Beyond Liberation: An Agenda for Educational Justice

The only thing that we done wrong

Stayed in the Wilderness a day too long!

Keep your eyes on the prize . . .

There are some of us whose whole adult life, since the early ‘60s or even before, has been devoted to the struggle for racial justice. It may have become our profession -- as in my case -- or simply the commitment to which we cling to define good and evil, progress and retreat.

For me the struggle probably began on a spring afternoon in 1956 when, as a Harvard student doing volunteer youth work in Boston’s inner city, I called the police to report that one of my Cub Scouts had been bitten by a stray dog. An hour or so later a police car pulled up and a beefy Boston cop, without getting out of his car, asked me two questions which I found I was unwilling to answer. The first was, "What color is the kid?" The second, "When are you going back to Cambridge?"

I was not willing to accept that color had anything to do with a hurt child. And instead of going back to Cambridge, I went on to serve as a minister in one of the churches where I had worked with youth. I live in the same community still, and continue to serve as an unpaid part-time minister. For half of the intervening 30 years I have also directed one of the most active state civil rights programs in education. My life has largely centered on racial justice and issues affecting poor children and their families.

I begin with this personal note because I am going to suggest that the time has come for those of us committed to racial justice and the interest of poor children to consider laying to rest the strategies that served us well in the ‘60s and even more recently. For if we cling to the exodus as the exclusive metaphor for our engagement, and to liberation as its dominant theme, we are guilty of neglecting "the whole counsel of God."

When my first son was born in 1967, I named him Joshua, saying "Dr. King has been our Moses, and we’ve followed him in the freedom struggle; our task now is to ‘go up and take the land’ promised by God." But making liberation real requires hard work and decades of construction. I’m afraid that we may lack the courage and patience for that task. Each time I read the Book of Judges I’m reminded of the confusion, division and repeated backsliding that we have experienced in Boston over these 20 years.

During the civil rights struggle of the ‘60s, middle-class liberals like me were content to play a supporting role, convinced that the only real freedom is that which people win for themselves by beginning to act as free men and women and children. We were witnesses of what can only be called a moral revolution, as black youth and their elders in the South took responsibility for their lives and dignity in a way that led to profound transformations.

The contagion spread to northern cities as well, though imperfectly. My own church youth group in Roxbury was transformed in a single night in early 1964. After I and other Boston-area ministers had returned from participating in the "movement" in Williamston, North Carolina, the "freedom choir" from Williamston paid a return visit. With considerable difficulty I was able to persuade a dozen leaders of our youth group to attend the first rally. Those street-smart black kids from the housing projects were emotionally bowled over by the songs and the testimonies of their contemporaries from a small southern town. In the following weeks they spent every waking moment with the visitors from Williamston, catching the infection of their self-respect and purposefulness. Their whole attitude and behavior changed; they became strongly motivated both to protest injustice and to make something of their lives and their community. And they have done so, as I, who am friends with some of them still, can verify.

In those days we saw ourselves as engaged in a struggle, even a war, and enough of us became casualties to justify that image. But that war has largely been won, and we are now in danger of "losing the peace." We have lost our grasp on the original point. Subtly but surely, we have shifted responsibility away from poor people by continually portraying them as victims, and doing battle on their behalf. Civil rights professionals like me have had a special stake in emphasizing victimization.

My point is certainly not that poor people are never victims. Certainly we must remain vigilant against recurrences of overt discrimination and exclusion. But we should not allow this danger to shape our entire effort and blind us to the second-generation problems that have emerged. Nor should we implicitly withhold from those we consider victims the dignity and the responsibility of full citizens.

Christians, in particular, should not fall into the error of environmental determinism. We believe in individual responsibility for sin, as well as in the existence of "principalities and powers" that distort human life and society. In rejecting the idea that the poor are completely responsible for their poverty, we should not fall into the opposite extreme of concluding that they have no responsibility for working their way out of poverty.

It has been my ongoing involvement -- as a pastor serving first a black congregation, then a Hispanic one, and now a largely West Indian and Haitian congregation -- with the lives of inner-city families that has forced me to change the direction of my efforts as a public official. As a state official responsible for criticizing local efforts, it’s possible for me to take a certain perverse delight in the continuing evidence of unequal educational outcomes. But regular contact with the children behind the statistics, and with their families, makes their failure and our failure to help them intolerable.

Three or four years ago we decided to shift the focus of our equity efforts in Massachusetts: instead of emphasizing access to educational opportunities we emphasize the effectiveness of the education provided to minority students.

When we speak of the effectiveness of education we mean whether it gives students a solid foundation for productive and satisfying lives. We are also concerned about the message that schools give to minority and nonminority students about what it means to live in a society which is diverse in race, culture and values, and yet is a nation with a democratic system of government. Do we help them develop a commitment to the "self-evident truths" of the Declaration of Independence, and to mutual respect and accommodation? Schooling that provides only skills without developing character is not effective schooling for a democracy; indeed, Horace Mann believed that it was worse than no schooling at all!

This is the most effective way that we have yet found of empowering poor parents,, of giving them real responsibility for the education of their children. It is striking, by the way, how many liberals object to allowing poor parents to make choices, convinced that such decisions should be left to professionals.

Our monitoring of several hundred urban schools under the pressures of racial change has made one thing very clear: while the elements of failure are depressingly similar from school to school, those of success are unique. They seem to grow from the chemistry of a particular principal interacting over time with particular teachers in the interest of particular children, with substantial involvement by parents in developing and sustaining a sense of common purpose. While schools can definitely learn from one another, there is no single formula. Indeed, the attempt to generalize from the success of one approach in one classroom or school and to impose it in another has highly mischievous results.

We have come to believe that a system allowing parents a choice among schools, if properly organized by an aggressive central administration, can release energies that only diversity makes available, without sacrificing accountability for the effective education of every child. This approach requires a vigorous effort to provide information to all parents about school options, how their own children are doing, and what they should expect of their schools. It also requires a willingness on the part of the superintendent to take action against principals or teachers whose performance does not create confidence on the part of parents, as reflected in their school choices. Choice is by itself no panacea, but it creates the framework within which effective education can be developed, and thc needs and goals of various student/parent communities met.

The demand for distinctive forms of education (most clearly seen in the growth of nonpublic schools) reveals that we do not all agree about the message that schooling should be passing on to the next generation. Therefore it becomes urgent to identify that on which we do agree. What do we want to be sure that every student will learn? What skills do we want her to acquire? What qualities of character do we want him to possess?

The new interest in defining a common content which should be included in all schooling has been perceived by some as a threat of imposed uniformity. They fear that this approach will reverse the gains of the past decade in appreciating cultural diversity. Seen in the context of choice. however, the stress on defining a common content is an essential aspect of encouraging diversity in all those ways in which we can afford to differ as a society.

It was only a decade later that elaborate efforts were made to justify desegregation on the basis of the improved reading scores which it was alleged to produce. It may have such an impact -- the researchers disagree -- but that is irrelevant to the real and original question: What sort of society do we want to be? How do we want our children to feel about people who differ from them racially and culturally? How do we want children who are black (or are members of other minority groups which the Brown decision did not have in mind) to feel about their racial identity, and what it means to participate in American life?

We cannot be satisfied with breaking down racial barriers and achieving some measure of numerical mixing. It would not even be enough to help linguistic-minority students to develop the necessary language and other skills, though this is an essential demand of equity. Only when we have taught children self-respect and mutual respect -- those qualities of character that make a diverse society possible -- and loyalty to the American "proposition" that makes diversity desirable will we have met the demands of equity.

It is true that we have been groping in this direction with our emphasis on "multicultural" education and similar efforts to enrich the curriculum, but they have been too superficial. The qualities which we are seeking to develop do not depend on "head knowledge" of different traditions, or even on experience of various forms of cooking or music, but on a slow but solid growth in character, or -- may I say it? -- in virtue.

Virtue is learned by heroic example (which may, of course, be presented out of many traditions) and by everyday practice. Schools that do not present such examples and provide opportunities for such everyday practice are not effective schools. They cannot, among other things, "awaken the child to cultural values" or "affect [children’s] hearts and minds" in a way that will lead to a society where racial justice and reconciliation are the norm rather than the happy exception.

My late father used to speak of the attractiveness of real goodness, and we should not be shy about seeking to demonstrate that quality and to evoke it in students. We will not, by the way. do so by avoiding any mention of the religious motivations that are central to the virtuous life for most individuals in any culture. And certainly the last thing that schools should do is to reinforce the cynicism of youth by taking an essentially debunking approach to the moral claims of the various religious traditions, as they too frequently do.

The education -- whether in formal schooling or not -- of youth in every society and culture addresses such questions of how we should live and what we should live for. It is a sad paradox that in our society, with its almost unprecedented need for mutual accommodation and the practice of civic virtues, we should be so hesitant about developing the qualities in our children that they will most need if our society is to endure.

It is certainly time that advocates for racial justice began to insist that schools take on the high mission of developing these qualities. Schools that are racially integrated -- assuming that the way integration is achieved promotes unity rather than division in the community -- will have the greatest need and opportunity to provide those daily experiences that make this real for children. They are, quite simply, the best schools, the most effective schools, for our diverse society.

Curriculum in the Public Schools: Can Compromise Be Reached?

Do strongly held religious convictions inevitably conflict with our system of public education? A visitor from another planet might well conclude that they do, given the heated attacks on public schools from the "religious right," and the equally heated warnings by "strict separationists" that there is a plot by "zealots" to impose religious uniformity on the nation's schoolchildren.

A very grave situation indeed . . . if true. In particular, those of us committed to public education should feel that our backs are against the wall if the commentators are reading the signs of the times correctly. And those of us who believe in respect for religious conviction in its diverse forms have further grounds for deep concern if the choices are truly "all or nothing" between an imposed orthodoxy and an education from which all religious reference has been purged.

However, I am convinced that the polemicists in both camps -- the "strict separationists" and the "religious right" -- read the signs of the times incorrectly.

A democratic polity has ample room for many shades of opinion; what it cannot well tolerate is attempts to excommunicate the opposition, to set it outside the range of permissible dialogue. The ugly aspect of the current debates is that some are attempting just such excommunication. After all, if the nation (that is, all of us) is "besieged by religious zealots" or "controlled by secular humanists, " the image suggests that we shut fast the gates and unite to repel their attacks.

What seems to be excluded by the nature of the current debate is the possibility of trying to understand the intentions (however clumsily implemented) of public educators on the one hand, or the concerns of religiously conservative parents (however clumsily expressed) on the other. As a public education official and an evangelical, I have become deeply concerned about this mutual incomprehension, and am convinced that beyond the alienating rhetoric about "humanist conspiracies" there are some legitimate grievances that should, for the sake of justice and the rights of conscience, be addressed.

In the name of religious liberty and of tolerance, I have found, the radical separationists are profoundly intolerant and illiberal toward religious conservatives. Such conservatives, estimated by pollster Daniel Yankelovich as one American in five, are actually somewhat marginal to the mainstream of national life, have few polished spokespersons, and are given to unsophisticated and vehement expression of their resentment about assaults on their convictions and values. This makes them an easy target, but it does not make throwing mud at them an exercise in religious liberalism.

Those who see any intrusion of religious concerns into public life as a profound threat to American democracy are having a field day with the recent federal court rulings in Tennessee and Alabama, upholding suits brought by concerned parents. The evangelical Alabama parents, unlike the fundamentalist Tennessee parents, have no desire to remove their children from the public schools; they wish consistently to have a cultureshaping role -- not to keep themselves from the world, as fundamentalists do in many ways. The evangelicals simply want to exert an influence over their children's education.

The Tennessee judge (in Mozert v. Hawkins County) ordered in November 1986 that public schools honor a request by a group of parents that their children be excused from using certain readers offensive to their religious convictions. This stands in a long tradition of court rulings that public education should accommodate religiously based objections, often raised by Jewish or Jehovah's Witness parents. As a result, Jewish groups, though usually nervous about evangelicals' intentions regarding public schools, have pointedly distanced themselves from the position of People for the American Way -- one of the active liberal advocacy groups -- that parents with religious concerns should enroll their children in private schools. "No one, " one Jewish writer noted, "should be forced to violate their faith in order to avail themselves of public benefits" (Washington Jewish Week, November 13, 1986).

The litigation in Alabama (Smith v. Board of School Commissioners), resulting in an early March ruling that "secular humanism" represents an unconstitutional "establishment of religion," has been the occasion for a new round of public anguish on the part of the separationists. For once, I am in partial agreement with them. As a public education official, I am appalled at the prospect of combing through the curriculum one more time to remove potentially offensive elements. As a parent, I want my children to be exposed to strong convictions in school, including those that I do not share -- not to be bored into a kind of moral indifference. The Alabama case threatens the little flavor that remains in our textbooks and reading materials.

In fairness to those who brought the suit, however, this is a case of the worm turning, of the dog biting after repeated provocation. For 30 years separationists, including Americans United for the Separation of Church and State, have filed many lawsuits and threatened many more to remove any vestige of Christian practice, even voluntary, from public schools. Church and State, the journal of Americans United, has year after year recorded a succession of triumphs for a totally secular (not "neutral") school; it was in its pages a decade ago that Leo Pfeffer, perhaps the most distinguished of the separationist attorneys, announced "the triumph of secular humanism."

Who, then, is the aggressor? Is it "religious zealots" who are besieging the ramparts of our common life as a nation? Or do conservative Christians (and other religious groups) have some right to feel backed into a corner by the relentlessly secularizing message of the mainstream media, of the public school curriculum, of those who seek to remove every acknowledgment of religion from the public square?

The claim that religious conservatives are about to seize control of the nation and impose their religious beliefs is either cynical or paranoid; it takes seriously the fantasies of the "theonomists" and other tiny groups among the millions of evangelicals and traditional Roman Catholics who are fully committed to playing by the rules of a pluralist democracy.

What most religious conservatives (who may, like me, be political liberals) ask is that our convictions be treated with respect and accommodated, not that they be imposed on anyone. The American political system has in fact shown a remarkable ability, for two centuries, to find such accommodations and to allow room for minority beliefs and opinions to flourish.

Although sympathizing with the parents in Tennessee and Alabama, I deplore the increasing tendency to turn to the courts to resolve such issues. It is a bad way to achieve compromise and accomodation. By casting the issues in the absolute terms of constitutionally protected rights, such litigation encourages a hardening of positions on both sides. Courts tend to rule on the basis of underlying principles that, once applied, may go far beyond the original intentions of the parties, and in ways that are contrary to the interests of all (see Luke 12:58). Certainly there are many instances in which action is necessary to guarantee basic freedoms and equal protection under the law, but litigation should be the last resort, not -- as too often today -- the first.

