, who would become a great nation and an avenue of divine blessing, and the promise to David, whose house would rule over Israel and eventually the nations.

The third divine activity is to deliver. God's deliverance of Israel from Egypt allows it to live in hope and courage in times of distress. God is an untiring opponent of oppression who works to create justice for all. The fourth activity of God is to command. Especially paradigmatic is the giving of the law at Sinai. The law, better translated as "teaching," provides guidance for life and the basis for judgment in both society and worship.

The fifth divine activity is to lead. God is one who intervenes to lead Israel in every circumstance. While testing the chosen, God is also present even in moments of high risk and great suffering to create blessing. Brueggemann recognizes that there is an openness to this story line. Unlike von Rad, whose "Hexateuch" ends with the conquest of the land (in Joshua), Brueggemann stops where the Torah concludes: with Israel encamped east of the Jordan awaiting entrance to the promised land. This lack of closure means that the Torah is shaped by the crisis of the exile. Believers, then and now, wait in hope for fulfillment.

Brueggemann also examines the major adjectives and nouns that describe the character of God. His "credo" of adjectives includes "merciful," "gracious, slow to anger" and "forgiving." Nouns speak of the knowability and constancy of God.

Brueggemann proposes that, in the language of affirmation, Israel moves from the particular (verbs), to the general (adjectives), to the more general (nouns). Nouns used of God typically are metaphors, meaning that God is both elusive and beyond the concreteness of human speech. Brueggemann notes that Israel's use of metaphors not only guards against idolatry but also tends toward monotheism. Metaphors for God include those of governance: the righteous judge committed to just rule and opposed to exploitation; the noble king who rules wisely and righteously in undoing the wiles of the wicked and protecting the innocent and victims from abuse; the loving father who cares for and yet holds Israel accountable; and the warrior who implements a rule that is both just and compassionate.

In considering the last metaphor, Brueggemann argues, not always convincingly, that for Israel war is conducted to defend and to give life. Also, war rhetoric is uttered by those without power who have no other means to obtain justice. Finally, Brueggemann contends that God lives at the edge of such violence -- war is not central to divine activity. Brueggemann does not ignore the terrifying accounts of war in the Hebrew Bible, especially those of the conquest of the

Caananites and the slaughter of even Israelites and Judahites by foreign invaders, which some prophets depict as instruments of divine judgment. But he does not rigorously criticize this representation..

To be fair, Brueggemann does take on the "demonic" side of God in later chapters. And he notes that there is a contradiction between those metaphors that speak of God's forgiveness and care for Israel and victims and those that tell of divine participation in war and punishment.

A second set of metaphors of God have to do with sustenance -- that is, nurture and blessing that enhance life. Yahweh is the doctor who can heal a wounded people, a gardener who plants and harvests the fruits of creation, a mother who begets, bears and nourishes her children, and a shepherd who tends the flock.

These two sets of metaphors, governance and sustenance, along with many others, point to the multiple images Israel used to speak of God. This multiplicity means that Old Testament theology resists reduction, is fluid and open, and thick in its description. To literalize or homogenize these images is to engage in idolatry, which Israel resisted.. They also demonstrate, along with the nouns, verbs and adjectives, that there is no center to old Testament theology ind no strategy for constructing a systematic rendering.

Israel's Countertestimony: Israel did not consider countertestimony unfaithful. Its faith is constantly probing and questioning. Thus, the Psalter raises the questions of "why?," "how long?" and "where?" Brueggemann argues that if God is not endlessly subjected to such criticism, the result is idolatry.

One of the themes of Israel's countertestimony is the hiddenness of Yahweh. In wisdom literature, especially, God is not directly known. Rather, God is revealed in the processes of daily life and in the workings orderly or not, of creation. The sages came to regard God as the creator of life-sustaining structures and the hidden guarantor of life. Those who lived in concert with the orders of creation recognized that they were accountable to the creator. This hiddenness at times took on an aesthetic dimension, especially in the priestly description of the character and function of the tabernacle and temple. Through priestly ritual, divine power is unleashed to produce blessing that sustains and enhances life.

A second theme of Israel's countertestimony is Yahweh's governance. The creating, ordering and sustaining care of God is at times personified as Woman Wisdom. Still, the sages admitted that there were contingencies of life and that God was mysterious. They subsequently yielded to the unlimited freedom of God, though they generally acknowledged in their traditional expressions that God created a world of goodness and required obedience.

There is a dark side to this countertestimony. In certain texts, Yahweh appears as devious, unstable and unreliable. At times God is deceptive and abusive, as for instance in Jeremiah's complaint in Jeremiah 20:7-18 and in the narrative account of the divine council to which the prophet Micaiah ben Imlah is privy (1 Kings 22:20-22). Why is it that David can be forgiven, but Saul cannot? This lack of consistency in the treatment of humans points to the presence of divine caprice.

Countertestimony also includes acknowledging the negative side of the character of Yahweh, as when Israel experiences punishment in great disproportion to its guilt or when God is silent and fails to act. Yahweh is accused of forgetting or dishonoring the covenant (Pss. 35; 86:14-16) or violently attacking without cause (Job). Indeed, it is this very point that leads to the questioning of divine justice.

The dark side of God is even more apparent in Ecclesiastes. God is a radically sovereign, inscrutable and capricious deity. Life makes no sense. All that Ecclesiastes affirms is that God does not care about differentiations and their fairness.

Brueggemann neither silences this countertestimony nor seeks to resolve the tension between affirmation and dissent. This tension between testimony and countertestimony belongs to the very core of Old Testament faith. Israelite theology is dialectical. Christian tradition continues the same dialectic: Friday of Easter week is the day of countertestimony, while Easter Sunday is the affirmation of the core testimony. Biblical faith is a dialectic that collapses if one of the two major poles is negated. Apocalyptic faith awaits in hope the resolution of this tension.

Israel's Unsolicited Testimony: Even against the advice of an attorney, a witness will often offer unsolicited testimony. For this testimony, Brueggemann turns to Yahweh's four "partners": Israel, humanity, the nations and creation.

Israel, of course, is God's most significant other. Israel affirms that Yahweh redeems it, issues promises for its future, leads it even in times of trial, and guides it through commands and instruction. Perhaps most important in this partnership is the original love of God for Israel expressed in the ancestral narratives and those of the Exodus and Sinai. This love by God requires the partner's obligatory love, especially expressed in covenant obedience.

The human person is Yahweh's second partner. Humans exist in relationship with God not as autonomous individuals but as creatures subject to the sovereignty of God and obedient to the divine will. Brueggemann points to the relational and dynamic features of this partnership (see Gen. 9:8-17).

Surprisingly, he argues that the notion of humanity made in the image of God plays a very small role in the Hebrew Bible. It is the breathing in of the divine breath that enables humans to become living persons, and this theme underscores that people depend on God to live. Individualism is rejected in favor of communal existence. The well-being of humans is commensurate with the degree of God's sovereignty and mercy, for God, not humans, ultimately rules over and cares for the world.

The third partner of Yahweh is the nations. Israel came to acknowledge that the span of the divine reach was not limited to Israel but extended to all peoples. The destiny of every nation was under the sovereignty of God. God summoned the nations to divine blessing mediated through Israel, but also used the nations to punish the chosen people. When they overstepped their limits, they received Yahweh's just punishment. The nations also were allowed the possibility of forgiveness and restoration.

The fourth and final partner of Yahweh is creation. God blesses creation, issuing a life-giving and life-sustaining power that makes existence possible. This divine blessing is the gift of God to humans, who are required not to exploit God's good creation. Worship is the setting in which the generosity of creation is both praised and embellished. Israel did not ignore the destructive capacity of creation, but regarded worship as the means by which this destruction could be negated and blessing could he increased. Creation was not formed once for all, but stood in jeopardy at the hands of an unruly chaos that could bring life and its sustaining orders to an end. Yet even on occasions of seeming hopelessness, Israel could believe in the renewal of creation.

Israel's Embodied Testimony: The first embodied testimony is the Torah. The Torah, says Brueggemann, is the authoritative rendering of the encounter of Israel with Yahweh at Mount Sinai.. However, the Torah is not fixed once and for all but continues to be shaped by and in turn forms a community that encounters Yahweh. The Psalter is imbued with this same Torah piety (Pss. 1, 19, 119) and eventually becomes the authoritative basis for wisdom.. Torah eventually is centered eschatologically in Zion (Jerusalem), not Sinai, and through its internalization Yahweh becomes known by all nations as the sovereign ruler of the world. Ignoring the constraints of Torah leads to undisciplined, godless existence, while a move to the other extreme, legalism, turns the religious and moral life into a sterile, rigid existence. Jews and Christians must learn to adapt to the reality of normative teaching. To practice Torah means not only ethical and responsible living hut also reflective study and pious devotion and worship.

The second embodiment of testimony is the king who also serves as God's mediator. While not universally embraced, eventually the royal house of David became central to Israel's life. Even with the failure of the dynasty in 587 B.C.E., the messianic hope awaited one who would one day rule justly on behalf of Yahweh. In time, this messianism merged with the image of the Son of Man in Daniel 7:13 and the Servant in Second Isaiah -- the human being who would descend from the House of David and reconstitute a faithful and just community of God.

The prophet is the third embodiment of testimony. Yahweh called prophets who would speak on his behalf, delivering messages of destruction and salvation. Prophets speak not universals but concrete particularities, and they speak in metaphors that destabilize and invite alternative perceptions of reality. Often challenged because they possessed no objective proof of their calling, prophets frequently suffered the fate of persecution and even death. The essence of the prophetic message is the articulation of Yahweh's divine control and guidance of all history.

The cultus served as the fourth mediator of divine presence. Like the German school before him, Brueggemann reclaims worship as a central dimension of Old Testament theology. Worship shapes the communal identity, while the place of worship empowers Israel's liturgical imagination. It was here that Yahweh dwelt and ruled over the world as divine sovereign. It was here that the power of divine rule exerted claim over the threat of chaos.

The sage served as the final mediator of divine presence. Creation is central to the sages' theological understanding, for through the orders of life brought into existence by God human existence was made possible. Through righteous and wise behavior these orders were enhanced and the community of Israel enjoyed well-being. The distortions of sapiential teaching include legalism and opportunism. While earlier wisdom dealt primarily with practical everyday life, eventually Torah and wisdom converged. Brueggemann agrees in part with von Rad that wisdom tradition was a major source of apocalyptic thinking. Finally, the sages became redactors of Israel's earlier literature.

