The Global Economy and its Theoretical Justification

I. The International Economy

In one sense, there has been a global economy for a long time. For thousands of years caravans carried goods between China and Europe. There are indications of connections in very ancient times between the Eastern and the Western Hemispheres. Nevertheless, these trade connections played a very small role in the economies of the trading partners.

The colonial expansion of Europe beginning in the fifteenth century changed that. Trade connections between Europe and many other parts of the world became important both to the colonial powers and to the colonized peoples. Needless to say, the relationship was highly exploitative, and the horrors inflicted on the colonized have left deep scars in much of the world.

Even so, this was not a truly global economy in the contemporary sense. I do not mean simply that some parts of the world were not involved. My point is that, although most of the globe was involved, the various colonial systems, such as the French and British Empires, were significantly separate from one another. For example, the British encouraged free trade within their empire and among their dominions, but they restricted trade between this whole system and outsiders.

This colonial system collapsed during and after World War II. A new system was created at Bretton Woods, embodied in the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the beginnings of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, which has now developed into the World Trade Organization. The European colonial powers had been so weakened by the war that they could not resist the insistence of the United States that their colonies and former colonies be freed to trade across imperial boundaries.

The new system, however, was still not a global economy. I do not mean simply that the world was divided into two quite separate systems, the capitalist and the communist. I mean that both world systems remained international in character. Although trade among nations was strongly encouraged, all those involved at Bretton Woods still envisioned that this trade would be among nations, each of which would have its own national economy.

Because many believed that disruptions in international trade had caused, or at least worsened, the Great Depression of the thirties, they created instruments to reduce the likelihood of a recurrence. The IMF was designed to help nations deal with temporary financial problems that made them unable to pay for needed imports. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade was to provide a place where unnecessary barriers to trade could be gradually reduced. The World Bank was to help in the reconstruction of Europe and the economic development of the newly independent former colonies.

For the first decade or so after the war, none of these institutions played a significant role. The reconstruction of Europe was aided much more by the U.S. Marshall Plan than by the World Bank. The developing countries depended on advice, investments, loans, and grants more from former colonial powers than on the international financial institutions. Matters of tariffs and trade were decided by individual countries in terms of their own interests more than by international agreements.

The World Bank was forbidden by its charter to interfere in the internal affairs of the nations to which it made loans. However, it began to work with national governments to develop economic plans for their countries. It also created infrastructures within countries, which it could directly fund and support. Its goal was to lend money to governments or to government-supported institutions for projects that would be sufficiently profitable that the loan could be repaid and the national economy enriched.

Much development during this period was through government operated projects and government-controlled industries. Most developing countries opted for a mixed economy. Many favored import-substitution industries, seeking to become more self-sufficient economically.

The results of this system were, of course, mixed. Most countries did increase their per capita income. International trade grew. But improvement was slow. In most countries, poverty was not greatly reduced. Furthermore, it became clear that many of the loans could not be repaid out of earnings from the investments they made possible. Partly this was due to poor planning, but much of it was due to corruption and the diversion of funds to military purposes. By 1970, the World Bank calculated, if loans continued at the same rate, payments on previous loans would equal of exceed new loans, so that there would be a flow of capital out of developing countries. That would work against further economic growth. In response, the World Bank, under the leadership of Robert McNamara, undertook greatly to accelerate World Bank lending.

The actual crisis was much more severe than anticipated. This was because the organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) raised the price of oil dramatically. Most developing countries were oil-importers, so the cost of their imports rose greatly, compounding their problems. The new wealth of the oil-rich countries, on the other hand, flowed into European and American banks, which were eager to lend. Suddenly loans by commercial banks to developing countries exceeded those of governments and international banks. These were less closely monitored, since the interest of the banks was only in collecting their money, not in the development of the borrowers. It was far easier for the governments of developing countries to borrow more money than to pay for their imports in any other way.

II. The Origins of Economic Globalization

When, toward the end of the decade, oil prices were raised again and the United States dramatically increased interest rates, this period of easy borrowing came to an abrupt end. Commercial banks realized that their loans were not as secure as they had thought and stopped lending. Since repayment of loans had depended on fresh borrowing, this precipitated a crisis. The crisis focused on Mexico’s threat to renege on its payments. At this point the IMF became an important actor in ways not envisioned in its founding. It stepped in to pressure lenders to make concessions on payments and to lend more money while pressuring the government of Mexico to change its policies to insure the ability to repay. The changes demanded by the IMF as a condition of assistance are called Structural Adjustment Policies (SAPs).

The requirements placed on Mexico initiated the global economy to replace the international one. The policies directing these changes embodied what is called the "Washington Consensus," led by the United States treasury department and agreed on by the IMF and the World Bank. This consensus was that development should henceforth be led by investments by transnational corporations (TNCs) rather than by grants by governments and intergovernmental organizations.

This shift could occur only as developing nations made themselves attractive to potential investors. This required massive change from the national economies that had heretofore been dominant. Laws requiring that businesses be largely owned and controlled by citizens had to be abolished, along with laws of any kind favoring local business. This involved the privatization of government-owned businesses, so that these businesses competed on an equal basis with those owned by outsiders. Tariffs and other barriers to trade had to be abolished or, at least, greatly reduced.

It is clear that import-substitution industries could not survive under this new regime. The new slogan was export-driven development. Each country was to export what it could produce most efficiently. In many non-industrialized countries this has led to rapid exploitation of their natural resources, especially forests.

A major incentive to investment by TNCs has been low wages and few restrictive government rules. Governments competing with each other to attract the investment they now needed were under pressure to lower already low wages and to avoid enforcing any rules they might have to protect workers from exploitation and the environment from pollution. The result has been called "the race to the bottom." A major instrument for lowering wages has been depreciating the value of the currency, since this reduced the value of wages without officially reducing them in the local currency.

Although low wages and little governmental restriction are major attractions to investors, they alone do not secure investment. There must also be stable government, public order, and a certain level of education. In addition, an infrastructure of transportation and communications is required. As a result, investment tends to concentrate in a few parts of the world, rather than being spread evenly over it. The combination of all these factors has made some parts of China, especially the southern coast, preeminently successful in their bid for investment.

The structural adjustment that began with Mexico has now been applied to most of the less-industrialized countries in the world. Its effect is to remove barriers to the free flow of goods and services across national boundaries. Most important, perhaps, is the financial integration of the world. Money is moved from one country to another in a fraction of a second. Sometimes this is a matter of buying and selling currencies, sometimes, stocks and bonds. Far more money is involved in these transactions than in investment in productive facilities or the actual purchase of goods and services.

One purpose of structural adjustment was to enable nations to pay their debts. In this respect, it has been only partially successful. Major defaults, such as the one threatened by Mexico, have been avoided. But repayments have typically been at the cost of services to the poor, and despite this sacrifice, the overall level of indebtedness has continued to rise. The burden of repayment is a severe limitation on development in many countries. In some of the poorest countries, the problem is so acute that there is now general agreement that concessions must be made.

But SAPs have proved an extremely effective instrument in accomplishing the basic purpose of the Washington consensus -- movement toward a single global market. This movement has been strongly supported by a succession of agreements worked out by the GATT, especially in its concluding efforts, called the Uruguay Round. This work has now been taken over by the WTO. In some parts of the world, regional agreements have gone even further. The European Community is the most impressive in this respect. But the North America Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) also carries the movement of erasing boundaries further than the WTO, and the proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) goes farther still. National boundaries are now minor impediments to the movement of capital, goods, and services. They significantly restrict only the movement of labor.

As already suggested, the process of globalization and that of privatization have gone hand in hand. The ideal is that TNCs be free to buy and operate any business in any country. This applies to utilities and transportation systems, for example, that in the past have typically been publicly owned or at least regulated. The goal now is that competition among private firms replace government involvement.

Globalization is, thus, the systematic reduction of the role of government in economic affairs. Indeed, the role of government has been so reduced that the World Bank held a conference a few years ago to consider what tasks remained to it. Basically governments are still needed in order to support the market. The market needs educated workers; so the government is responsible to see that education is available. The market needs secure public order; so the government needs law enforcement agencies and military forces. The market needs an infrastructure for transportation. The government should supply roads, railroads, and harbors. Of course, government is also responsible for caring for those who do not fit into the market economy.

The effects of globalization arouse great enthusiasm among some and great anger among others. Globalization has been immensely profitable for TNCs. World gross product has increased quite rapidly, but some parts of the world, such as sub-Saharan Africa, have been growing poorer. In most countries, those who are wealthier and better educated have benefited from the changes. On the other hand, in most countries, workers, peasants, and the unemployed have lost status and income. The gap between rich and poor is growing in almost all countries, and it is growing also between countries.

Another concern raised by the globalization of the past two decades is the sheer size and power of TNCs. It is often pointed out that when one makes a single list of nations in terms of the gross domestic product and of corporations in terms of their sales, just over half of the largest economies are corporations. Since money is power, especially in a world in which so many nations have been dis-empowered, this means that power is concentrated in the hands of persons whose professional purpose is the quest for profits for stockholders. One may worry about the consequences for those who do not belong to the capitalist class.

III. Economic Principles Supporting Globalization

Economic theory developed in a context in which nationalism was taken for granted as the context of economic activity. Adam Smith wrote about the wealth of nations and showed what national policies led to national economic growth. He took for granted that investors would prefer to do business in their own countries. Of course, this did not preclude trade, but the trade he envisioned was between nations, both of which understand themselves to profit from the trade.

Nevertheless, the theory developed by the classical economists supports the globalization, including the privatization, that is now occurring. It does so because it shows that larger markets are better than smaller ones and that markets function better when the government does not interfere with them. The arguments are simple and familiar.

First, with respect to the size of markets, economists saw two things. One is that there are economies of scale. At the most basic level, Adam Smith showed that when a farmer needed a pin and made it for himself it might take all day. When eleven workers each undertook a specialized act repeatedly, they could produce thousands of pins in a single day. Of course, a single farm family would have no need of all these pins. Even a village would not. The market must be large enough to absorb this produce.

But economists saw also that a market large enough to support a single producer is still not large enough to gain the social benefits of industrialization. If there is only one industrial producer of pins in the market, that producer’s only competition will be individuals for whom the task of making even a few pins is very time-consuming. The producer will be free to charge exorbitant prices and will have little incentive to become more efficient or produce better pins. Competition is crucial to the market. Hence, the market must be large enough to absorb the production of several producers. Even this is not sufficient. Although the small, labor-intensive factories here envisioned are far more efficient than individual producers, they can become still more efficient when they employ fossil fuel energy and enlarge their production. There are economies of scale, which rise as technology improves. We need a market large enough to absorb the production of several larger factories. Although the classical economists pointed this out in order to support national markets over against local ones, the argument works equally well for a global market over against national ones.

Economists also saw that government efforts to control markets inhibited efficient use of time and resources. During the Middle Ages and extending into the modern era, there was a sense that there was a just price for goods. This price should meet the reasonable needs of the producer for a good living but also be reasonable for the purchaser. Public authorities saw to it that this price was established.

Economists saw that it was better for the market to set the price. That is, sellers should strive to get as much as they could for their wares, and buyers should try to purchase them as cheaply as possible. As long as there are several sellers of the same product, a purchaser can play them off against each other until he arrives at the lowest price at which any of them is willing to sell. This puts pressure on producers to find more efficient ways of producing so as to be able to undersell competitors and increase market share. Producers also see that introducing a new or improved product may give them an at least temporary advantage, in that they can charge a higher price for the desired commodity before competitors drive the price back down.

Market prices also lead producers to be very sensitive to changing consumer interests. They do not want to produce what consumers no longer want. The incentive is to satisfy actual consumer demands. As a result more resources go into the production of wanted goods. This may not be the case when there is bureaucratic control of production.

The efficiency of the market in the allocation of resources and the stimulus of improved services leads to questioning the desirability of government ownership or control. However, for a long time, most economists recognized that there are natural monopolies, which must be brought under public control. That is, if competition among producers is not practical, then it is better for the public to manage the monopoly than to have it operated for private advantage. For example, it was assumed that a nation needed only one mail-delivery system. The same was understood to be true of most utilities. The judgment about transportation systems was mixed, but at least highways were generally built and operated at public expense.

Today competition has been introduced into areas once thought to be natural monopolies. For example, private corporations now compete with the post office in some of its formerly unique functions. They are quite successful in this. In principle, competition could take place with respect to all its functions. Economists generally believe that this would improve efficiency.

In my own state of California, the legislature approved almost unanimously a bill that introduced competition into the provision of electricity. State regulation was greatly reduced. The results have proved disastrous, but the idea has not died that, when correctly done, liberalization will improve efficiency and reduce prices. The conviction remains strong that, as long as competition among producers is present, the market sets prices better than bureaucracy.

This commitment to privatization leads not only to action within individual countries to submit more of the economic activity to market discipline but also to imposing this demand through SAPs and international agreements. The proposed FTAA goes farther than any previous agreement in this direction.

IV. Underlying Assumptions

I have explained that larger markets and privatization lead to greater efficiency. This is advocated on the grounds that greater efficiency creates economic growth. To explain this, I will shift to the language of "productivity." In theory, productivity could refer to any of the factors of production, that is, to capital, to labor, or to natural resources. But in fact it focuses on labor, with the understanding that labor productivity increases capital as well. Labor is more productive when a given number of hours of labor produce more goods and services. In the example taken from Adam Smith, the small pin factory greatly increases the productivity of labor, because the number of pins produced per worker per day rises dramatically.

Clearly, if the same number of people continue working an equal amount of time, then the total production of a country will rise when they produce more per hour of labor. Economists believe that the market insures that this situation will be approximated. Unfortunately, in an industrial society there is a kind of unemployment that is rare in pre-industrial societies where the need for labor is obvious. But economists show that the capital that is increased by production methods that require fewer workers will be invested elsewhere, so that new employment opportunities are created. As long as the percentage of the work force that is unemployed is small, economists generally regard this as necessary and even healthy. It discourages workers from making excessive demands that would reduce capital accumulation and new investment. Economists point to the consequences of the industrialization of Europe, North America, and the Asian tigers to show that industrialization, operating on market principles, raises living standards dramatically. They want the same results everywhere, and they believe that the market is the best instrument for attaining them.

Two assumptions operative here can be highlighted. One is that the primary goal of development is overall economic growth. The second is that for the attainment of growth the primary productivity required is that of labor. You may agree with these assumptions, but it is important to show that they can also be questioned. This questioning underlies much of the current anti-globalization movement.

There are other views of the summum bonum of a society or a nation than overall economic growth. Historically, justice has been considered the primary political virtue. Economic theory, and the aim at increasing wealth, pay little attention to justice in general or even to the equitable distribution of the goods and services produced. Actually, the increased wealth brought about by economic growth is concentrated in relatively few hands. Economists sometimes argue that when a society becomes sufficiently wealthy the benefits of increased wealth will trickle down to those who are now poor, but in the countries they cite as success stories, the improvement of the lot of the poor was greatly benefited by governmental action and labor unions, neither of which are viewed favorably from the point of view of the theory. The theory may be correct, but it has not thus far been proven by history.

The assumption that labor is that whose productivity is to be increased is also subject to questioning. When labor was scarce and raw materials and sinks for pollution were large, it made sense to concentrate on increasing labor productivity. Much of this was accomplished by harnessing the energy of fossil fuels. In the past century, the fuel of choice has been petroleum. Now many observe that globally speaking, labor is plentiful. Unemployment and underemployment are huge problems in much of the world. On the other hand, raw materials and sinks for pollution are now scarce. It is the efficient use of these resources, some critics of economic globalization argue, that should now preoccupy us. For example, to concentrate on increasing the use of petroleum to replace human labor in agriculture, for the sake of increasing the productivity of labor, no longer seems a wise policy.

Just as the response to concern about the poor is that wealth will trickle down; so the standard economist’s response to questions about resources is that the market will stimulate technology to take care of any shortages. There is evidence of this claim in the past. When certain metals grew scarce, plastics were invented to serve their functions. As soils lose their fertility, chemical fertilizers provide the needed nutriments for food-production.

Some economists recognize that the question of sinks is more difficult. Still some argue that as people become more willing to pay for clean air, through taxes in this instance, there can be market incentives to reduce pollution. In the particularly difficult question of global warming, thus far most economists have argued that it will be more efficient to respond to the problems caused by global warming as they occur than to make serious efforts to reduce it, since these efforts would slow economic growth.

If we ask why so few economists are willing to take more serious account of issues of justice or of the conservation of the natural world, the answer is found in two deeper assumptions. These are the understanding of human beings and of nature that are now built into the whole structure of the dominant economic thinking. If we disagree with these assumptions, we will have good reason to question the single-minded concentration on economic growth, on the one hand, and the lack of interest in the environment, on the other. That means that we may well be doubtful of the desirability of continuing the process of economic globalization in its present form.

V. Homo Economicus

Economic theory is based on a particular view of human beings. Economists all know that Homo economicus is an abstraction from the fullness of human reality. This is just as true of Homo politicus, Homo religiosus, Homo faber, or Homo ludens. There is nothing wrong in principle with examining human behavior in market transactions in some separation from human behavior in political or religious activities.

Economists observed that when we buy and sell we quite consistently seek to get the best bargains we can and sell as dearly as we can. When we need work, we try to get the best job we can, with pay a major consideration. When we need to employ helpers, we try to get them as inexpensively as possible. Economists abstracted this tendency from all the other human tendencies and attributed it to Homo economicus. They describe Homo economicus as devoted to personal economic gain.

It is not the case, of course, that all of our economic activity conforms to this norm. For one thing, our economic dealings within the family rarely do. Economists recognize this, and often speak of households as the economic units instead of individuals. But the boundaries of households are often blurred, and in any case households do not act consistently in purely self-serving ways. An interest in being fair plays some role in our economic dealings. Also people give away large sums of money, much of it out of concern to promote the general good or meet particular needs of others. Economists do not do well in accounting for these activities. But when all qualifications are made, it remains true that a great deal about human behavior in the market place can be described and predicted accurately when the people involved are viewed as economists see them.

Homo economicus is also understood to have insatiable wants. Some early economists thought that the goal of the economy was to produce sufficient goods to meet the needs of all. Growth would then give way to a steady-state economy. However, the profession as a whole rejected this view. They judged that human wants are insatiable. This does not mean that the desire for a particular good cannot be satisfied. It means that there is no limit to the new wants that arise as old ones are satisfied. There is obviously a measure of truth in this understanding of human beings in their economic behavior. The kinds of things that would have satisfied me fifty years ago no longer suffice. For example, I want faster communications, easier travel, and more space and facilities in my home.

Homo economicus primarily values money and the things money can buy. People work for money and seek the best-paying jobs they can find. Economists pay little attention to the quality of work. Again there is much truth to this. When a person changes jobs, our first thought is that the new job probably pays better. We marvel if someone voluntarily accepts a cut in income. Even when one does not need the increased income, one prizes it as a symbol of success and an opportunity to accomplish things one cannot accomplish without it. Money is, indeed, a major determinant in our decisions.

Clearly Homo economicus is a useful abstraction for many purposes, especially for the analysis of the way the economy functions. Nevertheless, it is not the whole truth, and when it passes from descriptive use to prescriptive use, that is, when policies are proposed that treat it as if it were the whole truth, there are serious dangers of distortion.

With respect to insatiability, we do not simply observe this as a fact of existence always and at all places. Actually, there are traditional societies in which it is not apparent, at least as a significant factor in human affairs. Even today economists sometimes worry that consumers will not buy enough. To prevent this failure of individuals to live up to their billing as insatiable, we have created a system designed to generate new desires as old ones are satisfied. Perfectly functional goods are rendered obsolete by new designs. One may no longer be able to buy the parts needed to repair them. Styles are systematically changed from year to year so that one who fails to buy new clothes is quickly out of fashion. Much of the advertising industry is designed to persuade us to desire new things. We have built an economy that requires the insatiability it presupposes, and we have to work to insure that people are in fact insatiable.

The transition from description to normative use occurs also with respect to the view of Homo economicus as acquisitive. Economists call the selfish behavior they describe "rational". They show that rational behavior leads to greater wealth not only on the part of those who practice it but also for society as a whole. The fact that "rational" behavior erodes community is not noticed, since community plays no role in economic thought. For economists there are only individuals in contractual relations. Giving up personal gain for the sake of maintaining a community is "irrational". The policies they advocate on the assumption that individuals are purely self-interested systematically erode the communities that depend on the importance of human relations that are not contractual.

The normative use of the theory shows up also in the destruction of types of work that are humanly more rewarding. In traditional societies there are specialists in the making of many needed goods. Shoes can serve as an example. The cobbler engages in the whole process of making a pair of shoes, often on order for a particular customer. There is pride and satisfaction in the work. Even if he can earn more by working in a factory, he will find that the loss of job satisfaction outweighs the increased income.

However, once a shoe factory is established, most cobblers have no choice. The price of shoes produced by the shoe factory is well below the price at which a cobbler must sell in order to live. Some cobblers may survive by repairing factory-made shoes. But most must become part of the wage labor force.

Again, my purpose is to point out that the economists’ description of how most of us act in our economic dealings most of the time has become a norm. People who do not want to act that way are forced to do so. The values of community life and creative work are destroyed for the sake of the greater wealth that can be produced when people behave in the manner of Homo economicus.

The communities that are being destroyed now include national ones. When Adam Smith wrote in 1776, his goal was to increase the wealth of nations. He took national community for granted as the context of economic activity. But economic theory as such has no place for community. It demonstrates that the market works best when it is large. Indeed, the larger the better. This allows for the economies of scale, so important to economists, along with the competition between corporations that is essential to the whole process. National boundaries are thus an impediment to economic efficiency. The goal, now largely realized, is a global economy.

VI. Dualism

A second principle underlying economic theory is the dualism of the human and the natural. A tendency toward dualism has characterized the entire Western tradition. It was intensified by Protestantism and systematized in the thought of the Enlightenment. For traditional economists, and emphatically for the dominant, neo-liberal school today, the only value that is recognized is that of human satisfaction. The only form of satisfaction that is seriously considered is that derived from the possession or consumption of desired goods and services. Economists encourage the ordering of the economy to the end of increasing human satisfaction.

The only value that can be attributed to the nonhuman world is instrumental. It can serve toward the satisfaction of human wants. Its value is the price that someone is prepared to pay for it. It is viewed as a commodity.

Given the standard Enlightenment view of the world as composed of human subjects and nonhuman objects, this dualism of humans and commodities seems appropriate. It is derived from the idea that the nonhuman world is available for the market, so that market forces can price it. Economists recognize that this is not quite true. For example, people value unspoiled landscapes, which are not for sale in the market. However, this is viewed as a minor qualification. Economists can approximate a market price by asking people how much they would pay to preserve this landscape and multiplying the figure by the number of people who would be willing to pay it.

The dualism is applied, with few qualms, when considering nonhuman animals. A cow is worth whatever price it brings in the market. The same is true of a cat. The cat’s value may be raised by human sentiment, but there is still likely to be some price at which its owners would part with it. What is totally omitted is the value of the cow or the cat for itself, the satisfactions it derives from being alive.

The commodification of nature expresses itself in other ways. In traditional society, much is held in common. Indeed, the natural environment is thought of more as part of the community than as a possession. The dualism of the economist is absent. All members of the community can have access to the forests and streams, and sometimes also the pastureland.

To many neo-liberal economists this practice appears irrational. Since these goods have value, they should be privatized and priced, so that those who use them will pay for this use. Privatization insures the most efficient, or economic, use of the resources.

Of course, privatization also favors those in position to purchase them, and it harms the poor. Today, one feature of the negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is the privatization of water. Dualism drives in the direction of the commodification of everything. The policy of privatization also expresses the primacy of the commitment to increase wealth over the goal of meeting the needs of the poor.

The reduction of the value of natural things to the price that individuals are now willing to pay for them in the market is highly problematic. As we have become aware of impending scarcities, we have realized that market price is a poor guide even to the instrumental value of commodities to human beings. For example, as long as there are large pools of oil in the ground, the price of oil will be determined by the policies of oil-producing countries as to how much to pump. Oil could remain plentiful in the market until very near the time that it is, for practical purposes, exhausted. Indeed, if OPEC does not control production with somewhat longer-term concerns in view, market forces will probably lead to that outcome. The actual value of oil for human society is far greater than the market price. The additional price will be paid when we are forced to make a rather abrupt transition to other forms of energy. It would be much better if oil were priced accordingly, but the market will not accomplish that. It can be done only if the political order, which can reflect longer-term concerns, takes precedence over the economic one.

The critique here is that the market, to which economists turn for establishing value, is shortsighted. Human beings are capable of rational judgments based on a longer view of things. If we use our collective wisdom through political processes, we will recognize needs before market prices reflect them. This does not directly challenge economists’ dualism, but it does show that their lack of interest in the natural world leads them to treat it only in categories they derive from the study of the industrial economy. The failure to give sustained attention to nature in its distinct character is a profound failure of economic theory.

More broadly, the dualism of the economists has rendered them as a group largely indifferent to the degradation of the earth. One can, of course, find economic reasons for avoiding this degradation. But the struggle to save the natural environment has not been led by those who view it as a commodity. It has been led by those who see it as having value in itself and as intimately interconnected with human well being. Economists may point to technological developments now occurring that will aid in the transition from a petroleum-based economy to a sustainable one. But the reasons for these development have not been market signals. Petroleum is still cheap. The reasons have been that people in fact know that the market price does not forecast the problems that lie ahead for us and that we need to prepare now. The more we shift decision-making to market forces, the greater the crises we will encounter in the future.

VII. Conclusions

Clearly I am critical of the assumptions underlying the present form of economic globalization. In conclusion, I want to make clear that my critique is not primarily of economists. Most of them recognize that economics as an academic discipline abstracts from the full concreteness of human beings and the natural world. They believe, rightly, that what they abstract and the conclusions they derive from studying these abstractions, are illuminating of much human behavior, especially in the industrial world.

The problem comes when the leaders of the political order decide to give priority to the policies derived from the abstractions of economists. When they do so, they give less attention to the value of justice, which concerns political theorists, the value of community, which concerns sociologists, the value of human fulfillment, which concerns psychologists, and the value of ecosystems, which concerns ecologists. If economists are to blame, it is because they do not remind policy makers that their recommendations are based on abstractions rather than on the real world. But this is knowledge that the leaders of the social and political order should bring with them.

We have always lived in one world, on one globe. For practical purposes, this globe has become much smaller. Geographical distances no longer count for much. We are connected technologically. Many of our problems are now inescapably global. In this sense there is no alternative to globalism. But it is a mistake to suppose that there is no alternative to the present form of capitalist, laissez-faire, economic globalization. There are important alternatives to that, alternatives that would emphasize justice, community, personal fulfillment, and the flourishing of the natural world, as well as increased economic activity where that is needed. This would be a very different globalization.

In my opinion, the present form of globalization is not sustainable. That means it will not continue indefinitely. Indeed, in some parts of the planet, I cannot see it continuing more than a few more decades at most. The transition from an unsustainable to a sustainable form of globalization will not be easy. The longer we wait to begin that process of transition, the more painful the change will be. I hope that China, with a history so different from that of the West, will help the world find a better way.

Free Trade And The World Trade Organization

I. Basic Assumptions of Economic Theory

I am honored to have been asked to address you with regard to the World Trade Organization and China. I am also aware of my limited qualifications. Many of you have far more detailed information than I about the history and policies of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade and the WTO. You certainly know more than I about the negotiations that led to China’s inclusion in this organization. Accordingly, it would make no sense for me to lecture you directly on this subject.

If I have a contribution to make to your reflections about the role of China in the WTO, it is at a different level. I have come to my interest in economic institutions from the side of philosophy and theology rather than as an economist. It is my view that this kind of cross-disciplinary study is useful, since it tends to raise questions of a different sort. So I do not apologize for my acute limitations with regard to strictly economic analyses.