The teaching of values and attitudes, of loyalties and aversions is not, it seems to me, a promising area for litigation. Inevitably it involves many fine adjustments, subtle judgments based upon the mature convictions of teachers and of parents, and their sense of responsibility for children-each of whom is unique. Such matters can neither be legislated nor ordered by a court. School life, like family life, does not flourish in an atmosphere of continual assertion of rights and grievances.

For several decades the strict separationists have had it all their way with the public schools; both the Alabama case and the Tennessee case are signs of a counteroffensive by parents for whom religion is a central part of that experience to which schools claim to do justice. The aim of these recent suits (contrary to the claims of outraged separationists) is not to restore traditional religious teaching and practices, but to purge away a "counterreligion," an alternative system of belief that the plaintiffs claim public schools are inculcating.

With extensive expert testimony, the plaintiffs made the case that secular humanism functions in many respects for its adherents as a religion (with ministers, fellowship, ceremonies marking the milestones of life, and a missionary program), and that it has many of the substantive characteristics of a religion as well, including a coherent interpretation of all of reality. I find their arguments convincing, I am less convinced by their contention that echoes of secular humanism's world view in certain. courses in the curriculum -- especially the saturation of home economics courses with pop humanistic psychology -- constitute the "establishment of religion" forbidden by the Constitution's First Amendment. But then I am similarly unconvinced that posting the Ten Commandments on a classroom wall constitutes such an establishment. The separationists have succeeded in convincing the courts that an action like this does constitute such an establishment, and what's sauce for the goose . .

Do we really want our public schools to be pushed further and further toward the blandness of a value-free curriculum? There is overwhelming evidence, from surveys both nationally and in a number of states, that parents do not, that they seek schools for their children in which clear standards come to expression. The present competition between ideological opponents to exclude anything offensive to their religious or secularist views is a strategy of "mutual assured destruction" of values and convictions. When all the strong colors are removed from the teacher's palette we will be left with shades of gray -- moral indifferentism. The parents who brought the Alabama and Tennessee suits are convinced that this process has already gone too far, yet ironically the litigation could drive it further. The effect would be devastating for public schools and for teachers and children,

It was an illusion of Horace Mann and the other reformers who shaped our educational system in conscious opposition to "sectarian" schools that a coherent "common" education could be provided by stressing only those convictions on which "men of good will" agreed. They had some excuse for their view; theirs was the age of the "evangelical united front" for social reform, and the stubborn resistance of Catholics could be seen as a short-term result of their foreignness Unfortunately, the common beliefs and values on which the "common school" rested have been dissolved away by the acids of modernity. Humpty-Dumpty is not to be put back together, and it is inappropriate to seek to do so by using mandatory school attendance to inculcate values in children that their parents find offensive.

The January appeal filed in the Tennessee case on behalf, of.. the school system could not be more clear in its assertion of a right to teach such values

The schools seek to teach students to be autonomous individuals, who can make their own judgments about moral questions. The schools believe that students should be able to evaluate and make judgments on their own, based on their experience and beliefs, not those of their teachers.... many of the plaintiffs' objections are directly inconsistent with the objectives of public education.

We take so much for granted the language of individual autonomy that it requires an effort to remember that there is another way of seeing the task of education, one involving exposure to a tradition representing accumulated (even divinely revealed) truth. In this view, pre-teenaged children should not be confronted with moral dilemmas in their elementary readers and encouraged to find their "own" solutions; they should be taught right from wrong by adults confident that these are absolutes.

It is not my purpose to argue for the correctness of one or the other view of education, only to note that these are issues over which reasonable people may differ, and to question whether the State has a right to impose the first approach in the face of opposition from parents. Indeed, by allowing parents to meet the compulsory school attendance requirement by sending their children to private institutions that espouse the second approach, the State tacitly acknowledges that its "compelling interest" in education is adequately served in such schools.

Is there a solution to the perennial conflict over the values presented in public schools? I believe there is. It starts with the recognition that public schools do not need to be identical, that they can offer a variety of pedagogically legitimate approaches to common educational goals. To take the example always used by those arguing for the "common school," religious tolerance can be taught without necessarily giving the message that all religious views are of equal validity. A good argument can be made, in fact, that the person who is solidly grounded in a religious identity is more free to be tolerant than another for whom differing beliefs are a threat. Catholics who graduate from Catholic schools, for example, may be more tolerant than Catholics who attended public schools.

This is not to argue that we should divide publicly supported education along denominational lines, as is the case in most Western democracies. Surveys indicate that while parents would like more choice in education, the number for whom explicitly religious instruction is a primary consideration is relatively small; most seem content to leave that to their churches and synagogues. A much greater concern, however, is the moral flavor of the school, the values by which it lives as well as those which it explicitly teaches. In this respect schools can differ greatly without going beyond what is appropriate for public education.

It is important to remember that the parents in Tennessee and in Alabama were not asking that their own religious beliefs be taught in the schools, much less seeking to "control religious impulses and reshape spiritual sensibilities" for the children of other parents. They sought, and successfully, at least pending appeal, for the schools to desist from teaching their children the elements of a view of the world contrary to their beliefs and sense of moral obligation. They were standing up for religious liberty, not for spiritual despotism.

If only all parents were equally concerned and involved! Public educators constantly lament the lack of involvement of parents. Is there any good reason why our educational policies should not respect their desire to guide the development of their children.

 

The Case for Regulating Campaign Finances: A Religious Perspective

Money plays an enormous role in selecting and electing our political leaders. Many doubt that any controls can be implemented to blunt the power and influence exercised by people with wealth. Nonetheless, a significant part of the American public thinks the situation has gotten out of hand. The nearly quantum leap in campaign spending over recent decades, propelled especially by the use of television, has provoked a growing sense that something should be done, even if there is little agreement on what this something might be.

Is campaign reform an issue whose time has come? That isn’t yet clear. There are arguments against such legislation, and the Supreme Court itself seems unclear about what the Constitution does and does not permit. But the issue is on the political agenda.

A full inquiry would entail a canvassing of specific legislative possibilities. If campaign financing is regulated, what shape should the controls take? Should there be limits on contributions? On expenditures by candidates? On so-called soft money given to political parties, or on independent expenditures by various organizations? Should there be public financing and, if so, under what conditions?

I want to withdraw provisionally from the practical details to address a larger question: Are there religious reasons why Christians should be concerned with campaign finance reform? I think there are. They are closely tied to our commitment to democratic process and religious freedom.

When the new United States ratified the Bill of Rights and so stipulated that "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof," it crowned a revolutionary reversal in Western politics. European societies through 14 centuries had assumed that a political community requires religious uniformity, and the logic of that assumption seemed impeccable: Religion involves the most fundamental commitment of people’s lives, their conviction about what makes life ultimately worthwhile; consequently, religious diversity within a political community opens the possibility of serious political conflict. Since religious plurality prevents opposing parties from being united by a deeper commitment, it is a recipe for civil instability. Against the force of that traditional view, the founders of our Republic asserted that the public good not only allowed but demanded religious freedom.

What accounts for this striking departure from the wisdom of the past? Thomas Jefferson best formulated the answer: "Truth is great," he wrote, "and has nothing to fear from the conflict unless . . . disarmed of her natural weapon, free argument and debate." One historian summarized the point this way: "Religious freedom was clearly envisaged as the deliberate creation of a situation where every religious opinion and practice, having the right to free expression, would continually contend with all the others in order that error might be exposed to view and the truth be recognized."

The revolutionary rationale for religious freedom is that democracy cannot exist without it. Democracy means, as Lincoln would later say, government not only of and for the people but also by the people, and this "sovereignty of the people" is real only when government is the consequence of full and free political discourse. Public debate would be arrested if the state could teach a religion or impose on citizens their deepest conviction about the common good. Full debate requires that the argument stretch to the ultimate ideal by which all activities of the state ought to be informed, and this means that citizens should be free to advance and defend any religion they find convincing.

Religious differences need not fracture political peace if religious adherents are concerned above all with the truth and, therefore, are willing to advocate their political convictions in full and free public debate. The only thing required to harmonize religious diversity and civil stability is the commitment of religious adherents to the way of persuasion.

Christians have the best of reasons to endorse religious freedom: Faith in and service to God cannot be coerced and, therefore, cannot be taught by the power of the state. Because religion properly affects political decisions through its own inherent persuasive power, we rejoice that the Constitution creates a body politic committed to the way of persuasion. In other words. Christians are convinced that their God and his purpose are "the great truth" that will prevail if the body politic is truly ruled by argument and debate.

Christians committed to the democratic process established by religious freedom ask: What’s needed for a democratic debate to be not only full, in the sense that the ultimate grounds for political decision are subject to public discussion, but also free? We can look again to the Constitution for at least part of the answer: A free political process requires that all citizens have equal standing. None should be given a privileged position, since the proper outcome depends only on the best argument, and an argument’s worth does not depend on where it comes from.

So a free debate requires certain equal rights that should never be invaded. All citizens must have basic rights to life and liberty, and political rights to the vote and to equal protection under the law. And all the channels of communication must be opened, through freedom of speech, the press, assembly and petition. But does government by the people also require more? Specifically, what is the proper relation between democracy and the distribution of wealth and income?

That there is a dramatic disparity of wealth and income in our nation is not open to dispute. Nor is the fact that money talks in the electoral process, having a significant influence on who is elected and what they do as elected officials. But disagreement sets in over whether the sovereignty of the people implies that this influence should be controlled by law.

Precisely because money talks, some will say that regulating campaign financing is inconsistent with democratic discussion and debate. It violates the right to freedom of speech. The Supreme Court took this view in Buckley v. Valeo (1976) when it struck down limits on campaign expenditures, finding that these involved a direct limitation on free expression. At the same time, however, the court allowed restrictions on contributions to stand, reasoning in part that giving funds to a campaign is only an indirect form of speech.

Many have argued that the court cannot have it both ways—that the distinction is vacuous. Helping to finance a campaign is also a direct form of speech, sometimes the only form in which citizens can express their opinions. If campaign spending cannot be regulated, they argue, then campaign financing must be entirely unregulated.

Every Christian who is committed to democracy must be zealous in protecting freedom of speech. It is a constitutional necessity of government by the people. Speech can be regulated only when it directly conflicts with other constitutional conditions of the democratic process—for instance, freedom of religion and assembly, equal protection under the law, and basic rights to life and liberty. But note that freedom of speech requires equal standing in the democratic process. Nothing in the Constitution prevents the conclusion that sizable differences in financial resources do or may compromise equality of access to the political debate. Consequently, regulation of campaign finances for the purpose of securing equality cannot be unconstitutional. The court in Buckley v. Valeo did not make this clear, and for that reason its decision can he faulted.

To be sure, regulation would transgress the Constitution if equality were achieved through suppressing everyone’s talk. Since equality of access cannot be the equality of silence, mandatory limitations on campaign spending must not be inhibiting. Funding patterns must be designed so that discourse prior to an election is not only open but encouraged.

Assuming that it is possible to control finances without inhibiting speech, it may now seem that the justice of appropriate regulation is obvious. But we should not rush to judgment. If the Constitution does not prevent financial controls, it also does not mandate them. The Constitution says nothing about relating the democratic process to the distribution of wealth and income, and for a good reason: The social and economic prerequisites for equal standing in the democratic process depend on one’s vision of social justice. And precisely because there is religious freedom, the Constitution cannot define social justice for us. The relation of political equality to money is one of the matters that the democratic debate itself must settle.

Despite the dramatic inequality in wealth and income, a substantial number of our fellow citizens do not think that financially unregulated campaigns betray political equality, since they believe that the division of money in our society is socially just. In their view, the Constitution sets the basic structure for a society in which individuals compete for life’s rewards, and the competitive economic market is the mechanism of social justice. Life is a race run according to the rules of the free market. People have a right to whatever their talents and effort command within the economic order. Having a right to their money, they also have a right to whatever part it may give them in the electoral process.

Let’s call this the view of "justice through competition." Those who see things this way allow that concentrated wealth may be unjust if it does not result from a truly free market. But then the economic order, not the funding of political campaigns, needs to be reformed. This belief, sometimes without clear articulation, stands behind much of the opposition to campaign finance regulations. Of course, we can point out that politicians and others who benefit from unregulated financing are loathe to surrender their selfish advantage. They pay lip service to some principled reasons for their opposition as a smokescreen to hide their own self-interest. Still, we should not too readily dismiss the power of ideals. Many sincerely believe that the free market is the mechanism of justice, so that winners in the economic competition have the right to whatever doors their resources may open—including political ones.

But Christianity presents a different vision of justice. In his summary of the divine purpose, Jesus announces two commandments: We are called to love God with all our heart and mind and strength and, therefore, we are also to love one another, our neighbor as ourselves. The second calling flows directly from the first. The God we are to serve without reservation loves all creatures completely, so that loyalty to this God is loyalty to those whom God loves. Since the whole world belongs to God, we belong to each other, and justice requires a social order designed to maximize the contribution that each individual can make to all. Social justice cannot be achieved through competition. Our life together is communal, not competitive, and it requires an economic division that enables each person to make a distinctive contribution to our common life.

Let’s call this the view of "justice for community." From this perspective, the economic inequality in our society—more extensive than in any other Western country and widening further during the past two decades—is clearly wrong. Still, it does not follow that the Christian view prescribes strict equality in the distribution of wealth and income. People have different roles within the social order, some of which require greater access to financial resources. I have in mind especially those roles that require extensive and expensive training and those that entail great risk.

Also, the division of income depends in part on the degree to which individuals choose to make the most of their opportunities. Justice does not prescribe subsidies for those who can but do not help themselves. Moreover, a properly governed free market is indeed an important form of economic organization, at least in a complex society, and reliance on it would be impossible if the resulting differences in distribution were canceled. Some economic inequalities may be required and others tolerated precisely in order to maximize the benefit to all.

But if justice for community does not dictate strict economic equality, it does mean that economic inequalities should not invade the political process. Since inequalities of wealth and income are meant to serve the community as a whole, the democratic process is the larger drama into which the subplot of financial inequality should fit. The decision about which inequalities are beneficial to all belongs to the democratic debate. Therefore, politics should not be biased by those inequalities. Equality of access trumps any strong suits that democratic decision may deal. Since the deal has resulted in extensive financial inequality, Christian justice counsels us to insulate the electoral process from the distortions that disparities in wealth can introduce. Campaign finance reform is necessary to protect the democratic process.

