What Can Liberals and Evangelicals Teach Each Other

The challenge of writing poetry, T. S. Eliot once said, is dealing with "undisciplined squads of emotion." The problem of writing about evangelicals, liberals and fundamentalists in today's world of religion is one of undisciplined squads of definitions. I live and work at a seminary whose former president, Henry Sloane Coffin, gave to its theological tradition the name "liberal evangelical." Such a description is sure to raise storms of protest in many sectors of American Christianity today. What evangelical wants to be called a liberal? What liberal, an evangelical'?

Rather than devote a great deal of space to getting the definitions straight, I will leave them for implicit explication in what follows. I believe myself to be both evangelical and liberal in my disposition as a Christian; but I know what my friends mean when they call me "liberal" and what my enemies mean when they say that a liberal is really a "radical," just as I know what they all mean when they voice either admiration or suspicion of "the evangelicals." On all sides of conversation between people who prefer one or another title for themselves, I hear claims that make sense to me as one Christian among many. I also hear claims that may have gotten neglected in my own sector of the Christian movement. But my sector has claims that it is unwilling to abandon in any debate with those who are most critical of it. In short, I think that so-called liberals and so-called evangelicals have important truths to urge upon each other.

What can liberal Christians learn from evangelicals?

1. Humans hunger for elevated significance in their lives. To the skeptical eye of anthropologists, religious story, religious ritual and religious theory all make astonishing claims about the ultimate importance of a human life. Liberal secularist critics of "creationism" sometimes seem oblivious to the assault which they are making not upon a theological theory, but upon the sense of worth that evangelicals derive from profound meanings associated with the biblical story of creation. The great God of so vast a universe, focusing divine attention upon the human creatures of earth? It is possible to make it seem an absurd claim. But the very essence of biblical religion (and some other world religions as well) has to do with just this apparent absurdity. People need to think that their lives amount to something. There are enough forces in history, especially in the 20th century, to convince any observant individual that we do not amount to much.

The eminent and eloquent paleontologist Loren Eiseley wrestled throughout his life with the apparent clash between the human cry for meaning and the new time and space-scales of the post-Darwinian account of the universe. Wrote Eiseley in 7he Immense Journey:

"In a universe whose size is beyond human imagining, where our world floats like a dust mote in the void of night, men have grown inconceivably lonely. We scan the time scale and the mechanism- of life itself for portents and signs of the invisible.... We watch the stars, but the signs are uncertain. We uncover the bones of the past and seek for our origins. There is a path there, but it appears to wander. The vagaries of the road may have a meaning, however; it is thus we torture ourselves " [(Vintage, 1957), pp. 161-1621.

Armed with science, sociology and pluralistic awareness, liberals sometimes seem to offer rational reasons why evangelicals should take less seriously their talk about God's self-revelation on behalf of a lost human world. People want to be saved from the undertow of sin, death and insignificance that so regularly undermines us. Evangelicals know this. Liberals, if they mean to be Christians, should know it too.

2. What one does believe, not what one does not, best defines a faith. H. Richard Niebuhr used to quote F. D. Maurice to the effect that "thinkers are more likely to be right in what they affirm than in what they deny." This is a rule that applies both to liberals and to evangelicals, and especially to the debate between them. The classic liberal tradition (represented in such thinkers as Hume, Jefferson and Kant) prided itself on its critical" spirit. It criticized the importance of one set of facts by calling attention to other facts. Learned Hand was expressing classic liberalism in his great dictum, "The spirit of liberty is the spirit that is not too sure it is right. " But vital religion has never been chiefly a way of grounding our uncertainty in yet more uncertainty. The very logic of not being too sure about one's own rightness may require a positive measure for detecting the right itself. In a word, evangelicals are at their best when they are preaching a positive message of Good News to people mired in bad news.

Is liberalism grounded in rational philosophic skepticism? Its critics often suspect that it is. Another kind of grounding is to be found in the famous plea of Oliver Cromwell to a cantankerous Scottish regiment: "I beseech you by the mercies of Christ, think that you may be wrong!" The Christ who is the way, truth and life for Christians will always stand as judge and critic of all our truths and works. But for Christians there is a great difference between the judgment of God and bare rational criticism, just as there is a great difference between meeting God in an idea and meeting God in Jesus of Nazareth. Among many liberals and evangelicals whom I know, the latter seem to grasp this simple principle better than do the former. In this they are the theologically wiser of the two.

3. Concrete love is the most powerful human truth. I suspect that the growth of many evangelical congregations has more to do with how members of those congregations relate to each other than with what sort of theology gets preached from their pulpits. The word "warm" often creeps into descriptions of evangelical piety, and at its most vigorous this warmth is likely to be present interpersonally. Not long ago I worshiped in a midwestern congregation which had its share of charismatics and other types of evangelicals. After the service a man approached me to say, "Six months ago I was in prison. When I got out, I visited around to various churches, but only here did they make me feel at home." Recent research on the electronic church strongly suggests that faithful viewers of the TV evangelists are overwhelmingly faithful church members. They find no substitute for churchgoing in tube-delivered inspiration. The truth here is not that preaching must appeal to "the heart," but rather that religion is a communal fact. Its vitality springs from concrete human relations between people who visibly care about each other. In their individualism, liberals may have missed this fact. In their congregations, evangelicals may have embodied it. It is hard to believe that one is important to God if one is unimportant to any group of neighbors.

4. There is a witness. Whatever else the word itself means, "evangelical" has to mean a testimony to Good News. In their preoccupation with critical thinking, intellectual clarity and tolerance, some liberal Christians forget that their only access to this historic faith is someone else's testimony. Nobody invents the Jewish or the Christian faith from the depths of his or her own mind. We are Jews or Christians because of something that happened, something worth reporting to generation after generation. Liberals have a right and an obligation to quarrel with many of the terms and techniques of witness employed by some evangelicals, but evangelicals are correct when they remind us that there is a faith "delivered to the saints," who in turn are responsible for delivering it to others.

There may be other elements of the evangelical perspective which its proponents wish liberals would take more seriously, but the above-mentioned are the ones that seem to me eminently worth commending.

What contributions do liberal Christians have to make in their dialogue with evangelicals?

A less self-serving and probably more ecumenical approach would be for liberals to wait for evangelicals themselves to answer this question. But we all have a right to think that we know our strengths as well as our weaknesses. Among the strengths of theological liberals in today's church, I would focus on the following.

1. Truth is as humanly important as meaning. There is no ultimate comfort in false meanings, or meanings whose base in reality is questionable. Ultimately the famous definition attributed to a bright Sunday school student -- "Faith is believing what you know ain't so" -- means that as an adult he will not show up in church. One inescapable point of debate here between liberals and evangelicals is their respective ways of understanding the Bible. Evangelical sermons abound in statements that begin, "The Bible says . . ." The "liberal evangelicals" to whom Coffin referred were ardent biblical scholars. They were determined to find out, as precisely as possible, what the Bible does and does not say. They made it difficult for anyone to ally the Bible unambiguously with any one theology -- e.g., millennarianism or Thomism or Calvinism. Modem religious liberalism, with its roots in the scientific spirit of the 18thcentury Enlightenment, took science seriously because it took the Creator of the real world seriously. No Marcionite or spiritualistic religion for them: the God of Israel and the God of Jesus, having made this world, inhabits it for our salvation. At stake is the issue over which the Nicene Council struggled mightily: Does God meet us in the real humanity of a historically real Jesus, "of one substance" with the real us, or not? Faith that ignores questions of reality will not long remain faith in the One to whom the gospel testifies.

2. 7he worshiping congregation is indispensable to the life of faith, but faithful life in the world is equally indispensable. Now that evangelicals have entered the political arena around issues such as school prayer, abortion law, and even the election of candidates, the old distinction that "liberals preach the social gospel and evangelicals a personal gospel" no longer holds. History, of course, is full of evangelical incursions into the issues of American society -- abolitionism and prohibition are two illustrations -- so the old saying never was very accurate. But many evangelicals still seem a bit uneasy in the push and shove of secular democratic politics. It is well that they do, for faithful discipleship in the midst of the world never was easy for Christians. The liberal readiness to see the world (with Calvin) as "the theater of God's glory" has its own tortuous history, and modem evangelicals have something to learn from that history for example, how "success" in secular society often demands compromise with that society.

One reason I respect Billy Graham's ministry is that he seems to have learned from the Watergate crisis not to hostage religion to power. Yet the liberal lesson here is not to send religion back into its gathered congregations. The lesson is that the withdrawal-and-return rhythm of the church's relation to the world is a rhythm of obedience, repentance and renewal. A decade ago research in Raleigh, North Carolina, demonstrated to some of us that the highest morale among citizens was likely to be found in those who had a sturdy religious faith, a community of friends who stood by them in thick and thin, and a track record, for persistent participation in the push and pull of politics. Liberals were apt to discover this truth as they went into the streets at the time of the civil rights movement and the Vietnam-era antiwar demonstrations. They did not think themselves into it. I hope that the newly political evangelicals discover the same truth.

3. To worship God in spirit and in truth is-to confess the inadequacy of our worship, spirit and truth. Liberal piety at its best has always stood firm on this insight. Karl Barth was always difficult to classify as either liberal or evangelical because he insisted that the divine Word was never coterminous with the words of Scripture, nor was the whole panoply of religion a sure instrument of that Word. Religions right, left and middle become captive to human pride when their adherents forget that "the sacrifice acceptable to God is a broken spirit" (Ps. 51:17).

Ironically enough, the liberal democratic tradition feared the incursion of religion into politics because its proponents did not particularly experience religion as a contributor of "the spirit that is not too sure it is right." Insofar as they mean to be Christian, why should the assorted political advocates of today's churches ride so high a theological horse when they enter the public political arena? Those who ride in on a high horse usually return as pedestrians: that is the ordinary democratic experience. One might even hope that this truth was discovered by the social-action-oriented evangelicals who came to the fore in the early '80s. On the basis of what Paul Tillich called the Protestant Principle, we can predict that in politics we will always be somewhat wrong even when we are somewhat right. "All have sinned and come short of the glory of God" (Rom. 3:23). Liberal pride and evangelical pride are neither liberal nor evangelical.

4. 7he freedom of God transcends every human freedom, and this truth is the hope of the world. Contemporary liberation theology has shown us what exploitative purposes the doctrine of God's transcendence can serve in hierarchical churches and societies. Its principal doctrine has been that the God of Israel and Jesus exercises divine freedom in taking up the causes of the world's poor and exploited. Most liberation theologians have more work to do if they are to make clear that this exercise of the divine freedom, too, can never be theologically identical with any particular political claim. But liberationists have no monopoly on this temptation. "Freedom" is one of the words that binds them rhetorically to both the evangelicals and the liberals. Ecumenical dialogue among these theological parties would be more likely if all three more consistently distinguished between the freedom of God and the creaturely freedoms of humanity. On the basis of that distinction, one might write confessions of this sort: God was free to protect Israel of old from the freedoms of Pharaoh; and the continued existence of the Jewish people in the 20th century exhibits that same divine freedom over against all the human freedom-including that of Christians-which has been exercised in history to obliterate the Jews.

God was free to preserve the word, the witness and the power of Jesus from the powers of Pilate; as a people created by the resurrecting Spirit of God, the church owes its continuing existence, too, to just that divine freedom.

God is still free to reform the religion of those who swear by the name of God in history, through persons and powers that do not swear by that name.

God is free to be kinder to humans than ever they were or will be to each other, even in the nuclear age.

Perhaps no major theological issue divides liberals and evangelicals so momentously as that concerning the relation of divine judgment to divine love. In the modern era, liberals have emphasized the love and de-emphasized the judgment of God. They have sought with some consistency to keep divine judgment and grace equally accessible to all. They shy away from those heaven-and hell divisions of humanity which lead to we-they splits in religious people's views of other people. In this, many liberals seem more authentically biblical than many evangelicals. The latter seem as preoccupied with the bad news as with the good, though such a preoccupation betrays the Bible's central message. To say that there is something central and something peripheral in the Bible is, of course, to state a liberal view of Scripture which elicits contempt from some evangelicals. But this is where 2,500 years of living with the Scriptures, in the synagogue and in the church, seems to require some choices of emphasis in Bible interpretation -- choices which we may call the principles of theology.

With Jonah and against Nahum, must we not side with the God who yearns for the salvation of the Assyrians'? With Paul and against the millennarians, must we not look forward to a great human reconciliation at the end of time more fervently than to a great divine vengeance upon all the sinners who have ever lived? In the inbetween times, must we not worship the Creator of all things, who forbids us to trample in the vineyards where the grapes of wrath are stored? Do we not know that whatever vengeance for destruction belongs to God, it does not belong to us? Are we ever authorized as Christians to threaten all the earth with a vengeance that God may be too kind ever to unleash? In the nuclear age, who are we to think that we hear the rumble of divine anger unless inside that anger we, like Hosea, hear the sound of tears?

Frankly, I am not sure that the word liberal or the word evangelical is the right tag for what I would covet for both liberals and evangelicals to learn in any future dialogue on this last issue. We live in a world whose creatures, though called to community, have practiced the arts of hostility and enmity -- to the vast neglect of the arts of love. The Scriptures, and especially the gospel, call us to be forgivers of each other's sins, not judges of all the earth; call us to be respectful of each other's strange ways, because we are all strangers enough to the transcending ways of God; call us to be faith-full enough to ascribe to our living Redeemer the right to love our enemies though we, in our finitude, have not yet learned to love them. "God is not the enemy of my enemies," said Martin Niemöller, recounting the spiritual lessons of his eight-year imprisonment under Hitler. "God is not even the enemy of God's own enemies." Even when they see each other as enemies, liberals and evangelicals must find their fundamental hope in that kind of assertion.

How the Fundamentalists Learned to Thrive

Colleagues, friends, hopeful Democrats and apprehensive Republicans often ask me if the Religious Right has run out of steam. I tell them that for nearly two decades I have been reading books and articles that purport to describe and explain the "rise and fall" or the "failed crusade" of the Christian Right. Religious conservatives have confounded these assessments by continuing to show up at the polls in large numbers. Moreover, they have grown from 26 percent of the Republican Party’s total membership in 1987 to slightly more than a third today. They control the GOP organization in nearly 20 states, and are a strong force in at least a dozen others. Have they lost their clout? Not likely.

Many of us assume that because our own circles include few fundamentalists, the numbers, influence and power of fundamentalists have peaked and are rapidly diminishing. This has been a recurring misperception throughout this century. Indeed, in 1926, following the humiliation of William Jennings Bryan in the Scopes trial and the rejection of the fundamentalist agenda by northern Baptist and Presbyterian denominations, this very journal declared that "anybody should be able to see [that] the whole fundamentalist movement was hollow and artificial" and "wholly lacking in qualities of constructive achievement or survival." Joel Carpenter begins his long-awaited and richly informative book with that quotation, gently noting that while one may question fundamentalism’s constructive achievements, "no one can deny that fundamentalism has survived" and "has found ways to influence American public life."

Carpenter’s aim is to explain how fundamentalists not only survived the setbacks and embarrassments of the ‘20s, but spent the ‘30s and ‘40s building and elaborating a resilient subculture. This subculture protected them from the storms of secularity, provided a stable base from which to launch repeated evangelistic offensives, and gave them hope that they might regain a role in shaping U.S. culture. Carpenter acknowledges the value of "fundamentalism" as a generic label for militant religious and cultural conservatism. But he focuses on that particular, identifiable strain of evangelical Christianity that is persistently revivalistic, emphasizes dispensationalist premillennialism and biblical inerrancy, militantly opposes theological modernism and cultural secularity and feels a strong sense of "trusteeship" for American culture.

American fundamentalists indeed retreated into the wilderness by the end of the ‘20s, keenly aware of their lost influence and their status as outsiders in a culture their forebears had done so much to shape. But instead of disappearing they regrouped, created a new constellation of institutions, and learned to use modern technology effectively. They reemerged after World War II more dynamic and vital than the mainline denominations that had come to think of them in the past tense.

Others have sketched the outlines of this process, noting the importance of "comeouter" sects and fellowships, Bible institutes and prophetic conferences, independent megachurches and mini-empires led by such warhorses as William Bell Riley and J. Frank Norris, widespread use of radio broadcasting and popular religious publications, and a powerful commitment to foreign missions. No one, however, has filled in the picture with Carpenter’s detail, balance and sure hand. Though familiar with this period, I repeatedly found myself saying, "So that’s how it happened. Now I understand much better."