Around 1980, it finally became clear to me that economic thinking is the governing ideology of the world. The work of philosophers and theologians is now of little significance in comparison. In our age of academic specialization this realization of comparative importance does not influence most philosophers and theologians to broaden their study. But the type of philosophy and theology to which I am committed is of a different sort. My mind was captured in graduate school by the mathematician-philosopher, Alfred North Whitehead. Whitehead sought a comprehensive vision inclusive of the sciences and the humanities. He opposed the fragmentation of thought into airtight academic disciplines. This meant that, as a philosopher and theologian, I should study the system of thought that was most important and effective in shaping the policies that governed national and international affairs. I judged this to be neo-liberal economics.

I have made no effort to become an economist. Fortunately, I found an economist, Herman Daly, who shared my interests and point of view, so that I could work with him. My focus was on the most basic assumptions underlying neo-liberal economics. I found that these assumptions are little discussed by economists. Actually economists call discussion of such matters "theology", and they dismiss such discussion from their discipline. Nevertheless, these basic assumptions exercise a profound influence on their thought and, through that, on the policies that now shape the world. To me it seems to be a matter of great importance that these assumptions be examined.

In this effort, I believe, Chinese thinkers have an important contribution to make. They are familiar with Marxist thinking as are few Western economists. Marx shared some of the basic assumptions of neo-liberal thought, but he disagreed with others. Awareness of these different assumptions should stimulate analysis and criticism at this level. Some Chinese thinkers are also familiar with traditional Chinese thought. There are marked tensions between the basic ideas of this traditional thought and those that control modern economic thinking. This should also encourage critical reflection about the assumptions underlying neo-liberal economic thought.

I have emphasized "neo-liberal" economic thought. Actually, so far as basic assumptions are concerned, there is not much difference between neo-liberal and classical economic thought. Keynes came to economics as a philosopher and was much more aware of the assumptions economists made than were most economists. There is much of interest in his work. But in the economic school that calls itself Keynesian, most of the assumptions of which I speak were retained.

I will identify just three of the crucial assumptions. One is that human beings are oriented to their own good and that they judge this good in economic terms. That is, people seek to consume what they like and to amass possessions while engaging in as little work as possible. Their wants are insatiable.

A second assumption, closely related, is that human beings, or households, are atomistic. Their relations with other individuals or households are competitive or contractual. They relate to one another in the market through exchange in which all seek the best deals they can obtain.

A third assumption is that natural resources are essentially infinite. When one resource becomes scarce, its price rises. It is used more efficiently; resources of lesser quality are exploited; and substitutes are developed to replace it. Technological advances compensate for shortages, so that the economy as a whole can expand without limit.

Many economists acknowledge that the account I have given of human nature, while useful for economic theory, is not suitable for all other purposes. It is, therefore, the duty of the government to judge the relative importance of economics and other concerns. However, today, most governments have judged that economics is supremely important and have subordinated other concerns to this one. Accordingly, this caveat is not important in understanding the global economy. For practical purposes the policies adopted in most countries assume this view of human beings and of the natural world. Communitarian and ecological concerns play little role. The question of justice now has reduced weight. Fortunately, even if governments subordinate these other concerns to economic growth, they cannot ignore them altogether. On the other hand, the WTO is under no necessity to consider them at all.

I had the opportunity to talk with an Indian economist, Dr. Jagdish Bhagwati, who has played an important role in creating the WTO and in bringing India more fully into the globalized economy. He knew that I was troubled by the neglect of ecological issues by the WTO. He assured me that he was also concerned about the environment, but he strongly opposed confusing the mission of the WTO by introducing these concerns into its decisions. He urged the establishment of a separate international institution to deal with this. My own judgment is that this would do little to solve the problem unless this environmental organization had the power to overrule WTO decisions. It was quite clear that my conversation partner would not have favored such a solution. The goal of economic growth is, for him as for most of those who shape global policies, primary.

In the following three sections, I will discuss topics to which I believe the WTO gives too little attention: the historical change of the nature and role of trade; the excessive power and influence of corporations; and the costs of growth.

I. Free Trade

One of the beliefs that economists typically, indeed overwhelmingly, draw from their assumptions is the desirability of trade. This desirability is the reason for the existence of the WTO and for granting it so much power. It is worthwhile to reflect about the reasons for this desirability and to ask if there are limits.

Economists rightly point out that few people can produce all that they need. They also show that the effort to do this is very inefficient. Robinson Crusoe is the model of the wholly self-sufficient man. But there were many desirable goods that Crusoe lacked. Had he had a trading partner, he could easily have produced more than he needed of a few things and exchanged these both for goods he could not produce and also for goods that took him a lot of time and effort to produce. Trade would have reduced the time required to meet his needs and would have made his life more comfortable. For most people, who do not have the resources of a whole island to draw upon, trade is even more important.

What is true of individuals is true also of whole communities. No community has access to everything that it would enjoy possessing or consuming. Most communities can easily produce more of some things than they need. To exchange their surpluses for what they lack benefits them.

Noone disputes the benefits of trade. Nevertheless, some question whether all trade is beneficial. Indeed, through much of history, most cities and nations have restricted trade in some ways. Many economists believe that virtually all such restrictions are harmful, that trade should be completely free. This view dominates the policies of the WTO. But this view that all trade is beneficial is not as evident as the fact that much trade is beneficial.

One concern on the part of less developed countries has been that more developed countries would have a general advantage in trade. That is, it seems that the more developed country could sell the whole range of traded goods more cheaply and thus prevent the economic development of the less developed country. Ricardo is famous for his refutation of this expectation. He developed the doctrine of "comparative advantage" in which he showed that trade between such nations benefits both.

Since this is an important issue today, and quite relevant to WTO policies, let us look briefly at his argument. He took Portugal and England as his example of trading partners. He hypothesized that Portugal was able to produce both wine and textiles more cheaply than England. The English fear would then be that in trading with Portugal England would import both and have nothing to exchange. Ricardo showed that this would not be the case. Although Portugal had an absolute advantage in both, it had a greater advantage in wine than in textiles. In his terminology, England had a "comparative advantage" in textiles because its absolute disadvantage was less in that area. Accordingly it would be more profitable for Portuguese capitalists to invest in wine than in textiles. English capitalists could then invest in textiles. The total production of wine and textiles would be greater than if Portugal produced both. Hence, both countries would gain by trading Portuguese wine for English textiles.

Ricardo’s argument is sound, given his assumptions. In addition to the common assumptions of economists, Ricardo added another. He argued that capitalists prefer to invest their money in their own countries. In the eighteenth century this may have been largely true. He noted that the argument would not apply between different parts of England such as London and Manchester. If Manchester had the absolute advantage in a variety of goods, the fact that London had a comparative advantage in some would not help London. London capitalists would invest in Manchester, and all the goods would be produced there.

In today’s global economy, it is clear that comparative advantage as understood by Ricardo is irrelevant. Investments move from one part of the world to another at lightning speed. They seek absolute advantage. Unfortunately, economists still sometimes refer to comparative advantage in their arguments for the expansion of trade. When pressed, they acknowledge that what they mean by that is not what Ricardo meant. Sometimes they mean simply that each country should produce what it can produce best in comparison with other countries. However, they have not worked out a clear alternative meaning that supports the conclusions to which Ricardo came.

In fact, trade today must be supported with arguments based on absolute advantage. A less developed country must compete in the global market on the basis of that in which it has an absolute advantage. The advantage it may possess is one that did not occur to Ricardo -- low wages.

In Ricardo’s day it was assumed that labor worked for subsistence and that subsistence wages were much the same everywhere. He never suggested that the English would work for less and thus bring down the cost of their textiles and wine to compensate for less-efficient methods of production. But today wage differences among nations are enormous. One main reason for the push to extend the size of the market is so that corporations can take advantage of cheap labor in some countries as they produce for consumption in countries where wages are high. Low labor costs provide an absolute advantage to some countries.

The real situation is, of course, more complex. The quality of labor, the stability of the society, and the strength of the infrastructure in transportation and communications are also important factors in attracting capital. It is China’s strength in all of these categories that has made it so successful in this competition. Nevertheless, low wages are a very important factor.

There are problems associated with this basis for trade that did not apply in the case proposed by Ricardo. There are many nations that have low-cost labor. In a global economy they are competing for investment. Since their main advantage is low wages, and they lose this advantage if costs are still lower elsewhere, the economic incentive is to lower wages still further. This is usually accomplished by depreciating the currency. The result is to reduce the standard of living of already impoverished workers.

This possibility did not occur to Ricardo. He assumed that subsistence provided a floor for worker wages. This was often defined as sufficient pay to keep a worker and his wife alive and enable them to raise two children to replace them in the workforce. In today’s global economy, few workers receive subsistence pay as thus defined. Each family needs at least two wage earners to subsist. Many of the factory workers are young single women who, when worn out, will be sent home. Most countries would like to raise wages, but if they do so, capital will pursue the absolute advantage of low wages elsewhere. National policies are constrained by the mobility of capital, which Ricardo did not anticipate.

My point is that the shift from a theory of comparative advantage to a situation where absolute advantage is decisive, along with the shift from near identity of wages in all countries to very large differentials, is decisive for a realistic discussion of trade today. My complaint is that economists have done too little to help us rethink trade in light of this change.

Some economists, of course, have drawn optimistic conclusions from this changed situation. In their analysis, if low-wage countries attract the most investment, these countries will grow most rapidly. As they grow, their wages will rise. This will be possible because in the process of industrialization they will develop the advanced technology and specialized skills that free them from competition with low-wage labor elsewhere. They can command higher prices for their goods and, thus, provide higher wages for their workers. We can see how this process worked out in Japan and in some of the other Asian tigers. Meanwhile, according to this optimistic view, new transnational investments will flow to countries where wages are still very low.

According to this account, in contrast to Ricardo’s argument from comparative advantage, the more-developed and less-developed countries benefit from trade in quite different ways. The more-developed country benefits from the low prices of the goods it consumes. Its capitalists benefit from being able to take advantage of low wages in other countries to reduce their costs. In addition there are technologically advanced goods that the developed country can sell profitably in the larger market that is opened up by trade.

The less-developed country benefits by attracting investment capital. This produces industrial jobs and increases the total wealth and productive capacity of the nation. This, in turn, begins the process of economic expansion and technical development, which leads toward becoming one of the more-developed nations.

There is little doubt that this can happen and has happened. The hope for this form of development creates great support for the system. But there are questions that should be asked and are too rarely asked.

This way of development is typically based in large part on trade and investment. But it has, in fact, rarely been based on "free trade". Yet breaking down all barriers to trade is often presented as the path that leads to success. There are real questions about the wisdom of such an approach; yet this goal is being pursued quite single-mindedly by the Bretton Woods Institutions, including the WTO. It is important to consider the dangers of free trade and the advantages of controlled or managed trade.

First, I need to make clear that under "free trade" I am including the free flow of capital as well as that of goods. Ricardo envisioned only the latter. But as we have seen, economic globalization is based on the free flow of capital. This is an even more important part of the global economy today than is the free flow of goods. It is very closely connected with the privatization of formerly publicly-owned properties and the reduction or elimination of government regulation. One could argue for free trade in goods and oppose the free movement in capital and the privatization and liberalization of economies, but that would not be the kind of "free trade" supported by neo-liberal economics and to which the WTO is committed. If you want to see the direction in which the United States is pressing the WTO to go, you should study the proposed Free Trade Agreement for the Americas. Obviously, the WTO is far from able to enforce such a regime now, but if China wants WTO membership, but does not want other parts of what the United States hopes for in the globalization process, it needs to tread very carefully indeed.

Second, consider the historical facts. If we limit ourselves to the past half-century, we see that Japan and other East Asian countries that succeeded in economic development did so by tight control of their own economies. Japanese companies are owned and controlled by Japanese. The Japanese government worked with corporations in making basic economic decisions. Japan did not allow the free flow of foreign goods into the country. This does not mean that Japan did not trade. It exported extensively and imported more cautiously. It did not subscribe to the ideology of free trade. It is more open now, for with its economic success, the risk of losing control of its own economy is greatly reduced.

The first great success story that is truly based on the ideology of free trade is Thailand. Through most of the nineties it was touted as showing how well the system works. Few problems were discussed. Then at the end of the decade, Thailand suffered a major setback. Remember that this economy was built on the inflow of investment to take advantage of low wages in the approved manner. Much of the investment was in the stock market. When astute observers decided that the market was overpriced, they withdrew their funds. Loans were also called in rather than renewed when due. There were few new investments. The economy collapsed.

Much of Thai industry was owned by outside corporations, but Thais owned some of it. When the crash came, Thais were forced to sell their businesses at very low prices. Outside capital bought it up. No doubt Thailand will recover from this setback, but its dependence on foreign capital will be even greater than before. One might suppose that it would introduce controls over the flow of capital or restrictions on foreign ownership, but such steps will not be allowed by the institutions dedicated to free trade. Following the Japanese model is not permitted. Thailand in the future will be even more dependent on decisions made by leaders in international finance. One can expect cycles of boom and bust.

This means that in general the free-trade model of development works better for the developed countries than the developing ones. It allows capital to move freely from one country to another, benefiting from their economic growth, but also benefiting from their economic crises. International capitalists will come to own more and more of the productive capacity of the world.

Thus far China has exercised control over its own development. This has by no means excluded investments from abroad. In this way, its path of development has differed from that of Japan. But it has not flung open its doors as did Thailand. As China is more and more fully incorporated into the WTO, with its strong commitment to the liberalization of trade, it will be important for China to decide what it really wants. I doubt that it wants to become vulnerable to the speculative investments of global capitalism or develop an economy that is chiefly owned by outsiders. Perhaps it will be able to move the WTO away from its support of predatory capitalism.

I. Corporate Dominance

There has been another change of enormous importance since the days when the basic assumptions of economic theory were established. The early economists thought of the economic actors chiefly as individuals and small businesses. Today the major actors are corporations.

It can be argued that corporations are now replacing nations as the major organizing forces in society. Their power expresses itself in several ways.

First, in economic terms, many of them are larger than most nations. If one draws up a list of nations in terms of their Gross Domestic Product and a list of corporations in terms of their gross income and then mixes these two lists, it turns out that 51 of the largest 100 economies are now corporations. Corporations are more tightly and efficiently organized than nations; so their economic power throughout the world is enormous.

Second, they have great power within the political order. This is apparent in the United States. Candidates for elective office require substantial funding in order to advertise themselves. Some of this money comes from ordinary citizens who support them but expect nothing in return. More of it comes from wealthy individuals and corporations whose chief purpose is to have access to, and influence on, government officials. There is no question but that corporations exercise a great influence on how our legislatures, governors, and presidents make their decisions. For example, the influence of the oil companies on the decisions of the present administration is clearly excessive.

Third, the Bretton Woods Institutions have turned to corporations to take the lead in global development. This took place decisively around 1980 in what is called the Washington Consensus. Under the leadership of Ronald Reagan, it was decided that global development would no longer be primarily a matter of grants and loans from governments and international banks to developing countries. It would be primarily by the investments of corporations. By the nineties this shift had been fully realized. The structural adjustment programs imposed on scores of nations around the world were designed to make them attractive to corporate investment.

Fourth, the second and third of these points have come together in the role that governments, especially the United States, play in shaping the international order. When one examines the policies of the United States in the WTO, for example, one can see that they are largely dictated by the desire to support particular corporations or, sometimes, transnational corporations in general. Few of them are designed to help American workers or farmers, although the rhetoric about them is typically deceptive. As noted above, this is even more dramatically true of the now proposed FTAA.

The dominance of corporate interests in international affairs can be shown in many ways. I will select one. In the past, it has always been assumed that a corporation must obey the laws of a country and make adjustments as new laws are passed. This certainly binds those businesses that are owned by citizens of the country. But it turned out that corporations hesitate to invest too deeply in a country if they fear that laws may change in ways that are unfavorable to them. For example, if there is the danger that the corporation’s assets in that country may be confiscated after a change of regime, it is understandable that a corporation wants the assurance that it will be compensated for its loss. It does not want to have to pursue its case against the government in the courts of that country, because it does not trust those to be impartial between their government and an outside corporation. For this reason, in order to encourage investment, many urge that disagreements between foreign corporations and governments be settled in a neutral context.

The proposed Multilateral Agreement on Investments had, among other things, provisions for this. There was sufficient objection in the United States and other developed countries to having their laws challenged in a transnational court that this agreement never came into effect. But the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had already instituted this kind of arrangement with little discussion or awareness of what is entailed. Under this agreement, a Canadian corporation is suing the United States because the state of California changed its laws about gasoline additives when it was found that its earlier laws had been environmentally harmful. U.S. corporations operating in the United States, of course, simply have to take the chance that their investments will prove unprofitable because of such changes in the law. But the Canadian corporation claims that its investment is protected from such losses by NAFTA.

I have chosen the case where it is the United States that is being sued. There are, as you might guess, more cases in which U.S. corporations are suing Canada and Mexico. The new FTAA, if adopted in its present form, will extend this protection of foreign corporations throughout the Western hemisphere.

Notice what is involved. First, transnational corporations are now claiming to be on an equal legal footing with governments. They do not come under the laws of the nations in which they operate. Those nations must submit themselves to adjudication with foreign corporations in a court of judgment in which the nation and the corporation are treated as equals.

Secondly, notice that foreign corporations now have an advantage over national ones. Instead of encouraging the development of a national economy, the new regime will favor Canadian corporations investing in the United States over their investing in Canada. U.S. corporations will have their investments in other countries better protected than those in the United States. It will be difficult for Canadian corporations operating in Canada to compete with U.S. corporations operating there.

At present the WTO adjudicates disputes among nations. In this way it has become the closest thing we have to world government. It alone is given the power to overrule the laws of nations, or at least to punish them for enforcing those laws. For the sake of trade, governments have been willing to give up an important part of their sovereignty. This is something new. There is little doubt that the WTO will in time be encouraged to give corporations analogous rights to punish nations for passing laws that are unfavorable to them. Perhaps China should resist!

The change in the historic situation due to the growing power of corporations has another effect. When the idea of "trade" was emphasized in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the image was of many individuals and businesses located in each country buying from one another and selling to one another. Those who advocated "free" trade wanted this trading among individuals and businesses to be free of government intrusion. In particular, there should be no tariffs to inhibit the exchange of goods.

Still today, the "free" in "free trade" refers to freedom from governments. Now the agents who are free from governments are chiefly transnational corporations, many of them huge. Much of the exchange of goods and services that crosses national boundaries takes place today internal to corporations. More than a third of U.S. exports and imports take place between the divisions and subsidiaries of the same company. Such trade does not come under the disciplines of the market. It is closely managed and controlled for the sake of gaining maximum benefits for the corporation. International trade internal to corporations is not what the theory of "free trade" envisioned. That it is now promoted and protected indicates the extent to which we have moved into an era of corporate capitalism.

As China participates in the WTO, it is my hope that it will oppose the continuing extension of the power and special privileges of corporations. They already concentrate far too much power in too few hands. There is no justification for going farther down that path.

II. Limits to Growth

There is another consideration with respect to the overall situation that is highly relevant to the goals of the WTO. There is a serious question as to whether growth can continue indefinitely as current theory and practice assume. This question can be asked either quite abstractly or quite concretely.

Most people agree that growth cannot continue forever. They recognize that there are physical limits. For example, the sun will eventually burn itself out. But many judge that absolute limits are a question for the remote future, that they are not relevant to our present activities and plans. Others think that we need to pay attention to some of the absolute limits now.

This debate can be illustrated with reference to what is called the net primary production. At present human beings use 40% of the net primary production on land. This has to do with the photosynthesis on the basis of which our foods and fibers and forest products are produced. We use 40% of the product of that photosynthesis, that is, of plant growth. It is hard to say what the absolute limit may be, if we are willing that all those species of animals that are not used by us should become extinct and that all wilderness disappear. But clearly there is a limit. We cannot go beyond 100%!

Similar limits exist in the area of fresh water, fertile soil, and petroleum. But in each case, technological optimists may argue that none of these limits need stop economic growth. For example, they suggest that technology will find ways to produce food chemically from abundant substances such as coal. Ocean water can be desalinized and transported to the places where it is needed. Chemicals can continue to take the place of natural fertility, and plants can be genetically altered to adapt to quite different agricultural regimes. Atomic energy or hydrogen can replace petroleum. In other words, some believe that in principle, and in the long run, technology can transcend limits of this kind and postpone any ultimate limit into the very distant future.

The book with the title, "Limits to Growth", published around 1970, did not focus on absolute limits. It dealt more with the allocation of resources. If the problem on which we focus is food production, we will not have the resources to deal with crises in energy production. The cost of responding to the problems generated by global warming will reduce our ability to deal with other forms of pollution. The authors tried multiple scenarios of dealing with the multiple foreseeable problems caused by continuing growth. All of them led to patterns of overshoot and collapse. In the original publication, the date of collapse in various scenarios tended to be around 2020. This date was deleted from subsequent publications, because the authors wanted to point to the problem in a more general way, not to predict the exact time when crises would lead to collapse.

Of course, there was strong criticism of this idea that continuing economic growth will lead to catastrophe in the relatively imminent future. But the basic account of the danger was not refuted. And thus far the actual course of events gives no reason to think that the danger is not real.

My own contribution to the discussion of limits has been to put the question in terms of the economic costs of growth. I believe that, in fact, there are moral and social costs, but these cannot be quantified in economic terms. Accordingly, I have been interested in developing measures of economic progress and regress that subtract economic costs from benefits. My view is that, whatever the technological possibilities, we should not pursue economic growth when the cost of doing so exceeds the economic benefit gained from the growth. At that point, we have reached what I regard as the "limits of growth."

One clear example can be found in the area of energy production. Some have argued, correctly, that we will never exhaust the oil in the ground. It simply becomes more expensive to extract it as the more accessible sources are used up. They suppose that as the price of oil rises, it will become profitable to pump this oil. The problem is that no matter how high the price of oil becomes, there will still be limits set by the cost of pumping. When it takes as much energy to extract the oil as the energy provided by the extracted oil, then it can no longer make sense to extract it. Unless we subtract the cost of growth from the benefits of growth, we will be seriously misled.

Unfortunately, no such charge is made in those measures most commonly used to evaluate changes, such as Gross National Product and Gross Domestic Product. All the costs of extracting the oil are added to the GDP. This gives a false impression of how well the economy is doing.

I am not sure why economists have given so little attention to so important a question. Most continue to cite growth figures enthusiastically, even when they acknowledge that the figures do not indicate how much real improvement there has been. A few economists have done studies that show that the improvement is less than indicated, but they have not kept these up or urged their adoption by government officials charged with reporting economic statistics.

The best work was done around 1970 by William Nordhaus and James Tobin. They developed a Measure of Sustainable Economic Welfare for the United States for the period 1929 to 1965. Over this period they showed that sustainable economic welfare had improved by about two-thirds the amount indicated by GNP figures. They argued that since there was a fairly high positive correlation, it was acceptable to use GNP figures as a guide to policies designed to improve the economy.

Their interpretation of their own work was disappointing. Their actual figures showed that economic well being improved markedly with economic growth during the 30s and early 40s, but that in the postwar period, from 1947 to 1965 sustainable economic welfare grew at only one-sixth the rate of GNP. This indicated a marked decline in the usefulness of GNP figures, if the goal is improved economic welfare. The statistics left open the possibility that the cost of growth might soon exceed the benefits of growth. Even if that did not happen, it seemed to me that economic policies should be re-oriented to benefiting people economically rather than to increasing the GNP by any means at hand.

Because this question seemed important to me, I organized a group in the mid 80s, initially with the intention of bringing the MSEW up to date. Unfortunately, some of the sources were not available to us. More important, we judged that our index, which we called the Index of Sustainable Economic Welfare (ISEW) should be different from theirs in two ways.

First, we decided to omit calculations for leisure time. These were so large a contributor to the MSEW that they tended to overwhelm the other figures. Much of the overall result depended on which of several possible ways of calculating the value of leisure time was employed. For example, one calculation considered by Nordhaus and Tobin showed the MSEW actually declining in the years after 1947 instead of growing slowly, as their preferred figures indicated. We did not question that the inclusion of leisure time was valid, but we decided that our index would be more illuminating without it.

Second, Nordhaus and Tobin did their work while environmental consciousness was still in its infancy. They chose to neglect environmental costs. We thought that these should be an important part of the index.

Because of the omission of leisure from our index, between 1950 and 1965 the correlation between growth in GNP and growth in the ISEW was higher than between the GNP and the MSEW of Nordhaus and Tobin. During that period the ISEW grew almost half as fast as the GNP, instead of one-sixth for the MSEW. However, from 1966 to 1990, while the GNP increased by half, the ISEW declined slightly. An organization called Redefining Progress took over our project in the nineties and introduced a moderate treatment of the value of leisure time. With this addition, the decline in sustainable economic welfare turns out to be considerable. It is almost certain the MSEW, which also included consideration of leisure, would have shown a similar decline in this period had Nordhaus and Tobin continued their work.

I do not want to overstate the case. There are many questions to be asked about the statistics used and the inclusions and omissions in any index. There are always other ways of calculating that would have different results. Figures of this kind are far from exact. Nevertheless, I am confident that our figures are much more indicative of actual change in sustainable economic welfare than is GDP. I believe the calculations show, beyond reasonable doubt, that in recent years in the United States the costs of growth are at least equal to the benefits of growth. In other words, our continuing rapid growth is not making us economically better off.

Similar calculations have been made in a number of European countries with similar results. The strong indication is that, in highly developed economies, growth as measured by standard indices is of no real advantage to the people as a whole. This raises very fundamental questions as to the goals and policies of such organizations as the WTO.

Thus far these questions have been asked only by nongovernmental organizations. I believe it is time that they be taken seriously by governments. It is clear to me that the government of the United States is too controlled by corporations that profit from present growth policies to engage in this work. Perhaps the government of China can give leadership.

In all probability the sustainable economic welfare of the Chinese people is rising along with the truly extraordinary growth of GDP. But one can be certain that it is not rising as rapidly as the GDP. In China, too, growth has its costs. Indeed, these costs may be more apparent and immediate in China than in most other places.

For example, the building of the Three Gorges Dam is needed to supply electricity and water. But if one wishes to measure economic welfare, the cost of construction should be subtracted from the GDP, including the cost of building new housing and other facilities for resettlement purposes. The loss of the forests and fields that will be flooded should also be subtracted.

Similarly, as aquifers are exhausted, their value should be subtracted from sustainable economic welfare. As pollution grows worse, the resulting need for healthcare should be subtracted. As economic growth brings about more crime, the added costs for police and law courts and prisons should be subtracted. When all this is done, I expect you will find that, in the not too distant future, the costs of economic growth in China, as in the United States, will equal and then surpass benefits.

From all this I draw the conclusion that we should order our economic life to increase benefits with as little cost as possible. This would lead to slower growth as measured by GDP. But it would reduce costs even more. The growth would be channeled differently. This redirection would require more participation by civil society as well as by government than global corporate capitalism now allows. Perhaps China, which is still independent of corporate control, can help to reshape the WTO so that its effects will be truly beneficial.

Four Types of Universities

Lecture Two

My account of higher education, like that of public education, follows the history in the West. I believe that it is well for Thai educators to be aware of this history, because in many ways it is also the background of Thai universities. These have not, in fact, grown out of the Buddhist schools that have existed in Thailand for many centuries. On the contrary, they were developed out of Western models and are quite similar to some of the universities in the United States.

My concerns about higher education are different from those about public schools, but in one respect they are identical. Like public schools, higher education now functions in the service of the capitalist market. Whereas public schools are designed to produce workers for the market, higher education is designed to produce engineers, scientists, accountants, managers, consultants, and executives for corporations, as well as the teachers, doctors, and lawyers required for the market society.

