Individualism and the Crisis of Civic Membership

The consequences of radical individualism are more strikingly evident today than they were even a decade ago when Habits of the Heart was published. In Habits we spoke of commitment, of community and of citizenship as useful contrast terms to an alienating individualism. Properly understood, these terms are still valuable for our current understanding. But today we think the phrase "civic membership" brings out something not quite captured by these other terms. While we criticized distorted forms of individualism, we never sought to neglect the central significance of the individual person or failed to sympathize with the difficulties faced by the individual self in our society. "Civic membership" points to that critical intersection of personal identity with social identity. If we face a crisis of civic identity, it is not just a social crisis; it is a personal crisis as well.

One way of characterizing the crisis of civic membership is to speak of declining "social capital." Robert Putnam, who has brought the term to public attention, defines social capital as follows: "By analogy with notions of physical capital and human capital -- tools and training that enhance individual productivity -- social capital refers to features of social organization, such as networks, norms, and trust, that facilitate coordination and cooperation for mutual benefits." There are a number of possible indices of social capital, but the two that Putnam has used most extensively are associational membership and public trust.

Putnam has chosen a stunning image as the title of a recent article: Bowling Alone: America's Declining Social Capital (Journal of Democracy, January 1995). He reports that between 1980 and 1993 the total number of bowlers in America increased by 10 percent, while league bowling decreased by 40 percent. This is not a trivial example: nearly 80 million Americans went bowling at least once in 1993, nearly a third more than voted in the 1994 congressional election and roughly the same as claim to attend church regularly.

For Putnam, people bowling by themselves are a symbol of the decline of associational life, the vigor of which has been seen as the heart of our civic culture ever since Alexis de Tocqueville visited the U.S. in the 1830s.

In the 1970s dramatic declines began to hit the associations typically composed of women, such as the PTA and the League of Women Voters. This has often been explained as the result of the massive entry of women into the work force. In the 1980S falling membership struck typically male associations, such as the Lions, Elks, Masons and Shriners, as well. Union membership has dropped by half since its peak in the middle 1950s. We all know of the continuing decline of the number of eligible voters who actually go to the polls, but Putnam reminds us that the number of Americans who answer yes when asked whether they have attended a public meeting on town or school affairs in the last year has fallen by more than a third since 1973.

Almost the only groups that are growing are support groups, such as 12-step groups. These groups make minimal demands on their members and are oriented primarily to the needs of individuals. Indeed, Robert Wuthnow has characterized them as involving individuals who "focus on themselves in the presence of others" -- what we might call being alone together. Putnam argues that paper membership groups, such as the American Association of Retired Persons, which has grown to gargantuan proportions, have little or no civic consequences because their members, although they may have common interests, have no meaningful interaction with one another.

Putnam also worries that the Internet, the electronic town meeting, and other much ballyhooed new technological devices are probably civically vacuous because they do not sustain civic engagement. Talk radio, for instance, mobilizes private opinion, not public opinion, and trades on anxiety, anger and distrust, all of which are deadly to civic culture. The one sphere that seems to be resisting the general trend is religion. Religious membership and church attendance have remained fairly constant after the decline from the religious boom of the 1950s, although membership in church-related groups has declined by about one-sixth since the 1960s.

Accompanying the decline of associational involvement is the decline of public trust. We are not surprised to hear that the proportion of Americans who reply that they trust the government in Washington only some of the time or almost never has risen steadily from 30 percent in 1966 to 75 percent in 1992. But are we prepared to hear that the proportion of Americans who say that most people can be trusted fell by more than a third between 1960, when 58 per-cent chose that alternative, and 1993, when only 37 percent did?

The argument for decline in social capital is not one that we made in Habits of the Heart. Habits was essentially a cultural analysis, more about language than about behavior. We worried that the language of individualism might undermine civic commitment, but we pointed to the historically high levels of associational membership in America and the relative strength of such memberships compared with other advanced industrial nations. Whether there has really been such a decline is still controversial, but we are inclined to believe that tendencies that were not entirely clear in the early 1980s when Habits was written are now discernible and disconcerting.

We believe that the culture and language of individualism influence these trends but that there are also structural reasons for them, many of which stem from changes in the global economy that have increased the disparity between the rich and poor and threatened the survival of the middle class. The decline in social capital is evident in different ways in different classes. For example, the decline in civic engagement in the overclass is indicated by their withdrawal into gated, guarded communities. It is also related to the constant movement of companies in the process of mergers and breakups. Rosabeth Kanter has recently suggested some of the consequences:

"For communities as well as employees this constant shuffling of company identities is confusing and its effects profound. Cities and towns rely on the private sector to augment public services and support community causes. There is a strong 'headquarters bias' in this giving: companies based in a city tend to do more for it, contributing $75,000 a year on average more to the local United Way than companies of similar size with headquarters elsewhere."

Kanter points out that the loss of a corporate headquarters in a middle-sized city can tear holes in the social fabric. Not only are thousands of jobs lost but so is the civic leadership of corporate executives. Local charities lose not only money but board members.

Corporate volatility can lead to a kind of placelessness at the top of the pyramid: "Cut loose from society the rich man can play his chosen role free of guilt and responsibility," observes Michael Lewis. "He becomes that great figure of American mythology -- the roaming frontiersman. hese days the man who has made a fortune is likely to spend more on his means of transportation than on his home: the private jet is the possession that most distinguishes him from the rest of us.... The old aristocratic conceit of place has given way to a glorious placelessness." The mansions of the old rich were certainly expressions of conspicuous consumption, but they also encouraged a sense of responsibility for the particular place (city, state, region) where they were located.

Moving to the opposite end of the income spectrum, Lee Rainwater, in his classic book What Money Buys, shows that poverty -- income insufficient to maintain an acceptable level of living -- operates to deprive the poor not only of material capital but of social capital as well. In traditional hierarchical societies low levels of material well-being can be associated with established statuses that confer the benefits of clientship. In our kind of society, with its fundamentally egalitarian ideology and its emphasis on individual self-reliance, status -- even personal identity -- is conferred primarily by one's relationship to the economy, by one's work and the income derived from one's work. Lacking a socially acceptable income, or any likelihood of attaining one, has long-term consequences for the kind of person one becomes and the kind of life one is likely to live. As Rainwater puts it:

"As people grow up and live their lives, they are engaged in a constant implicit assessment of their likely chances for having the access and resources necessary to maintain a sense of valid identity. People's anticipation of their future chances, particularly as children, adolescents, and younger adults, seems to affect quite markedly the way they relate to others and the way they make use of the resources available to them. When individuals make the assessment that their future possibilities for participating in validating activities are low and particularly when that estimate is constantly confirmed by others in their world (teachers, police, parents), then the process of searching for alternative validating potentials that result, in deviant behavior is set in motion. When people define their position in life as such that they have 'nothing to lose,' they are much less responsive to the efforts at social control exercised informally by those in their neighborhood and formally by official agencies of social regulation."

By reducing social capital, chronic poverty blocks economic and political participation, and consequently weakens the capacity to develop moral character and sustain a viable family life as well.

When we add to the consequences of poverty the consequences of residential segregation, the situation becomes devastating. We should remember that in spite of fair-housing laws residential segregation for black Americans has remained unchanged in our larger cities for the past three decades. What has changed is that the geographical areas with the highest poverty rates have lost retail trade outlets, government services, political influence and, worst of all, employment that provides anything like an adequate living. Those deprived of social capital have come to be confined to "reservations" that are effectively outside the environing society.

As for the anxious middle class, Herbert Gans in Middle American Individualism helps us understand what is happening to social capital in that group. Gans has criticized Habits of the Heart for being too censorious of middle American individualism. After all, says Gans, the residents of the lower-middle- and working-class suburbs who are more devoted to their family and friends than to civic life are only a generation or two away from the grinding poverty of manual labor among their immigrant ancestors or the backbreaking labor of peasant agriculture in the old country.

The social condition of those not-so-distant ancestors was one of vulnerable subordination, of being kicked around by people who told them what to do. Owning one's own home, taking one's vacations wherever one wants, being free to decide whom to see or what to buy once one has left the workplace, are all freedoms that are especially cherished by those whose ancestors never had them. The modest suburb is not the open frontier, but it is, under the circumstances, a reasonable facsimile thereof.

Among the many ironies in the life of at least a significant number of these middle Americans, however, is that labor union membership had much to do with their attaining a relative affluence and its attendant independence. Yet for many of them the labor union has become one more alien institution from which they would like to be free. Middle Americans are not only suspicious of government, according to Gans, they don't like organizations of any kind. Compared to the upper middle class, they are not joiners, belonging to only one or two associations at the most, the likeliest being a church. While continuing to identify strongly with the nation, they are increasingly suspicious of politics, which they find confusing and dismaying. Their political participation steadily declines.

As a consequence of tendencies that Gans is probably right in asking us to understand, middle Americans are today losing the social capital that allowed them to attain their valued independence in the first place. Above all, this is true of the decline of the labor movement. This decline is due to legislative changes in the past 20 years that have deprived unions of much of their power and influence, and congressional refusal since 1991 to raise the minimum wage from $4.25 an hour. But, as we see in France and other European countries, where loyalty to labor unions has survived, such attacks can be turned back. Where unions exist in America, union meetings attract 5 percent of the members at most. Lacking the social capital that union membership would provide, anxious-class Americans are vulnerable in new ways to the arbitrary domination they thought they had escaped. One may not even own one's home and one's recreational vehicle for long if one's job is downsized and the only alternative employment is at the minimum wage.

The decline of social capital in American has particularly distressing consequences if we consider what has happened to political participation. In Voice and Equality, Sydney Verba and his colleagues have given us a comprehensive review of political participation. Although the data concerning trends over time are not unambiguous, they do indicate certain tendencies. During the past 30 years the level of education in the American public has steadily risen, but the political participation that is usually associated with education has not.

Even more significant is the nature of the changes. Political party identification and membership have declined, while campaign contributions and writing to members of Congress have increased. Both of these growing kinds of activities normally take place in the privacy of one's home as one writes a check or a letter. Verba and his associates note that neither generates the personal satisfactions that more social forms of political participation do.

Further, making monetary contributions correlates highly with income and is the most unequal form of participation in our society. The increasing salience of monetary contributions as a form of political participation, as well as the general tendency for political participation to correlate with income, education and occupation, leads to the summary conclusion of the book:

"Meaningful democratic participation requires that the voices of citizens in politics be clear, loud and equal: clear so that public officials know what citizens want and need, loud so that officials have an incentive to pay attention to what they hear, and equal so that the democratic ideal of equal responsiveness to the preferences and interests of all is not violated. Our analysis of voluntary activity in American politics suggests that the public's voice is often loud, sometimes clear, but rarely equal."

Although unequal levels of education, occupation and income favor the originally advantaged in securing the resources for political participation, there is one significant exception. As Verba and his associates note:

"Only religious institutions provide a counterbalance to this cumulative resource process. They play an unusual role in the American participatory system by providing opportunities for the development of civic skills to those who would otherwise be resource-poor. It is commonplace to ascribe the special character of American politics to the weakness of unions and the absence of class-based political parties that can mobilize the disadvantaged -- in particular, the working class -- to political activity. Another way that American society is exceptional is in how often Americans go to church -- with the result that the mobilizing function often performed elsewhere by unions and labor or social democratic parties is more likely to be performed by religious institutions."

Although most Americans agree that things are seriously amiss in our society, that we are not, as the poll questions often put it, "headed in the right direction," they differ over why this is so and what should be done about it. We have sought answers by looking at the structural problems that we have described under the rubrics of the crisis in civic membership and the decline of social capital. What are some of the other explanations?

Perhaps the most widespread alternative explanation locates the sources of our problems in a crisis of the family. The cry that what our society most needs is "family values" is not one to be lightly dismissed. Almost all the tendencies that we have been describing threaten family life and are often experienced most acutely within the context of the family. Being unemployed and thus unable to get married or not having enough income to support an existing family due to downsizing or part-timing and the tensions caused by these conditions can certainly be understood as family crises. But why is the crisis expressed as a failure of family values?

It is unlikely that we will understand this phenomenon unless we take account once again of the culture of individualism. If we see unemployment or reduced income due to downsizing as purely individual problems rather than structural problems of the economy, then we will seek to understand what is wrong with the unemployed or underemployed individual. If we also discern that such individuals are prone to having children out of wedlock, frequently divorcing, or failing to make child-support payments, we may conclude that the cause is inadequate family values. In Habits of the Heart we strongly affirmed the value of the family and in both Habits and The Good Society we argued for renewed commitment to marriage and family responsibilities. But to imagine that problems arising from failures rooted in the structure of our economy and polity are due primarily to the failings of individuals with inadequate family values seems to us sadly mistaken. It not only increases the level of individual guilt feelings, it distracts attention from larger failures of collective responsibility.

There is a further consequence of the link between cultural individualism and the emphasis on family values. Families have traditionally been supported by the paid labor of men. Failure to support one's family may be taken as an indication of inadequate manhood. It is easy to draw the conclusion that if American men would only act like men, then family life would be improved and social problems solved. Some such way of thinking undoubtedly lies behind the movement known as Promise Keepers as well as the Million Man March of 1995. While we share many of the values of these movements, we are skeptical that increased male responsibility will prove to be an adequate solution to our deep structural economic and political problems or even do more than marginally diminish the severe strains on the American family. The notion that if men would only be men then all would be well in our society seems to us a sad cultural delusion.

Another common alternative explanation of our difficulties is to explain them as the failure of community. This is indeed the case, we believe, but only if our understanding of community is broad and deep enough. In many current usages of the term, however, community means face-to-face groups formed by the voluntary efforts of individuals. Here failure of community as the source of our problems can be interpreted to mean that if more people would only volunteer to help in soup kitchens or Habitat for Humanity or Meals on Wheels, then our social problems would be solved. Habits of the Heart strongly affirms face-to-face communities and the valuable contributions that voluntary groups can make to society. But we do not believe that the deep structural problems that we face as a society can be seriously alleviated by an increase in devotion to community in this narrow sense. We would agree that an increase in the voluntary commitments of individuals can over the long haul increase our social capital and thus add to the resources we can bring to bear on our problems. But to get at the roots of our problems these resources must be used to overcome institutional difficulties that cannot be directly addressed by voluntary action alone.

There is another problem with emphasizing a small-scale and voluntaristic understanding of community as the solution to our problems. Voluntary activity tends to correlate with income, education and occupation. "Joiners" are more apt to be found in the overclass than in the underclass or anxious middle class-with the significant exception of religious groups. This means that many voluntary activities are not so much designed to help the most deprived -- though we don't want to overlook those that are -- -as to serve the interests of the affluent. This is particularly true of political voluntarism.

Thus, dismantling structures of public provision for the most deprived in hopes that the voluntary sector can take over is mistaken in three important respects. The voluntary sector by no means has the resources to take up the slack, as churches, charities and foundations have been pointing out repeatedly in recent years. The second reason is that our more affluent citizens may feel that they have fulfilled their obligation to society by giving time and money to "make a difference" through voluntary activity without considering that they have hardly made a dent in the real problems faced by most Americans. The third reason is that the voluntary sector is disproportionately run by our better-off citizens, and a good many voluntary activities do more to protect the well-to-do than the needy.

There is another sense of community that also presents difficulties if we think the solution to our problems lies in reviving community, and that is the notion of community as neighborhood or locality. Habits of the Heart encourages strong neighborhoods and supports civic engagement in towns and cities. But residential segregation is a fact of life in contemporary America. Even leaving aside the hypersegregation of urban ghettos, segregation by class arising from differential housing costs is increasingly evident in suburban America. Thus it is quite possible that in "getting involved" with one's neighborhood or even with one's suburban town one will never meet someone of a different race or class. One will not be exposed to the reality of life of people in circumstances different from one's own.

The explanations of our social problems that stress the failure of family values or the failure of community have in common the notion that our problems are individual or are social in only a narrow sense (that is, involving family and local community), rather than economic, political and cultural. A related feature that these common explanations of our troubles share is hostility to the role of government or the state. If we can take care of ourselves with possibly a little help from our friends and family, who needs the state? Indeed, the state is often viewed as an interfering father who won't recognize that his children have grown up and don't need him any more. He can't help solve our problems because in large measure it is he who created them.

In contrast, the market, in this mind-set, seems benign, a neutral theater for competition in which achievement is rewarded and incompetence punished. There is some awareness that markets are not neutral, that there are people and organizations with enormous economic power capable of making decisions that adversely affect many citizens. From this point of view, big business joins big government as the source of problems rather than their solution. Yet more than in most comparable societies Americans are inclined to think that the market is fairer than the state.

The culture of individualism, then, has made no small contribution to the rise of the ideology we referred to in Habits as neocapitalism. There we drew a picture of the American political situation that has turned out not to be entirely adequate. We suggested that the impasse between welfare liberalism and its countermovement, neocapitalism, was coming to an end and two alternatives, the administered society and economic democracy, were looming on the scene. As it turned out, this incipient pair of alternatives did not materialize, or at least they are enduring a long wait. Instead, neocapitalism has grown ever stronger ideologically and politically. Criticism of "big government" and "tax-and-spend liberalism' has mounted even as particular constituencies, which in the aggregate include most citizens, favor those forms of public provision that benefit them in particular, while opposing benefits they do not receive.

We do not believe we were wrong ten years ago in seeing the severe strains that the neocapitalist formula was creating for the nation. Today those strains are more obvious than ever. But we clearly underestimated the ideological fervor that the neocapitalist position was able to tap. This is ironic, since so much of that fervor derives from the very thing we focused on in our book: individualism. The only thing that makes the neocapitalist vision viable is the degree to which it can be seen as an expression, even a moral expression, of our dominant ideological individualism, with its compulsive stress on independence, its contempt for weakness and its adulation of success.