There is a yet deeper theme in the Christian concern for equal democratic access. Those who believe in justice as competition typically also adhere to a larger conviction: The good society maximizes the place of the free market because the overriding purpose of our life together is to make possible the satisfaction of people’s wants. Liberty is both the first and last political principle. The principal task of politics is to maximize voluntary exchanges because liberty means the freedom of all to make of their lives whatever they choose.

This vision of the good society has profoundly influenced American politics, especially during our century and during the past two decades. It has made the pursuit of ever greater economic growth an almost unquestioned social goal, a goal with which all other proposals for social policy must be consistent. And it is a kind of religious vision. In the political life of those who embrace it, it occupies the same place that the vision of God’s purpose occupies in the life of a Christian. Because this religion of the free market is often the sanction for unregulated campaign financing, we have every reason to say that there is something religious at stake in this issue.

Since, according to the Christian ideal, we belong to each other because everything in this world belongs to the love of God, making of ourselves whatever we choose is not what matters. What matters is what we make of our lives together—whether we live in a way that makes each person both a beneficiary and a benefactor of our communities. What really counts is not things that satisfy our wants but our relationships with people, relationships in which each is the greater because she or he both gives to and receives from the creativity of others. Not economic growth but our common humanity needs to be maximized—the humanity we create in our families, our neighborhoods, our diverse associations and our public life. A full and free democratic process is not merely the best way to govern the larger social order; it is also itself the realization of community, itself the creation of our common humanity. Equality of access should be maximized because it makes our political community one in which we truly belong to each other.

This is the deepest reason why Christians are troubled by the apathy and cynicism that has infected our political process. When the number of actual voters is less than half of those registered, and presidents can be elected by one-quarter of the citizens, the power of democracy to create the widest form of our common humanity has been sapped by indifference.

Some of this apathy can also be traced to the ethos of the marketplace. Because our culture has for so long insidiously taught citizens that the good life is measured by their economic success and participation in the consumer society, it is small wonder so many believe that politics is a burden that conflicts with their pursuit of what really matters. But apathy is also the expression of cynicism, especially among those whose material access to the political process is weakest. When money is as unequally available as it is in our society and talks as loudly as it does in our electoral process, it is also small wonder that many see political engagement as an exercise in futility.

Campaign finance reform will not itself make the political process a full and free discussion and debate. But the promise of democracy will not be renewed without it. Christians for whom the divine purpose requires a political community that fashions and draws out our common humanity are summoned to join in the search for appropriate ways to regulate the role of money in political campaigns. Since this goal must be achieved through the very political process that is so much in need of reform, some may say we are dreaming. But ideals have their own power—and, in any event, we are commissioned to seek the divine purpose in the politics of our day.

 

The Purpose of Human Rights

Modern moral and political thought has often focused on the question of human rights: What rights, if any, belong to all human individuals solely because they are human? Within the past two centuries, theoretical address to this question has been marked by a dominant consensus. It holds that a principle or principles of human rights must be independent of any comprehensive telos to which all human activity ought to be directed, that is, a telos defined by reality as such and, in that sense, metaphysical. In contrast, thinkers within the tradition of process thought typically assert that all moral and political principles are dependent on a purpose in the nature of things. On my reading, however, this tradition has not adequately responded to the specifically moral argument that a comprehensive telos is inconsistent with universal or human rights. This essay seeks programmatically to vindicate neoclassical metaphysics against that indictment.1

The term "human rights" is a more recent formulation of the older concept of natural rights, and in the course of a long conversation, the latter concept has generally been inseparable from the idea of natural law. In the early modern period, political thinkers formulated a new conception of natural law, whose distinctive character has defined a distinctively modern tradition of thought about natural or human rights. A synoptic appreciation of this development will help to clarify the dominant consensus and, thereby; the indictment to which this essay seeks to respond. In turn, that clarification will help to set the terms in which the argument for a neoclassical conception of human rights can be given a programmatic statement.

I. The Indictment

Summarily speaking, the premodern conception of natural law was itself inseparable from the conception of a comprehensive telos, typically understood throughout medieval thought as defined by a divine purpose. For Thomas Aquinas, whose achievement culminates and, in that sense, represents the medieval consensus, law is "an ordinance of reason for the common good, promulgated by him who has the care of the community" (61 5), and the natural law is "the rational creature’s participation" (618) in the divine perfection that is the final end of all things. Accordingly, the first precept of practical reason is that "good is to be done and promoted, and evil is to be avoided" (637, emphasis deleted), which means that the natural law is somehow derived from the comprehensive good defined by the final end or divine purpose. Following the Reformation, its challenge to Roman authority; and the religious divisions thereby introduced into the Western world, the Renaissance included widespread doubt that there can be any reasoned agreement about an inclusive good. Against the background of thought for which morality as such depends on a comprehensive purpose, this doubt threatened to become a more or less complete moral skepticism. The distinctively modern conception of natural law emerged as an effort to articulate common moral principles notwithstanding disagreement about the highest or inclusive good.

J. B. Schneewind argues that Hugo Grotius presented the first sustained attempt to rethink morality in this way. Concerned principally with international conflicts, Grotius held that humans are, on the one hand, inherently prone to strife as a result of their conflicting purposes or ideas of the good and, on the other, socially-minded beings who want to live together. Accordingly, the moral question asks about the constraints properly placed on diverse pursuits in order that sociable desires may be fulfilled. "Grotius’s successors," Schneewind summarizes, became "a distinctively modern school of natural law" because they accepted this "Grotian problematic" (73). On the new conception, in other words, the natural law defines obligations that make social peace possible because they are consistent with differing inclusive interests. Correspondingly, Grotius offered a new conception of natural rights, namely, moral qualities of being a person that are also independent of any highest good. These are, therefore, qualities that all others ought to respect, in the sense that such respect ought to constrain their own purposes.

Thomas Hobbes pushed the Grotian problematic to its extreme, denying that humans are naturally sociable and, thereby, removing the ground for any conception of duty. For Hobbes, natural right is exhausted by the right to preserve ones own life, which does not imply that others have correlative duties because, in the natural condition, prescription serves an individual’s will for her or his own self-preservation. On this account, natural law is derivative from the right of nature, in the sense that the former consists in general precepts with which reason counsels the pursuit of self-preservation, and the social contract is based solely on those precepts. Moreover, the absence of duties to others follows from the absence of grounds for reasoned agreement about the good. "Good, evil, and contemptible are ever used with relation to the person who useth them: there being nothing simply and absolutely so; nor any common rule of good and evil, to be taken from the nature of the objects themselves" (48-49). What is taken to be good is solely a matter of an individual’s nonrational desire. Since there is no rational question of better or worse desires, practical reason is exhausted by the instrumental question about means to the ends associated with self-preservation.

Most moral and political theory subsequent to Hobbes has, in one way or another, reasserted the correlation of rights and duties. For some, moreover, doing so involved a rejection of the Grotian problematic itself. This is transparent in thinkers influenced by Christian teleology (see Schneewind 286), including those who advanced systematic revisions within the Western metaphysical tradition -- especially Leibniz and, later, Hegel. Other alternatives to the new conception of natural law appeared in utilitarianism and, later, pragmatism. But a major tradition in modern thought has agreed that the moral problem must be solved independently of any inclusive telos or conception of the inclusive good. On a widespread reading, this agreement constitutes the principal form of modern political liberalism, and we may call this nonteleological liberalism.

With Immanuel Kant’s achievement, the moral grounds for nonteleological liberalism were given their most decisive and subsequently efficacious statement. The categorical imperative to "treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (46) was, for Kant, the "universal law of nature" (38) and his understanding of it is the most radical conception of natural law in its modern sense. Convinced that no human purpose could define the moral law unless a metaphysical telos could be known, Kant was also convinced that metaphysical knowledge is impossible. He concluded that the moral law is completely independent of ends as objects of desire and can be defined only by the formal universality of freedom or practical reason. "Nothing can possibly be conceived in the world, or even out of it, which can be called good without qualification, except a good will." (11).

We may also say, then, that Kant provided a precise reason for replacing the term "natural rights" with "human rights." Virtually all previous representatives of the modern natural law tradition, including Grotius and even Hobbes, had in some way or other related natural rights to divine power or command, which served as the source for the directives of natural law notwithstanding that these did not derive from a divine telos or comprehensive purpose. In this sense, these thinkers still grounded morality in something about the larger context of human life. With his deconstruction of metaphysical knowledge, Kant eliminated any such connection. To be sure, Kant himself spoke of God’s existence as a practical postulate, but this postulate depends on a logically prior recognition of the moral law, the necessity of which depends on nothing other than the character of rational freedom. Independently of anything about the larger context, in other words, universal rights are grounded in the moral qualities of human persons. What Kant defended, we might say, is the law of our nature as rational creatures, and the universal right to be treated as an end withal is, in that sense, a thoroughly human right.

Since Kant, nonteleological liberalism grounded solely in the moral qualities of persons has profoundly shaped both political theory and political practice, and most of the subsequent theorists who are principally responsible for this account of rights have been especially and avowedly indebted to his practical philosophy. In the current conversation, these theorists include Brian Barry, Alan Gewirth, Jürgen Habermas, and John Rawls. Still, such theorists also continue, as did Kant himself, the modern natural law tradition, at least in the following way: The duties prescribed by nonteleological liberalism are defined in terms of rights that are prior to any inclusive good; that is, these rights are separated from, and respect for them overrides, any inclusive telos humans might pursue.

For this reason, these liberal theories face a fundamental problem. Whatever one’s conception of the good, Barry himself remarks, "I take it to be unproblematic that it has motivational force. The problem is [. . .] to explain why people might do anything else" (112), that is, might act in accord with an independent principle or principles of rights. Barry and others attempt to give that explanation. So far as I can see, however, the nature of this problem prevents a solution, although here I will only suggest the dilemma: The chosen telos of human action defines the actor’s inclusive evaluation of her or his possibilities. Accordingly, any constraints on her or his purposes that an actor is motivated to accept are dependent on this evaluation. If the moral law does not prescribe an inclusive telos for the decision among possible purposes, then this decision cannot imply any obligation except that the actor be directed by the purpose chosen. In this sense, Hobbes represents the logical consequence of the modern natural law tradition. With its separation of human rights from the good, moral theory loses, to adopt a phrase of Whitehead’s, its "security of intellectual justification" (Adventures 36)2

In recent discussion, some so-called communtarian or republican thinkers have, in their own way, challenged the Kantian and, thereby, the modern natural law tradition. So far from "defining rights according to principles that are neutral among conceptions of the good," writes Michael Sandel, "republican theory interprets rights in the light of a particular conception of the good society," and such theory thereby affirms "a politics of the common good" (25). We might say that this mode of political thought seeks to reaffirm a teleological conception of rights. Nonetheless, the shadow of Kant over virtually all contemporary moral and political theory is shown in this: With nonteleological Kantians, republicans typically agree, at least by implication, that there is no metaphysical good on which moral and political principles and thus human rights are dependent.

This means that virtually all on both sides of the so-called liberal/ communitarian debate pursue their discussion within the common conviction that political theory is independent of the metaphysical project Kant exiled from the realm of possible knowledge and effectively banished to the margins of modern moral thought. Communitarians who share this conviction also face a fundamental problem. Accepting Kant’s assessment of metaphysics but rejecting the implications he drew for moral theory, these political thinkers must somehow formulate and defend a conception of the inclusive or common good without appeal to a comprehensive purpose. On my reading, this task has not been successfully completed. Insofar as they do articulate the common good, communitarian or republican thinkers seem typically to assert a telos in all respects specific to some culture or historical community. So far as I can see, moreover, a teleological moral theory that insists on its independence from metaphysics cannot finally escape a kind of relativism that is inconsistent with the affirmation of universal or human rights. As a consequence, many nonteleologists find communitarianism wanting.

Naturally, these brief comments in critique of both nonteleological liberals and some of their communitarian or republican antagonists cannot be convincing absent an extended engagement with their proposals. I offer those comments only to suggest the kind of arguments open to a theory of human rights backed by the resources of neoclassical metaphysics. But the preceding historical synopsis has sought principally to explicate the inhospitable contemporary context for that theory Through its denial of metaphysical knowledge, Kant’s critique of reason created a dominant consensus in subsequent moral and political theory. We can say summarily that a neoclassical address to the question of human rights is a return to pre-Kantian and largely premodern thought in a way that virtually all contemporary political theories find incredible.

Within the dominant consensus, as the historical synopsis has also shown comprehensive teleology is rejected not only by all because it is metaphysical but also by some because it is teleological. The former circle includes communitarian or non-metaphysical teleologists, while the latter is limited to nonteleological liberals. Accordingly, a metaphysical theory of human rights cannot be successful without defense against both indictments. But contemporary moral and political philosophers rarely offer sustained arguments against the metaphysical project as such. To the contrary, the impossibility of a critical metaphysics is taken for granted in pursuit of one or another alternative ground for moral theory. Still, many nonteleological Kantians do advance strictly moral arguments against teleological ethics. Although the target of those arguments is typically utilitarianism, it is generally clear that comprehensive or metaphysical teleology is thought to have similar failings.

These arguments present a special challenge to neoclassical metaphysics because they are advanced by those who, in a time when relativism in some form or other seems to be ascendant, share the affirmation of a universal moral principle or principles. These Kantian theorists, in other words, indict metaphysical teleology as inconsistent with the very universal or human rights for which both seek to provide a ground. To the best of my knowledge, process thinkers have not adequately answered this charge. Accordingly; it is this indictment to which this essay seeks programmatically to respond, and we can approach that defense through reviewing the arguments against teleological ethics.

Teleological ethics deny universal rights, we are sometimes told, because pursuit of the telos must override all other moral norms. Any other duties such an ethic might affirm can only be obligations derived from the supreme imperative to maximize the good and, therefore, all other norms are merely prima facie. In the terms of a traditional distinction, there are no perfect duties, duties "not to do, or not to omit, an action of a certain [specific] kind," whatever the consequences, because all specific duties can be canceled by the imperfect duty "to promote a certain general end" (Donagan 154). Whatever rights we may seek to affirm, including basic rights to life and bodily integrity, they are at best provisional because subject to rebuttal by the intent to create the best consequences.

It is certainly possible for the adherent of teleology to bite this bullet and try to show that the conceivable circumstances in which rights would be overridden are extreme and rare (e.g., Hare). But nonteleologists argue forcefully that the very idea of taking or torturing or otherwise physically invading innocent human life under any circumstances is inconsistent with our deepest moral intuitions (e.g., Donagan 172-89). Human rights must be absolute in the sense that they cannot be overridden by any consequences. This is not to deny that rights themselves may conflict, so that those of one individual may be limited, or may in specified ways be overridden, by the rights of others. The point is, rather, that the community of rights cannot be overridden by pursuit of the maximal good and, therefore, teleological ethics cannot be valid.