Carpenter begins by demonstrating that fundamentalism in the ‘30s and ‘40s was not a formless aggregate of disgruntled religious conservatives but a vigorous, self-conscious and comprehensive movement. Having left or been driven out of mainline denominations, fundamentalists replaced the services and associations they had lost by turning increasingly to an elaborate network of parachurch agencies. Moody Bible Institute, the Bible Institute of Los Angeles and scores of lesser-known schools trained thousands of leaders for work in local churches and on the mission field, organized conferences and revivals, sponsored radio broadcasts, published literature and served as surrogate denominations. Dozens of summer Bible conferences attracted thousands of guests who came to know and trust one another and to have their common beliefs shaped and confirmed by leading preachers. Some of these preachers exerted enormous influence over their regions. For example, Riley, pastor of the First Baptist Church in Minneapolis, presided over a collection of schools that furnished so many pastors for that region that he was able to engineer a temporary takeover of Minnesota’s Baptist organization.

Fundamentalist leaders also were influential as editors and pamphleteers. In addition to producing the Moody Monthly, the Sunday School Times, the Fundamentalist (Norris) and the Sword of the Lord (John R. Rice), fundamentalists conveyed their message in the Essentialist, Conflict, Defender and Dynamite. As these names suggest, some publications were inflammatory and irresponsible. Others were unimaginative, repetitive and dull. Still, they were read, and they formed a habit of reading among their constituents. As a result the best sellers that appear in the New York Times lists are regularly dwarfed by books sold by and to evangelical Christians.

Perhaps even more significant, fundamentalists seized the opportunity offered by radio. When the major networks refused to sell them time, preferring instead to donate it to representatives of mainline denominations and ecumenical organizations, independent broadcasters bought time on local stations, laying the groundwork for what later came to be known as the electronic church. The most successful of these pioneers was Charles E. Fuller, whose Old-Fashioned Revival Hour was heard over 1,000 stations by 1943, at a cost of $1.5 million for airtime alone. Radio ministers not only kept evangelical doctrine before the people; they made it clear that legions still built on the firm foundation and walked on the ancient pathways, and would teach their children to do the same.

These often overlapping activities and associations—Carpenter uses the image of overlaid map transparencies—connected individuals and congregations to one another, enhancing their sense of purpose and giving them reason to hope for success. They also showed that it was possible to succeed without assistance from denominational structures, thus easing the separation of fundamentalists from parent bodies they felt had been corrupted by modernism.

Separation, of course, is a defining characteristic of fundamentalism, and Carpenter devotes three chapters to its various manifestations. By withdrawing from those deemed less doctrinally pure, fundamentalists drew (and draw) lines of demarcation between friends and enemies, the faithful and the backsliders, the saved and the lost. In part, this stance was defensive and self-protective. Because they were not well equipped to deal with the intellectual challenges posed by modernism, fundamentalists withdrew from mainstream seminaries and secular universities, frequently adopting an anti-intellectual, populist stance that, to use Carpenter’s phrase, "often took the form of railing against one’s enemies before an audience of one’s friends." More positively, as fundamentalists have seen the nation become more secular they have felt a responsibility to be "an exemplary, called-out people," pure in word, deed, thought and appearance. They have felt obligated to win others to Christ and rescue them from a lost and dying world. Unfortunately, this passion for purity has often impelled them to withdraw not only from those clearly in "the world" or in modernist churches, but also from folk who differ with them on matters that seem quite trivial to those outside their camp.

Separatism was bolstered by the fact that a dispensationalist reading of scripture led them to expect the secular and modernist world’s rejection of fundamentalists and their beliefs. Whereas challenges to biblical faith, world war, the decline of conventional morality, economic depression, and growing expectation of another great war undermined liberal optimism, that scenario made the dispensationalist interpretation of scripture, with its predictions of a downward spiral preceding the second coming of Christ, increasingly plausible. Fundamentalists who subscribed to these teachings not only felt they were getting the news in advance, but took delight in the prospect of being able to say, "See, I told you we were right," as they floated upward on the rapturing cloud.

As has often been noted, premillennialism discouraged efforts at social amelioration by fundamentalists, but it did not quash them. On the contrary, fundamentalists believed they had been assigned to a lifeboat and exhorted to "save all you can." Historian Perry Miller characterized revival as "the engine of the Republic," a phenomenon that played a central role in transforming a somewhat loose constitutional federation into a republican union. Fundamentalists have never lost their conviction that what revival has done before, it can do again.

Heartened by their increasing vigor, they began to hope, expect and work for widespread revival. Already skilled at using radio to reach large audiences, they became adept at incorporating contemporary modes of popular entertainment into their evangelistic efforts. Nowhere was this clearer than in Youth for Christ, a movement that began as an effort to provide Christian young people with a blend of wholesome entertainment and high-powered, upbeat evangelism. It soon became the largest and most effective youth organization in America, with extensive outreach in England and on the Continent.

Beyond affecting hundreds of thousands of young people directly, Youth for Christ played a crucial role in helping the less separatist segment of fundamentalism reintegrate into mainstream American life. As its first full-time representative, Billy Graham traveled throughout America and Europe, speaking at rallies and teaching pastors and youth leaders how to develop evangelism programs for young people. In the process, he developed and cultivated an extensive network of evangelical leaders and Christian businessmen who would sponsor and support his evangelistic crusades and who would cooperate with each other in myriad similar ventures.

Carpenter emphasizes fundamentalists’ commitment to foreign missions, noting that as mainline denominations retrenched or withdrew from mission work, the number of fundamentalist missionaries multiplied. This process received a tremendous boost after World War II, as veterans, hoping to save the souls of the people they had liberated or defeated, returned to the fields where they had once fought. Today, fundamentalists and evangelicals (including Pentecostals) constitute approximately 90 percent of all Protestant missionaries working in foreign lands.

In the concluding chapter, Carpenter points to the contemporary results of the history he has described. Evangelicalism, much of it still staunchly fundamentalist in doctrine, now includes approximately one-fourth of all American adults. Fundamentalists and their more progressive evangelical descendants have repeatedly adapted successfully to the conditions and opportunities of modern life. In an era in which confidence in traditional institutions is low, evangelicals have spawned a diverse collection of nontraditional ministries that are generally more efficient and effective than denominational bureaucracies. While decrying the pervasiveness of secularity, they have harnessed the tools and attitudes of popular entertainment and a market economy to create churches, messages and programs that are able "to win a hearing, a following, and, eventually, a measure of respectability." And, while not abandoning their trust in a soon-returning Lord, they have turned once again to the this-worldly project of reinfusing society with Christian mores and ideals.

Though Carpenter no longer considers himself a fundamentalist, fundamentalism is the stock from which he sprang. He wants to make sure we understand its strengths as well as its weaknesses. It is not, he correctly insists, a religion that appeals primarily to the socially dysfunctional, the psychologically wounded or the politically and economically disinherited. On the contrary, "fundamentalism has offered ordinary people of conservative instincts an alternative to liberal faith in human progress, a way of making sense out of the world, exerting some control over their lives, and creating a way of life they can believe in." Carpenter makes the case for this modest but important assertion as well as anyone who has written about fundamentalism in recent years.

 

Christian Science Today: Resuming the Dialogue

From its inception in 1879, the Church of Christ, Scientist has had but one agenda: the practical implementing of a theology in which the healing of sin is primary and the healing of disease indispensable. Indeed, there is a built-in limit, rare in our time, to the degree to which Christian Scientists can compromise this commitment without invalidating the very reason for the existence of their church.

It’s no secret that this church is facing tough times today. Judging by such objective indicators as the number of branch churches and of practitioners (those in the spiritual healing ministry), its membership has been declining at about the same rate as, or slightly faster than, that of several mainline denominations. Questions about the practice of Christian Science healing for children have been raised in such forums as the New England Journal of Medicine. The media have brought to public attention several cases in which Christian Science parents have been prosecuted for the deaths of their children while under spiritual treatment (cases, which the church argues are unrepresentative of its healing record). And fundamentalist literature targeting Christian Science as a cult has been circulating in unprecedented volume over the past several years.

At the same time, however, Christian Science has a clearer relation to issues before the Christian world than it has had for many decades. The opening up of the whole subject of feminine spirituality in recent feminist literature, for example, has led to a marked increase in attention to the character and social role of founder Mary Baker Eddy. And the revival of interest in spiritual healing among many denominations is making the historical role of Christian Science in stimulating this development an issue which cannot be ignored.

Though most Christians would probably agree with William H. Willimon that Christian Scientists are "part of the family, distant relatives at least" ("Are There Cults at Furman?" January 19, 1983, Christian Century), it is unlikely that they would have more than the vaguest notion of the contours of Christian Science theology. Quite possibly, they would not think of it as having one. In this respect, they may be the unwitting inheritors, and perhaps perpetuators, of the viewpoint that a woman cannot have anything serious to say, at least not about theology. A recent study in a feminist periodical presents considerable evidence that reductionist stereotypes of Eddy that are still current, even among feminists, sprang to a surprising extent from resentment directed toward her as a woman making serious truth claims in a male-dominated society (Jean McDonald, "Mary Baker Eddy and the Nineteenth Century ‘Public’ Woman: A Feminist Reappraisal, "Journal of Feminist Studies in Religion [Spring, 1986], pp. 89-112).

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, there were substantial ecumenical contacts between Christian Scientists and mainstream Christians at various levels. In 1968 and 1969, for instance, representatives from the Mother Church met with mainline leaders in New York and other cities for a series of intense and fruitful theological discussions, which resulted in a booklet of position papers called "Ecumenical Papers" (still available from the Christian Science Church). At the grass-roots level, Christian Scientists articulated their faith before hundreds of religious education groups in mainstream churches yearly.

Such exchanges have declined precipitously in recent years. Indeed, it requires an act of historical imagination to recapture the atmosphere in which they occurred, so fractious has the religious environment become. Useful theological distinctions have too often been overridden in textbook rehashes of Christian Science that try to make it "lie down" in some prefixed category (idealism, "Harmonialism," Gnosticism, etc.). It seems an appropriate occasion, then, to try to revive an honest theological dialogue between Christian Science and mainstream Christianity.

On the crucial theological point of the deity of Jesus, there is a clear and unambiguous difference between Christian Science and traditional Christian doctrine. For example, the fact that Christian Scientists do not believe in the deity of Jesus precludes their church from membership in the World Council of Churches. But their position is seriously misread if it is not understood that in Christian Science, Jesus is regarded as the figure through whom, supremely and uniquely, God’s nature was manifested to humanity. In Eddy’s theology, Jesus’ virgin birth, crucifixion and bodily resurrection were the pivotal events in human history, absolutely indispensable to human salvation.

However distinct the metaphysical context in which she defined the meaning of these events, Eddy saw them as having revelatory meaning precisely because they were historical events. In an age when church leaders can dismiss the virgin birth and question the resurrection without seriously rattling theological teacups, this conviction is bound to seem positively conservative. The first step in grasping Christian Science is to recognize that it not only accepts but builds upon these events, as well as upon the healing stories. As Eddy put it, "The life of Christ is the predicate and postulate of all that I teach" (No and Yes, p. 10).

It might be said that Eddy "demythologized" the healings of Jesus and his resurrection—but in an opposite sense from the way that Bultmann did. She did not deny that these events occurred, but she denied that they should be understood under the category of "miracle." Christian Scientists see these events not as supernatural interruptions of the natural order but as a revelatory appearance of a spiritual reality, shaking the very foundations of human perception.

For Christian Science, this spiritual reality is the Kingdom of God revealed through Jesus’ life of obedience and sacrifice. Jesus showed that this spiritual reality is not merely an ethical ideal to be realized, or a future state to be attained; if God is really God, if he is present and supreme, his kingdom must be a present reality. As Eddy wrote, "Our Master said, ‘The kingdom of heaven is at hand.’ Then God and heaven . . . are now and here; and a change in human consciousness, from sin to holiness, would reveal this wonder of being" (Unity of Good [First Church of Christ, Scientist, 1887], p. 37).

In a sense, the theology of Christian Science takes with radical seriousness the classic Christian doctrine of sin and what the change "from sin to holiness" must include. But it believes that the gospel offers the data of a new reality which, far from being some abstract metaphysical ultimate, can be progressively realized through Christian discipleship. Jesus’ emphatic command to heal the sick indicates that this discipleship leads to freedom from disease as well as from sin.

In spiritual healing as Eddy understood it, the human mind does not "do" something to another mind; rather, it witnesses through prayer and self-purification to the presence of the God supremely revealed through Jesus Christ. With the greater apprehension of that presence comes the dawning through "spiritual sense" (a term Eddy adapted from her "New Light" Puritan heritage) of what life in Christ even now can include. The love of God becomes more substantive; more palpable; the distortions and pains which plague human existence less necessary and authoritative. The new reality which broke into human experience in the person of Jesus becomes more distinct not through new conceptions about a transcendent reality, but through the growing experience of the power of that reality to bring transformation and healing in daily life.

A recent editorial in a Christian Science periodical proclaims that "healing, after all, is the name for how God is known and expressed in human experience" (A. W. Phinney, "What do you think about Christian healing?" Christian Science Sentinel [February 4, 1985], p. 195). But the purpose of this healing is not human improvement so much as it is the renewed God-experience it makes possible. Thus, the complaint that some people use Christian Science in order to attain secular ends of health, wealth or success is a wholly valid one from the point of view of Christian Science itself.

Many involved in Christian healing share the Christian Scientists’ belief in spiritual healing as an integral part of a living Christianity, and they share the renewed sense of God’s presence that issues from healing. They also share the conviction that God’s will is actively ranged against suffering and disease.

What other Christians do not share is Christian Scientists’ conviction that God is absolutely not the author of the conditions of finitude—meaning material existence—which give rise to suffering and disease. This may well be the most significant nonnegotiable difference between Christian Science and traditional Christian theology. Christian Scientists understand God as the sovereign creator, absolutely distinct from his creation. However, they see the finitude of God’s creation not as his creative will but as the way creation appears within the habitual limits of human perception.

This does not mean that Christian Scientists deny the intensity of the human experience of disease and pain. Eddy herself had far too deep an immersion in the fires of human suffering and spoke too feelingly of its importance in Christian experience to believe that the tribulations of what she once called "the ghastly farce of material existence" (Science and Health, p. 272) could be minimized or ignored. Yet her theology does maintain that sin and finitude are not part of authentic being in Christ, and that a deeper experience of God’s presence and our relation to him effectively diminishes and will eventually destroy the conditions of suffering which God does not sanction and never made. We might, therefore, speak of the theology of Christian Science as at once a theology of God’s presence and of God’s absence. For it holds that all the evils of the human condition are, in the final analysis, traceable to the drastic human failure to acknowledge and experience the reality of his presence.

From this standpoint, the question of whether Christianity is a healing religion is no minor speculative issue. It is a question about the very reality of the God whom the Bible reveals. Christian Scientists see their special role as that of pioneering in the spiritual healing which they see as a natural, though as yet largely unexplored, consequence of Christian discipleship. For them, such healing is the necessary and decisive proof of the revolutionary power of Christianity to transform human experience as a whole.

The focus on healing explains the relative de-emphasis in Christian Science—at least as contrasted with mainstream Protestantism—on the social dimension of Christian witness. But the term "relative" must be used here not only because the Mother Church has for years contributed substantial sums to relief efforts in wartime and emergency situations, such as the recent earthquake in Mexico, but because it continues to publish the Christian Science Monitor, in itself a far from negligible social commitment. For nearly seven decades the newspaper has helped orient Christian Scientists’ concerns to the practical problems of the world. Its four-part series "Hunger in Africa" (November 27-30, 1984), which concluded with a list of relief agencies to which donations could be sent, and the recent series "Exiles Among Us: Poor and Black in America" (November 13-20, 1986) are instances in which it has contributed significantly to public understanding of social problems.