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Liturgy For Life

In exploring the minister’s public obligations, it would seem sensible to bypass the activity of worship and concentrate on the minister’s social service, on the grounds that the latter bears most directly on politics. Politics seems far removed from the liturgical. Politics defines the world of means subordinate to ends, of instrumental complexes, of conflict, disputation and strife. In contrast, worship refers to an action which is an end in itself; it offers, at best, some measure of respite from those political conflicts that threaten to tear a society apart.

Put even more forcefully, do we not run the risk of corrupting worship if we begin with the political implications of the liturgy? Men and women worship God because God is. They corrupt worship if they bend worship to some other goal: peace of mind, career advancement, family unity, better health, moral improvement or political cause. Some such secondary goods may follow from worship, but if these become the aim and purpose of worship, the worshiper instrumentalizes God to other ends, thus diminishing God to what God is not, the great slot machine in the sky. Joseph Pieper says: "To celebrate a festival means to do something which is in no way tied up to other goals; [it] has been removed from all ‘so that’ and ‘in order to.’ True festivity cannot be imagined as residing anywhere but in the realm of activity that is meaningful in itself" (In Tune with the World: A Theory of Festivity).

While one corrupts worship if one reduces it to the "so that" and the "in order to" of politics (or to the goals of the marketplace or psychic health), secondary implications, including the political, do flow from worship. The Catholic moralist Dietrich von Hildebrand sketched in Liturgy and Personality a portrait of the liturgically formed person, the person who takes the liturgy seriously, who does not corrupt it for reasons of self-improvement, self-advancement or any other secondary gains, yet who reflects secondarily the shaping power of the liturgy on character. Similarly, one may ask what liturgically formed citizens might look like, that is, citizens who take seriously the sacraments of the Lord’s Supper and baptism and the ordinary prayers of the church as an influence on their interactions in the polis, even though they do not exploit worship for political goals. (Protestants need to learn here from other faith traditions. Whereas the Protestant usually asks, ‘What is the scripturally formed person like?," the Catholic (and Eastern Orthodox) believer asks, "What is the liturgically formed person like?")

The Sacrament of the Lord’s Supper. In a pluralistic country, this sacrament cannot directly provide the basis for societal unity. To impose the sacrament on others would convert it into what it cannot be and still be itself: an intrusive creed that divides. But Christian congregations must take the eucharistic vision seriously in fulfilling their responsibilities as a public within a public at large.

This central act of Christian worship reenacts the meal Jesus shared with his disciples before his imminent and violent death. Even that meal in its human details did not offer a respite from the violence to follow. The disciples squabbled over which of them was the greatest; but Jesus undercut their game of king of the mountain by reversing the world’s understanding of royalty. "The kings of the Gentiles lord it over them. . . . But not so with you; rather the greatest among you must become like the youngest, and the leader like one who serves. . . . I am among you as one who serves" (Luke 22:24-27).

In the course of the meal, Jesus rebuked Judas, who would betray him, and Peter, who, despite his grandiloquent profession of loyalty, would deny him. Yet, at this same meal, Jesus took bread and wine and distributed them to his errant, defecting disciples. He would proceed thereafter to fulfill his own indefectible purpose -- despite outright betrayal, the apathy of disciples in Gethsemane, the shiftiness of political leaders, the fickleness of crowds, and the violence and isolation of the death which he knew would follow. Subsequent generations of Christians, repeating his words, take bread and wine as their way of "making present" (anamnesis) his self-expending and nourishing love.

In its sheer violence, Jesus’ death resembles the liturgies of violence endlessly repeated in the modern media, but points in the opposite direction. It arouses awed love rather than fear, creates community rather than isolated onlookers; it invites people to join and share, not to watch alone at a distance through satellite TV. The reenactment of the Eucharist would reclaim the sorry past, but in mercy rather than vengeance; transform the future without deforming the present; and extend charity outward to the needy, the stranger and the enemy, while it presses judgment and mercy inward to that dark comer where self-pity and malice fester. This event impels Christians both to come together and to go out to others in self-expending love.

Participation in this event is an end in itself; it transcends the political. But the "making present" of the Eucharist does not withdraw celebrants from the rough terrain of the political; it brings to the surface those conflicts with which the political order must cope. The sacrament acknowledges those threats to life to which the dark pessimism of Hobbes and the social contract theorists testified. However, it also states that the deepest taproot of community among us is not a Summum Malum that forces fearful, self-interested men and women into the social contract but a Summum Bonum that breaks and limits the hold of fear upon us and invites us into the covenant of undaunted, self-expending love.

In a sense, modern-day terrorism represents a liturgical reaction to the social-contract theory of the state. Terrorists intuit that the modern social contract relies heavily upon the power of fear to hold things together. But fearful self-interest that draws people together can quickly drive them apart. In wielding violence, terrorists trigger the disintegrative power of fearful self-interest. In receiving (and accepting into one’s own life) the Savior who lays down his life for others, the Eucharist offers the social order the leavening power of self-donative love.

The prominence of the terrorist’s cult of blood from the ‘70s onward exposes at once the insatiable hunger of modern people for the liturgical and the deprivations of a politics that springs from a lack of liturgical substance. The ritual of terrorism parodies the sacrament of the Eucharist. Luther called the Christian sacrament the enacted word; the modern terrorist substitutes the propaganda of deed. The Christian rite remembers a figure who serves at once as high priest and sacrifice. The terrorist act distinguishes the high priest from his victims. However, if the terrorist holds his ground, he must be ready to die, if not for his victims, with them. His readiness to kill and die creates the power he exercises over the society that watches raptly on television.

Like the traditional act of worship, the terrorist’s attack goes beyond the ordinary limits of political means and ends. Politically, the deed often seems counterproductive, self-destructive and irrational. It doesn’t seem to make any sense as a means directed to an end. As John Hume, a Catholic member of Parliament, long ago complained about terrorism in Northern Ireland, "The Provos bombed themselves to the conference table and they bombed themselves away again." The action is ecstatic in the sense that it stands outside the causal nexus of means and ends; it juts out religiously as an end in itself. It does not look beyond itself to a further justification. Some terrorists express this ecstatic element mythically in their expectation that the martyr will be directly translated into heaven.

Terrorism offers a festival of death, a celebration that has its own priest and victims and that carries with it the risk that the priest himself will become a victim. Others concelebrate in this liturgical action through the medium of the media. Thus the media respond to the human thirst for ritual, the need for ecstasy, the desire to be lifted out of the daily round. Through violent death, their horror before it and their need to draw near it, the event relieves liturgically bereft men and women of that other death, boredom; and it momentarily strips the state, founded in self-interest, of its protective power.

The Sacrament of Infant Baptism. The folksy domestic sentiment with which we surround the sacrament of baptism obscures its daring as a public rite. This sacrament acknowledges, on principle, that the church welcomes the disconcertingly strange, the future in all its squirming uncertainty, into its life. The sacrament asks parents to relax their obsessive hold on their child. It invites those most inclined to deal myopically with the infant, most tempted to seek its good at the expense of others and to crush it to the bosom in apprehensive love, to hand over their child into the hands of another. Baptism asks parents to see their child at a disquieting, yet quieting, distance; that is, to accept it as a child of God. Taken seriously, the rite requires parents to prepare their child for something more than a domestic significance and to free the child for a public identity beyond their final reach and control.

The Prayers of Invocation and Adoration. These prayers at the outset of worship distinguish the Ruler of the Universe from those principalities and powers that normally lure the human heart and command allegiance. The prayers of adoration block idolatry; they leave no doubt as to the status of the government and, indeed, all political causes: humanly important, but not ultimate. The citizen cannot pray to an eternal God and take a temporary state too seriously. God has allowed the state for both the good that it can do and the evil that it can prevent, but, in the setting of adoration:

Even the nations are like a drop from a bucket, and are accounted as dust on the scales. . . . All the nations are as nothing before him; they are accounted by him as less than nothing and emptiness.

Yet, this metaphysical/religious vision should not end in political detachment. As it strips political leaders and activists of vanity and illusion, it should also free them to wield power under God and in the service of God’s creatures. The prayers of adoration help let the air out of inflationary political rhetoric; and thus they ought to reduce the violence and divisiveness which that rhetoric tends to inspire.

Intercessory Prayer. Usually these prayers, whether in worship or personal devotions, include petitions for four overlapping groups of people: intimates and friends, public authorities, enemies and the needy. At first glance, prayers for family and friends would seem to contradict the meaning of public life. They seem to presuppose a kind of deity of the hearth. They ask God to extend the parents’ loving and partial hand. The supplicant asks God to treat those in the circle of intimacy preferentially, to act like a legislature that passes a private bill or like a president who occasionally suspends general laws to intervene in a special case.

The supplicant should pray for those she loves. But the Lord’s Prayer qualifies such intercessions and subjects them to the Son’s petition: "nevertheless not my will but thine be done." Intercession forces supplicants to take those nearest and dearest, the beleaguered objects of their worry, and to see them at a distance and in a strange light, and to recognize that their ultimate well-being does not depend upon their own efforts to contrive their good. Intercession, so understood, moves those one loves from a private closet into the open air; it ought to continue what baptism began as it releases those one loves into a more spacious life.

The church also offers intercessory prayers for public authorities, both ecclesiastical and political. At a minimum this particular prayer reminds worshipers that prayer cannot simply dwell on the turmoil of private life. The church’s prayers and its actions must also extend to queens and presidents, bishops and vicars, deans and sheriffs, garbage collectors and safety inspectors, and all others who bear the burden of office. The petition for political leaders in one of the Protestant orders of worship reads: "Mighty God, Lord of the nations, govern those who govern us, your servant . . . President of the United States, and those who share the public trust in every land." Usually Christians who are Democrats -- give or take a few scandals -- pray that prayer more easily when a Roosevelt, Truman, Kennedy, Johnson, Carter or Clinton occupies the White House. Christians who are Republicans find it easier to utter the president’s name when an Eisenhower, Nixon, Ford, Reagan or Bush occupies the oval office. Praying ungrudgingly for Caesar depends a little on who wears Caesar’s toga. What should we make of a prayer that asks people to bring one of those sulphurous political names to their lips? At a minimum, such a prayer calls for something other than scorn for political leaders.

Intercessory prayer has a further public significance: it invites Christians to pray for their competitors and enemies. Psychologically, competitors usually preoccupy the petitioner as much as do friends and family. The very existence of competitors threatens; they can become an obsession. Supposed or real, his enemies make every man his own Kremlinologist. He ponders their every move, believes them subtle and malignant; they crowd him; he wishes them dead. Intercessory prayer forces Christians to look at their enemies in a new light, releasing them from the grip of suspicion, hatred and revenge, and to pray for their well-being. This relocation of his enemies in the public space of intercessory prayer also acknowledges that no world and space exists wholly free of competitors. As Freud rightly taught, it takes only three parties -- a man, a woman and a child -- to create the conditions for enmity in the world, and the introduction of a fourth, as scripture tells us, raises Cain. As Martin Luther King Jr. taught, praying for one’s enemies need not lead to a quiescent politics; such praying reminds us that one may contend sharply with the unjust enemy yet still leave him some room to turn around. (Martin Luther King Jr. insisted in his "Letter from Birmingham Jail" that nonviolent resistance should both begin and end with the effort to negotiate, a process which requires concession on both sides.)

Finally, intercessory prayer pulls back into public consciousness those people whom we ordinarily hide in the outer edge of the fire light -- the lame, the halt, the blind, the sick, the poor and the captive. We fix focus on our friends and enemies; we hide the needy from sight. We bury them prematurely. We herd the sick, the deviant, the defective, the aged and the delinquent into isolated institutions and hire professionals to manage them, a strategy that frees the rest of us to attend to our own interests. Prison inmates become "forgotten men." When we ignore the needy and consign the inmate to oblivion, we shrink and depopulate the public realm. We reduce the number of those who can be seen and heard, can make their wants known, and can participate in public debate. Intercessory prayer for "all sorts and conditions" of men and women requires us to bring them from the margins back to the center of our consciousness to attend to their well-being.

The Prayers of Confession. Their placement in the worship service before intercessory prayer offers a clue as to why we neglect the needy. Neglect does not usually spring from the fact that we are too smug, too complacent, or too engrossed in our own riches to bother with the bereft. If we examine our excuses for neglect, including our reasons for institutionalization, we discover not so much smugness but anxiety, not complacency but a sense of harassment, not riches but a feeling of bankruptcy. The question "What can I do?" often means, in despair, "I have nothing for the real needs of another because I cannot satisfy my own. How could I help him? Better to avoid him. To have to face him would be too depressing. He would remind me of my own emptiness."

Not all expediency in our treatment of the distressed derives from gross callousness; usually, we are simply too busy obscuring from view our own poverty. We consign to oblivion the maimed, the disfigured and the decrepit because we have already condemned to oblivion a portion of ourselves. To address them in their needs would require us to confess to God our own needs. But we do not want to accept the depths of our own neediness. The needy, hidden away, threaten us because of what we have already desperately hidden away from ourselves. For some such reason, we prefer, even at great expense, to have the needy hidden from sight. And what better way to cover them with shadows and to obscure our own neediness than to put them in the hands of professionals who know how to make a great show of strength, experience and competence in handling a given subdivision of the distressed? Thus we convert the exigent into occasions in and through which the community exhibits its precedence and power.

What have these strategies of neglect got to do with the prayers of confession? The French commentator Michel Foucault offers a clue. He observes in Madness and Civilization that medieval society, except for its treatment of lepers (and religious minorities), tended, less than ours, to incarcerate its own members for deviancy But by the 17th and 18th centuries, society imprisoned the idle, the poor, the insane and the criminal without distinction in the former houses of leprosy. Foucault believes that the religious ritual of confession helped shape the medieval attitude toward deviancy. Prayers of confession openly acknowledge human imperfection; they thereby imply some confidence that we can meet evil in the open without its engulfing those who pray. But after the 17th century, Western society felt increasingly "ashamed in the presence of the inhuman." It assumed that one could handle evil only by banishing it. An age that aspires to total autonomy finds it more difficult to acknowledge in the mainstream of its life the dependent, the defective and the irrational. They remind us of a negativity so threatening and absolute that the society can deal with them only by hiding from them, by putting them out of sight.

Confession, by inviting a person to acknowledge evil and fault in himself, allows him to see and address the distress of others. Confession makes intercession possible. The faith that shapes the Eucharist and its prayers of confession and intercession assumes that the negative is real but not ultimate. The quarrels and the defections of first generation disciples, the sins of disciples in our own generation, and the defects and delinquencies of the race at large are grave indeed but not so grave as to engulf us all.

The Prayers of Thanksgiving impel the church toward giving -- toward its service function -- but differently motivated than philanthropic giving. The ideal of philanthropy (which informs much of the giving of voluntary communities, conscientious professionals, and corporations with a conscience) commends a love of humankind that issues in concrete deeds of service to others. However, the ideal of philanthropy tends to divide the human race in two: relatively self-sufficient benefactors and needy beneficiaries. It presupposes a unilateral or one-way transfer from giver to receiver. This assumption of asymmetry dominates not only private charity, professional pro bono work and corporate philanthropy, but also the conventional self-interpretation of America as philanthropist among the nations and the American church as patron to the churches in the Third World.

This idealist’s picture of a social world divided into givers and receivers, while morally superior to a callous neglect of the needy, overlooks the fact that the benefactor receives as well as gives. Scripture and the prayers of thanksgiving provide powerful warrants for giving but always within the setting of a primordial receiving. The scriptures of Israel urge the Jewish farmer, in harvesting, not to pick his crops too clean. He should leave some for the sojourner, for he was once a sojourner in Egypt. Thus God’s own actions, his care for Israel while a stranger in Egypt, prompts and measures Israel’s treatment of the stranger in its midst. The imperative to give rests upon the narrative account of a gift already received. Thus the moral/legal element in scripture (the halacha) rests upon a narrative base (the agada). Similarly, the New Testament reads, "In this is love, not that we loved God but that he loved us. . . . Beloved, since God loved us so much, we also ought to love one another"(1 John 4:10,11). The imperative derives from the revelatory event of the divine love.

These passages push the believer toward a different notion of love from the philosopher’s principle of beneficence. Benevolence is self-derived. The rational principle of beneficence presupposes the structural relationship of benefactor to beneficiary, of giver to receiver. These sacred narratives reposition the benefactor; they open up a revelatory horizon against which the potential benefactor can discover herself to be a beneficiary. Her petty benefactions merely acknowledge love already received beyond her deserving.

Persuasion and Discernment: The Gifts of Leadership

The President as Leader: Appealing to the Better Angels of Our Nature, by Erwin C. Hargrove. University Press of Kansas. 240 pp. $25.00

The ancient cities of Jerusalem, Sparta and Athens can stand for three different types of leaders -- charismatic, military and persuasive. The founder of Jerusalem, King David, led by charisma. David was a man of transcendent gifts and charm: a poet, a musician and a great strategist. Though he was a sometime adulterer and betrayer of his men, he founded a great nation and was the prototype for a personal, kingly rule.

The founders of American democracy rejected charismatic leadership, insisting on a government of laws, not of men. However, a sad counterfeit of charismatic leadership still shows up today in the cult of the celebrity, and in a disposition to limit presidential candidates to those who pass the camera test for office. Instead of an account of the hero's deeds, we get a People magazine report on the celebrity's personality.