I call this devotion to the market and its needs "idolatry." Because the word is familiar to us largely from the Bible, and because in the Bible the writers had figures of metal, stone, and wood chiefly in mind, my use of the term may require explanation. The biblical condemnation of idolatry was because a physical depiction of deity could easily be too closely identified with the deity itself. Some Jews and Christians were led by this danger to avoid all depiction of deity. But most Christians have recognized that, despite the danger, paintings and statues can play a positive role in leading the mind toward the deeper reality they represent. Statues of Christ in Christendom or of Buddha in Thailand need not function as idols.

Furthermore, statues and paintings do not pose the greatest temptation to falsely identify a finite object as that which is worthy of our devotion. Today, at least, there is greater danger of treating the nation, or wealth, or personal success as if it were of ultimate importance. These, then, are the idols against which we should issue our warnings.

Idolatry is a serious temptation to all of us. We give our ultimate allegiance to something that is not ultimate. For Christians, the church or the Bible can become an idol. For many individuals personal success or sexual prowess can become an idol. One main theological task in each generation is to name and expose the prevalent idols in the culture and also within the church. When we view our global situation today, it is clear that the most powerful idols are wealth and its servant, the market.

The main resistance in the university to the orientation toward wealth is another idolatry. I have called this disciplinolatry, and I will explain later how this idolatry has been encouraged in recent times. Many scholars in many departments of the university devote themselves to the advancement of their disciplines with little concern for their contribution to society or the world. If they are recognized as successful by their peers, that suffices. Even their students are not equally important to them. Their loyalty is to their guild rather than to the university that employs them.

These idolatries have become important in universities only in the past two hundred years. To understand this, I will describe the rise of modern and contemporary universities against the background of earlier ones. What have been the purposes of universities in the past? How did the present situation come about?

My friend and colleague, Marcus Ford, has recently completed a manuscript on the university. It will be published later this year (2002) by Greenwood Press under the title Beyond the Modern University: Toward a Constructive Postmodern University. He identifies four models, and I am borrowing extensively from him in the account I will offer. Even the quotations I include from other authors are ones that I derive from his text.

The four models discussed by Ford are twelfth-century Paris, seventeenth-century Halle, nineteenth-century Berlin, and twentieth-century Phoenix. They provide an excellent typology for types of universities. They also offer an historical sequence that is illuminating.

We will see, however, that the emergence of a new type does not put an end to the older ones. The ideal of Paris is still with us, as are those of Halle and Berlin. Nevertheless, Berlin is more representative of the contemporary university than are Paris and Halle, and today this is being replaced by Phoenix. My critique of the contemporary university will focus on Berlin and Phoenix.

I. Paris

Paris was not the earliest of the great medieval universities. Universities dotted the Mediterranean world already when the University of Paris was founded between 1150 and 1170. But Paris was soon recognized as the greatest of medieval universities. Hence its self-understanding and actual practices have had the greatest influence.

The University of Paris served the society of its day primarily by serving the church. Europe understood itself as Christian, and the church was the primary institution of Christendom. Most Christians, however, saw no conflict between their Christian faith, on the one side, and reason and scholarly knowledge, on the other. The general assumption was that the more one knew and the better one reasoned, the better Christian faith would be articulated.

The university was comprised of four faculties. We might describe one, the faculty of liberal arts, as constituting the college. The other three were graduate professional schools: medicine, canon law, and theology. To become a physician one studied for thirty-two months in the faculty of liberal arts and an additional five and a half years in the school of medicine. To become a doctor of canon law, the times required were four years and an additional forty months.

The most demanding and prestigious program was in theology. In the thirteenth century the total time required was similar to that for the physician: five years of liberal arts followed by three in the graduate program. But in the fourteenth century the requirement had doubled: six in liberal arts and ten in theology!

The primacy of theology was displayed not only in the special prestige of the theological program but also in its influence on the liberal arts. Although the tradition of liberal arts went back to the Greeks, the medieval form was fully Christianized. The value of grammar, logic, and rhetoric (the trivium) was understood to lie ultimately in their clarification and promotion of the faith. The same can be said of the quadrivium: geometry, arithmetic, music and astronomy. Jacques de Vitry made this fully explicit. "Geometry is good by which we learn how to measure the earth, the domain of our bodies; arithmetic teaches us to count the newness of our days; music reminds us of the songs of the blessed in heaven; astronomy makes us think of the celestial bodies and stars shining brilliantly in God’s presence." (Quoted in The Medieval University: 1200-1400, by Lowrie J. Daly. NY: Sneed and Ward, 1961, p. 103.) The primacy of theology was displayed also by the fact that the actual curriculum emphasized learning Latin, the language of the church, and among the liberal arts, logic, the tool of accurate reasoning required for good theology.

Paris eventually declined, but other universities took up its great program of providing an overall understanding of reality grounded in Christian faith. In England, Oxford and Cambridge followed the basic model of Paris. When Harvard College was founded in Boston in the mid-seventeenth century, one can discern the same basic purpose and form of education. Its task was the "education of the English & Indian youth of the country in knowledge and godliness." It differed from Paris in that, instead of Latin, it taught Greek, Hebrew, Syriac, and Aramaic, since Protestants wanted scholars to study the Bible in its original form. Also the curriculum included history, botany, ethics and politics along with the traditional liberal arts. But clearly it was a liberal arts education, geared to the appropriation of the Christian tradition, and assuming that learning and faith are mutually supportive.

The shift from Latin to the biblical languages reflected the influence of the humanism of the Renaissance on the leaders of the Reformation. Humanism emphasized getting back to original documents and appreciating their literary form. During the nineteenth century, the emphasis on the biblical languages waned, but the humanistic approach to the broader human past flourished. Thus the liberal arts were separated from the rather narrow focus on Christianity that characterized their medieval and early Protestant form, while being reshaped by the influence of the Renaissance.

The dominant form of higher education in the United States up until the Second World War was the liberal arts college. Most of these colleges were established by Protestant denominations. Well into the twentieth century, they continued basic elements of the model that goes back to the University of Paris. Although the emphasis on biblical languages declined, and the new sciences, including the social sciences, were given large place, these colleges resisted practical training in favor of liberal arts, understood in a humanistic, Christian perspective.

The close tie of these colleges to the churches began to weaken in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Although the reality was actually mixed, churches were thought by much of the public to oppose the new evolutionary theories arising in biology. The easy assumption that Christian faith and broad learning were mutually supportive, an assumption central to the Paris model, was challenged. By the early twentieth century many liberal arts colleges founded by the churches were distancing themselves from commitment to official church doctrines. They were more likely to speak of Christian values or, even more generally, of good character. Their ability to resist further secularization has been weakened, so that many of them now have lost much of their liberal arts character as well as their rootage in Christian faith. Nevertheless, even today, the heritage of Paris is not dead.

II. Halle

By the middle of the seventeenth century the primacy of Christian faith and the church were giving way to the primacy of the nation state. At Westphalia in 1648, thirty years of religious wars were brought to an end by giving to rulers the right to establish, within their realms, whatever pattern of institutional religion they desired. In this way, religious institutions were clearly subordinated to secular government. Rather rapidly, in the decades that followed, there developed a primary self-identification in terms of nationality. Most Europeans in the eighteenth century were French, Prussian, or English first, and only secondarily Catholic, Lutheran, or Anglican. Wars were fought for the glory and power of nation states rather than for Christianity against the infidel, or for sectarian religious beliefs.

It is not surprising, therefore, that a new form of university was established, geared to the service of a nation rather than the church. This happened first at Halle in 1697. Frederick I of Brandenburg established the university initially as a center of Lutheran culture, but this church relationship was soon abandoned. The new ideal was free inquiry, scientific ways of thinking, and rationalism. Latin was abandoned, with German becoming the language of instruction. Professors were given almost complete control over their work.

Instead of a curriculum geared to preparing leaders for the church, the work at Halle was designed especially to prepare people for service to the state. Geography, politics, public administration, and statecraft displaced theology. The sciences were also given a prominent role. The university was to "advance the worldly practical purposes of men and the benefit of society." (Christian Thomasius, The Decline of the German Mandarins: The German Academic Community, 1890-1933, by Fritz K. Ringer. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1969, p. 17)

This idea that the university existed to serve the state, and that it did so best by communicating practical knowledge, caught on widely. Other universities that accepted this general purpose emphasized other types of practical activity. For example, the curriculum at the University of Stuttgart consisted in courses in law, military science, public administration, forestry, medicine, and economics. When Thailand first established its universities, they, too were in the service of the state. In this case, however, the Buddhist sangha was more closely integrated with the state.

This model of the university also came to the United States. The idea was affirmed by Benjamin Rush who called for a university dedicated to "those branches of knowledge which increase the conveniences of life, lessen human misery, improve our country, promote population, exalt the human understanding, and establish domestic, social and political happiness." (Killing the Spirit: Higher Education in America, by Page Smith. NY: Viking Press, 1990, p. 33.)

In the nineteenth century the idea of a university serving the practical needs of the nation caught on in the United States. It was given a great boost by the Morrill Land Grant Act in 1862. This act allowed each state to establish colleges "where the leading object shall be, without excluding other scientific and classical studies, and including military tactics, to teach such branches of learning as are related to agriculture and the mechanic arts." (Cf. The Magnificent Charter: The Origin and Role of the Morrill Land-Grant Colleges and Universities, by Joseph B. Edmond. Hicksville, NY: Exposition Press, 1978, p. 16.) As a result of this act at least one institution of higher learning was established for these practical purposes in each state.

III. Berlin

Within German-speaking countries there was a strong reaction against turning universities into training grounds for employment. Many felt that the university’s real task was research. Research aimed at knowledge, but it never claimed to have attained it. In the words of Wilhelm von Humboldt, research universities "always treat knowledge as an as yet unresolved problem, and thus always stay at research." (Daniel Fallon, The German University. Boulder: Colorado Assoc. University Press, 1980, p. 17.) Whether what was learned had practical application was of secondary interest.

In many ways this was closer to the medieval understanding than to that of Halle, but it was radically secularized. At Paris the truth that was sought was Christian truth. It was finally truth about God, who was understood to be the Truth. It was a wisdom that could guide all thought and action. In the eighteenth century, the intellectuals who opposed training for useful service sought mundane information. They were concerned neither about an overarching, all-inclusive Truth, nor about a truth that could orient people or guide their lives.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant was influential in shaping this quest. Kant emphasized the limits of reason. It could not tell us what the world, apart from our experience of it, is really like. It certainly could not lead the mind from knowledge of the world to knowledge of God. It could only deal with the world as it is given in our sensuous experience, that is, with the phenomena. This world is ordered by Geist, the human mind or spirit. The study of Geist, the distinctively human, proceeds on quite different grounds. There are, therefore, two sets of studies or academic disciplines, those that study the phenomena, which are what we mean by nature, and those that study the distinctively human. The first are called in German, Naturwissenschaften, and the latter, Geisteswissenschaften. In English these are understood to be the sciences and the humanities.

Throughout the eighteenth century, this vision of a true university was unrealized, but the destruction caused in Germany by the Napoleonic wars provided an opportunity for something new to happen. In 1810 the University of Berlin was founded, based on the vision of a true research university. It shaped the understanding of what a university should be, influencing the other German universities, and making Germany the world center of scholarly research.

Since it was understood that professors were dedicated to research, ready to follow the evidence wherever it took them, great emphasis was placed on their freedom. Noone was to be pressured by church or state to adapt research or to avoid certain topics. Since practical outcomes were not in view, it was assumed that financial considerations would have no distorting effect on research.

The academic disciplines came into being as contexts for research. For this purpose, a delimited subject matter was required. The natural sciences, for example, could focus on living things or inanimate ones. But even this elementary example indicates that the distinction is not a simple one. Living things have inanimate components. Thus the full study of living things should include chemical and physical analysis of their inanimate components. However, biology as an academic discipline does not do this. It leaves this part of the study of living things to other disciplines. It analyzes its objects only into cells. In short, it is not an exhaustive science of living things, but a study of some aspects of these things. Chemistry and physics study other aspects of these same things. Thus the physical sciences are not distinguished so much by the entities they study but by the level at which they study them.

Having defined a subject matter, a discipline works out the best methods of inquiry for that subject matter. Actually, there is a dialectical relation between method and subject matter. In biology for example, the methods chosen have been largely analytical. The biologist studies organisms by examining their organs, and organs by examining their cellular structure. This method proves very fruitful. Nevertheless, quite obviously, there are characteristics of the behavior of a living animal that are not directly examined in this manner.

This defect is compensated for in part by examining the behavior of laboratory animals. They are subjected to stimuli and their responses are carefully recorded. Again, much can be learned by such methods. Nevertheless, the behavior of animals in the wild cannot be examined in this way. Only a few biologists have actually lived with animals in their native habitats in order to study their behavior there, and the results are not always recognized as "scientific", since they are not readily repeatable in the fashion required by science.

In the humanities the typical subject matter is a body of texts. The method of study is interpretation or hermeneutics. Different disciplines grow up around different bodies of literature. The hermeneutical methods found most effective in the diverse disciplines differ from one another.

I was myself shocked by the extent of this difference within the Claremont School of Theology. For some years we required a course introducing students to the scholarly study of the Bible. We initially supposed that historiography and hermeneutics could be taught in a way that would be applicable alike to the Old and New Testaments and to church history. Once students were introduced to these critical methods they should be able to move directly to their employment in all their historical courses.

It turned out, however, that this would not work. Courses in Old Testament, New Testament, and Church History are staffed by scholars who operate in separate guilds. Each guild has its own history that has led it to identify cutting-edge scholarship in its own way. As a result the historiographical and hermeneutical methods favored by Old Testament scholars differs from those favored by New Testament scholars. The methods favored by church historians differ from both. Students had to learn three types of historiography and three types of hermeneutics!

The circularity between method and subject matter is clear in the humanities as well as in the natural sciences. Each method highlights some features of the text and ignores others. There can be no one method of research that treats the text as a whole in all its dimensions.

The tendency of the disciplinary organization of research has been fragmentation into more and more disciplines. Since each discipline applies one or more methods to a subject matter that lends itself to fruitful research with those methods, new methods generate new subject matters. Also, as there is recognition that some aspects of the phenomena are neglected by existing disciplines, there is room for new ones to be born.

This approach has been brilliantly successful. It has generated vast quantities of information, much of it highly reliable, dwarfing all that had previously existed. Since, regardless of its intention, much of this information has proved to have practical applications, it has also transformed the world. No doubt, such methods would have been developed even if universities had not been organized to support and promote them. Prior to the nineteenth century, scientific research took place largely independent of universities. But there can be little doubt that the organization of universities around research vastly increased the scientific output.

The German research university was greatly admired in the United States. Ambitious American students went to Germany to study and returned fully aware of the inferiority of American colleges in terms of the disciplinary standards they had learned. They began to transplant the academic disciplines or to reproduce them in the United States in the latter part of the nineteenth century. Johns Hopkins was the first American university to be established fully on the Berlin model. The University of Chicago also advanced this program.

By the twentieth century academic prestige was increasingly connected with research. After World War II, even liberal arts colleges were deeply affected. They hired the graduates of research universities, who had been socialized into particular disciplines and wanted to introduce their students into these. Basic courses were increasingly taught as introductions to the several academic disciplines. The colleges gained prestige if their faculties published their own research. Thus the adoption of the Berlin model in prestigious universities changed the nature of college education as well.

IV. Phoenix

The University of Phoenix represents both an evolution from, and a reversal of, the Berlin model. Since this evolution and reversal have occurred most dramatically in the United States, I will talk about the changes there that have led to this new understanding of what higher education is about. I understand that somewhat similar educational institutions have emerged in Thailand as well.

The Enlightenment is the term we give for the secularization of the European world. It overthrew the dominance of the church through shifting power and personal commitment to the nation state. It overthrew the dominance of theology by its appeal to a different kind of reasoning from that which informed the University of Paris.

Inspired by the success of physics, eighteenth-century thinkers became convinced that the mysteries of nature could be fully grasped through careful research. To follow careful protocols and deal honestly with the results constituted the heart of reason. Metaphysics, theology, and any other speculative or authoritarian types of thinking were repudiated in the name of reason. We have seen how the University of Berlin was based on these convictions, just as the University of Halle expressed the nationalism that was the other pole of the Enlightenment.

During the first half of the twentieth century, nationalism and rationalism appeared to be triumphant. However, nationalism took truly extreme forms. The most extreme, probably, was Nazism, which came into power in the homeland of the greatest universities. These universities, many modeled on Berlin, gave little or no resistance to the Nazi takeover of the whole society. In a profound way, this brought to an end the sense of self-evidence about the Enlightenment ordering of society and education. It was obvious that there were problems with both nationalism and rationalism.

At the end of World War II, Europeans understood that they could not rebuild Europe around the absolute sovereignty of nation states. In the previous lecture I noted how this led to giving primacy to the economic order. This shift from the primacy of the political to the primacy of the economic has taken place all over the world. It was accelerated in the 1980s. Today we take economic globalization for granted, and we wonder just what role the nation state still has to play.

The effects of this shift on education have been played out more dramatically in the United States than in Europe. For land grant colleges and universities to shift from a primary focus on the service of the state to a focus on service of the market was an easy transition. After all they were founded to strengthen the economy of the state. Nevertheless, the change in rhetoric and in its implications for the way education is carried out is considerable.

In this new, economistic order, the function of education is to improve the stock of human capital in the nation. Although one can see how this evolves from Halle, one must recognize the difference as well. Here are the words of a pair of commentators, John Sperling and Robert Tucker.

"The American standard of living, the productivity of the American economy and America’s ability to compete in the global economy no longer rest exclusively, or even primarily, on natural resources, capital plants, access to financial capital, or population. These assets are now secondary to the quality of human capital. . . . This quality is largely determined by education." (For Profit Higher Education: Developing a World-Class Workforce. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 1997, p. 93)

The shift to a market-orientation occurred through much of the state university systems. The change resulted in large part from the expansion of higher education in the United States after World War II. This expressed its democratization and certainly should be celebrated.

Prior to the war, most Americans did not go beyond a high school education. Higher education could be characterized as elitist. After the war, the American ideal was the availability of higher education to all. Veterans were given funds to return to college. The states developed community colleges for post-high school study and also vastly expanded their university systems.

Although liberal arts did not disappear, it soon became apparent that most students came to college with hopes of improving their employment prospects. More and more, colleges and universities competed with one another to offer programs geared to this desire. Much of the argument in the state legislatures for funding these expanded systems of higher education was also couched in economic terms. Quite rapidly the public understanding of the purpose of higher education changed.

Before World War II, college was an expected rite of passage for persons of certain classes, such as professionals. A liberal education was a mark of culture. One needed that culture to play one’s role as a leader in society. After completing a liberal education, one might study for a profession or one might enter the world of business, usually without further formal education. Bankers would be expected to be college graduates, but they normally learned the business of banking by experience in banks rather than by special courses in an institution of higher education. A university was a liberal arts college plus a graduate school and professional schools. The graduate school was likely to embody the influence of Berlin. If one was really serious about graduate studies one might well go to Europe to complete them. In short, outside of the land grant colleges and teachers colleges, that is, in the more prestigious forms of higher education, the primary models continued to be Paris and Berlin.

After World War II, the natural question to ask a student soon came to be: "What are you studying?" The question now means, "For what job are you preparing?" Sometimes students move immediately into their job-related studies. I understand this is common in Thailand. In the United States most colleges require that students be exposed to a spread of courses, introducing them to a range of academic disciplines, but students are soon able to order most of their work to their anticipated jobs. In some cases, the program of preparation may be completed within the college curriculum or even within the first two years. In other cases, college studies may be pre-professional, especially pre-law and pre-medicine. Programs for business are sometimes even more integrated between college work and graduate-professional studies.

None of this is usually thought of in terms of service of the state. Young people are encouraged by parents and society to aim as high as possible in terms of the opportunities offered by the market. Students who study this and that according to their personal interests are viewed with some suspicion even within the university. To acquire a college degree that has not prepared one for a job or for further work leading to a job is regarded as eccentric and wasteful. That higher education is now pursued primarily for its contribution to personal wealth is confirmed by a 2001 survey conducted by the Higher Education Research Institute at UCLA. 200,000 students were asked which of twenty goals motivated their decision to go to college. Three our of five chose "being very well off financially." (Anne Marie Cox, "Phoenix Ascending", In These Times, May 13, 2002, p. 10)

Given this basic attitude toward higher education, it is understandable that institutions develop that are unambiguous in their efforts to meet the need for job training. Neither traditional liberal arts nor most of the new academic disciplines turn out to be very useful for this purpose. John Sperling, founder of the University of Phoenix told one interviewer, "Coming here is not a rite of passage. We are not trying to develop their value systems or go in for that ‘expand their minds" bullshit. (Ibid.)

In earlier models, decisions about the curriculum were made for the students. At Paris and at Berlin, the faculty made the decisions; at Halle, the government. This pattern was retained in colleges and universities in the United States. Today, a major shift is occurring.

Higher education is now largely market-driven. Colleges and universities ask what young people want in order to get ahead in their competition for good jobs. They then undertake to provide what is wanted. Insofar as they take the initiative to provide what in their judgment is needed, they decide this in consultation, not with public officials, but with business leaders.

In Claremont, California, where I live, there is a cluster of excellent liberal arts colleges. They work together under the rubric, the Claremont Colleges. They have a number of common facilities, and students can take courses in colleges other than the one in which they enroll. They have certainly made adjustments to the new situation in which students come to prepare for jobs, but to a remarkable degree they maintain the liberal arts tradition. Whatever their limitations, there is no doubt in my mind that they expose students to important features of what is going on in our world and offer them new ways of understanding their larger context. In other words, the faculty’s judgment of what the students need to study to be effective leaders in society still plays a role in the curriculum.

The Claremont Graduate University is also part of the Claremont Colleges. In the past, this consisted of graduate programs primarily in the humanities and social sciences. However, it has long had a graduate program in education and others in business and management. Today these, especially those oriented to the business world, dominate the school.

After retirement, the former president of one of these colleges discovered a need in the bio-chemical industry. This industry required, in a number of positions, persons with scientific knowledge, but these positions did not require the specialized knowledge of PhDs in biology and chemistry. A master’s level knowledge of certain aspects of both would suffice. Yet no existing program prepared people in just this way. The response was to propose a new institution to be funded largely by the Keck Foundation to respond to just this need. The trustees will be chiefly representatives of major bio-chemical industries.

The plan is to have instructors who will come directly from the bio-chemical companies involved, teach for a few years, and then return to the companies. This will insure that they do not get out of touch with what is really going on in the industry. The research done by students during their graduate studies will also be intimately related to the needs of the corporations. The school will be able virtually to guarantee well-paying employment on completion of the program.

The presidents of the colleges voted to welcome the Keck Institute into the Claremont Colleges. There has, however, been resistance from the college faculties. This new institution is obviously market-driven in the way that liberal arts colleges have resisted. In response to this objection, it is pointed out that the graduate schools of business and management are already oriented to meeting the felt needs of the business community. Why should a program designed to meet the needs of the bio-chemical industry not have equal justification? Although objections persist, the Keck Institute is almost certain to become a part of the Claremont Colleges.

I recite this history to indicate how powerful are the forces operating in American society to tie higher education to the market. In most university contexts, the Keck Institute would have been welcomed without resistance. This kind of higher education has increased rapidly over recent years. It is a new form, reflecting the market society that has been shaped globally in the past few decades.

The Keck Institute will make some concessions to its environment in the Claremont Colleges. For example, it is committed to requiring course on business ethics of all students. This is unusual. Institutes and programs in higher education that directly serve business and industry are not typically expected to make such concessions to the traditions stemming from Paris. For this neglect of ethics, Berlin, with its value neutral approach, has already paved the way.

Nevertheless, this kind of educational program is as offensive to the followers of Berlin as to those who continue the tradition of Paris. The reasons are different. For Berlin, to shape teaching and results to practical ends is always to fall short of the ideal of pure research. The way in which the entire program is avowedly geared to specific practical needs of particular corporations flouts the ideals of Berlin publicly and unapologetically.

However, over a long period of time, the academic disciplines and their research projects have been increasingly influenced by financial considerations. Much research in universities has long been supported by grants from industry and shaped to its needs. Truly "pure" research, not oriented to practical results of some kind, has already become quite rare. Thus the transition from Berlin to the new market-oriented model has largely already taken place. Resistance from the academic disciplines is sporadic and ineffective.

The breakdown of the Berlin model has another dimension. I noted that the German universities gave little resistance to Hitler. Their commitment to academic disciplines and pure research gave rise to no values and convictions from which a collective opposition to Hitler could arise. Indeed, Nazism could shape research to its own ends.

This raised questions about the Enlightenment idea that the sort of reason embodied in academic disciplines could liberate human beings from error and provide the basis of social life. People, even researchers, cannot live by information alone. Furthermore, what they put forward as information, especially in the social sciences and humanities, is not as objective as they claim. One could easily detect the anti-Jewish bias of much of the most prestigious German scholarship even before the Nazi takeover. Later, feminists pointed out the patriarchal bias that had shaped the whole history of scholarship. From today’s more global perspective, the Eurocentrism of Western scholarship is painfully apparent.

From such recognitions of the inescapable importance of points of view, one can move in two directions. One is to carry further the relativization of all values. Berlin had already relativized most. There remained only the commitment to objectivity and honesty in the quest for knowledge. Now it was recognized that many of those who had been most admired for their embodiment of such norms had failed. These ideals, too, should be abandoned. What was left was self-interest, which is embodied and rationalized in the market. It is in the interest of researchers to serve the market, since this will pay well for their research. That this biases research is no problem, once we recognize that all research is biased and that there are no objective values by which to judge one bias better than another.

The second response is to emphasize how crucial for the future of the world are the values and purposes that guide research and teaching. Such an emphasis would lead us in an entirely different direction. We will explore this in the next lecture.

In any case, we can see that none of the previous models in fact has offered strong footing for resistance to the new model of market-driven education. To complete the transformation, only one more step is needed. The market-driven institutions I have described thus far have all been funded by the state or private money. As long as education is subsidized, the subsidizing institutions have some power to shape the content and form of education they offer.

The full market ideal is that educational institutions compete with one another to offer what customers want in such a way that these customers will pay to get it. This makes the institutions fully responsive to their "customers", who now replace "students" in both the rhetoric and reality of the for-profit institutions. The University of Phoenix has taken this further step and thus illustrates what market-driven education in its fullest expression has become.

The University of Phoenix is ultimately responsible to its investors. That means that it will offer only programs for which there is a good market. Since the customers are expecting to profit from their expenditures, these programs will be in areas for which the market has a demand. The university offers no degrees in the humanities or even the sciences. It offers twelve undergraduate degrees, all but one of which are in the field of business. The remaining one is in nursing. Of the eight masters degrees six are in business, one in nursing, and one in education. Its one doctoral degree is in organizational leadership. Through all of these programs it expects to improve the human capital of the nation. But the immediate task is to satisfy the customer who pays to attend the classes. If its programs do not significantly improve the earning power of these customers, market forces will undoubtedly bring about changes.

The university not only offers its programs to individuals, it also serves businesses directly. It is prepared to offer courses directly in the workplace. In this case, the corporation is the customer, hoping to improve its profitability through the improvement of its human capital. Again, unless the university can persuade corporations that their investments pay off in a quite direct way, the university will not survive.

From the business point of view, this radical dependence of universities on market forces should insure the best product for the least cost. From the point of view of society, there is a gain in that the cost of training for jobs is no longer borne by the public purse. But from the point of view of the ideals that have shaped higher education in the past, this is a disaster.

Prior to the current epoch, everyone agreed that education in general should transmit values achieved in the past. Indeed, education does this whatever its goal may be. But the values transmitted by Phoenix are only those of the market place. The university becomes part of the market society and serves to strengthen it and to exclude consideration of any other values than those associated with personal or corporate gain.