On my intuitions, this conclusion would be convincing if indeed the very concept of a comprehensive telos implies what the critics assume that it implies, namely, that all moral norms other than the supreme teleological imperative are merely prima facie. But this assumption is fallacious, and its fallacy can be disclosed through attention to a second argument that makes no appeal to moral intuitions but, rather, purports to show how every teleological ethic is self-defeating. On this second argument, general adherence to any such ethic prevents maximization of the good. Since no individual can have settled expectations about the circumstances in which others will make their choices, the absence of any perfect duties means that she or he cannot have settled expectations about what others will do. For instance, one cannot count on another keeping her or his promise because circumstances at the time when the promise falls due may dictate or permit that it be broken in order to maximize the good. Moreover, the unpredictability is, as it were, cumulative. If a person who makes a promise finds, at the time when keeping it arrives, that the future she or he faces is less settled, then it will be less likely that keeping it is teleologically required. In sum, maximizing the good, at least on any plausible account of it, requires social cooperation and coordination and, therefore, social practices or institutions in which roles are to be played or duties are to be observed whatever the consequences. If they are morally permissible, promises should be kept because they are made, institutional commitments fulfilled because they have been accepted, laws obeyed because they have been enacted. Since it implies that all specific norms are prima facie, a teleological ethic self-destructs.

As Barry has pointed out, however, this second argument admits of a ready reply. If maximizing the good is prevented by a teleological principle that overrides the norms human cooperation requires, then the teleology in question may proscribe that understanding of its supreme principle. The criticism fallaciously assumes that a teleological ethic means "looking at each calculation in isolation, and not taking adequate account of the effects on a society’s capacity to function of its being known that all actions are taken on the basis of such calculations" (219); each case, it is assumed, should be "separately taken" (224). To the contrary, a teleological ethic may imply that at least some cases should not be separately taken, precisely for the reasons on which the criticism depends.

Let us restate the point in terms of a difference between direct and indirect applications of a teleological principle. The ethic may not prescribe that this principle be applied directly to every human activity. At least in some circumstances, the required application may be indirect or may proceed through the specific norms of social cooperation that are necessary in order to maximize the good. It is one thing teleologically to validate a particular action "separately taken" and another to validate it by appeal to a system of norms or a social practice that is itself validated teleologically. In some circumstances, keeping a promise or obeying a law may be proscribed if pursuit of the comprehensive telos is directly applied; in the same circumstances the action may be prescribed as to a pattern of social cooperation that is itself required to maximize the good -- and, in this sense, the action is required whatever the consequences.

We may now return to the relation between teleology and human rights. If a principle that prescribes maximizing the good may be indirectly applied through social practices, then it is not transparent that every teleological ethic implies the merely prima facie character of the community of rights. At least, the way is open to argue that each individual has some perfect duties with respect to the treatment of all others, specific moral obligations that cannot be canceled by a duty to maximize the good. Whether a supreme teleological principle consistently implies such a community of rights depends entirely, it would seem on what conception of the comprehensive good is in question. Still, the case against teleological ethics may here offer this response: Granting the difference between direct and indirect applications, this yields only the familiar distinction between "act-teleology" and "rule-teleology,"3 is problematic for the following reason: Social practices or patterns of social cooperation cannot be validated teleologically without a comparative assessment of the good and evil consequences differing possible systems of rules or norms (for instance, differing sets of rights) are likely, if adopted, to produce. Even if this assessment is not the same as taking each act separately, each actor must still decide whether probable consequences authorize a given social practice or some alternative set of rules. Thus, it is conceivable that any practice heretofore valid should now be violated in the interest of reform. This means that there can be no strictly human rights, those that cannot be overridden by any consequences.

Whatever its merits in other respects, however, this criticism depends on its assumption that a teleological validation of perfect duties must be empirical. I will argue programmatically that this assumption is also fallacious, at least if a teleological ethic exploits the resources of neoclassical metaphysics. In other words, I will argue for a universal social practice whose constitutive principle is nonempirical or a priori, even while its validation presupposes another or supreme moral principle. Accordingly, the remainder of this essay will proceed as follows: I will first seek to show that the meta-ethical character of every claim to moral validity includes a principle of social action by which a universal community of rights is constituted, so that no moral theory can be valid if it is inconsistent with these rights. Just because it is meta-ethical, this principle itself presupposes another or supreme moral principle, and I will subsequently argue that the universal set of tights in question is an indirect application of the teleology backed by neoclassical metaphysics.

II. The Formative Principle

"The meta-ethical character of every claim to moral validity" designates the common character of all such claims in distinction from nonmoral claims. Whatever else this designation includes, a claim to validity for some or other moral prescription is in this respect explicitly neutral to all moral prescriptions, that is, explicitly neutral to whether or not they are valid. In the respect that a moral claim is explicitly partisan in moral disagreements, it differs not only from nonmoral claims but also from one or more other moral ones. Considered meta-ethically, then, a claim to validity for some moral prescription claims validity for some obligatory evaluation of possible purposes, that is, some designation of choices as those agents ought to make or those reason requires. It follows that a putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless and thus cannot be valid if the individuals to whom it is said to apply cannot act as it requires and do so because the prescription is valid. If we emphasize the ability to act as prescribed, this meta-ethical statement means that "ought implies can." A putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless if the alternatives of an agent to whom it is said to apply do not include the required action. If we emphasize the claim to validity, a putative moral prescription is meta-ethically senseless if an agent to whom it is said to apply cannot choose in a manner that expresses dissent, that is, expresses her or his decision that the prescription is not valid.

Let us now focus on action that affects another individual or individuals and call it social action. It follows from what has been said that moral prescriptions for social action prescribe common decisions, in the sense that each of the participants should and thus can choose to affirm the prescribed action because it is valid. If I am morally required or permitted to act in a certain manner, and if that action has effects on you, then the moral validity of the prescription on which I act means that your acceptance of those effects is required by reason -- and, in that sense, the prescription implies a common decision. Thus, a prescription for social action or, as we may also say, the prescribed social action itself is meta-ethically senseless unless each participant can choose in a manner that expresses her or his dissent. When the prescription constitutes a social practice, moreover, the expression of dissent must be possible even if the practice is otherwise observed, that is, even if all other participants adhere to the principles or norms that purport to prescribe morally valid interaction. Every affected individual must be able to participate as an exercise of practical reason alone.

Consider in this context the social practice of slavery, where, for present purposes, this means an order of interaction whose norms prescribe that some human individuals ought to have exclusive disposal over the activities of others. If slavery is in force, in the sense that slave owners adhere to its norms and the political community enforces them, then slaves cannot choose in a manner that expresses dissent from the putative validity of the practice. Having no standing in the community that creates the practice, they cannot politically or socially contest it. To be sure, slaves might seek to escape or rebel. But these ways of expressing dissent are not themselves recognized by the rules of slavery. To the contrary, the practice is meant to be so designed that such possibilities are coercively precluded, and they only betray that the practice cannot be fully established. That this practice is meta-ethically senseless is confirmed by the fact that individuals whose service to another depends on their participation in a common decision are not slaves.

Because it implies the possibility of dissent, the meta-ethical character of every social action prescribes by implication at least one social practice, namely, the specific practice designed to address disagreement about the validity of social prescriptions and, thereby, to pursue a common decision. In the face of dissent, common decision making is itself an associational process that requires norms of interaction. I will call this the practice of moral discourse, appropriating the term "discourse" from Habermas and designating with it the specific social practice that suspends other purposes in order to assess the validity of contested claims (see Habermas, Theory 17-18,25,42; Moral 158-60). Hence, discourse may also be described as the practice of argumentation or common critical reflection in which claims are validated or invalidated by the giving of reasons. I recognize that the prescription of this practice remains vague until its meaning is clarified in terms of actual patterns or institutions of common decision making, and the attempt to pursue that matter will turn directly to political community. Before taking that turn, however, it is important to identify another implication of moral discourse.

As a derivation from the meta-ethical character of every claim to moral validity, the specific practice of moral discourse both implies and is implied by -- and, in that sense, belongs to -- a principle that constitutes social action universally. In all human relationships, individuals are morally bound to treat each other as potential participants in moral discourse. No social action can be morally valid if it treats another individual in a manner that denies the possibility of contestation and, therefore, of moral discourse. We can also say, then, that all human individuals always have the rights that define them as potential participants in moral discourse, one of which is the right to be or become an actual participant in such discourse, and these universal rights articulate a universal social practice. They cannot be overridden by any consideration of consequences. Indeed, they cannot be overridden by any other prescription at all, precisely because they are implied by the meta-ethical character of any claim to moral validity, whatever its content.

The principle constituting this universal social practice is itself meta-ethical, in the following sense: the social action prescribed is explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement.4 On the face of it, one might object, a prescription of universal rights cannot be explicitly neutral to all such disagreement because it is not explicitly neutral to disagreement about the principle itself. But we should distinguish between the stated or propositional content of the principle, on the one hand, and the action prescribed, on the other. The stated or propositional content is indeed an explicit denial of its denial. But this is not the case with the action. Treating all individuals as potential participants in discourse is explicitly neutral even to disagreement about whether all individuals should be so treated, since that disagreement defines a question about what treatment reason requires.

We may call this meta-ethical principle a formative principle of social action, meaning precisely that adherence to it is explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement. As such, the principle is distinguished from all substantive prescriptions, adherence to any one of which is not explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement. Accordingly, the social practice constituted by this principle is a formative practice, and the rights it prescribes are formative rights. We may also say that the distinguishing mark of a formative prescription is its explicit neutrality to all substantive ones; that is, asserting the former does nor explicitly affirm or deny the moral validity of any prescription whose prescribed action is partisan in some or other moral disagreement. This is equivalent to saving that the action prescribed by a formative prescription is explicitly neutral even to disagreement about itself because, were this not so, it would be a substantive prescription.

On my reading, Karl-Otto Apel states the meta-ethical principle of social action when he asserts that every claim to validity commits the actor to a recognition of all human individuals as persons. "All beings who are capable of linguistic communication must be recognized as persons since in all their actions and utterances they are potential participants in a discussion" ("Pierce 259). Following Apel, I will use the term "communicative rights" to designate the formative rights that belong to all humans as potential participants in moral discourse, and I will call the formative principle in question the principle of communicative respect. On Apel’s account, these rights articulate the valid meaning that can be given to the second formulation of Kant’s categorical imperative: "So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only" (46).

Since communicative rights define every human individual as a potential participant in discourse, their content can be derived from the necessary conditions of moral discourse as a specific social practice. As noted above, the defining purpose of moral discourse is to determine through argument the validity or invalidity of contested moral claims. Whether this practice achieves its common purpose, then, depends solely on the soundness of arguments, the opportunity for criticism, and common pursuit of the truth. Accordingly, its necessary conditions include equal freedom for all participants to advance and contest any claim and the arguments for it; the absence of internal coercion in the form of strategic activity or, stated positively, uncompromised commitment on the part of all participants to seek the truth; and the absence of external coercion that might influence the acceptance or contestation of claims (cf. Habermas, Theory 25; Habermas, Justification 31).

With the term "external coercion," I mean coercion that is not specific to the practice of discourse. A specific social practice occurs in the context of social relationships generally and, therefore, may specify more general norms or principles of social action. The latter are, then, external normative conditions of the specific practice. For instance, valid norms of criminal law are external normative conditions of, say, the specific practice of economic bargaining. In the nature of the case, the external normative conditions cannot be suspended by the internal norms of the specific practice. If there is a legal prohibition of assault, for instance, then assault cannot be a permitted procedure in economic bargaining. Thus, if some or all participants in the specific practice of discourse were permitted to coerce others in relationships generally, the coercion could invade the discourse and corrupt its pursuit of the truth. Let us suppose, for instance, that slavery is morally permissible and a master and slave are to have a discourse about some matter. Under these conditions, the norms of slavery are external conditions that cannot be suspended, and it would be morally permissible for the master to control the supposed discourse by a threat of harsh treatment once the discussion has ceased. Reaching agreement by the force of argument alone would not be morally required. Hence, the necessary conditions of discourse include the absence of external coercion that might influence the contestation or acceptance of claims (cf. Apel, "Types" 342).

To be sure, "coercion" can occur in many specific forms. Generally defined as "dominating, restraining, or controlling another forcibly," coercion involves interference with freedom, where "interference" means that the freedom in question is lessened in comparison with what it would have been had the interfering individual or group not acted at all, and this broad designation leaves open to dispute what kinds of interference are immoral. But the relevant meaning of "coercion" is determined by the formative character of communicative respect; that is, the proscription of interference must be explicitly neutral to all substantive prescriptions. Every such prescription is itself subject to dissent, and, therefore, the relevant freedom cannot be defined in a manner that explicitly answers any question about substantive norms or principles of social action. This means, if we abstract from the actual practice of discourse, that rights to communicative respect protect only those freedoms that can be defined without explicit reference to human association. Insofar as freedom cannot be so defined, a proscription on external coercion requires a substantive principle or norm of social action.

There is, in other words, a strictly individualistic character to the freedoms in question, and they include: freedom to affirm one’s own future as an individual, freedom to control one’s own body, freedom to use personal property, and freedom to choose one’s own understanding of the good. We can speak of corresponding rights to life, to bodily integrity and movement, to the use of personal property, and to conscience -- where having the right means that all others have the duty not to interfere. I will call these formative rights the rights to private liberties, where the term "private" means here that the freedoms in question can be defined without any explicit reference to human association. Clearly, the principle of communicative respect does not mean that the private liberties to which any given individual has a right are unlimited. The freedom of each is morally constrained by, and is subject to interference in order to prevent her or his invasion of, the rightful freedom of all others. Moreover, each has a right to equal freedom, because equal freedom is a necessary condition of the specific practice of discourse. But it remains that this community of rights cannot be overridden by any other moral prescription.

It is now important to show that the private liberties cannot exhaust the freedoms protected by communicative rights, because they include the right to be an actual participant in discourse. Attention to that right returns us to the question about actual patterns or institutions of common decision making. In one sense, moral discourse can occur at any time and any place. This specific practice requires only that two or more individuals agree to suspend other purposes in order to assess the validity of contested moral claims. But it seems wrong to say that an individual is morally bound to engage in discourse whenever a recipient of her or his action contests its moral validity. This would mean, for instance, that participants in an economic transaction are bound to halt their activity whenever any one of them or any affected individual objects to it, or a criminal court judge is bound to halt the trial’s proceedings if the accused dissents from a specific rule of the judicial system. Social action would or, at least, could be constantly disrupted. Moreover, the decision to halt other social action in order to engage in discourse is itself a social action, and a principle that prescribes that decision whenever social action is contested should itself he subject to contestation and common decision. But this is not possible unless there is a particular discourse in which common decisions are taken about when and where actual discourse ought or is permitted to occur.