Brueggemann suggests that the dialectical pattern of testimony and countertestimony provides a model for our current situation. As Israel could not reach hegemony in its understanding, so we in the postmodern period cannot. Old Testament theology does not aim at consensus, but rather at an ongoing conversation, situated in a variety of changing contexts, about the character and activity of God.

Perhaps we must be content to live by asking the right questions and not by finding the correct answers. Yet I wonder how one ever comes to moral decisions and affirmations of faith without the risky business of saying yes or no to testimonies and disputations in our own time and place. Dialogue takes us only so far. Decisions finally have to be made that are critical to human faith and action, and life itself.

Brueggemann rightly contends that pluralism does not mean that anything goes. He says that the dominant alternative to Israel's Yahwism in our time is a military consumerism in which individual persons are the primary units of meaning and reference. According to this modern vision, happiness lies in obtaining, using and consuming materials without restraint, even when this exacts a heavy price from others. This construal of reality is military in the sense that the use of force or of the threat of force secures and maintains one's disproportionate right to goods -- and this power is equated with happiness. Yahwism, by contrast, emphasizes the sharing of gifts generously with the poor. Israel's world invites us to participate in a covenant exchange that continually redeploys power between the strong and the weak. All must be neighbors.

Yet I wonder if it is wealth and power that are the culprits and whether redistribution of goods is the key solution. I would contend that the Hebrew Bible condemns not wealth, but rather the hoarding of wealth that leads to the destitution, deprivation and even annihilation of the "neighbor" and the "other."

We are truly at the end of one dominant age of theological interpretation and at the beginning of another. The threats to the present world order, grounded in what Brueggemann calls "military capitalism," abound in frightening form. In its "Christian" form, this ideology, especially as used by the Religious Right, has undergirded and sought to legitimate the current Promethean world order of the West in general and the U.S. in particular. Brueggemann seeks to undo this cultural ideology by pointing to Israel's fundamental affirmation of the justice of God.

 

Biblical Authority

The authority of the Bible is a perennial and urgent issue for those of us who stake our lives on its testimony. This issue, however, is bound to remain unsettled and therefore perpetually disputatious. It cannot be otherwise, since the biblical text is endlessly "strange and new." It always and inescapably outdistances our categories of understanding and explanation, of interpretation and control. Because the Bible is "the live word of the living God," it will not compliantly submit to the accounts we prefer to give of it. There is something intrinsically unfamiliar about the book; and when we seek to override that unfamiliarity, we are on the hazardous ground of idolatry. Rather than proclaiming loud, dogmatic slogans about the Bible, we might do better to consider the odd and intimate ways in which we have each been led to where we are in our relationship with the scriptures.

At my confirmation, the pastor (in my case, my father) selected a verse for each confirmand, a verse to mark one’s life. It was read while hands were laid on ones head in confirmation, read at one’s funeral and many times in between. My father read over me Psalm 119:105: "Your word is a lamp to my feet! and a light to my path." Providentially, he marked my life by this book that would be lamp and light, to illumine a way to obedience and mark a path to fullness, joy and wellbeing.

Before that moment of confirmation, through baptismal vows and through my nurture in the faith, my church prepared me to attend to the Bible in a certain way. I am a child of the Prussian Union, a church body created in 1817 on the 300th anniversary of the year Luther posted his 39 theses on the door of the Würtemberg church. The Prussian king, weary of the arguments about the Eucharist going on between Calvinists and Lutherans, decreed an ecumenical church that was to be open to diversity and based on a broad consensus of evangelical faith that intended to protect liberty of conscience. This church body brought to the U.S. a slogan now taken over and claimed by many others: "In essentials unity; in nonessentials liberty; in all things charity."

"In all things charity" became the interpretive principle that produced a fundamentally irenic church. The ambiance of that climate for Bible reading may be indicated in two ways. First, the quarrels over the historical-critical reading of the Bible, faced by every church sooner or later, were firmly settled in my church in 1870, when one seminary teacher was forced out of teaching but quickly restored to a pastoral position of esteem. Second, our only seminary, Eden Seminary, had no systematic theologian on its faculty until 1946, and things were managed in a mood of trustful piety that produced not hard-nosed certitude, but irenic charity.

My first and best teacher was my father, who taught me the artistry as well as the authority of scripture. After my confirmation came a series of others who further shaped me in faith. In seminary I had an astonishing gift of excellent Bible teachers, none of whom published, as perhaps the best teachers do not. Allen Wehrli, who had studied under Hermann Gunkel in Halle, taught us the vast density of the Bible’s artistry, with attention to the form of the text. His pedagogy was imaginative storytelling -- long before the work of C. Ernest Wright or Fred Craddock, Wehrli understood that the Bible is narrative. Lionel Whiston introduced us to Gerhard von Rad, who was just then becoming known to English readers. I have ever since devoured Von Rad, who showed us that the practice of biblical faith is first of all recital. I learned from Wehrli and Vhiston that the Bible is essentially an open, imaginative narrative of God’s staggering care for the world, a narrative that feeds and nurtures us into an obedience that builds community precisely through respect for the liberty of individual Christians.

After seminary, purely by accident, I stumbled onto James Muilenburg at Union Seminary in New York, arguably the most compelling Old Testament teacher of his generation. He taught us that the Bible will have its authoritative, noncoercive way with us if we but attend with educated alertness to the cadences and sounds of the text in all its detail.

Since graduate school, I have been blessed by a host of insistent teachers -- seminarians who would not settle for easy answers, churchpeople who asked new and probing questions, even other Bible teachers. But mostly my continuing education has come through the writing and witness of people who are empowered by the text to live lives of courage, suffering and sacrifice, people who have found this book a source and energy for the fullness of true life lived unafraid.

This succession of teachers has let me see how broad, deep, demanding and generous is this text, how utterly beyond me in its richness. "A lamp to my feet and a light to my path. . ."

How each of us reads the Bible is partly the result of family, neighbors and friends (a socialization process), and partly the God-given accident of long-term development in faith. Consequently, the real issues of biblical authority and interpretation are not likely to be settled by cognitive formulations or by appeals to classic confessions. These issues live in often unrecognized, uncriticized and deeply powerful ways -- especially if they are rooted (as they may be for most of us) in hurt, anger or anxiety.

Decisions about biblical meanings are not made on the spot, but result from the growth of habits and convictions. And if that is so, then the disputes over meaning require not frontal arguments but long-term pastoral attentiveness to one another in good faith.

A church in dispute will require great self-knowing candor and a generous openness among its members. Such attentiveness may lead us to recognize that the story of someone else’s nurture in the faith could be a transformative gift that allows us to read the text in a new way. My own story leads me to identify six facets of biblical interpretation that I believe are likely to be operative among us all.

Inherency. The Bible is inherently the live word of God, revealing the character and will of God and empowering us for an alternative life in the world. While I believe in the indeterminacy of the text to some large extent, I know that finally the Bible is forceful and consistent in its main theological claim. It expresses the conviction that the God who created the world in love redeems the world in suffering and will consummate the world in joyous well-being. That flow of conviction about God’s self-disclosure in the Bible is surely the main claim of the apostolic faith, a claim upon which the church fundamentally agrees. That fundamental agreement is, of course, the beginning of the conversation and not its conclusion; but it is a deep and important starting point. From that inherent claim certain things follow:

First, all of us in the church are bound together by this foundation of apostolic faith. As my tradition affirms, "in essentials unity." It also means, moreover, that in disputes about biblical authority nobody has the high ground morally or hermeneutically. Our common commitment to the truth of the book makes us equal before the book, as it does around the table.

Second, since the inherency of evangelical truth in the book is focused on its main claims, it follows that there is much in the text that is "lesser," not a main claim, but probes and attempts over the generations to carry the main claims to specificity. These attempts are characteristically informed by particular circumstance and are open to variation, nuance and even contradiction. It is a primal Reformation principle that our faith is evangelical, linked to the good news and not to biblicism. The potential distinction between good news and lesser claims can lead to much dispute.

Third, the inherent word of God in the biblical text is refracted through many authors who were not disembodied voices of revealed truth but circumstance-situated men and women of faith (as are we all) who said what their circumstances permitted and required them to say of that which is truly inherent. It is this human refraction that makes the hard work of critical study inescapable, so that every text is given a suspicious scrutiny whereby we may consider the ways in which bodied humanness has succeeded or not succeeded in bearing truthful and faithful witness.

Fourth, given both inherency and circumstance-situated human refraction, the Bible is so endlessly a surprise beyond us that Karl Barth famously and rightly termed it "strange and new." The Bible is not a fixed, frozen, readily exhausted read; it is, rather, a "script," always reread, through which the Spirit makes all things new. When the church adjudicates between the inherent and the circumstance-situated, it is sorely tempted to settle, close and idolize. Therefore, inherency of an evangelical kind demands a constant resistance to familiarity. Nobody’s reading is final or inerrant, precisely because the key Character in the book who creates, redeems and consummates is always beyond us in holy hiddenness. When we push boldly through the hiddenness, wanting to know more clearly, what we thought was holy ground turns out to be a playground for idolatry. Our reading, then, is inescapably provisional. It is rightly done with the modesty of those who are always to be surprised again by what is "strange and new.

Interpretation. Recognizing the claim of biblical authority is not difficult as it pertains to the main affirmations of apostolic faith. But from that base line, the hard, disputatious work of interpretation needs to be recognized precisely for what it is: nothing more than interpretation. As our mothers and fathers have always known, the Bible is not self-evident and self-interpreting, and the Reformers did not mean to say that it was so when they escaped the church’s magisterium. Rather the Bible requires and insists upon human interpretation, which is inescapably subjective, necessarily provisional and inevitably disputatious. I propose as an interpretive rule that all of our interpretations need to be regarded, at the most, as having only tentative authority. This will enable us to make our best, most insistent claims, but then regularly relinquish our pet interpretations and, together with our partners in dispute, fall back in joy into the inherent apostolic claims that outdistance all of our too familiar and too partisan interpretations. We may learn from the rabbis the marvelous rhythm of deep interpretive dispute and profound common yielding in joy and affectionate well-being. The characteristic and sometimes demonic mode of Reformed interpretation is not tentativeness and relinquishment, but tentativeness hardening into absoluteness. It often becomes a sleight-of-hand act, substituting our interpretive preference for the inherency of apostolic claims.