It is interesting to note that the closest analogy to the University of Phoenix in the past is to be found in some of the early Medieval universities. The University of Paris was controlled by its faculty, but some of the older universities were student-controlled. The students hired teachers to instruct them and did not pay them if they were not satisfied. Thus, the determination of curriculum by the "customers" was as thoroughgoing as in the case of Phoenix. Nevertheless, the situation differed from Phoenix in many ways, especially because the students were seeking help in preparing for life in one of the professions rather than in business, and there was no question of stockholders expecting profits from the operation.

I need hardly say that, from the point of view of any of the great religious traditions, the single-minded pursuit of wealth controlling the University of Phoenix is profoundly wrong-headed. It will not yield the happiness at which it supposes that it aims. It will weaken and ultimately destroy the social fabric. It will dehumanize the individual.

Perhaps the vividness and purity with which Phoenix embodies the university in the service of the market will provide the occasion for other universities, still holding to some features of the ideals of Paris and Berlin, to reflect freshly about the values and commitments that have been eroding already in their institutions. For others, such as Marcus Ford and myself, it prods consideration of the need for a new kind of college or university. In the concluding lecture, I will share my hopes and dreams.

Envisioning a Fifth Model

Lecture Three

Now comes the fun part. It is important to consider where we are and how we have arrived here. It is important to recognize what is wrong with this. But it is equally important and more enjoyable to imagine alternatives that would be better.

It is surprising how many people believe that what is is what must be. Since higher education in general now exists in the service of the market, many assume that serving the market is what higher education necessarily does. It prepares people for better paying work and greater responsibility. To propose that higher education might have another function seems utopian or irrelevant.

Because research and teaching are now organized in terms of academic disciplines, many faculty members assume that all rigorous research and reflection must conform to this model. Thus, in German, to be careful and accurate and responsible is to be wissenschaftlich, and, unfortunately, to be wissenschaftlich is also to conform to the norms of an established Wissenschaft. This is often translated "science", but the better English equivalent is discipline. In English we suppose that if we do not conform to the norms of a discipline we are being undisciplined in our work! Given this interpretation, it is difficult to propose an alternative organization of research and knowledge.

An historical perspective should help to open our minds to other possibilities. There were highly disciplined thinkers at Paris, and the work they did had its own intellectual and scholarly excellence. There is no universal and objective standard by which it can be declared inferior to the academic work done at Berlin. It was different, aiming at a different goal.

In addition to a historical perspective, something else is needed if we are to challenge what now is and propose something better. We must have strong convictions about better and worse. Otherwise we are likely simply to accept the results that history has brought.

At this point it is important to reemphasize that these lectures are presented from a religious perspective. Buddhists and Christians have convictions about the real needs of people that they do not derive from what is currently most popular. Both recognize the importance both of scientific knowledge and of meeting the physical needs of human beings, but both deny that either this kind of knowledge or material wealth is of primary importance for true human well-being. Hence both must object to forms that higher education has taken in recent times. Yet thus far neither community has been very creative in proposing alternative forms of higher education.

Our question now, as Buddhists and Christians, is what the purpose and goal of higher education should be. Should it renew the purposes and goals of an earlier model? You may have detected in my previous lecture that, if I had to choose among them, I would probably prove to be the ultra-conservative, favoring the earliest. I would not, of course, want to repeat what was done at the University of Paris. The humanistic contribution of the Renaissance improved the liberal arts, as well as modern natural and social sciences, must be a major part of any liberal arts education that would make sense today. But I do believe that, from either a Buddhist or a Christian point of view, liberal arts education in a value-laden context is superior to any of the forms of higher education that succeeded it.

In what follows I undertake to do two things. First, I want to describe a way to separate job preparation from research and research from liberal education. In the context of such separation, I offer a reason for reemphasizing liberal education.

But second, I have a more radical proposal for higher education. Some considerable segment of higher education should be devoted to responding to the greatest public needs of our time. This would provide a different focus from any of the earlier models. To clarify this, I will describe some of these needs as I see them and then make proposals for what a responsive form of higher education might be.

I. Sorting Out the Functions of Higher Education

Despite my appreciation for liberal arts education, I do not favor making it a part of all education beyond high school. It has its limitations, especially for our time. Society probably cannot afford to educate most of its youth through college without thereby preparing them for jobs. Many young people are not motivated to study for the sake of understanding their cultural and scientific heritage. When topics like this are studied by rote without motivation, they have little effect on students. It may be better that, after high school, many students prepare themselves for a job. For those who, later in life, decide to broaden themselves culturally, society should provide adults many opportunities for further schooling.

In my judgment, however, job training should not be thought of as higher education, and the institutions that provide it should not be called universities. The programs offered in the University of Phoenix make a great deal of sense in this context, but there is no reason to call this school a university. We can have schools of business and schools of nursing, and schools of many other types. Their cost should be borne by their "customers", either the students or the corporations for which they are being prepared as improved "human capital". If society decides that it is in the public interest to offer job training, it may, of course, help.

We could also have scientific research institutes. Prior to the establishment of the University of Berlin, most research took place in such institutes. Today, the ideal of disinterested research is largely ineffective. Most funds for such research come from industry, from pharmaceutical companies, from foundations interested in health, and from the government, especially the military. These funds could be redirected to institutes separate from universities, and we would all understand that their staffs were for hire.

The institutes that serve in this way would not be places for teaching most students, although those wanting to become scientific researchers could learn research methods as apprentices. The apprenticeship might involve attending lectures and reading books along with laboratory work. At some point apprentices could be given certificates of completion, qualifying them to serve as independent researchers. We may hope that, in addition, government and foundations will also fund some "pure" research. This could be included in universities, although even this form of research might be better carried out in separate institutes.

There should also be professional schools. Increasingly, the professions are being treated simply as jobs, with professionals viewed as employees of educational or medical institutions. But this direction in which our society is going should be opposed. We should restore the distinction between professionals and employees, renewing the status of professionals as having responsibility for the way their shared role in society is conducted and as eschewing the dominance of the market in their decisions. Professional schools would then be structured to socialize students into the ethos and the responsibilities of the profession as well as to provide the information and experience that are required for carrying out the expected social role.

In the past century or so, more and more groups have claimed professional status, and the meaning of "professional" has been greatly watered down. I am proposing that "professionals" be those who not only set their own standards and accept joint responsibility for their implementation but also assume a broad cultural responsibility. They must demonstrate that they are not guided in their decisions primarily by the goal of moneymaking. Their educational requirements must express this commitment to accepting a social role not primarily determined by the market.

Many groups that claim professional status could accept this standard and work toward its fuller attainment. But from the point of view both of society and many individuals employed in these fields, this may not be desirable in all cases. One could argue, for example, that architects play a social role that needs to be culturally informed and socially responsible but that this is less true for engineers. On the other hand, if engineers as a group were willing to internalize the social role of the professional, this might be a great gain for society.

If nursing is to be considered a profession, under this regime, that means that nursing will be limited to persons who are prepared to play a certain cultural and social role. This limitation may not be desirable. Our need for skilled help in hospitals and homes may be such that we do not want to limit this role to those who assume the broader responsibility of professionals. On the other hand, it may make good sense to have some professional nurses alongside a larger group who work skillfully in the field without assuming any wider cultural and social role.

The reality is that physicians, though they are classically understood to be professionals, have themselves become much less professional by this understanding. Not all doctors have a wide understanding of the culture in which they work or of the role of medicine within it. I believe that they, and society, have been impoverished by the tendency to suppose that technical expertise is more important than societal leadership. I hope that they, as a group, would choose to raise their standards in this respect rather than to become a trade union of experts in medicine, narrowly conceived.

My proposal is that liberal arts colleges should develop curricula directed to making future professionals historically, culturally, politically, and socially aware. In short it would prepare them for their roles as social and cultural leaders and not for their diverse fields. This would remove from the liberal arts college the pre-law, pre-medicine, and pre-business curricula, and allow it to devote itself to what has traditionally been its primary task.

If it is judged that an adequate liberal arts curriculum can be completed in three years instead of four, there should be no objection to this. If it is judged that, without the pre-professional work in colleges, professional schools need to extend their programs, such extension is justified. The point is only that each institution should do what it does best, and that the need to prepare future professionals to be cultural and social leaders is just as important as the need to equip them for the specifics of one profession.

If this model were adopted, the decision by those in particular fields as to whether to claim professional status would, at the same time, be a decision as to whether to require liberal arts education before study for the particular profession. Some roles in the business world can be conducted better by those who understand themselves as professionals and accept a broad cultural and social responsibility for leadership along with that for the standards of their profession. Obviously, not everyone working for businesses is likely to assume such responsibilities. Clarity about the role of liberal arts could serve to evoke reflection in many fields about the responsibilities borne by their leaders.

In some professional schools, liberal arts or humanistic education should continue. This is especially true of theological schools. Ministry is the profession that is least tempted to short-circuit liberal education. Much of the professional program consists in further liberal education. I refer to courses in Bible, church history, theology, and history of religions and in philosophy, sociology, and psychology of religion. The main problem here is that of most liberal education, that is, the influence of Berlin on the way liberal arts courses are taught. Instead of teaching prospective pastors what they need to know about the Bible in order to be effective in ministry, professors are tempted to give them introductions to the academic disciplines of Old Testament and New Testament.

One very important profession is education. Teachers need a renewed sense of their status as cultural and social leaders and therefore of the importance of liberal arts education in their preparation. Liberal arts education does not exclude majors, and for those who plan to teach in high school, such majors will be important. As in the case of theological education, professional work in institutions preparing teachers is likely to include further liberal studies of particular relevance to teaching along with the study and practice of effective teaching.

A sub-profession within education is college teaching. Whereas a college major should qualify one to teach that subject in high school, it does not suffice for teaching it in college. Hence much of the preparation for college teaching will be further study of the field. Specialization, however, should not be understood in terms of academic disciplines. One should specialize in the kind of study and knowledge that is most needed in liberal arts colleges, not in the kind that advances the work and status of academic guilds. Professional education for college teachers should also include considerably more attention to the art of teaching than do most of today’s graduate programs.

Today, great emphasis is placed on college teachers doing and publishing "research". Indeed, in their training this is emphasized more than teaching. The meaning of "research" is, however, vague. Often it is simply identified with scholarly publication. Good college teachers keep current on developments in their fields, and they often have their own contributions to make. Publications of this sort grow out of their teaching and often feed back into their teaching. Publication can also express the responsibility of professionals to the wider public. This is all well and good.

But "research" sometimes identifies instead only a more rarefied and specialized activity dealing with questions of interest to the discipline but remote from the needs of college students and the public. This is often in tension with the proper role of the college teacher. It is better done in research institutes; also teachers in graduate schools may share in this work.

I am proposing all this to deal with the fact that many jobs in our society require training or education beyond high school. The liberal arts program would benefit those who want to expand their cultural understanding and take some responsibility for transmitting the culture to the future, while also preparing students to go into professional schools where the profession believes that it has social and cultural responsibilities as well as simply offering employment. Others could by-pass this and go directly into job training.

What I have proposed thus far is a clarification of the difference between job training, research, liberal arts education, and professional education, along with an indication of how they might be embodied in future institutions. It is not impossible that something like this emerge out of current developments in higher education. Today’s university has no coherent self-understanding. It performs a variety of useful functions that pull the institution as a whole in different directions. This institution could easily break up into its separate programs, recognizing that many of them can be carried forward better in separate institutions. The label "university" should apply only to the combination of the liberal arts college and the professional schools that presuppose the liberal education this college offers. More efficient ways of accomplishing other legitimate goals are already being developed, as in the case of the University of Phoenix.

II. A Different Purpose

My judgment is, however, that these proposals are not sufficient. They take for granted that a society much like our own can continue indefinitely, and they propose to meet the needs of that society as efficiently as possible. They highlight cultural and social needs that are less and less emphasized in today’s market society, thereby improving the chances of society to survive. But the changes I have proposed would still not orient the university to the greatest needs of society for advanced study and research. They ignore the deeper threats that society now faces.

These threats can be considered together under the broad rubric -- the global crisis. Any hope of intelligent response requires that this be unpacked. There is no one right way of identifying its chief ingredients and of prioritizing them. Nevertheless, that must not deter us from providing some specifications of the crisis and examples of its most important ingredients.

Every formulation of these threats is itself subject to dispute. Some believe they are much less serious than they appear to others. (Cf. Bjorn Lomborg, The Skeptical Environmentalist: Measuring the Real State of the World. Cambridge University Press, 2001) Since some of these "others" believe that the continuation of a decent human life on this planet is threatened, the accurate formulation of the threats is itself of great importance.

One way of approaching this task is to think of the growth of human demands on a more or less fixed natural environment. Consider a few statistics. In the twentieth century the use of energy increased sixteen fold. Water use grew nine fold. The marine fish catch was thirty-five times larger at the end of the century than at the beginning. In general food production grew faster than the fourfold increase in population.

This is remarkable, and in one sense human beings can take great pride in their accomplishment. What is distressing, however, is that despite this enormous growth in overall production and consumption, half the world’s people are still lacing in necessities. They have benefited little or not at all from this enormous economic growth. We are told that a great deal more growth is required to meet these needs. The growth at which we are to aim is calculated by different authors as from six fold ("the Brundtland Report", World Commission on Environment and Development Staff, Our Common Future. New York: Oxford University Press, 1987) to thirty fold (Robin Maris, Ending Poverty).

No one supposes that we can achieve such growth in a straightforward way. At present petroleum is our most important source of energy. At present rates of us resources will be exhausted in a few decades. Continuing increase in annual use will only serve to hasten the crisis of their exhaustion. A vast increase in energy use must depend on other resources and new technologies.

In any case, our past record of increased energy use has been accompanied by a seventeen-fold increase in carbon emissions, a thirteen-fold increase in sulfur dioxide emissions, and an eightfold increase in lead emissions to the atmosphere.

It is not yet apparent how a manifold increased of energy consumption is to be achieved in the fact of dwindling supplies of our most important source and increasingly serious pollution.

But energy is only one of our problems. In many areas available fresh water is fully utilized and, indeed, the water store in aquifers is being exhausted. These are typically the places where more water is most needed. A vast increase in water availability in such places will probably require a huge program of desalinization of ocean water and transporting it. Though technically possible, this will be immensely expensive in resources and in ecological effects.

The catch of wild fish in the oceans can hardly be increased. It has reached and overreached its limits with some species. Future increase will depend of fish farming, which has its own problems.

In the past century success in feeding a growing population depended in large part on doubling cropland and a five-fold increase in irrigated land. However, even maintaining present production will prove difficult. Cropland is being lost to expanding deserts, and diminished topsoil in many areas threatens future production. Irrigated lands are subject to the problem of salinization, and irrigation will be difficult to continue in many places as aquifers are exhausted. There is little possibility of much further increase in either of these areas. Hopes for huge increases in production now hinge on technological solutions.

The great example of a technological solution in the past was the Green Revolution. Varieties of grains were developed that greatly increased per acre production. They did so, however, by increasing the capacity of the plants to take advantage of increased water supplies and of petroleum based fertilizers. They increased the vulnerability of food production to blight and insects. Thus the very success of this technological solution makes future production more precarious in face of the shortage of water and petroleum and the constant evolution of new pests. New technological solutions are likely to increase the dangers along with the quantity of production.

Among the problems to which growth in general contributes is global warming. This leads to greater irregularities of weather, more destructive storms, and rising ocean levels. The latter will be especially damaging the world’s great deltas, which are now so important agriculturally.

In the light of all this, is the present commitment to continued rapid growth wise? Can it solve the problems of poverty, or will it lead to environmental disasters that worsen the lot of the poor and, ultimately, of all humanity? Surely these are important questions -- more important than those that are asked and answered in any of our established disciplines!

The urgent questions we face are not limited to ecological ones. There are social and existential ones as well. The methods of social change employed for the sake of economic growth often worsen the lot of the poor, whatever their long-term goal. Traditional communities are destroyed and replaced by vast slums around huge cities. Traditional religions are losing their hold, and it seems that only capitalist values are available to replace them. The effort of each individual to get ahead does not provide an adequate ground for social responsibility or personal meaning. Domination of the world by great centers of capital and the military might of the United States breeds deep resentment. These are also important problems.

This picture of our situation should at least raise the question in our minds as to whether it is wise simply to continue our present direction, confident that technology and the market, our current gods, will solve problems as they arise. Surely there cannot be a more important question facing humanity today. Surely, a significant part of our collective intellectual resources should be devoted to studying issues of this sort and proposing responses that could moderate, if they cannot eliminate, the crises that now loom ahead of us.

III. A University for the Common Good

What does this imply for higher education? Some may assume that the university as now organized is making an important contribution to reflection about our situation, our prospects, and how to improve them. Unfortunately, it is not. There are, of course, individual faculty members who are giving excellent leadership and there are groups of students who are deeply concerned and responsive. Further, various academic disciplines contribute to reflection about these matters. But nowhere in most universities is there a sustained examination of the problems humanity faces and a discussion of alternative responses.

One problem is that the disciplinary organization of research counts against a helpful response. The problem is not one of chemistry in separation from sociology or both in separation from economics, or even of all three in separation from philosophy and religion. Even if one identified every academic discipline that touches on the problem humanity now faces and added together such contributions to understanding and response as one can find within them, one would not have much help toward an appropriate response. The fragments would not fit together, and, in any case, everything would depend on the point of view from which one tried to arrange them.

Because we now live in a market-oriented society, we turn to economists for guidance. For example, we ask economists what we should do in response to the prospects of global warming. Thus far, leading economists have encouraged us to do rather little. Viewed as an economic problem, the question is what the economic cost of global warming will be. Economists have calculated that most of our productive activity in the United States is not much affected by the weather. Only agriculture is strongly dependent on weather, and it contributes rather little to the Gross Domestic Product. Hence, economists encourage us to direct our policies toward economic growth. They assure us that we will then have the resources to pay the costs of adjustment to global warming.

The next most influential group is ecologists. Many have learned that they also have a perspective on the world situation to which attention should be paid. Their view of the appropriate response to the prospects of global warming is quite different. They encourage us to do all we can to slow it down.

Clearly sociologists, political theorists, and many others have contributions to make to this discussion. I will not discuss the issue from these other points of view. They are all fragmentary, and they reflect the categories of research that have proved fruitful for the advancement of the disciplines. They are poorly designed to give us any overview of major features of the real world.

Sad to say, the liberal arts, which I have held up as an important contribution to preparing a socially responsible leadership, do not help much either. They are oriented to the wisdom of the past, and no past generation faced the problems that now confront us. When they deal with the present, the social and cultural analyses they offer reveal important problems of many kinds, but these tend to distract us from the global crisis more than to direct our attention to it.

If we agree that some portion of higher education should be devoted to helping us all to understand the depths and complexities of the problems that face us and to envisioning ways of mitigating impending catastrophes, then what would that look like? I suggest that we have had some suggestive models at the fringe of universities in recent decades. These arose in the sixties in response to student protests against the irrelevance of their studies to the realities of their world. They provided programs focused on important issues or features of society rather than distinguished by disciplines. Three examples are ethnic studies, gender studies, and peace studies. In the seventies these were supplemented by environmental studies.

On the whole, the university has not proved hospitable to these programs over the decades. There is pressure to assimilate portions of them into existing academic disciplines. Most of those who teach in them are themselves socialized to think of good teaching and research as conforming to disciplinary norms. The defenders often try to make these new programs as much like new academic disciplines as possible. This involves a shift from the passionate inquiry and advocacy in which they all began toward methodologically self-conscious objective study of the phenomena.

Nevertheless, they continue to show that there is a fruitful way to organize teaching and research other than by academic disciplines. Of course, work that has been done in many disciplines can contribute, but it contributes to a way of reflecting and studying that does not fit any of them. My thesis is that what is distinctive about this approach can be clarified and generalized.

The clarification I would offer is that study and research can be organized around problems. The problem of how to feed humanity in the future is one that I have mentioned. It does not fit any academic discipline, but some of what has been learned in many disciplines can prove helpful. However, the goal will be to establish a new specialty that develops its own approaches to its subject matter rather than to patch together the contributions of the existing disciplines. Students who spend extended time in seeking to understand this problem and propose steps toward its solution will have to become conversant with the interconnections of climate, soils, agricultural practices, the social context of farmers, the relation of peasant farmers and agribusiness, governmental policies that affect the production of food, the earth’s natural resources, technology, the various existing and possible economies, and many other things. Among these will be the structure of beliefs and attitudes that have supported the abandonment of family farms and peasant agriculture as well as the politics involved. If the students decide that we need to return to more labor-intensive forms of agriculture, they will have to consider how we can draw people to the land and how these people can learn again the ways of farming. The students cannot become experts in a long series of disciplines. They can become experts in food production and its real prospects in our time.

I have advocated such an educational institution chiefly for the sake of society as a whole. We urgently need critical thinking about this and other problems. But this would not be its only benefit. I believe such an institution would also provide excellent education for students. Learning to identify an urgent problem, to understand its multifaceted nature, and to think through possible responses is relevant to much of life. If one has engaged in this kind of study in two or three areas during the course of one’s education, it is likely that, as life goes on, one will be able to contribute to the understanding and solution of other problems.

There is no time here to discuss other problems in any detail, but it may help just to list some. The example I spelled out at some length focused on food. Our society makes many other demands on natural resources that are being used at an unsustainable rate. As noted, our leaders seem to believe that technology can solve such problems through substitutions. We need focused study of the actual state of our planetary resources, how they are used, what substitutions are possible, what the cost of these technical changes will be, where we will hit real limits, and so forth. Ideally, the discussion would also consider the social and psychological factors involved, so that the problems of implementing changes rapidly can be recognized in advance.

Above we have emphasized the question of energy as a special case of natural resources. What sources of energy can and should be used in the near future and in the long term? What technological developments are now most urgent? Must we learn to use energy more frugally? If so, what lifestyle changes will be involved? Can these changes be voluntary or de we require new laws? What social and cultural changes will be needed to adjust to a changing energy situation? What political actions are needed now to bring about these changes?

Population growth is not a problem in itself, but it does seem to make many other problems more difficult to solve. Even today, it is poorly understood. Pressure on resources is, of course, a combination of population and per capita consumption. There are many psychological, sociological, and economic factors involved in both. If one great need is to reduce our pressure on the Earth, then there is a cluster of issues here that are of great urgency. They lead quickly to basic ethical and religious questions.

One difficulty today is that so many people are alienated from the political process and from institutions and leadership generally. This is especially true in the United States, but similar problems occur elsewhere as well. Most Americans have narrowed their horizons to concerns for themselves and their families, or perhaps for some limited group within society. This makes positive political action extremely difficult. It also weakens the social fabric of society and makes positive responses unlikely even to excellent proposals for change. To understand what is happening in our society and what might be done to change the direction in which we are going is another important focus of inquiry.

Some of us believe that at a deep level our problem lies in our worldview. This was largely shaped in the Enlightenment. Most research presupposes an Enlightenment understanding of the world as consisting of matter in motion, with the material entities related to one another only externally. An analogous view applies to human beings, who are understood to relate to one another only through contracts and exchanges. We need to examine this worldview as to its effects on human thought and behavior broadly. We also need to ask whether it fits the facts of both the natural and social sciences, and whether a different worldview might both fit the facts better and guide action in more positive ways. Buddhism has much to contribute to the emergence of a more realistic worldview, but thus far, I fear, even in Thailand, academic work proceeds on the assumptions of the Western Enlightenment rather than those of Buddhist enlightenment.

Another area of inquiry might be the human being and what is required for human flourishing. At present we have discovered that affluence as such does not make people happy. What would further human fulfillment? How does work contribute or take away from human well-being? What can the economy contribute? What is physical health, and how is it attained? How is modern Western medicine related to the healing arts of other traditions? Is modern medicine sustainable? What other dimensions of the human being are important? What contributions can be made by the economy? How can they be fulfilled? What role do religious traditions play?

I have emphasized global and national problems, but many believe solutions must be local, and, in any case, large-scale problems can sometimes be best studied locally. A focus might be to study the local region in terms of its capacity to sustain itself ecologically, socially, and economically. The changes needed to achieve improvement could be identified, and students could learn the obstacles to implementing them through making some effort to do so. Hence they would study also the culture and politics of the locale.

I trust that by now you will understand that there are important questions to be considered and that they are subject to rigorous inquiry that is also holistic, imaginative, and creative. The work done on each focus would overlap with others in ways that disciplines try not to do. But this overlapping can be helpful to all the special inquiries involved. Whereas it is almost impossible to incorporate the results of one discipline into another, it should be quite possible to incorporate what is learned in one of these areas into the thinking in other areas.

Exactly how the central problems selected in a university would be decided upon and defined should be left to the several institutions. No university, however large and prestigious, can do everything. The more study is given to any of these problems, even the more overlapping there is in the definitions of problems, the better. When we are seeking wisdom, instead of value-free information, we do not want sharp boundaries or the defense of turf.

What would a college look like that was organized on these principles? The first year might be spent in an overview of eco-social history and cultural-intellectual history to show how we have come to our present situation, along with a survey of the problems we face. Each of the subsequent years might be devoted to the study of one of the problems selected for foci by the university. Students would function as teams under the guidance of faculty members, and the intention and expectation would be to build on the work done in previous years and produce papers that would be of use to the public. Sometimes a team might decide to continue on for a second year with the same focus, believing that in that way it could contribute much more seriously to answering society’s questions.

Of course, individuals would take their own projects on assignment by the team, but the emphasis would be on contributing to the team effort. There would be no grades, but the team as a whole would periodically give feedback to each of its members. Anyone who, in the judgment of both students and faculty, failed to contribute to the effort would simply be dropped from the team. He or she could try again the next year.

What I have depicted here does not exist and is not immediately in prospect. Nevertheless, there are some moves in this direction. A number of small colleges, chiefly those from the left wing of the Reformation and with Roman Catholic commitments, have seriously asked the question of their mission in the context of awareness of the global crisis. There is a new Buddhist college in California that may go farther than any other in the direction I have identified. All these colleges have modified their curriculum (in various ways) so as to introduce their students to dimensions of the problem and prepare them to live and serve in the real, threatened world. The focus is often ecological, but not to the exclusion of human concerns. To whatever extent they order the curriculum to articulating and responding to basic needs of humanity or of our own society, they will be transforming themselves into the new type of higher education for which I call.

One question posed by this proposal is whether this problem-oriented curriculum should take the place of the liberal arts curriculum. Is this the education needed in preparation for becoming a responsible professional or just a good citizen? Actually, I incline to think it would be a better education for this purpose than the liberal arts one. However, I note that in the past, a variety of types of institutions of higher education have existed side-by-side. As long as each type makes a positive contribution, this seems good. Although I hope that more colleges will shift from liberal arts to problem-solving, I think it will be well for the two types to exist side-by-side. No doubt that will lead to hybrid forms as well.

IV. Religion and Higher Education

I have not spoken directly of the relation of Buddhism and Christianity to higher education. Nevertheless, that has in fact been my topic. My first proposal for the reorganization of higher education accented the distinctive role of the professions and the importance of liberal arts in this context. Historically this is a return to the Christian model of Paris with, of course, many changes in the content of the liberal arts and of professional education. In my concluding proposal, I have criticized current higher education, including liberal arts colleges, and expressed my hope that they can direct some of their vast resources to helping humanity find its way through its most difficult problems. This critique and proposal stems from my Christian conviction that God loves the world and seeks through us to save it.

There is also the broader question: What can provide the motivation and vision to inspire the development of a new kind of higher education? As I have noted, in fact this has come chiefly from colleges that take seriously the religious convictions in their traditions. I believe that without a traditional religious basis, or a religiously-tinged passion arising from our new global situation, there will be little critique of either disciplinolatry or economism, and little impetus to develop new patterns.

Unfortunately, only a few of the church-related colleges are open to this kind of change. Most mainline Christian colleges have modeled themselves on secular institutions. They seek "excellence" as defined by the same standards as secular institutions. If they ask about their distinctive role as Christian institutions at all, the answers are likely to be superficial. Schools belonging to conservative churches, on the other hand, are often very conscious of their Christian grounds, but they typically express this in terms of conservative mores, an emphasis on pious practices, and the teaching of Christian doctrine in the curriculum.