What the formative principle of communicative respect prescribes, then, is a particular practice of discourse in which the widest possible common decisions are taken. Indeed, ad hoc engagements in discourse always presuppose this widest possible discourse because any argument about the validity of social prescriptions is potentially an argument about the most general moral principles and thus about social action generally. Whatever else is involved, in other words, the right to engage in moral discourse must mean the freedom to participate in a particular association that is constituted as the widest possible moral discourse and in which common decisions may determine the character of social action generally. Given this association, it is not necessary that all social action be disrupted whenever any participant contests its moral validity. Whether and, if so, when more local engagement in discourse is required or permitted can itself be a common decision of the wider discourse, because every individual’s right to discourse is fulfilled by her or his opportunity to express dissent in the particular association whose common decisions are about the moral permissibility of all specific projects or practices.

In sum, the right to participate in moral discourse is the right to participate in political discourse, that is, a particular association or social practice that has nonetheless a general character because its distinguishing purpose is to order or govern all action and association in a society. I will formulate this conclusion by saying that the formative principle of communicative respect prescribes a democratic political association. Moral grounds for the distinctively legal character of political decisions are, I believe, included in this prescription. Because the communicative right to participate in democratic discourse cancels the right to halt at any time any social action whose moral validity one contests, the principle of communicative respect includes the right to have democratic decisions coercively enforced. An association that makes common decisions governing all social action does not honor each individual’s right to dissent from the moral validity of any social action unless the association prevents other individuals from violating its governing decisions. It now follows that the constitutive principles of this association must also be legal in character; that is, an institutional process through which governing activities are properly determined must itself be coercively enforced.

The proper provisions of a democratic constitution institutionalize the formative principle of communicative respect. In sum, we can say that the political association should be constituted as a full and free political discourse. It should be free in the sense that all individuals who are subject to the common decisions in question have equal rights to participation, and the discourse should be full in the sense that it takes no moral principle or norm to be immune from dissent. Calling this association a discourse means that every proposed principle or norm, if questioned, can be redeemed only by argument. "Full and free discourse" is, in other words, a summary expression of the internal conditions of discourse noted earlier: equal freedom of all participants to advance and contest any claim and the arguments for it, and uncompromised commitment on the part all participants to seek the truth. "Full and free political discourse" means that these internal conditions characterize the process by which governance is determined.

For this reason, a democratic constitution should institutionalize the state and stipulate the decision-making procedures through which officials of the state are selected and legislation is enacted, interpreted, and enforced. The constitution should also stipulate the process by which the constitution itself can be changed, allowing that whether any actual constitution is in fact democratic is itself subject to debate. These general requirements do not imply any specific set of political institutions, such that the constitutions of all democracies should be identical in detail. Whatever the detailed provisions, however, they are not democratic unless they allow the political association to maximize the measure in which the taking, interpretation, and enforcement of political decisions is effected through full and free discourse.

Thus, the constitution must also stipulate the right of all individuals or citizens to be participants in the democratic discourse. The duties correlative with these rights must be explicitly neutral to all substantive social prescriptions precisely because the discourse is about those prescriptions in their pertinence to legal norms. Properly speaking, a democratic constitution provides the one set of legal prescriptions that must be explicitly accepted by all citizens as participants in the political discourse, including discourse about whether the actual constitution is in fact democratic and, indeed, whether democracy itself is the proper form of the political association. We might say that the constitutional rights of citizens are those that all political participants must explicitly accept in order to have a political discourse about what all political participants must explicitly accept in order to have a political discourse -- and it is this character that makes the rights formative. In addition to the rights to private liberties previously discussed, then, a democratic constitution must also stipulate a set of rights to public liberties, which includes the familiar rights to freedom of speech, freedom of the press, freedom to assemble and petition, due process, and equal protection of the laws.

The public liberties also include the right to religious freedom. Indeed, religious freedom may be understood as the inclusive constitutional right of democratic citizens, in the sense that all other constitutional rights are conditions of it. In saying this, I assume that religious freedom is the right of each citizen to choose her or his explicit belief about the most fundamental character of reality and human purpose, and thus a democratic constitution stipulates that no such belief is illegitimate5. Given that assumption, the right to choose one’s religion is the right to free participation in a political discourse that is also full, a discourse in which no claim that purports to be a contribution to political decision is immune to criticism and, if contested, requires argumentative redemption. Hence, the principle of religious freedom also implies that constitutional stipulations should do nothing more than institutionalize the formative principle of communicative respect; they cannot properly require of any citizen as a political participant explicit adherence to any substantive prescription for social action. But just because the constitution is formative, protection of the rights it stipulates cannot be overridden by any other moral prescription, including any religious one, that is pertinent to the activities of the state.6

III. The Comprehensive Principle

I have pursued an outline of formative human rights in order to argue programmatically that a moral and political theory backed by neoclassical metaphysics may be understood to prescribe the universal principle of communicative respect as an indirect application of a comprehensive telos. Some may propose, however, that a convincing argument for communicative rights achieves too much because it contradicts the assertion that moral theory requires such a telos. In the nature of the case, this assertion implies that no moral prescription is valid independently of the comprehensive good. Against that implication, it might be said, the argument for formative human rights validates the norms of a universal social practice without appeal to any conception of a comprehensive good. Indeed Apel himself, to whom the previous argument is indebted, draws precisely that conclusion. On his account, the principle of communicative respect is "a meta-norm for communicatively generating material norms" ("Types" 335), where this means that the former is independent of any of the latter, and thus there are no universal moral principles that are substantive in character.

Apel does not mean that the principle of communicative respect is the only valid social prescription. This formative principle presupposes that moral claims can be accepted or contested because they can be valid or invalid and, thereby, presupposes the possibility of valid substantive prescriptions. Nor can this consequence be avoided by saying that, substantive prescriptions aside, a valid claim could still be made for the principle of communicative respect itself. It cannot be the case that the only prescription from which it makes sense to dissent is a prescription about whether one has a right to dissent, because this prescription implies that there is something else one might contest. In the end, this is just to say that democracy makes no sense in the absence of something about which citizens may engage in full and free discourse. If the political practice constituted by communicative respect is a democratic discourse, this discourse cannot be solely about the norms of that practice. This would mean that democratic politics has nothing to argue about except its own constitution, and it would be senseless to constitute a discourse for the sole purpose of constituting it. To the contrary, the discourse is about the activities of the state or about legislated norms by which all social action will be governed. Were valid claims for substantive prescriptions impossible, political decisions could not be the consequence of discourse, and governance by discourse could not govern.

For Apel, then, no other valid social prescription is, like the principle of communicative respect, universal. This principle presupposes that there are or, at least, can be valid substantive prescriptions but implies nothing about what they are. Hence, the principle is formal or independent of any material norm. So far as I can see, however, this position is self-contradictory. The presupposition that substantive prescriptions can be valid is senseless unless the principle of communicative respect also implies the meaning of "valid substantive prescription," that is, implies the criterion in terms of which substantive prescriptions can be distinguished as valid and invalid. But a criterion for this distinction is itself a substantive moral principle. It is, moreover, a universal substantive principle, since the implications of universal principles are themselves universal. I recognize that, for Apel, the universal criterion of valid substantive prescriptions is simply that they can be redeemed by argument or in moral discourse. But the meta-ethical character of moral discourse cannot itself be the criterion in terms of which sound and unsound moral arguments can be distinguished in or through discourse. To the contrary, this distinction requires a principle of substantive moral validity, such that a sound argument shows the conformity of a given prescription to that principle. Hence, a democratic constitution implies not only the possibility of valid substantive prescriptions but also a universal principle to which all the activities of the state or legislated norms governing social action ought to conform.

If we use the term "principles of justice" to designate specifically political principles, we can say that the universal rights of communicative respect imply that justice has a compound character. In other words, a valid theory of justice requires an internal distinction between the formative principle or set of principles that should be explicitly articulated in a democratic constitution and the substantive principle or set of principles that ought to determine decisions taken in or through the full and free political discourse. Because this distinction must be internal to the theory, the character of justice must be "self-differentiating," and the nature of this self-differentiation may be stated as follows: The substantive principle or set of principles consistently implies as an aspect of itself the overriding formative principles of a democratic constitution, and thus the formative or constitutional principles imply as their own ground the substantive principle or principles of justice, even if it is no business of the constitution to stipulate what is substantively required.

Whether justice in this compound sense itself depends on a comprehensive purpose is another question. An affirmative answer to this question takes issue with moral thinkers such as Gewirth, who fully agree that universal moral principles cannot be exhausted by the formative rights I have identified but also hold that the supreme substantive principle is nonteleological. Although I dunk that Gewirth’s proposal is subject to the criticism of nonteleological ethics I suggested summarily near the outset, anything approaching a decisive resolution of this issue in favor of teleological ethics will require nothing less than a more or less complete case for a metaphysical proposal. I cannot pursue such a resolution here. Instead, I will assume that the case for neoclassical metaphysics can otherwise be made and attempt programmatically to show that the comprehensive purpose it formulates grounds justice as compound, grounds a substantive principle of justice that consistently implies the formative human rights of communicative respect.7 Toward the conclusion of this argument, I will also seek to identify an inclusive human right that is substantive in character.

In order to proceed with this task, I will here merely stipulate what I take to be conceptions of the comprehensive purpose and thus the comprehensive good backed by neoclassical metaphysics. On this metaphysical account, reality as such includes as its primal source and final end a divine individual that is distinguished from all others by virtue of its complete relativity to all actual things as actual and all possible things as possibilities. As implied by this divine sociality, all other individuals are also socially constituted and are defined by their fragmentary or partial relativity. Thus, the basic metaphysical notion is "creativity," which means that actualization consists in the unification of diverse relations. Accordingly, "good" in its metaphysical sense consists in the realization of unity-in-diversity as a contribution to the all-inclusive divine creativity, and the greater good is the realization of greater creativity. The comprehensive purpose is maximal unity-in-diversity realized in the world and, therefore, in the divine reality.

In comparison with nonhuman worldly existence, human activities enjoy opportunities for good that are vastly extended. The difference is finally a difference of degree, but the degree of difference is so dramatic that Whitehead can say "the Rubicon has been crossed" (Modes 38). For this reason, future human creativity occupies a preeminent place in our pursuit of the comprehensive telos. With respect to that pursuit, moreover, there is a sense in which we act best toward the natural world when we aim at the maximal human future. Greater possibilities everywhere depend on a greater order of creativity in the relevant past. "The universe," says Whitehead "achieves its values by reason of its coordination into societies of societies and into societies of societies of societies" (Adventures 206). Given the dramatically higher possibilities in human existence, it follows, at least in a summary sense, that our effects on the coordination of nonhuman societies in the world maximize value in the universe when they maximize the possibilities of human achievement -- and, by implication, in the long run. This is emphatically not to say that good is identical with human achievement, much less with the satisfaction of human wants and preferences. To the contrary, unity-in-diversity is intrinsically good wherever it is achieved because every realization of it makes a difference to the divine good. The conclusion here concerns the teleological order within the world as a principle for practical deliberation and, in that sense, asserts a coincidence between maximizing creativity in the world as such and maximizing future human good.

On this conclusion, the comprehensive purpose as a principle for moral decisions may be formulated: maximize creativity in the human future as such. Even granting something like the teleological order I have asserted, however, some may doubt that this formulation adequately states our responsibilities to our natural habitat, especially responsibilities to the diversity of species in the nonhuman world and to individual animals, at least within species whose members exhibit the capacity to suffer. Prescribing pursuit of maximal human good may appear to authorize an instrumental treatment of the natural world in ways inconsistent with its importance to the divine good. The issues implicit in these considerations require a longer discussion than the focus here on the question of human rights allows. Perhaps pursuit of the maximal human creativity should be constrained by the following principle of environmental respect: A purpose that reduces natural creativity relative to some alternative for the decision in question is a violation of the maximal divine good unless the purpose is required in order to maximize human creativity in the long run.8 All implications considered, I expect that maximizing human creativity itself includes adherence to this principle. Precisely because the nonhuman world is intrinsically valuable, the good we realize is greater, other things equal, when our relations to the natural habitat appreciate the nonhuman world for its own sake. In any event, I will assume the principle of environmental respect as I also assume the coincidence of maximizing human good and maximizing creativity as such.

The distinctive character of human life that grounds this coincidence further implies a coincidence between maximizing human opportunities as such and maximizing the order of creativity in the relevant human past. The higher possibilities of human achievement are a gift from past human achievements, favorably ordered, where the human past includes both the previous activities of the individual in question and the communities of individuals to whom she or he relates. Because the contribution to value of any given activity is greater when, other things equal, it affects subsequent activity more widely, we can say that the comprehensive telos prescribes the pursuit of our maximal common humanity -- and, by implication, in the long run. What should be maximized, in other words, is the creativity shared between or among human individuals. On my reading, this was Whitehead’s point when he attached to "statesmen the hope that "variously coordinated groups should contribute to the complex pattern of community life, each in virtue of its peculiarity. In this way, individuality gains the effectiveness which issues from coordination, and freedom obtains power necessary for its perfection" (Adventures 67).

The term "common humanity" is sometimes used to mean descriptively the characteristics or normatively the rights that are universally human. In contrast, I designate thereby the common world insofar as it is constituted by the communication of distinctively human achievement. Because this distinctively human order should be maximized, it has a certain self-surpassing character; relativity to a greater common humanity offers individuals the possibility for a greater contribution to it, and the possibility realized amplifies opportunity further. To be sure, the possibility may not be realized; individuals may compromise the achievement they might otherwise contribute or debase the human order of which they are the beneficiaries. Thus, the self-surpassing character of our common humanity is a teleological or normative feature; it identifies what is meant to be the case.

Since each individual must decide what to make of the opportunity she or he is given, our maximal common humanity may be reformulated in terms of the conditions of emancipation. On this suggestion, "emancipation" means the opportunity to be creative, the measure of power that "issues from coordination," and individuals are more or less emancipated depending on the natural and human context in which their lives are set. Because the order created by human achievements is greater insofar as each individual benefits from and contributes to it, our comprehensive telos prescribes pursuit of everyone’s emancipation. For any given individual, the conditions of emancipation are complex, consisting in part of those that are distinctively hers or his and extending through those specific to intimate and local associations to those shared within increasingly wider communities. In their widest form, we may speak of "general conditions of emancipation," those that are important or potentially important to the creativity of any individual. I have in mind conditions such as those of health, economic provision, education, cultural richness, environmental integrity, and the general patterns of associational life itself. These, on my accounting, are the subject matter of justice. Summarily speaking, the pursuit of justice seeks to maximize the general conditions for more distinctive local associations and individuals and, thereby to maximize everyone’s emancipation.