The process of interpretation which precludes final settlement on almost all questions is evident in the Bible itself. A stunning case in point is the Mosaic teaching in Deuteronomy 23:1-8 that bans from the community all those with distorted sexuality and all those who are foreigners. In Isaiah 56:3-8 this Mosaic teaching is overturned in the Bible itself, offering what Herbert Donner terms an intentional "abrogation" of Mosaic law through new teaching. The old, no doubt circumstance-driven exclusion is answered by a circumstance-driven inclusiveness.

In Deuteronomy 24:1, moreover, Moses teaches that marriages broken in infidelity cannot be restored, even if both parties want to get back together. But in Jeremiah 3, in a shocking reversal given in a pathos-filled poem, God’s own voice indicates a readiness to violate that Torah teaching for the sake of restored marriage to Israel. The old teaching is seen to be problematic even for God. The latter text shows God prepared to move beyond the old prohibition of Torah in order that the inherent evangelical claims of God’s graciousness may be fully available even to a recalcitrant Israel. In embarrassment and perhaps even in humiliation, the God of Jeremiah’s poem willfully overrides the old text. It becomes clear that the interpretive project that constitutes the final form of the text is itself profoundly polyvalent, yielding no single exegetical outcome, but allowing layers and layers of fresh reading in which God’s own life and character are deeply engaged and put at risk.

Imagination. Responsible interpretation requires imagination. I understand that imagination makes serious Calvinists nervous because it smacks of the subjective freedom to carry the text in undeveloped directions and to engage in fantasy. But I would insist that imagination is in any case inevitable in any interpretive process that is more than simple reiteration, and that faithful imagination is characteristically not autonomous fantasy but good-faith extrapolation. I understand imagination, no doubt a complex epistemological process, to be the capacity to entertain images of meaning and reality that are beyond the givens of observable experience. That is, imagination is the hosting of "otherwise," and I submit that every serious teacher or preacher invites people to an "otherwise" beyond the evident. Without that we have nothing to say. We must take risks and act daringly to push beyond what is known to that which is hoped for and trusted but not yet in hand.

Interpretation is not the reiteration of the text but, rather, the movement of the text beyond itself in fresh, often formerly unuttered ways. Jesus’ parables are a prime example. They open the listening community to possible futures. Beyond parabolic teaching, however, there was in ancient Israel and in the early church an observant wonder. As eyewitnesses created texts out of observed and remembered miracles, texted miracles in turn become materials for imagination that pushed well beyond what was given or intended even in the text. This is an inescapable process for those of us who insist that the Bible is a contemporary word to us. We transport ourselves out of the 21st century back to the ancient world of the text or, conversely, we transpose ancient voices into contemporary voices of authority.

Those of us who think critically do not believe that the Old Testament was talking about Jesus, and yet we make the linkages. Surely Paul was not thinking of time crisis over 16th-century indulgences when he wrote about "faith alone." Surely Isaiah was not thinking of Martin Luther King’s dream of a new earth. Yet we make such leaps all the time. What a huge leap to imagine that the primal commission to "till and keep the earth" (Gen. 2:15) is really about environmental issues and the chemicals used by Iowa farmers. Yet we make it. What a huge leap to imagine that the ancient provision for Jubilee in Leviticus 25 has anything to do with the cancellation of Third World debt or with an implied critique of global capitalism. Yet we make it. What a huge leap to imagine that an ancient purity code in Leviticus 18 bears upon consenting gays and lesbians in the 21st century and has anything to do with ordination. Yet we make it.

We are all committed to the high practice of subjective extrapolations because we have figured out that a cold, reiterative objectivity has no missional energy or moral force. We do it, and will not stop doing it. It is, however, surely healing and humbling for us to have enough self-knowledge to concede that what we are doing will not carry the freight of absoluteness.

Imagination can indeed be a gift of the Spirit, but it is a gift used with immense subjective freedom. Therefore, after our imaginative interpretations are made with vigor in dispute with others in the church, we must regularly, gracefully and with modesty fall back from our best extrapolations to the sure apostolic claims that lie behind our extremities of imagination, liberal or conservative.

Ideology. A consideration of ideology is difficult for us because we American churchpeople are largely innocent about our own interpretive work. We are seldom aware of or honest about the ways in which our work is shot through with distorting vested interests. But it is so, whether we know it or not. There is no interpretation of scripture (nor of anything else) that is unaffected by the passions, convictions and perceptions of the interpreter. Ideology is the self-deceiving practice of taking a part for the whole, of taking "my truth" for the truth, of palming off the particular as a universal. It is so already in the text of scripture itself as current scholarship makes clear, because the spirit-given text is given us by and through human authors. It is so because spirit-filled interpretation is given us by and through bodied authors who must make their way in the world -- and in making our way, we humans do not see so clearly or love so dearly or follow so nearly as we might imagine.

There are endless examples of ideology at work in interpretation. Historical criticism is no innocent practice, for it intends to fend off church authority and protect the freedom of the autonomous interpreter. Canonical criticism is no innocent practice, for it intends to maintain old coherences against the perceived threat of more recent fragmentation. High moralism is no innocent practice, even if it sounds disciplined and noble, for much of it grows out of fear and is a strategy to fend off anxiety. Communitarian inclusiveness is no innocent practice, because it reflects a reaction against exclusivism and so is readily given to a kind of reactive carelessness.

There is enough truth in every such interpretive posture and strategy -- and a hundred others we might name -- to make it credible and to gather a constituency for it. But it is not ideologically innocent, and therefore has no absolute claim.

In a disputatious church, a healthy practice might be to reflect upon the ideological passion not of others, but ol one’s self and one’s cohorts. I believe that such reflection would invariably indicate that every passionate interpretive voice is shot through with vested interest, sometimes barely hidden. It is completely predictable that interpreters who are restrictive about gays and lesbians will characteristically advocate high capitalism and a strong national defense. Conversely, those who are ‘open and affirming" will characteristically maintain a critique of consumer capitalism, and consensus on a whole cluster of other issues. One can argue that such a package only indicates a theological-ethical coherence. Perhaps, but in no case is the package innocent, since we incline to make our decisions without any critical reflection, but only in order to sustain the package.

Every passionate vested interest has working in it a high measure of anxiety about deep threats, perhaps perceived, perhaps imagined. And anxiety has a force that permits us to deal in wholesale categories without the nuance of tile particular. A judgment grounded in anxiety, anywhere on the theological spectrum, does not want to be disturbed or informed by facts on the ground. Every vested interest shaped by anxiety has near its source old fears that are deep and hidden, but for all of that authoritative. Every one has at its very bottom hurt -- old hurt, new hurt, hurt for ourselves, for those we remember, for those we love. The lingering, unhealed pain becomes a hermeneutical principle out of which we will not be talked.

Every ideological passion, liberal or conservative, may be encased in scripture itself or enshrined in longstanding interpretation until it is regarded as absolute and trusted as decisive authority. And where an ideology becomes loud and destructive in the interpretive community, we may be sure that the doses of anxiety, fear and hurt within it are huge and finally irrepressible.

I do not for an instant suggest that no distinctions can be made, nor that it is so dark that all cats are gray. And certainly, given our ideological passions, we must go on and interpret in any case. But I do say that in our best judgments concerning scripture, we might be aware enough of our propensity to distort in the service of vested interests, anxiety, fear and hurt that we recognize that our best interpretation might be not only a vehicle for but also a block to and distortion of the crucified truth of the gospel.

I have come belatedly to see, in my own case, that my hermeneutical passion is largely propelled by the fact that my father was a pastor who was economically abused by the church he served, abused as a means of control. I cannot measure the ways in which that felt awareness determines how I work, how I interpret, who I read, whom I trust as a reliable voice. The wound is deep enough to pervade everything; I suspect, moreover, that I am not the only one for whom this is true. It could be that we turn our anxieties, fears and hurts to good advantage as vehicles for obedience. But even in so doing, we are put on notice. We cannot escape from such passions; but we can submit them to brothers and sisters whose own history of distortion is very different from ours and as powerful in its defining force.

Inspiration. It is traditional to speak of scripture as "inspired." There is a long history of unhelpful formulations of what that notion might mean. Without appealing to classical formulations that characteristically have more to do with "testing" the spirit (1 John 4:1) than with "not quenching" the spirit (1 Thess. 5:19), we may affirm that the force of God’s purpose. will and capacity for liberation, reconciliation and new life is everywhere in the biblical text. In such an affirmation, of course, we say more than we can understand, for the claim is precisely an acknowledgment that in and through this text, God’s wind blows through and past all our critical and confessional categories of reading and understanding. That powerful and enlivening force, moreover, pertains not simply to the ordaining of the text but to its transmission and interpretation among us.

The spirit will not be regimented, and therefore none of our reading is guaranteed to be inspired. But it does happen on occasion. It does happen that in and through the text we are blown beyond ourselves. It does happen that the spirit teaches, guides and heals through the text, so that the text yields something other than an echo of ourselves. It does happen that in prayer and study believers are led to what is "strange and new." It does happen that preachers are led to utterances beyond what they set out to make. It does happen that churches, in councils, sessions and other courts, are led beyond themselves, powered beyond prejudice, liberated beyond convention, overwhelmed by the capacity for new risks.

Importance. Biblical interpretation, done with imagination willing to risk ideological distortion, open to the inspiring spirit, is important. But it is important not because it might allow some to seize control of the church, but because it gives the world access to the good truth of the God who creates, redeems and consummates. That missional intention is urgent in every circumstance and season. The church at its most faithful has always understood that we read scripture for the sake of the church’s missional testimony.

But the reading of the Bible is now especially urgent because our society is sore tempted to reduce the human project to commodity. In its devotion to the making of money it reduces persons to objects and thins human communications to electronic icons. Technique in all its military modes and derivatively in every other mode threatens us, Technique is aimed at control, the fencing out of death, the fencing out of gift and, eventually, the fencing out of humanness.

Nonetheless, we in the church dare affirm that the lively word of scripture is the primal antidote to technique, the primal news that fends off trivialization. Thinning to control and trivializing to evade ambiguity are the major goals of our culture. The church in its disputatious anxiety is tempted to join the move to technique, to thin the Bible and make it one-dimensional, deeply tempted to trivialize the Bible by acting as though it is important because it may solve some disruptive social inconvenience. The dispute tends to reduce what is rich and dangerous in the book to knowable technique, and what is urgent and immense to exhaustible trivia.