In ancient Sparta, a military society, leadership took the form of command. Sparta was a society given to taciturnity. It depended upon the bark of command and the grunt of obedience. Military leaders do not need to use many words. Leaders of the Spartan type abhor the messy give-and-take of political compromise; they prefer the clarity of military confrontation to the shifting waters of political coalitions. They prize hierarchy. We still partly depend on such leadership today. Our president is commander in chief, and corporations depend heavily on command; but that is not the whole of leadership in a democracy.

In Athens leadership depended on persuasion. Athens relied on logos or rhetor (that is, the word or the art of persuasion). Democracies are inherently wordy. A parliament is literally a house of words. The American presidency may no longer be a bully pulpit, but it has to be a bully blackboard to the nation. You cannot lead for long, you cannot even command the armed forces for long, unless you are able to persuade the people to follow.

Erwin C. Hargrove in The President as Leader highlights the importance of Athenian leadership -- that is, leading through teaching and persuasion. "Politicians must try their best to describe the world and their plans for dealing with it in the most accurate terms they can master." In short, they must "teach reality" While Hargrove concedes that presidents must bargain, manipulate, control and maneuver, their first task is to "teach reality to publics and their fellow politicians through rhetoric." On this issue, Hargrove follows James MacGregor Burns, who in his book Leadership distinguished transactional from transformational leaders. The transactional leader gives followers what they want. The transformational leader addresses their deeper needs. The transformational leader who would address needs rather than wants must perforce teach and persuade; otherwise the leader's transformational acts will be done paternalistically or dictatorially.

Comparing Franklin Roosevelt and two of his successors, Lyndon Johnson and Ronald Reagan, Hargrove gives Roosevelt the best score. Johnson skillfully bargained with and manipulated politicians on domestic issues, but he lacked the gift of teaching and persuading the nation, especially in foreign policy, as he persisted in fighting a war based on a series of illusions. Reagan was a master communicator -- his effectiveness on television rivaled FDR's mastery of radio -- but his charm tended to obscure the fact that he was not teaching about reality. He plumped for a supply-side strategy of tax cuts, even though the strategy failed to produce the private savings, the balanced budget or the economic benefits for ordinary workers that some of his theorists had forecast.

In "teaching reality," a president must address and draw on the deep and enduring values of the people to meet their most significant challenges. According to Hargrove, FDR "knew how to lead by listening and teaching, and then listening and learning more, as he again taught. He could sense what was in people's minds at any given historical moment and articulate plausible remedies for their concerns."

Just what are the deep cultural ideals that a president must address if he would teach reality? I have great difficulty with Hargrove's answer to this question. In his judgment, liberal individualism supplies the basic cultural ideal that an effective presidential leader must invoke. Hargrove defines "liberal individualism" spaciously enough to cover both economic libertarians and democratic egalitarians. Economic libertarians (read Republicans) gain power when government becomes too burdensome; egalitarians (read Democrats) ascend when the free play of the market economy begins to exclude too many from the fundamental goods of American life. Both parties are individualistic, not communitarian.

In my judgment,Hargrove is diagnostically wrong in locating American culture wholly within the parameters of liberal individualism and morally and politically wrong in arguing that "teaching reality" must automatically confine itself to culturally established borders.

First, his diagnosis forces him to dismiss the communitarian elements in the American heritage, both religious and political. All three major religious traditions -- Protestant, Catholic and Jewish -- relied on their communal origins as they made their way into this country. Jews disembarked in the U.S. under the triple banner of God, Torah and Israel. Catholics defined the church as the body of Christ, its members compacted inseparably as members of that body. Although Protestants later bought into the rhetoric of individualism, they did not begin on that note. The early Protestant settlers entered into their shipboard covenants, understood themselves as bound together in "the ligaments of love," and defined their several callings as the way in which God ordained them to serve the common good.

Some commentators have countered that the emphasis on individual liberty and equality in the revolutionary period broke with this communitarian heritage. Revolutionary thinkers established the two poles of liberal individualism: they invoked liberty more often than any other ideal; and they justified independence with Jefferson's proposition that all men are created equal.

But the principles of liberty and equality do not exhaustively define American culture. Immediately after attaining liberty, the revolutionaries invoked "public virtue" more often than any other term, a virtue which they defined as the readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the common good. Why public virtue? The revolutionaries recognized that liberty itself would not long survive unless people sustained a readiness to serve the common good.

The framers of the Constitution carried forward this sense of community into the first words we uttered as a nation: "We the people." The preamble of the Constitution does not proclaim, "We, the factions of the United States" of "We, the individuals of the United States," but "We, the people." Individualism may be the primary language spoken in the U.S., but it is not the only language. A communitarian language may, in Robert Bellah's words, rank second to individualism in American life, but it is not a foreign language. In "teaching reality," leaders can appeal to it.

Furthermore, even if individuals did describe the American character, we need not restrict teaching reality to what Americans have hitherto found acceptable. Aristotle (with whom Hargrove opens and closes his book) recognized that though we may not be able to do surgery upon our characters, we must learn how to strive against our weaknesses. If dominantly individualistic, Americans may need to learn how to counter elements of their individualism. For individualism, while powerful, does not help us respond adequately to the circumstances of persons in a completely interconnected and interdependent world. Individualism has help create a world that individualism cannot survive.

Having urged a more adventuresome view of leading through teaching, I want nevertheless to stress two obstacles to the undertaking which Hargrove overlooks. one is circumstantial, the other, intrinsic.

Earlier I suggested that the U.S., like Athens, depends upon leadership by persuasion. But for such leadership to work, leaders need access to the place where they have a chance to persuade. In ancient Athens that site was the marketplace, to which leaders had access without fee. In the modern U.S., the place to which leaders need access of the television station, and the ticket of admission is astronomical. Money calls the shots for both political parties -- over $1 billion in the l996 election.

Because of the high price of political access today, we also use words differently. We no longer put them together in extended argument in order to catch all the factors that count in a complex political judgment. We dice them into sound bites, intended not to persuade but to manipulate. Money threatens to corrupt not simply leaders but political discourse. Improving such discourse is only partly a question of changing behavior. We also need systemic reforms to shorten political campaigns and to allow leaders more free access to television for the business of governance. As things stand, we have reversed the relationship of campaigning to governing: leaders today do not campaign occasionally in order to govern: they campaign constantly and govern only occasionally.

Hargrove also overlooks as intrinsic, sometimes tragic limitation of political discourse. He asserts that presidents can successfully simplify issues without distorting the political message or the cultural ideals that justify it. In rare transcendent moments that may be the case. Lincoln surely offered incandescent simplicity in his Gettysburg Address and Second Inaugural Address. But language describing programs and politics inevitably sloganizes; it prescinds from the full complexity of experience. And although political abstractions also clarify portions of the total consciousness of a people and help organize the government for action, they also distort, neglect and marginalize other ranges of experience and conviction. Politics traffics in the possible and the doable and not the altogether. Its slogans inevitable grow distant and spectral. That limitation has hampered political discourse long before the advent of TV.

The inevitable distortions and sloganizing of politics led the philosopher R. G. Collingwood to argue that a society needs its artists as well as its politicians. The artist engages in a retrieval and freshening of the language and therefore in an enrichment and clarification of consciousness. This in turn leads to a recovery of community in its entirety, which politics always runs the risk of sacrificing for the sake of immediate action.

Religion can also serve the political health of a people, not only through the particular advice and counsel it occasionally offers, but indirectly through its more spacious horizons. As Samuel Johnson put it: "How small, of all that human hearts must endure, I That part which laws or kings can cause or cure!" In addition to making their own modest contributions to the work of immediate action, churches and synagogues have a further responsibility to recognize and serve the vast territory of the spirit that lies beyond the reach of politics. In serving this wider domain, churches and synagogues should not diminish or despise the limited arena of politics or dismiss the huge distinctions that must be made between honest and demagogic discourse, between the president as teacher and the president as artful illusionist. But they should remember that the health and vigor of the political arena itself requires contributions from other sources upon which inclusive community depends

What kind of moral character must a leader in a democracy possess? Hargrove's discussion of character is brief and unexceptionable. Trust depends upon the leader's exhibition of integrity, judgment and competence. The emotionally secure, self-confident leader listens better to others and elicits better their confidence in him. Character is itself a tool of leadership in that it enhances the leader's capacity to persuade others; and persuasion "is a far more effective approach to leadership than control," trickery or manipulation. Hargrove also refers to the capacity for "discernment." If leading entails "teaching reality," then discernment surely heads the list of virtues the leader needs. Discernment entails more than tactical alertness (to which Machiavelli reduced the classical virtue of prudence). We need to associate discernment with practical wisdom about ends and not just the adroit choice of means to predetermined ends.

It is on this point that we can distinguish leading from managing. The manager, whether working for the government or a corporation, operates with preset goals. The task of managing is somewhat custodial, janitorial. The leader faces the more difficult task of choosing goals. Leadership usually entails breaking new ground. The word leading, in root, means going. Going where? Politics poses the vexing questions of destination. It requires the wise choice of goals (which the culture has not entirely selected) and the means to them (about which serious differences of judgment may exist).

Political leaders rely heavily on advisers to help them set priorities. But no matter how much wisdom and information leaders take in, they cannot dispel all doubts or eliminate all risks. At best, they choose wisely what risks to take. So in addition to the virtue of discernment, the leader needs courage. A rough patch of trouble usually follows hard choices -- and most decisions that cross a president's desk are hard choices.

Thomas Aquinas defined courage as firmness of soul in the face of adversity. Such courage has two aspects: active and passive. Courage requires the active capacity to attack problems, rather than dodging or ducking them. But courage also calls for an equally important, somewhat more passive, endurance or resilience in defeat -- an ability to pick oneself up off the floor and carry on. (Our modern political campaigns test the virtue of endurance to the point of cruelty.)

Leadership also requires the virtue of temperance. Plato once noted that to govern others, one must first be able to govern oneself. The current political ordeal of the nation in response to Bill Clinton's behavior painfully reminds us of the wisdom of Plato's assertion. Runaway desire can set institutions lurching, both defensively and reactively, out of control. But the greater long-term danger to the republic's integrity comes not from sexual misconduct but from the intrusion and corruption of cash.

Finally, leadership in a democracy requires the virtue of public-spiritedness; what the founders of the country called public virtue, a readiness to sacrifice self-interest to the common good. Some have called this the virtue of contributive justice, and it is surely the indispensable fount of contributive justice. We cannot distribute well or wisely for the good of all if we do not exact well and proportionately from the bounty of each.

We need the virtue of public-spiritedness, and we need to honor that virtue when we find it. It is a huge irony that at a time when the entire world depends on good political decisions coming out of the U.S., Americans have contempt for politics as a vocation. We act as though our government is headed by King George III, a foreign power, not an instrument of national purpose. To that degree, we deny to ourselves the possibility of some structural solutions to deep-seated problems: poverty, a badly educated populace, some 80 million citizens with little or no health care insurance, and the disturbing growth of an underclass. One cannot simply shine a thousand points of light on deep structural problems and expect them to disappear. We need also the government as the instrument of good order and justice.

We need the virtue of public-spiritedness also in the leaders of corporations and other huge organizations. In large part, such organizations pursue their own interests, but they will not long survive if leaders in the "private" sector do not keep an eye on the common good.

The two powerful institutions in the medieval world were the church and the state. The two great institutions in the modern world are business and government. We woefully underestimate the power of business leaders if we think they are engaged in private enterprise, for their decisions have huge public impacts not only on their stockholders but on the jobs we need, the neighborhoods in which we live, the water we drink, the air we breathe and the schools in which we learn. In effect, business leaders and professional leaders are unelected public officials.

So what does leadership in a democracy require? The Greek art of persuasion certainly. It also requires the ancient virtues of wisdom, courage, temperance and public-spiritedness. And it is not enough to demand these of our political leaders alone. The leaders of other powerful institutions in society must evince these virtues as well.

Albert Camus: Political Moralist

The writings of Albert Camus have had a decisive influence on the political convictions of many young Frenchmen. Yet he often sounds like a Christian moralist. In fact there is no better way of moving toward the center of his political convictions than by recognizing their theological dimension.

"The astonishing history evoked here is the history of European pride." With these words Camus introduces his eloquent study of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, The Rebel (New York: Alfred Knopf, Inc., 1956). Camus writes scathingly "of the horizontal religions of our times," of the attempted deification of man that has plagued contemporary life. In the fashion of the Christian prophet, he pursues the moral pretensions of the French Revolutionaries, the pedantry and hypocrisy of the bourgeois world, the demonia of the fascists, and the messianic utopianism of the Marxists. In all these movements, Camus argues, man overreaches himself, pretends to one sort of divinity or another, but concludes by justifying the violation of man.

Further, in a manner reminiscent of the classical theologians, Camus links the cardinal sin of pride with a consequent dishonesty and murder. Every human absolute eventually contradicts itself and does so at terrible expense to the solidarity of the race. In honor of Justice, Law and Order the French Revolutionists unleashed a lawless terror. Although praising the formal virtues of honesty, conscience, and the dignity of work, the bourgeois class created social conditions that made the exercise of these virtues impossible. While declaring everything permissible in the name of a glorious Germany, Hitler led this very Germany to an impermissible, inglorious defeat. In deference to a future humanity, the Stalinist commits inhumanities that defer indefinitely the advent of the New Jerusalem. The results in each case are more than contradictions furnished by the turns and twists of events. There is a fundamental moral incoherence at the root of all these movements, as they lay an ax to their own principles and split open the race.

Camus’ affirmations also have a familiar ring for moralists in Christian circles, especially those concerned with "proximate justice." Against the wild immodesty, contradiction and betrayal of human solidarity that ensues when men absolutize a particular group or future for man, Camus urges a passion for justice that is governed at every point by a sense of limits. He displays the essential double tension: The prophet’s zeal for response to the abuse of man’s dignity, with distrust for a zeal that denies all restraints upon that response. In every instance, Camus recommends a modesty, honesty and decency in political action that will honor the proximate character of justice; he recommends these persuasively by reflecting the discipline of these virtues in his own writing.

Yet the rejections and affirmations suggested so far are hardly enough to register Camus in the latent Church. Notoriously absent from "the history of European pride" is the sense that it is man who is prideful. Ideologies rather than men appear to do most of the overreaching of limits. Man is treated as the victim rather than the author of the ideologies that have dominated our times. In short, there is little sense of man as sinner. As might be suspected, Camus also shows little sympathy for "realism" in politics—an immediate corollary of the sinfulness of man for so many Christian moralists. He has little patience with those who counsel the use of force on the grounds that the world is not yet redeemed. Camus calls not for realistic action in the light of the sinfulness of man but for action on behalf of man as the relatively innocent victim.

And yet, admitting these distinctions, why not add a dash of pessimism and a pinch of realism and still recognize in Camus’ study of pride a significant contribution to Christian anthropology? This is rather difficult, for at the very core of his whole thinking is the denial of God. Clearly denied in his doctrine of limited political goals is God, the Limiter. Although it is out of fashion amongst some theologians to take such a denial seriously, Camus, at least, asks us to consider it so. The denial of God informs the whole of his political thinking. Ultimately he makes it the basis for his rejection of realism in politics, and he places it at the origin of every virtue and every improvement in the human condition. To sense the weight and breadth of this conviction, it is worth returning again to his understanding of pride.

Christians have interpreted pride as the attempt on the part of the creature to play the Creator. In fact, Augustine once remarked that every sin is a grotesque mimicry of one of the perfections of God. Curiosity imitates God’s omniscience; ambition seeks to duplicate God’s glory; luxuriousness parodies the abundance of the divine life, etc. In sin, man perversely imitates God’s virtues.

Camus also understands pride as the attempt to imitate God. Not his virtues, for God has none. But rather this single encompassing vice: God is a murderer. The proposition is simple and fully horrifying. If God exists and every man dies, God is the death-bringer. He is the one who places every man under the penalty of suffering and death. When all the cant, the prayers and imprecations are done with, this is the truth about God: He is the one who slays, the one who raises buboes in the groins of little children, the one who places all men under the penalty of the destruction of their flesh. Neither cult, nor ecclesiastical apparatus, nor theological ingenuity can obscure this fact. ". . . the order of the world is shaped by death" (The Plague, tr. Stuart Gilbert, London, Hamish Hamilton, 1948, p. 223), which inflicts upon man a never-ending defeat. In the light of this horrible fact, Camus does not summon man to atheism but to blasphemy. To deny God’s existence is inaccurate. In a sense, he does exist. God exists as the destroyer. But to say "Hallowed be thy name"? This is unthinkable. In decency, man can only blaspheme the death-bringer, resist and desecrate his name. He is a ghoul, a chewer of corpses, against whom men ought to rebel. For God has transgressed a limit—human life.

Camus urges action then, not in the image and similitude of God, but action that bears witness to one’s original manhood, a manhood that receives its outline in the original refusal to consent to God and his works.

Pride, on the other hand, is a human work of murder added to the divine work of murder, a human injustice that corresponds to the divine injustice, a transgression of limits.

The chief difference between God and man is that God offers no justification for his behavior; he is silent. But man does. In political life, he offers ideologies which attempt to justify murder. Reactionary ideology justifies unrestrained repression as a means of preserving good order and life. Revolutionary ideology justifies the use of every means—war, duplicity and murder—for the sake of a future life and order.

Camus opposes both on the grounds of the limit discovered in the original insurrection against death itself. All subsequent established orders and revolutions betray their origins when they resort to murderous means in their own right.

No more than Israel is permitted to forget her covenant with her God, or the Church her covenant in the blood of Christ, is the revolutionist permitted to forget his covenant in the blood that originally prompted his insurrection against death. In organizing itself for the future, a revolution must not forget its origins. Otherwise the revolution obscures its future goals and disfigures its face in the present.