The schools that are moving in the direction for which I am calling are those that are clearly committed to the Christian faith or the Buddhist vision but understand their Christianity or Buddhism as leading to responsibility to the world and its people. In the United States they are usually schools of religious bodies that have not, or at least not long, understood themselves as part of the mainstream of American and academic culture. They are, therefore, more willing to be different, if that difference expresses their distinctive faith. A few small private schools without connections to religious institutions also engage in fresh explorations of what higher education should be about.

We can hope that these schools will be joined by others. In the United States, what used to be mainline Christian denominations are now old-line denominations. These are no longer quasi-established. Some Christian leaders are celebrating this disestablishment as an opportunity to become faithful to our heritage and sources. The colleges of these denominations are increasingly forced to choose whether to give up their remaining identification as Christian and compete in a purely secular context or to rethink their responsibilities as Christian institutions. If they decide on this latter role, then there is a real possibility that they will ask what they can do for humanity and the Earth at this juncture of world history. This could lead them in the direction in which I am calling them.

For these reasons I do not believe that the idea of colleges that order themselves to responding to the world’s most urgent problems is simply a fantasy. Something along these lines is beginning to happen. If we identify it, raise the question of its merits, and celebrate the new experiments, perhaps we can nurture the possibility into full realization.

Ecology and Economy

Dear Chinese Friends,

I appreciate the chance to be with you and to share some of my ideas with you, although I realize that it would be much better to listen first, at length, to you in order to learn what you see as the major problems you face. Since that is not practical, I will speak first and then learn something from your responses.

Although there are many, many problems and issues facing humanity at this time, I believe the most crucial have to do with the deep tension between ecology and economy. This is ironic, because the root meanings of these two English words are hardly distinguishable. They both derive from the Greek word oikos, which means "household". Ecology is the logos of the household; economy, the nomos of the household. Logos can be translated as "reason", and nomos, as "law", but their connotations overlap. Yet what is now meant by ecology is deeply at odds with what is meant by economy.

Today, when we think of ecology, the household in question is the biosphere, primarily the natural environment. When we think of the economy, we think of the human production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services. The two topics are treated in such a way that they hardly touch each other. And there is the problem. We need a healthy natural environment as a context for our lives. We need to produce, exchange, and consume goods and services. But precisely because we need both, preoccupation with either one, when the other is not in view, can be disastrous.

Realistically, in the past half century at least, attention has been overwhelmingly focused on economy. The arguments have been about how to increase production, exchange, and consumption of goods and services. Some economists argued that a centralized bureaucracy could plan economic growth most effectively. Others asserted that a market free from government interference would grow more rapidly. Most economies have in fact had elements of both, but on the whole giving more freedom to entrepreneurs has proved more effective.

This debate among economists has in general presupposed that natural resources are not limited. In the West, the dominant school of neo-liberal economists is often quite explicit about this. It believes that technological advance will handle any problems that arise from natural shortages. There are no limits to growth. The more rapidly we increase production, exchange, and consumption the better. Since larger markets speed economic growth, the ideal is a single global market. We need not deal with environmental problems in terms of public policy, since the market will take care of them. For example, as petroleum becomes expensive, other sources of energy, which are now more costly, will become competitive. Then they will be widely used.

Those who look at the world ecologically see things quite differently. They see that human beings are consuming more and more of the total natural product of the world. Wilderness is growing scarce or, by some definitions, has already disappeared. Many species can survive only as managed by human beings. The oil, which has made possible so much of the economic growth, will become scarce and expensive within a few decades. Fresh water is already scarce in many parts of the world. Fisheries are declining. Agricultural production will not be able to keep up with demand. Air, water, and soil are being poisoned. The heating of the atmosphere leads to increased storms and more erratic weather. Those who see things this way urge that, at a minimum, we should focus on conservation of scarce resources, reduction of pollution, and technological innovations that will enable us to adjust to a post-petroleum economy.

Thus far, the economists are victorious. All societies make some concessions to the ecologists, but only when these are not too costly in economic terms. Economic growth is the organizing principle of society. The educational system is in its service. We judge governments primarily in terms of how rapidly nations grow under their policies.

One reason that the economists are more successful in the West is that the benefits of economic growth are immediate whereas the costs are imposed chiefly on the future. Ecologists warn that within a couple of decades our petroleum-based agriculture will not work. But right now it is very profitable for the great corporations that control it, if not for most farmers. Oil is cheap. We can continue, profitably, to displace traditional agriculture, based on solar energy and human and animal labor, with petroleum-based agriculture requiring far less labor. It is far more pleasant to leave to the next generation the task of picking up the pieces when this system collapses than to anticipate the problem now. The fact that most economists encourage faith in new technology gives moral support to sloth.

Another reason for the success of the economists and the weakness of the ecologists is that the mindset of the economists, like that of most of the population, is modern. Modern rationality has compartmentalized various realms of thought. In the university we speak of multiple disciplines. One discipline may borrow from another, but basically each is autonomous. It develops its own models of the world it studies and its own methods for studying this. It does not interfere with work in other disciplines and it rejects outside interference in its own work.

The work that is done within a discipline is technical reason. In the field of technical reason modernity has been unrivalled. Among the most successful of the disciplines is economics. It has developed a model of the human being and methods of working with that model that are brilliant and convincing within the self-imposed limits. It is a modern study par excellence. And as such it communicates well to those educated in the modern university.

The model of the human being with which economists work, Homo economicus, is also purely modern. Human beings are treated in economics only is so far as they are self-contained individuals whose relations with other individuals are market transactions. Given this model, the kinds of relations that make for human community do not appear at all. Hence, within the purview of economic theory, the destruction of communities is not a loss. A fortiori the degradation of the natural world is not considered.

Ecologists approach matters quite differently. As students of the living world around us, they found that the compartmentalized and linear thinking of modernity did not work well. In this compartmentalized way, they could study rats in mazes and individual animal behavior in laboratories. They could dissect rabbits and learn about their organs. But none of this told them much about the way life took place in nature. There, each species of animals interacted with other species and with the plants that made up the ecosystem. The behavior of each organism is deeply affected by its ever-changing environment. The effects of one change work themselves out in surprising changes elsewhere in the system. Often changes introduced with the best of intentions have unanticipated deleterious results.

As we have become aware of this, we have also become aware of the history of human degradation of the environment. We know that many of our deserts were created by overgrazing, that ancient cities were abandoned because irrigation led to salinization of the soils, that deforestation has dried up springs and rivers as well as caused erosion on a mammoth scale. We are alerted to the real possibility that our present civilization is radically unsustainable.

The debate between economists and ecologists is, therefore, a debate between modernists and postmodernists of a certain stripe. Because we still live in the modern age, the ecologists are handicapped by having to make their case in modernist terms. They have to make specific predictions, and often the course of events proves them wrong. There was a famous instance in which an ecologist, Paul Ehrlich, bet an economist, Julian Simon, that the prices of raw materials would rise during a certain decade. The economist predicted they would fall, and this proved to be correct. Ehrlich based his prediction on his correct assessment that population would rise, demand would rise even faster, and more raw materials would be needed. But the economist understood more deeply how increased demand stimulates increased production and producers compete more intensely to sell their products. Economists have again and again been justified by history, against Malthus, in their expectation that food production will increase faster than population growth. It seems that their faith in technology and the market has been repeatedly vindicated.

Despite this, ecologists are sure that, at a more fundamental level, economists are wrong. Without examining the details of history or of what is now going on, economists project the statistical patterns of the past into the indefinite future. But ecologists are sure that the patterns that worked when the human economy was small in relation to the natural world will break down as the relationship changes. They point out the high social and ecological costs of past technological solutions to the production of food, such as the Green Revolution, and the unsustainability of its practices as oil becomes scarce. The proposed technological solution through genetic manipulation will solve some problems at the expense of generating others. The whole system becomes more and more precarious. Meanwhile aquifers are exhausted and rivers run dry. The technological solution of desalinization of ocean water and pumping it to the fields is so expensive in energy that its relevance is minimal. Creating plants that can survive with reduced water goes in just the opposite direction from the green revolution. A new mindset is needed, one that locates food production in the wider ecological and social context and involves consideration of how the affluent can reduce their demands for food. Encouragement of reducing consumption cuts directly against the economist’s interest in endless growth.

II.

Actually there is a third important voice in the contemporary debate. This is the voice that speaks for fairness. I noted above that community has no value in neo-liberal economic thinking. But even if we think of people as individuals, related only in the market, we can ask how the market, when left to itself, distributes its goods and services. Does it do so fairly? In the compartmentalized thought world of modernity, this question belongs to political theory rather than to economics. But since we have transferred so much power to the economic order, we need to raise the question. The answer is that the strength of the market is that it encourages growth. How that growth is distributed is not a concern of economics as such. The empirical and historical fact is that the market favors the rich over the poor and tends to concentrate wealth in fewer and fewer hands.

The minimum statement about this lack of equal opportunity and results is that most of the growth in the economy goes to the rich. What is debated is whether the poor benefit at all. Some advocates of growth adopt the trickle down theory. They are convinced that as there is more and more growth some of the benefits automatically trickle down to the poor. Some argue that in the long run the inequality generated by the market at certain stages lessens. Economic growth will lead toward equality.

Those who hold to this optimistic scenario point to the history of Western Europe. There is no doubt that after a period in which workers were intensively exploited, the situation changed. By the 1960s workers in Europe enjoyed the fruits of industrial development and economic growth. The gap between rich and poor narrowed markedly. One could say that fairness triumphed.

However, this was not a result of the market alone. Labor organized and struggled for decades to have a voice in political decisions. Legislation established high minimum wages and benefits. Taxation functioned to redistribute wealth. Of course, without the high level of national production, the wealth would not have been available to distribute. But it is disingenuous to describe the market as the agent of a fair distribution.

That the market works the other way can be seen in recent times. In the sixties and into the seventies the United States moved toward a reduction of poverty. For many workers, wages were good. But there were increasing pressures to free the market from political constraints. With Ronald Reagan’s election, these pressures became successful. The government has steadily reduced its aid to the poor and its support of workers. It has given a freer and freer hand to corporations. Through free trade agreements with Canada and Mexico it has enlarged the market. All this has made for economic growth. It has also made for increased inequality. Although economists dispute this, the evidence is that the market left to itself does very little for the poor.

Indeed, I believe that left to itself the market worsens the condition of the poor. In the United States in the past quarter century, working families have maintained their standard of living only by working more hours. Whereas once it was assumed that a man with an ordinary job could support his wife and children, now the standard is two incomes. There is little doubt that children receive less parental attention and that there are negative social consequences. Of course, the family is likely to have many devices in the home that did not even exist in the earlier period to which I refer. Expectations with respect to housing and motor transport have risen. Overall, it is hard to say whether the standard of living has gone up or down, but that more people work more hours at lower hourly pay is not seriously in dispute. Meanwhile, the pay of CEOs has soared.

III.

Especially since World War II the world has been committed to economic growth. This commitment was challenged by the ideas of those shaped by ecological sensitivity. They argued in the seventies that the most important goal must be sustainability. Otherwise the whole of humanity would be involved in a boom followed by a terrible bust when the limits of growth were reached. A sustainable society would be one in which population growth ended and goods were distributed in such a way that all could meet their minimal needs for a decent life.

Clearly there is a sharp conflict here. The policies that make for continuing rapid growth and those that make for sustainability thus understood are diametrically opposed. The United Nations called a meeting at Rio de Janeiro in 1992 where this conflict was to be worked through. The United States government, under George Bush, was determined that this conference not derail the commitment to economic growth through globalization. It did not. It co-opted the term "sustainable" by using it to modify "development." And it interpreted development to mean primarily economic growth.

Even so, the use of the adjective sustainable as a modifier of growth has had some effect. The World Bank, for example, has paid more attention to the environmental impact of the forms of economic development that it supports. Many national governments have given heightened thought to what is involved. Recently many have been willing to work toward the reduction of their carbon emissions so as to slow the process of global warming.

The United States government, however, has given little but lip service to making the growth to which it is committed sustainable. Fortunately, a number of good laws and policies were in effect already, helping to maintain the quality of the environment within the United States. But the United States continues to lead the effort to reduce barriers to trade in ways that in fact lead to ecological devastation. Even within the United States the corporate lobby works, sometimes successfully, to undermine such environmental protection as we now have. Profit, not sustainability, is the dominant concern of business and of much of the political leadership that is beholden to the wealthy for funding their campaigns.

Near Rio there was an unofficial meeting of nongovernmental organizations of many sorts. Some were focused on environmental issues, often quite local ones. Others represented labor or peasants. Some were concerned about particular ethnic groups or represented the interests of fourth world groups. Still others were committed to human rights for all. These groups discovered that despite their differences, they had a common enemy in the transnational corporations that dominated the global economy. These were supported by the great Bretton Woods Institutions, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund and the structural adjustment they imposed on debtor nations all over the world. The whole system designed for growth favored the large corporations and exploited workers, peasants, and the natural environment. Human rights everywhere suffered.

Prior to Rio, it seemed that the disparate voices of protest against corporation-dominated economic globalization cancelled each other out. The interests of peasants and workers differed and both groups were suspicious of middle class environmentalists. As long as these interests could be played off against each other corporate victory was assured. But at Rio a new set of connections was made. Since then it has been possible to speak of an NGO position on the issues facing the global community. And this reflects much more the aim at sustainable society than the aim at sustainable growth. Every UN- sponsored meeting has been accompanied by an NGO meeting that developed its own positions on the topic at hand. And there is considerable coherence in these documents.

NGO meetings do not accompany only those sponsored by the United Nations. Each time the leaders of the seven or eight great industrial powers gather for what they call an Economic Summit, there is also a meeting of TOES, The Other Economic Summit, which articulates the NGO vision over against the dominant one.

More recently the NGO movement has undertaken to mount major protests against the policies of the Bretton Woods Institutions. The protest against the World Trade Organization at Seattle took many Americans by surprise because it demonstrated the cooperation between labor and environmentalists. Because there were also bitter disagreements between First and Third World representatives to the WTO, the protesters were successful and the meeting was a failure. Subsequent protests in Washington, Quebec, Prague, and Geneva have been met by increasing police violence. They have had limited success, but they have forced the world to see that the policies of our global leaders are bitterly rejected by masses of citizens. The violence that takes place at these events is in small part due to the fact that the aim of the protest leaders to maintain a nonviolent movement cannot be enforced on all participants. But most of the violence is that of the police who carry out orders to make the protesters, however nonviolent, pay a high price for their protests.

Our leaders tell us that the protesters are naïve, that the only hope for attaining their goals of human and ecological well being rest in the pursuit of just the economic globalization to which they object. These leaders appeal to the dominant economic theory that teaches that the larger the market and the freer it is of governmental interference, the faster wealth is created. It is assumed that this rapid increase of wealth will benefit all.

I am one of those who supports the goal of sustainable society rather than sustainable growth. If the growth that is pursued were truly sustainable, I would have no objection. Such growth belongs to a sustainable society. Truly sustainable growth would operate within the limits of renewal of resources. We would not exploit a specie of fish beyond the rate of its reproduction. We would not cut down trees faster than new trees can be grown. Further, we would not degrade the quality of what we were exploiting. The health of the ocean and of the forests would be maintained. With respect to nonrenewable resources, we would use them as slowly as possible, developing alternatives as we proceeded.

But this is far from the case. The growth that is supported by dominant policies has wiped out the stock of certain types of fish not only locally but globally. It is reducing habitat for fish reproduction such as mangrove groves and degrading the ocean floor. It is replacing natural forests with monoculture and causing enormous loss of soil for trees through erosion. This is not sustainable. In the meantime, it renders drives many people out of their native habitats in forests, forces farmers off the land, pays laborers less than a living wage, and renders the poor more powerless.

On the other hand, it builds tall buildings, produces huge quantities of goods for those who can afford them, renders travel all over the world easy, and makes life very comfortable, even luxurious, for perhaps a quarter of the world’s population. It holds before many others the promise that they can participate in this affluence. It argues that there is no alternative.

Further, it thinks of sustainability in another way. As some species of fish are decimated and become unavailable, others are harvested. Fish farms replace wild fish. Genetic manipulation can increase the size of fish. As long as technology can keep ahead of natural decline, it is supposed, the fish harvest can grow. If this is not possible, other foods can be substituted for fish. Sustainable growth allows for unlimited substitution as long as human nutritional needs are met. Growth as increase of economic activity can thus continue indefinitely.

Those with ecological sensitivities are skeptical of this possibility. Substitutes for a healthy ocean and adequate soils are not as easy to obtain as substitutes for one form of metal or another. Even the question of substituting other forms of energy for oil will prove more difficult than economists generally seem to recognize. In addition the substitution of an artificial environment for a natural one seems to many of us a huge loss not really compensated by more gadgets.

This is not the place to pursue this argument between advocates of sustainable society and endless growth. It is, in my opinion, the most important issue facing humanity today. If the economists are correct, then a prosperous future awaits all our descendants, if only we will be patient and stay the course. There will be plenty of goods and services for all, and even the poorest will have enough. If the ecologists are correct, continuing on our present course is a sure recipe for disaster. The children of those who now sacrifice for their sake will be the first to be destroyed by scarcity and pollution. Even the rich will live in an impoverished and inhuman world.

No doubt the truth lies somewhere in between. But I have acknowledged that my judgment is closer to that of the ecologists. Perhaps China can find a way through the dilemmas posed by the clash of economic and ecological thinking and practice. Perhaps China can even lead the way for the whole world.

Constructive Postmodernism

I. What is "post-modern"?

"Postmodern" is an intentionally odd term in English. For a long time, the words "modern" and "contemporary" and "up-to-date" were used almost interchangeably. The content of the "modern" changed with time. What was technologically "modern" in the nineteenth century was called "Victorian" in the twentieth century.

However, the term, "modern", became attached also to particular styles. For example, "modern" architecture was not simply whatever was currently fashionable but specifically the Bauhaus style. Architects who understood that style but went beyond it could either say that what was once modern was no longer so, or call themselves "postmodern". Some in fact chose to label themselves "postmodern".

The more general and important use of the term "modern," however, referred to a much broader movement and period of time. There were textbooks on "modern" European history. The contrast here was with ancient and medieval history. The break between ancient and medieval came with the collapse of the Roman Empire in the West. The boundary line between medieval and modern was much less clear, but certainly the fourteenth century was still medieval and the seventeenth century was universally regarded as modern.

Until recently, modern history was assumed to continue to the present and to be still in process. But during the twentieth century there was a cumulative sense that major characteristics of the recent past were ending. The word "post" was used to describe the new situation. When the age of European empire ended after World War II, the new situation was described as post-colonial. As the globalization of the economy reduced the importance of national boundaries, one could speak of a post-nationalist epoch. As the industrial heartland exported its traditional factories and concentrated on information technology, people spoke of a post-industrial age. As Christianity became increasingly disestablished politically and unconvincing to the intelligentsia, the new situation could be called post-Christian. As the basic assumptions of the Enlightenment became more and more questionable, one could describe the new cultural and intellectual developments as post-Enlightenment. As commitments to various theories of government and society lost their sway, people spoke of the new climate as post-ideological. As feminists lifted to consciousness the age-old pattern of male domination and destroyed its self-evidence, they could call for a post-patriarchal society.

With so much profound change occurring, the sense arose among some European intellectuals that the differences between the new global society and the past few centuries is as great as that between the modern period and the medieval one. We no longer live by the basic assumptions and styles that began with what has been called modern civilization. Our world is post-modern.

One problem with that label is that it gives little clue as to what features of the modern world are being left behind. The term has been used so commonly and with such different meanings that it is now itself becoming out-of-date. Some view the "post-modern" movement as a short-lived fad and speak of being post-post-modern.

Although too much is at stake in the critique of the modern world to dismiss as a fad the idea that we are moving into a new epoch, the term is weak also in that it does not provide any positive indication of what is succeeding the modern or what should follow it. The most influential form of post-modernism is often called "deconstructive". The accent clearly falls on the critique of the assumptions derived from the modern period that still shape most of our Western culture. This critique is a valuable and even necessary undertaking, but a new world cannot be built simply on taking apart the old.

II. Constructive Post-modernism

Constructive post-modernism is, of course, just one of several forms of post-modernism. The term "constructive" is used to contrast with "deconstructive" to emphasize that constructive post-modernism is proposing a positive alternative to the modern world. This does not mean that it opposes the work of deconstructing many features of modernity. The point is that critique and rejection should be accompanied by proposals for reconstruction.

The label was invented by David Griffin, who edits the State University of New York Series on Constructive Postmodernism, but the position to which he has given that label has been around for some time. He comes to it from the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead, to which I also subscribe. Several persons influenced by Whitehead used the term "post-modern" in the 1960s, but we did not emphasize it, and its recent currency is not the result of our use.

Whitehead did not use the term, but he did use the term "modern" in a way that suggested that the modern period is over. Already in the twenties, he published a book under the title Science and the Modern World. In the book he makes clear that the "modern science" of which he speaks is now superseded. It was bound up with a view of reality that science itself has shown to be invalid. Our task is to reconstruct a scientific worldview based on new developments in relativity and quantum theory. Since the whole of modern culture has been intimately related to the same worldview, the changes required are pervasive. Whitehead suggested the direction of needed change in that book and developed it much more fully in subsequent ones. That some of us spoke of this new way of thinking as post-modern followed easily.

Many of the conclusions to which those of us influenced by Whitehead have come have been reached by others out of different intellectual histories. For example, feminists criticize many of the same features of the Western cultural heritage to which Whiteheadians object. Often their criticisms are richer and more pointed than ours have been. Ecologists have joined Whiteheadians in objecting to the tendency of modern Westerners to ignore the natural world or treat it as merely instrumental to human use. Buddhists, for millennia, have rejected some of the ideas that Whitehead found wrong in modern Western thought. Hence, Griffin’s series includes writings by people who have been little influenced by Whitehead but have come to similar conclusions.

Nevertheless, Whitehead’s philosophy provides the most systematic and explicit account of the basic assumptions of constructive post-modernism. I will explain these assumptions primarily in Whitehead’s terms while recognizing that other formulations are possible and that others, feminists and environmentalists, for example, make independent contributions of great importance to the contemporary movement.

III. The Scientific and Philosophical Underpinnings

The Enlightenment adopted the machine as its basic model of reality. It did so in conscious reaction to the primacy of organic models in the Middle Ages. Even living things are to be understood as complex mechanisms. Everything is composed of matter. All forces operate ultimately by pushes and pulls. Teleology is excluded. In short, the world can be understood exhaustively in terms of matter in motion. Everything can ultimately be explained by the laws of motion

This vision of reality was extremely fruitful for physics and the other natural sciences. This fruitfulness reinforced confidence in the worldview. It also strengthened its acceptance by the culture as a whole.

On the other hand, most people were not disposed to view themselves as parts of this world machine. The philosopher who did most to shape this vision of the world, Rene Descartes, regarded the human mind as wholly different in nature. Whereas everything else is material, the human mind is mental and operates by entirely different principles. We are left with a radical, metaphysical dualism. Dualism poses insuperable philosophical problems; so modern Western philosophy can be seen as a struggle to overcome it. Some philosophers became thoroughgoing materialists, others, phenomenalists, and still others, idealists. But overall the project of overcoming dualism has not been successful.

Scientists, in any case, continued their work through the nineteenth century on the assumption of the mechanistic worldview. They were shaken only by the development of relativity theory with its move from matter to energy as basic to the world and by the discovery that the subatomic world did not conform to their worldview. For some purposes it was to be treated as particles; for others, as waves. One important step in the disintegration of this worldview came with the discovery that there was no ether through which light waves were propagated

On the whole, dualism was accepted by the general culture. To this day it shapes the structure of the university, with its division between the sciences and the humanities. Most people, whether they articulate it or not, view the world given to them in sight and touch as material, while they consider themselves to transcend that purely material status. The evolutionary perspective, which has also entered into the common sense of the culture, created acute difficulties for this dualism, but somehow the two inconsistent ideas have continued to exist side-by-side in the general culture and in the university.

Clearly, modernity has left us in a state of intellectual confusion and chaos. It thinks of nature in materialistic terms, but in these terms it can explain neither the natural world nor how it is related to human beings. It can provide no notion of substance, yet matter is inherently a substantialist notion, since matter is understood to take on different forms without ceasing to be the same matter. One material object precludes others in the space that it occupies, but in the real world, there is interpenetration among the actualities.

A common response has been to decide that the world is unintelligible. If it does not conform to the schema imposed on it by modern thought, then in principle, many think, it cannot be understood. We must simply abandon the goal of understanding in any broad or inclusive sense. The project of reason launched by the Enlightenment is a failure. The mind can analyze, but it cannot synthesize or arrive at any universal truths.

Much of post-modernism adopts this view. It depicts modernity as the Age of Reason and post-modernity as requiring the abandonment of all attempts to achieve a comprehensive vision of the world. Metaphysics is regarded as out-of-date. All thinking must be understood to be relative to the conditioned standpoint from which it arises. Especially if that standpoint is a privileged one, it is to be regarded with suspicion as an instrument of domination. This post-modern enterprise is unmasking the false pretenses of modern thinkers. It abandons the effort to achieve a coherent view of nature, much more, of the world as a whole.

I have been describing, in particular, deconstructive postmodernism. There is much to accomplish in this work. Recent decades have expanded our understanding of the many non-rational factors that enter into human thought. Historians and anthropologists have made us aware of the historical and cultural conditioning of our thought. Marx showed us how much of our thinking is shaped by our class perspective. Freud unveiled many unconscious forces at work in our supposedly rational thought. Now women have forced us to acknowledge how gender informs our thinking.

Despite all of this, Whiteheadian post-modernists continue to believe that efforts at comprehensive thinking are appropriate and needed. We disagree that the breakdown of the Enlightenment conceptuality displays the limits of conceptual thought in general. Before abandoning the wider quest for intelligibility and understanding, we propose that we should test the usefulness of other conceptualities.

Whitehead’s basic proposal is that we should shift from substance thinking to event thinking. Thinking from the model of the machine is clearly an example of substance thinking. In general, taking the objects for philosophical analysis from the data of sense perception leaves us in the grip of substance thinking even when we acknowledge that we cannot discover substances in or through our sensory experience. But we also have the idea of an event or happening. Just as we can think of tables and clocks; so we can also think of conversations and car accidents. Modern thought has conditioned us to think of conversations and accidents as enacted by people or happening to objects. In other words events presuppose substances. But there is the other possibility that events are the primary realities and that what we think of as substances are complex structures of events.

This is not a new move. Buddhists turned from Hindu substantialism to the primacy of events more than two millennia ago. Heraclitus is famous among Greek philosophers for initiating a similar move. Hegel certainly emphasized the processive character of things. What is new in the twentieth century are the data of contemporary physics that call for explanation in terms of an event philosophy. Whitehead’s philosophy is the most extended and rigorous effort to carry through this program. It is, in this way, post-modern in a sense that earlier proponents of the primacy of events could not have been.

Whereas the effort to overcome dualism was doomed to failure when nature was conceived as material substance, a nondual view follows quite naturally when nature is conceived first and foremost in terms of events. A human experience also has the character of an event. Of course, a human experience has characteristics we do not expect to find in unicellular organisms, certainly not in molecular or electronic events. Nevertheless, it is possible to identify characteristics that all events share and to imagine how more complex events evolved out of simpler ones. Gradations and differences are very important, and the study of human beings involves dimensions that are not relevant to the study of the natural world. But there is no metaphysical divide between the two sets of events.

Just as science has analyzed complex "material" objects into smaller ones; so also it can and does analyze complex events into the simpler ones of which they are composed. At some point we arrive at events that cannot be further divided. A momentary human experience is such an event. So also, probably, is a quantum burst of energy. Whitehead calls these unit events "actual occasions". In Whitehead’s view, actual occasions are best understood as syntheses of their relations to other events. In other words, preceding events participate in making them what they are. Whereas, when we think in substance terms, we ask what a thing is in itself and then how is it related, when we think in event terms, we recognize that an actual occasion comes into being as a synthesis of relations and has no existence apart from those relations.