The Bible is too important to be reduced in this way because the dangers of the world are too great and the expectations of God are too large. What if liberals and conservatives in the church, for all their disagreement, would together put their energies to upholding the main truth against the main threat? The issues before God’s creation (of which we are stewards) are immense; those issues shame us when our energy is deployed only to settle our anxieties. The biblical script insists that the world is not without God, not without the holy gift of life rooted in love. And yet we twitter! The Bible is a lamp and light to fend off the darkness, The darkness is real, and the light is for walking boldly, faithfully in a darkness we do not and cannot control. In this crisis, the church must consider what is entrusted peculiarly to us in this book.

Recently an Israeli journalist in Jerusalem commented on the fracturing dispute in Israel over who constitutes a real Jew, orthodox, conservative or reform. And he said about the dispute, "If any Jew wins, all Jews lose." Think about it: "If anyone wins, everyone loses."

Off By Nine Miles (Isaiah 60:1-7; Matthew 2:1-12)

Matthew is not the first one to imagine three rich wise guys from the East coming to Jerusalem. His story line and plot come from Isaiah 60, a poem recited to Jews in Jerusalem about 580 B.C.E. These Jews had been in exile in Iraq for a couple of generations and had come back to the bombed-out city of Jerusalem. They were in despair. Who wants to live in a city where the towers are torn down and the economy has failed, and nobody knows what to do about it?

In the middle of the mess, an amazing poet invites his depressed, discouraged contemporaries to look up, to hope and to expect everything to change. "Rise, shine, for your light has come." The poet anticipates that Jerusalem will become a beehive of productivity and prosperity, a new center of international trade. "Nations will come to your light, and kings to the brightness of your dawn. . ." Caravans loaded with trade goods will come from Asia and bring prosperity. This is cause for celebration. God has promised to make the city work effectively in peace, and a promise from God is very sure.

Like Matthew, the wise men know about Isaiah 60. They know they are to go to Jerusalem and to take rare spices, gold and frankincense and myrrh. Most important, they know that they will find the new king of all peace and prosperity. But when Herod (the current king in Jerusalem) hears of these plans, he is frightened. A new king is a threat to the old king and the old order.

Then a strange thing happens. In his panic, Herod arranges a consultation with the leading Old Testament scholars, and says to them, "Tell me about Isaiah 60. What is all this business about camels and gold and frankincense and myrrh?" The scholars tell him: You have the wrong text. And the wise men outside your window are using the wrong text. Isaiah 60 will mislead you because it suggests that Jerusalem will prosper and have great urban wealth and be restored as the center of the global economy. In that scenario, the urban elites can recover their former power and prestige and nothing will really change.

Herod does not like that verdict and asks, defiantly, "Well, do you have a better text?" The scholars are afraid of the angry king, but tell him, with much trepidation, that the right text is Micah 5:2-4:

But you, O Bethlehem of Ephrathah . . . from you shall come forth for me one who is to rule in Israel, whose origin is from of old . . .

This is the voice of a peasant hope for the future, a voice that is not impressed with high towers and great arenas, banks and urban achievements. It anticipates a different future, as yet unaccomplished, that will organize the peasant land in resistance to imperial threat. Micah anticipates a leader who will bring well-being to his people, not by great political ambition, but by attentiveness to the folks on the ground.

Herod tells the Eastern intellectuals the truth, and the rest is history. They head for Bethlehem, a rural place, dusty, unnoticed and unpretentious. It is, however, the proper milieu for the birth of the One who will offer an alternative to the arrogant learning of intellectuals and the arrogant power of urban rulers.

The narrative of Epiphany is the story of these two human communities: Jerusalem, with its great pretensions, and Bethlehem, with its modest promises. We can choose a "return to normalcy" in a triumphalist mode, a life of self-sufficiency that contains within it its own seeds of destruction. Or we can choose an alternative that comes in innocence and a hope that confounds our usual pretensions. We can receive life given in vulnerability. It is amazing -- the true accent of epiphany -- that the wise men do not resist this alternative but go on to the village. Rather than hesitate or resist, they reorganize their wealth and learning, and reorient themselves and their lives around a baby with no credentials.

Bethlehem is nine miles south of Jerusalem. The wise men had a long intellectual history of erudition and along-term practice of mastery. But they had missed their goal by nine miles. It is mind-boggling to think how the story might have gone had Herod’s interpreters not remembered Micah 2.

Our task is to let the vulnerability of Micah 2 disrupt the self-congratulation of Isaiah 60. Most of us are looking in the wrong place. We are off by nine miles. We are now invited to travel those hard, demanding miles away from self-sufficiency. Epiphany is a good time to take the journey, for September 11 reminds us of the shambles that can come through our excessive pretension. The way beyond is not about security and prosperity but about vulnerability, neighborliness, generosity, a modest future with spears turned into pruning hooks and swords into plowshares.

The wise men, and the eager nations ready for an alternative, made the trip. It would be ironic if the "outsiders" among us made that move and we who are God’s own people resisted. Imagine a nine-mile trip . . . and a very different way homey

The Bible as Scripture

Book Review:

Isaiah

By Brevard S. Childs. Westminster John Knox, 555 pp.



Since the publication of his Biblical Theology in Crisis in 1970, Brevard Childs (recently retired from Yale Divinity School) has pursued a single-minded interpretive agenda with passion and imagination: that the legitimate interpretation of the Bible is as the scripture of the church. Interpretation is to be done in the context of the faith of the church and in the service of its practice. In a variety of ways he has opposed the practice of "autonomous" interpretation outside the matrix of faith that is characteristic of the academic guild, which is preoccupied with historical questions, and which regards historical criticism as the goal and end of interpretation. From Childs’s perspective, the nature of the biblical material itself makes interpretation inescapably theological. It has as its subject the theological claims made in and through the text and received by the church.

While Childs’s claim is contentious, he has largely succeeded in changing the face of the interpretive project, and he has done so almost single-handedly. (His effort has been greatly abetted by the fact that in the 1970s, as he got under way, there was in Old Testament studies a widespread break away from historical criticism. That break was part of a larger loss of confidence in modernist certitude that was broadly based and no doubt sharply advanced by the failure of the "experts" concerning the Vietnam War. Thus Childs’s program is not without contextual connections, though he himself would minimize the impact of such a context.)

Childs has decisively altered the way in which interpreters like myself, who are situated in the church, do interpretation; moreover, even those who disagree with his perspective, sometimes vociferously, must struggle with the questions upon which he has insisted and the perspective he has legitimated by the power of his argument.

For his program in general Childs prefers the catch-all term "canonical," which, over time, has meant a variety of different things in his writing. But it has consistently meant that the biblical text is shaped with a theological intentionality that is deeply and intimately connected to the most elemental faith claims of the church. Childs has written a series of books, an impressive corpus, that has become discipline-defining. Each has been something of an experiment to see how the biblical material might be read afresh from a canonical perspective, even though Childs himself would eschew the term "experimentation."

It seemed evident to me in his Introduction to the Bible as Scripture in 1979 (wherein he considers the "canonical" shape of each book of the Old Testament) that the Book of Isaiah was his most successful probe. Isaiah’s expanse and complexity gave him working room for interpretation, and it lent itself peculiarly well to the dynamic of "old/new" that has been defining for Childs’s interpretive approach. The "old/new" for Childs is variously Old Testament -- New Testament, old text -- new redaction as interpretation, or historical-canonical.

In each case, Childs’s point is that in the biblical text one can see the canonical interpreters themselves reworking older material in order to make fresh, normative theological claims that move decisively beyond the locus of the early text. The Book of Isaiah, with its important divisions by biblical critics into "First, Second and Third Isaiah," especially lends itself to this argument. In the present volume, Childs continues that particular probe and moves in rich and suggestive directions.

Childs’s commentary is a remarkable achievement, nothing less than an intellectual tour de force. The reader needs to ponder what passion, resilience and steadfastness are required to keep a particular interpretive agenda always in view through such a long text, some of which is less than scintillating and some of which surely defies interpretation. Childs works through the text without ducking any of the difficult problems it presents and offers suggestive theological interpretations. He gives only slight attention to textual problems, so that the commentary has none of the marks of the older, forbidding commentaries that have the feel of a phone book.

In his erudition, Childs is, of course, fully engaged with the critical tradition of scholarship; his primary contemporary conversation partners are W. A. M. Beuken, Christopher Seitz, Marvin Sweeney and Hugh Williamson. In the end however, it is Childs’s own fresh perspective that claims attention, sometimes yielding sober analysis and sometimes (as in chapters 24-27) the soaring rhetoric of passionate exposition. Much of what the book offers is well-expressed consensus interpretation. Here and there one might quibble with a detail. But the sum total is stunning in its reach-ness to rethink the text and the faith to which it testifies.

Childs’s purpose, however, is not merely to offer yet another commentary, albeit an innovative and comprehensive one. Rather it is to call repeated and sustained attention to the interpretive process within the text whereby materials that can be located historically are transposed through a redactional process into canonical materials that are no longer connected in any primary way to their historical rootage, but to the total encompassment of the larger canonical text, and are to be interpreted not historically but canonically. Child’s procedure is to call attention to each text’s problematic, and in his exposition to show not only how the problematic may be resolved but how the problematic itself becomes a clue to faithful canonical interpretation. It is this recurring act of transposition that preoccupies the work and that constitutes a decisive gain, as the text is shown to be an intentional theological project.

In order to appreciate fully this programmatic accent, it is useful to cite Childs’s recurring insistence on it:

It is thus crucial that the interpretation not focus simply on the preliterary form of the text. To interpret this text as a historical vestige, moored in misguided hopes from Israel’s past, is to misunderstand the canonical forces at work in shaping the prophetic tradition into a corpus of scripture directed to Israel’s subsequent generations of faith.

Although accurate historical dating can at times be of exegetical significance, the crucial interpretive task lies in determining the narrative function to which such texts have been assigned, rather than in supplying a reconstructed setting apart from its present literary (canonical) context.

The proper role for the study of the diachronic dimensions of the text lies not in fragmenting or in replacing the synchronic level, but in using a recovery of a depth dimension for increasing an understanding of the theological substance that constitutes the biblical narrative itself. When an earlier generation used the term kerygmatic, it was expressing a similar concern.