The specific purpose of the church Eddy founded is to be an effective agency for the spiritual awakening upon which, as Christian Scientists see it, the solution of humanity’s manifold problems ultimately rests. Christian Scientists generally would agree that bringing prayer to bear on human tragedy and suffering does not preclude taking other practical steps to alleviate them. As a Christian Scientist said recently in response to a medical student’s question as to how she would help starving children in Africa: "I suspect if I were there I would do what you would do—cradle as many as I could and feed them with all the food I could lay my hands on. I hope I would remember to turn sincerely and expectantly to God for guidance as to how to do more—intelligently—to meet the immediate human needs of the multitude, but to take practical inspired steps for healing the fears, hates, misunderstanding, and cruelties that bring suffering to humanity" ("Some Questions and Answers about Christian Science," Christian Science Sentinel, September 2, 1985, pp. 1508-09). The underlying question about Christian Scientists’ social stance, therefore, is not whether they are too little committed to social action, but whether spiritual healing as they understand it can actually happen and whether it means what they think it means for Christianity.

How should one evaluate the healing efforts of a denomination which has been committed to Christian healing for over a century, and which endeavors to practice it amid a secular climate in which medical assumptions are axiomatic?

Christian Scientists point to their century-long healing experience as evidence that cannot be ignored. If this evidence is dismissed out of hand on the basis of rigidly reductionist standards, what does that say about our attitude toward the gospel? And if it is taken seriously, what are its implications for Christian faith?

Obviously, these questions have relevance that far transcends the interest of a single denomination. Christian Scientists remain rather like distant relatives who insist on raising uncomfortable questions—questions the rest of the family might prefer to ignore. There is still much for the family to discuss.

 

Spiritual Healing On Trial: A Christian Scientist Reports

In May a young Christian Science couple pleaded Innocent in a Boston courtroom to charges of manslaughter in the death of their two-year-old son. Ginger and David Twitchell had sought to treat their son’s bowel obstruction through spiritual means. The case may not go to trial, for the Twitchells’ conduct appears to fall under a Massachusetts statute that, according to an attorney general for the Commonwealth, "expressly precludes imposition of criminal liability as a negligent parent for failure to provide medical care because of religious beliefs." The district attorney can prosecute the couple only by finding a way around this statute.

Prosecutions of Christian Science parents are also pending in California and Florida, but the charges against the Twitchells have drawn special attention, being brought in the very shadow of the dome of the Mother Church, world headquarters of the denomination. Some media covering the case have tried to exploit this dramatic aspect. Yet the breadth of the coverage -- from tabloids and radio talk shows to wire-service stories and TV discussion forums -- has also allowed legal thinkers, medical ethicists and church spokespeople to begin sorting out opinions.

Terms such as "complex," "dilemma" and "far reaching" have studded more informed discussions of the case. In Harvard law professor Arthur Miller’s words: "The courts have to balance the rights of the parents, the rights of religion, and the rights of the state," and this is "almost impossible to do with any precision and consistency." A widely quoted church statement asserts, "It is obvious that what is being put on trial here is not the action of individual parents but a public policy, a healing practice, and a way of life in many families."

Even some of those who oppose laws accommodating Christian Science healing for children (in Massachusetts and most other states) hold that prosecutions of already grieving parents makes little sense. In a strongly worded statement condemning such laws, the American Academy of Pediatrics declared that it did not "advocate punishment of offending parents as a solution." Of the Twitchell case specifically, Kenneth Simmons, law professor at Boston University, said, "I think there is a very good argument that this is an illegal prosecution, and beyond that I also believe it’s an unwise prosecution because Christian Scientists looking at that law would quite reasonably believe that they are protected."

The issue in the case appears to revolve around a conflict between the parents’ First Amendment rights to practice their religious beliefs and the state’s duty to protect the health of children. Most commentators hold that while adults have the right to practice spiritual healing for themselves, they have no religious right to endanger their children’s health. The most intriguing and least-noticed aspect of the debate is that Christian Scientists agree with this position. They do not emphasize their religious right as over against the state’s interest, but accept parents obligation to maintain their children’s health and the state’s interest in seeing that this is done. A fair estimate of Christian Science healing, they maintain, would show it to be an effective form of treatment which responsibly fulfills this obligation, with a support system including nonmedical nursing and care facilities for the sick. As a church member put it to an interviewer, "The refusal of medical care is because we have found through experience and demonstration of healing that spiritual means -- prayer and spiritual treatment -- work more effectively for us" ("Christian Scientists Say Prayer is Best Medicine," Lawrence Eagle Tribune, May 9)

It is important to establish what is meant by "spiritual treatment." Christian Scientists hold that behind all diseases are mental factors rooted in the human mind’s blindness to God’s presence and our authentic relation to God, revealed in the life of Christ. They hold that treatment is a form of prayer or communion with God in which God’s reality and power, admitted and witnessed to, become so real as to eclipse the temporal "reality" of disease and pain. Such treatment they see as actively and specifically ministering to human need. As one Christian Scientist explained it to a high-school group, "Healing happens when your sense of God becomes greater than your sense of the problem."

Christian Scientists do not claim that their practice of spiritual healing should be accommodated in law simply because it is religious, but rather that it should not be proscribed by law simply because it is religious, and in the absence of clear evidence that it is ineffectual. In view of laws requiring medical care for children, they assert that not accommodating their form of healing in law would be to proscribe it. But would such accommodations violate the establishment clause of the First Amendment? No, say Christian Scientists. Pointing to other statutes and court decisions recognizing special practices of the Amish, Roman Catholics, Seventh-day Adventists and Jews, among others, they argue that in their case also, such laws are necessary to implement the free exercise clause of the First Amendment. Remarked church spokesperson Nathan Talbot: "We abhor the idea that the Constitution gives anyone the right to martyr a child. But our approach to healing demands fair consideration. As with any form of treatment, Christian Science deserves to be judged on the basis of an overall assessment of its results, rather than on the a priori assumption that nothing but medical care should be acceptable by the state as a means of caring for the health of the young.

The question of the evidence for spiritual healing is a thorny one. An important exploration of the issue is Robert Peel’s recent book Spiritual Healing in a Scientific Age (Harper & Row, 1987) The core of the work consists of affidavits by Christian Scientists attesting to the healing of such disorders as spinal meningitis, compound pelvic fracture, broken vertebra, breast cancer, cancer of the uterus, double club feet, third-degree burns, acute rheumatic fever, polio, eczema, epilepsy, appendicitis, rheumatoid arthritis, tuberculosis, blood poisoning, diptheria and glaucoma. Each of the healings Peel cites, over half of which involve children, were medically corroborated either by diagnoses or follow-up medical examination or both.

In the March issue of Second Opinion exploring the relation of faith, medicine and healing, James P. Wind notes that "Peel’s book explores the dangerous zone between theology and medicine" and "asks readers -- especially those with reflexive skepticism about the subject -- to take seriously the revival of spiritual healing in our post-modern age." But with the exception of this rather adventurous issue of Second Opinion, there is little to indicate that such reflection is occurring. Wind cites Peel’s reference to a British physician’s judgment that serious scholarship in this zone of inquiry can be a form of "academic suicide." Peel’s book itself has received surprisingly few academic reviews, which suggests that the questions it raises are regarded by many as beyond serious consideration.

The militantly secular views that dismiss spiritual healing are known quantities. In the current debate over Christian Science, it is almost commonplace for those holding these views to write off accounts of spiritual healing with the reductionistic if not pejorative term "anecdotal," since they refer to real-life events rather than ones that occur in a laboratory context. (Even so, what is surprising about Peel’s book is how much medical corroboration there is for the healing accounts.)

From a Christian standpoint, the decision not to take seriously the evidence for spiritual healing has sobering implications. If one rejects out of hand the evidence for Christian healing, many would ask, is one not rejecting an aspect of Christian experience necessary to the realization of the gospel’s promise today? As Gordon Dalbey noted six years ago, "The ministry of physical healing stands in the center of our Christian faith. And yet, though the Gospels are filled with stories of healing, and the Church itself is born through an act of healing (Acts 3) , most church people seem anxious to disown these stories, as if they embarrassed us" ("Recovering Christian Healing," The Christian Century, June 9-16, 1982).

Probably fewer church people would be embarrassed by these stories today. During this decade, the recovery of Christian healing has accelerated to the point that it has become an undeniable part of the Christian landscape. As with most grass-roots movements, it has included differing and in some instances contradictory approaches. And both Christian Science and the form of Christian healing that has become part of mainstream church life should be clearly differentiated from the "faith healing" associated with TV evangelism, itinerant evangelists (portrayed, for example, in the recent CBS television film "Promised a Miracle") and fundamentalist groups such as Faith Assembly. A recent article in a Christian Science periodical observed, "Many Christians who have ministries of healing reject the label ‘faith healing.’ It’s becoming apparent that blind faith doesn’t stand up to the scrutiny of an increasingly sophisticated and technological society" (David B. Andrews, "The Future of Christian Healing: Fresh Convictions and Spiritual Realism," Christian Science Journal. June 1988, p. 33)

A Methodist minister actively involved in spiritual healing for many years speaks for one current of opinion when he says, "Christian Science has been a tremendous influence because it has put its finger right on what Christ says about healing the sick. Christian Scientists have demonstrated it; they have practiced it and put it at the very heart of what they’re trying to do" ("Christian Science and Spiritual Healing Today: A Conversation with the Reverend Paul Higgins," Christian Science Sentinel, October 6, 1986, p. 1860)

The most questionable aspect of Christian Science for many is its view that medical and spiritual treatment cannot be beneficially combined. For Christian Scientists, this approach follows from a belief that spiritual treatment rests on a basis wholly different from that of medicine. It does not mean that one cannot pray as any Christian would that another experience more of God’s healing love. But it is motivated by a concern that patients not rely for healing on contradictory forms of treatment -- and also by deference to the efforts of medical professionals if their care has been elected. The church strongly emphasizes that choice of treatment remains wholly individual and voluntary. However, those engaged in the ministry of Christian Science healing for the public must usually withdraw their names from listings in church periodicals for a stipulated period of time if they decide to make use of medical care for themselves.

Whatever one’s view of this approach to healing, it has resulted in a body of evidence about healings that have been effected through spiritual means alone. In light of this evidence, it is ironic that Christian Science healing should be attracting attention more by its failure than by its successes. Put in an unenviable media spotlight, Christian Scientists have objected to what they see as the inequity of the public judgment upon them. As one of them put it recently, "Many children, as well as adults, die under medical care. . . . Nobody gives a second thought to those, they just let it go . . . whereas a few cases where prayer has appeared to fail are brought out and publicized all over the country" (Lawrence Eagle Tribune, May 9)

Yet for Christian Scientists, as for those in the medical community, failures in practice often cause genuine soul-searching. A brief interview with David Twitchell on ABC’s "20/20" gave a public glimpse of a private struggle. "Maybe a doctor could have saved Robyn," he said. But then he added, "Have you ever asked a doctor for a guarantee?" -- a pointed comment, considering the consent forms typically required for those undergoing medical treatment listing multiple risks for which hospitals disclaim responsibility. Yet for Twitchell the honest regret remained: "If we were closer to God we could have stopped this from happening. In that way I blame myself."

Such aching "ifs" have also been voiced by medical professionals and those who have sought their ministrations. In medicine, as in spiritual healing, particular failures prove nothing unless related to an overall record. There may never be a "scientific" way to measure the record of Christian Scientists against that of medical treatment, other than the more or less commonsense observation that Christian Scientists are generally reasonable citizens who have not been losing children at a conspicuously rapid rate. There are currently five prosecutions in process against Christian Scientists who have lost children in this decade, during which intense media scrutiny has been given to the issue.

The death of a child under any circumstances or method of care is jarring. It is difficult to determine the number of Christian Scientists relying upon spiritual means for the healing of children, but the handful of losses among their children does not seem dramatically high for a small but widespread denomination. In Massachusetts, where Christian Science is relatively strong. Robyn Twitchell is the only child to have died under Christian Science care during this decade.

It is the successes of a healing system, not just its failures, that its opponents must reckon with. Future decades may see that reluctance to take the evidence for spiritual healing seriously as one last form of resistance to the drastic deconstruction of the mechanistic concept of reality. "Twentieth century physics," writes Peel, "suggests reality may be different from that posited by the reductionist, determinist, or ‘scientific’ materialism of the past -- and posited still by the biomedical hard-liner of today." Not that the evidence for spiritual healing is itself enough to validate a theological viewpoint. Yet the cumulative weight of testimony as to its validity is more than sufficient to disrupt the complacency of a biomedical world view that would exclude it.

In view of the indictment of the Twitchells and others. assessing this evidence is far more than an intellectual exercise. The reality of spiritual healing as Christian Scientists practice it matters profoundly to those who believe it to be dangerous. It matters to Christian Scientists who see their form of healing not only as a valid and responsible form of healthcare but as vital to the future of Christianity. One fact is certain: dealing with this question demands a rationality disciplined enough to discard dogmatisms, both religious and scientific.

Theology: What Is It? Who Does It? How Is It Done?

I wondered then [1966] why theologians can be so aware of the institutional and historical setting of other people’s theology and so uncritical about their own. I thought that what we really need to learn from the Marxists . . . [was] how the theologian’s locus in the class structure and power fabric of his society influences his theology. The trouble is that I still think that’s true, and that when your readers see that they’ll think my mind has not changed. And everybody knows a theologian’s mind must change every ten years. Otherwise, why the series?

The citation above is taken from my contribution to the 1970 version of this series, in which I recalled what I had written for an interim series in 1966. In rereading both of these previous articles, I was surprised at the constancy, maybe even doggedness, of my theological preoccupations. Perhaps that is only to be expected. Still, my invitation to contribute to the 1980-81 series has for some reason made me vaguely suspicious, not just of my own previous forays but also of the series itself and what it has meant for theology.

That Sniff of Suspicion

I could, of course, simply repress my uneasiness and just barge ahead and write. It wouldn’t be the first time. Still, "the hermeneutics of suspicion" suggests another course: not to bury my queasiness but to explore its significance. Truly critical theology always begins with that sniff of suspicion. One feels disquieted about the way a question is asked, the unspoken assumptions of any intellectual enterprise.

Maybe this series is an example of something about which we ought to be at least a little suspicious. It is, after all, an integral part of the history it records. The editors, by deciding who will be invited to write (and who will not be invited), delineate the limits of the permissible. The contributors in turn, taking their signals from the history of the series as well as from the kind of writing that has produced the invitation, will then demonstrate what theology is and how it is produced. Little of this will happen through explicit argument. But since implicit messages are usually more important than manifest ones (they communicate "deep structures" rather than transient content), and since they are the part of the message that is least often subjected to critical examination, it seems doubly important to examine them in the case of this series.

Good. Already my sniffing has turned up something worth further pursuit. Although so far it may all sound grippingly commonsensical, please stay with me. The most formative ideas of any age are the ones viewed as commonsensical or self-evident, so the chances are that we have already blundered into the hiding place of three of the most influential assumptions present in the world of theology today: namely, what theology is, how it is done and who does it. It is about these questions that my mind may be changing. Let us see.

A Theology of the Elite

Who then does theology? By now it has become tiresome to keep pointing out that "theologians," including the ones who have made this series so influential, have been preponderantly white, male, Euro-American, etc. Indeed, the Century’s present editors, as aware as anyone of this criticism, will undoubtedly include red, black, brown, female and non-Euro-American figures on this year’s invitation list. It will be much harder, however, to avoid the characterization made a few years back by Philip Scharper that "most of the theologians -- Protestant and Catholic -- who have had such a heavy influence on American theologians and American theology have tended to be, almost by definition, members of tile upper-middle class, indeed forming something of an intellectual elite" (Catholic Mind, April 1976, p. 18). This is a problem that even the most skillful editorial selection cannot avoid. Why?

The reason this class bias is so stubborn is clear. The minimal conditions (could we even call them "means of production"?) for doing theology, even for writing such an article as this, include the ability to read and write in at least one language, some familiarity with the received tradition of concepts and categories, sufficient leisure to think, and the power to get one’s ideas published or otherwise heard. But these conditions are available only to people who have benefited from privileged educational opportunities and whose present position in life frees them from a daily struggle against hunger and cold. These minimal "class" conditions exclude the vast majority of people from ever being considered theologians, at least in this respect.

I am not interested in scolding. Theology has always been produced by an elite, and although the voices of blacks, feminists and other previously excluded groups have undercut some established perspectives, they have not done much to challenge the class bias. What I am asking is whether the conditions that automatically exclude all but middle-class people from doing theology make a significant difference in the theology itself, including my theology. Or is it something one can safely ignore? This consideration moves us on to the question of how theology is done.