Furthermore, if there is intrinsic value in some events, such as moments of human experience, there is intrinsic value in all events. This is particularly important with respect to other sentient beings, but it makes a difference even for our attitude toward the inanimate world. Of course, the interconnection of things means that all have value for one another. But it is important to add that nothing has value only for other things. Every actual occasion has value in and for itself as well.

These three points are crucial to constructive post-modernism. They are by no means limited to Whiteheadians. First, dualism is rejected. Human beings recognize their kinship to all things. Second, individuals do not exist apart from one another. Everything is interrelated. Human beings are part of a complex web of existence. And third, every actual occasion is of value. It is wrong to appraise nonhuman entities only by their contributions to our well being.

David Griffin speaks of this post-modern understanding of the natural world in terms of re-enchantment. Instead of a world of dead, passive, valueless, matter we inhabit a world of living, active, intrinsically valuable occasions. Instead of alienation from a merely objective world, we experience kinship and participation in nature. This has two types of implications. First, it calls for a re-enchanted science, that is, a science that seeks to understand the world as living, active, and valuable. Second, it calls for rethinking the public policies that have been based on the modern worldview. This is especially important with respect to economics, since that has become the reigning discipline in the shaping of governmental policies. I will devote the next three sections of this lecture to these topics.

IV Post-modern Science

One major reason for developing a post-modern worldview is the confused of science at this time. That confusion has given aid and comfort to those who want to end the project of formulating comprehensive worldviews. They encourage us to abandon the quest for any kind of universality. Paradoxically, in doing so, they often make universalistic arguments, but this is not the place to pursue the internal conflicts occasioned by their proposals. Their critique of reason opens the door also to forms of irrationalism and fideism that the deconstructive post-modernists do not, in fact, want.

The task of reconstructing science around the primacy of events is, of course, an enormous one, and I am not qualified to contribute to it. Nevertheless, I think you may be interested in some of the steps that have been taken. I will report briefly on developments in relativity and quantum theory.

Whitehead himself devoted a great deal of time and thought to formulating a theory of relativity. He did not dispute the empirical accuracy of Einstein’s theory, but he believed there were weaknesses in its formulation that could be cured by shifting more fully away from substance thinking. He found Einstein’s view of space-time especially troubling. Einstein treated space-time as if had a substantial character that Whitehead believed it did not have.

The issue focused on Einstein’s claim that the curvature of light as it passed around heavenly bodies was based on the curvature of space. Whitehead believed that space is not the kind of thing that can be either curved or straight. As a mathematician he pointed out that any space that can be viewed as elliptic or hyperbolic can also be viewed as Euclidian. To assert the curvature of space as a physical or metaphysical fact is deeply misleading and leads to a theory that cannot be genuinely understood.

Whitehead proposed that similar results can be obtained by focusing exclusively on multiple time systems. He worked this out in mathematical detail in his book on The Principle of Relativity. The predictions following from his formula were so close to Einstein’s that for a long time no test could be made to support either formula against the other. However, about twenty years ago, more refined tests of the tides began to count against Whitehead’s predictions. His formula called for summing up all the gravitational forces of the universe, whereas Einstein employed a nonlinear equation.

Whitehead was aware that the empirical evidence might count against his formulation. For him nothing fundamental was at stake. He offered a second equation whose results, he said, would be identical with Einstein’s, but he did not work this out. Only recently has this second Whiteheadian formula been unpacked, thanks to the work of Robert Russell. Like the other equation, it replaces the curvature of space with multiple time systems. It shows that a more intelligible account of relativity can be given.

A hundred years ago intelligibility would have been important to the community of physicists. For centuries physics had sought to understand and explain nature. But the confusion of modern physics had not stopped progress in prediction and control, and many physicists abandoned the effort to understand. Most are now conditioned to be interested in new theories only if they lead to new predictions. Accordingly, the availability of a more intelligible theory counts for little, and Whitehead’s achievement has received very little attention.

There is another respect, however, in which Whitehead’s theory may prove to have advantages. It does not require that the speed of light is an absolute limit for the transmission of energy. For Whitehead this is an empirical question. Today, there is evidence of faster transmissions.

For Einstein, the issue was not only the transmission of energy but also any kind of influence whatsoever. He was accordingly troubled by a thought experiment that indicated that two particles with opposite spin would be in communication with each other instantaneously. The thought experiment assumed that with paired particles, if the spin of one changes, the spin of the other also changes. This occurs however far apart the paired particles may be. This theory is called Bell’s theorem.

Experiments have verified that Bell’s theorem is correct. There seems to be influence at a distance that is virtually instantaneous. This is not possible in Einstein’s worldview.

Whitehead, on the other hand, was open to this possibility. His judgment was that the transmission of energy through what he called pure physical prehensions depended on contiguity and would, therefore, take time to propagate over a distance. But he thought that there is another way that occasions can relate for which spatial distance is not determinative. He called this "hybrid physical feeling". A hybrid physical feeling does not transmit energy, but it does communicate information. It is the influence of the "mental" pole of one occasion on another. Among human beings this can be found in mental telepathy. Something analogous can occur among much simpler occasions.

It is my understanding that at the quantum level there is evidence that what happens in one occasion is affected by the whole quantum world. I do not know enough to affirm this, or whether the effect would be instantaneous or could be mediated at the speed of light. But if, as I have been told, the influence seems to be instantaneous, Whitehead’s philosophy could provide an explanation that other theories seem to lack.

Quantum theory has been in fundamental difficulty from the beginning. Experimenters approached the data with two models in mind. They thought that light and similar phenomena must consist in either waves or particles. This judgment showed the power of substance thinking over their minds. "Particle" is a new term for something like the earlier atom, which turned out, despite its name, to be divisible. Particles are envisioned as tiny lumps of matter that travel though space. Waves, on the other hand, are patterns of motion and thus more like events. However, the basic model was taken from movements on the surface of water. Sound waves were movements of air. It was assumed that light waves also had a material substratum, which was named the "ether." When the lack of an ether was demonstrated, the idea of light waves became essentially unintelligible, but the language was retained because the mathematics developed for the analysis of wave motion was useful also for some features of light.

It is well known that some experiments showed the particle character of light and others showed its wave character. Unfortunately, the concept of a wave and that of a particle cannot intelligibly be applied to the same thing. The solution was to impose on this confusion a notion of polarity, which in fact clarified nothing.

There is another possible approach. If one gives up substance thinking and understands the world in terms of events instead, one can see the experimental situation in terms of a field of events. Some patterns of relations of occasions in a field can resemble "particles" sufficiently that mathematics designed to interpret particles has relevance. Other patterns of relations in the field resemble waves. I do not mean to suggest that this simple comment solves the problems. I mean only that it provides a different context for thinking about the phenomena.

Whitehead himself wrote little about quantum theory. Nevertheless, his metaphysics can easily be considered a quantum one. The world consists, in his view, in interrelated "actual occasions", most of which are quantum events.

The quantum theorist whose thought most resembled Whitehead’s was David Bohm. Bohm wrote extensively about the importance of thinking in terms of events rather than substances. He proposed the model of the hologram for thinking of unit events, a model very similar to what Whitehead says about actual occasions. And, unlike Whitehead, he developed, together with Basil Hiley, a quantum theory based on this different perspective, which can predict all known quantum phenomena.

Like Whitehead’s still viable theory of relativity, Bohm’s formulation predicts chiefly what is already predicted by established theories. Its advantage is coherence and intelligibility rather than prediction. Unfortunately, most physicists have been conditioned to think that the only test of the value of a theory is its ability to predict and thus to be tested empirically; so this theory has not gained much attention. For this reason, we must share Bohm’s hope that there are some distinctive testable predictions that can be derived from his formulations.

The constructive post-modern vision has implications for other sciences as well. All the sciences studying living things have, in the modern context, treated their subjects as if they were mere objects. It has been part of the modern program to empty the world of any purposefulness. Purposeful behavior is denied any role in the evolutionary process despite its obvious importance. Or, if the importance of apparently purposeful behavior is acknowledged, it is explained as only apparently purposeful, actually resulting from mechanical causes. From the point of view of constructive postmodernism, on the other hand, there is no reason to deny a role to animal purposes. The recognition such purposes makes possible a far more adequate and plausible account of the evolutionary process.

In the past, wild animals have been studied almost entirely in captivity. Often they are dissected so that the behavior of the animal as a whole can be explained by the behavior of its parts. Much has been learned in these reductionist ways. But much is also obscured. Only recently have a few students actually spent extended time with animals in the wild. They have learned much that could never be discovered in the laboratory. However, their work is not really encouraged by the guild. It is hardly recognized as science from the point of view of modernity. From a constructive post-modern point of view, in contrast, it is an important source of information that should inform what is studied in the laboratory as well.

Studies of the relation of the brain to subjective experience are another area in which constructive post-modern thought can make a large difference. The great majority of work in this field remains reductionistic. Explanation for subjective experience is sought in brain activity. The possibility that subjective experience participates as a causal agent in the process is hardly considered. Fortunately, there have been exceptions. Roger Sperry’s work on the split brain led him to recognize the causal role of conscious experience. This is the direction of inquiry that constructive post-modernism supports.

IV Constructive Post-modern Political Theory

Modern thought has been influenced by many factors. In this lecture I will view it only in terms of the influence upon it of the model I have been describing. Just as the world as a whole was viewed as composed of tiny bits of matter that related to one another only externally, that is, spatio-temporally, so human beings were viewed as individuals who relate to one another only externally. In this case, the relations were viewed as contractual. Political and economic theory were both developed on this basis.

In the Middle Ages the church provided legitimacy to both ecclesiastical and political authority. This gave a certain primacy to the religious institution. Political leaders were not happy with this, and especially as modernity dawned, they sought legitimacy without involvement of the church. They could claim the divine right of kings, but it was better still if this right could be derived from an analysis of the social situation as such. Accordingly, they favored the social contract theory.

This theory was based on a myth. The idea was that at the beginning there was anarchy. Each family sought only its own good with no responsibility to others and no restrictions on how they might treat others. This meant equally that there was no check on how others might treat them. The result was profoundly unsatisfactory. In Thomas Hobbes’ famous formulation, life was "nasty, brutish, and short." According to Hobbes, it was so bad that it was to the advantage of each family to gain security at any price in liberty. He deduced that the social contract consisted in the surrender of all personal liberty to a monarch in exchange for the security of person and property. John Locke did not see the consequences of anarchy in quite such dire terms. Accordingly, he thought that a certain amount of personal liberty was preserved in the contract. The American constitution builds on Locke with its claim that all have the right to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness.

Of course, this is a completely unhistorical picture. Human beings originated and evolved in tightly knit tribal communities. Only gradually, and much later, did they develop more individual autonomy. The legitimate point of the theory was, of course, that as they developed individuality, it was still important for them to accept sufficient government control to insure security. That was the Hobbesian ground of the legitimation of rulers. A ruler who could not secure the persons and property of subjects lost legitimacy under this theory. As long as such security was preserved, protests of lack of freedom, or of injustice, carried little weight.

The point here is not to debate the relative merits of Hobbes and Locke, but to stress the atomistic individualism of modern political theory in both these forms. In contrast, constructive post-modern theory emphasizes that people are bound together in communities before they develop personal individuality. This is simply historical and sociological fact. An infant can only become a full human being in relations with others in which contracts play a very small role.

Viewed in this light, the question of the legitimation of government is quite different. A community needs some pattern of governance. This applies already in the family. There the question is whether the father (or the mother) makes all the decisions or whether there is participation of both and even of the children in decision-making. We may assume that in many instances the father has the physical power to enforce his will. The question is whether this best reflects the nature of the whole pattern of relations within the family. Are all members of the family most benefited by this pattern? Does it achieve even the deeper purposes of the father in the most fulfilling ways?

A post-modern approach is not likely to prescribe particular rules. It does encourage experimentation with inclusion. Obviously a baby cannot take part in family decision-making, and a child of eight cannot play the same role as the mother or father. But listening to all voices and progressive weighting of their preferences makes sense when we understand each member of the family as largely constituted by relations to the others.

Just as individuals cannot exist apart from relationships to others, so also the family depends on larger patterns of relationship. In every situation, some patterns are always given, and what is thus given is to be respected and dealt with. One never begins with a blank slate. Still, ideally, each family participates as one family among others in affirming, critiquing, and modifying those larger patterns. People and families grow when they participate in the decisions that shape their context.

This participation can sometimes consist in direct involvement as in many tribal councils or the New England town meetings. More often it involves selection of representatives people trust to decide issues that may be too complex for most members of the community to make sound judgments. Either way, there is no assurance that the decisions will be wise, but the strengthening of community that follows from a sense of ownership of the process is an intrinsic value. And it normally protects participants from extreme exploitation and distortion.

My intention here is not to spell out a political theory but to indicate that a post-modern theory emphasizes the bottom-up approach. Modern thought began with dispersed power but moved directly to its centralization. Once centralized, the ruler would organize power from the top down. In the United States, local communities have power only as that is granted them by the individual states. In a post-modern society the state would have powers granted it by the cities and counties. The whole structure of authority would grow out of community, communities of communities, and communities of communities of communities.

VI. Constructive Post-Modern Economic Theory

The same understanding of human beings underlay modern economic theory. Homo economicus is viewed as an atomic individual related to others only in market transactions and contracts. Accordingly, economic theory has no place for community or for such values of community as justice. The goal is simply increased economic activity or the creation of wealth.

This wealth is increased when the market sets prices based on supply and demand with no interference from outside. Originally the market that served as the model for economists was the village market, where personal relations provided a favorable context for the transactions. However, economic analysis showed that larger markets encouraged faster growth. Since human relations other than market transactions counted for nothing in economics, economists favored larger and larger markets – today, a global market.

In the past, markets were always contained with political borders. This did not insure that they were well managed, but it offered the possibility that concerns for community and justice could establish some limits on their hegemony and moderate their effects. Today there is no global government to regulate markets or defend communities from their ravages.

A post-modern economics would return as far as possible to the village market. That is, economic structures should operate within political ones, and the closer these are to the people who are governed, the better the chance for genuine human participation. Obviously, however, many goods needed by contemporary society cannot be produced locally. Still it is possible to favor a bottom-up economy along with the bottom-up political structures. What can be produced and marketed locally should be. What requires a larger market should come under the jurisdiction of a community of communities. Production that requires a still larger market should be supervised by a community of communities of communities. These may reach to a global level, but this will not be a global economy in the present sense. It will not erase the boundaries between communities or run roughshod over their interests.

Modern thought was dualistic, and this has been reflected in economic policies with respect to nature. This has been particularly apparent in the United States. The policy of Europeans coming to the Americas in general, and to the United States in particular, has been one of rapid exploitation of nature, viewed simply as "natural resources." Economic theory has depicted nature in no other way, and even natural resources have not been regarded as important. They have virtually disappeared from standard economic textbooks, which treat labor and capital as the only significant factors of production. The United States still has policies that favor the rapid exploitation of resources for the sake of economic growth.

Even now when the limits of resources and problems of pollution have forced themselves on the attention of everyone, our inheritance from modernity counts heavily against an adequate response. We calculate the cost of preserving bits and pieces of the natural world in economic terms. When we ask what policy to adopt in view of global warming, economists are inclined to advise us not to make any costly changes. If we accumulate enough capital, they argue, we will be in position to pay the costs of global warming as they arise.

The modern attitude toward other creatures expresses itself today in the way we raise animals for slaughter. We do not concern ourselves with their suffering. It turns out that the meat of calves is tenderer when they get no exercise; so some are raised in tight confinement. Chickens are raised in such confined quarters that they cannot spread their wings. Since money can be saved by mass production, huge hog farms now raise their hogs in miserable condition, meanwhile massively polluting the land and water and bankrupting farmers who try to continue more natural production methods.

Some constructive post-modernists have become vegetarians. Since they believe that the animals we raise for our food have their own intrinsic value, they do not want to participate in a system that kills them. Others do no believe that killing animals is necessarily so bad that it should be given up altogether. I am one of these. We argue that if an animal is allowed to have a good life and is killed humanely, this is, on the whole, positive. If people did not raise them for food, there would be far fewer animals in the world. Accordingly, moderate meat eating is acceptable.

On the other hand, in the United States, the justification of eating meat is becoming ever more difficult. More and more of our meat is raised in ways that mean the animal’s whole life is one of misery. The enjoyment of the meat can hardly counterbalance such extended suffering.

There are additional reasons for a post-modernist to be concerned. Our American appetite for beef leads to the cutting down of tropical forests in Latin America to gain temporary grazing land. This is often abandoned after a few years because it is not really suitable for this purpose, but the destruction of forest cover and animal habitat has long-lasting consequences.

As global grain supplies decline in relation to demand, there will be additional reasons for reducing meat consumption. Obviously, the first claim on the grain should go to relieving hunger. Huge quantities of grain are now fed to animals. The calories in the meat produced are around a tenth of the calories available for direct consumption in the grain. When eating meat not only causes suffering to animals but also deprives the world’s poor of needed food, it will certainly not be justified.

Conclusions

Although there are many similarities between constructive and deconstructive post-modernists, the sections of this paper that deal with science and with public policy would not be likely to appear in a lecture on the latter topic. Deconstructive post-modernists are interested in showing that the dominant forms of science are shaped by particular perspectives and do not have the universality to which they pretend. With this point constructive post-modernists are in enthusiastic agreement. But deconstructive post-modernists usually discourage the attempt to develop better theories, an attempt that seems important to constructive postmodernists.

Somewhat similarly, deconstructive postmodernists show how many, widely affirmed, policies have assumptions that express the bias and self-interest of those in power. They often do brilliant work in showing the elements of self-deception present in those who uphold them. But they are unlikely to go on to propose other policies. They are likely to view any policies proposed as expressive of other biases and interests. As a result they do not give support to any. From the point of view of constructive post-modernists, society cannot function without policies to guide decisions. All may be tainted, and we should never pretend to have no personal interests or to be unbiased in our judgments. But the world will not survive without improved public policies, ambiguous as they may remain.

Constructive post-modernists make no claim to perfection or finality for their ideas about philosophy, science, or public policy. We know that we are all finite beings with limited understanding and that we see the world from one perspective among many. We know that our perspectives are conditioned by many relativizing factors, and that these perspectives determine which features of the totality stand out for us. But we also believe that what we see from particular perspectives includes valid and valuable elements of the always-elusive truth. We also believe that by being open to what others see from their different perspectives, we can correct and expand our present thinking. Constructive post-modernism understands the world as a whole, and itself in particular, to be in process.

A Buddhist-Christian Critique of Neo-Liberal Economics

I. Introduction

I have focused this discussion on neo-liberal economics because this is now the dominant form. It is dominant in universities in the United States, and it exercises a dominant influence on the institutions that support the global economy. This includes the government of the United States and the Bretton Woods Institutions -- The International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the World Trade Organization.

I have described my critique as Buddhist-Christian. By this I do not mean anything esoteric. Although I am interested in differences between these two great religious traditions, I do not believe these differences are important for the critique of the dominant pattern of economic thinking. It is interesting that an early critic who wrote on "Buddhist Economics" was a conservative Catholic. I refer, of course, to Schumacher.

A critique of neo-liberal economics can emphasize either the theory or the practice. Both critiques are important, and a Buddhist or Christian perspective can inform either one. I have chosen to emphasize the theoretical one, although I will also indicate how theory works out in practice. What is wrong, from a Buddhist or Christian point of view, with the theory of neo-liberal economics?

Before launching into such a critique, I want to note that a quite similar critique could be directed to many of the academic disciplines. Economics as a discipline is not worse than others from a Buddhist or Christian point of view. The difference is that it is the discipline that has succeeded most brilliantly. It has the ear of policy makers and corporate leaders, that is, of those who are in fact shaping the future of the world.

II. Academic Disciplines

Part of what is wrong with all the academic disciplines is that their shared understanding of the way knowledge should be pursued and organized is wrong from a Buddhist or Christian perspective. Too often it is supposed that any rigorous pursuit of specialized knowledge must take the form of one of these academic disciplines. This is not true, and the assumption that it is true has caused great harm. Let me explain.

The academic disciplines are children of the European Enlightenment. There is much to be said positively about the achievements of the Enlightenment and its children, the disciplines, but today I am attending chiefly to what is wrong. This draws attention to the worldview of the Enlightenment. Deliberately and consciously the Enlightenment thinkers reacted against the Medieval understanding of the world in which organic models played a primary role. They proposed that, instead, the machine be taken as the basic model. The clock was the machine most often in view.

There were two particularly important changes involved in this shift of basic models. The first was the rejection of teleology. Organisms behave purposefully, and Medieval thinkers, influenced by Aristotle, gave a great deal of attention to teleology. One could understand the behavior of an organism when one understood its purposes. One could understand any part of the universe when one understood the role it played in the whole. Early modern thinkers rightly saw that this preoccupation with teleology had misdirected much thought and research. To understand the world, they were convinced, one should focus on efficient causes.

Of course, clocks also serve purposes. But the purposes are not inherent in the clock. The behavior of the clock is to be explained in detail by the mechanical forces operating among its parts. The parts behave as they do, not because of their intrinsic nature or purposes, but because they are compelled to do so by pressures exerted on them by other parts.

Teleological questions are appropriate only if we ask why the clock exists at all. Here we appeal to human purposes. To understand the working of the clock we attend only to efficient causes. Similarly, if we ask why the great world machine exists, we appeal to the purposes of God. If we ask how the world machine operates, we attend only to efficient causes.

A second feature of the machine in contrast to the organism is that it is essentially unchanged by a change in its environment. Organisms require particular types of environments in order to survive. Even within those limits, their behavior is extensively affected by the nature of their environments. An animal in a small cage behaves very differently from the same animal in the wild. The animal appears to be internally affected by its environment. That is, its reality in-and-for-itself is informed by its relations to the things in its environment. The organism is internally related to its environment.

Within extreme limits, a clock remains what it is, virtually unchanged, in many different environments. An account of the behavior of the clock can ignore its environment. Of course, a clock can be smashed by an axe. It is not impervious to external objects. But the impact of the axe on the clock is of the same order as that of one part of the clock on another. It is a mechanical force. The clock does not appear to be internally related to anything else.

When Enlightenment thinkers decided that the whole of nature operates in terms of mechanical forces, they concluded that the apparent difference between organisms and mechanisms is only apparent. In reality, they assumed, a deeper analysis of organisms shows that their behavior is also explained by efficient causes operating among their parts or on them from without. The effect of the environment upon them is also by external, mechanical causes. Organisms are no more purposeful or interconnected than machines.

Since the world operates mechanically, apparent wholes can be understood by analysis into their parts. Each of these parts can be analyzed into its parts, and so forth. This analysis should proceed until we arrive at those parts that are indivisible and therefore not further analyzable. These are the atoms. Ultimately, the whole natural world can in principle be explained by atoms moving in relation to one another according to the laws of motion.

The feature of this cosmology that most influenced the organization of research into academic disciplines is the view that the parts can be separated from one another for purposes of analysis. Their relations to one another are not important to understanding them. Hence bits and pieces of the totality of things can become the subject of an academic discipline that can then develop suitable methods of study with little attention to what is happening in other disciplines.

Of course, this simplifies matters in several ways. The most important is that it ignores another feature of the Enlightenment, its dualism. The more emphatically nature was denied any internality and purposiveness, the clearer it was that human minds are different from nature. The study of human minds and what they do in the world, accordingly, was separated sharply from the study of nature. Since Kant, this distinction has been formalized in terms of Naturwissenschaft and the Geisteswissenschaf. In English we often distinguish the sciences and the humanities.

Both the sciences and the humanities are further divided into narrower Wissenschaften, or academic disciplines. These continued to be understood as each having its own subject matter, clearly demarcated in its separation from others. Each discipline, once established, was free to develop the methods it found most fruitful for the study of its subject matter. Analytical methods predominated in the humanities as in the natural sciences, although the humanities often aimed at understanding in a sense not sought in the natural sciences.

When the distinction was first established, the study of society was not far advanced. But as social studies developed, there was some question as to whether they should belong to the humanities or to the sciences. On the whole, they have preferred to be social sciences. Economics, in particular, has prided itself on its scientific character.

Economics has been particularly successful in establishing its subject matter as separate and distinct from the subject matter of other social sciences. It has developed its methods for investigating that subject matter. Like the natural sciences it has transformed itself largely into mathematics. This is particularly true of the neo-liberal economics that is our topic.

Clearly this view of reality that is presupposed in the disciplinary organization of knowledge, and specifically in the discipline of economics, is deeply alien to the worldview of both Buddhism and Christianity. Nothing could be more central to the Buddhist worldview than the profound interconnectedness of things. For Christians this has not been quite so explicit. But the understanding of the world in the Bible and in the Christian tradition prior to the Enlightenment is certainly organic rather than mechanistic. The Hebrew understanding of "the land" certainly implied relations to nature that are excluded in the mechanistic worldview.

Of course, there can be no denying that the separative and analytic approach has led to enormous increase in our information about the world and its processes. The Enlightenment and its expression in the organization of knowledge into academic disciplines has been a brilliant success. Nevertheless, from the point of view of both Buddhism and Christianity, the vast increase in information has been gained at the price of a loss of wisdom.

Defenders of the academic disciplines often claim that all that is needed is that the results attained in the various disciplines be added to one another and integrated. But this is hardly possible. The results are formulated in categories peculiar to each discipline. Integrating even two disciplines turns out to be a truly formidable job. Furthermore, much about the world has been excluded from all the disciplines. For example, the complex interconnections of things are in principle excluded, as is the purposive element in all but the human. Even in the study of the human, there is some embarrassment about a full acknowledgment of the complexity of human purposes.

Despite this criticism, we can agree that when we keep in mind the abstraction that is involved in each discipline from reality as a whole, we can profit from the information offered without being led seriously astray. The problem comes when we move too directly from the findings of a discipline to application in the real world. At that point, neglect in practice of all that the discipline has neglected in theory can have disastrous results.

III. The Discipline of Economics

The discipline of economics is, today, being applied to reality without appreciation for the way it has abstracted particular features of that reality from the whole. Economists at their best know that human behavior in markets is only one aspect of human behavior. They recognize that the increase of market activity is only one contribution to human well being. They acknowledge that there are other ways of studying human beings that also throw light on what policies should be pursued.

The problem is that our social and political leaders have decided that increased wealth is the most worthy of all goals. They rightly believe that knowledge of how wealth can be increased is the province of economic theory and that economists are those best qualified to guide policy toward this end. If we are to criticize economists, it is to point out that they have been all too willing to agree that wealth is the supreme goal and that, therefore, they are the best counselors of national and global policy. But our most basic criticism must be directed toward ourselves and our leaders, rather than toward the economists to whom we have turned for guidance.

Clearly Buddhists and Christians cannot agree that wealth is the supreme goal of social and political policy. Buddhists know that attachment to worldly goods, and certainly to their increase, blocks the path of spiritual advance. A culture focused on this end is deeply sick. Christians believe the first task of government is justice, and they see that the pursuit of wealth profoundly interferes with the achievement of justice. We know also that Jesus was very explicit in asserting that we cannot serve both God and wealth.

That does not mean that either Buddhists or Christians oppose the acquisition of material goods. Buddhism is the middle way, eschewing asceticism. Christians believe that the Earth and all its creatures are good and that people are free to use the resources of the Earth. Both Buddhists and Christians want the basic needs of all to be met. We do not oppose the enjoyment of additional goods. But we deeply, fundamentally, oppose placing the quest for wealth first. For Christians the call is to seek first the Kingdom of God, a world in which God’s will is done. Justice, peace, and meeting the basic needs of all are much higher priorities than simply increasing overall wealth.