Hermeneutically speaking it is crucial to understand how the major force in the shaping of the prophetic corpus derived from the experience by Israel of an ongoing encounter with God mediated through scripture rather than through the direct influence of allegedly independent events of world affairs. It is precisely this filtering process of scriptural reflection on the ways of Cod that gave a coherent meaning to the changing life of Israel in the world of human affairs.

The second point to make . . . turns on the theological role of the editors in shaping the biblical material to render it in light of the larger literary collection.

In sum, I would argue that the crucial interpretive problem of 56:1-8 lies in carefully distinguishing between the literary (canonical) function of the text and historical reconstructions developed according to a prior diachronic interpretation of its setting, dating, and postexilic addressee.

It is this transposition to the canonical that permits the text to have its free, recurring say in the Book of Isaiah and, consequently, in the faith of Israel and of the church.

Despite the power of this programmatic interpretation, it is nevertheless true, as Childs himself occasionally recognizes, that the matter is not so simple, and he cannot be done so readily with the "historical." Thus he can say of Isaiah 15-16 that "much of the difficulty of understanding this passage lies in the inability to establish its original historical setting." And in the complex narratives of Isaiah 36-39, he is at pains to insist upon historical rootage: "I shall defend the position that the speech of the Rabshekeh is not simply a free creation of the redactor and without any serious connection with the historical events of 701 but has an important element of historical verisimilitude. . . . And even in its redacted form the text is placed after 587, surely an historical judgment." Thus the narrative reflects "a genuine historical memory. As a consequence there "are certain restraints on Israel’s creative imagination." Chapter 39, moreover, is a "bridge" between Babylonian kings.

Indeed, Childs is quite aware of the danger of emitting off a text’s historical rooting so as to produce a "timeless" text, a critique to which his work has been subjected. "The importance of studying parallels lies in providing a check against isolating the Hebrew prophet from his specific historical context as if his text represented a timeless religious literature that floated above all historical particularity," he writes. "In sum, Isa. 53:2 ff. cannot be interpreted either as simply a future prophecy or as a timeless metaphor of the suffering nation of Israel." The linkage of historical and canonical is complicated, and Childs has not been able to resolve it. But what he has done is to legitimate and make clear the "canonical" side of this dialectic that has been absent from most "historical" studies.

The Christian reader of this commentary will be interested in the connections between Isaiah and the New Testament. On the whole, Childs is most restrained in making such connections and for the most part does so only when the text is explicit. On only two occasions does he offer an extended interpretation pointing toward the New Testament.

First, he provides a reflection on Isaiah 53 "Within a Canonical Context." There he is free to make explicit the Christian claim that Isaiah 53 was a text, "as authoritative scripture, that exercised pressure on the early church in its struggle to understand the suffering and death of Jesus Christ." One of Childs’s most helpful interpretations concerns the vexed issue of Isaiah 49:6, wherein the servant Israel seems to have a mission to Israel. Childs proposes that the faithful prophet "has been named servant, not to replace corporate Israel the servant in Second Isaiah remains inseparable from Israel -- but as a faithful embodiment of the nation Israel who has not preformed its chosen role." Thus the relation of servant to Israel is as ecclesiola in ecclesia.

Second, Childs offers a brief comment on the quotation of Isaiah 61 in Luke 4. He observes that in Luke’s usage, Isaiah 61 is "scripture’s foreshadowing of [Christ’s] entire earthly ministry," that the servant songs refer to the "entire mission of the servant, his life, death, and offspring," and not simply to his death. These particular cases exhibit the fine balance Childs practices as a passionate Christian interpreter and as a restrained exegete who listens attentively to the texts.

Childs’s book is an immense act of interpretive imagination. It is in this regard that I raise a query that does not detract at all from my profound appreciation for what he has wrought. The commentary is very much the scholarly accomplishment of an identifiable scholar, an imaginative interpreter who is present in this remarkable interpretation. Yet Childs sometimes -- I think too often -- proceeds as though his interpretive finesse were simply a "given" in the text itself (rather like the defense of Aaron, though in Childs’s case with a positive outcome. Aaron claimed simply that, when he threw the people’s gold into the fire, "out came this calf’). This tone tends to obscure the imaginative work of the interpreter, and gives the impression that the interpretation is beyond criticism, as though it were an unquestioned given in the text itself. It gives the interpretation itself something like canonical status. But Childs’s interpretations are not textual "givens," but are often based on certain critical, redactional judgments that are "made to stick" by the force of Childs’s assertion, and they are in the interest of sometimes rather explicit theological advocacy.

A case in point is Childs’s recurring use of the term "coercion," by which he apparently means that the text itself, in its deep authority, requires a certain exposition, redaction or reading. This is a curious usage on two counts; first it is a term that bespeaks harsh force, a connotation that I would not attribute to an authorizing evangelical text. And second, what Childs has found to be coercive -- that is, inescapably required -- has not been found so by many other theologically serious interpreters before him.

I respectfully suggest that the coercion is not on the part of the text itself, much as Childs might wish it to be, but on the part of the interpreter, who with passion matched by learning strains to establish the interpretive point beyond a shadow of doubt or reservation. That is, what the commentator marks as "coercive" is presented as a canonical claim, so that the imaginative force of the interpreter remains hidden. The inference from such a rhetorical usage may be that this is a final reading not to be questioned, a claim that Childs himself would make only in his moments of deepest passion.

The temptation of the "canonical" commentator to hide in the "canonical" text is moreover evident in Childs’s dismissal of perspectives other than his own. While he looks askance at historical interpretation per se, he is completely impatient with "sociological" interpretation, dismissive of "psychological" interpretation, alert to what is "ideological" and utterly contemptuous of what he terms "modern ‘politically correct’ formulation." The latter charge is leveled against interpretations that, to his mind, are excessively "inclusive," when the "canonical" makes clear that the "wicked" are not ever to be included.

Now Childs may be correct about misinformed sociological and psychological interpretation, and I make no defense of the cases he cites. What I wonder about is the characteristic assumption of the commentary that "theological" interpretation, as distinct from the psychological or sociological, is pure and innocent and, moreover, that this commentator work is completely free of such matters. I am unpersuaded. This commentator, like every commentator, is deeply set in a myriad of experiential forces that cannot be screened out simply by a resolve to do the "canonical," even as the ancient powers of canonization were not innocent and detached. As the text is not "timeless," for all of its theological intentionality, so every commentator produces work that is "timeful" and surely not disinterested. It is no derogation to notice that Childs’s commentary is not an innocent one, but is, like every serious commentary, a powerful advocacy against several implied adversaries.

The conclusion of the Book of Isaiah (66:23-24) is particularly noteworthy because the penultimate verse asserts in wondrous fashion that "all flesh shall come to worship me, whereas the final verse moves in the opposite direction of harsh judgment on those who rebel. Childs insists on verse 24 as a decisive clue for reading, whereas much interpretation and synagogue practice give the final word to verse 23. Of verse 24, Childs concludes: "The enemies of God in Third Isaiah are identified with those of every age -- thus the consistent appeal to the enemies of First Isaiah -- because they constitute an ontological opposition to God’s will."

The vigor of this verdict is noteworthy, because Childs seems to escalate the rhetoric even beyond that of the text itself by an introduction of the modifier "ontological." The use of the term is startling and seems to move in a Manichean direction. This term, together with Childs’s earlier-stated contempt for "politically correct" inclusiveness, suggests a profound rejection of those who stand outside the pale of a faith that is "canonical" and "coercive." In any case, after that rhetorical venture, Childs draws back to join traditional practice: "It is, therefore, not by chance that the book of Isaiah closes on this same note of judgment. Still, it is not wrong theologically when the synagogue chose to repeat the promise of 66:23 after v. 24 in order to bear testimony that the worship of the one true God by his faithful has the last word." But the harshness of the added modifier rings in one’s ears, because we cannot have it both ways as a final word, standing theologically with verse 23, canonically with verse 24.

For all his commitment to the faith and practice of the church, Childs has not written a commentary easily accessible to those working in the church. He has not intended to do so. His is more of a meta-commentary, concerned with elemental interpretive matters. But those who are willing to do the work that this commentary requires will be deeply rewarded. Pondering this commentary will stiffen the spine of the faithful for preaching, teaching, interpretation and life in the world.

How the Early Church Practiced Charity

Review: Poverty and Leadership in the Later Roman Empire, by Peter Brown, University Press of New England, 176 pp., also in paperback.



Upon receiving the Nobel Peace Prize, former president Jimmy Carter remarked that the "growing gap between the rich and poor" is the most elemental problem facing the world economy. But the gap between the rich and the poor is also a very old problem. Princeton historian Peter Brown takes up this issue of care for the poor as it was practiced in the fourth and fifth centuries of the Christian era.

As usual, Brown combines erudition with an elegant style and makes his argument readily accessible. His concern with the social location of poverty is part of his larger effort to understand the character of Christianity as it negotiated its place in a still durable classical culture. The interface of classical and Christian culture has its obvious pivot point in Augustine, of whom Brown has written a classic study

Brown begins by contrasting classical and Christian notions of care for society. In the former, euergesia (to do good) was a practice of the wealthy, who contributed to the well-being of society. Their giving was a much-celebrated civic virtue. But their contributions were given to an undifferentiated cultural system that made no social distinctions on the basis of need. Consequently, the poor were never visible.

Christians, on the other hand -- and especially bishops -- were charged to be "lovers of the poor," a category that comprised both those poor in fact ("deep poverty") and those who lived under the constant threat of poverty ("shallow poverty"). Such care constituted a major change in "social imagination," Brown says. "In a sense, it was the Christian bishops who invented the poor. They rose to leadership in late Roman society by bringing the poor into ever-sharper focus."

Brown does not oversimplify or sentimentalize the bishops’ achievement. He observes that with the conversion of Constantine, which made Christianity the official religion of the empire, bishops were invested with social significance and huge financial resources, and were obligated to give evidence of a responsible use of this entitlement. "The clergy could be called to account by the state if they failed to make use of their privileges for the benefit of the poor." As a consequence, the bishops funded hospitals and houses of care that were concerned especially with the poor.

Brown observes that the main body of the church was made up of "middling persons" who were not wealthy but who made modest but steady contributions to the church’s support of the poor. This means of funding was quite a contrast to the classical pattern of the wealthy giving large gifts. The church also had to make an effort to support and sustain this "middling" constituency, which itself was always under the threat of falling into poverty.