During the earlier review of the case against teleological ethics, I argued that a comprehensive teleology may ground its own indirect application through social practices or institutions, whose norms are morally binding whatever the consequences of action "separately taken." Indirect applications are prescribed insofar as the social coordination and cooperation such practices make possible is required in order to maximize the good. It should be evident that maximizing the emancipation of all and, thereby, our common humanity prescribes a wide range of social practices. Emancipation would be quickly reduced to primitive levels in the absence of norms that steady and enhance the character of human interaction.

Moreover, this teleological validation of social practices is not merely empirical, such that any given or proposed social practice should be assessed through a consideration of its contingent consequences. To the contrary, this telos grounds the meta-ethical principle of communicative respect and thus the universal practice constituted by it, because our maximal common humanity prescribes pursuit of everyone’s emancipation. Greater emancipation means a greater range of possible purposes. Whatever the possibilities given to an individual by some morally valid social action of which she or he is a recipient, the possibility of accepting those effects because they are morally valid is always consistent with them -- and the absence of this freedom lessens emancipation. Whatever social action is morally prescribed, in other words, an individual’s range of purposes is greater if she or he can also choose whether to dissent from her or his social context. Being a recipient of communicative respect is, we may say, a formative condition of emancipation.

This means that our maximal common humanity also grounds teleologically a democratic political association, because democracy is prescribed by the principle of communicative respect. The right to participate in the widest possible moral discourse, through which social practices are legislated and justice is pursued, is also a formative condition of emancipation. Moreover, the substantive principle of justice that ought to be convincing in democratic discourse and, through the discourse, to control political decisions is implicit in what has been said. Because the general conditions of emancipation are the subject matter of justice and legislated social practices should serve our maximal common humanity, this substantive principle of justice may be formulated as follows: Maximize the measure of general conditions of emancipation that is equally available to all. But the phrase "the measure of" is redundant, given the term "maximize," so that we max’ restate the principle more concisely: Maximize the general conditions of emancipation to which there is equal access. Let us call this the principle of justice as general emancipation, using the term "general" to express not only the kind of emancipatory conditions with which justice is properly concerned but also the prescription to maximize the measure of those conditions that is generally available or equally available to all.

Naturally, much more needs to be said in order adequately to clarify this conception of justice in a manner that is internally coherent and practically consequential. Among other things, one must explicate how maximizing the opportunity equally available to all relates the several differing general conditions of emancipation to each other. But if we assume that this larger task can be successfully completed, we have reason to assert that justice so conceived is self-differentiating in the sense that marks the compound character of justice. Given that our maximal common humanity grounds teleologically the formative principle of communicative respect and thus a democratic political association, the substantive principle of justice as general emancipation consistently implies as an aspect of itself the overriding formative principles of a democratic constitution. Whatever legal norms increase the measure of general emancipation to which there is equal access, this measure is less than it might be unless all are subjects of the rights to private and public liberties. Thus, the political duty to secure these communicative rights cannot be canceled by any other duties justice may prescribe. This is simply to repeat that these alone are the rights properly protected by a democratic constitution, with which all other political decisions should be consistent.

Success in clarifying the substantive principle of justice will also make possible the formulation of a universal human right that I will call the right to general emancipation. In contrast to the formative rights properly stipulated in a democratic constitution, this is a substantive right, and it may be stated as follows: Human individuals as such have a right to the greatest measure of general emancipatory conditions that a legal order can provide or promote equally for all. The associational order or set of social practices that is legislated by a political association has as its specific purpose nothing other than securing for all individuals this universal right. Having done so, moreover, the norms of the legal order override direct application of the comprehensive purpose. These norms are to be observed whatever the consequences. Thus, we can say that our maximal common humanity prescribes a compound set of human rights, an inclusive substantive right to general emancipation that consistently implies as an aspect of itself the formative rights of communicative respect.

Conspicuously absent from justice so conceived is the constitutional guarantee of any substantive rights -- for instance, the right to assistance with basic economic necessities if one cannot provide them for oneself or the right to some level of health care or the right to some measure of education. This absence may seem to put a democratic constitution at odds with itself, because the formative right to equal participation in democratic discourse is in fact worthless unless one’s substantive right to general emancipatory conditions is at least in some measure secured. There is something quite disingenuous in saying, for instance, that citizens of the United States who suffer economic and social deprivation can be nonetheless equal participants in the political process. But the affirmation that all human individuals have certain substantive rights democratic communities should secure is one thing, and the assertion that these rights should be stipulated in a political constitution is something else. If democratic politics can be constituted only as a full and free discussion and debate, then the constitution should be explicitly neutral to all substantive principles and norms of human association, any claim for which is subject to contestation within the discourse.

This is not to deny that democratic discourse is impaired by substantive inequalities that the political community can and should alter. But whether the political process is in fact democratic cannot be guaranteed by the constitution. For instance, the constitution cannot enforce a commitment to discourse itself in distinction from the use of political procedures strategically to pursue ones own interests. To the contrary, the constitution can only anticipate that citizens will engage in a pursuit of the truth. Similarly, although for different reasons, we must say that a democratic constitution anticipates substantive justice in the activities of the democratic state. Democracy itself is not possible unless the constituted political process is in large or, at least, tolerable measure successful, so that governance fulfills its moral obligations by pursuing justice as general emancipation. It then follows that the citizens of a democracy have a formative right, under certain circumstances, to alter the current regime by extra-legal means. At least when the substantive barriers to full and free discourse are intolerable, the anticipation of the constitution itself may permit activity that violates statutory law. But this formative right is also characterized by severe constraints. The practice constituted by rights to private liberties may not be violated and, further, rebellion is bound by something like the following principle: Extra-legal attempts to establish what one takes to be the substantive conditions of a full and free discourse are not permitted unless the changes are more likely to occur or to occur more quickly in this manner than through legal activity, and the democratic political process is likely to sustain the changes once they are made.

Assuming that this statement of principles for a conception of human rights backed by neoclassical metaphysics can be given a detailed formulation and defense, we may repeat that a moral and political theory of this kind is the more important because the alternative it offers is largely neglected in the contemporary discussion. In agreement with most nonteleological expressions in the liberal political tradition, this theory affirms that rights articulate a universal or natural moral law; but, against the persisting weight of the modern natural law tradition, the universal right to general emancipation is not bound to the assertion that human rights are independent of any inclusive good. In agreement with some recent communitarian proposals, this theory affirms that rights are inseparable from a common good; but, against the assumption that this good is in all respects historically specific, the right to general emancipation is inseparable from a comprehensive good. The comprehensive purpose exiled from modern moral and political thought is reasserted as the purpose of human rights. They are secured morally and politically by the telos of our maximal common humanity and, through it, the maximal divine good.

 

Notes

1. An earlier draft of this essay was discussed at a conference on human rights sponsored by the Center for Process Studies and held in honor of Douglas Sturm. I am grateful to participants in that conference and to subsequent assessors for Process Studies for their critical assistance, and I dedicate this essay to Douglas Sturm.

2. We can also say that nonteleological theories commit "the partialist fallacy." Any such theory is partialist because it defines the difference between moral and immoral action in terms of an abstract aspect of possible actions, namely, whether the alternatives for choice do or do not observe certain constraints on the pursuit of ends. Because the nonteleological principle or set of principles is independent of any inclusive end, the implication is that the alternatives in other respects are neither moral nor immoral. But, then, any such theory is fallacious because it implicitly asserts that alternatives in respects other than those marked by the nonteleological principle are morally indifferent, and that assertion is a moral evaluation of the alternatives in those other respects. The mistake committed when one equates a concrete entity with some abstract aspect of it is what Whitehead calls "the fallacy of misplaced concreteness" (Process 7). We can say that the partialist fallacy, a commitment of which mistakes the evaluation of some abstract aspect for an evaluation of possible actions as wholes, is the fallacy of misplaced concreteness as it appears in moral theory.

3. I do not object to the terms "act-teleology" and "rule-teleology" as long as we allow that the latter may have differing meanings. In contrast to some forms of rule-teleology, I understand indirect applications to mean that the comprehensive telos justifies social practices, that is, institutions or patterns of coordination in which the participating social actions cannot be described independently of constitutive norms or principles that bind actors whatever the consequences (cf. Rawls, "Two Concepts").

4. To speak strictly, one should say that the principle is meta-ethical because the prescribed action is insofar or in that respect explicitly neutral to all moral disagreement. Any action that observes this principle will exemplify other characteristics in addition to such observance. But I will assume that "insofar" or "in that respect" is understood.

5. I do not mean that every explicit belief of this kind is a religious one. Some may be merely philosophical or ideological in nature. A religion, on my intention, is a cultural formation or cultural system in terms of which adherents of the religion seek to mediate or cultivate their implicit beliefs about the fundamental character of reality and human purpose -- where any such implicit belief is a decision for a self-understanding with which a person leads her or his life. As a political principle, however, freedom to choose one’s religion in this sense implies the freedom to choose one’s explicit belief about reality and human purpose as such, even if that belief is merely philosophical or ideological in nature. This is because the freedom to choose one’s religion is the freedom to decide whether any given religion is true, and, since all given religions may be false, the freedom so to decide must be included within religious freedom.

6. Given the possibility of constitutional amendment, some may argue, it is not necessary to limit constitutional stipulations to formative conditions. Substantive constitutional prescriptions do not contradict a full and free political discourse because the provision for constitutional change stipulates that even these prescriptions are subject to dissent. But this argument misses the point. Because explicit acceptance of the constitution defines citizens as participants in the political process, only formative constitutional prescriptions are consistent with the possibility of discourse about the constitution itself. In contrast, constitutional stipulations that are substantive contradict the provision for constitutional change because they falsely assert that they must be explicitly accepted by any political participant who seeks to change them democratically The contradiction becomes fully apparent if we recognize that the argument for permitting substantive constitutional prescriptions also permits an established religion.

7. It may be worth emphasizing that the substantive principle of justice in a teleological ethic (or, for that matter, any ethic at all) is invalid unless it consistently implies the formative human rights of communicative respect. Since the principle of communicative respect is meta-ethical, it is implied, consistently or inconsistently, by any ethic at all.

8. In terms of this principle, I expect, one might speak of the prima facie "rights" of nonhuman animals, at least of those that are conscious, and in a more extended sense of the term, the prima facie "right" of the natural order to its own diversity

 

Works Cited

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Happiness and the Public World: Beyond Political Liberalism

In recent years, many political thinkers have argued that political liberalism is impoverished, so that our political future is better served by efforts to transcend that tradition. Frequently, the titles of their books express this general claim, e.g., Theodore J. Lowi’s The End of Liberalism (EL), Robert Paul Wolfe’s The Poverty of Liberalism (PL), and Henry S. Kariel’s Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow (BL). Because I find considerable merit in this claim, this paper intends to suggest that Whitehead’s thought provides a perspective within which to fashion a more adequate political vision.

As a kind of political thought, "liberalism" has many meanings. In its more common contemporary use, it contrasts with political "conservatism," such that contemporary American political discussion is often largely understood as a debate between the two. But the case against liberalism offered by recent thinkers indicts commitments held by both parties to that debate. In other words, "liberalism" is used by these thinkers with a more inclusive meaning, according to which the tradition of political Liberalism dates back at least to the philosophy of John Locke and numbers Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, Adam Smith, Thomas Jefferson, Milton Friedman, and Reinhold Niebuhr among its spokesmen. In this light, the common contemporary senses of "liberal" and "conservative" refer to contentious members of the same political family. This essay also uses liberalism in the broad sense.

Although it is clear that Whitehead thought and wrote about politics, it is debatable whether he formulated an explicit political philosophy. My intent here is not to examine his specifically political writings but to pursue some of the political implications of his metaphysical system. There are important respects in which these implications might themselves be called liberal, many of which have been identified by Samuel H. Beer (CR). But to seek a political vision more adequate than liberalism is not necessarily to repudiate liberalism entirely, and I will also discuss how the basic liberal affirmation of freedom and individuality is appropriated in Whitehead’s thought. Nonetheless, the burden of this essay is to identify a certain respect in which Whitehead’s thought departs from liberal commitments. Specifically, I will argue that Whitehead’s perspective yields an understanding of happiness sufficiently different from the liberal view that Whitehead’s thought can be the basis for a transcendence of the liberal tradition.

I. The Poverty of Liberalism

Fundamental to liberal political theory is what I call liberalism’s "private view of happiness." This view is, I hold, more or less pervasively affirmed, explicitly or implicitly, throughout the liberal tradition, so that its absence would provide good reason to doubt whether the theory in question is a part of that tradition. Subsequent to the utilitarians, the term "happiness" has not enjoyed widespread currency in political theory. The terms "interest" and "self-interest" are more familiar, and I will use these as synonyms for "happiness." Each of the three will denote the good for a human individual.1 Because of its long association with the liberal tradition, "interest" is so often used to mean an individual’s private happiness that the phrase "private view of interest" may seem redundant. Principally because of its utilitarian usage, "happiness" has something of the same problem, although it also has classical associations that make it more easily disengaged from liberalism. In any case, I wish to make clear that both terms are used here in a broader sense, such that the liberal view of interest (or self-interest, or happiness) is simply one of the alternatives.2 In speaking of a private view of self-interest, I mean that human community is thought to be solely instrumental to, i.e., not constitutive of, happiness. What is privative about self-interest in liberal theory is its exclusion of human community. Consequently, freedom as a political principle has generally received from liberals a negative definition. Since political principles identify the proper relations between humans, and since these relations are not constitutive of happiness, freedom has meant the absence of authority or coercion, i.e., the liberty to pursue happiness without human interference.

This reading of the liberal tradition is in accord with Wolfe’s claim that liberalism is "methodologically individualist." In Wolfe’s usage, this term means precisely that human interaction is not constitutive of interests (PL, chapters i and v, esp. 74). Other students of liberalism have held that its view of happiness is not only private but also preferential, i.e., that the nature of one’s self-interest is solely a matter of preference, so that one’s happiness is defined in whatever way one pleases. Thus Sheldin Wolin says that, for liberalism, "what was important was not any supposed ‘objective’ status of interest but what each individual believed to be his interest" (PV 339). Similarly, Roberto Mangabeira Unger says that for liberal psychology "desires are arbitrary from the perspective of the understanding" and that for liberal political theory "value is the social face of desire" (KP 44, 67). Kenneth and Patricia Dolbeare claim that "the goals of liberalism can be succinctly stated. In general, they are that as many individuals as possible realize as many of their private preferences as possible" (AmI 6).