Camus is clearly interested in recovering a form of sanctity in political life founded in a double refusal: The refusal of God and the refusal to be God. His rather spectacular theological criticism is directed to that end. He rejects political realism in both its conservative and revolutionary forms and summons man to a modesty, an honesty, and a decency that he believes to be within the reach of man—and certainly within the reach of Western man—as it recovers the best in the European revolutionary tradition. His argument against the pride of the realists concludes in a summons to sanctity.

Sanctity does not refer here to the possession of some moral perfection by hero or community, but rather to a politics of witness—political action that is luminous at every point to its origin. If need be, even the goal must be sacrificed for the sake of this witness.

¼ revolution must try to act, not in order to come into existence at some future date in the eyes of a world reduced to acquiescence, but in terms of the obscure existence already made manifest in the act of insurrection.

(The Rebel, p. 252)

Camus’ saints are the revolutionaries of 1905 in Russia, members of the battle organization of the Social Revolutionary Party. These men, above all, were distinguished by a sense of limit. Kaliayev, for example, was willing to assassinate, but not when there were children in the carriage of the victim. Moreover, as testimony to the fact that not even such discriminate murder, strictly speaking, was justified, the revolutionary was prepared to atone with the offering of his own life. Camus, in a bitter note, distinguishes such rebels from the dominant realist tradition in the West by remarking,

Two different species of men. One kills only once and pays with his life. The other justifies thousands of crimes and consents to be rewarded with honors.

(The Rebel, p. 273, note 6)

Revolutionaries like Kaliayev, however, have always been criticized by the realists as being nihilistic. They live and die on behalf of an immediate witness, but they are irresponsible toward the future. They are ready to protest momentarily; they are willing to take their Hungarian holiday from tyranny. But soon the ecstasy is over, and they lapse by their ineffectiveness once again into the negative fraternity of the condemned. If one is limited to means that must bear immediate witness to one’s origin and end, then there is little hope of success. And when a leader pays little attention to success, he purchases a glorious moment at great cost to his people. Renunciation of all concern with efficacy, in the long run, implies a practical acceptance of the world as run by those who avail themselves of force without restraint.

The whole art of politics depends upon the use of means that to some degree obscure origin and goal. Perhaps in the realm of art it is possible to achieve a work that is luminous in detail, that suggests an utter appropriateness in the use of means, but not so in politics. Unless one is willing to abandon the future, there is need for the use of force, indirection and even disguise in the present.

Camus does not entirely neglect this argument of the realists against a political ethic of immediate witness. He is not unmindful of the problem of power in politics. His savage attack on capital punishment, for example, is not an attack upon penal systems as such. His novel, The Plague, does not disparage the need for public structures of power. In The Rebel he shows himself sufficiently sensitive to the problem of political force to cast about for power groups that would furnish the material principle for his own ideas.

However, Camus is outspoken in his criticism of the absolute justification of the use of power. In Western culture absolute justification has been furnished by futurism—Christian and Marxist; therefore, Camus has leveled his guns against both. Conservative Christian futurism urged the acceptance of present abuse in the name of a supernatural tomorrow; Marxist futurism has encouraged revolutionary violence in the service of an earthly tomorrow. In both cases the means are justified absolutely; the present is a mere instrument in the hands of God or the Party. Camus insists that the present can never be considered raw material or instrument in relation to the future. Violence may be necessary, but it is never in the strictest sense of the word justified.

Beyond urging this restraint on the use of power, however, Camus also argues that the realists overlook different levels of power and efficacy. Camus suggests that there is an efficacy in sap, as well as in the tornado, that the realists are inclined to overlook. On this point, Camus has more in mind than the Western politician who has discovered that there are moral and spiritual, as well as military, forces and urges their full use. Rather he suggests an altogether different relation to power than that of use and manipulation. Here Camus’ Mediterranean piety toward nature—and human nature—comes to the fore: Nature cultivated rather than manipulated, enjoyed rather than transformed, attested to rather than detested in the name of a more perfect fulfillment that lies ahead. When nature and human nature are looked at in this way, different levels of power and efficacy come into view.

Realists and futurists are doubly blind then—blind to suffering as they sacrifice the present to the future, that is, as they treat human nature and its powers like raw material that must be manipulated and transformed; but blind also to the creative possibilities of history itself, as they overlook different levels of efficacy and power.

Camus may be blind in his own way. We may not hold to his argument. We may surely note with some irony that his work has come out of a country in signal need of as much realism in politics as it can lay its hand on. But it is difficult to read Camus without having one’s own vision corrected—particularly a tendency to farsightedness that causes one to overlook the evil and the summons to witness that lie near at hand. It is remarkable how easy it is to deal carelessly with the present, to charge off the whole of life to the interim needs of battle without witnessing to the origin of the war, to remain frozen in the present while serving some forgotten future thaw.

The Church militant has always recognized a danger in the Franciscan spirit. This journal was founded in concern with that danger. No doubt there is an even greater danger of Franciscanism in politics. But, no less than the Church, the political order is in trouble if there is no one around to insist on an immediate witness.

Manichaeism in American Politics



Richard Hofstadter has published a series of essays on the Radical Right entitled The Paranoid Style in American Politics (Knopf). He might just as well have called his book The Manichaean Style in American Politics, since the metaphysical and moral presuppositions of the Radical Right are Manichaean to the core.

The Manichaeans, of course, were dualists. They reduced all distinctions to the cosmic struggle between two rival powers: Good and Evil, Spirit and Matter, the Kingdom of Light and the Kingdom of Darkness. Hofstadter is not the first to note the element of dualism in American politics. Christian moralists have long bemoaned the tendency to reduce the complications of politics to the simple terms of a TV western, in which the forces of righteousness are pitted against satanic power.

In the Church this Manichaeism often expresses itself in the somewhat self-pitying struggle of "good church people" arrayed against the politicians. In the political Right Wing it generates—and anoints—a whole series of readiness committees, Minutemen and freedom evangelists pitted against the Communists, fellow-travelers and dupes in American education, press, church and government.

Although Christian moralists have recognized the analogy between the ancient Manichaeans and the Radical Right, for the most part they have left the analogy unexplored beyond references to a militant dualism. For this reason certain oddities in the behavior of the Radical Right have been only partly illumined. Why, for example, did Senator Joseph McCarthy hound and harry the relatively powerless domestic Communists and pay so little attention to the Kremlin and its power—if he were truly dedicated to a cosmic struggle against the Communist foe? Or again, why did the Goldwaterites in 1964 conduct a Presidential campaign so ineptly as to hand a massive victory to the liberal Democrats—if they were seriously opposed to "Socialistic" forces in the United States?

These oddities, of course, admit of certain ordinary political explanations. McCarthy in the Fifties saw enormous personal advantage in investigating domestic communism. Although he might not be able to touch the power of the Kremlin, he could be extremely effective in discrediting the power of "Socialistic" Washington. The Goldwaterites in the Sixties, on the other hand, were so absorbed in high revenge against the liberal wing of the Republican Party that they refused to undertake those reconciling actions essential to party unity and election victory.

But these explanations only beg for a further accounting of the obsessions that made such behavior seem plausible. McCarthy, after all, lost out eventually, and to Washington, not the Kremlin; and the Goldwaterites lost, not simply the election but control of the party. The behavior of the Right Wing has been altogether too contradictory for a solely political explanation of its strategies to give satisfaction. Perhaps a certain important feature of historic Manichaeism can shed some light on these peculiarities.

The Manichaean understanding of the three epochs into which cosmic history is divided is just as important for purposes of social analysis as their dualism. These stages were distinguished from one another entirely by the varying relations that obtained between the Kingdoms of Good and Evil.

(1) Originally the two kingdoms were separate from one another, but their separation was somewhat uneasy and unstable. The Kingdom of Darkness—out of envy, greed, resentment and the like—initiated acts of aggression against its rival.

(2) A consequent period of confusion and commingling occurred between the two forces. This confusion and commingling of Spirit and Matter, Light and Darkness, characterizes the created world that we know and its ongoing history. Since this epoch represents a net gain for satanic power, the created cosmos and its continuing life are not the work of the good God but rather a device of the devil to perpetuate his victories. Man, of course, is at the center of this confusion, inasmuch as he is an admixture of both spiritual and material powers.

(3) In the final, apocalyptic stage of history, a radical separation will occur once again. This stage will be distinguished from, and superior to, the first in that the forces of darkness will be shorn of their power of initiative and will retreat—wholly impotent and inert. The realm of Spirit prepares itself for this final stage of history by acts of purification in which it rigorously disengages itself from Matter. This disengagement entailed for the historic Manichaeans an ascetic ethic. It meant specifically the renunciation not only of sexual intercourse (as carnal) but also of its fruits in offspring. Children guaranteed to the devil the perpetuation of this present evil age.

Obviously the worst stage for the Manichaean is the second: the present era of confusion. The term "evil," in effect, has a double meaning. It refers primarily to Matter, Darkness and Flesh, but it also refers to the confusion of this Kingdom of Evil with its opposite. A clear-cut conflict between the two kingdoms is more tolerable than a state of affairs in which they overlap and blend.

Manichaean dualism and its consequent revulsion against the jumbling together of opposites is a metaphysics inhospitable not only to marriage but also to the Western sense of politics. Both marriage and politics presuppose the possibility of some kind of community or agreement between parties distinct from one another.

But the metaphysics of the Manichee does not allow for a fundamental distinction between beings or for a community between beings so distinct. There is either absolute identity (as Spirit without distinction is divinely good) or opposition (as Spirit and Flesh are anathema to one another) or confusion (as Spirit and Flesh overrun each other), but there is no community between entities in their distinction.

We have only to mention Christian metaphysics on the subject to sense the degree to which Manichaeism perforce is unfriendly not only to the ordinance of marriage but also to the development of political institutions. For the Christian there is a fundamental distinction in the Godhead between Father, Son and Holy Spirit and yet an indissoluble bond between them; there is a radical distinction between Creator and creature, Savior and sinner and yet a bond of covenant between them. Derivatively, there is a creaturely distinction between soul and body, and yet a unity; between man and woman, and yet the covenant of marriage is possible; between various human groups and communities, and yet certain kinds of agreements, bartering of interests and ties are possible between them.

The Manichaean, by contrast, wants metaphysical apartheid. The best state of affairs inevitably is that in which the Spirit, by virtue of its warfare with the Flesh, has won its final separation from the Flesh and its ties. (It would be interesting to know whether the Manichaean—and his successors—opposes commingling because he finds something evil or whether he finds something evil because it forces him into commingling. The relations may be reciprocal and reversible.)

Put in this way, it is quite obvious why a metaphysical abhorrence of marriage betrays itself in the very language that the Manichaean uses to describe the second stage of history: Spirit is "trapped" in the Flesh, or again, Spirit and Flesh "commingle" with one another. Both metaphors have overtones that are familiar to this day in the language of those revolted by sex and marriage, for whom marriage is a "trap" and the sexual act is a repugnantly intimate and messy commingling.

Just as surely as he opposes marriage, the Manichaean must abhor the realm of politics. From the vantage point of his simplicities and purities, politics is the realm of the imprecise and the confused, the impure and the compromised.

Perhaps this revulsion against commingling throws some light on the question of why Senator McCarthy and his followers were so obsessed with the domestic Communist while disinterested in practical measures against international communism. I do not think the explanation lies in the direction of the late Elmer Davis’ interpretation, an analysis that Hofstadter cites and criticizes. Davis argued that the Radical Right compensated for its sense of insecurity before an international foe by attacking its more helpless domestic counterpart. W. H. Auden characterized this type of persecution rather succinctly when he observed:

Shameless insecurity

Prays for a boot to lick

And many a sore bottom

Finds a sorer one to kick.

Hofstadter revises Davis’ theory. He does not believe that the general insecurity of the nation before international communism accounts for the emergence of the Radical Right as much as the more special insecurities (over status) felt by those who are marginal within American life. Rootless and without status, certain folk (especially certain ethnic groups) flock to the superpatriots, who will confirm their identity as Americans at the expense of the Socialist, Communist, New Dealer and fellow-traveler.

The theories of insecurity, however, fail to explain the passionate moral outrage that energized the McCarthy and Goldwater movements. (Hofstadter in a sense revises his own theory in favor of this moral factor when, in a later essay, he credits "fundamentalist Christianity" more than ethnic and status factors for the fervor of the Goldwater movement.) This moral outrage, like all Manichaean vehemence, is doubly compounded. Communism itself is evil, but even more evil is its confusion with our national life. A clearly defined enemy in the Kremlin is not half so upsetting as the obscenity of the Communist or Communist dupe in our midst. This is the intolerable confusion of which our national life must be purified, even to the neglect of measures taken to protect the nation against an admitted foe.

An abhorrence of commingling produces not only an obsessive and ritualistic persecution of the "traitor" but also a certain incapacity for the ordinary agreements, compromises and alignments that characterize political life. McCarthy, toward the end of his career, and the Goldwaterites after him proved themselves to be remarkably apolitical. (The indifference of the Right Wing to the development of a foreign policy in any political sense of the term is perfectly consistent with its incapacity for political agreements on the domestic scene.)

Hofstadter has persuasively detailed all this in his account of the unbending and rigid—indeed frigid and infertile—Presidential campaign of 1964. Goldwater’s advisers were unwilling, from his nomination onward, to negotiate in any form or fashion with the progressive wing of the Republican Party; they did not treat the selection of a Vice Presidential candidate as a marriage of convenience dictated by the political needs of the campaign; they refused to move to the center for strategic purposes to recover the independent voter (it is difficult for a dualist to take a "neutral" with enough seriousness to yield to him on many issues) they were insensitive to the full impact of Goldwater’s speeches upon groups beyond the assembly of believers in his audience; for prudential reasons, they kept Goldwater from mingling with the press, but they also saw to it that the poor, the crowds, the slums and the ghettos were assiduously avoided. (See Robert J. Donovan, The Future of the Republican Party, p. 55, quoted by Hofstadter.)

All these stratagems were pursued relentlessly to their dismal conclusion in a massive election-day defeat and the consequent cascade of liberal social legislation that poured out of the 89th Congress. Meanwhile, the movement itself remained pure, unadulterated, uncompromised and unconfused—and to this degree undefeated!

The use of language from the sexual sphere is not altogether forced. Being consistent, Goldwater’s campaign reached one of its climaxes with his address in the Mormon Tabernacle. There he talked about the safety of our women in the modern city—a legitimate issue, to be sure, but not one that he proposed to solve by action other than the moral example set by the occupant of the White House. Obviously he chose the issue not because he had political solutions for the problem of violence in the city, but because sexual violence offered symbolic statement for everything profoundly feared in the way of commingling by the movement and its followers.

Perhaps this general account of the passional presuppositions of the Right Wing also throws light on why the arguments and rhetoric of racial Manichaeans inevitably take on a sexual cast. Though the liberal may be talking about housing, education and job opportunities, the racist inevitably climaxes the argument with the sex question, "Would you want your daughter to marry one ?" And if this question is not terrifying enough, the racist continues with dark prophecies concerning the mongrelization of the white race. The liberal is baffled by this apocalyptic leap from politics to sex, but for the Manichaean it only brings these broader social questions to their repellent but intrinsic consummation.

Hofstadter is careful to point out that the Radical Right is not truly conservative. While seeking to dominate our more conservative political party, it is actually pseudo-conservative. It seeks to root out and not to conserve, to purify and not to nurture, to deny rather than to preserve much of the American heritage.

However, the corresponding question is never raised as to whether this movement in its spiritual content might not, with equal justification, be called pseudo-Christian rather than Christian. Instead Hofstadter uses the terms "paranoid style," "fundamentalist Christianity," "Christian apocalypticism" and "Manichaean dualism" somewhat interchangeably.

At best, he takes only marginal note of the existence of a Protestantism and Roman Catholicism distinguishable from this religious phenomenon. Undoubtedly there is some warrant for this identification. Manichaeism has intruded itself into certain reaches of Christianity. But no one sophisticated in the Christian tradition from Augustine onward can deny the difference between this faith and Manichaeism, no matter what Manichaeans in later ages may choose to call themselves.

This question as to whether the two can be distinguished from one another is more than a matter of academic objectivity or of Christian patriotism. For the secularist concerned with the health of the political order it has certain practical consequences for his attitude toward Christianity.

If the Christian faith and dualism are, in fact, inseparable, then the secularist would have good grounds for fearing the influence of the faith on American culture. Specifically he would fear its presence and influence in the sphere of education, and through education its impact upon political life. Conversely, he would hope for an increasingly "secularized" education as a means of purging American life of a dualism whose influence is deleterious.

Hofstadter is not without leanings in this direction. Puzzling over the fact that Birchites have usually attained more formal education than their fellow Americans, he raises the question as to whether they were educated in the great cosmopolitan colleges and universities or in denominational colleges. The hint is that a more secular and cosmopolitan education might help to rescue Americans from the influence of this pernicious movement.

In the absence of all the facts, one might offer a quite different conjecture. The John Birch Society and other radical movements from the Right (and Left) are notoriously strong precisely in those regions in which education is dominated by the modern state university. For the most part, until recently, theological studies have been absent from the curricula of such institutions. Consequently in many states the choice offered to college students is between religious fundamentalism (which is admittedly Manichaean) and religious illiteracy. To this degree it has been correspondingly difficult for clerical leadership to develop a theologically sophisticated laity, a laity that would find it more difficult to confuse the Christian faith with a primitive Manichaeism.

Obviously it would be foolish to exaggerate the political consequences of educational oversights. Nevertheless, there is a certain poetic justice in the predicament of the secular professor who opposes vehemently the teaching of religion at state institutions but confronts in his state an unholy alliance between the Right and a fundamentalistic Christianity. In a sense, he gets what he deserves.