The sustained effort to care for the poor that came to characterize the church is derived, Brown suggests, from "an ancient Near Eastern model of justice" mediated through the church’s liturgical use of the Old Testament. The Old Testament tradition accented the legitimate "cry" of the poor that elicited a response of "justice" from the powerful.

Brown appeals particularly to the word play of Isaiah 5:7: the monumental clarity and poetic elegance of the juxtaposition of the term z’daqah, "the cry," with its remedy, ze ‘aqah, "justice." This was not lost on the great Hebraist, Saint Jerome. The movement from "cry" to "justice" conveyed a~ ethos of justice -- firm, paternal and mercifully swift -- that appealed to many humble late Roman people who found themselves living in a postclassical world in which Old Testament conditions reigned.

"I would suggest that an almost subliminal reception of the Hebrew Bible, through the chanting of the Psalms and through the solemn injunctions of the bishop in connection with the episcopalis audientia, came to offer a meaning to the word pauper very different from the ‘pauperized’ image of the merely ‘economic’ poor. The pauper was a person with a claim upon the great. As with the poor of Israel, those who used the court of the bishop and attended his church also expected to call upon him, in time of need, for justice and protection," Brown writes.

As the bishops developed ways to make this concern front and center in the church, a passion for the poor began to "seep out of the churches" into the horizons and practices of the empire. The language of cry-justice "added a novel tincture to the language of public relations. It became a language that was increasingly found to be apposite to describe the quality of the relation of the emperor to his subjects, and of the weak to the powerful." Thus over time the advocacy of the church began to redefine relationships between the wealthy and the poor, the powerful and the powerless, well beyond the confines of the church.

In his final chapter Brown observes that the growing appreciation of the legitimacy of the cry of the poor created a social awareness that the powerful were obligated to provide justice and protection for the poor. Through the work of the bishops the poor were given a voice that created "an advocacy revolution" and eventually a "culture of criticism." Brown observes that "the squeaky wheel gets the grease." Through the church, the neediest were given permission to squeak!

This rhetorical revolution not only redefined the relationship of the rich and the poor, it also redefined the relationship of the believer to God. God could be addressed with urgent petitions as a matter of right.

Brown delighted this reviewer with his appreciation of the Psalter and would delight any right-minded Calvinist with his appreciation of Karl Barth’s statement in Church Dogmatics IV, 2: as a poor man, writes Barth, Christ "shares as such the strange destiny which falls on God in His people and the world -- to be the One who is ignored and forgotten and despised and discounted by men.

Brown finishes with a remarkable discussion of the Christology of Nestorius and Cyril of Alexandria in their effort to sort out both the distance and solidarity between the Father and Son by comparing it to the distance between God and believer and between rich and poor. The accent is upon solidarity. Brown argues that the rhetorical revolution that legitimated the cry of the needy transformed all relationships away from earlier modes in which the poor were mute and invisible.

The church still has a chance to employ such rhetoric in a technological society that wants to deny a voice to all those who live "outside the program." Brown does not make any "contemporary extrapolation" from his study, and we should not expect a disciplined historian to do so. In his final two sentences, however, he recognizes the contemporary urgency that is intrinsic to his argument: "The hope of solidarity itself, and the recognition of its attendant burdens, still weighs upon us today It has remained a fragile aspiration, as much in need of condensation into symbolic forms of requisite density and imaginative power as it ever was in the fourth, fifth, and sixth centuries of the Common Era."

Of course, the interface of Christianity with classical culture is very different from the church’s interface with the current U.S. economic-military hegemony and the shameless power of the market to damage human communities. Yet the parallels are suggestive enough that we might consider the accomplishment of those ancient bishops as instructive for the contemporary church.

Those who champion an undifferentiated "market society" shrilly shout "class war" if one suggests that the poor are a distinct social presence. If the poor can remain unrecognized, then no special effort on their behalf is required. I imagine that the practitioners of the old civic virtue of euergesia thought the same thing. But the Christian bishops, fed by the rhetoric of the Psalter, insisted upon a differentiation that denied the illusion of social cohesion.

The contemporary church has important allies in its attentiveness to the poor -- allies like Derek Bok, who in The Trouble with Government gives us statistics that make the plight of the poor inescapably vivid. He reminds us, for example, that "5.3 million households in 1995 consisted of ‘very low-income renters’ who received no federal housing assistance and either lived in severely substandard housing or paid half or more of their reported income for rent." Or like Lewis H. Lapham, who in the December 2002 issue of Harper’s points out that the "grotesque maldistribution of the country’s wealth over the last 30 years has brought forth a class system fully outfitted with the traditional accessories of complacence, stupidity and pride."

Most poignantly, in her report on her firsthand experience with systemic poverty, Nickel and Dimed: On (Not) Getting By in America, Barbara Ehrenreich makes us see "poverty as acute distress: The lunch that consists of Doritos or hot dog rolls, leading to faintness before the end of the shift. The ‘home’ that is also a car or a van. The illness or injury that must be ‘worked through,’ with gritted teeth, because there’s no sick pay or health insurance and the loss of one day’s pay will mean no groceries for the next."

Ehrenreich writes that the appropriate emotional response to systemic poverty "is shame -- shame at our own dependency, in this case, on the underpaid labor of others. When someone works for less pay than she can live on -- when, for example, she goes hungry so that you can eat more cheaply and conveniently -- then she has made a great sacrifice for you, she has made you a gift of some part of her abilities, her health and her life. The ‘working poor,’ as they are approvingly termed, are in fact the major philanthropists of our society."

In addition to paying attention to such allies, the church can also follow the lead of the ancient bishops by accomplishing a revolution in rhetoric. In a linguistically flat technological society the church can return to the "mother tongue" of scriptural poetry and prayer, through which we learn to hear the cry of the needy and to understand that they must receive justice. To do so requires liberals to quit speaking and reasoning like social scientists. It requires conservatives to quit appealing to philosophic certitudes. It invites conservatives and liberals together to reembrace the dangerous rhetoric of covenantal interaction.

For all of the new imperial social entitlements they received, the ancient bishops -- even with mixed motives -- insisted on being who they were: teachers of the gospel. They could not and did not evade the imaginative alternative of gospel truth. And they demonstrated how the primal language of the church could perform as a public language.

The Liturgy of Abundance, The Myth of Scarcity

The majority of the world's resources pour into the United States. And as we Americans grow more and more wealthy, money is becoming a kind of narcotic for us. We hardly notice our own prosperity or the poverty of so many others. The great contradiction is that we have more and more money and less and less generosity -- less and less public money for the needy, less charity for the neighbor.

Robert Wuthnow, sociologist of religion at Princeton University, has studied stewardship in the church and discovered that preachers do a good job of promoting stewardship. They study it, think about it, explain it well. But folks don't get it. Though many of us are well intentioned, we have invested our lives in consumerism. We have a love affair with "more" -- and we will never have enough. Consumerism is not simply a marketing strategy. It has become a demonic spiritual force among us, and the theological question facing us is whether the gospel has the power to help us withstand it.

The Bible starts out with a liturgy of abundance. Genesis I is a song of praise for God's generosity. It tells how well the world is ordered. It keeps saying, "It is good, it is good, it is good, it is very good." It declares that God blesses -- that is, endows with vitality -- the plants and the animals and the fish and the birds and humankind. And it pictures the creator as saying, "Be fruitful and multiply." In an orgy of fruitfulness, everything in its kind is to multiply the overflowing goodness that pours from God's creator spirit. And as you know, the creation ends in Sabbath. God is so overrun with fruitfulness that God says, "I've got to take a break from all this. I've got to get out of the office."

And Israel celebrates God's abundance. Psalm 104, the longest creation poem, is a commentary on Genesis I. The psalmist surveys creation and names it all: the heavens and the earth, the waters and springs and streams and trees and birds and goats and wine and oil and bread and people and lions. This goes on for 23 verses and ends in the 24th with the psalmist's expression of awe and praise for God and God's creation. Verses 27 and 28 are something like a table prayer. They proclaim, "You give them all food in due season, you feed everybody." The psalm ends by picturing God as a great respirator. It says, "If you give your breath the world will live; if you ever stop breathing, the world will die." But the psalm makes clear that we don't need to worry. God is utterly, utterly reliable. The fruitfulness of the world is guaranteed.

Psalm 150, the last psalm in the book, is an exuberant expression of amazement at God's goodness. It just says, "Praise Yahweh, praise Yahweh with lute, praise Yahweh with trumpet, praise, praise, praise." Together, these three scriptures proclaim that God's force of life is loose in the world. Genesis 1 affirms generosity and denies scarcity. Psalm 104 celebrates the buoyancy of creation and rejects anxiety. Psalm 150 enacts abandoning oneself to God and letting go of the need to have anything under control.

Later in Genesis God blesses Abraham, Sarah and their family. God tells them to be a blessing, to bless the people of all nations. Blessing is the force of well-being active in the world, and faith is the awareness that creation is the gift that keeps on giving. That awareness dominates Genesis until its 47th chapter. In that chapter Pharaoh dreams that there will be a famine in the land. famine in the land. So Pharaoh gets organized to administer, control and monopolize the food supply. Pharaoh introduces the principle of scarcity into the world economy. For the first time in the Bible, someone says, "There's not enough. Let's get everything."

Martin Nieimoller, the German pastor who heroically opposed Adolf Hitler, was a young man when, as part of a delegation of leaders of the Evangelical Lutheran Church, he met with Hitler in 1933. Niemoller stood at the back of the room and looked and listened. He didn't say anything. When he went home, his wife asked him what he had learned that day. Niemöller replied, "I discovered that Herr Hitler is a terribly frightened man."

Because Pharaoh, like Hitler after him, is afraid that there aren't enough good things to go around, he must try to have them all. Because he is fearful, he is ruthless. Pharaoh hires Joseph to manage the monopoly. When the crops fail and the peasants run out of food, they come to Joseph. And on behalf of Pharaoh, Joseph says, "What's your collateral?" They give up their land for food, and then, the next year, they give up their cattle. By the third year of the famine they have no collateral but themselves. And that's how the children of Israel become slaves -- through an economic transaction.

By the end of Genesis 47 Pharaoh has all the land except that belonging to the priests, which he never touches because he needs somebody to bless him. The notion of scarcity has been introduced into biblical faith. The Book of Exodus records the contest between the liturgy of generosity and the myth of scarcity -- a contest that still tears us apart today

The promises of the creation story continue to operate in the lives of the children of Israel. Even in captivity, the people multiply. By the end of Exodus 1 Pharaoh decides that they have become so numerous that he doesn't want any more Hebrew babies to be born. He tells the two midwives, Shiphrah and Puah (though we don't know Pharaoh's name, we know theirs), to kill all the newborn boys. But they don't, and the Hebrew babies just keep popping out.