There is room to argue that the preferential view of self-interest is not completely generic to liberal theory. Some liberals have held that there are certain private needs, notably biological ones, the fulfillment of which is essential to happiness. Thus Locke, for whom human life was God’s creation, insisted that "every one is bound to preserve himself, and not to quit his station willfully" (TG II, section 6), i.e., that the conditions necessary to a responsible maintenance of God’s workmanship are a part of one’s interest. Generally, however, even those liberals who recognize certain essential private needs do not assert that self-interest as such can be objectively defined. Happiness is understood as the fulfillment of needs and wants, such that meeting certain needs is a precondition for the pursuit of wants, and the wants are whatever one believes or prefers them to be. Thus, the liberal view of happiness is untenable unless the preferential view can be defended, and there is at least rough justice in saying that the liberal understanding of self-interest is not only private but also preferential.

In any case, an equation of private with preferential was historically effected by the alliance between liberal thought and modern economics. Wolin has described how the liberal discontent with all forms of political authority led to a fascination with the idea that economic society could be a "self-adjusting order," a "network of activities carried on by actors who knew no principle of authority." As a consequence, Wolin continues, the study of economics tended to escalate into a study of society as a whole (PV 301, 299-305). "Political Economy" -- or, better perhaps, "Economic Polity" -- was born. Economics, at least in the classical and neoclassical forms that have dominated its modern development, is a science that analyzes interactions as exchanges relevant to ends determined by consumer preferences, such that the ends lie beyond the domain of the inquiry. "The economist . . . considers how the distribution of human activities affects the satisfaction of human wants, the wants being taken for granted" (MDS 103). The development of liberal theory based upon a preferential view- of happiness has had momentous consequences in the modern west, including complicity in the general subordination of political affairs to economic goals. Also, the increasing discontent with the dominance of economic institutions in this country is one of the principal reasons for the belief that liberalism is impoverished (see BL, KP, PL).

Because it has appropriated the preferential view of happiness, much academic political science has become a territory within liberalism’s sphere of influence. In his widely persuasive attempt to apply "systems theory" to political analysis, for instance, David Easton writes that "what distinguishes political interactions . . . is that they are predominantly oriented toward the authoritative allocation of values for a society" (EPA 50; see also PcS, chapter v). We need not pause to be precise about the terms "authoritative" and "society," since these serve in Easton’s definition to distinguish political from other kinds of human interaction. What is relevant here is Easton’s understanding of the values that politics (and other kinds of human interaction) allocates, and it is clear throughout his work that these are assumed to be "expressions of our preferences," i.e., "can ultimately be reduced to emotional responses conditioned by the individual’s total life experience" (PcS 22, 221). Easton is a significant example. In his recent analysis of contemporary social and political theory, David J. Bernstein argues that "when we concentrate on . . . mainstream social science, we detect . . . the constant suggestion that in the final analysis ‘values’ are only individual emotional responses" (RSPT 53).

Mainstream political science has not deliberately sought to be an advocate for liberalism. As Bernstein discusses, the dominant intent of Easton and others has been to develop a study of politics "modeled after the methodological assumptions of the natural sciences" (EPA 8; see RSPT, part I). Since natural science seeks to explain events independently of any final causation (i.e., of purpose or value), Easton distinguishes categorically between explanatory theories of political science and normative theories designed to provide principles for political choice (see PcS, chapter 9). In other words, mainstream political science has insisted upon the logical independence of fact and value, such that only propositions about facts can be properly called true or false, and the study of political facts is "value-neutral" or "value-free." The liberal tradition, then, is one of the normative perspectives from which this approach to political science means to be independent. For liberal theorists have never embraced the thoroughgoing "emotivist" understanding of ethics implied in "value-free" science. If they have held to a preferential view of self-interest, these theorists have also affirmed one or more political principles having to do with the proper distribution of interest-fulfillment (principles such as equal liberty, equal opportunity, the greatest happiness of the greatest number) and asserted that these principles are in some sense objective and true.

Nonetheless, precisely the scientific intent to be "value-free" opened common ground for political science and political liberalism. Seeking a conception of politics that is logically independent of values, political science found attractive the view that human community is solely instrumental to preferences. As long as politics is solely a means to decide which among competing and complementary preferential interests will be honored and denied, political activity is defined independently of any particular preference. I have already indicated how liberalism has been implicated in the subordination of politics to economic purposes and institutions. Because it appropriated the preferential view of self-interest, "value-free" political science has become a servant of the same master.

The conclusion just reached suggests that supposedly value-free political science has had value commitments in spite of itself, at least to the extent that it affirms happiness to be a private matter.5 In addition, I am persuaded that political science explicitly based upon a preferential view of self-interest always implicitly invokes an objective criterion of happiness. If the interaction of politics is interpreted in terms of its service to various preferences, the interests of various individuals must be compared. Thus, to describe the deliberations of a political body in light of its "allocation of values," i.e., in terms of conflicting and complementary interests that are honored and denied, is to imply that the similarities and differences between those interests can be determined. Were this not the case, one could never know that the honoring of some was the denial of others. But comparison requires some principle of measurement, i.e., the various interests must be "values" of a common variable, and this variable is the tacit criterion of happiness invoked. In contemporary discussions, the common variable used is frequently the measure of money, i.e., interests are compared on the basis of what satisfaction costs in monetary terms, and this reflects the extent to which economic presuppositions have influenced our understanding of politics.

This argument simply rephrases Aristotle. Since all human activity aims at some good, Aristotle claimed, a science of action requires a knowledge of the chief good (NE 1094a 1-1094b 11). His point was that human action is purposive, such that each action is defined by the putative good that it pursues. (Whether this good is thought to be preferential or objective is, at the moment, irrelevant.) Consequently, a science of the relations between human actions (e.g., an interpretation of political interaction) inescapably involves an ordering of human purposes, i.e., an evaluation of the supposed goods. The same point can be made in terms more familiar to the Whiteheadian tradition. Since all human activity is constituted in some measure by choice, a theory of human interaction cannot be based upon a principle of efficient causation. Consequently, a theory of politics requires an ordering principle of final causation, i.e., a principle of value, which alone allows one to describe the relations among choices.6 Perhaps enough has been said, then, to indicate a line of argument through which the liberal view of happiness may be challenged and attention to an alternative provoked. Therefore, I now turn to the thought of Whitehead.

II. A Whiteheadian View of Happiness

With Aristotle, I have claimed that political affairs cannot be understood independently of a principle of value. Whitehead concurs. Indeed, for Whitehead, nothing can be fully understood independently of its importance, for reality as such is value-realization.

As an enterprise in metaphysics, Whitehead’s thought seeks to identify those "universals characterizing ultimate matter of fact" (PR 31), i.e., those highest generalities exemplified in all concrete things. The final appeal in this endeavor, he contends, is to "the self-evidence of experience" (MT 158), although it should be emphasized that our experience of metaphysical generalities is neither immediately obvious to consciousness nor readily expressible. Also, the appeal to experience is, in Whitehead, wedded with rationalism. The expression of metaphysical apprehensions should be clear and coherent and, because those generalities are strictly universal, should permit of no alternative. A metaphysically irrational world, in other words, could never be experienced.

"Our primary experience," says Whitehead, is a "sense of worth" (MT 149). "Primary" here does not mean chronologically prior but rather primordial, such that the experience of specific objects is always a discrimination within what is given to experience primordially. "The details are a reaction to the totality" (MT 148f). In saying that this original experience is a "sense of worth," Whitehead means that we experience reality as such to be the realization of importance. "The dim meaning of fact -- or actuality -- is intrinsic importance for itself, for others, and for the whole" (MT 159). This last citation introduces "the primitive stage of discrimination" in our experience of totality. "The value-experience differentiates itself in the sense of many existences with value-experience; and this sense of the multiplicity of value-experiences again differentiates itself] into the totality of value-experience, and the many other value-experiences, and the egoistic value-experience" (MT 150).

That each distinguished value-experience has importance for others as well as itself is another way of saying that they are differentiations within an originative sense of worth. Each value-experience is self-determined unification of its relations to other value-experiences. It is, we might say, an evaluation of other evaluations. "The many become one and are increased by one" (PR 32). The relations between these occasions of experience are temporally asymmetrical; past occasions have value for the present, but not vice-versa. Each "arises as an effect facing its past and ends as a cause facing its future" (AI 194). In between lies the exercise of freedom, without which the occasion could not be unified, i.e., could not be one value-experience (see AI 255). Since Whitehead, with Aristotle, holds that the exercise of freedom aims at some good (i.e., unification is a value-experience), he also says that "in between [the past from which things arise and the future toward which they end] lies the teleology of the universe" (AI 194).

The teleology of the universe is defined by the totality. Whitehead insists that totality itself is differentiated as a value-experience, i.e., that our experience discloses an individual completely inclusive of all others, so that value for self and others is also value for the whole. As the term "totality" implies, the distinction between the whole and all others (or, as Whitehead also says, between God and the world) is one of inclusiveness. The others are fragmentary, inclusive of the multiplicity only in some degree (and, in the case of most of the multiplicity, only in a trivial degree). The whole, on the contrary, loses nothing. Thus, without importance for the whole, there would be no measure of an actuality’s value. Neither the self, because it has importance for others, nor any of the others, because they are fragmentary, can provide this measure. "Importance is primarily monistic in its reference to the Universe. . . . In some sense or other, Importance is derived from the immanence of infinitude in the finite" (MT 28). Here lies the basis in Whitehead’s thought for the relation of philosophical theology to questions of values and ethics -- and, therefore, of religion to politics.

Because totality is constituted by its completely adequate relativity, i.e., its inclusiveness of all things, it is in essence a unity-in-diversity, an aesthetic composition. This composition can be greater or less only insofar as what it includes is greater or less, so that the value for the whole depends upon the unity-in-diversity realized in the fragmentary occasions of the world. The principle of value is aesthetic, and this is another way of saying that importance is the measure of the metaphysical fact that the many become one and are increased by one. "Beauty . . . is the one aim which by its very nature is self-justifying," because "the teleology of the universe is directed to the production of beauty" (AI 266, 265).

The aesthetic character of reality means that every worldly value-experience contributes to the divine totality partly through the beauty that it actualizes and partly through its contribution to the beauty of subsequent occasions. Moreover, I believe that present beauty is maximized when the occasion’s aim is to maximize the future. There are some passages where, to all appearances, Whitehead denies this. An occasion exercises its freedom, he says, toward "intensity of feeling (a) in the immediate subject and (/3) in the relevant future." Because the anticipation of the future is a part of the present, he continues, "this double aim . . . is less divided than appears on the surface" (PR 23). But this seems to imply that the two are divided in some measure. Thus, he also writes: "Of course, the present can be sacrificed for the future, so that Truth or Beauty in the future can be the reason for the immediate attenuation of either" (AI 241).

But consider the consequence if the pursuit of maximal beauty for all is not coincident with maximal beauty for self. It follows that the divine telos is not the production of beauty but the production of the pursuit of beauty, and the two are not identical. Every future creation, when it arrives, is present. If the best decision does not maximize beauty in the present, maximal beauty cannot be the good. But maximal beauty must be the telos of the universe, otherwise there is no point in pursuing it. In short, the result is absurd.7 I am persuaded, therefore, that the passages cited above introduce inconsistency into Whitehead’s formulation. In contrast, the following citation suggests the more coherent position: "The antithesis between the general good and the individual interest can only be abolished when the individual is such that its interest is in the general good, thus exemplifying the loss of minor intensities in order to find them again with finer composition in a wider sweep of interest" (PR 23). In any case, I conclude that the present cannot be sacrificed in the pursuit of maximal future beauty. Rather that pursuit is maximal present beauty.

The aesthetic character of reality also means that the importance which an occasion can have for itself and the future depends upon the importance that the past has for it. Where the latter is greater, the possibilities of the present occasion are increased. This in no way implies that the worth of an occasion is completely determined by others. Unification, as we have seen, is a free creation. The value of an occasion depends in part upon what it does with the world presented to it. Again, however, the two are correlated. The measure of freedom that an occasion may exercise depends upon its inheritance. Thus, for instance, the self-conscious freedom of human activity is made possible by the extremely complex order that it is privileged to appropriate, including the conditions which support life on this earth and the complexity of the human body. Indeed, to say that a more important order offers greater freedom and to say that it offers greater possibilities of value are two ways of saying the same thing.

With respect to human life, it is important to note that individuals or persons are not single value-experiences. Rather, specifically human existence is, in Whitehead’s term, a "personal society," i.e., a temporal sequence of occasions which share, by virtue of inheritance from the earlier to the later, a defining characteristic that makes the man or woman in question just this individual and not some other. Thus, when speaking of persons, the appropriate reference of "self" and "others" alters. Importance for self now refers not simply to the immediate experience but also to future experiences in the personal society of which the present occasion is a part. Importance for others refers to the contributions made to occasions beyond the individual in question, occasions sometimes within other human individuals.

Whitehead further holds that a human occasion contributes far more completely to self than to others in the world, so that a human individual’s dialogue with itself is highly coordinated. "The life of a man is an historic route of actual occasions which in a marked degree . . . inherit from each other" (PR 137). For the most part, this extensive coordination permits one to discuss the life of an individual as if it were an aesthetic whole. The relations of an individual to the wider world are, generally speaking, analogous to those of an occasion to other value-experiences. On the one hand, value for self is maximized insofar as one pursues the maximal contribution to others. This is not to say that an individual should ignore the effect of his or her present upon his or her future. But one’s life is so coordinated that each present decision implies a larger decision, witting or unwitting, about the purpose of one s life as a whole, at least insofar as one’s future can be anticipated. Present human activity, in other words, reflects a decision about one’s place as an individual in the wider world. On the other hand, one’s possibilities as a coordinated individual are greater insofar as the accumulated importance appropriated from the wider world is greater. This is not to deny that one inherits value from one’s own past. On the contrary, the notion of accumulated importance implies it. But the importance of one’s past in its turn depended upon its relations to the wider world.