While Hofstadter may be faulted for his failure to distinguish carefully the two religious traditions, he can only be admired for the objectivity, imagination and compassion with which he enters into the passional life of the Radical Right. He does not assume that there is no objective warrant for some of its fears or that a conspiratorial interpretation of events is invariably wrong; he enters compassionately into the insecurities and aversions that help to produce its mania. In this regard, Hofstadter offers an admirable model for the Church’s own mode of relating to such movements. Even though the Church opts for action aligned with the political liberal or the revolutionary Left, it cannot afford to do so (even when it must do so decisively) in such a way as to produce from its side a sterile impasse. It will do little good if the Church only matches the paranoia from the Right with a paranoia from the Left. (No one can read certain Leftist journals without recognizing that a paranoid element can develop in its literature as well. See Staughton Lynd, "Waiting for Righty: The Lessons of the Oswald Case," Studies on the Left, Vol. 4, No. 2, Spring 1964, pp. 135-141.)

It will also avail little if the Church simply looks down upon the Right (and the Left) from the smug vantage point of a liberal establishment. If its contribution to the political sphere is to be health-giving instead of self-satisfying, the Church will have to do more than seize upon the inadequate formulations, inconsistencies and omissions in the argument of the Radical Right for the sake of winning a debate. The Church will need to understand Manichaeans in their passional life better than they understand themselves.

But to do this, the Church may have to divest itself of some of its diagnostic assumptions about the modern world. Increasingly theologians have assumed that the modern age is secular and secular without remainder. This is a diagnostic error of major proportions for which the presence of Manichaeism in the Right Wing is only secondary evidence. No adequate exposition of the passional elements in this movement will be forthcoming if the Church does not recognize that the Radical Right (and much else in modern life) cannot be understood in secular terms alone. The movement actually reeks of religion.

It should be a cause for some gratitude then that Richard Hofstadter, a secular historian, has painstakingly reminded the Church of this fact.

Crumbling Pillars — Anarchy at Home and Abroad

The attacks on the World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, constituted an attack not simply on America but on the modern world order. One of the proud towers of the modern world is confidence in reason -- not in the human power for reason (the ancient world celebrated that power) but rather the powers acquired through reason. Modern science yields technologies that benefit humankind. So we proclaimed on the surface of the moon: one small step for man, a giant step for mankind. However, today those hostile to modernity have argued that Western power leads only to the mastery of some men over others. So bring down the tower of technical reason.

The second tower of the modern world is the social contract state. According to Hobbes’s account, the state comes into being in order to protect us from death. We give to the state a monopoly over the power of death through the police department, the fire department and the military. In exchange, the state assures us that when we go to sleep, we will not be murdered in the night; when we go to work, we will not be incinerated; when we read our mail, we will not be lethally infected.

Perpetrators of random violence seek to expose the social contract state in its relative powerlessness. Decades ago, when the Irish conflict erupted in the bombing of various pubs in London, a member of Parliament said, "From now on, every man his own magistrate." Scotland Yard cannot protect you. Random violence suffuses everyday life with uncertainty and therefore with a dread before the anarchic.

The terrorist attack doesn’t seem to fit into the ordered cause-and-effect world of political means and ends. What is its political utility? What does one hope to accomplish by a propaganda of deed? Persuade the power-holders? Make life intolerable for the society at large so as to compel it to attend to a grievance that a minority finds unbearable? The terrorist attack seems only to galvanize hatred and fear.

Terrorism cannot be wholly understood as a political strategy. It also reflects a kind of religious ecstasy. Whatever the specifics of their religious tradition, terrorists have often depended for their foot soldiers upon ecstatics who stand outside the ordinary, practical world of means and ends. They consummate a deed that has become an end-in-itself.

Formally considered, the concept of an action which is an end-in-itself puts us rather close to the religious meaning of celebration. As Josef Pieper pointed out, "To celebrate a festival means to do something which is in no way tied up to other goals; it has been removed from all ‘so that’ and ‘in order to.’ True festivity cannot be imagined as residing anywhere but in the realm of activity that is meaningful in itself." In the case of terrorism, of course, we are talking about a festival of death, a celebration that has its own priest and victim and that carries with it the likely risk that the priest himself will become one of the victims. The rest of us become awed witnesses to this liturgical action through the medium of the media.

A government seeking to stop terrorism -- whether Russia, Indonesia, the United States or Israel -- faces in reverse the same dynamics of irrational and counterproductive politics. Disproportionate retaliatory action is difficult to curtail because it offers, by discharging a boundless resentment, an immediate satisfaction, even though it may solve no problem. In this sense, argues Thomas L. Friedman of the New York Times, Ariel Sharon lives in the present. He offers no future.

In the first stage of the American reaction to the attack of September 11, American leaders seemed aware of the problem of shaping the future. The president talked about the importance of humility and the fair treatment of Muslims and about the ultimate necessity of nation-building in Afghanistan. The government seemed aware that, after overthrowing the Taliban government, we should not leave Afghanistan in the lurch, as we had earlier when we helped engineer the defeat of the Soviets there. If we simply kill a hundred possible terrorists in Afghanistan and do little about the swamp of poverty, hunger, despair and political disarray in that country and elsewhere in the Third World, we will fail to "dry out the breeding ground of terrorists." We may simply produce thousands of terrorists in their place.

By October 2002, however, saber-rattling replaced staying power in our response to the world scene. In Afghanistan, we have engaged in what Michael Ignatieff has called "nation-building lite." The passions of war aroused, we diverted attention from Afghanistan to the prospect of a preemptive strike against Iraq, not simply to remove banned weapons but to replace the regime. Government leaders also proposed a long-term weapons policy that would brook no rivals among nations or any combinations of nations.

A rather clear vision of America and its role underlies the policies of hard-liners. Hawks liken America to ancient Rome. We are not a nation-state primus inter pares, but primus super omnes. Robert D. Kaplan notes approvingly the ascendancy of civilian tough guys In the Defense Department over the State Department. His book Warrior Politics (2002) carries the sub-title, Why Leadership Demands a Pagan Ethos. America occupies the position today of imperial Rome in stabilizing the world, and Kaplan recommends a sacred canon of literature to guide leaders who wield such power: Livy, Sun Tzu, Thucydides. Machiavelli, Hobbes, Malthus, Alexander Hamilton and Tiberius. Machismo rules. If you want to be a Tiberius today, get yourself elected president of the United States.

The hawks’ critics, such as Joseph S. Nye, recognize the analogy to Rome but recommend an alternative response. The former assistant secretary of defense is no pacifist, no advocate of dismantling the world’s superpower, no mocker of the value of order in world affairs. However, he asks that the United States think through what it takes to act appropriately as the country which "bestrides the world like a colossus," a country that "dominates business, commerce, and communications; its economy. . the world’s most successful, its military might second to none."

Behaving like a Hobbesian state won’t do the job. To effect outcomes it wants, such a nation must recognize the importance of "soft power" -- cultural and ideological appeal -- as well as the "hard power" -- military and economic -- at its disposal. We cannot wield power for long as "a single imperial power unilaterally struggling against multiple corrosive forces." Our influence in a turbulent world will decline swiftly if we spurn or bypass international agreements and institutions and if we define American economic interests narrowly, making financial decisions at a distance (which, in a global economy, too often resembles bombing at a distance). Politically and economically, we will leave behind only the tinder for conflagrations in the decades to come.

We cannot ignore the more interior threats of anarchy at home. Rome was a republic before it was an empire, and the empire eventually faltered after the soul of the republic withered. Roman history poses questions not only for Imperial America but for the internal health of the republic of America. Nye wisely includes in his book on foreign policy a chapter on "Democracy in America." The threat to America from abroad stirs less anxiety than the potential for turmoil at home. One does not want to exaggerate here.

Obviously, nothing so traumatic has happened in present-day America as the shaking of the foundations which the Russians underwent in the ‘80s, and nothing so upsetting as the turbulent politics of the late ‘60s and ‘70s in the U.S. Still, danger signs persist despite several decades of prosperity.

The deterioration of neighborhoods in our inner cities, the decline of elemental safety -- never mind education -- in many of our schools, the burgeoning of jail populations (to the point that we have the highest percentage of incarcerated citizens of any country in the industrial world), the great strains on the family, the general slackening of discipline, which a consumerist and media-driven society relentlessly encourages, and a huge transfer of wealth In the 1980s and ‘90s (during this period, the upper 1 percent of Americans more than doubled its wealth, while the lowest 20 percent suffered an actual decline) -- all these changes signal a community at risk.

Some 20 percent of American children live in officially calculated (and therefore underestimated) poverty; over 40 million Americans have no health care insurance; and well over 20 million are underinsured. The majority of those without health care coverage are the working poor, whose children attend schools vastly overcrowded and underfunded, with little access through the school system to those skills that might help them negotiate life in an Information Age.

Most worries about eventual turmoil in this country have centered on the emergence of a permanent underclass, not the temporary underclass of newly arrived immigrants but a permanent "internal proletariat." In his Study of History, Arnold Toynbee defined an internal proletariat as a large body of people who are in the society but not of it, because they do not participate adequately in the fundamental goods which the society has to offer. Measured by that standard, the wealthiest nation the world has ever seen has been industriously creating an internal proletariat, thus preparing the way for the fulfillment of Toynbee’s prophecy that most "high civilizations" die, not by the weapons of outsiders, but by their own hands. They die by suicide, not murder.

The dominant class shows the most worrisome symptoms of an approaching instability. Classically, conservatives have prized order and abhorred instability and chaos. Their religious vision entailed a moral corollary: members of the guardian class should accept some measure of responsibility for sustaining the stability and well-being of the society at large. However today many of the most successful members of our society, instead of sustaining order, have been rather busily engaged in what Robert Reich has called "the secession of the successful." They tend to withdraw into gated communities, with private security guards and "enclaves of good schools, excellent health care, and first-rate infrastructures -- all the while scoffing at almost all functions of government, thus cutting off the supply of taxes for most public undertakings -- leaving much of the rest of the population behind." Too many of the most favored and powerful have abandoned the Puritan ideal of the "city built on a hill" (language to which Ronald Reagan once appealed) and aspire to living in a mansion behind walls, where they can act out the anarchic fantasy of doing what pleases them.

Meanwhile, we have witnessed the sudden evanescence of stock values in institutions that seemed so tangibly ascendant -- Enron, Worldcom, Global Crossing, McLeod USA, Cendant, Sunbeam, Waste Management, Dynegy, Qwest and Adelphia Communications. Chief executives in these and many other firms enjoyed salaries, bonuses and other perks as much as 400 times the average salaries in their companies. Half of the top 200 American chief executives received in 2001 an average of $50 million in stock options. (This device kept off the books actual corporate expenses against profits, thus jacking up the value of their own stocks.) Some executives took advantage of insider knowledge to sell off their company stocks before the bubble burst; and most chief executives enjoyed golden parachutes to escape future financial contingencies of the sort that ordinary earthlings face.

In a global, cyberspace economy, some corporate leaders tend to become an elusive, disembodied, aerial elite, emotionally protected by distance from the mayhem and suffering they wreak. Kevin Phillips has captured the pneumatic element in this withdrawal: Virtual corporations "were all head -- for finance, legal, marketing, design, and research and development functions -- and little or no body in the sense of fixed manufacturing capacity." This picture of all head and no body conforms to our cartoon images of the ghostly, the apparitional.

During this shedding of embodied life and responsibility, where were the purported guardians of the common good? Accountants belong to the only profession that explicitly carries the word "public" in its self-description -- certified public accountants. But accountants compromised the clarity and integrity of their public role when they defined themselves solely as make-up artists, emphasizing quarterly reports for the sake of stock market prices or annual returns for tax purposes.

As for politicians, they have increasingly depended massively on campaign funds from interest groups to keep them in office. Not surprisingly, many politicians have run for office opposed to the government as though it were a foreign power, not an instrument of national purpose. To that end, they have starved regulatory agencies so that they cannot perform their proper jobs or, as in the case of the Environmental Protection Agency assigned them the task of doing themselves out of a job.

During a ten-year period, the Internal Revenue Service suffered a 26 percent decrease in permanent employees, despite a 14 percent increase in tax returns to monitor. Prosecutions of tax cheats dropped by half from what they were ten years earlier; also, the government selectively audited those making less than $200,000 a year much more often than the wealthy, partly because the tax avoidance strategies of the wealthy are especially difficult to monitor and enforce. More than 3 million corporations operate worldwide with no identifiable owners; moreover, wealthy individuals "may control as much as 17 trillion of assets in jurisdictions with opaque bank secrecy laws."

Even in the wake of well-financed terrorist attacks, economic libertarians have fought reforms aimed at secret accounts, offshore tax havens, private banks, shelf corporations and correspondent accounts that accommodate and sanitize secret accounts. Companies that locate offshore to avoid U.S. taxes have not lost their freedom to bid for homeland security contracts paid for by taxes. The tax bill, signed into law in June 2001, failed to remove loopholes, and it reduced taxes, largely for the wealthy, by $1.35 trillion across a ten-year period.

Beneath such discrete polity debates lies the question of the readiness of the powerful to pay for civilization. As Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. put it," I like to pay taxes. With them, I buy civilization." Concluding a book on The Cheating of America Charles Lewis and Bill Allison return the issue of tax evasion and tax policies to the basic question of order vs. anarchy "The role of law is one of the greatest inheritances of civilization, the great bedrock against anarchy and barbarism. And the perils of having a financial Wild West . . . are all too real."

One might conclude that I have written the foregoing from the stance of a moderate conservative who derives the principle of justice from its contribution to the primary good of order. If we are arbitrary and overbearing in foreign policy and unfair in domestic policies, we will reap a whirlwind. Such reasoning assumes that, of the two basic goods, order is primary; justice, secondary.

Such a position, in my judgment, does not satisfactorily honor the claims of Justice. John Stuart Mill once argued that the claim of justice depends upon its utility in producing good outcomes. Treat people fairly because if you don’t, they will be upset, discontented and unproductive. Turmoil will ensue. That may be true in good part. However, Mill’s argument overlooks the capacity of the silver-tongued tyrant -- domestic or public -- to obscure from his victims the fact that he has dealt with them unfairly. Injustice is independently wrong and not simply because it produces human turmoil.

Further, Mill fails to uncover the reason why people get upset when they discover that they or others have been treated unfairly. They grow angry with unjust treatment, not because such practice will produce bad outcomes but because, irrespective of outcomes, they perceive such treatment as wrong.

Order serves to protect a society against anarchy and the tyranny that follows in anarchy’s wake. The French and Russian revolutions taught us that. However, at the deepest levels, the philosophical and religious traditions of the West tend to place truth and justice at the foundation of all else in our common life. Truth and justice are ultimate; order, while fundamental, ultimately derives from them. The Greeks expressed this view philosophically when they asserted that nomus (the law, the source of order) does not stand higher than nous and logos (that is, reason and the word). Rulers should not Impose from the top down laws which are opaque and arbitrary incapable of rational explication and defense.

Both ancient Jews and Christians expressed this priority religiously when they proclaimed that the God of order and peace is, first and foremost, righteous and just. To be sure, the first chapters of Genesis narrate the great ordering deeds of God, but righteousness enfolds them. God saw each of his mighty deeds and pronounced it good. The prophets warned that this cosmic ordering hardly sanctifies the machinations of thrones, parliaments, religious castes, plutocrats or other wielders of abusive power. Indeed, the prophets actually saw God’s spacious justice as a way of creating order, whereas rulers of a prevailing order are most likely to see justice as a threat.

Finally, the New Testament daringly grounds both ordering and doing justly in the final reign of charity so much so that scripture imputes to the Christ a role in God’s original ordering. The world comes into being through the Word, the Word which is "the image of the invisible God, the firstborn of all creation; for in him all things were created, in heaven and on earth, visible and invisible." This great charitable ordering of all things does not simply found and stabilize the world about us and create away station for settlers in the middle of the road. In the rough terrain of politics, It creates a preferential option (respectful of order, but nevertheless pressing) for justice and charity

So the story has it. He did not walk down the middle of the road but turned aside to help. He consorted with the disdained and the despised he searched out the lost win, the lost sheep; he spoke for the poor, the meek, the sick, the bereaved, the voiceless in the courts, and the silent in their graves. Christians and other monotheists have a responsibility to push politics and their own lives in that direction.

The Ethical Foundations of Health Care Reform

Our health care system contains much of which we should be proud and much that we should conserve. It has enlisted the devotion of millions of professionals, created splendid hospitals, clinics and research institutions, and dazzled the world with its technical achievements. And it has allowed for some choice in doctors. Any reform of the system must preserve its virtues.

Yet our health care system is seriously flawed. It fails to reach many of us: at any given time, it excludes over one seventh of the population (about 40 million people) from health care insurance; it leaves another one-seventh underinsured. The consequences for individuals and families are devastating. When we exclude people from health care they suffer a triple deprivation—the misery of illness, the desperation of little or no treatment, and the cruel proof that they do not really belong to the community. We make them strangers in their own land.

When individuals lack health care, the promise of our common life together is also diminished. In relieving private distress, the nation enables its people to contribute more fully to its public life. The nation thereby serves its own public flourishing.

Our system also does not offer enough primary, preventive, home and long-term care, and it woefully neglects mental health coverage. We tend to be acute-care gluttons and preventive-care anemics.

Reflecting this lopsided emphasis, the system oversupplies us with specialists (some 70 percent of our doctors are specialists, compared with only 30 to 50 percent in comparable industrial countries) and undersupplies us with generalists whom we need for effective preventive, rehabilitative and long-term care.