By the end of Exodus, Pharaoh has been as mean, brutal and ugly as he knows how to be -- and as the myth of scarcity tends to be. Finally' he becomes so exasperated by his inability to control the people of Israel that he calls Moses and Aaron to come to him. Pharaoh tells them, "Take your people and leave. Take your flocks and herds and just get out of here!" And then the great king of Egypt, who presides over a monopoly of the region's resources, asks Moses and Aaron to bless him. The powers of scarcity admit to this little community of abundance, "It is clear that you are the wave of the future. So before you leave, lay your powerful hands upon us and give us energy." The text shows that the power of the future is not in the hands of those who believe in scarcity and monopolize the world's resources; it is in the hands of those who trust God's abundance.

When the children of Israel of Israel are in the wilderness, beyond the reach of Egypt, they still look back and think, "Should we really go? All the world's glory is in Egypt and with Pharaoh." But when they finally turn around and look into the wilderness, where there are no monopolies, they see the glory of Yahweh.

In answer to the people's fears and complaints, something extraordinary happens. God's love comes trickling down in the form of bread. They say, "Manhue?" -- Hebrew for "What is it?" -- and the word "manna" is born. They had never before received bread as a free gift that they couldn't control, predict, plan for or own. The meaning of this strange narrative is that the gifts of life are indeed given by a generous God. It's a wonder, it's a miracle, it's an embarrassment, it's irrational, but God's abundance transcends the market economy.

Three things happened to this bread in Exodus 16. First, everybody had enough. But because Israel had learned to believe in scarcity in Egypt, people started to hoard the bread. When they tried to bank it, to invest it, it turned sour and rotted, because you cannot store up God's generosity. Finally, Moses said, "You know what we ought to do? We ought to do what God did in Genesis I. We ought to have a Sabbath." Sabbath means that there's enough bread, that we don't have to hustle every day of our lives. There's no record that Pharaoh ever took a day off. People who think their lives consist of struggling to get more and more can never slow down because they won't ever have enough.

When the people of Israel cross the Jordan River into the promised land the manna stops coming. Now they can and will have to grow their food. Very soon Israel suffers a terrible defeat in battle and Joshua conducts an investigation to find out who or what undermined the war effort. He finally traces their defeat to a man called A'chan, who stole some of the spoils of battle and withheld them from the community. Possessing land, property and wealth makes people covetous, the Bible warns.

We who are now the richest nation are today's main coveters. We never feel that we have enough; we have to have more and more, and this insatiable desire destroys us. Whether we are liberal or conservative Christians, we must confess that the central problem of our lives is that we are torn apart by the conflict between our attraction to the good news of God's abundance and the power of our belief in scarcity -- a belief that makes us greedy, mean and unneighborly. We spend our lives trying to sort out that ambiguity.

The conflict between the narratives of abundance and of scarcity is the defining problem confronting us at the turn of the millennium. The gospel story of abundance asserts that we originated in the magnificent, inexplicable love of a God who loved the world into generous being. The baptismal service declares that each of us has been miraculously loved into existence by God. And the story of abundance says that our lives will end in God, and that this well-being cannot be taken from us. In the words of St. Paul, neither life nor death nor angels nor principalities nor things -- nothing can separate us from God.

What we know about our beginnings and our endings, then, creates a different kind of present tense for us. We can live according to an ethic whereby we are not driven, controlled, anxious, frantic or greedy, precisely because we are sufficiently at home and at peace to care about others as we have been cared for.

But if you are like me, while you read the Bible you keep looking over at the screen to see how the market is doing. If you are like me, you read the Bible on a good day, but you watch Nike ads every day. And the Nike story says that our beginnings are in our achievements, and that we must create ourselves. My wife and I have some young friends who have a four-year-old son. Recently the mother told us that she was about to make a crucial decision. She had to get her son into the right kindergarten because if she didn't, then he wouldn't get into the right prep school. And that would mean not being able to get into Davidson College. And if he didn't go to school there he wouldn't be connected to the bankers in Charlotte and be able to get the kind of job where he would make a lot of money. Our friends' story is a kind of a parable of our notion that we must position ourselves because we must achieve, and build our own lives.

According to the Nike story, whoever has the most shoes when he dies wins. The Nike story says there are no gifts to be given because there's no giver. We end up only with whatever we manage to get for ourselves. This story ends in despair. It gives us a present tense of anxiety, fear, greed and brutality. It produces child and wife abuse, indifference to the poor, the buildup of armaments, divisions between people, and environmental racism. It tells us not to care about anyone but ourselves -- and it is the prevailing creed of American society

Wouldn't it be wonderful if liberal and conservative church people, who love to quarrel with each other, came to a common realization that the real issue confronting us is whether the news of God's abundance can be trusted in the face of the story of scarcity? What we know in the secret recesses of our hearts is that the story of scarcity is a tale of death. And the people of God counter this tale by witnessing to the manna. There is a more excellent bread than crass materialism. It is the bread of life and you don't have to bake it. As we walk into the new millennium, we must decide where our trust is placed.

The great question now facing the church is whether our faith allows us to live in a new way. If we choose the story of death, we will lose the land -- to excessive chemical fertilizer, or by pumping out the water table for irrigation, perhaps. Or maybe we'll only lose it at night, as going out after dark becomes more and more dangerous.

Joshua 24 puts the choice before us. Joshua begins by reciting the story of God's generosity, and he concludes by saying, "I don't know about you, but I and my house will choose the Lord." This is not a church-growth text. Joshua warns the people that this choice will bring them a bunch of trouble. If they want to be in on the story of abundance, they must put away their foreign gods -- I would identify them as the gods of scarcity.

Jesus said it more succinctly. You cannot serve God and mammon. You cannot serve God and do what you please with your money or your sex or your land. And then he says, "Don't be anxious, because everything you need will be given to you." But you must decide. Christians have a long history of trying to squeeze Jesus out of public life and reduce him to a private little Savior. But to do this is to ignore what the Bible really says. Jesus talks a great deal about the kingdom of God -- and what he means by that is a public life reorganized toward neighborliness.

As a little child Jesus must often have heard his mother, Mary, singing. And as we know, the sang a revolutionary song, the Magnificat--the anthem of Luke's Gospel. She sang about neighborliness: about how God brings down the mighty from their thrones and lifts up the lowly; about how God fills the hungry with good things and sends the rich away empty. Mary did not make up this dangerous song. She took it from another mother, Hannah, who sang it much earlier to little Samuel, who became one of ancient Israel's greatest revolutionaries. Hannah, Mary, and their little boys imagined a great social transformation. Jesus enacted his mother's song well. Everywhere he went he broke the vicious cycles of poverty, bondage, fear and death; he healed, transformed, empowered and brought new life. Jesus' example gives us the mandate to transform our public life.

Telling parables was one of Jesus' revolutionary activities, for parables are subversive re-imagining of reality. The ideology devoted to encouraging consumption wants to shrivel our imaginations so that we cannot conceive of living in any way that would be less profitable for the dominant corporate structures. But Jesus tells us that we can change the world. The Christian community performs a vital service by keeping the parables alive. These stories haunt us and push us in directions we never thought we would go.

Performing what the Bible calls "wonders and signs" was another way in which Jesus enacted his mother's song. These signs--or miracles--may seem odd to us, but in fact they are the typical gifts we receive when the world gets organized and placed under the sovereignty of God. Everywhere Jesus goes the world is rearrange: the blind receive their sight, the lame walk, the lepers are cleansed, the deaf hear, the dead are raised, and the poor are freed from debt. The forgiveness of debts is the hardest thing to do--harder even than raising the dead to life. Jesus left ordinary people dazzled, amazed, and grateful; he left powerful people angry and upset, because very time he performed a wonder, they lost a little of their clout. The wonders of the new age of the coming of God's kingdom may scandalize and upset us. They dazzle us, but they also make us nervous. The people of God need pastoral help in processing this ambivalent sense of both deeply yearning for God's new creation and deeply fearing it.

The feeding of the multitudes, recorded in Mark's Gospel, is an example of the new world coming into being through God. When the disciples, charged with feeding the hungry crowd, found a child with five loaves and two fishes, Jesus took, blessed ,broke and gave the bread. These are the four decisive verbs of our sacramental existence. Jesus conducted a Eucharist, a gratitude. He demonstrated that the world is filled with abundance and freighted with generosity. If bread is broken and shared, there is enough for all. Jesus is engaged in the sacramental, subversive reordering of public reality.

The profane is the opposite of the sacramental. "Profane" means flat, empty, one-dimensional, exhausted. The market ideology wants us to believe that the world is profane--life consists of buying and selling, weighing, measuring and trading, and then finally sinking down into death and nothingness. But Jesus presents and entirely different kind of economy, one infused with the mystery of abundance and a cruciform kind of generosity. Five thousand are fed and 12 baskets of food are left over--one for every tribe of Israel. Jesus transforms the economy by blessing it and breaking it beyond self-interest. From broken Friday bread comes Sunday abundance. In this and in the following account of a miraculous feeding in Mark, people do not grasp, hoard, resent, or act selfishly; they watch as the juices of heaven multiply the bread of earth. Jesus reaffirms Genesis 1.

When people forget that Jesus is the bread of the world, they start eating junk food--the food of the Pharisees and of Herod, the bread of moralism and of power. To often the church forgets the true bread and is tempted by junk food. Our faith is not just about spiritual matters; it is about the transformation of the world. The closer we stay to Jesus, the more we will bring a new economy of abundance to the world. The disciples often don't get what Jesus is about because they keep trying to fit him into old patterns--and to do so it to make him innocuous, irrelevant and boring. But Paul gets it.

In 2 Corinthians 8, Paul directs a stewardship campaign for the early church and presents Jesus as the new economist. Though Jesus was rich, Paul says, "yet for your sakes he became poor, that by his poverty you might become rich." We say it take money to make money. Paul says it takes poverty to produce abundance. Jesus gave himself to enrich others, and we should do the same. Our abundance and the poverty of others need to be brought into a new balance. Paul ends his stewardship letter by quoting Exodus 16: "And the one who had much did not have too much, and the one who had little did not have too little." The citation is from the story of the manna that transformed the wilderness into abundancy.