A New Blade

In the past two centuries Christian theologians have become increasingly self-critical about how theology is done, especially about sources and procedures. This capacity for self-criticism has often been regarded as the most important single theological development of that period. The question I keep asking myself now, however, is whether theologians are prepared to take the next step, that of moving from a historical-critical to a sociocritical method. This step would move us beyond the sharp awareness we now have, for example, of how the rhetorical conventions and cultural symbols of any period shape even, its most original theology, to a recognition of how the pervasive ideology of the dominant class in any society influences the theology it produces. As the Jesuit theologian Alfred T. Hennelly says, we now need a new "Ockham’s razor" to be used for "the careful dissection of the manifold relationships that exist between the ideology of the Western ruling elites and the development of western theology."

A new Ockham’s razor? Yes, I think we need one. The first one, it will be recalled, was invented by the 14th century Franciscan theologian William of Ockham to pare away the superfluous from the essential. Ockham believed that an "overloaded" concept inevitably suffered distortion. Likewise, because of the class position of those who write it, most theology today is freighted with an overload of the dominant class ideology. The trouble is that while most theologians are trained to watch out for historical biases and logical non sequiturs, we are rarely taught how to recognize the distortion a dominant ideological perspective imposes on our own or other people’s theological work. The Christian Century’s series, by example and not by intent, continues by and large to hold up this truncated model of a less-than-critical theology which proceeds without much awareness of its own class bias.

Since this dominant model of how theology should be done is perpetuated by implicit example, a counterproposal needs to be made explicit. My thesis here is that no theology that claims to be "critical" can continue to ignore this ideological-critical dimension. Understanding how the dominant ideology of any society, including our own, becomes a latent but potent element in the production of theology should be an integral, not just an ancillary, part of the theological enterprise itself. Ockham’s razor needs a new blade. This moves us on to the next question to which the Century’s series supplies an implicit answer: the question of what theology is.

In the Western intellectual tradition, a serious hiatus has developed over the past few centuries between the study of religious and theological ideas as such, including their internal relations to each other, on the one hand, and the study of the historical and political significance of theological formulations in human societies on the other. The first task is usually thought of as "theology," while the second -- with its parallel or "dialectical" concern for how social reality influences theological ideas -- is generally turned over to other disciplines. Again, by and large, the Century’s series reproduces this hiatus.

I believe that this separation is a serious mistake. It arose historically along with the modern fragmentation of the disciplines, the overspecialization of intellectual labor, and the separation of church and state. But its danger is that it leads to just that ethereal view of theology which obscures its social sources and thereby disguises its ideological significance. If a strong sociocritical element were built into theology, this separation would not be possible. The integration of this dimension into our theological work, as a part of what theology is, constitutes an urgent need. To put it another way, theology must be its own most informed critic. It must constantly expand its awareness not just of its own internal processes but of how it influences and is influenced by its milieu.

Idealogy and Ideas

So far I have not gone much beyond what I said in 1970. In that article I also wrote: "All thinking, including theological thinking, arises in part as ideology; that is, in defense of this or that institution’s power and privilege."

The idea is not new. I wonder, then, why most theologians have been so hesitant to enter into the next phase, the sociocritical phase, of theological history. Could it be because most of us suspect that it would confront us with some embarrassing contradictions which other fields could more easily avoid? How can members of a privileged elite be the interpreters of a Message which so ringingly challenges all established power and all elites? The question is a serious one, and it requires me to go beyond my 1970 thoughts on the subject.

Despite the obvious difficulties middle-class theologians face in this regard, I do not believe that middle-classness as such necessarily prevents anyone from doing Christian theology. The notion that class automatically "determines" ideas is not defended by any serious class analyst today. It is as dead as that equally quaint notion that ideas appear by inspiration or insight and without reference to the impinging social reality. But the ghost of the mechanical-determinist idea still haunts the intellectual world, functioning as a favorite straw man to be pummeled by those who need a horrible example of reductionism to warn us against the dire peril of investigating the relationship among class, ideology and ideas.

The fact is, however, that the relationship between ideology and ideas (and vice versa) can be laid open -- and with a scalpel (or a razor), not with a meat cleaver. A fecund tradition of Marxist literary criticism -- including such figures as Lucien Goldmann, Walter Benjamin and Georg Lukács -- can help us see how. But no theologian can even begin to slice through the ideological gristle of a text or to prevent her or his own work from being ideologically "overdetermined" without passing through one indispensable first step: the recognition that such ideological distortion does occur. Only after this initial recognition can one go on to learn how it occurs and how to minimize it in one’s own case.

The inventor of Muzak once claimed that the great success of his invention lay in the simple fact that one never notices it until it is turned off. The same is true of ideology. What is needed, as Karl Mannheim pointed out years ago in Ideology and Utopia, is a knowledge of how to spot and deal with something which by its very nature eludes most forms of detection. Although we can easily discern someone else’s ideology if it is different from ours (liberation theologians, for example, are constantly accused of being "too ideological"), we have a desperately difficult time recognizing our own. "Theirs" is patent and obtuse. Our own ideology, however, passes itself off as the obvious or even as "standards of scholarly excellence." But as the literary critics I have just mentioned lucidly demonstrate, the task of recognizing and analyzing ideology is not impossible. It can be done.

Resign from the Middle Class?

The first step is to lay aside any possibility of simply jumping out of one’s class skin. Intellectuals gain absolutely nothing by lamenting the fact that they were not born with a different gender or pigmentation or into a different social stratum. Worse, the pious lamentation itself can often become a symbolic substitute for an effective critical method. Class bias is not dissolved by religious ecstasy or heroic imagination. This is why I believe that the well-intentioned phrase "identifying with the poor" is misleading in two ways.

First, "identification" is too psychologistic and can easily pass over into a neo-Franciscan romanticism. Whatever the values of voluntary poverty, the most salient characteristic of real poverty is that it is not voluntary. Poverty is not just penury. It is also powerlessness. Education, social skills, "contacts" and experience in the dominant culture are all part of what it means to be "nonpoor," and since none of these can simply be shed, even someone who has embraced voluntary poverty or some kind of simpler life style remains middle class in the most important respects.

Second, as anyone who has lived among the poor for any length of time knows, the dominant ideology has also impressed itself on the consciousness of poor people. They often follow it with a vengeance. Middle-class theologians only deceive themselves if they think they can just resign from the middle class. Still, class is not fate. Classes come into existence in history and they exist only in conflict with each other. Therefore, "class" is a political and social category, not an ontological one. This means that middle-class theologians (including black and feminist and Third World theologians) can learn how to uncover and deal with the dominant ideological component of theology, but the strategy for doing so must be a political-social strategy commensurate with the nature of class itself. How can this be done?

Encountering the ‘Rival Sibling’

In my view, the problem the theologian faces in this respect is not essentially different from the one faced by any other intellectual who is interested in becoming critically aware of her or his own class perspective. The method for dealing with the problem is similar also. Antonio Gramsci, the Italian Marxist whose writings have undergone such a remarkable renaissance in recent years, especially as we search for a more "Western" and democratic form of socialism, was fascinated with this issue. Gramsci kept asking himself throughout his life how so many intellectuals both in past historical periods and in his own time, people who were not an integral part of the poor or working classes, could nonetheless give essential leadership to people’s liberation movements. How did these intellectuals come to understand and neutralize their own bondage to dominant class ideologies?

Gramsci’s answer, put very simply, is that the issue of how one does intellectual work eventually comes down to the question of for whom one does it. For Gramsci, this was a matter not of goodwill but of social location.

Intellectuals, Gramsci suggested, occupy a kind of no-man’s land between the principal classes. As mental workers who live off what they write or teach, they sell the product of their own labor. They are not capitalists. But the style and pace of the work they do as artisans (their "work process," a central category in Marxist analysis) is still largely in their own hands, which is not the case for factory workers, For Gramsci, this contradictory position of intellectuals has both advantages and disadvantages. Not totally ensconced in any single class, the intellectual artisan-worker is in a better position to choose where her or his loyalties will be invested.

But there is a trap to be avoided. Since in capitalist society the intellectual is not structurally part of the working class, and since nearly all opportunities for intellectual employment are within institutions directed by the ruling classes, the tendency to allow oneself to be molded by the dominant ideology and to become one of its -- albeit unconscious -- perpetuators is very powerful. How, then, do critical intellectuals become aware of this danger and exercise the choice they have to avoid perpetuating the dominant-pervasive ideology? (Note that I am not dealing here with those intellectuals who consciously decide to champion the dominant ideology.) How does the dominant ideology become visible to someone who might well remain unconsciously under its sway?

The English literary critic Terry Eagleton, who stands in the tradition of Goldmann and Lukács, answers this question eloquently:

Ideology, seen from within, has no outside; in this sense one does not transgress its outer limits as one crosses a geographical boundary . . . It is impossible to come to its frontiers from within . . . in discovering its demarcations, ideology discovers its self-dissolution; it cannot survive the "culture shock" consequent on its stumbling into alien territory adjacent to itself. . . . It cannot survive the traumatic recognition of its own repressed parentage -- the truth that it is not after all self-reproductive but was historically brought to birth. . . . Such a recognition may be forced upon ideology by the unwelcome discovery of a rival sibling, an antagonistic ideology which reveals to it the secret of its own birth [Criticism and Ideology, pp. 95-96].

Put more prosaically, the only way to become aware of one’s own ideology is to see one’s work through the mirror of another ideology. For theologians working in institutions dominated by the prevailing ideology of careerism, individualism, scholarly objectivity and the rest, this "encounter with the rival sibling" is essential. It requires us to look at our work from the perspective of those who are oppressed by that ideology and who are therefore actively trying to expose it and to transform the society of which it is a part.

The German theologian F. W. Marquardt suggests that whatever other value Marxist thought may have, for the theologian who works in a capitalist milieu it provides an indispensable heuristic device with which to expose her or his unreflective "bourgeois" assumptions. I think Marquardt is right as far as he goes. Today, Marxism is the rival sibling. But his suggestion still depends on the continuing personal goodwill of the individual theologian. For Gramsci, on the other hand, the matter was not one of goodwill but of accountability. It is a question not in the first instance of what one reads (though that is obviously important) but of for whom one works -- as distinguished from by whom one is remunerated. All intellectuals need an accountability network since thinking is by its nature a social process. The question for Gramsci was this: Which accountability community will it be?

The ‘OK’ Agenda

Gramsci’s formula provides an effective antidote to the way the dominant ideology actually influences intellectual work. As the French critic Pierre Macherey has observed (Pour une Théorie de la Production Littéraire), ideology shapes a text more in what is not said than in what is said. It makes itself felt in what is left out, in what the feminist writer Tillie Olsen calls "the silences."

Ideology also makes its impact at the level of agendas and priorities. The dominant classes have certain questions they would like to have addressed and other questions they would prefer not to have aired. The "OK" questions are the ones around which conferences are organized and for which research grants and travel fellowships are made available. The approved agenda also influences what counts as "careful," "thoughtful" and, most of all, "responsible" work. Not even the best-intentioned intellectual can avoid this agenda because of the imbalance between the way its pressures are felt (as subtle, reasonable and built into the fabric of institutional relations) and the way those of an alternative agenda are felt (as "outside," diversionary, professionally unproductive).

Accountability does not come naturally. True, in a capitalist society, accountability to the dominant ideology appears to be spontaneous, but it appears so because that ideology informs the mechanisms by which accountability is institutionalized. This means that an alternative form of accountability must be a matter of self-conscious selection. It must be self-imposed.

This question of accountability structures is an especially important one for feminists, Third World people, blacks and other minority students who are learning theology at institutions directed by the dominant classes. It is critical for such students to understand that they already have -- at least in principle an alternative accountability structure. The latent but powerful influence of theological education, however, can often move them out of that community and into forms of accountability provided by the dominant culture. If this pressure is not resisted, such students will soon find themselves reproducing dominant ideologies along with everyone else.

For the practicing theologian the task is even more difficult. To place oneself in an alternative accountability structure runs counter to many of the career patterns and associational forms of academic intellectuals. Also, as I have already mentioned, since the dominant ideology permeates not only the middle classes but -- through the device Gramsci called "cultural hegemony" -- the working and poor classes as well, the intellectual cannot settle for some kind of "identification with the poor." Rather than "identification" I prefer the more political term "alliance." Rather than with "the poor," these alliances should link us to those groups that are actively opposing the dominant society and its ideology. And this can become both personally and professionally risky. Still, it is not impossible. It involves discovering those newly emergent social locations, forums, problems and "standards of scholarship" within which many intellectuals and some theologians are already working. It raises the question of "for whom" one does theology.

In his own way, Karl Barth sensed the priority of the question of "for whom" one does theology -- what we have called accountability. Barth rejected the idea that one does theology for the guild, or for the profession, or for the academy. He saw that it was crucial for him to declare as unequivocally as possible that he was accountable first of all to the church. He was a "church theologian" and was careful to inscribe this reminder in the title of his major opus. Friedrich Schleiermacher, on the other hand, declared in his most widely read work that he considered those for whom he wrote to be the "cultured despisers of religion."

New Interlocutors

I appreciate the fact that both Barth and Schleiermacher were so explicit about their intended "interlocutors" -- that is, the people to whom they listened, for whom they wrote and from whom they wanted a response. In this respect, they both did much better than many present-day theologians who are never quite clear on this, perhaps the most critical methodological issue of all. Still, I think we must move beyond both Barth and Schleiermacher on this question of accountability.

In a passing reference to Jesus’ statement that "the Sabbath is made for man, not man for the Sabbath," Juan Luis Segundo puts the question with characteristic bluntness. Does not this statement, he asks, mean today "that human life in society, liberated as far as possible from alienations, constitutes the absolute value, and that all religious institutions, all dogmas, all the sacraments and all ecclesiastical authorities have only a relative, that is, a functional value?"

I think Segundo is right, and this means that we can no longer be merely church theologians in any institutional sense. The coming of the Kingdom of God through the angry poor and the disinherited, both inside and outside the church, must provide our accountability structure. It also means that we cannot address our theology to the questions and concerns of the "cultured despisers" of religion, since to converse mainly with them does nothing to crack open the dominant ideology we share with them or to change the society which that ideology helps perpetuate.

Whenever my ideas have changed over the past ten years, it has been because new conversation partners, new critics, have raised new questions. Maybe what we all need most in theology today is a new Ockham’s razor and new interlocutors to help us learn how to use it.

The Secular City 25 Years Later

I wrote The Secular City after having lived for a year in Berlin, where I taught in a church sponsored adult education program with branches on both sides of the barbed wire. The wall was constructed a few months before I arrived, so I had to commute back and forth through Checkpoint Charlie, whose familiar wooden shack and warning sign— "You are leaving the American sector"—have now been placed in a museum. Berlin had been the home of Dietrich Bonhoeffer, and many of his friends and co-workers were still there. So we talked a lot about Bonhoeffer that year, especially about the musings he set down during the last months of his life about the hiddenness of God and the coming of a "postreligious" age in human history. In the tense and tired Berlin of the early 1960s that made a lot of sense.

In retrospect, of course, it is easy to see that human religiosity is a much more persistent quality than Bonhoeffer thought it was. Nearly everywhere we look in the world today we witness an unanticipated resurgence of traditional religion. The renaissance of Islamic culture and politics, the rebirth of Shinto in Japan, the appearance of powerful Jewish, Hindu and Christian "fundamentalisms" in Israel, India and the U.S.—all these have raised important questions about the allegedly ineluctable process of secularization. But where does that leave us?

If anything, I believe these developments make the central thesis of The Secular City even more credible. I argued then that secularization—if it is not permitted to calcify into an ideology (which I called "secular- ism")—is not everywhere and always an evil. It prevents powerful religions from acting on their theocratic pretensions. It allows people to choose among a wider range of worldviews. Today, in parallel fashion, it seems obvious that the resurgence of religion in the world is not everywhere and always a good thing. Do the long-suffering people of Iran believe that after the removal of their ruthless shah, the installation of a quasi-theocratic Islamic republic has turned out to be a wholly positive move? Do those Israelis and Palestinians who yearn for a peaceful settlement of the West Bank bloodletting believe that either the Jewish or the Muslim religious parties are helping? How do the citizens of Beirut and Belfast feel about the continuing vitality of religion?