The system pays for procedures performed rather than good outcomes achieved, and it exposes those who cannot pay to dramatically lower success rates for a given procedure. It often overtreats; yet insurance sometimes disappears when most needed. It exposes to financial ruin the person who has lost his or her job. It locks others into jobs they do not want because of pre-existing medical conditions, and it often establishes lifetime limits on care.

The system burdens health care practitioners and institutions with too many regulations and forms. A financial officer at one hospital reports that her staff has to handle some 3,200 different types of accounts receivable. The head of the major city hospital in Dallas says he needs 300 people to handle what, at a comparable hospital under the Canadian system, can be dispatched by three people.

Our system also costs more to operate than any other health care system in the world; no other country exceeds 10 percent of its GNP in health care costs, yet we are above 14 percent and rising further out of control. The system now consumes one-seventh of everything that we make or do. Even this figure does not fully measure the cost. The "fringe benefit" of health care is anything but a fringe cost of producing cars, computers, refrigerators and, for that matter, education. In some of our industries, health care is the second-largest cost after wages and salaries. This fact reduces the competitiveness of American businesses: Why should companies build cars in Detroit if their health care costs per worker are $500 to $750 less across the bridge in Windsor, Canada? Some commentators have argued that we have recently slowed down the increasing costs of medical care. But under three presidents we have undergone temporary slowdowns in costs only to see them speed up again. For our own sake and the sake of our children, we must be better stewards of our nation’s resources.

Further, our payment system is unfair. Businesses, insurance companies, hospitals, the government and patients engage furiously in cost shifting as they fob off on others their expenses. Hospitals jack up their prices to the insured to cover their costs in caring for indigent patients. Some doctors try to skim off the well-insured patients, while avoiding others. Insurance companies pick healthy customers to avoid making payouts to the sick. Companies shift to part-time, temporary or younger employees to reduce fringe-benefit costs. The government’s savings on Medicare and Medicaid patients sometimes comes at the expense of prices paid by insured patients. Some people are forced to stay on welfare because the low-paying jobs in the service industries do not provide the coverage they receive under Medicaid. All this artful dodging eventually dumps costs on workers and taxpayers, either through lower salary raises, higher taxes or higher insurance payments.

A major reform of our health care system will rank as the most comprehensive piece of social legislation since the establishment of the social security system. We cannot engage in so grand an undertaking without being clear about its moral foundations In my judgment, those foundations are three: 1) health care is a fundamental good; 2) health care is not the only fundamental good; and 3) health care is a public good.

To say that health care is a fundamental good means that health care is one of the necessities of life. It is not an optional commodity, like a Walkman, a tie or a scarf. Mothers instinctively affirm this truth when they concentrate their hopes on just this: the birth of a healthy baby—ten fingers, ten toes, a good heart, robust lungs. Why this single, humble, anxious wish? The mother prizes her baby’s health because of the promise it holds for the child’s life and flourishing. Healthy children, and therefore health care, are part of a nation’s covenant with its future.

Because health care is a fundamental good, the American system must honor and reflect the following five moral principles.

The system must offer universal access. Health benefits should reach all of us without financial or other barriers. Citizens should not fear that part-time or temporary employment, or a change or loss of a job, will block health care coverage. No one should lose access to health insurance due to pre-existing conditions, or to age, race or genetic background. Barriers to access arising from linguistic and cultural differences, geographical distance, and disability must also come down.

Why should Americans especially insist that a basic good, such as health care, ought to reach all citizens? Our three major religious traditions—Protestant, Catholic and Jewish—are communitarian. They have all insisted that no one should be left out in the cold when it comes to the basics in life. Some individualists may counter that our revolutionary emphasis on individual liberty made a break with this communitarian heritage. This view of our past, however, overlooks the first words we spoke as a nation: "We the people." The Preamble to the Constitution does not proclaim, "We the factions of the United States" or "We the interest groups of the United States" or "We the individuals of the United States," but "We the people." That declaration was tested and affirmed through the bitter ordeal of the Civil War. We could not survive, half slave, half free. Neither can we stand divided between the sick and the well, the protected and the uninsured. Our flourishing as a people rests upon our ability to create a health care system that binds us together as a nation. The principle of universal access goes to the soul of reform. Currently, we are the only industrial nation, other than South Africa, that fails to offer universal access.

The system must be comprehensive. Benefits must meet the full range of health care needs. We should offer primary, preventive and some long-term care as well as acute care; home, as well as hospital care; treatment for mental as well as physical illness. An observer once saw through our lopsided allocations in the U. S. when he wrote, "Our system’s philosophy might be condensed in the motto, ‘Millions for [acute] care and not one cent for prevention!"’ -Those lines were written in 1886. When we attend too little to primary, preventive and mental health care, the cost of acute care increases: we mistarget funds, and we fail to empower people to take responsibility for their own health.

When we do not offer comprehensive coverage, we also fail to offer universal coverage. We discriminate against whole classes of the afflicted, such as the mentally ill or those in need of long term care. We would find it strange to treat renal disease but not heart attack victims. But currently many plans lavish care on the physically ill but discriminate against the mentally ill. A scheme that aspires to universal coverage must offer a comprehensive package.

The system must be fair in that it does not create a two-nation system—dividing the nation over this fundamental good—and fair in that the costs and burdens of meeting health care needs are spread across the entire community. Some might respond: don’t the uninsured receive the benefit of care through the emergency room? Unfortunately, their care does not match that of the insured. Their mortality rate for a given procedure is 1.8 times higher than the rate for the insured. The astronomical costs of some acute and long-term services can impoverish the sick and the disabled and their families, and the prospect of these costs imperils the security of those of us who have not yet been stricken.

We would find it absurd to limit the protection of defense—another fundamental good—only to those who could afford a private army. We ought not limit access to medical care only to those who can hire a platoon of doctors. We also need a system that fairly shares the cost of health care. We must secure contributions from all and eliminate the widespread patterns of cost shifting and free loading. A fair sharing, of benefits and burdens draws the community together and ties the generations to one another.

The System must be of high quality. Health care is too important a good not to be good. Fostering good quality requires providing health care professionals with an environment that encourages their best work, protects the integrity of professional judgment, delivers effective treatments and weeds out unethical and incompetent practitioners. It also means providing patients with sufficient information about the outcomes achieved by different plans to help them make informed, rational choices.

Ordinarily, consumers in the marketplace can enforce quality through their ability to compare products knowledgeably. But patients today do not have the information to make those judgments about doctors, hospitals and health care plans—and it is difficult to acquire this knowledge in the midst of a medical crisis.

Health care is also too important a good not to get better. Therefore, the system must also support research for improving the full range of health care services, including research on the outcomes of health care and more research directed to preventive, rehabilitative and terminal care. Without the assurance of quality in the basic health care package, the well-to-do will buy up and out, returning the country to a two-nation system.

The system must be responsive to choice. Health care is too fundamental a good, affecting each of us too intimately and fatefully, not to give us some measure of freedom to choose our doctors, the treatments we receive and the health care plans in which we receive them. Too many people lack choice altogether or enjoy choice on only one of these matters. Honoring choice in the health care system not only respects liberty; it also engages the patient in the activity of preventive, acute, rehabilitative and long-term care.

While health care is a fundamental good, it is not the only fundamental good. We must also defend the nation, provide housing and educate our children. Thus we need a system that allocates wisely and manages efficiently so as to accommodate other basic goods.

To enable us to allocate wisely, the health care system must let us compare and balance what we spend on health care against other national priorities and evaluate and choose among diverse health services. In the past, the structure and funding of the health care system has not given us enough information about costs to make clear choices among these priorities. We need this information to put ourselves in a better position to meet all our social needs and also to decide more wisely among competing health care needs. Efficient management is a moral, not just an economic, imperative. Ethics is not one sphere and economics another. The British universities had it right when they linked the study of economics, politics and philosophy. Ethics, politics and economics are interconnected.

The health care system should also be simple to use, without bureaucratic roadblocks to the delivery of care. I have two daughters who are physicians, and they find it discouraging, to say the least, to talk to a person at the other end of an 800 line, someone who has power to approve or refuse a treatment, and be asked, "How do you spell ‘manic depressive’?" Senator Robert Dole criticized the Clinton plan for its complexity by showing an organizational chart of the plan on TV; he did not mention that the current system is so complex that one could not even bring it into view on a TV camera. Nevertheless, he had a point. Whatever the reform plan, it must offer simple access for patients and ease of management for doctors and other caregivers. The Clinton administration, sensitive to this issue, would locate responsibility for individual patient care in the provider organizations rather than in the National Health Council or the statewide purchasing alliances.

The new system will also need to reduce administrative costs. Today 1,500 insurance companies compete for our health care dollars, producing huge redundancies and complexities in administration and advertising costs. Moreover, these companies largely compete not in matters of price and quality, but in the art of designing benefits packages so as to avoid claims from people when they fall sick.

Efficiency must be defined with a wise heart, not just a calculator. Providers should not be bound by medical cookbooks but should be encouraged to adopt wise treatment guidelines. Inevitably, controlling costs requires distinctions between needs and wants, effectiveness and futility, and setting priorities among health needs. Efficiency in the service of universal access is a virtue, not a limit. It can offer choices and opportunities for health care for all people, instead of denying choice to millions. We must allocate our resources wisely so that we can achieve the goals of our health care system and address our other national needs.

Health care is a public good, and a good system must help increase our sense of responsibility, both as providers and as consumers. A huge social investment has helped to educate health care professionals and sustain the good which they offer. Federal outlays for research and medical education, patients who offer their bodies to let young residents practice, community chest drives, foundation gifts, corporate grants, municipal taxes, bonds floated to build hospitals— all these aspects of health care confound the notion that health care is exclusively a private skill or a commodity up for grabs to the highest bidder. A society that carefully reckons with the social derivation of health care cannot plausibly reduce the distressed patient merely to a profit opportunity or an object of occasional charity.

The indebtedness of professionals vastly exceeds the school loans or fellowships they have received. No man or woman can go through medical school and think of himself or herself as self-made, and indeed thousands of professionals want to give back, even as they have received. The health care system must foster ways in which practitioners can make good on their profession as a calling, not just a career. The system must protect the integrity of professional judgment, weed out the incompetent or unethical practitioner, and encourage excellence.

The success of a health care system also depends upon an increased sense of responsibility on the part of the recipients of health care. We cannot solve our problems through a social mechanism alone. The success or failure of a system depends upon the "habits of the heart" of a citizenry. Patients must be active partners in their health care. Preventing a heart attack, recovering from a spinal injury, coping with a stroke—these often require changes in the patients’ habits. The system cannot gratify all wants or remove the mark of mortality from our frame. We need some self-control over our wants, some composure in the midst of illness, and courage in the face of dying. No system of itself can bring these virtues to us. We need to bring them to the system so that its benefits may sustain us more fully.

The ancient Romans tended to emphasize the benefits of citizenship; the Athenians emphasized its responsibilities. For its moral and economic success, our new system of health care will require both.

These three basic convictions about the good of health care and their derivative moral principles do not lie easily together. Tensions are sure to arise between paying for the fundamental good of health care and providing for other basic goods (and relatively trivial commodities). The goals of universal and comprehensive coverage, for example, will confront the hurdle of the start-up costs which major changes in either government or business invariably entail. Differences will also develop over the best mechanism and institutions by which to reach even agreed-upon goals. Inevitably, decisions about priorities will need to be made. Clinton signaled his judgment on one of them when in the course of his February speech on health care he declared that he would not sign a bill unless it offered universal coverage. But even on this issue differences exist as to how fast the country can or will move. (The administration hopes to offer universal access within four years of the passage of legislation.)

What are the political chances of forging a new health care system that addresses our needs? Are we willing to make significant changes? My tragic law of politics goes as follows: the perception of a problem and the willingness to solve it rarely join before the solution is beyond reach. We could have reformed the health care system much more easily when Harry Truman said we needed to do it in 1948 and when health care costs were 4.5 percent of GNP. The amount was large, but relatively marginal to our total GNP. Today, however, health care costs have risen to 14 percent of GNP, and 11 million people have jobs in the industry—some of them ready to attack changes that might affect their interests. The huge growth of the health care industry makes it relatively difficult to reform it. Gridlocks in government usually reflect gridlocks in society at large.

I am not unrelievedly pessimistic, however. The president has at least managed to put the problem on the national agenda. Politics, as Max Weber once put it, is at best slow boring through hard wood. I hope the Clintons have some success in sustaining the support of those 60 percent of the voters who have said they would consider some raise in taxes in order to provide universal coverage. Political solutions are possible but difficult—a good deal more difficult than my fellow Texan, just-lift-up-the-hood-and-fix-it Ross Perot, is willing to admit.

To achieve major reform we cannot treat health care simply as a partisan or an interest-group issue. We will need to return to our foundations as a people. Our founders assumed that if a nation could create a common good, it should make that good common. We can now deliver the good of health care to all our people, and this good will help secure and enhance the life, liberty and welfare that is our nation’s promise to its citizens. It is time to make that promise to each other.

Is such a covenant among us realistic, coming as it does so late in the day and with well-established interests already in the field? It will surely require a broad appeal to self-interest. But it will also need to appeal to what Lincoln called "the better angels of our nature," those angels that De Tocqueville must have discerned when he wrote that a "covenant exists...between all the citizens of a democracy when they all feel themselves subject to the same weakness and the same dangers; their interests as well as their compassion makes it a rule with them to lend one another assistance when required."

 

 

Niebuhr Versus Niebuhr: The Tragic Nature of History

An intriguing debate took place on the pages of The Christian Century in 1932 between brothers H. Richard Niebuhr and Reinhold Niebuhr. The immediate occasion for the publication of their articles was Japan's invasion of Manchuria, and the concrete issue that the brothers addressed was the proper response of the United States to that invasion. Both appeal to the tragic character of human history to support their views, yet each draws a radically different conclusion.

H. Richard advocated noninvolvement and repentance for our own sins; Reinhold, though agreeing on the need for the United States to acknowledge its own wrongs, asserted the necessity of our being ready to act, with force if necessary, to curb Japanese aggression. I want to consider not which of the two theologians was right in this situation, but the different ways they used the idea of tragedy in reflecting on a moral issue.

The exchange consists of three short articles published in March and April of 1932. H. Richard's article "The Grace of Doing Nothing" (March 23) introduces his perspective: "It may be that the greatest moral problems of the individual or a society arise when there is nothing to be done." He specifies several different "ways of being inactive": the inactivity of "the conservative believer in things as they are," the inactivity of "the pessimist who watches a world go to pieces," and the inactivity of the communists who see current struggles as convolutions preceding the ultimate establishment of a classless society. Against these kinds of inactivity, H. Richard contrasts the useful inactivity of Christians who believe that, even when they cannot act meaningfully in history, God is nonetheless working to being about justice and peace.

H. Richard Niebuhr grounds his argument about the proper U.S. response to the Japanese invasion in his understanding of the relationship between the Christian believer and God. He claims that from a Christian point of view, the present world conflict represents God's judgement. Given God's involvement in history, human attempts to change history's course can do little to alter its outcome. Yet the Christian believes that ultimately God is working in history for the good of humankind.

In preparation for the future, Christians should "divorce themselves from the program of nationalism and capitalism, and unite in a higher loyalty which transcends national and classs lines of division." Most important, Christians in the United States should repent for their own nation's sins, for H. Richard believed, Japan was following the example set by the United States and European nations in their imperialist expansion.

Because in its criticism of Japan the U.S. was not wholly disinterested (it was basically protecting its own interests in Asia), that criticism could only seem selfrighteous and hypocritical to the Japanese. What was needed instead was "rigid self-analysis" -- what "the old Christians called repentance. " Niebuhr concludes:

The inactivity of radical Christianity is not the inactivity of those who call evil good; it is the inaction of those who do not judge their neighbors because they cannot fool themselves into a sense of superior righteousness. It is not the inactivity of a resigned patience, but of a patience that is full of hope, and is based on faith.

Though American Christians could do nothing overtly to stop the suffering, they should have faith that, despite all appearances, God was involved in these historical events and that a deeper process of healing was at work.

In a response requested by the editors, Reinhold Niebuhr argues in "Must We Do Nothing?" (March 30) that his brother is wrong in claiming that one should act in history only from what he calls a "pure love ethic. Reinhold agrees that America's concern about Japanese aggression is not completely disinterested, but, he disagrees with H. Richard's claim that it is better not to act at all than to act from motives that are not wholly free from all self-interest. If such purity of motive were always required, Reinhold argues, a nation would never act at all, for no nation can act in strict accord with a perfectionistic moral standard.

Reinhold's article makes many of the main points argued in his Moral Man and Immoral Society, also published in 1932. Since groups cannot live according to the same ethical standards as individuals, justice, not love, is the highest ideal to which groups can realistically. Justice is a norm based on balancing various conflicting claims. Justice presupposes assertion of the rights of different parties and the establishment of some kind of tolerable harmony. Reinhold asserts that H. Richard's idealistic moral position leads to withdrawal, and is irrelevant to history's power struggles.

What is Reinhold's alternative?

It would be better to come to ethical terms with the forces of nature in history, and try to use ethically directed coercion in order that violence may be avoided . . . . In practice, specific and contemporary terms this means that we must try to dissuade Japan from her military venture, but must use coercion to frustrate her designs if necessary, must reduce coercion to a minimum and prevent it from issuing in violence, must engage in constant self-analysis in order to reduce the moral conceit of Japan's critics and judges to a minimum, and must try in every social situation to maximize the ethical forces and yet not sacrifice the possibility of achieving an ethical goal because we are afraid to use any but purely ethical means.

Reinhold does not specify just what concrete measures the United States should take, or how much coercion may permissibly be used, but he calls on his country-even with its mixed motives-to be prepared to confront Japan.