It is, of course, easier to talk about these things than to live them. Many people both inside and outside of the church haven't a clue that Jesus is talking about the economy. We haven't taught them that he is. But we must begin to do so now, no matter how economically compromised we may feel. Our world absolutely requires this news. It has nothing to do with being Republicans or Democrats, liberals or conservatives, socialists or capitalists. It is much more elemental: the creation is infused with the Creator's generosity, and we can find practices, procedures and institutions that allow that generosity to work. Like the rich young man in Mark 10, we all have many possessions. Sharing our abundance may, as Jesus says, be impossible for mortals, but nothing is impossible for God. None of us knows what risks God's spirit may empower us to take. Our faith, ministry and hope at the turn of the millennium are that the Creator will empower us to trust his generosity, so that bread may abound.

Theological Education: Healing the Blind Beggar

Mark 10:46-52 records a standard healing miracle. There is a person in need who comes to Jesus. Jesus acts and the person is healed. We may be jaded enough not to believe in the story, or else so familiar with it that we don’t notice what is going on. It is, however, a story that has much to tell us about what it is that theological education should be helping the churches to do.

We should first notice that the man is described as "a blind beggar." That is an interesting juxtaposition. He has a physical ailment -- he wants his sight back -- but he is also a beggar. I wonder about the relation between his blindness and his status as a beggar. Perhaps he was blind and therefore could not get an education and could not work, and so he ended up as a beggar. Perhaps. But there are blind people who do not end up as beggars. Perhaps, because he was a beggar, he never had access to nutritious food or to health care, and so became blind. The cause-and-effect relationship between the man’s poverty and his blindness is difficult to determine. It may be enough simply to note that physical ailments often accompany poverty and powerlessness. When one quits caring and hoping for things, one often gives up on physical well-being as well.

The social location of the man looms larger in the narrative than we may at first recognize. For the story does not simply concern the blind beggar and Jesus. There is a third actor: "many of the people." They are a nameless, faceless mass. We might say that they represent public opinion or peer pressure. I do not know what they have to do with the man’s blindness, but surely they have something to do with his status as a beggar. It is in relation to them that he is a beggar. They have established the norm which categorizes him as such.

The odd action of "many of the people" draws our attention to them. The text says, "They told him to hold his tongue." They wanted the beggar silenced. The people’s effort to silence the blind beggar reflects their wish to keep him a beggar -- dependent and blind. If the man were healed, if he were to shake off his powerlessness, he would begin to demand food and care. Eventually he would enter the job market and perhaps even reclaim the patrimony that he had lost. If he were to do that, it might mean that someone else would lose status. The blind beggar’s silence, on the other hand, would ensure that the status quo would be maintained. In a similar way, in every society, powerful institutions -- churches, schools, courts, hospitals -- serve to keep people in their designated slots.

The action in the story is begun by the blind beggar: "He cried out." He turns out to know more and trust more and ask more than the people expected from a blind beggar. First, he addresses Jesus with a christological title: ‘Son of David." He knows it is "Messiah time," the time when the blind see and the poor have their debts canceled and beggars become citizens again (cf. Luke 7:22-23) Who would have thought that a blind beggar would know it was this time? Second, he dares to issue an imperative. He asks that the power of the powerful one (Jesus) be given to one who has no claim except the courage to cry out. The blind beggar names and entreats Jesus. The people rebuke him, but he asks again. He will not be dismissed. He gains his voice from his hope and belief that Jesus is the Messiah. He had waited long enough for the promises which God had made even to blind beggars. God now needs to be enjoined to keep those promises.

The people do not want to concede that it is the time for fulfillment. They have an interest in postponing that time, because it would mean sharing power with beggars and being surrounded by more people who speak out and make claims.

The beggar does not speak in vain. Jesus says, "What do you want me to do?" The beggar has been heard. The beggar’s response to Jesus is terse and unambiguous: "I want my sight back." I want to be whole. I want access to public life. If I get my eyes, I will quit this begging. I want my dependency to end. I am entitled to more. And I will have it.

Jesus’ response is quick and simple. "Go, your faith has cured you." His faith has done it. His faith is an act of hope which refuses to settle for the status quo: "Faith is the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen" (Heb. 11:1) This blind man’s only resource was things hoped for, things not seen, and such faith gave him sight. Faith is an overt act of self-assertion by which the man knows he is entitled to healing. In asserting his faith, the beggar performs an act of subversion; he violates all the conventions and steps out of his assigned role. Faith is the courage to speak, to announce for oneself a new possibility.

This emphasis on the beggar’s act may sound like auto-therapy, as if it is the beggar who heals himself. But, of course, this healing happens only with Jesus as the partner in dialogue. The narrative makes this point in a quite understated way. It is the key presence of Jesus, the name of Jesus, that evokes the hope and that gives the beggar the nerve and the occasion to speak (v. 47). The outcome, in spite of the resistant crowd, is that the beggar receives his sight. Then, we are told, "He followed him." The beggar becomes a disciple, committed to a new life of obedience. This healing does not just allow the man to do his own thing. His new health binds him to his healer.

The meaning of this healing narrative can be summarized this way:

1. The man’s illness reflects a powerlessness in society that leads to economic disadvantage and physical liability (the two tending to go together)

2. The community wishes to perpetuate the man’s powerlessness by forcing him to be silent.

3. Hope leads the man to speak out, which is an act of social subversion.

4. It is the availability of Jesus as a committed partner in dialogue that permits healing to take place. In that dialogue, there is power to transform life. And the unreported result of that transformation is that the community’s life is transformed as well.

What does all this have to do with theological education? I suggest these four points correspond directly to four crucial areas of need in theological education.

1. Theological education that promises healing and liberation must have the sociological imagination (in C. Wright Mills’s term) to see that healing is mediated through social processes and social structures. Religion is never simply about "me and Jesus." It is also never simply a matter of psychology, as if problems are just in one’s psyche or have to do only with one’s self-understanding. Blindness is related to being a beggar, and one is always a beggar in a social context. Theological education in America must overcome its sociological indifference and naïveté. A massive investment in social criticism is needed in the American church, for it is the structures of our society and institutions, wittingly or not, that define people as beggars and that render them blind. In short, theological education must teach students to read Marx as discerningly as they now read Freud.

2. Theological education that promises healing and liberation must face the fact that a key issue in healing, salvation and liberation is power. The key transaction in the healing narrative is the seizure of power by the blind beggar. The question of power has been kept off the table in recent times by a religiousness that emphasizes a personal, psychological quest for happiness, comfort or meaning. But this gospel narrative does not lie. It insists that raising the power issue and jeopardizing the power monopoly of the many are essential to the process of healing. In ministry, the issues of who has power and how it is held, shaped or monopolized are crucial. Those who are kept powerless will not be healed; they will remain beggars.

3. Theological education that promises healing and liberation must recognize that the first step in gaining power is bringing things to speech. The key turn in the narrative is when the blind beggar is able to speak of his pain. The first marvel of the story is that the beggar, rather than be silenced, cries out in pain and hope for the messianic reality.

We face a crisis of speech in our time. (I do not say "language," with which scholarship is now fascinated, for I refer here to the act of speaking, not the structure of language -- parole, not langue.) The crisis of contemporary speech is caused by the silence of those who are on the margins of society. It is also caused by speech that, warped by the modes of technology, involves an exchange of information but does not personally address another person ("Son of David") or announce something about oneself ("have mercy on me") Where there is neither address nor announcement, there will never be healing, salvation or liberation. History moves and life is transformed when the powerless get speech. We need, therefore, in all our institutions, to be asking: Who has speech? Who does the talking? Who does the decisive speaking?

Theological education has been peculiarly entrusted with the treasure of serious speech, of address and announcement. In the scriptural tradition which authorizes us, it is the speech of the poor that begins history (cf. Exod. 2:23-25) In preaching and liturgy it is the speech of the "little ones" that releases transforming energy.

4. Theological education that promises healing and liberation must be unashamedly christological. The healing narrative in Mark is clearly about Jesus. Without Jesus there would be no story to interest us, even as there would be no chance for healing. It is only in the presence of Jesus that the blind beggar is able to seize power.

In recent years we have been fascinated by the models of health defined by Freud, by Eastern religion, by technology, by philosophy. Our situation now is like that of the beggar: the other cures have failed. The cry to the Son of David is the last and only hope.

A christological focus in theological education does not mean using slogans or invoking a magical name. Rather, it refers to the disclosure of truth, given in the crucifixion and resurrection, about where the power of life comes from. The power of life does not come from the usual sources administered by society, nor from any special "gnosis" among us, but only from the news of God’s sovereignty and graciousness and in acts of self-abandonment and obedience. Our culture nurtures us in different truths and tempts us with other disclosures, but the blind beggar shows us that there is only one way to life.

Theological education, then, requires attention to all the factors that we find in the story of the blind beggar. It requires realism about social conditions; awareness of the issues of power and powerlessness; concern to allow those who have been silent to speak; and an emphasis on the centrality of Jesus. Out of all of that comes wholeness. We are not told exactly how wholeness comes, but the concluding message is: "Your faith has cured you."

We are invited by this narrative to relearn the healing process as it is given to us in evangelical faith. (I use the word "evangelical" in its proper sense as the adjectival form of "gospel," and not with all the unfortunate contemporary distortions of the term.) We need to relearn that process, for it is different from a magical conversion, and does not rely on technical solutions alone, as if it were no different from fixing a lawn mower.

Excessive fascination with technical healing is dangerous because it only increases the monopoly of power and drives beggars into deeper blindness. The hard issues in healing and in education are not technical but political.

Alternatives to technical healing which are preoccupied with the self are also to be handled gingerly, because we do not contain within us the power for life. Pastoral healing, messianic healing, has to do with the formation of a community of joy and obedience.

We are -- all of us -- blind beggars, with genuine hurts and handicaps. We are -- all of us -- part of the crowd, and we try to silence the groans of others because they are a threat to our position. All of us stammer for speech, and all of us wonder if we have the nerve to voice our hope in the Messiah. All of us imagine that we know what time it is, but we are not sure.

It is time for theological education to notice the categories of healing that are offered in Mark 10:46-52.

The issue before theological education is whether it will overcome its own vested interests and learn the healing process revealed by Jesus. Without that process, beggars will remain blind and the blind are sure to remain beggars. But new power and fresh possibility are offered wherever Jesus is Lord.