The truth is that both religious revival and secularization are morally ambiguous processes. Both heal and destroy. We still desperately need a way of welcoming diversity that does not deteriorate into nihilism, and a sober recognition that neither religious nor secular movements are good or bad as such. Both can become either the bearers of emancipation or the avatars of misery, or some of each. Wouldn’t a modest sprinkling of secularization, a de-religionizing of the issues, come as a welcome relief in Ulster, and help resolve the murderous tensions in Kashmir and the Gaza strip?

I can understand the people who are encouraged by the worldwide revival of religion today. The victims of atheistic and antireligious regimes are just as dead as those of clericalist terror. But the people who welcome the re-emergence of the rites and values that give people a sense of dignity and continuity—a bar mitzvah in Warsaw, churches reopening in Smolensk, thousands of American college students thoughtfully exploring comparative religion—sometimes forget that a revival of religion is never an unmixed blessing. The same somber icons of St. Michael and Our Lady that sustained Russian believers through the winter of Stalinism and its aftermath also provide the anti-Semites of Pamyat with their most potent symbols. How do we weigh the promising new interest in Judaism among so many young people in America against the fumings of Rabbi Meyer Kahane? Shinto is another case in point. The spirit of respect for the past and reverence for the land that enables the Japanese to adopt modern technologies without destroying their environment also feeds an ominous sense of special destiny and a revived emperor cult that democratically inclined Japanese are watching with extreme misgivings.

The thesis of The Secular City was that God is first the Lord of history and only then the Head of the Church. This means that God can be just as present in the secular as in the religious realms of life, and we unduly cramp the divine presence by confining it to some specially delineated spiritual or ecclesial sector. This idea has two implications. First, it suggests that people of faith need not flee from the allegedly godless contemporary world. God came into this world, and that is where we belong as well. But second, it also means that not all that is "spiritual" is good for the spirit. These ideas were not particularly new. Indeed, the presence of the holy within the profane is suggested by the doctrine of the incarnation—not a recent innovation. As for suspicion toward religion, both Jesus and the Hebrew prophets lashed out at much of the religion they saw around them. But some simple truths need restating time and again. And today is surely no exception.

In rereading The Secular City after a quarter of a century I smiled occasionally at its audacity, the way a father might chuckle at the shenanigans of a rambunctious child. Its argument is nothing if not sweeping. By page 12 of the introduction the reader has been wafted through a dizzying tour of nothing less than the whole of human history, from tribe to technopolis, from Sophocles to Lewis Mumford, from the Stone Age to Max Weber. And all of this before chapter one. Then comes a theological portrait of the "coming" of the secular city in which Barth and Tillich and Camus and John F. Kennedy jostle each other in what might have seemed to all of them a somewhat unfamiliar proximity. The next part of the book is devoted to what I called "revolutionary theology," a phrase that, at least in those days, struck people as a world-class oxymoron. It is followed by an attack on Playboy magazine, which I called "antisexual," that drew me into a furious (at first) and later tedious debate with that magazine’s publisher. A lot of territory to cover in a 244-page book.

The final section is a polemic against the so-called "death of God" theologians who were au courant at the time. I portrayed them, correctly I think, as remaining obsessed—albeit negatively—with the classical god of metaphysical theism, while I was talking about Someone Else, the mysterious and elusive Other of the prophets and Jesus, who—like Jacques Brel—was very much alive although living in unexpected quarters. I have never been able to understand why, after having unleashed this guerre de plume against the death-of-godders, some critics persisted in including me among them.

In any case, the death-of-god theology had an unusually short half-life, whereas the issue I tried in my youthful enthusiasm to tackle—the significance of the ongoing battle between religion and secularization—rightly continues to stoke debate and analysis. To illustrate the dilemma from my own Christian tradition, how many Mother Teresas and Oscar Romeros does it take to balance a Jim and Tammy Bakker? And how do we measure Pope John II’s courageous vision of a "Europe without borders" against his worldwide crusade against contraception? So much good and so much mischief is done—as it always has been—in the name of God. Perhaps the suggestion I made at the end of The Secular City, which sounded radical to some readers then, is still a good one: we should learn something from the ancient Jewish tradition of not pronouncing the name of the Holy One, live through a period of reverent reticence in religious language, and wait for the spirit to make known a new vocabulary that is not so tarnished by trivialization and misuse.

I actually said a little more than that, and the final paragraph of the book may be worth recalling because it prepared the way for the theological movement that was to pick up where The Secular City left off. On that last page I speculated on the significance of the puzzling fact that, according to the book of Exodus, when Moses asked for the name of the One who told him to lead the Israelite slaves from their Egyptian captivity, the Voice from the burning bush refused to give it. Moses was to get about the business of liberating his people. "Tell them ‘I will do what I will do’ has sent you," the Voice said. That, apparently, was enough. The name would come in God’s good time. Reflecting in 1965 on this astonishing episode, I wrote:

The Exodus marked for the Jews a turning point of such elemental power that a new divine name was needed to replace the titles that had grown out of their previous experience. Our transition today ... will be no less shaking. Rather than clinging stubbornly to antiquated appellations or anxiously synthesizing new ones, perhaps, like Moses, we must simply take up the work of liberating the captives, confident that we will be granted a new name by events of the future.

Although I was only dimly aware of it at the time, in this paragraph I was actually proposing an agenda for the next stage of theology, one which was taken up with a brilliance and daring far beyond my hopes, first by Latin American theologians and then by others throughout the world. For between these concluding lines, which crystallized the thrust of the entire book, can be detected what were to become the two basic premises of liberation theology.

The first premise is that for us, as for Moses, an act of engagement for justice in the world, not a pause for theological reflection, should be the first "moment" of an appropriate response to God. First hear the Voice, then get to work freeing the captives. The "name" will come later. Theology is important, but it comes after, not before, the commitment to doing, to what some still call "discipleship." This inverts the established Western assumption that right action must derive from previously clarified ideas. Liberation theology’s insistence that thought—including theological thought—is imbedded in the grittiness of real life is one of its most salutary contributions.

The second premise of liberation theology is that "accompanying" the poor and the captives in their pilgrimage is not only an ethical responsibility, but that it provides the most promising context for theological reflection. Not just "history" in general, but the effort of excluded and marginalized people to claim God’s promise is the preferred "locus theologicus." As the Catholic bishops of Latin America put it in their influential statement of 1968, one must think theologically from the perspective of a "preferential option for the poor." It is not hard to see now, although I was scarcely able to see it then, that the next logical step after The Secular City was liberation theology. But the link between the two was neither simple nor direct.

At first I was puzzled at how much attention the Spanish translation of my book, La Ciudad Secular, received from Latin American theologians. They criticized it vociferously, but they also built on it. They invited me to Peru and Mexico and Brazil to debate it. But as I listened to their criticisms I became convinced that they understood it better than anyone else, maybe even better than I did myself. Still, they made use of it in a way I had not anticipated. Gustavo Gutiérrez, whose controversial book The Theology of Liberation appeared a few years after mine, clarifies the connection best. In the economically developed capitalist countries, he explains, secularization tends to take a cultural form. It challenges the hegemony of traditional religious world views, calls human beings to assume their rightful role in shaping history, and opens the door to a pluralism of symbolic universes. In the poor countries, however, secularization assumes quite a different expression. It challenges the misuse of religion by ruling elites to sacralize their privileges, and it enlists the powerful symbols of faith into the conflict with despotism. In the Third World, as Gutiérrez puts it in one of his best-known formulations, the theologian’s conversation partner is not "the nonbeliever" but rather "the nonperson." This means that among the tarpaper shantytowns of Lima and São Paulo the interlocutor of theology is not some skeptical "modern man" who thinks religion stifles thought; rather, it is the faceless people whose lives as well as faith are threatened because tyrannies grounded in some religious or nonreligious mythology strangle them into an early death. The distinction Gutiérrez makes shows that he is applying the same praxis-oriented approach to theology I advocated in a different religious and political environment. Liberation theology is the legitimate, though unanticipated, heir of The Secular City.

Heirs, of course, go their own way, and there is one part in my book that I wish had played a larger role in the subsequent development of Third World liberation theologies. In one section I argued that in the Soviet-dominated countries of Eastern Europe it was not religion but communism that needed "secularizing." Here I wrote from direct observation. I had personally seen the bizarre attempts of communist regimes to set up ersatz confirmation, wedding and burial services. I had noticed that in Poland, smothered under an imposed Sovietized culture, it was the Catholic intellectuals who were the most outspoken advocates of "cultural pluralism." I can still remember the young Czech pastor who told me in 1964, four years before the Prague Spring, that he opposed communism "not because it is rationalist but because it is not rational enough ... too metaphysical." By entering into an honest dialogue with the Marxists who ran their countries at the time, Christians, he said, were trying to force the communists "to be what they said they were, socialist and scientific, and to get them to stop trying to create a new holy orthodoxy."

It was these courageous Christians, I believe, who eventually saw the fruit of their patience blossom in 1989. Unlike some other believers, they refused either to flee to the West or to knuckle under to the regimes or to retreat into "inner immigration." They opted to stay, to participate, to criticize, and to be ready when dialogue became possible. They were also practicing a form of liberation theology, staying in a difficult situation and accompanying an oppressed people in the long quest for freedom. When an interviewer asked the pastor of one of the churches in Leipzig that had provided the space, the inspiration and the preparation for the East German revolution of November 1989 what the theological basis for his contribution was, he answered that it was "Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Latin American liberation theology."

There is much continuity. But there are also many important contemporary theological currents for which I can find little foreshadowing in The Secular City. For starters, in reading the book again in 1990 1 winced every time I saw the word "man" blatantly wielded to refer to any body and everybody. The first page of the introduction: "The world has become man’s task and man’s responsibility. Contemporary man has become the cosmopolitan." And so on. I would feel better if I could claim that it was, after all, only a matter of blunderbuss pronouns, that today my language would be gender inclusive. But I know it cuts deeper than that. The truth is that The Secular City was written without the benefit of the two decades of feminist theological scholarship that was to begin shortly after it was published. What difference would it have made?

A lot. In fact, knowing what I know now, I would have had to recast virtually every chapter. How could I rely so heavily on the themes of disenchantment and desacralization, as I did in the opening section, without coping with the obvious fact that these historical processes—which I saw in a positive light—suggest a certain patriarchal domination of the natural world with which women have been so closely identified in Hebrew and Christian religious symbolization? More basically, I have learned since 1965, often from my own students, that we can no longer read the Bible without recognizing that it comes to us already severely tampered with, expurgated, and perhaps even edited with an eye to perpetuating the authority of men. I have learned that many of the classical sources I was taught to rely on so heavily, from Augustine to Tillich, sound very different when they are read with women’s questions in mind. And my last chapter, "To Speak in a Secular Fashion of God," would have had to take into consideration that employing exclusively male language for the deity has contributed to the marginalization of half the people of the world. .

But even on the issues later raised by feminist theologians, The Secular City contains some hints and anticipations. The chapter that, to my amazement, became the most widely discussed and quoted is titled "Sex and Secularization." It contains the aforementioned onslaught against Playboy which exposes the pseudo-sex of the airbrushed centerfold, the ideal woman pimply adolescent boys prefer because she makes no demands whatever. They can safely fold her up whenever they want to, which is not possible with the genuine article. It also lampoons the Miss America festival as a repristination of the old fertility goddess cults, reworked in the interests of male fantasies and commodity marketing. Was I at least a proto-feminist? Not on a par with current feminist cultural criticism, but not too bad for 25 years ago, and for a man.

There is another important theological current that at first seems strangely missing from The Secular City but whose absence, in retrospect, one can understand if not forgive. The American city is the principal locus of African-American theology. It was not until a few years after the publication of my book, however, that black theologians began making that fact evident to the wider theological community. It is all the more surprising that I overlooked African-American religion in 1965 since I was personally caught up in the civil rights movement. I had first met Martin Luther King, Jr., in 1956, during the summer of the Montgomery bus boycott. At the time I was chaplain at Oberlin College in Ohio and I invited him to come speak. He flew in a few months later and we started a friendship that was to last until his death in 1968. As a member of his Southern Christian Leadership Conference I marched and demonstrated in both the North and the South. I responded to the call to come to Selma, was arrested and jailed briefly in Williamstown, North Carolina, and took some of the responsibility in organizing the SCLC’s effort to desegregate St. Augustine, Florida. All through these years my family and I lived in Roxbury, the predominantly African-American section of Boston.

Still, it was only later, with the advent of the Black Power movement and the coming of black theology, that I began to take seriously what the modern American city meant to African-Americans. Again, if I had thought about this very carefully at the time I could have foreseen some of the reservations black theologians voiced about The Secular City. Its controlling metaphors of "the man at the giant switchboard" and "the man in the cloverleaf," which were meant to symbolize the communication grid and the mobility network of the modern metropolis, seemed implausible to people who had been denied both mobility and communication, and for whom the city was often not a place of expanded freedom but the site of more sophisticated humiliations. It became clear to me only as the years passed that The Secular City reflects the perspective of a relatively privileged urbanite. The city, secular or otherwise, feels quite different to those for whom its promise turns out to be a cruel deception.

In the years that have passed since The Secular City was published much has happened to the cities of the world, including American cities, and most of it has not been good. Instead of contributing to the liberative process, many cities have become sprawling concentrations of human misery, wracked with racial, religious and class animosity. The names Beirut, Calcutta, South Bronx and Belfast conjure images of violence, neglect and death. Ironically, the cities of the world have often become the victims of their own self-promotion and the failure of the rural environs to sustain life. Millions of people, both hopeful and desperate, stream into them to escape the unbearable existence they must endure in the devastated countryside, but what do they find?

If Mexico City spells the future of the city, then the future looks grim. Lewis Mumford, who began his life as a celebrant of the possibility of truly urbane life, became disillusioned before his death in 1990. He once wrote that when the city becomes the whole world the city no longer exists. That prediction now seems increasingly possible. By the year 2000 Mexico City will have nearly 32 million residents, of whom 15 million will eke out a marginal existence in its smoggy slums. Calcutta, Rio de Janeiro, Jakarta, Manila and Lima will not be far behind, all with populations between 10 and 20 million, with half the people in each city locked into ghettos of poverty. Indeed, in some African cities such as Addis Ababa and Ibadan, somewhere between 75 and 90 percent of the population will live in shantytown squalor.

In the cities of the U.S. we have not fared much better. Real estate values gyrate, making millions for a select few, while homeless people, now including increased numbers of women with children, crowd into church basements and temporary shelters. The already marvelous cultural mix of our cities, spiced by the recent arrival of increasing numbers of Asians and Latin Americans, could enable us to prove to the world that ethnic diversity is a plus. Instead, in some cities at least, we hover on the edge of a technicolor war of all against all: white against black against yellow against brown. And the whole picture is worsened by the diminution of the middle class and the increasing chasm between those with too much and those with too little. One is sometimes tempted simply to give up on the city.

We should not. One of my main purposes in writing The Secular City was to challenge the antiurban bias that infects American religion (at least white church life). How many times did I hear, as a child, that "God made the country, but man made the city"? This is a gravely deficient doctrine of God. We need a spirituality that can discern the presence of God not just "In the Garden" as the old Protestant hymn puts it, but also, as a better hymn says, "Where cross the crowded ways of life, / Where sound the cries of race and clan. . ."

The Bible portrays a God who is present in the jagged reality of conflict and dislocation, calling the faithful into the crowded ways, not away from them. Nothing is further removed from this biblical God than the inward-oriented serenity cults and get-rich-now salvation schemes that inundate the airwaves and pollute the religious atmosphere. Here Bonhoeffer had it exactly right. From behind bars he wrote that we are summoned as human beings to "share the suffering of God in the world." If the divine mystery is present in a special way among the poorest and most misused of his or her children, as the biblical images and stories—from the slaves in Egypt to the official lynching of Jesus—constantly remind us, then allegedly religious people who insulate themselves from the city are putting themselves at considerable risk. By removing ourselves from the despised and the outcast we are at the same time insulating ourselves from God, and it is in the cities that these, "the least of them," are to be found.