Reinhold concludes his article by articulating his theological beliefs about the perennial tragedy of human history. "To say all this is really to confess that the history of mankind is a perennial tragedy; for the highest ideals which the individual may project are ideals which he can never realize in social and collective terms." The religious imagination sets goals beyond history because humankind can never achieve its highest ethical goals in history. For Reinhold, the tragic character of human history lies in the gap between the cooperation that we know ought to be the norm and the reality of bitter conflicts between different human interests.

In the last installment of the "fraternal war between my brother and me," titled "The Only Way Into the Kingdom of God," H. Richard says that the most significant issue between himself and his brother is not inactivity versus activity, as the essays' titles misleadingly imply. Rather, the real question is about what sort of activity is most appropriate for Christian believers in this particular situation. Now H. Richard, too, supports his position by setting forth his understanding of tragedy. He writes that, unlike Reinhold, he does not think "'the history of mankind is a perennial tragedy' which can derive meaning only from a goal which lies beyond history? For the Christian, "tragedy is only a prelude to fulfillment."

Yet H. Richard recognizes that for particular individuals -- and even for entire nations -- history can have a tragic character. He makes the puzzling assertion that "history is not a perennial tragedy but a road to fulfillment and that fulfillment requires the tragic outcome of every self-assertion." H. Richard thus seems to distinguish between the good of the whole and the good of each individual part of the whole. He sees God as "the structure in things," giving ultimate meaning to history even through the suffering of the innocent. History has "created fellowship in atoms and organisms, at bitter cost to electrons and cells; history is creating something better than human selfhood but at bitter cost to that selfhood."

To H. Richard, Reinhold's attempt to reconcile Christian love with assertions of self-interest only "makes Christian love an ambulance driver in the wars of interested and clashing parties. " The Christian faces an ultimate either - or choice: the way of self-assertion -- which can only bring counter assertion and conflict -- or the way of repentance and forgiveness. The choice of repentance, he maintains, is as valid for entire societies as it is for individuals, and it is the only way to avoid the ceaseless cycle of assertion and counter assertion that leads to war.

For both Niebuhrs, certain fundamental experiences of limitation suggest that human existence is tragic. But each brother sees limitation in a different sphere. H. Richard emphasizes the experience of being limited in power: a self's or a nation's sense of dependence and finitude in having to undergo what is beyond its control. He holds that any actions the United States could take in the Japanese situation would have little effect on the deeper forces and movements of history. H. Richard's view of human limitation is expressed in his understanding of God as the structure in all things, "the rock against which we beat in vain, that which bruises and overwhelms us when we wish to impose our wishes, contrary to his, upon him."

Though he insists that history as a whole is not a tragedy, H. Richard says the fates of individuals may well be tragic. In fact, the fate of any given individual probably will be tragic, since he believes that all self-assertions end in destructive conflict. H. Richard locates the source of tragedy in the fact that the good of the whole comes about at the expense of the individual parts of the whole -- hence the analogy he makes comparing history to any to the evolution of atoms and organisms at a "bitter cost" to electrons and cells.

While H. Richard focuses on the limits of power, Reinhold concentrates on the limits of human righteousness. He discovers tragedy not so much in human finitude as in pride. Reinhold stresses not the contrast between the good of the whole and defeat of the self-assertive individual parts, but rather the gap between the ideal and actuality -- between the absolute ethical ideals that humans conceive and the limited goals that can actually be achieved by collective action. For Reinhold, life is tragic because "man cannot live without a sense of the absolute, but neither can he achieve the absolute."

In his 1937 collection of sermons Beyond Tragedy and in his classic work The Nature and Destiny of Man, Reinhold details his understanding of the source of tragedy in human pride and sin. He insightfully detects sin in the form of moral self-righteousness, in our deep human tendency to believe that we are morally better than we really are. When humans overestimate their moral stature, pretension leads to smug self-righteousness, then to a sort of moral imperialism that causes conflict with others, and finally to downfall-a collapse of pretension.

This sense of the tragic should, Reinhold contends, qualify both our individual and national actions. While nations must act in their own self-interest, their actions will be more clear sighted, and probably more effective in the long run, if two things that guard against moral self-righteousness guide them: Christian repentance for sin and a sense of the "perennial tragedy" of human history.

H. Richard finds tragedy in the limits of human power: Reinhold sees it in the limits of human righteousness. These two views of tragedy correspond to and illuminate two kinds of moral situation which are extremely perplexing to ethical thought. H. Richard recognizes that in some situations no direct action is appropriate. Sometimes overt action against one evil is a futile effort- or produces a greater evil. However, H. Richard believes that Christian faith provides invaluable resources for helping people face the tragic sense engendered by this frustrating inactivity. We must, he says (1) critically analyze our past actions, (2) interpret the present suffering as a judgment on us, (3) repent of our own sins and (4) prepare for a future reconciliation. Above all, Christians should be sustained by their trust that God is at work in history even when history seems to defeat their deepest longings and hopes.

In The Responsible Self, H. Richard calls attention to the importance of suffering as a neglected idea needing reappropriation in moral thinking. The 1932 incident in China illustrates how the concept of suffering may help Christians face their sense of helplessness and passivity when they cannot act directly. The United States was forced to watch a tragedy: not an aesthetic tragedy -- a work of art -- but a historical event that caused tremendous undeserved suffering. H. Richard did not really call Christians to inaction; instead, he called them to certain forms of inner work and reflection.

H. Richard's view of tragedy, in sum, may help people deal with the frustration of not being able to ease the suffering of others, while trying to find some meaning in suffering. This is the same sense of tragedy as work in Stanley Hauerwas's The Peaceable Kingdom (University of Notre Dame Press, 1984), the last chapter of which offers reflections on the exchange between the Niebuhrs. Hauerwas explains how the virtues of patience and hope and peaceableness are necessary to sustain the Christian attempting to live joyfully in the presence of the tragic.

Reinhold's view of tragedy, on the other hand, helps to interpret the moral situation in which some good result cannot be achieved without morally ambiguous actions. Reinhold asserts that when a moral agent (or a nation) cannot avoid some great evil except by producing what it hopes will be a lesser evil, we must "not sacrifice the possibility of achieving an ethical goal because we are afraid to use any but purely ethical means." The Christian is called to engage actively in political decision-making, asserting his or her religious perspective while recognizing that all human groups are limited in their moral goodness. Reinhold claims that a tragic view of history is necessary to help the Christian negotiate the gap between the ethical ideal and the possibilities attainable by human collective action. Reinhold thought U.S. political and economic interests had stakes in keeping China free of Japanese domination, and that this self-interest qualified our claim to impartiality in our denunciations of Japan. Yet for him the Japanese invasion was clearly a political crime and a moral evil that had to be opposed. Despite our mixed motives, he argues in his Century article, the United States had to be prepared to use force if necessary to curb Japanese aggression. America could act with the necessary courage and humility in this situation only if we recognized the tragic gap between our nation's lofty moral ideals and its actual achievements in history. Reinhold's sense of tragedy, then, by understanding the limits of human righteousness, helps illuminate moral situations in which one cannot act with ideal disinterest and pure motives, but believes some evil must be resisted, even though that action -- especially when force is used-- risks producing some other evil.

If both Niebuhrs' views of tragedy can shed light on certain moral situations, both also have their potential dangers. H. Richard's understanding has the danger of leading to passivity and fatalism. His theology has been criticized for subordinating God's redemptive work to his creative and ordering work. This tendency is noticeable in H. Richard's view that human attempts to alter the structure of things in the world inevitably result in tragedy. From this perspective the moral life seems to involved only adaptation or accommodation to existing structures or relationships. And if all assertions of human interest share a common guilt. Moral discrimination and choice seem to lose their significance. The assumption that all acts of human self assertion are identical forms of sinful rebellion against God and are fated to destruction would paralyze moral life. The only meaningful role for the Christian then seems to be inner reflection and repentance. These internal processes are not seen as leading to overt action in the world. Such an understanding could lead the Christian to believe that there is "nothing to be done" directly in historical situations when in fact creative action could decisively affect the outcome of events.

Against H. Richard's emphasis on human finitude and dependence, Reinhold's awareness of human freedom and the Christian's political responsibility seems better to acknowledge the creative and liberating possibilities of moral action and of God's work in history. Yet Reinhold's view of tragedy as an inescapable aspect of life also poses moral dangers. For his view of tragedy as the result of the inevitable gap between the ideal and the actual in human conduct could also be applied indiscriminately to other situations. If we act with the belief that all our actions may bring aboutevil, we may deceive ourselves into justifying actions that we suspect we should not do. The real crux of the issue is not that we will deceive others, but that we will deceive ourselves. We may commit evil intentionally, thinking that because we recognize our mixed motives, we are permitted to get our hands as dirty as necessary to achieve our noble goals. If we are all enmeshed in evil anyway, what difference can a little more make, so long as our intentions and the outcome are good? We may, by such reasoning, justify our use of any means to achieve what we think are good ends on the assumption that -- since history is a perennial tragedy, and collective actions are always on a lower ethical level than individual actions -- we are not obligated to strive for the highest ideals possible, or to present an alternative to the usual way of the world. If H. Richard's view of tragedy poses danger of passivity, Reinhold's leads to the danger of "sinning bravely," by employing the concept of tragedy to justify the use of evil means to some supposedly good end.

The danger in both men's analysis stems from their common view that all of life is tragic. Because neither brother defines "tragedy" carefully, each fails to distinguish between a tragic moral situation and a view of life itself as tragic. Christians do not need a tragic view of all of life, but rather a moral and theological perspective hat accounts for tragic moral situations and that helps believers deal with them creatively and faithfully. Such a perspective would enable us to deal responsibly and creatively without own involvement and complicity in evil, without claiming that all actions are equally guilty. It would account for the perplexing situation in which a moral agent must intentionally will evil as part of a moral act, or allow some evil to take place through a refusal to take action.

Such an account of tragedy probably cannot be systematized or translated into an ethical theory or method. Perhaps the most we can hope for is a "sense" of tragedy that discerns the tragic dimensions of particular moral conflicts, and faces the resulting pain and guilt, refusing to rationalize them away.

Yet the danger of this sense of tragedy is that it will be generalized into a sweeping claim about all of human experience, and applied mechanically and indiscriminately to every moral problem. Furthermore, as we have seen, there are at least two meanings underlying references to tragedy. That the two Niebuhrs could each interpret the Manchurian situation in 1932 as tragic and yet come to differing conclusions about the proper American response shows that using the concept of tragedy in ethical reflection hardly resolves disagreements, but may simply shift them to a deeper level. The concept of tragedy seems indispensable to refer to certain fundamental aspects of human moral experience, and yet it poses many perplexities for theological and ethical thought. The work of both Niebuhrs holds promise for further reflection on the crucial yet elusive concept of tragedy.

Militias, Christian Identity and the Radical Right

The bombing of the federal building in Oklahoma City opened a window on the previously invisible subculture of militias, survivalists and conspiracy theorists. This radical right-wing subculture has existed for more than a quarter century, and its roots extend back to manifestations of nativism, racism and anti-Semitism earlier in this century.

Many of the subculture's current denizens portray themselves as asserting individual rights against federal government encroachment. Their hot issues are gun control, taxation, and the federal raid on the Branch Davidian compound in Waco. They interpret the Constitution through a kind of "legal fundamentalism." For example, some claim to have discovered the essence of the Constitution in doctrines that raise individual gun possession above the powers of the national government. As one widely circulated militia manual puts it:

Our constitutional liberties are systematically being eroded and denied. The fact that officials are infringing gun rights on every front is simply a manifestation of their inner tendency to empower themselves. Left unchecked, this power will lead to genuine tyranny... The more citizens that own guns, the less willing the government will be to threaten us.

In the world of militias, the national government is a devious and dangerous force, the enemy of its own population.

While this bizarre theory of politics often revolves around issues of law, rights and the state, it ultimately rests on religious foundations. The religious beliefs that undergird the radical right are hard to describe for two reasons, the first having to do with the far right's organizational structure, the second related to its doctrinal basis.

Structurally, the radical right is a confusing, seemingly anarchic world. Survivalists, militias, Klans, neo-Nazis, Christian Identity churches, skinheads and Christian constitutionalists do not inhabit neatly defined segments. Their styles of rhetoric, dress and symbolism are not mutually exclusive, and often interpenetrate and overlap. A person may be a survivalist Christian Identity believer who likes skinhead music, has a fondness for Nazi symbols, and is sympathetic to Christian constitutional arguments. Another participant in the movement might accept some parts of this world but not others.

The memberships of right-wing organizations often overlap, and the groups themselves (like those on the far left) are often riven by factionalism and internal conflicts. It is not surprising, therefore, that months after the Oklahoma City bombing journalists still have difficulty describing suspect Timothy MeVeigh's relationship to the Michigan Militia and to Christian Identity groups. Within the subculture, individuals migrate easily from group to group, sometimes appropriating one set of ideas and symbols, sometimes another, sometimes several simultaneously.

Whatever cohesion this world possesses comes from its alternative system of communications. Mail-order book services, computer bulletin boards, gun shows, Bible camps, pamphlets, periodicals and short-wave radio broadcasts knit the far right together. This network compensates for a fractious organizational life, and it allows the neophyte who enters the communications network to become aware of other groups, doctrines and styles. The picture these media provide is a kind of mirror image of the worldview that prevails in the larger society. These media suggest that the dominant worldview is fraudulent, that things are not as they seem, that only the chosen few within the movement really know what is happening and why.

The melange of right-wing organizations also makes it difficult to discern the movement's religious profile. A few of its members espouse Norse-Germanic paganism or reject all supernatural religion. But the vast majority rely on ideas that originated in conservative Protestantism, albeit sometimes these ideas have been so distorted that they would be rejected by mainstream evangelicals. No organization has the power to enforce a clear religious orthodoxy. Nevertheless, some family resemblances do appear among the various religious concerns.

For example, those on the radical right tend to be biblical literalists for whom scripture speaks to both the problems of daily life and the dilemmas of politics. They also tend to be millennialists who believe we are living in the end-time foretold in the Boo]< of Revelation. From literalism and millennialism other beliefs branch out. The belief that the Bible takes precedence over any command of government is shared with people of very different political persuasions, including some on the left. On the right, however, such "higher law" arguments become the basis not for civil disobedience but for armed confrontation with the state. Thus they become an essential part of the argument that militias use to defend their existence and define their role.

Right-wing higher law ideas are more likely to produce confrontational outcomes precisely because they are linked to a millenarian-apocalyptic view of history. The radical right sees itself standing at a kind of historical cul-de-sac. The world is running out of time. Most Protestant millenarians are adherents of dispensationalism, and they assert that believers need not fear the violence and conflict (the "tribulation") at the end of history, for the saved will be rescued in the "rapture"-lifted off the earth to dwell with Christ in heaven until the Second Coming. Most people on the radical right do not believe they will be rescued, however. They consider the rapture a theological error. They believe the saved must remain on earth during the seven years of the tribulation that will precede the Second Coming. During this time of persecution and upheaval, they must find some way to survive.

"Survivalism"-- a retreat from the world into self-sufficient enclaves -- thus becomes the strategy of choice. The saved must not only be self-sufficient in food, medical care and other necessities; they must also be able to defend themselves from their ultimate enemy, the endtime government of the Antichrist. Mark Koemke, the Michigan short-wave broadcaster much favored in militia circles, advises the stockpiling of gold, weapons and tools. "If we do not accept the Mark [of the Beast], we're going to have to take care of ourselves."

At this point the religious framework of the radical right intersects with its conspiratorial view of politics. The tribulation will be the era of the Antichrist, Satan's final instrument in his struggle to defeat God in the battle for control of the world. Rightists see the federal government falling more and more under the control of malevolent forces. In this context one can understand why George Bush's popularization of the phrase "new world order" at the time of the gulf war was a political gaffe. He meant, of course, a reinvigoration of the system of collective security envisioned by the drafters of the United Nations Charter. But to some, the phrase "new world order" refers to the imposition of the Antichrist's rule. Important segments of the evangelical mainstream have endorsed this view. Pat Robertson in his 1991 book The New World Order uses the phrase as a code word for a diabolical plot, which he describes with anti-Semitic over-tones. The fact that "new world order" has taken on conspiratorial associations for Protestants outside the radical right is seen by rightists as a validation of their own worldview.

For the radical right, the "new world order" involves a conspiracy in which the United Nations plays a central role. While it may seem odd to attribute great power to so ineffectual an organization, the right regards the UN as the instrument through which national governments will be destroyed, enabling the Antichrist to gain control of the world. Since any government associated with the UN is deemed to be part of the Antichrist plot, the national government is illegitimate. The right concludes, finally, that groups and localities must defend themselves militarily against an alien, hostile state which is seeking to uproot the Constitution in favor of "one-world government."

If the aim of the Antichiist's forces is to displace constitutional authority, the theory goes, it must do so by stealth and subterfuge. Attempting to seize power directly would create massive public opposition. Hence right-wing conspiratorialism is enfolded in a more sweeping religious vision of armed struggle in the end-time, when the aware and the saved battle with the mysterious hidden "they" who manipulate power -- in guises as varied as the FBI, the Federal Reserve, the Trilateral Commission and the Anti-Defamation League. The current right-wing obsession with "black helicopters" -- allegedly the conspiracy's favored means of surveillance and transportation -- exhibits conspiratorialism's characteristic combination of specificity and vagueness. Conspiratorialists are often precise about the time and location of black helicopter sightings, yet can neither produce the helicopters nor explain why others have not noticed them.