Even if there were nothing else to criticize about economic theory, Buddhists and Christians would have to oppose the role that economic thought plays in our world today. But the general comments made thus far point toward other features of Enlightenment thought that are fully adopted by the academic discipline of economics, especially in its neo-liberal form. We will turn now to two of them.

IV. Homo economicus

First, economic theory is based on a particular view of human beings. Economists all know that Homo economicus is an abstraction from the fullness of human reality. This is just as true of Homo politicus, Homo religiosus, Homo faber, or Homo ludens. There is nothing wrong in principle with examining human behavior in market transactions in some separation from human behavior in political or religious activities.

Economists observed that when we buy and sell we quite consistently seek to get the best bargains we can and sell as dearly as we can. When we need work, we try to get the best job we can, with pay a major consideration. When we need help, we try to get that as inexpensively as possible. Economists abstracted this tendency from all the other human tendencies and attributed it to Homo economicus. They describe Homo economicus as devoted to personal economic gain.

It is not the case, of course, that all of our economic activity conforms to this norm. For one thing, our economic dealings within the family rarely do. Economists recognize this, and often speak of households as the economic units instead of individuals. But the boundaries of households are often blurred, and in any case households do not act consistently in purely self-serving ways. An interest in being fair plays some role in our economic dealings. Also people give away large sums of money, much of it out of concern to promote the general good or to meet particular needs of others. Economists do not do well in accounting for these activities. But when all qualifications are made, it remains true that a great deal about human behavior in the market place can be described and predicted accurately when the people involved are viewed as economists see them.

Homo economicus is also understood to have insatiable wants. Some early economists thought that the goal of the economy was to produce sufficient goods to meet the needs of all. Growth would then give way to a steady-state economy. However, the profession as a whole rejected this view. They judged that human wants are insatiable. This did not mean that the desire for a particular good cannot be satisfied. It meant that there is no limit to the new wants that arise as old ones are satisfied. There is obviously a measure of truth in this understanding of human beings in their economic behavior. The kinds of things that would have satisfied me fifty years ago no longer suffice. For example, I want faster communications, easier travel, and more space and facilities in my home.

Clearly Homo economicus is a useful abstraction for many purposes. Nevertheless, when description passes over to prescription, consequences are often disastrous. With respect to the insatiability of desires, we do not simply observe this as a fact of human existence always and at all places. On the contrary, we have created a system designed to generate new desires. Perfectly functional goods are quickly rendered obsolete by new designs. Styles are systematically changed from year to year to encourage new purchases. Much of the advertising industry is designed to persuade us to desire new things. Our whole economy is built on the basis of ever-increasing consumption, which in turn adds endlessly to the stress upon the environment. Creating unsatisfied wants fuels an unsustainable system.

It is obvious that neither Buddhism nor Christianity can support this doctrine or the practice that follows from it. Buddhism emphasizes that true life comes from the abandonment of all craving. Our system posits and encourages limitless craving. Christianity sometimes suggests that craving for spiritual goods is desirable, but it gives no support to craving for unneeded material possessions and consumption. There could hardly be a flatter contradiction.

The conflict is equally sharp with respect to the economist’s view that human beings behave self-interestedly. Buddhists and Christians may agree that there is a strong tendency in this direction. But we deplore this and encourage other tendencies.

Economists, on the other hand, call the selfish behavior they describe "rational." They show that rational behavior leads to greater wealth not only on the part of those individuals who practice it but also in society as a whole. At this point they, tend to forget that wealth is only one of many goods, and that other academic disciplines study some of these other goods. Many of them forget that from the point of view of these other disciplines, human community is a value. Hence, they tend to advocate policies that support the behavior they call "rational" even though it erodes or destroys human community.

This encouragement of "rational" behavior played an important role in development thinking in the years after World War II. Development workers often found that the people they worked with were very loath to leave the villages in which they lived. However, standard economic development theory focused on increasing productivity, that is, the amount of goods produced per hour of human labor. This could be accomplished best by industrialization. That required that people now working on small peasant farms work in factories, which were located in urban centers. According to economic theory, they should be glad to go if the factories paid more than peasant work. But in fact most of the people involved prized their community participation more than increased income. They were, in economic language, "irrational." Their traditionalism was an obstacle to economic progress. The great need was seen as "modernization" or "rationalization", which meant the subordination of community to economic growth.

If development economists had been more inclined to study history, they would have known that this was not a new problem. One factor that helped produce a labor force for the industrial revolution in England was the enclosure movement. When landholders shifted from peasant farming to raising sheep, far less labor was needed. Accordingly they evicted peasants from their land. Those who had been evicted had no choice but wage labor, much of it in factories. When colonial governments in Africa found that natives were reluctant to work on plantations or roads, they required them to pay taxes in cash, which they could obtain only by wage labor. People are not by nature primarily Homo economicus. The social and economic system turns them into this kind of creature. From the point of view of Buddhism and Christianity, this is not a gain.

In recent decades a main contributor to creating a labor force for industrialization was another part of the development model. According to the dominant economic development model, since traditional societies were primarily agricultural, agriculture should produce surpluses of internationally wanted products that would bring in foreign currencies needed for industrialization. Neo-colonial agribusiness was the best instrument for achieving this end. Accordingly, governments cooperated with international agricultural interests to enable them to create large plantations. By introducing modern agricultural practices and monoculture, these could increase productivity, that is, the amount produced by each worker. Peasants deprived of access to land and not needed in corporate agriculture contributed to the industrial labor force.

It is not only peasants who are forced to become more productive. The same is true of artisans. In traditional societies there are specialists in the making of many needed goods. Shoes can serve as an example. The cobbler engages in the whole process of making a pair of shoes, often on order for a particular customer. There is pride and satisfaction in the work. Even if he can earn more by working in a factory, he will find the loss of job satisfaction outweighs the increased income.

However, once a shoe factory is established, most cobblers have no choice. The price of shoes produced by the shoe factory is well below the price at which he must sell in order to live. Some cobblers may survive by repairing factory-made shoes. But most must become part of the wage labor force.

Again, my purpose is to point out that the economists’ description of how most of us act in our economic dealings most of the time has become a norm. People who do not want to act that way are forced to do so. The values of community life and creative work are destroyed for the sake of the greater wealth that can be produced when people behave in the manner of Homo economicus.

The communities that are being destroyed now include national ones. When Adam Smith wrote in 1776, his goal was to increase the wealth of nations. He took national community for granted as the context of economic activity. But economic theory as such has no place for community. It demonstrates that the market works best when it is large. Indeed, the larger the better. This allows for the economies of scale, so important to economists, along with the competition between corporations that is essential to the whole process. National boundaries are thus an impediment to economic efficiency. The goal, now largely realized, is a global economy.

Obviously, there is resistance. We are Homo politicus as well as Homo economicus. Until fairly recently, our overall global behavior reflected our political nature more than our economic nature. We fought wars for national advantage, not global economic gain. But today, nations like the United States, which would not dream of sacrificing sovereignty to an international political body such as the United Nations, are prepared to sacrifice it to economic institutions for the sake of economic growth.

Of course, the real destruction of national community is going on chiefly in poorer countries, as a result of structural adjustment and such treaties as NAFTA. The goal is the erasure of national boundaries so far as the economy is concerned. Since the governments are expected to serve the economy, they cannot act for the sake of national well being in any terms beyond contributing to the growth of the global economy. Some economists assure them that by doing this they will eventually share in the global prosperity, but thus far, and for the foreseeable future, this does not apply to most of their citizens. The gap in wealth between the affluent and the poor in each country has greatly increased. It is acutely difficult to maintain real national community between the newly affluent, who benefit from the global economy, and the disempowered and impoverished who are exploited by it. Similarly as the gap between affluent and impoverished nations grows, the ideal of a community of nations evaporates.

V. Dualism

A second principle underlying economic theory is equally explicit and equally offensive to Buddhists and Christians. It is the dualism of the human and the natural. On this point also, Buddhist teaching is especially emphatic. The rejection of dualism is central to the Buddhist worldview. Christians, especially Western Christians, on the other hand, have had dualistic tendencies for centuries.

Nevertheless, today Christian theologians for the most part reject dualism, at least in its more extreme forms, and biblical scholars point out that it is alien to the Bible. We Christians are repenting of having succumbed to dualistic thinking through the influence of Greek thought and, especially, in extreme form, the effects of Enlightenment thought on Protestantism. As a penitent Christian I join Buddhists in strongly opposing this dualism.

But no such repentance is occurring in the mainstream of economic thought. For traditional economists, and emphatically for neo-liberal ones today, the only value that is recognized is that of human satisfaction. The only form of satisfaction that is recognized is that derived from the possession or consumption of desired goods and services. Economists encourage the ordering of the economy to the end of increasing human satisfaction.

The only value that can be attributed to the non-human world is instrumental. It can serve toward the satisfaction of human wants. Its value is the price that someone is prepared to pay for it. It is viewed as a commodity.

Given the standard Enlightenment view of the world as composed of human subjects and non-human objects, this dualism of humans and commodities seems appropriate. It is derived from the idea that the non-human world is available for the market, so that market forces can price it. Economists recognize that this is not entirely true. For example, people value unspoiled landscapes, which are not for sale in the market. However, this is viewed as a minor qualification. Economists can approximate a market price by asking people how much they would pay to preserve this landscape and multiplying the figure by the number of people who would be willing to pay it.

The dualism is applied, with few qualms, when considering non-human animals. A cow is worth whatever price it brings in the market. The same is true of a cat. The cat’s value may be raised by human sentiment, but there is still likely to be some price at which its owners would part with it. What is totally omitted is the value of the cow or the cat for itself, the satisfactions it derives from being alive.

Christianity historically has not been very clear about the intrinsic value of animals. It fell victim to Enlightenment dualism with little struggle. Nevertheless, it is beginning a process of repentance, and I personally insist that as Christians we have strong reasons to oppose the denial by economic theory of any intrinsic value to animals. The affirmation of such value has been strongest and clearest in the religions of India. Buddhism shares in that heritage, although its commitment to the intrinsic value of animals has been seriously weakened in its East Asia forms. Still, this commitment is sufficiently prominent in the tradition to provide contemporary Buddhists with a basis for protest against the economic theory that the only value of animals is the price humans will pay for them and against the factory farming that this theory supports.

The commodification of nature expresses itself in other ways. In traditional society, much is held in common. Indeed, the natural environment is thought of more as part of the community than as a possession. The dualism of the economist is absent. All members of the community can have access to the forests and streams, and sometimes also the pastureland.

To many neo-liberal economists this practice appears irrational. Since these goods have value, they should be privatized and priced, so that those who use them will pay for this use. Privatization insures the most economic use of the resources.

Of course, privatization also favors those in position to purchase them and damages the poor. Today, one feature of the negotiations over the Free Trade Agreement of the Americas is the privatization of water. Dualism drives in the direction of the commodification of everything. Obviously, the policy of privatization also expresses the primacy of the commitment to increase wealth over the goal of meeting the needs of the poor. At this point Buddhists and Christians can join humanists of many stripes in protesting.

Christians can be much clearer in their opposition to the reduction of the value of natural things to their price than about the intrinsic value of animals. As we have become aware of impending scarcities, we have realized that market price is a poor guide even to the instrumental value of commodities to human beings. For example, as long as there are large pools of oil in the ground, the price of oil will be determined by the policies of oil-producing countries as to how much to pump. Oil could remain plentiful in the market until very near the time that it is, for practical purposes, exhausted. Indeed, if OPEC does not control production with somewhat longer-term concerns in view, market forces will probably lead to that outcome. The actual value of oil for human society is far greater than the market price. The additional price will be paid when we are forced to make a rather abrupt transition to other forms of energy. It would be much better if oil was priced accordingly, but the market will not accomplish that. It can be done only if the political order, which can reflect longer-term concerns, takes precedence over the commitment to the economic one.

The critique here is that the market to which economists turn for establishing value is shortsighted. Human beings are capable of rational judgments based on a longer view of things. Christian teaching has been clear that this historical perspective is important. We need to identify our calling in terms of where we stand in an ongoing history. If we do so, we will recognize needs before market prices reflect them. This does not directly challenge economists’ dualism, but it does object to the conclusions they draw from it.

More broadly, the dualism of the economists has rendered them as a group largely indifferent to the degradation of the earth. One can, of course, find economic reasons for avoiding this degradation. But the struggle to save the natural environment has not been led by those who view it as a commodity. It has been led by those who see it as having value in itself and as intimately interconnected with human well being. I count Buddhists and Christians among these. For twenty years the World Council of Churches has spoken of Christian commitment to the "integrity of creation". Christians debate exactly what that phrase means, but we all know that it expresses the conviction that God cares about the creation and that the interconnectedness of things in the created order must be recognized and protected. Economics as an academic discipline has not internalized any such principle. It is our duty to critique the dualistic theory and oppose the practices that follow from it.

VI. Can We Propose as Well as Oppose?

Many Buddhists and Christians believe that community as such has values, and that communities often preserve and transmit rich traditions that make for a good life. We believe that many traditional communities were much more sustainable and better integrated with their natural environments than are the societies with which development and economic globalization have replaced them. We believe that modern economic development has destroyed, and is still destroying, much of great value. The Buddhist and Christian critique of the application of economic thinking to the real world is very harsh.

But when we protest this destruction, we are often challenged to show that there is another way of responding to global poverty. All of us agree that in the years after World War II there were unmet human needs in many parts of the world. In many villages, most infants failed to reach the age of one. Preventable diseases ravaged whole countries. Hunger was a frequent problem. Development was intended to overcome these problems. Could Buddhists or Christians oppose development?

Furthermore, we should not romanticize the virtues of village life. It was often highly exploitative. Sometimes, as in India, there were whole classes of the excluded. Women were often degraded. Sometimes, as in parts of Africa, they were the objects of appalling operations. Development was intended to break the power of unjust and destructive traditions. Could we oppose that?

That would certainly not have been a possible position for Buddhists and Christians. The question was not then, and is not now, whether there should be development. The question was and is, what kind of development is helpful. After fifty years of development that has been highly successful in increasing global wealth, none of the problems that validly called for development have been solved. Where there has been progress, as in infant survival, this has resulted from targeted programs more than from the general increase of wealth. To challenge the pursuit of global wealth is not to oppose development but to call for that kind of development that genuinely responds to urgent human need.

Supporters of present economic policies often speak as if the alternative to global capitalism is state socialism, and they rightly point to its limitations. Buddhists and Christians have generally been quite aware of these limitations. But the issue is, in fact, quite different. The alternative to the top-down development programs of both global capitalism and state socialism is bottom-up development.

Bottom-up development is often called community development. Instead of viewing persons as individual atoms related to one another through contracts and market transactions, we view people as persons-in-community, valuing the relations that constitute community. Our interest is in the development of communities, thereby improving the situation of the persons who make them up.

This is the kind of development that Gandhi promoted. A symbol of Gandhian development was the sewing machine. This kind of simple technology would enable women in villages to use their time efficiently and profitably during periods when they did not need to work in the fields. Gandhi also worked to overcome the discrimination against the untouchables in these villages. Gandhian development is open to improving the situation of women socially as well as economically. Village development should be, can be, and often is, both economic and ethical. At every point it should involve the villagers in decision-making. They often know their problems and needs better than anyone else. Also, if they have ownership over the woods-plots or pumps that improve their community life, they will care for them and keep them operative. The cost of improving conditions within villages is usually modest in relation to the returns.

Often villagers already have a strong sense of their interconnection with their environment and of the importance of maintaining or developing a sustainable relationship. When they act in unsustainable ways, this is often because their traditional systems have been disrupted and they can survive only by destructive practices. Their unsustainable activities are usually the consequence of top-down development. The task of bottom-up development is to counter these effects.

The Buddhist Sarvodaya movement in Sri Lanka adopted the Gandhian vision. Here, too, the primary focus has been on the restoration and strengthening of village life. Local irrigation systems destroyed by British colonial governments are being rebuilt, and the water buffalo agriculture, renewed.

Of course, top-down development has already driven many people from traditional villages into the slums surrounding great metropolitan areas. It is too late for village development to help them. Another bottom-up model has been developed in the new urban context. It began in Bangladesh and has spread around the world. This is micro-lending.

Small sums are loaned to poor, enterprising individuals, to start their own tiny businesses. Most of the recipients are women. Often they gather in mutual support groups. The results have been astonishingly successful. The great majority of the borrowers repay their loans and significantly increase their incomes. Their self-esteem and ability to support others also increase markedly. Buddhists and Christians can support this kind of development with enthusiasm.

Most Buddhist and Christian development activity around the world has this bottom-up character in one form or another. Hence, I am not simply describing a theoretical ideal. The problem is that this is sometimes thought of as the consequence of limited resources rather than basic conviction. Many who support this kind of development also give moral and political support to the top down policies that dominate the global economic system. It is incumbent on those of us who are in position to influence the thinking of faithful people to make clear that the neo-liberal economic thought that informs most current top-down development, riding roughshod over communities, and reshaping the lives and thinking of hundreds of millions of people, is based on assumptions that are antithetical to ours. We should articulately and unequivocally withdraw moral support from these practices and encourage all who truly care about human beings and the other beings that make up our earth to work directly for their benefit.

Buddhism and the Natural Sciences

Let me begin my saying that I am poorly informed with respect to the history of the relation of Buddhism and the natural sciences as these developed in India, China, Korea, and Japan. This is not because I question the importance of these sciences. I have no doubt, for example, that people in these countries learned much about the human body that Westerners are only now beginning to appropriate. What role Buddhism played in these and other studies in either India or China is a question that interests me, but not one that I can answer.

Simply because of the limits of my knowledge, I am speaking only of the relation of Buddhism to natural sciences as they developed in the West. This may be the most important question today, because these sciences, for good or ill, have overwhelmed most of the South and East Asian sciences. These Western sciences are the ones that are taught in universities in India, China, Korea, and Japan.

I. The Christian History with Science

Clearly the interaction of religious tradition with Western science has been quite different for Buddhism and for Western Christianity. For Buddhism the encounter with this science was an encounter with a foreign system of thought. In the West Christianity and science developed together, sometimes supporting one another, and sometimes in enmity. Current Christianity is a product of centuries of such interaction. In the East, although science as a foreign import, it has generally been viewed as simply different from Buddhism. The struggle that has left deep scars in Christianity has not been part of this history.

My own judgment is that Buddhists have adopted too easily one of the positions to which Christian theology has had recourse -- that of different spheres for the spiritual and natural worlds. To explain this judgment, I will speak briefly of how this resolution came about in the West and my objections to it. I will then elaborate my reasons for hoping for a more serious and critical engagement of Buddhism with the natural sciences.

It was a Christian culture that gave rise to modern Western science. Furthermore, most of the founders of modern science explained their reasons for engaging in scientific work in Christian terms. Although later scientists, who detached themselves entirely from Christianity, preferred a history of science that ignored this explanation, a serious historian of ideas should pay close attention.

The question is why one should devote oneself to long-term, careful observation of nature? Why should one then seek mathematical formulae explaining what one observes?

Some science was, no doubt, motivated by the desire to make advantageous changes in the world. The origin of chemistry in alchemy was of this kind. But in fact modern science did not arise in alchemy. Much more important was astronomy, where no one dreamed of manipulation.

It is also important to note that, during the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, Western Europe was not the world center of education, of culture or of wealth. To suppose that the scientific study of nature is a natural by-product of a certain stage of cultural development simply does not fit the facts of world history. The direction of intellectual efforts is typically the result of the particular character of the culture in which these occur.

In Western Europe the culture judged that knowledge of nature was a great good, and the reason that this knowledge was so important was that it was knowledge of God’s working. Furthermore, the conviction that God was rational underlay the confidence that behind the apparently chaotic movements of things there lay a rational harmony that could be mathematically described. In other words, the deep-seated assumption that the universe is the product of an intelligent Creator lay behind the rise of modern science.

The theology that supported this view was a synthesis of Aristotle’s philosophy and the Bible. Something very much like this synthesis had been developed by Muslim thinkers and imported into Christian Europe. Islam made its own contribution to the natural sciences, and if history had favored its cultures more, it might well have been the primary context for their development. We will never know. On the other hand, Eastern Europe, although for a thousand years it had had a higher culture than the West, might never have developed modern science. So I am saying neither that there is something inherent in Christianity as such that gives birth to science nor that no other tradition provides the necessary context. I am only saying that the form that Christianity took in Western Europe after the assimilation of Islamic philosophy in the thirteenth century was uniquely favorable.

The fact that Western Christianity gave birth to science did not mean that the relation was always harmonious. The most famous case of conflict was over Galileo’s discovery of the imperfection of the heavenly bodies. He learned this simply by looking at the moon through a more powerful telescope. Actually there is no conflict between this discovery and the Bible. What led to conflict was that the church had embraced Aristotelian science, which speculated that there was a profound difference between earthly bodies and celestial ones. The latter were supposed to be perfect. The Pope relied on the leading astronomers of the day, and they opposed the new science of Galileo.

Misleadingly, many scientists and historians have emphasized this incident as indicative of the general relationship of the new science and Christianity. The facts are quite otherwise. What is remarkable is that, during a period in which the church persecuted Christian heretics in large numbers and Christian fought one another in terrible wars over theological differences, no scientists lost their lives for overturning the established worldview of Christendom. Many of the leading scientists were deeply religious, some, clergymen. In the eighteenth century, the founder of my own denomination, John Wesley, continued the teaching that natural science provided a second way to the knowledge of God alongside the Bible. In this, he was quite typical of his time.

Indeed, the great majority of thoughtful Christians, at least in the Protestant world, adopted what they understood to be the worldview of science and adapted Christian teaching to that. The main issue in the eighteenth century was whether the creation was so perfect that God never intervened in it, or there were occasions in which God worked miracles. But this was an argument about how to adapt Christian belief to science, not between science and faith.

Even in Wesley’s time there were scientists and philosophers who questioned the positive connection between science and faith. But it was only in the latter part of the nineteenth century that science and theology came into a conflict of socially serious importance. This was over the doctrine of evolution. Heretofore, most people, including most scientists, supposed that the world came into being in more or less its present form. The more complexities science discovered in the world, the more one marveled at the wisdom and power of the Creator. But evolutionary theory proposed that there was an explanation for all this complexity that did not involve any creative act. The present astonishing order was the outgrowth of natural, purposeless processes.

Obviously, this was in sharp conflict with a literal reading of the Bible, and this was in itself disturbing. But the church had dealt with that kind of conflict before. From ancient times, the literal reading was often subordinated to others. Protestantism recovered an emphasis on the literal reading, but not in the sense of contemporary Fundamentalism. That movement arose in reaction to more liberal Christian responses to evolutionary theory in the early part of the twentieth century.

The deeper problem was that the worldview that society and culture had accepted as scientific was mechanistic. Hence it was thought that science required that the natural world be understood as nothing more than matter in motion. From this world, human beings had, understandably, exempted themselves. The worldview that resulted from this stratagem was probably the most dualistic in all of history. Its advantage was that it secured to human beings freedom and responsibility and value. It undergirded the development of the doctrine of individual rights.

Evolutionary theory destroyed this dualistic solution to the problem brought about by the scientific worldview. Now science was invading this privileged sanctuary. It was claiming, in principle, that human beings are part of the mechanical world system, that they can be explained like everything else in terms of matter in motion.

My point here is that evolutionary theory, developed in the context of a mechanistic worldview, was a real threat to faith. We should not regard those who rejected it as simply ignorant and benighted. To this day the acceptance of the standard form of evolutionary theory has profoundly negative consequences.

One response was Fundamentalism. The authority of the Bible, read quite straightforwardly, supersedes the authority of empirical evidence and scientific theory. The theory of evolution is simply wrong.

Most Christians could not follow that route. A second response was to develop a different worldview in which Christians could both affirm the empirical evidence for evolution and deny that it has the reductionistic implications given it by the mechanistic worldview. Evolution can then be understood as calling forth a new, nonmaterialistic naturalism. It can also be understood as showing us the way God creates, so that the emphasis could shift from the one creative act in the past to the continuing creativity of God in the present. This sort of view played a considerable role in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. The process theology that I represent is one form of this response. The most famous recent proponent was Teilhard de Chardin.

From my point of view, it is unfortunate that a third response, which followed the lead of Immanuel Kant, became the most widespread. Kant was responding to the earlier challenge of David Hume, who showed that the underlying assumptions of both science and theology were not supportable empirically. The focus here was causality. A mechanistic view of nature presupposed causes as necessary relations. Event A causes event B to happen. The idea of creation asserts that God is the cause of the world. Hume showed that sense experience gives us no access to causes of this kind. Kant argued that empirical experience in itself tells us nothing about the world, even the phenomenal world. We know this only as it is organized by the human mind. The mind imposes causal, as well as spatio-temporal relations upon it. But when we come to understanding the human mind and human behavior, we apply wholly different categories.

Kantian dualism of the phenomena, on the one side, and Geist, on the other, superseded the Cartesian dualism of matter and mind for most German intellectual work. It was quite influential in the English-speaking world as well. It lent itself to the solution of the crisis introduced by evolutionary theory. One could assert that for science mechanistic evolutionary theory is true, and that human beings are fully part of the evolved world. But for the humanities, including theology, this understanding is irrelevant. These proceed as if human existence is of an entirely different order. We have now the great divide within the university between the sciences and the humanities and a profoundly split consciousness throughout Western culture.

In the twentieth century, scientists discovered many things that did not fit the mechanistic worldview. Einstein’s relativity theory broke with it in important ways. The whole idea of matter gave way progressively to that of energy. Quantum theory was driven into extreme paradoxes when it tried to explain itself in mechanistic terms.

The public has been fascinated by these breaks with traditional Western science and has responded enthusiastically to the writings of those scientists who have come up with new views. Unfortunately, however, the vast majority of scientists have accepted the Kantian dualism, although their work is not now, as Kant thought, to interpret nature in mechanistic terms. They have given up the effort to understand. Their task is to develop mathematical formulae that enable them to predict the results of experiments. On the other side, humanists develop hermeneutical methods for the interpretation of documents with no regard for scientific thought. Philosophers, analogously, have given up the synthetic task that was theirs so long. They are now satisfied with analysis, phenomenological description, or deconstruction. The work of rethinking the world as inclusive of both nature and human beings in the light of the best information available is largely excluded from the universities.

II. The Buddhist History with Science

Buddhism has a very different relation to natural science. There is little in Buddhism to encourage people to devote their lives to scientific experiment or to seeking the laws of nature. Buddhists are more likely to attend to nature in its concrete particularity than to seek abstract universal principles. The knowledge to be gained by scientific study would not be expected to advance the movement toward enlightenment.

On the other hand, Buddhism is free from those attachments that have led Christians to resist the acceptance of scientific findings. There is no attachment to a traditional cosmology that is threatened by scientific advance, or at least, any such attachment would fall immediately under Buddhist critique. There is no doctrine of creation that is undercut by new ways of understanding how the world came into being. There is no claim to a special status of human beings that is weakened by evolutionary theory.

Seeing this, Buddhists have sometimes asserted superiority over Christianity. The enlightenment to which they point is not vulnerable to new empirical findings or scientific theories. It is a matter of experience that is self-verifying.

In one sense this is true. Buddhism is not bound up with doctrines of the sort that have led Christians into conflict with science. It does not affirm a God whose existence is problematic, so that belief requires the support of arguments whose foundations are vulnerable to scientific advance. The belief in human freedom, so central to Christianity, is not thematically developed in Buddhism. One attraction of Buddhism to Christians since the latter part of the nineteenth century has been this freedom from controversial doctrines.

However, as I see it, Buddhist discourse is not, in fact, consistent with every possible worldview. Quite the contrary. Buddhism would make no sense if the world were in fact nothing but matter in motion. A science formulated in those terms may not threaten Buddhism in its specifics, but it contradicts Buddhism fundamentally and generally. Sociologically and psychologically, one who is convinced of the truth of the modern scientific worldview will have no interest in listening to Buddhist discourse or in pursuing Buddhist enlightenment. Buddhists have as much reason as Christians to oppose this worldview.