I have no intention of rewriting The Secular City with benefit of nearly three decades of hindsight. I cannot. Even if I could, it would be pointless. After it was published I experienced what literary critics often point out, that any work of art—a poem, a painting, even a book of theology—quickly escapes its creator’s hand and takes on a life of its own. Within a few months of its modest first printing (10,000 copies), and even though it was scarcely noticed by reviewers, the book began to sell so briskly the publisher moved to multiple reprintings. Soon it appeared on the bestseller lists—unheard of at the time for a book on theology. Sales moved into hundreds of thousands. The publisher was astonished, as was 1.

I cannot pretend not to have enjoyed those initial years of unsought notoriety. I was attacked, feted, commended, analyzed, refuted. A publishing house that had brusquely refused the manuscript when I first submitted it thoughtfully telephoned to ask if I was planning to write a sequel. The book seems to have become a special favorite with Roman Catholics, perhaps since it came out just as the Second Vatican Council was ending, and they were eager to test the new atmosphere of free inquiry. Even Pope Paul VI read it and, in an audience I had with him later, told me that although he did not agree with what I wrote, he had read it "with great interest." Professors began requiring it in classes. Church study groups took it up. Within a couple of years the book’s sales, in all editions and translations, were approaching a million.

What did I learn from all this? For one thing, that most theologians and most publishers had severely underestimated the number of people who were willing to spend good money on serious books about religion. The Secular City may well have marked the end of the unchallenged reign of clerical and academic elitism in theology. Laypeople were obviously ready to get into the discussion. In fact, they were demanding to be part of it and were unwilling to allow theologians to continue to write books just for each other. Whatever one may think about the ideas in The Secular City, they are neither simple nor obvious. The book cannot be read with the television on. I do not take credit for having called forth the vociferous and critical laity we now seem to have in every church, and perhaps especially the Catholic Church, who make so much marvelous trouble for ecclesiastical leaders. But I like to think that The Secular City helped create the climate that forced church leaders and theologians to come down from their balconies and out of their studies and talk seriously with the ordinary people who constitute 99 percent of the churches of the world.

0f course, there are things I would do differently today, not only in how I would write The Secular City, but in virtually every other area of my life. "We get too soon old," as the Pennsylvania Dutch aphorism puts it, "and too late smart." Knowing what I do now about the Jewish religious tradition, I would not counterpose law and gospel as captivity to the past versus openness to the future, as Rudolf Bultmann and a whole tradition of German theologians taught me to do. The law too, I have come to see, is a gift of grace. I would also try not to base my theological reading of current world history so narrowly in my own Christian tradition, but would try to draw on the insights of other traditions, as we must all increasingly do at a time when the world religions elbow each other in unprecedented closeness. After all, Muslims and Buddhists and Hindus had already created cosmopolitan world cities when Western Christendom still consisted of backwater villages. We may have something to learn from them about transforming our urban battlefields into communities that nurture life instead of throttling it. We need all the help we can get if Mumford’s dystopian nightmare—a planet transformed into a vast urban non-city—is to be avoided.

Was The Secular City a harbinger of postmodernism, as one writer recently suggested? The word itself did not exist then, and I am not sure I know what it means today. But if it suggests a willingness to live with a certain pragmatism and provisionality, a suspicion of all-encompassing schemes, a readiness to risk a little more disorder instead of a little too much Ordnung, then I think the book qualifies. Nearly ten years after The Secular City Jonathan Raban published a book titled Soft City: The Art of Cosmopolitan Living. It is sometimes cited as the first clearly postmodernist text. If it is, it may be significant that when I read it, a few years after its publication, I immediately felt I had found a compatriot. Raban says:

. . . the city and the book are opposed forms: to force the city’s spread, contingency, and aimless motion into the tight progression of a narrative is to risk a total falsehood. There is no single point of view from which we can grasp the city as a whole. That indeed is the distinction between the city and the small town.... A good working definition of metropolitan life would center on its intrinsic illegibility.

This "illegibility" is part of what I was getting at. It is one of the principal features of the new secular world-city we are called to live in today, bereft of the inclusive images and all-embracing world-pictures that sustained our ancestors, We will always need those orienting and value-sustaining symbols. But today we must learn to appreciate them in a new way because we know in our bones that no one of them, and not even all of them together, can provide a point of view by which the totality can be grasped. In short, living in the city should be the school of living in the postmodern, "illegible" world. It should be a continuous lesson in "citizenship," in how to live in the world-city. But we still have not learned. As Raban says,

We live in cities badly; we have built them up in culpable innocence and now fret helplessly in a synthetic wilderness of our own construction. We need ... to make a serious, imaginative assessment of that special relationship between the self and the city; its unique plasticity, its privacy and its freedom.

It’s true: "we live in cities badly." But we must learn to live in cities or we will not survive. We are missing our big chance, an opportunity that God or destiny has provided us and which, if we muff it, may never come up again.

Tucked away on page 177 of The Secular City comes a little-noticed paragraph that perhaps I should have used as an epigraph for this essay, or maybe it should be put in italics. Secularization, I wrote, "is not the Messiah. But neither is it anti-Christ. It is rather a dangerous liberation." It "raises the stakes," vastly increasing the range both of human freedom and of human responsibility. It poses risks "of a larger order than those it displaces. But the promise exceeds the peril, or at least makes it worth taking the risk."

All I could add today is that we really have no choice about whether we take the risk. We already live in the world-city and there is no return. God has placed us in this urban exile, and is teaching us a more mature faith, for it is a quality of unfaith to have to flee from complexity and disruption, or to scurry around trying to relate every segment of experience to some comforting inclusive whole, as though the universe might implode unless we hold it together with our own conceptualizations. God is teaching us to approach life in the illegible city without feeling the need for a Big Key.

This does not mean we have to become nihilists. Far from it. Several years ago a friend told me he thought the implicit concept underlying The Secular City is the good old Calvinist doctrine of providence. At first I balked, but I have come to believe he is right. We live today without the maps or timetables in which our ancestors invested such confidence. To live well instead of badly we need a certain strange confidence that, despite our fragmented and discontinuous experience, somehow it all eventually makes sense. But we don’t need to know the how. There is Someone Else, even in The Secular City, who sees to that.

God’s Last Laugh

In a passage in Umberto Eco’s The Name of the Rose, one monk furiously upbraids another one for presuming to think that Christ ever laughed. We may dismiss his rigidness as excessive, but the question remains: Why does laughter hold such a meager place in our religion?

In the church I attended as a boy, a snicker during the sermon was ample proof that you must have been thinking of something else. Laughter and faith seem incommensurate. But are they really? It has not always been so. In his Divine Comedy, Dante Alighieri reports that after he had made the tortuous ascent from hell to purgatory, and had then drawn close to the celestial sphere, he suddenly heard a sound he had never heard before. Stopping and listening, he then writes, "me sembiana un riso del universo." It sounded "like the laughter of the universe."

True, on Easter Sunday 1987 there appears to be very little to smile about in God’s universe. Wars still tear at the flesh in Central America, Afghanistan, and Lebanon. Wide-eyed Iranian boys, roped together in platoons lest they lose heart, are urged forward into Iraqi mine fields. Hunger chokes children’s lives every day while our gifts of imagination and inventiveness go into fashioning ever deadlier missiles and countermissiles. American agents kill and burn in Nicaragua while being paid by funds gathered from arms sales by shadowy figures who act in our names. The concept of "the consent of the governed" sometimes seems almost as inoperative as it was when a Caesar imposed his will by fiat. All in all, there seems to be little room for laughter.

Yet the Bible teaches us that in the face of proud claims of rulers and the cruelty of despots, "The Holy One who sitteth in the heavens shall laugh" (Psalm 2:4). God laughs at oppression and meanness? At first the idea sounds irreverent, surprising. With suffering and evil so rampant, how can a loving God laugh?

The Easter story gives us a clue to this baffling riddle. A small and precarious clue, perhaps, but a clue nonetheless. God laughs, it seems, because God knows how it all turns out in the end. Further, the laughter of God, as the passion accounts tell us, does not come from afar. It does not emanate from One who can safely chortle, from a safe distance, at another’s pain. It comes from One who has also felt the hunger pangs, the hurt of betrayal by friends and the torturer’s touch.

Perhaps Easter Sunday 1987 provides us with just the right occasion to reclaim the holy laughter that fell on Dante’s astonished ears as his steps drew near God’s dwelling place. On the Christian calendar Easter is a feast of gladness. Grief turns into jubilation. Bitter defeat becomes exuberant hope. Even those who walk in the valley of the shadow of death know they need fear no evil. But, without a trace of irreverence, can we not also say there is something genuinely comic about Easter? Could it be God’s hilarious answer to those who sported and derided God’s prophet, who blindfolded and buffeted him, and who continue to hound and deprive God’s children today?

I hope so. On Easter, after all, we retell an unlikely tale that -- were it not so profoundly true -- would have to be passed off as a lame joke. Without even so much as a stop-me-if-you’ve-heard-this-one (since most of us already have), we recount the tale of a man who sided with the disinherited and the heartbroken, who became the hope of those who had lost all hope, who was tortured to death and sealed in a tomb. So far there is nothing terribly noteworthy because so many others have gone through so much of the same.

But the punchline of this tall story is that this same man so his friends insisted -- was once more alive. The Romans and their local supporters had thought they had rid themselves of the rabble-rousing rabbi for good. Against the clear counsel of the wisest Pharisees, a clique of the Jerusalem elite, fearful that Jesus might provoke a bloody Roman reprisal, conspired with the imperial occupation authorities to push through a drumhead trial. Unable to concoct a credible religious excuse to condemn Jesus -- who remained a pious Jew -- they advanced a political charge. Jesus claimed, they said, to be a king, and "we have no king but Caesar." So, they warned Pilate, "If you release him, you are no friend of Caesar’s."

Silence and After

This was too much for Pilate. Like all underlings clinging to the middle rungs of power before and since, he feared nothing more than a negative report to headquarters. So he confronted Jesus with the accusation. Having such a charge brought against him, Jesus held his silence. Yes, he had spoken of a new reign that was already arriving in the midst of Pilate’s world. But it was a kingdom neither Pilate nor Caesar had the spiritual capacity to discern. Indeed how could the rich and powerful understand that he was talking about a kingdom that bore no resemblance to the one Rome had imposed on his people with its fearful phalanxes of legions?

If his accusers had not already grasped the Message -- that the reign he was talking about was one in which peace would hold sway and the hungry would be fed -- how could they understand it now? But Jesus’ tormentors knew only the kind of power that paid them. So it was ironic that when they designed a nasty sight-gag by handing him a phony scepter and placing a crown of thorns on his head, they inadvertently hit closer to the truth than they knew: Jesus’ kingdom is one that comes only when people risk the pain that results from speaking inconvenient truth to spurious power. So Jesus was put to death.

For a while there was no laughter. The joking was over. The raucous howls of the executioners stopped only when they finally grew weary. The obscene hoots of the passersby ended at last when the figure on the cross would not rail back. The sneers of Pilate and the jeers of Herod also subsided when, their official duties finished, they returned to their palaces having rid themselves once and for all -- so they thought -- of this troublemaker.

Now there was no laughter. Only silence. But then came Easter morning. And if we listen carefully to the silence of that dawn we may also detect, dimly and at a distance, what Dante heard when he came within earshot of the Paradiso. We hear a gentle murmur, ethereal yet earthly, angelic yet terribly human. It begins as a whisper that as we listen begins to sound like laughter. But if we fine-tune our hearing we notice it bears no resemblance at all to the screeches and howls we heard during the trial at the cross. It sounds more like the laughter of eight-year-olds doing cartwheels or of old friends savoring a birthday, or of a gray-haired couple chuckling at the antics of a grandchild. Yet it is more, much more.

Holy laughter is a gift of grace. It is the human spirit’s last defense against banality and despair. Sometimes I think that comedians -- those of the gentle type -- can he God’s emissaries in a mean-spirited time like ours. Woody Allen depicts neurotic people who, despite everything, somehow succeed in being compassionate. Garrison Keillor reports regularly from a forgotten little town on the pedestrian virtues and unspectacular goodness of ordinary people. Rightly rendered, the comic spirit transcends tragedy. It steps outside the probability tables and enables us to catch a fleeting glimpse of what might be, even of what -- ultimately -- already is.

Some people, no matter how hard you try to explain it, simply don’t get a joke. The Easter Story is like that. There is no point whatever is trying to explain it or make it more plausible. Easter is that moment when the laughter of the universe breaks through. It fades, of course, like a distant radio signal on a stormy night. A lot of noise and static crowds it out. But once we have heard it we know from then on that it is there. It is God’s last laugh.

Playboy’s Doctrine of Male

Sometime this month over one million American young men will place sixty cents on a counter somewhere and walk away with a copy of Playboy, one of the most spectacular successes in the entire history of American journalism. When one remembers that every copy will probably be seen by several other people in college dormitories and suburban rumpus rooms, the total readership in any one month easily exceeds that of all the independent religious magazines, serious political and cultural journals, and literary periodicals put together.

What accounts for this uncanny reception? What factors in American life have combined to allow Playboy’s ambitious young publisher, Hugh Hefner, to pyramid his jackpot into a chain of night clubs, TV spectaculars, bachelor tours to Europe and special discount cards? What impact does Playboy really have?

Clearly Playboy’s astonishing popularity is not attributable solely to pin-up girls. For sheer nudity, its pictorial art cannot compete with such would-be competitors as Dude and Escapade. Rather, Playboy appeals to a highly mobile, increasingly affluent group of young readers, mostly between eighteen and thirty, who want much more from their drugstore reading than bosoms and thighs. They need a total image of what it means to be a man. And Mr. Hefner’s Playboy has no hesitancy about telling them.

Why should such a need arise? David Riesman has argued that the responsibility for character formation in our society has shifted from the family to the peer group and to the mass media peer group surrogates. Things are changing so rapidly that one who is equipped by his family with inflexible, highly internalized values becomes unable to deal with the accelerated pace of change and with the varying contexts in which he is called upon to function. This is especially true in the area of consumer values toward which the "other-directed person" is increasingly oriented.

Within the confusing plethora of mass media signals and peer group values, Playboy fills a special need. For the insecure young man with newly acquired time and money on his hands who still feels uncertain about his consumer skills, Playboy supplies a comprehensive and authoritative guidebook to this foreboding new world to which he now has access. It tells him not only who to be; it tells him how to be it, and even provides consolation outlets for those who secretly feel that they have not quite made it.

In supplying for the other-directed consumer of leisure both the normative identity image and the means for achieving it, Playboy relies on a careful integration of copy and advertising material. The comic book that appeals to a younger generation with an analogous problem skillfully intersperses illustrations of incredibly muscled men and excessively mammalian women with advertisements for body-building gimmicks and foam rubber brassiere supplements. Thus the thin-chested comic book readers of both sexes are thoughtfully supplied with both the ends and the means for attaining a spurious brand of maturity. Playboy merely continues the comic book tactic for the next age group. Since within every identity crisis, whether in ‘teens or twenties, there is usually a sexual identity problem, Playboy speaks to those who desperately want to know what it means to be a man, and more specifically a male, in today’s world.

Both the image of man and the means for its attainment exhibit a remarkable consistency in Playboy. The skilled consumer is cool and unruffled. He savors sports cars, liquor, high fidelity and book club selections with a casual, unhurried aplomb. Though he must certainly have and use the latest consumption item, he must not permit himself to get too attached to it. The style will change and he must always be ready to adjust. His persistent anxiety that he may mix a drink incorrectly, enjoy a jazz group that is passé, or wear last year’s necktie style is comforted by an authoritative tone in Playboy beside which papal encyclicals sound irresolute.

"Don’t hesitate," he is told; "this assertive, self-assured weskit is what every man of taste wants for the fall season." Lingering doubts about his masculinity are extirpated by the firm assurance that "real men demand this ruggedly masculine smoke" (cigar ad). Though "the ladies will swoon for you, no matter what they promise, don’t give them a puff. This cigar is for men only." A fur-lined canvas field jacket is described as "the most masculine thing since the cave man." What to be and how to be it are both made unambiguously clear.

But since being a male necessitates some kind of relationship to females, Playboy fearlessly confronts this problem too, and solves it by the consistent application of the same formula. Sex becomes one of the items of leisure activity that the knowledgeable consumer of leisure handles with his characteristic skill and detachment. The girl becomes a desirable, indeed an indispensable "Playboy accessory."