These views find their fullest expression in the Christian Identity movement, the most significant religious manifestation on the extreme right. It is not clear whether Timothy McVeigh had Christian Identity associations, although press reports have linked him with Elohim City, a Christian Identity commune in Oklahoma. However, Identity's ideas have diffused so widely through the right's alternative communications network that the movement was surely known to McVeigh.

Christian Identity emerged in the late 1940s, primarily on the West Coast. By the 1970s it bad appeared throughout the country, especially in rural areas of the West and South -- such as the Ozarks and mountain areas of the Pacific Northwest-with small numbers of Jews and nonwhites.

Christian Identity millennialism has a distinctively racist tinge. Members believe that Armageddon will be a race war of "Aryans" against Jews and nonwhites. The "Aryans" are not merely whites of northern and western European descent; they are the real biological Israel, for according to Identity the biblical tribes of Israel migrated in ancient times from the Middle East to Western Europe. The Jews, in their view, have nothing to do with the Israelites. They are instead considered demonic impostors-"Satan's spawn," descended through Cain from a sexual union between Eve and the devil in the Garden, the primal sin.

This strange theology has seeped into virtually every corner of the radical right. It may be found among Klansmen and militia members, survivalists and neo-Nazis. And small wonder. Identity provides the perfect religious frame for the far right's political agenda. Every purported conspiracy and cabal, whether of international bankers, Trilateralists or the UN, can be brought within Identity's "great conspiracy" -- Satan's plot to take over the world and deprive "Aryans" of their birthright, a plot that Identity believes began in the Garden of Eden and will end only at Armageddon. Plot can be nested in plot, in an ascending pyramid of conspiracies that ends with the devil himself.

Identity also gives believers the assurance that they constitute a divine warrior elite, the only ones vouchsafed true knowledge of history. This sense of divine assurance compensates for Identity's inability to create a mass base for itself. No on knows precisely how many Identity believers there are-the movement is broken up into dozens, perhaps hundreds, of churches and Bible study groups-any more than the overall size of the radical right can be known. I estimate that the hard-core -radical right numbers 100-200,000, of whom perhaps 20-30,000 are committed Identity believers. So small a movement cannot expect to make its presence felt on the American religious scene in conventional ways. Even its growth rate is unlikely to change its marginal status. But Identity's very marginality seems to assure its members of their special position. Convinced that most other Christians have been duped or coopted by the conspiracy, they remain certain of their own incorruptibility. The neglect and scorn of others confirms their sense of cbosenness, as well as their disdain for the main currents of American life.

Identity seems poised to benefit from the interest in the militia movement. Significant Identity figures have participated in or supported militias, though most militia members have come from other religious backgrounds. The militias can serve as bridge movements, carrying those already familiar with Rush Limbaugh, Pat Robertson and the John Birch Society to involvement with militant conspiratorialism, racism and anti-Semitism. Whatever their motivations, the fearful and alienated who join militias quickly become integrated into the far right's network of videotapes, pamphlets and audiocassettes.

The danger presented by the militias is thus twofold. The most obvious danger is that resentful armed cadres can intimidate and polarize small localities, as Posse Comitatus groups did in the rural Midwest in the 1970s and '80s. (Posse Comitatus contended that no legitimate political authority exists above the county level.) The more far-reaching danger is that militias will channel members to move from the outer reaches of acceptable politics to a darker world of apocalyptic racism and anti-Semitism.

How Communication Studies Can Help Us to Bridge the Gap in Our Theology Megaphors

 . . . the spoken word is the normal vehicle of faith. . . . In our times the "word" also becomes image, colors and sounds, acquiring varied forms from the diverse media of social communications (Medellin Conference, 1968).

 

The word informs both theology and communication. Words serve us as content and as vehicles of tratissmission. What happens when "the word" is altered-when the communication content and the transmission technologies change?

For people of Christian faith, the communication between God and the people of God was altered dramatically when God entered history to interact as person with all of humanity. Today we are living in another period of altered communication, one spurred primarily by technological tools. All of us have had our patterns of work, of relationship, of faith, dramatically altered by a tumultuous communications revolution similar in its impact to the introduction of printing in the fifteenth century.

Most of us learned in textbooks, even in high school, that there was a connection between tile introduction of the technology of printing and the democratization of thought. Is there any doubt that this played a role in the Reformation (Eisenstein 1979)? Similar structural changes are underway today in a global community linked now by digital bits as well as by printed documents. What are the implications for those of us who care deeply about effective communication among ourselves, and with our God? In these pages I will (1) provide an overview of communication scholarship trends, (2) offer some reflections concerning the impact of new technologies that promote human interaction and cooperative alliances, and (3) make some practical suggestions that can enrich our communication-theology integration.

 

COMMUNICATION SCHOLARSHIP

The dialogic aspect of communication study has emerged from much previous theory. Early communication research stressed the impact of messages moving from a single source to a receiver, with the possibility, of course, that the message received was not necessarily the same one that was sent, due to variations of perception, a sort of "static" that interferes with the message content (Shannon and Weaver 1949). One could speak, I suppose, of sin as similar "static" interposing itself between God's message to us and our reception and implementation of the divine message in our lives.

Other communication research has dealt with the power of mass media in altering our consciousness and informing our choices-the propaganda or advertising aspect of media messages (Lasswell 1927; Roloff and Miller 1980). This type of analysis is very much a part of current concerns about how media manipulate, for example encouraging us to become more active consumers, creating unrealistic perceptions of a more violent world, and imposing American culture on media audiences throughout the globe.

Other scholars have dealt with the agenda-setting role of media, especially news media (McLeod, Becker, and Byrnes 1974). Our media define what is "news" and we allow them to do it when we focus our own discussions upon the news content as it has been defined for us by media players. We all know that these so-called news experts have real limitations. For example, they work within an industry, a business, that defines most news stories in terms of conflict narratives. They stress the bizarre and they often do so in short sound bites rather than with in-depth analysis. And yet, their choices define what our news is and we know what is chosen by these agenda-setters by what is transmitted on radio and TV, the main source of news today for most of the world's population.

Some communication research has focused on a critique of media economic power and the problem of increasing portions of media profits being in the hands of fewer and fewer corporations (Compaine 1982). These data provoke concern in terms of economic justice, but another real issue is that media owners and players are "gatekeepers," with the power to define who has access to information. In an information economy, information is what we use to leverage ourselves into economic transactions. By ownership of the channels and the profits and the prices, modern media players could become a new type of feudal baron. However, modern communication technologies are breaking up this gatekeeper monopoly. The late Ithiel de Sola Pool, in Technologies of Freedom (1983), was one of the first to note the decentralizing impact of new interactive communication technologies oil policies and markets.

All of this indicates tile importance of public policies in telecommunications-issues such as legislation or how much our governments should regulate in the public's interest and how much the marketplace should decide. This issue of public policy relates to the duties of the human race as stewards of the gifts of creation, including scientific and technological gifts.

Another exciting thread of communication scholarship has incorporated advances in anthropology; this research focuses on communication and culture (Carey 1989). Such scholars speak of liminality, myth, ritual, and symbol found by audiences within the stories of our cultures. Perhaps most of our stories are told today through media channels-fictional stories, news stories, advertising stories. Theologians and pastoral leaders make a big mistake when they ignore the fact that global audiences interact with these stories as they view them. Many people who do not watch much TV themselves need to keep in mind that humanity now gathers around the TV and movie screen for the magical stories that were once shared by bards. People absorb information and principles of socialization from these stories-from the quest of "Star Trek" to the brash dialogue of "The Simpsons. " Much of this type of research has been done on the impact and the global popularity of the soap opera "Dallas" (Liebes and Katz 1990).

Incidentally, although evangelical media have been analyzed (Hoover 1988), very little research has been done on communication patterns within Churches. It might be surprising to discover the dynamics of communication flows within the U.S. Catholic Church: who listens to whom; how various messages get transferred (and transformed) within the institutional Church; which messages are credible or meaningful in the beliefs of the faith-community; and to what extent the culture, including the media, alter these messages. There could be very interesting findings in such research!

Linguistic analysis has been a very serious thread of communication studies, based on the philosophy of language, or semiotics. David Tracy's work (1975) has focused our attention on religious language. Dialogic anthropology proposes that humankind becomes human through communication, with varied communication patterns. Communication theory scholars have probed ramifications of the technological interconnected web of networks of which we are all a part.

Everett Rogers, one of the foremost scholars of the communication field, has claimed that interactive, two-way technologies represent an epistemological turning point in communication research (Rogers 1986). We are moving from linear, point-to-point communication patterns to a web of networked interactions, where individual two-way dialogues are linked with wider groups. So we move from dyads to forums as we begin to use newer technological tools to decentralize the dynamics of messages. Televised broadcasts from the streets of China and Russia have shown global audiences that with telephones and fax machines

and computer terminals it is no longer possible to control communication from a centralized source. There are obvious implications for hierarchical structures and top-down communication styles.

My own research emphasis in harnessing technological tools for public service-in education, in medicine, and in servicing the basic needs of the poor-has led me to conceptualize strategies to facilitate cooperative (linking) ventures because communication technologies change so rapidly and the entrepreneurial opportunities are so vast. This situation requires collaborative strategic planning and much of my own thinking and writing has stressed this approach, called "strategic alliances" by the corporate sector. Interactive strategic alliances (ISAS) form the heart of making collaboration a social habit by institutionalizing collaborative mechanisms.

A COMMUNICATION MEDIA CONTEXT

One might first ask, what are the ramifications of living in a "wired" or "mediated" world? What, exactly, is this "information age" that we speak of so glibly? What do theologians have to do with the socalled information superhighway and a five-hundred-channel world? Here are some examples of technological links that go beyond the simple exchange of movie and TV stories:

If its present rate of growth continues, the computer network Internet will have 300 million users by 1999, 750 million by 2000, and 1.5 billion by 2001.

As computer power increases and the size of the unit decreases, personal communication networks will permit wireless interconnection from units that fit in our hand or suit pocket.

The economics and the ease of interconnection will alter our habits from independence to interdependence. Our technological link ups foster attitudes that blend both a global identity and a fierce ethnic pride. One analyst commented about computer forums and bulletin boards: "E-mail is a tribe-maker . . . at the same time that) it globalizes us."

Interactive TV has the potential (in the United States) to tap into the fifteen-billion-dollar-per-year video rental market, the ten billion-dollar-per-year arcade game market, and the home retail market, which may be worth hundreds of billions of dollars every year.

In Russia, in Somalia, in Bosnia, in South Africa, mass media and smaller interactive technologies provide a window through which global audiences gaze and actively participate. This seems to link us globally while at the same time provoking regional alliances and ethnicpride skirmishes. How will this impact the human family searching for God?

We probably need, as Rogers suggests, to reexamine much theory and practice in the light of this "wired" world. Some medieval faith constructs were linked to the idea of the sun revolving around the earth. As Galileo learned, when new scientific information is put forward it is not easy to let go of our comfortable paradigms. Change disrupts; today's rapid change disrupts exponentially.

Words and images, used metaphorically, provide central symbols of the Christian tradition. Such symbols, we have been told, give rise to thought. Theologians, of course, have already risked exploring new metaphors and updating symbols. Both liberation theory and feminist theory have pushed theologians into new arenas.

Today's rapidity of change (technological, symbolic, metaphorical, communicative) challenges us to reflect and communicate about faith within changing Church communities in changing cultures. This is a task which theologians and communication theorists and practitioners should address through much dialogue and joint analysis.

CHANGING PATTERNS

I have begun to reflect more systematically on the impact of modern interactive communication technologies on our individual and collective (institutional) expressions of faith. In a recent essay, I explore how communication interactivity is a metaphor for a more dialogic "communio" ecclesiology (Plude 1994). In that text I explore four questions: (1) What forms of participatory communication are emerging in Churches and what is the role of authority in such forums? (2) How do we encourage collaboration, which the theologian Hermann Pottmeyer calls "animating forms of cooperation"? (3) Must participatory freedom lead to polarization and, in reaction, central control? (4) Call new communication and collaborative theories help Churches become vital communities, to Teammate an apparent diminution of faith in some modern societies?

In trying to answer these questions, I found supportive texts in Karl Rahner, Bernard Lonergan, Avery Dulles, Walter Kasper, Edward Schillebeeckx, Joseph Komonchak, Patrick Granfield, Bernard H5ring, and others. My reflections took an "open systems" view of Church, based somewhat on Granfield's (1973) study. A very helpful framework for analysis is used by Paul Soukup (1983), where he organizes the literature around four major theological themes: religious self understanding, Christian attitudes toward communication, pastoral uses of communication, and ethics and advocacy. He then sets up a matrix to cross-classify the literature around the following communication analogues: linguistic, aesthetic, cultural, interpersonal, sender-receiver, and theological. These categories are reflected in the summary provided above of communication concepts in the research literature.

I will suggest three aspects of new technology interactivity and offer some potential applications for religious theory and practice. Instead of talking about using TV to evangelize, I will focus upon the changes forced upon us by interactive or two-way communication/computer tools. Such intra group communication changes are of great significance to faith communities; however, this often is neglected in our concern over the impact of mass media.

One changing pattern is occurring within organizational structures. As interactive technologies become more widespread, organizations are flattened; they become more horizontal than vertical. A key organizational reason for the change is that it is no longer necessary to have everyone located in one central place because connections (as well as communication) within the organization are facilitated by technology -- computers, fax machines, and wireless telephony, for example. Many organizations, therefore, are spreading out, decentralizing their operations, simply linking them technologically instead of organizing large numbers of people in one place.

With this distribution of organizational structure tends to come a shared responsibility and accountability. Large bureaucracies are struggling to follow corporate organizations in a major movement toward decentralization. In addition to being possible technologically, this is proving more productive.

Another organizational pattern involves linking up the dispersed units. Interactive technologies foster team linkages because tasks can be facilitated by data-base management systems. The salesperson, inventory clerk, and bookkeeper can all do their piece of a customer's order because each one is operating from the same data base within the computer system. Such team linkages are almost seamless or invisible, but they are becoming a daily part of organizational patterns and relationships. Modern organizations see many groups interconnect around tasks instead of in the old departmental arrangements. These ad hoc groupings within organizational structures allow flexibility that was not possible in former, rigid organizational patterns.

Much of this relationship reflection makes one think of covenantal concepts in salvation history. Theology deals much with relationship and must, of course, be aware of changing relationships in human-kind's history. One theologian mentioned to me recently that he reminds his students that the concept of "father" changes somewhat with modern culture. Thus we need to seek religious-language metaphors that work in our age.

The organizational patterns described above entail governance changes also. Top-down hierarchical management structures are melting into shared responsibility patterns. Members of such organizations tend to have more autonomy. Obviously it is vital to coordinate (link) the units and this is a major challenge when organizational structures are dispersed.

It is not difficult to see the connection between these organizational patterns and theological questions such as the issue of the local Church in ecclesiology. In many organizations there is often a tension (which can be quite creative) between the central and the local authority. As this is discussed theoretically (and under the guidance of the Spirit), it could be helpful for theologians to be aware that, on the practical level, these issues are linked to communication theories and technologies that have transformed organizational patterns in our day.

A second aspect of the change instituted by two-way technological tools relates to communication flows themselves. We are all linked into many networks. And our communication messages can now be stored for later use (e.g., by telephone answering machines, computer E-mail, fax messages). The dialogic communication flow breaks out of the tyranny of controlled one-way programmed media, It is possible that the incredible popularity of the VCR is directly related to the desire latent within us to control our own programming content and our viewing time-frame.

Communication patterns within institutions are more participatory in an interactive communication technology world. Feedback (talkback) becomes a common communication mode and it is difficult to return to an authoritative top-down communication style. It is no accident that small group media are a favored communication mode in small base communities of faith. These tools allow interaction and the communication loop is energized by this participatory potential.

Another rich aspect of this interactive communication pattern is what one author has called "shared minds." Corporations using teleconferencing usually cite the savings possible because people do not have to travel to get to meetings; they can be linked into a meeting technologically (by telephone, computer, or video). However, tile larger payoff may well be that ideas are born from the process of collective input that the format of a forum permits. There is an accumulation, a piling up, of thinking when one is part of an interactive group.

I cannot help but think of the work of John Henry Newman or Yves Congar when reflecting upon a participatory theology, as the Church struggles to move toward more inclusive roles for laity, for women, for national cultures. One is also reminded of our obligation to give the poor a voice and options that are more meaningful than violence. We are seeing participation in the political arena (U.S. talk shows, faxes fueling uprisings in China and Russia). Our communities of faith, too, are interactive liturgically, sacramentally, and a technological world can serve these faith communities.

One must also consider the concept of technology as power. Information technologies like the telephone have long been considered basic necessities in developed nations, although there are surprisingly large blocks of people even in the United States without telephone access. A farmer in a remote village in India is economically disadvantaged if he does not know current prices at a regional market and he is unable to sell his crops at the right time. Even access to a village phone transforms economic realities for him and his family if it allows him to monitor market prices some distance away. In fact, the growing use of "wireless" technologies will allow such nations to "leapfrog" over previous wired technologies.

Access to information technology is a power issue, an economic issue, a justice issue. Interactive technologies offer the chance to transform the concept of "power over" to "power with." A gospel response to new technologies is to safeguard access for all God's children rather than reserve most of the goods for a favored few.

I would recommend, finally, some interaction between a theology of spirituality and those who become victims of new technological tools. Who among us does not regret that information technologies move information faster and faster, increasing the pace of our lives? As one who struggles to be contemplative I find that I must occasionally pull the plug! Communication technologies can inform the theological enterprise, but how very much the interactive world needs to be reminded of Thomas Merton's comment in his Asian Journal: "the deepest level of communication is not communication, but communion. It is wordless. It is beyond words, beyond speech, beyond concept."