Indeed, they have an additional basis for opposition. They can appeal to newer developments in physics as supporting a worldview to which they came independently. Especially the phenomena of quanta can be more intelligibly understood if we adopt the view of pratitya samutpada.

This advantage of Buddhism in the interpretation of contemporary scientific findings has been widely noticed. It has certainly increased interest in Buddhism in the West. But on the whole the scientists who note this connection are not sophisticated in their understanding of Buddhism and in fact make little use of this new way of thinking in their continuing work.

I hope for more. I am also very open to learning from you of contemporary physicists in Japan who are engaged in reconstructing physics on the lines suggested by Buddhism. I have heard occasionally of such work, but this program seems not to have gone very far.

III. Obstacles to Buddhist Involvement

It is my suspicion that another Buddhist teaching inhibits such a program. Buddhists are often quite suspicious of the ability of language to avoid misleading us. They are willing to employ language as "skillful means", but the truth to which they point still eludes language.

To develop science we must formulate concepts and theories. One may, in fact should, recognize that concepts and theories are subject to correction, but the goal is better concepts and theories. Buddhists rightly emphasize that we should not attach ourselves to concepts and theories. But too strong an emphasis here on nonattachment can reduce the interest in generating new concepts and new theories. Without these, there will be no progress in science and specifically now, no breaking of the power of the deeply entrenched mechanistic worldview. This will give way only as it is shown that there is another way to think about nature that explains all that has been previously explained mechanistically and more besides. If Buddhism could give a greater spiritual value to the understanding of the world, its potential contribution to the progress of science and of a scientifically-informed worldview might be realized.

What would it take to persuade Buddhists that this kind of involvement in an intellectual enterprise is truly important? I don’t know. As far as I can tell, understanding alone is not sufficiently important in Buddhist tradition to call forth such efforts. The chances may be better with compassion. But why would compassion call one to devote one’s life to transforming science and the scientific worldview?

The answer, I believe, is that the inherited Western worldview has done, and is doing, great harm to human beings and the other creatures with which we share the planet. Viewing nature as a machine has led human beings to treat it that way. We are moving toward a crisis of global proportions, and our mechanistic vision deters us from taking the drastic steps needed to change direction. When human beings, or some human beings, are treated as part of this mechanistic world, they are terribly exploited. This has been true in my own country of much of the treatment of people of other races, especially Native Americans and Africans. It still leads to lack of sensitivity to the underclass and to peoples in other parts of the world, especially the poor. We too often view them as "others" rather than in terms of our kinship and interconnectedness. To change our basic way of perceiving the natural world and all its human inhabitants is an urgent expression of compassion.

Just after writing this I received a message from the Institute of Science in Society, with its headquarters in England. I was pleased to find that a similar analysis of the harm done by this worldview is gaining more institutional expression. Listen to a few paragraphs of the ISIS communication.

The new trade-related intellectual properties regime in industrialised nations is an unprecedented privatisation of knowledge, which has also encouraged the biopiracy of indigenous knowledge and resources on a global scale. This regime is being imposed on the rest of the world through the World Trade Organisation, as part of a relentless drive towards economic globalisation.

Economic globalisation is widely acknowledged to be the major cause of poverty, social disintegration and environmental degradation over the past decades. At the same time, it is obstructing any attempt to reverse the trends and to implement a global agenda for sustainability.

Fifty thousand gathered in Porto Alegre in February at the Second World Social Forum to voice unanimous opposition to economic globalisation and to call for alternative models of world governance and finance.

Almost no one is targeting the predominant, reductionist knowledge system of the west, that has provided the intellectual impetus for globalisation as well as the instruments of destruction and oppression. It has also marginalised indigenous knowledge systems and driven countless to extinction.

But western science itself is undergoing a profound paradigm change towards an organic perspective that has deep affinities with indigenous knowledge systems around the world. We have all the means to bring a truly sustainable and equitable world into being, only the political will, and the appropriate vision, is missing. We need some means to help focus attention on how that could be done, and to underpin a new model of world governance and finance.

Perhaps, however, there may be a barrier in Buddhist teaching to applying compassion to this kind of task. In talking with Buddhists, I find a certain ambivalence as to the expression of compassion. Some say that compassion always expresses itself in seeking the enlightenment of others. If so, improving social and cultural conditions is not an appropriate expression of compassion. Others believe that relief of suffering of any kind, even if it does not lead toward enlightenment, is a proper expression of compassion. But even for these, it often seems that the models of compassionate action are typically spontaneous responses to immediately apparent suffering. For those who think in this way, changing the structures of thought and perception built into so much of our science would be too indirect a contribution to the relief of suffering to be a true expression of Buddhist compassion.

Nevertheless, I believe many Buddhists recognize that social systems cause much of the suffering in the world and that these social systems are grounded in conceptual systems. Changing these conceptual systems may be a particularly important contribution, in the long run, to the relief of suffering. If Buddhists can think in this way, their compassion can draw them into the work of critique and reconstruction of the worldview that still underlies most of Western thinking. Since Western social and natural sciences shape the thinking of many Easterners today as well, the problem is not limited to the West.

IV. Potential Buddhist Contributions

If Buddhists were motivated to enter vigorously into the discussion, they could contribute a great deal. The ISIS refers to the emergence of more organic thinking in Western science. This is certainly progress. Organisms are interactive and are centers of creative activity. To understand the world as composed of organisms rather than mechanisms could affect public policy for the better, as well as the formulation of scientific theory.

But the organismic thinking that dominated Medieval understanding in the West also had its limits. It supported a hierarchical vision of society that offered little freedom to individuals. In any case, there were good reasons to turn from it in the pursuit of a more adequate scientific account.

What Buddhism offers goes beyond a model of organisms. It accents nonduality and the absence of substance. This allows for the reality of the individual, but not for individuals apart from others. The individuals involved have no permanence; they are continuously passing away. They are what they are by virtue of what all other individuals are. All things interpenetrate.

There is much in quantum theory today that points in the direction of this vision of reality. It is far more appropriate to the evidence than the substantialist, materialist models that still influence the formulations. As noted above, this has been widely recognized. Yet the needed change has not occurred. The Western mind has not succeeded in finding the formulations it needs.

Consider the way in which quantum theory is still talked about and developed. In the first place, it is commonly called "quantum mechanics," despite the nonmechanical character of the events with which it deals. It still speaks frequently of "particles", although that to which it refers cannot have the characteristics that term connotes. Alternately it speaks of "waves", although the idea of a wave implies a substantial medium, such as water or air, and it has long been established that no such substantial medium underlies quantum phenomena.

In other words, there is now considerable evidence from science that Buddhists are correct, but scientists do not know how to think about the kind of world that Buddhists have been affirming for more than two millennia. Buddhists should be able to interpret the data in terms of a vision of pratitya samutpada. This should provide a far more coherent vision.

Until recently scientists were in quest of such a vision. It was their inability to attain it in the twentieth century that drove them to the kind of irrationalism that now characterizes much of science. Scientists often say that they are no longer trying to understand nature; they seek only to make predictions that they can experimentally check. This provides the knowledge needed for technology to develop. What the real world is like, or even whether there is any such world apart from our ideas or language about it are, for some scientists, now irrelevant questions.

The theoretical result of this indifference to what is real is sometimes an extreme dualism. It is supposed that there is the world of thought or language, and there is the world of nature. In this dualistic view, how they are related, or whether they are related at all does not matter. At other times, the result is an extreme idealism. It is supposed that the world of language is the only world there is. We are told that there can be no experience of reality other than of language.

I am not sure that anyone ever believes these theoretical results. But because sophisticated people accept these theories as the best available, they influence the direction of inquiry and thereby of policy. They do great harm. If taken with full seriousness they would direct those who believe them away from any effort to attain Buddhist enlightenment.

This abandonment of the intellectual task of understanding the world is as detrimental to society as was the mechanistic view that it partly replaced. Buddhists could help greatly to restore intelligibility to science. It is my conviction that science, as well as society as a whole, would gain by this change.

It may seem strange to appeal to Buddhism to provide intelligibility. Buddhism has long taught us not to put trust in concepts and conceptual understanding. It recognized that the vision it offered worked against the tendency of concepts to objectify, to reify, to rigidify, and to separate. Concepts typically encourage the dualism of subject and object rather than the nondual vision that comes closer to the truth. But in fact in the process of criticizing concepts and attachment to them, Buddhists have developed new concepts that would be far more helpful than the old ones in formulating scientific theories. There is a tremendous opportunity here.

IV. A Whiteheadian Postscript

My conviction that the continuing influence of substantialist, materialist, mechanistic, reductionist thinking blocks a movement toward understanding comes from the influence of the philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead. He struggled against that kind of thinking and developed a process-relational vision that has much in common with Buddhist thought. He did not completely free himself from the thinking against which he struggled, and his followers have tended in part to fall back into it. I have long thought that if Buddhists would engage in this effort with us, we could achieve still more consistent and accurate formulations.

Whitehead did not himself develop a quantum theory. However, David Bohm and Basil Hiley have recently formulated a quantum theory congenial to his thought. It provides a very different way of thinking of the quantum world than the traditional models have offered. Bohm was deeply influenced by Indian thought of a sort that was more Buddhist than Hindu. This indicates the kinds of contributions that Buddhism has already made to science and how much remains to be done.

My study of Whitehead also suggests to me that Buddhists could learn from this engagement. Although profound, and I believe basically true, most Buddhist teaching is formulated in images that remain imprecise. They leave many important questions unanswered. When one struggles with the task of explaining experimental data in terms of these images, greater precision necessarily develops. It is my belief that this greater precision will enrich Buddhist understanding.

One might respond that this kind of understanding is unimportant to Buddhism, that precision is needed is only where enlightenment is at stake. If that is the Buddhist view, I must respectfully disagree. However desirable and important enlightenment may be, the survival of a livable earth for our descendants is also desirable and important. Perhaps if all individuals attained enlightenment the social and economic problems would take care of themselves. But we cannot afford to wait until that happens before engaging the destructive forces in the world. I believe these include the worldview that is so closely connected with most scientific thinking.

In the past few decades there has emerged a movement of socially-engaged Buddhists. In part this was a response to Christian criticism. Sulak Sivaraksa of Thailand has been the primary leader of this group, and it may be better rooted in Thai Buddhism than in some other forms. Nevertheless, it has gained a following in the United States among Buddhists of a variety of backgrounds, especially among Euro-American converts. My experience with socially-engaged Buddhists has made me very enthusiastic. There is no group of Christians in whose judgment and commitment I have greater, or perhaps even equal, confidence. For one thing, they have integrated ecological thinking into their social thought much better than have most Christians. In addition, I think that in many cases their meditational practice has led to fuller personal integration around basic commitments.

The primary focus of this movement is, of course, social analysis and action. Nevertheless, some of these Buddhists are also engaged in thinking in the physical sciences, especially ecology. There is here a promising beginning of the engagement for which I hope and from which the world can expect much.

The world today is in bondage to the quest of wealth, and it accepts mainstream economic thought as its theology. This economic thought models itself on physics, unfortunately the physics of the nineteenth century. It treats human beings as isolated substances. Both the goal of wealth and this atomistic understanding of human beings are in radical contradiction with Buddhist teaching. Unfortunately, Buddhist habits of relative passivity toward authority are such that I do not hear the strong voice of protest that should come from this community. I hope that new habits of engagement with the sciences will characterize the next generation.

Denis Hurtubise on Ford and the "Traditional" Interpretation

Dennis Hurtubise (Process Studies 29.1) has provided a helpful and accurate summary of Ford’s findings on the latest stage of Whitehead’s thinking in Process and Reality. His thesis is that Ford’s work does not offer the support to the "traditional" interpretation that Ford himself suggests. Chiefly, this means that passages traditional interpreters have employed to argue that the initial aim is derived from the Consequent Nature of God rather than the Primordial Nature alone fail to provide evidence for this view

With respect to several of the passages Hurtubise cites, he is correct. The overwhelming portion of the book is written without the Consequent Nature in mind, and certainly with no thought of creatures prehending it. Accordingly, Ford believes that any passage that can be read without this doctrine should be read in that way. Although the passage on page 88 about the "super-jective nature" reads easily as implying the doctrine in question, I agree that it may not have been intended to do so. The passage on pages 244-45 is quite unlikely to have the Consequent Nature in view Ford’s careful analysis, as summarized by Hurtubise, is helpful in showing that the only text pointing clearly to the efficacy of the Consequent Nature of God in the world is on pages 350-51.

My only quarrel with Hurtubise’s account is with respect to this last passage. He leaves the impression that in Ford’s analysis it does not offer support for the traditional interpretation. But his detailed statements about Ford do not support this implication. Ford sees here an instance of Whitehead’s intuitions outrunning his systematic formulations. I agree with Ford. But from this, what should we conclude? Ford takes the systematic notion that an actual entity can only be prehended when it has achieved satisfaction, combined with the notion that as satisfied an actual entity is in the past, as rendering unacceptable the intuition that the Consequent Nature as everlasting concrescence can be prehended. Traditional interpreters have instead undertaken to develop the system in such a way as to make sense of the intuition. This is certainly a difference. My objection to Hurtubise’s formulation is that it seems to imply that Ford thinks that his textual analysis indicates that Whitehead himself did not affirm the efficacy of the Consequent Nature in the world. In my reading of Ford, he acknowledges that Whitehead’s statement affirms such efficacy, but he responds that Whitehead should not have taken this step because it violates his own systematic position.

The argument between Ford and traditional interpreters, then, is about how to move forward from the very last phase of Whitehead’s formulations in Process and Reality, not about what Whitehead intended to say. Ford has moved to a quite different and original form of theism, which he does not claim to find in Whitehead. Traditional interpreters seek a way of accounting for Whitehead’s final intuition as expressed in his account of the fourth phase with minimal adjustments of the systematic position at which he had arrived. They divide on how best to do so. One group holds that, in view of the marked differences between God and all other actual entities, there are reasons to see the divine satisfaction as also functioning differently from the satisfactions of actual occasions. The weaving of physical feelings on the eternally satisfied Primordial Nature allows, they believe, for a growing, everlasting satisfaction. Another group follows Charles Hartshorne in viewing God as a personally ordered society of actual occasions rather than as a single, everlasting actual entity. This solves the problem of the possibility of prehending the Consequent Nature, but it is clearly a change from Whitehead rather than an interpretation of his texts.

Ford dismisses both moves as unsatisfactory. But this dismissal is not based on the denial that the intuition expressed in these paragraphs calls for some such development. It is based, instead, on the judgment that the divine satisfaction must be very much like creaturely ones, on the one hand, and that the Hartshornean move creates additional problems, on the other. I believe his dismissal is too quick. There are, of course, theoretical problems with both moves. A perfected and universally convincing doctrine of God does not exist in the process context or in any other. The same is true of a doctrine of human beings or of societies or of electrons, or of the status of the past. My own judgment is that the recent work of Palmyre M. F Oomen in Process Studies comes remarkably close both to satisfying the need for coherence and to faithfully respecting the texts of Process and Reality. I do not find Ford’s objections to her formulations persuasive. But that does not mean that now we have the perfected doctrine!

I do not intend, therefore, to suggest that there are no remaining problems in making sense of Whitehead’s latest intuition. But surely few would argue that Ford’s alternate proposals are free from all difficulties. What I am urging is that we understand the difference between the traditional interpreters and Ford as that between the effort to make sense of Whitehead’s intuition in terms of Whitehead’s categories and disallowing it because it conflicts with the simplest understanding of some of those categories. This seems to be the way Ford understands the difference. The debate about how seriously to take Whitehead’s intuition, even when he has not fully systematized it, is different from the question of identifying the meaning of the passage in which the intuition is expressed. That the passage implies that the Consequent Nature of God affects what happens in the world is clear. That the only mode of such influence systematically considered in Process and Rea1ity is prehensive is not in dispute. Supposing that creatures have two separate prehensions of God, one of each nature, would complicate the theory far more than viewing the one prehensive relation as relating to both natures. Hence, if we begin with the goal of making sense of Whitehead’s intuition, as Ford also understands it, the traditional interpretations have much in their favor.

 

Works Cited

Hurtubise, Denis. "Lewis S. Ford and the Traditional Interpretations of Whitehead’s Metaphysics." Process Studies 29.1 (2000):168-74.

Oomen, Palmyre M. F. "The Prehensibility of God’s Consequent Nature." Process Studies 27.1-2 (1998): 108-33.

Saving the Earth

Book Review: The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming

By David C. Victor Princeton University Press, 114 pp.,



When the threat of global warming burst into our awareness about 15 years ago, I was profoundly shaken. Human action would lead to the melting of the polar ice caps and the consequent rise of ocean levels. Low-lying islands and densely populated river deltas would disappear under the ocean waters. Eco-systems would be drastically altered, speeding up the extinction of species. Coral reefs would disappear along with all the fish dependent on them. Tropical diseases would migrate into the temperate zones. The already difficult prospect of providing food for a rapidly growing world population would be vastly complicated.

Surely, I thought, skepticism about the reality of the greenhouse effect would be overcome by the scientific evidence. Surely people would see that real change in economic practice is needed, not just a few minor adjustments.

But I was wrong. Although the extreme skeptics have indeed gradually lost influence, and humanly caused climate change has been publicly acknowledged, appeals for a large-scale shift in how we live and do business are rarely heard. A spirit of amelioration is in the air. At least within the political and business sectors, the issues now discussed are the exact nature of the changes that global warming will bring and the rate at which they will occur. These are important questions, to be sure. If the changes are small and gradual, the kind of shock I felt might have been an overreaction. Perhaps this is, after all, just one more problem to be taken in stride.

Unfortunately, such a tepid approach is not warranted by the facts. Each time a major scientific assessment is made, the official predictions become more disturbing. Currently, the scientific consensus is that the temperature of the planet will rise six to eight degrees Fahrenheit during this century. This will make the planet hotter than it has been for millions of years. Even a rise of 11 degrees is now recognized as possible.

The rise in temperature will not be evenly distributed. Indeed, there may be dramatic cooling in some areas. One possible scenario is that rising temperatures may alter ocean currents, depriving Europe of the Gulf Stream and making it more like Labrador or Siberia. It is not surprising that Europeans are prepared to pay a considerable amount to reduce the risk of such a change.

What can be predicted with greatest confidence is that weather patterns will become less stable. Droughts and floods will increase in number and intensity. This is already happening. The 1998 floods in Bangladesh are but a foretaste of things to come.

One major response to the crisis has been a careful cost-benefit analysis. This focuses, almost by definition, on the economy, and those who do such analyses are rarely moved by the larger fate of the earth. They point out that little of the U.S. economy is closely tied to climate. Agricultural gains in some places will offset losses in others. It will be cheaper, they tell us, to adjust to increased storm damage, build more dikes and seawalls, relocate people and pay the costs of increased air-conditioning than it would be to take steps to slow global warming. The conclusion is that we should continue to pursue the economic growth that causes global warming, recognizing that some of our new wealth will be used to respond to weather-related problems.

Given the prominence of this kind of thinking, many of us were profoundly relieved when representatives of most of the world’s nations met in Kyoto in 1997 and hammered out the Kyoto Protocol. We were deeply grateful to Al Gore for ensuring that the U.S. did not block agreement at that meeting, even though we knew that getting the protocol ratified, especially by the U.S., would be hard work. We knew that a Republican Congress would never support such a protocol if it was proposed by a Democratic president. But we hoped that either a Democratic Congress could be elected or a Republican administration might succeed in pushing the protocol through a Republican Congress. Our hearts sank when it became clear that the Bush administration has no intention of pursuing this effort.

Then David Victor’s book appeared. The title was disheartening, and the book’s sustained critique of the protocol upset those of us who had pinned our hopes on it. I approached the book in a defensive spirit, believing that the Kyoto Protocol is the only hope for slowing the emission of greenhouse gases. How could anyone write so dispassionately about its limitations, discouraging efforts to make it effective? Surely what the protocol needs is massive support in the face of the concerted opposition to it of the now nearly omnipotent oil lobby. Surely what we need is a massive effort to solve the protocol’s deficiencies rather than a cool explanation of their insolubility.

I have not entirely transcended this reaction to the book. The author does not share my sense of horror at the prospect of continuing along our present path. Accordingly, he does not share my sense of urgency. There is little passion in the book, just a cold, hard look at the protocol and the prospects for its implementation.

Nevertheless, Victor is not the enemy. He bears bad news, but one’s reaction to bad news should not be directed against its bearer. Victor’s painstaking analysis shows that the signers of the protocol left the really difficult questions to be worked out later, according to an unrealistic timetable. He carefully analyzes the alternative ways these difficult matters could be dealt with and shows that none of them could succeed. We lack the necessary technical knowledge. The instruments for enforcement do not exist and would be unacceptable to governments. The effect of implementing the Kyoto Protocol, he says, would be to transfer vast sums of money from some countries to others without reducing the emission of greenhouse gases.

Victor sees no prospect of implementing the Kyoto Protocol partly because the production of greenhouse gases has risen steadily during the years since the Kyoto meeting. This makes the Kyoto goal of reducing such emissions to 7 percent below the 1990 level more and more unrealistic. Without drastic action we will be emitting 22 percent more greenhouse gases in the target year 2008 than we did in 1990, or 29 percent more than the Kyoto target. And the Bush administration calls for policies that would lead to a still larger gap. The goals of the protocol appear entirely unrealistic.

The U.S. signed the protocol only with the understanding that target goals could be met in other ways than by actually reducing emissions to the designated level. Of the two other procedures that were envisioned, the first was the trading of emission rights. If a company has the right to emit a certain amount of pollution and reduces its pollution below that level, it can sell the difference to another company that finds it difficult to reach the allowed level. Overall pollution is reduced. The first company has gone further than the law required. The second company is paying for its continuing pollution and therefore has an incentive to improve when the cost of doing so is less than the cost of buying extra permits. The Kyoto Protocol envisions this kind of trading of emission rights among countries.

Victor points out that many of the preconditions for monitoring such trading among nations do not exist and cannot rapidly be created. They would require more intrusion by a global agency into the affairs of each nation than any nation has thus far accepted. Furthermore, even if such trading were implemented, it would be unlikely to reduce total emissions for some time, for reasons having to do with the collapse of the economies of the former Soviet Union. As a result of that collapse, emission levels there are far below the allowable levels. Consequently, these countries would be permitted to sell their rights to pollute without making any reduction in their own pollution. Indeed, they could greatly increase their pollution levels and still have rights to sell. The whole purpose of the Kyoto Protocol could thus be thwarted.

The Kyoto Protocol also allows a nation to emit more greenhouse gases if it increases the earth’s capacity to absorb these gases. For example, it would receive credits for reforestation, a goal it might pursue in another country rather than within its own boundaries. Transferring pollution-reducing technology can also count toward a nation’s target.

Victor does not fault the logic of these elements of the protocol, but he does point out the extreme difficulty of measuring and monitoring them. Determining how to do this measuring and monitoring, like many other things, was left for future conferences to decide. Victor rightly argues that governments would be likely to cook their books in order to meet the requirement. While reforestation would go on in some areas, forests would surreptitiously be cut down in others. Keeping tabs on such matters throughout the world would require systems that have not yet even been envisioned. The belief that others were cheating would reduce the incentive to be honest.

Rather than discounting either the possibility or the desirability of an agreement aiming at the goals of the protocol and adopting many of its policies, Victor makes proposals that he believes are more feasible. Since Kyoto does not allow some of the elements in his proposal, he argues for a new basis. He could have written much the same book under the title The Need for Revision of the Kyoto Protocol. The issues he raises are technical rather than substantive. But "technical" questions often are decisive.

The energy crisis, now focused on California but containing threats for the rest of the country, provides an occasion for dramatic change. The higher prices for gas, electricity and gasoline that will result from the crisis will provide economic incentives to support the moral imperative to do all we can to protect the environment.

If simply to support the Kyoto Protocol is to beat our heads against a stone wall, then those who care about the future of the planet need to consider other ways of reducing the emission of greenhouse gases. Since the U.S. is the greatest contributor to the problem, Americans can make a substantial difference simply by pressing for changes in our own country. If we could actually decrease our production of greenhouse gases, new life might be breathed into the protocol’s goals. Those goals may be unattainable by 2008, but an American government could commit itself to significant reductions without condemning itself to draconian policies that the public would never accept. This would encourage other countries to make a real effort to reduce their own emissions. That Victor’s arguments do not apply to a scenario of this sort may indicate that those of us who want an international agreement along the lines of a modified Kyoto Protocol may have a better chance of success than his book suggests.

In the U.S., political leaders propose two scenarios. The first, to which the Bush administration seems largely committed, is to encourage oil and gas production and the building of conventional power plants. The administration wants to remove environmental constraints and the protection of such areas as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. This scenario would benefit oil companies but would not prevent increased costs to consumers. And it would hasten climate change. For this administration, the crisis is also an opportunity to renew commitment to nuclear power, which does not contribute significantly to climate change but places other, equally severe burdens on our descendants. Thus far the administration has trivialized the gains to be realized by efficiency and conservation.

The alternative proposal is to increase conventional production much more slowly, while emphasizing more benign sources of energy. The scenario calls for the introduction of many energy-saving devices that would slow the rising demand for energy. It would lessen the increase of greenhouse gases and allow us to avoid building additional nuclear energy plants.

Almost everyone would be better off with the second scenario. It would lower energy costs for consumers, make more money available for other investments and reduce the damage to the global climate. Even oil and gas companies, if they would consider their long-term futures, would see the disadvantages in rapidly depleting their natural resources. Unfortunately, huge short-term profits can be made from the massive investment the Bush administration now favors, and currently this seems to outweigh all other considerations.

We should do all we can to support the second scenario rather than the first. Most of us can greatly reduce our consumption of electricity by changing our lighting and getting more efficient refrigerators. We can reduce consumption of heating and cooling fuels by improving our insulation. We can cut our gasoline consumption drastically by shifting from SUVs to the new generation of fuel-efficient and alternative energy cars. The rising prices of fuel will increasingly cause care for the earth and self-interest to coincide. With popular will and sufficient imagination, we could avoid building conventional power plants altogether.

But the short-term gains made by a popular movement, responding to increased costs and moral imperatives, cannot by themselves get us to the goal. We also need government regulations -- an area in which the U.S. has lagged far behind other industrial countries. For example, government regulations can be used to push the automotive companies to produce vehicles that pollute far less.

We also need stricter regulations on home building, including regulations that encourage buildings that are net exporters of energy. Such buildings already exist and can be replicated. Our goal should be that half the buildings constructed in 2010 would require only solar heating or cooling systems. We should also have a massive program for retrofitting the homes of the poor so that rising fuel prices can be countered by reduced energy needs.

We can go even further. Paolo Soleri has envisioned cities that operate on passive solar energy and in which there is no motor transportation. An imaginative government concerned about global warming could test this concept. We could aim to build small model cities of this type during the next decade and begin to learn how to build larger ones.

We could make it a national policy to wean agriculture from its dependence on fossil fuels as rapidly as possible. This effort would merge with existing movements for sustainable agriculture and organic farming. We should also encourage the production of food near the places where it is consumed, reducing dependence on packaging and transportation. Systematic national programs of these sorts would lead to a steady and substantial decline in the emission of greenhouse gases and greatly increase our ability to lead the family of nations into international agreements on the environment.

We need to reexamine our basic commitment to economic growth. Why are we so convinced that growth is needed? It does not contribute to general economic betterment. Most of the monetary gains go to the wealthiest 1 percent, and it is doubtful that they are any happier as a result. Why not redirect our emphasis from economic growth to economic improvement as one element in a total improvement of the human and ecological situation?

Our god has for so long been economic growth that such a proposal may seem heretical and unrealistic. Christians, however, are called to worship God, not wealth. God cares for the earth. Surely we should put the long-term wellbeing of the earth and all its inhabitants above the enrichment of the rich. If we did so the solution to the problem of global warming would be far easier.