In a question-answering column entitled: "The Playboy Advisor," queries about smoking equipment (how to break in a meerschaum pipe), cocktail preparation (how to mix a "Yellow Fever") and whether or not to wear suspenders with a vest, alternate with questions about what to do with girls who complicate the cardinal principle of casualness, either by suggesting marriage or by some other impulsive gesture toward permanent relationship. The infallible answer from the oracle never varies: sex must be contained, at all cost, within the entertainment-recreation area. Don’t let her get "serious."

After all, the most famous feature of the magazine is its monthly fold-out photo of a playmate. She is the symbol par excellence of recreational sex. When play time is over, the playmate’s function ceases, so she must be made to understand the rules of the game. As the crew-cut young man in a Playboy cartoon says to the rumpled and disarrayed girl he is passionately embracing, "Why speak of love at a time like this?"

The magazine’s fiction purveys the same kind of severely departmentalized sex. Although the editors have recently dressed up the contents of Playboy with contributions by Hemingway, Bemelmans and even a Chekhov translation, the regular run of stories relies on a repetitious and predictable formula. A successful young man, either single or somewhat less than ideally married—a figure with whom readers have no difficulty identifying—encounters a gorgeous and seductive woman who makes no demands on him except sex. She is the prose duplication of the cool-eyed but hot-blooded playmate of the foldout page.

Drawing heavily on the phantasy life of all young Americans, the writers utilize for their stereotyped heroines the hero’s school teacher, his secretary, an old girl friend, or the girl who brings her car into the garage where he works. The happy issue is always a casual but satisfying sexual experience with no entangling alliances whatever. Unlike the women he knows in real life, the Playboy reader’s fictional girl friends know their place and ask for nothing more. They present no danger of permanent involvement. Like any good accessory, they are detachable and disposable.

Many of the advertisements reinforce the sex-accessory identification in another way by attributing female characteristics to the items they sell. Thus a full page ad for the MG assures us that this car is not only "the smoothest pleasure machine" on the road and that having one is a "love-affair," but most importantly, "you drive it—it doesn’t drive you." The ad ends with the equivocal question, "Is it a date?"

Playboy insists that its message is one of liberation. Its gospel frees us from captivity to the puritanical "hat-pin brigade." It solemnly crusades for "frankness" and publishes scores of letters congratulating it for its unblushing "candor." Yet the whole phenomenon of which Playboy is only a part vividly illustrates the awful fact of a new kind of tyranny.

Those liberated by technology and increased prosperity to new worlds of leisure now become the anxious slaves of dictatorial taste-makers. Obsequiously waiting for the latest signal on what is cool and what is awkward, they are paralyzed by the fear that they may hear pronounced on them that dread sentence occasionally intoned by "The Playboy Advisor": "you goofed!" Leisure is thus swallowed up in apprehensive competitiveness, its liberating potential transformed into a self-destructive compulsion to consume only what is au courant. Playboy mediates the World of the most high into one section of the consumer world, but to me it is a world of bondage, not of freedom.

Nor will Playboy’s synthetic doctrine of man stand the test of scrutiny. Psychoanalysts constantly remind us how deeply seated sexuality is in the human self. But if they didn’t remind us, we would soon discover it anyway in our own experience. As much as the human male might like to terminate his relationship with a woman as he snaps off the stereo, or store her for special purposes like a camel’s hair jacket, it really can’t be done. And anyone with a modicum of experience with women knows it can t be done. Perhaps this is the reason why Playboy’s readership drops off so sharply after the age of thirty.

Playboy really feeds on the presence of a repressed fear of involvement with women, which for various reasons is still present in many otherwise adult Americans. So Playboy’s version of sexuality grows increasingly irrelevant as authentic sexual maturity is achieved.

The male identity crisis to which Playboy speaks has at its roots a deep-set fear of sex, a fear that is uncomfortably combined with fascination. Playboy strives to resolve this antinomy by reducing the terrible proportions of sexuality, its power and its passion, to a packageable consumption item. Thus in Playboy’s iconography, the nude woman symbolizes total sexual accessibility, but demands nothing from the observer. "You drive it—it doesn’t drive you." The terror of sex, which cannot be separated from its ecstasy, is dissolved. But this futile attempt to reduce the mysterium tremendum of the sexual fails to solve the problem of being a man. For sexuality is the basic form of all human relationship, and therein lies its terror and its power.

Karl Barth has called this basic relational form of man’s life Mitmensch, co-humanity. It means to me that becoming fully human, in my case a human male, necessitates not having the other totally exposed to me and my purposes—while I remain uncommitted—but exposing myself to the risk of encounter with the other by reciprocal self-exposure. The story of man’s refusal to be so exposed goes back to the story of Eden and is expressed by man’s desire to control the other rather than to be with the other. It is basically the fear to be ones self, a lack of the "courage to be."

Thus any theological critique of Playboy that focuses on its "lewdness" will misfire completely. Playboy and its less successful imitators are not "sex magazines" at all. They are basically anti-sexual. They dilute and dissipate authentic sexuality by reducing it to an accessory, by keeping it at a safe distance.

It is precisely because these magazines are anti-sexual that they deserve the most searching kind of theological criticism. They foster a heretical doctrine of man, one at radical variance with the biblical view. For Playboy’s man, others—especially women—are for him. They are his leisure accessories, his playthings. For the Bible, man only becomes fully man by being for the other.

Moralistic criticisms of Playboy fail because its anti-moralism is one of the few places in which Playboy is right. But if Christians bear the name of One who was truly man because he was totally for the other, and if it is in him that we know who God is and what human life is for, then we must see in Playboy the latest and slickest episode in man’s continuing refusal to be fully human.

Best of Intentions

In many important respects the ethics of Judaism and Christianity are similar. Both emphasize the oneness of the human family and the responsibility we have for each other. Jesus continued and at times intensified the Old Testament prophets’ defense of the poor and the powerless. But there is one matter on which the two traditions have diverged. Whereas Jewish thinking has emphasized actual deeds and their consequences, Christianity has often focused on intentions. Once, in the course of assuring his disciples that it was not so awful if they could not wash their hands before eating, Jesus said, "Out of the heart come evil intentions, murder, adultery, fornication, theft, false witness, slander. These are what defile a person, but to eat with unwashed hands does not defile" (Matt. 15:19, 20). He seems to be saying that the heart, not the hands, is the real source of a moral infraction.

The distinction is not absolute. Within the Jewish tradition, one of the Ten Commandments prohibits "coveting," which is an inner attitude; and Jesus condemned the pious people who ignored the beaten man on the road to Jericho. Whatever pity may have been in their hearts, they did not do what they should have done. But still, as the two traditions developed over the years, the distinction became a real one. For Christians this was evident several years ago when the Roman Catholic bishops of the United States condemned even the possession of nuclear weapons as a violation of the just war ethic. They argued that in order for these weapons to serve as a deterrent, a potential enemy had to be convinced that in certain circumstances we actually intended to use them. But such an intention, they argued, was already immoral. The underlying premise of their argument is that evil intentions spawn evil deeds, and it is better to nip the foul flower in the bud rather than wait for the wicked action to blossom.

In recent years, however, we have begun to see a certain convergence between these two ways of thinking about moral issues. Prodded by the need to reflect on actual policy options and their probable outcomes, Christian scholars have begun to probe more deeply into the possible consequences of actions, and not just what motivates them. Also, with the dramatic rediscovery of their mystical tradition, Jews have delved deeper into the inner self and its intricate labyrinth of impulses and desires.

I think this convergence is a healthy development. It is needed because once again our technology has outpaced our traditional modes of moral reasoning. There was a time when evil thoughts and evil deeds took place at close quarters. There was a time when you needed to wield a club or a spear to kill your neighbor. Now we can do untold harm to multitudes of people at a great distance, and without feeling personally involved. In her brilliant book Evil in Modern Thought An Alternative History of Philosophy, Susan Neiman cites this impersonality as one of our gravest ethical dilemmas. It means, she argues, that we can no longer focus on evil intentions as a key to morality. We can now do great evil without intending to. What we need today is more awareness, a wider recognition of how the vast systems we are caught up in can do terrible things and how we can contribute to that evil without even being conscious of it.

This is a disturbing idea. It means that the traditional debate about deeds and intentions needs to be rethought. "I didn’t really mean it," should no longer exonerate us so easily, nor should "I had no idea of what I was doing." In our century to be unaware is to be less than moral.

This question came up with an unusual degree of forcefulness in my course on Jesus when we discussed his famous words from the cross: "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do." I knew already that the students had strong feelings, if not always well-formulated ideas, on the topics we took up. But this discussion, more than any other we had, exposed the complexity of the moral world they live in.

It started innocently enough when I asked the students if they were surprised or puzzled that Jesus was ready to forgive those who were at that very moment torturing him to death. As usual, their responses varied. Some said they were not surprised. That, after all, was the kind of person he was. Others confessed they simply could not understand it. They could not imagine themselves doing such a thing, so it made Jesus less credible as a moral guide by seeming to put him out of reach.

What puzzled all of them, however, was the phrase "for they know not what they do." How, they wanted to know, could they not be aware of what they were doing? Also, just who was included in the "them"? Was it mainly the soldiers who mocked and beat him, or did it include the passersby who taunted him, the officials who had passed sentence on him, the spineless disciples who had fled, the collaborator who had betrayed him for a bribe? Besides, what if they clearly had been aware of what they were doing, so that he could not have said, "they know not"; would he still have forgiven them? It was soon obvious that this single phrase from Jesus’ lips was packed with layers of moral quandaries.

How, one student asked, could anyone engaged in something so blatantly cruel not be aware of what he was doing?

"Easy," another student answered. "We are rarely aware of the full implications of the things we do. There are always unforeseen consequences. Maybe that’s what Jesus meant."

Another student pointed out that if by "them" Jesus was speaking of the Roman soldiers, we should remember that they were under orders. The Romans routinely used crucifixion as a form of punishment for people they adjudged dangerous to their rule. Maybe these soldiers had just gotten used to it, had become deaf to the moans of the victims. The text says they were relaxed enough to throw dice for Jesus’ tunic as he twisted and pleaded for water. Certainly prison officials today seem able to inject lethal chemicals into the veins of prisoners or strap them into chairs to receive a 20,000-volt jolt of electricity when a judge tells them to do so. Maybe these soldiers thought they were just carrying out a routine order.

As for the Roman officials and their local collaborators, maybe they really believed Jesus was a genuine threat to civil order and had to be dealt with in the customary fashion. Maybe they thought that they were just doing their duty and did not feel the least uncomfortable. Still, most of the students were not satisfied. "How could these people not know what they were doing?" they continued to ask.

Finally one young woman went back to a previous comment: Maybe what Jesus wanted to say was that they were not aware of the full extent of their actions, or of the long-range implications. They were small cogs in a large machine. So, in that sense they did not really "know." A chemistry student agreed: How could anybody ever be expected to accept responsibility for all the possible implications of what he might do? His remark sparked some further discussion, especially among the science majors, of how difficult -- maybe impossible -- it is to foresee how scientific discoveries might eventually be used. This led to some reflection about whether Alfred Nobel would have -- or should have -- given up devising dynamite if he had known how often it would be used in bombs. Another student who had seen a production of the play Copenhagen deepened the argument by recalling the moral dilemma faced by Niels Bohr, Werner Heisenberg and later Robert Oppenheimer and others who were inventing the first atomic bomb. Oppenheimer, for example, knew how destructive it was, but knew (or thought) the Germans were trying to make one too, so he went ahead with it. Later, however, he vigorously opposed developing the nuclear bomb.

The discussion was still raging on when I had to leave, and when I came back an hour later most of the students were still at it, and they had not come to any consensus. I was not surprised. This text had propelled them into one of the most contentious moral issues of our time. Because advances in technology, especially in weaponry, remove individuals from the results of their actions, they allow human beings to do enormous evil without feeling the least bit involved. Pushing a red "fire" button at a target someone else has charted thousands of miles away is different from stabbing someone with a javelin. There is a quantitative gap between the battle-ax and the heat-seeking missile. Mass murder can become routine -- even "banal," as Hannah Arendt described it in the case of Adolf Eichmann.

I learned a lot from the discussion of "they know not what they do." Clearly the students were becoming more and more aware of the bewildering complexity of many modern moral issues, but they still desperately wanted to "do the right thing." We did not come to any wholly satisfactory conclusion, but our probes into the questions of agency, awareness and responsibility were valuable. They helped students to see that "the way it is done" is not always -- maybe even rarely -- the way it should be done. It stimulated them to imagine alternatives.

Also, the way the students struggled with the issues made me even more aware that -- like most of us -- they were human beings who really did want to act morally and responsibly. But most of them would always live and work in institutions in which someone else made the rules and set the standard operating procedures. For that reason, despite their best intentions, they would not always be clear about what it would mean to "do the right thing," and might not always be able to do it even when they were. It was for this reason, I reminded them, that we should not focus exclusively on the "know not" part of this famous phrase but should also remember that it begins with, "Forgive them."

My suggestion, however, did not resolve the dilemma. "What do you mean by forgiveness?" they asked. When, they wondered, should we forgive people who do mean or awful things to us or to others? Can we expect people we have hurt to forgive us? What does forgiveness have to do with being sorry, remorseful or penitent?

These are questions that sages have pondered for centuries, but it was fascinating to see how alive and immediate they were today for these young people, and I suspect for their elders as well. They are also unavoidable questions if one is studying the life of Jesus. The first words attributed to him in the oldest Gospel are, "The time has arrived; the kingdom of God is upon you." The next sentence is, "Repent, and believe the gospel" (Mark 1:14). There is every indication that those who heard these words of Jesus recognized what he was asking for, although not all were willing to comply. All Jews of the time, even those with a minimal exposure to their religious heritage, would have known that repentance involves three elements: genuine regret for one’s misdeeds, sorrow and remorse for the injury they have caused others, and a deeply felt desire to avoid repeating time offense. Without these three ingredients, genuine forgiveness, either by God or by one’s fellow human beings, was not in the picture.

All this would have been familiar to most of Rabbi Jesus’ hearers. The new element was the urgent tone of his demand for repentance. The coming reign of God, for which the pious prayed, was beginning now, and the change of heart it required could not be postponed. As we have seen, Jesus’ parables and sayings carry this same note of immediacy. Today, now, this moment is the time for repentance. The kingdom of God, albeit hidden and partial, is coming to birth in the midst of you.

For Jews today, God’s demand for confession and penitence is enacted during the Days of Awe between Rosh Hashanah and Yom Kippur. In what is staged as a cosmic courtroom drama, the people gather and confess not only their own transgressions, but also those of the whole people. At the last moment, just as the book of life is being closed, God’s verdict is announced. Because God is ultimately compassionate, everyone is forgiven and afforded the opportunity to begin a new year with a clean slate.

During the nearly 2,000 years since the earthly ministry of Jesus, the various Christian churches have also developed highly complex liturgies of repentance and forgiveness. But the core of the Christian understanding is crystallized in the ancient invitation to the commemoration of the Lord’s Supper, which eventually found its way into the Book of Common Prayer. It reads as follows:

Ye who do truly and earnestly repent you of your sins, and are in love and charity with your neighbors, and intend to lead a new life, following the commandments of God, and walking from henceforth in his holy ways: Draw near with faith, and take this holy Sacrament to your comfort; and make your humble confession to Almighty God, devoutly kneeling.

It would be hard to find a more compressed summary of the Christian understanding of repentance and forgiveness. First, this invitation assumes that human beings are free. They are endowed by God with the capacity for choice and are therefore responsible for their actions. True, in some of its forms, the Christian idea of original sin seems to qualify this key premise. Yet, recognizing the paradox involved, the overwhelming consensus of Christian theology is that however free will may be blemished or weakened within the actual conditions of history, human beings nonetheless do have the ability to choose. Otherwise, the call for repentance would be meaningless.

This is not a trivial observation. Jesus’ summons to repentance to all who came within earshot -- the pious and the reprobate, the weak and the strong, the powerful and the socially marginalized -- undercuts any kind of religious, psychological or sociocultural determinism. It constitutes a firm rejection of any notion of karma or kismet that would make God or destiny or behavior in a past life or childhood mistreatment responsible for one’s actions. It suggests that although there can be mitigating circumstances, neither fate nor the psychological history of the person can be advanced as the sole reason for his or her conduct. Neither does it allow "it had to be done" or "nothing can be done about it" as excuses. It endows even the most victimized and oppressed peoples with a continuing and genuine responsibility, if only to struggle against whatever deprives them of their personhood. My offenses are ultimately mine. The cogito ergo sum of the Christian view of repentance is: Since I can repent, I am responsible.

The words truly and earnestly also carry an important message. They remind us that there is such a thing as inauthentic repentance. In our secularized culture this spurious repentance often appears in the "public apology" that falls short of the real thing. The psychiatrist Aaron Lazarre has pointed out that our public discourse is rife with such bogus apologies. A frequent form is, "I am really sorry that you feel that way" or words to that effect. The style of these utterances raises questions about whether they meet the standards of "truly and earnestly" preserved in the invitation to communion. Public apologies are often marked by the systematic elimination of personal reference and a reliance on the passive voice. The "I" somehow disappears. They rely on phrases such as "injuries . . . may have been done" or "mistakes were made." This erasure of the subject betrays a continuing reluctance to accept personal responsibility.

The phrase "are in love and charity with your neighbors" means that the truly penitent person has already taken the first step toward reintegrating him or herself into the human community whose fabric has been torn by the betrayal of trust a transgression implies. Here the ancient Jewish emphasis on what was actually done continues to inform Christian practice. It is not enough just to intend to put things right. The word are is in the present tense. I must already be in love and charity with my neighbors, at least to some extent. Here reconciliation between a human being and his or her neighbors and reconciliation with God are indissolubly linked.

During the Days of Awe before Yom Kippur, Jews are reminded that God can forgive those sins that we commit against him, but that we must seek forgiveness from our human neighbors for the violations we enact against them. In the Christian view, this idea is modified to some extent. Since God is present in the neighbor, all sins, including those against the neighbor, are also sins against God, And since Christians usually retain the moral but not the ritual elements of Torah, it is hard to imagine a sin against God (in a Christian view) that is not also a sin against some neighbor.

The phrases "intend to lead a new life" and "walking from henceforth in his holy ways" suggest a determination on the part of the penitent person not to repeat the destructive conduct. But "intend" also allows for the weakness of human flesh. The invitation recognizes that we rarely live out even our most earnest intentions. Nonetheless, even though we fall short, we should still have those intentions. Further, the "new life" referred to is not one without moral guidelines. "Following the commandments of God" recalls not only the Ten Commandments but also the Golden Rule. In some forms of the communion service, the Ten Commandments are readjust before the invitation is issued. This reinforces the notion that these biblical principles are intended to provide moral parameters for the "new life" the penitent person now intends to live.

Finally, and perhaps most important, is the invitation to participate in communion. It is, as it were, a read-mission into the family of God, gathered around a table that in Christian belief symbolizes the whole of humanity. It is the gateway through which one is welcomed back into a fellowship whose trust and confidence one has broken. It is an avenue to the restoration of the multiple relationships without which human life would cease to be human.

This linking of repentance and forgiveness with restoration to community echoes Jesus’ linking his call to repentance with his announcement that the kingdom of God -- the healed and restored human community -- is "at hand." The point is vital to the Christian view of repentance. Genuine repentance is an integral element in the coming of the reconciled world of justice and peace that God wills. Unlike Rousseau’s famous observation that "man was born free, but is everywhere in chains," the Christian phrase would be, "People were created to live together, but are everywhere divided and in enmity." The Christian liturgy of communion is a symbol of the ultimate goal of a restored human community.

In many Christian theologies, this restoratio humanii is believed to be no less than the purpose of the incarnation. Medieval paintings of the crucifixion often show the skull of Adam at the base of the cross. The idea is that a new humanity is now taking shape on the spot where the first human being met his tragic denouement. Jesus spent his earthly ministry breaking the social and cultural taboos that had excluded certain types of people (prostitutes, lepers, tax collectors) from table fellowship with respectable, pious people. For Jesus, this was an act of symbolic restoration. Inclusive table fellowship modeled an inclusive humanity. It prefigured the messianic feast foreseen by the prophets. The ultimate feast is unconditionally inclusive. As the Protestant theologian Karl Barth once remarked, the church should be "the provisional demonstration of God’s intention for the whole, human race."

It is important in both the Jewish and Christian traditions to avoid two extremes, which neither has always done successfully. The first extreme is to make penitence and forgiveness so easy they come to mean nothing. This overlooks the stubborn fact that repentance, forgiveness and reconciliation all belong together, and that each requires real effort. Sometimes Catholics have misunderstood the sacrament of confession as a license to repeat their misdeeds, since one can always confess again. Likewise, Protestants have misread the idea of justification by grace as permission to do as they please, since it is God’s business to forgive. This amounts to what the Protestant theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer once called "cheap grace.

The other extreme is to make forgiveness so terribly demanding that, as in the mind of Stavrogin, the poignant hero of Dostoevsky’s novel Demons, it becomes unreachable. If anything, I think our forebears, both Christian and Jewish, may frequently have made forgiveness too demanding. But I also fear that the "user-friendly" style of much contemporary religion may be sliding toward cheap grace.

In any case, although our extended dialogue as we pondered Jesus’ words may not have solved this old dilemma. I hope it left the students with the conviction that the kingdom of God that Jesus announced was not for people who never did anything wrong. It was for "sinners," for those who -- mostly -- tried their best to do the right thing, often failed, but accepted the forgiveness of God and of others, forgave others and themselves, and started over.

The Radical Witness of Bill Coffin

Book Review:

William Sloane Coffin Jr.: A Holy Impatience

By Warren Goldstein. Yale University Press. 400 pp.

A good biography, expertly researched and finely crafted, conveys not just the trajectory of someone’s life but also a feeling for the era in which the person lived. This superb telling of the "still far from finished" life of William Sloane Coffin is just such an accomplishment.

Oliver Wendell Holmes once mused that a man must be involved in the action and passion of his times or else be judged not fully to have lived. If this is true, then Coffin lived more intensely than most of us. It is hard to think of a 20th-century churchman other than Martin Luther King Jr. who was more centrally and visibly involved in the tumultuous years of the civil rights movement and the antiwar movement. Coffin not only lived those events but made some of them happen, and he inspired hundreds of young people to become involved and thus to live fully as well.

Coffin and I have been friends for (can it really be?) nearly 50 years. We first met when we were both students at Yale Divinity School in the mid-1950s. We got there, however, along quite different paths.

Coffin, who is a few years older than I, arrived after a swashbuckling early career in the Office of Strategic Services and the CIA. A sophisticated New Yorker from a prominent Manhattan family, he had studied piano in Paris, played guitar with gusto and loved to belt out Red Army songs in Russian. He stemmed from an impressive lineage of theologians and church leaders. He roared around New Haven on a BMW motorcycle and lived off campus. His fieldwork assignment was at Yale’s Battell Chapel. He was easily the most visible member of our student body.

I, on the other hand, grew up in a sleepy Pennsylvania town and arrived at YDS directly from Penn State. There were no scholars or preachers anywhere in my genealogy. My overseas adventures were restricted to two summers of feeding horses and shoveling manure on relief ships to Poland and Belgium just after World War H. I lived on the YDS campus and borrowed my roommate’s wheezing Studebaker to drive to my fieldwork in a struggling blue-collar congregation in North Haven. Still, Coffin and I took some of the same courses, including a memorable seminar on theology and literature taught by Julian Hartt, from which I still remember a spirited discussion about Albert Camus’s The Plague, which Coffin, of course, had read in French.

After graduation we both chose campus ministry, Coffin first at Williams and then, for two decades, at Yale. I started at Temple University and then went to Oberlin College. We saw little of each other until the civil rights movement erupted during the 1960s. Coffin’s unswerving moral resolve and personal daring set the tone for countless ministers, priests and rabbis, including me.

In reading about that period in Goldstein’s book, however, I began to feel a bit like a GI grunt who had landed on Normandy or frozen his toes in the Battle of the Bulge but only later learned what was really going on. I was definitely a foot soldier, albeit one who paid his dues in a southern jail. Coffin, on the other hand, was always either in charge or leading the charge. When I, along with a group of fellow clergy from Boston, was arrested, only the Boston Globe and the other local papers noticed. Whenever Coffin was arrested (which happened a lot) it was reported in the New York Times, and he was interviewed on network TV

Goldstein writes candidly about how Coffin liked to be in the forefront rather than in the ranks. But though his celebrity aura could have caused resentment, it never did. Coffin earned his prominence. He took risks many of us were not yet ready to take. He not only enjoyed being a pop-culture figure, he used the role skillfully. Few public personalities could handle the interview format more adroitly. When he appeared on TV, he always said directly and eloquently what we who lacked his deft and winning way with words would have liked to be able to say.

Coffin first caught the public eye when he helped organize and then led the effort to desegregate the interstate bus system with what came to be called "Freedom Rides." This section of the book represents history as it should be written -- with a sagacious use of sources, a strong narrative drive, and an authentic whiff of the charged atmosphere of the times. Then came the marches and demonstrations, including Selma and St. Augustine, in which I also participated, but was usually hidden by the crowd in the many pictures taken of the events. Not Coffin. Again he was up front, exposing himself to both the danger and the cameras, and when the interviews started, acting as our eloquent tribune.

About the movement to end the war in Vietnam, Coffin at first hesitated. As Goldstein shows, he was not sure that this issue posed the same kind of clear moral choice that racism and segregation did. Also, he was on a first-name basis with many Washington leaders who supported the war (some of them Yalies like himself). That made things awkward -- though it helped later when he became an antiwar leader and these people felt compelled to return his calls. Coffin’s participation in the peace movement was characteristic of his style. First he agonized, but when he made his decision to oppose the war, he unstintingly poured all the power of his personal example, boundless energy and silver tongue into the fight. He did this with the support, if not the agreement, of Kingman Brewster, the president of Yale, with whom he kept in close communication,

One of Coffin’s best skills was that he could keep more people in the loop, communicating with all sides, than nearly anyone else I have ever known. He could speak with a distraught member of the Yale board, an enraged parent and a Black Panther leader all within the same hour and somehow manage to retain the trust of all of them. But he was not mainly a mediator; he was a partisan. His opposition to the war reached its public climax in his famous trial, along with several other defendants, for turning in draft cards at a worship service at Arlington Street Church in Boston. That trial dragged on, at great financial and emotional expense to Coffin and the others, until the charges were eventually dropped.

Goldstein’s book is candid, indeed at times unsparing, in probing into Coffin’s personal life. His father died in 1933 when he was nine, and he maintained an unusually close relationship with his mother, Catherine. Such a bond seems quite understandable for a person who loses one parent so early. But it piques Goldstein’s sometimes overactive Freudian curiosity and at times pushes his investigation close to the quagmire of psycho-history.

Coffin’s first two marriages come in for microscopic, almost clinical, analysis and post hoc speculation. This may be standard operating procedure for biographies nowadays, but the reader will occasionally wince (as I did) at disclosures that must have been painful for the principals to read. Was it real1y necessary, for example, to assert that Coffin had so internalized his mother’s view of the women in his life that he had hardly any independent judgment about them? Interesting -- as they say -- if true. But how much does it help us to understand who Coffin is, and how he managed to cut the swathe he did for nearly three decades?

In 1977 Coffin left the Yale chaplaincy to become the pastor of Riverside Church in New York City. Under his leadership it became not just a powerful preaching station, but -- with the indispensable help of Cora Weiss (who does not get enough credit in this book) -- a buzzing center for the peace and nuclear disarmament movements. Meanwhile, Coffin was one of the most sought-after graduation and special-events speakers in the country, and he had a hard time saying no to such invitations. He seemed to be everywhere, often flying across the country, but just as he had always gotten back to Battell Chapel for Sunday services, so he was almost always back in his pulpit at Riverside Church by the time the bells rang. As Goldstein correctly states, he was becoming -- next to Martin Luther King Jr. – "the most influential liberal Protestant in America."

But Coffin’s red-eye schedule took a toll on family life. In later years he regretted not having spent more time with his family, although Goldstein claims that the children never seemed to complain. In the early 1980s Coffin lived through horrendous losses. His mother died. Then, a short month later, in January 1983, his son Alex, with whom Coffin had an unusually close bond, was killed after his car skidded into Boston harbor during a storm. Engulfed by grief, the family gathered in Vermont, where Coffin’s brother Ned lived and where Coffin had been courting Randy Wilson, whom he later married. Handy reports that she had hoped Coffin would stay for a while, to absorb the pain. But he insisted he had to get back to New York, claiming that "the church needs me."

That was, as she put it, "bullshit," but she also knew what Coffin the preacher sensed -- that the best way to deal with his grief was to write and deliver a sermon about it. He did. Titled simply "Alex’s Death," it is the most requested of all his hundreds of sermons. Commenting later, he said that what had really infuriated him at this time was the well-meaning people who reassured him that what had happened to his son was "God’s will." It was certainly not, he said. "My own consolation lies in knowing that it was not the will of God that Alex die; that when the waves closed over the sinking car, God’s heart was the first of all our hearts to break." He also took comfort from some lines of Emily Dickinson "By a departing light / we see acuter, quite, / than by a wick that stays.

One wonders why Goldstein, who was a student at Yale during Coffin’s tenure as chaplain, seems to shortchange his long and productive pastorate at Riverside Church. A writer who began with an excellent book on baseball, Goldstein has captured the zestful image of Coffin as a popular cultural hero. But Coffin was first and foremost a churchman and a preacher, and one of the most important facets of his immense legacy is the impact he had on two generations of churches and churchpeople. At the very time when some observers contended that the "mainline churches" were stagnating while the more conservative ones were growing, the man who occupied the most visible Protestant pulpit in America showed, Sunday after Sunday, that the mainline had not become a sideline. In addition to Riverside’s large multiracial congregation, some of its pews were always filled by visiting church folk from around the country.

Coffin has never been one to sign on to new theological trends. His underlying perspective, mainly forged at Yale, was that of a broadly ecumenical Presbyterian. He added flesh to those bones during the Riverside years, and he demonstrated convincingly that this theology could be related to a host of social issues. But it always remained possible to think of him as "neo-orthodox," an heir of Barth, Tillich and the Niebuhrs.

A few years ago when I was teaching a course on Protestant theology in the 20th century I invited Coffin to talk to the class so they could get a taste of what was once a sturdy theological movement. As the class discussion went on I became aware that Coffin’s theological posture, though the core of a robust political ethic, was not fully connecting with the new generation of theological students. It did not seem to them to allow much room for interfaith enrichment or enlargement.

Coffin’s main expansion in that direction arose, characteristically, from personal encounters and had more to do with solidarity than with metaphysics. It grew out of his deep fondness for Rabbi Abraham Joshua Heschel, with whom he marched in demonstrations. His interest in Asian traditions was largely restricted to the Buddhist monks, like Thich Nhat Hanh, who made such an invaluable contribution to the peace movement. Coffin could spot authenticity (and phoniness) whatever vestment it wore, and he was eager to work with anyone who shared his burning vision of a -- at least somewhat -- better world.

Goldstein’s last chapter, "Flunking Retirement," nicely sums up Coffin’s current situation. Two small strokes and a heart attack have slowed him down, but just a bit. He lives in Stafford, Vermont, in a rambling frame house next door to the village church. He is extremely happily married to Wilson, a warm and charming but no-nonsense Vermont Yankee. He walks with a cane. Due to his persevering efforts with a speech therapist, only a slight slur colors his inimitable New York accent. He speaks in public less frequently now, but follows the news carefully and counsels a range of young church leaders who still look to him for wisdom. He can always produce just the right aphorism or one-liner for any occasion.

And he is as swift on the pick-up as ever. Two years ago I bought some books at a local kiosk near my home. When I went to pay with my Visa card, the young sales clerk looked at my name and said, "It’s such an honor to meet you. I’ve admired you for years -- when you were the chaplain at Yale and were leading the civil rights and antiwar movement." Not wanting to embarrass him, I thanked him and left. But later my conscience bothered me. Chagrined, I phoned Coffin and told him what had happened. "Don’t worry about it, Harvey," he shot back, "I’d do the same for you."

He might, though I doubt that the occasion will ever arise. There is only one Bill Coffin. This biography comes very close to taking his measure, but it does not fully succeed. Coffin has too many dimensions for anyone to get them all right. Life is still larger than art -- especially when it is fully lived within the action and passion of the time.