I am now in a position to formulate an understanding of happiness consistent with Whitehead’s thought. Since happiness is the good for a human individual, it can only be human value for self. Happiness, in other words, is a human individual’s enjoyment of beauty. This definition implies a coincidence between happiness and virtue. Human action is virtuous insofar as it conforms to the telos of the universe. But I have just said that a human’s pursuit of the general good also maximizes the value for self. Thus, the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happy person.8 To some, this conclusion may be suspect, because it may seem apparent that virtue sometimes requires a sacrifice of the self. It is true that an individual may be called upon to forego certain enjoyments in order to enhance the possibilities of others. But Whitehead’s perspective implies that this sacrifice is, in a profound sense, only apparent, i.e., is a sacrifice of the lesser for the greater self. For commitment to the divine purpose brings one into fundamental harmony with "the way things are," and this harmony means a profound strengthening of the individual’s aesthetic experience. There is, in the phrase of Reinhold Niebuhr, a "tangent toward transcendence" in the definition of happiness (NDM II 82). Whitehead calls it "peace," a "satisfaction deeper than joy or sorrow." "Peace is a quality of mind steady in its reliance that fine action is treasured in the nature of things" (AI 172, 274).

In contrast to that of liberalism, this understanding of happiness is evidently non-preferential. Happiness is a person’s enjoyment of beauty, and this is so notwithstanding that one thinks or prefers otherwise. It should also be clear that happiness in a Whiteheadian perspective is non-private. Other human individuals are a part of the world which the self inherits and to which it contributes. Since human beauty is constituted by all of one’s relations, human community is constitutive of happiness.9 I will now seek to be more precise regarding the connection between happiness and human community and, in the process, to provide the basis for a political theory that transcends liberalism.

III. Beyond Political Liberalism

On its way to a view of happiness, the last section outlined a perspective in which reality as such cannot be fully understood independently of its importance. With respect to politics, Whitehead and Aristotle agree at least in this: political theory is inescapably normative. The basis for a Whiteheadian political theory, then, is ethical.

Aristotle insisted that discussion should seek only "as much clearness as the subject matter admits of." With respect to "fine and just actions," he continued, "we must be content . . . to indicate the truth roughly and in outline, and in speaking about things which are only for the most part true . . . to reach conclusions that are no better" (NE 1094b 15, 19-23). There is a significant sense in which Whitehead agrees again. This agreement does not extend to the metaphysical obligation to which human decision is ethically bound, namely, conformity with the divine telos. For metaphysical matters are true in a strict sense. But metaphysical truths are supremely general, and human choice is involved with particulars. Moreover, the fragmentary character of human existence limits its power to discern the particulars with which it is involved. In order to inform human deliberation and choice, therefore, ethical theory must abstract from the supreme particularities of occasions in some measure. Human action is discussed in terms of the relations of human individuals to other human individuals and to subhuman aggregates or societies of occasions. This inevitable abstraction makes ethical theory true only "for the most part," a consequence illustrated above when I noted that a human individual is, for the most part, analogous to a single value-experience. It is in that Aristotelian spirit that my discussion of ethical and political theory proceeds.

I now wish to argue that conformity with the divine telos may, for purposes of ethical deliberation, be translated into what I call the maximal happiness principle: so act as to maximize happiness -- and, by implication, in the long run. I emphasize that this translation is effected simply in order to facilitate ethical reflection and choice. Consequently, it does not imply that happiness alone is intrinsically good. On the contrary, the divine telos implies that beauty, wherever produced, is self-justifying. The translation does imply that maximal beauty is pursued insofar as one seeks to maximize happiness. What reason is there to believe that this is the case?

Recall that higher possibilities of value are dependent upon greater importance in the world that is inherited. "The dominance of societies, harmoniously requiring each other, is the essential condition for depth of satisfaction" (PR 142). Conversely, the importance of lower forms of existence is greater when they are so ordered as to increase the higher possibilities. "The Universe achieves its values by reason of its coordination into societies of societies, and into societies of societies of societies" (AI 206). This is one way to express the aesthetic character of existence and value. Whitehead further holds that, so far as we know, specifically human existence enjoys the highest possibilities of freedom and importance. He distinguishes four grades of value-experiences. Freedom in the lower two, the inorganic and the vegetable, is severely limited. Such occasions are far more creatures of "the average" than experiences permitted sufficient unity-in-diversity to exhibit significant individuality. Their dominating purpose is the survival of the society (e.g., the stone, the organism) of which they are a part. Nonhuman animal experience, the third grade, is sometimes conscious and thus rises to real, although faint, individual expression. But self-conscious or human existence, the fourth grade, "immensely extends this concept, ‘permitting purposes far transcending survival and, therefore, exhibiting marked individuality that results from pursuit of the better and the best. "When we come to mankind, nature seems to have burst through another of its boundaries. . . . Outrageous novelty is introduced." "The distinction between men and animals is in one sense only a difference in degree. But the extent of the degree makes all the difference. The Rubicon has been crossed" (MT 36, 38, 39).

Given the distinctiveness of human existence and the aesthetic character of reality, it follows that greater beauty is served insofar as subhuman existence is so ordered as to maximize the possibilities of happiness. The crossing of the Rubicon is critical to this conclusion. Only because human existence is a broad grade of existence embodying immensely higher possibilities can a conclusion be drawn about subhuman existence as such. If, to the contrary, the difference between humans and some sub-humans were slight (if, for instance, humans were only slightly superior to nonhuman primates, so that human existence were a species belonging to what we now call the nonhuman animal world), it would not be clear that the appearance of humans represents the maximal importance of subhuman existence as such. Instead, the human species might then be the result of some more particular fortuitous coordination.

In short, extreme and enduring inequality of potential is the essential condition for assuming the aesthetic subordination of one kind of existence to another. For this reason alone, I believe, there is no general justification for aristocratic principles, i.e., for subordination of one society of humans to the happiness of another, whether the basis be that of birth, education, technological achievement, or whatever. Granting that inequalities of potential exist in human individuals, these inequalities are too slight and too subject to change (i.e., neither extreme nor enduring) to conclude that the maximal happiness of one group is coincident with the maximal importance of the rest. Human inequality is due to circumstances more particular than aristocratic principles assume. With respect to the teleology of the universe, humans are in principle equals, and the proper principle for ethical deliberation is maximal happiness as such.10

I should stress that the aesthetic character of reality justifies the sacrifice of nature (i.e., subhuman existence) for happiness only when this maximizes happiness. Far from condoning every destruction of nature that is executed in the name of human purposes, the maximal happiness principle prescribes such sacrifice only when the human possibilities are thereby greater than they would otherwise be. Self-conscious freedom has permitted intentional exploitation of the earth in vast measure for the sake of human settlement. But the extent to which human existence depends upon a natural order of "societies, harmoniously requiring each other" has recently become all the more apparent as the accumulated effects of industry, technology, and population growth have presented major "environmental" problems (see CC). Moreover, the capacity to destroy vast natural aggregates is also the capacity to appreciate vast natural beauty. If a species of whales becomes extinct while whalers become prosperous, the potential loss to human happiness is great, and only if greater human possibilities are created is the deed justified. Because of its abstract character, this discussion cannot settle any specific conflict between natural preservation and economic production. But much that pretends to be human progress and against which "conservationists" protest may well be proscribed by the maximal happiness principle.

Assume, then, that the maximal happiness principle is the basis for ethical theory. I now wish to argue that ethical deliberation may translate this principle into what I call the maximal public principle: so act as to maximize the public world -- and, by implication, in the long run. I use "public world" to mean the world that is constituted by human communication, i.e., the world shared by virtue of the relation (s) of one or more human individuals to one or more other human individuals. To maximize the public world is to maximize this sharing, where "maximize" refers to the only Whiteheadian way in which human sharing as such can be greater or less, namely, in the beauty achieved. What reason is there to believe that maximal happiness is pursued insofar as one seeks to maximize the public world?

This question may be answered by recurring to the considerations that support the maximal happiness principle, i.e., the aesthetic character of reality (higher possibilities are dependent upon greater importance in the inherited world) and the distinctiveness of human existence (human possibilities are immensely higher than those of other worldly existence). Given these premises, I have concluded that nature is better ordered insofar as it increases the possibilities of happiness. But it also follows that human individuals themselves have the greatest potential for increasing the possibilities of other human individuals. Since human existence is most important, it can add most to the importance of the inherited world. Indeed, if human existence could be isolated from the effects of the human community, the contribution from subhuman existence alone would permit human individuality only in some minimal measure. The higher possibilities of human purpose emerge only because of the importance that previous human achievements have left to be appropriated. Nor is this conclusion altered by the fact that some individuals have greater innate capacities than others. Significant development of those capacities is possible only because other humans contribute to their exercise. The potential in Aristotle’s mind was unusual. But his achievements would not have been noteworthy in the absence of Plato and the academy.

The matter may be put more precisely. We have seen that the inherited world is more important insofar as it increases human possibilities. But, then, the inherited world is also more important insofar as it includes human achievements. The present always becomes past, and, with respect to the measure of importance, what is true of relations between present and past is true of relations within the past. Thus, human possibilities are increased in the measure that human individuality is a part of the inherited world. The universe achieves its happiness by reason of coordination into societies of subhuman societies that contribute to human communication that contributes to happiness. Alternatively stated, maximal happiness is pursued insofar as one seeks to maximize human communication, i.e., seeks to maximize the public world. Whitehead’s gloss on the story of creation is apt: "The account of the sixth day should be written, He gave them speech, and they became souls" (MT 57).

Some may object that this discussion of happiness and the public world has been one-sided. Happiness has been explored in terms of the relations between humans and their past, the objection goes, while the relation of human action to the future has been ignored. What about the joy of knowing that one’s experience will be shared, the satisfaction in anticipating that one’s action will make a difference? Happiness is constituted not only by appropriating the public world from which activity arises but also by contributing to the public world toward which activity ends. But the point this objection seeks to protect has been implicit throughout. I have argued that greater importance in the past means greater possibilities in the present. I have not argued that the present is constituted solely by its relations to the past. On the contrary, I have said that a more important inheritance means greater freedom, and that happiness is maximized when this freedom is exercised for the general good. Thus, increased human possibility always means increased opportunity to make a difference. If a greater public world inherited means greater happiness, so does a greater public world pursued.

Clarity will be served by repeating that the maximal happiness principle is translated into the maximal public principle only for purposes of ethical deliberation. The discussion does not assert that happiness is constituted solely by human communication, i.e., the Whiteheadian understanding is not a simple reversal of the private view of liberalism. On the contrary, private constituents of happiness have been implied above. Included in these (at least on the whole) are the sustaining relations of human existence to the human body and, through it, to the rest of the subhuman world. Moreover, the suffering that can be inflicted through disturbance within the human body indicates the extent to which general biological health and "material" security constitute happiness, although the fact that these ends dominate the lives of most people in the contemporary world indicates how far short of its possibilities the human race remains. A Whiteheadian political theory, then, should have due regard for the biological and "material" conditions of human existence, recognizing that these yield their own measure of self-enjoyment.11 Also included in private happiness are the nonshared aspects of the individual’s dialogue with himself or herself. As we have noted, relations to self are far more complete than relations to other humans. In substantial measure, then, we alone enjoy the individuality that we achieve. Moreover, some of the dialogue with self should not be shared. The public world is better served if individuals have times of preparation for the public and a realm of privacy protected from the sight of other people. A Whiteheadian political theory, then, will prescribe the pursuit and enjoyment of a private dialogue with oneself in the measure that this is essential to maximizing the happiness created by communication among humans.

But the reality of private happiness does not compromise the teleological priority of the public world. What the maximal public principle does assert is that private happiness is ethically understood as a precondition for, or teleologically subservient to, the happiness created by the public world. Maximizing happiness is maximizing the public world. As one consequence, the Whiteheadian perspective stands in fundamental opposition to what has sometimes been called "metaphysical individualism," i.e., the theory that human individuals are self-contained in the sense that communities are created by them but not vice-versa. In contrast, a Whiteheadian political theory insists that communities create the possibilities of creating communities. The relationship is thoroughly reciprocal, and human individuality is the consequence as well as the cause of human relations. Although "metaphysical individualism" is far from synonymous with the liberal tradition, something like it has frequently appeared as the basis for the instrumental theory of human community, i.e., human community is said to be solely instrumental to happiness because it does not constitute human existence. Whatever the basis for the instrumental theory, however, the Whiteheadian perspective implies that politics is fundamentally misunderstood when its end is thought to be diverse private interests. To the contrary, the maximal public principle asserts that the end of politics is to maximize the world that humans have in common.

Some may counter that a political theory in this mode must also reject the liberal affirmation of maximal freedom. In politics, this objection holds, a substantive end such as the maximal public world is always purchased at some cost to the self-determination of individuals. Thus, only when self-interests are assumed to be preferential, so that liberty itself is the only goal of politics, can freedom be uncompromisingly pursued. However, the Whiteheadian understanding outlined here takes issue with both the premise and the conclusion of this objection. Take first the premise, namely, that a substantive telos compromises freedom. The public world is to be maximized, it will be recalled, because human existence offers the highest possibilities of value, and, for Whitehead, higher possibilities of value are always higher possibilities of freedom. Far from compromising human freedom, then, the substantive goal of a maximal public world calls for maximal human self-determination.

For the same reason, a Whiteheadian politics denies the conclusion of the liberal objection, namely, that freedom can be maximized only if self-interest is viewed as preferential. In the present perspective, the range of freedom enjoyed depends upon the human community that one inherits, so that a more important public world not only waits upon but is a condition for greater self-conscious freedom. What is suggested to the liberal, in other words, is a redefinition of freedom. Instead of being the absence of interference by other humans, human freedom is the capacity for individuality. In its concern to prevent interference, liberalism has been blind to the way in which a community devoted to private interests prevents the higher ranges of freedom and individuality from appearing.12 What is also suggested, therefore, is a new understanding of the relation between freedom and order, in which they are, ideally at least, complementary rather than opposed.

Earlier, I asserted that the social and political order in America has been defined in large part by the priority given to economic goals and economic institutions, and that the poverty of liberalism is revealed partly through its complicity in supporting this priority. The judgment was implicit that the continuing reign of economic goals constitutes a fundamental problem in contemporary America. I believe that the maximal public principle provides an alternative to liberalism in the context of which a thorough statement of this problem may be formulated and a renewed social and political order advanced. Clearly, this would not be an order in which economic institutions are unimportant. As has been noted, a certain level of biological and material welfare is a precondition for substantial human sharing. Indeed, this suggests another way in which a Whiteheadian politics might affirm the liberal past. Instead of praising economic success because it satisfies more and more consumer preferences, one may appreciate the development of western industry and technology because it offers release from material concerns in a measure that permits widespread and substantial attention to the public world. This implies, then, that the renewed social and political order would be one in which economic goals are made subservient to another priority. That change reflects the fundamental sense in which Whiteheadian thought offers a political vision beyond liberalism.

 

References

AmI -- Kenneth M. Dolbeare and Patricia Dolbeare. American Ideologies. Chicago: Markham Publishing Company, 1971.

BL -- Kenry S. Kariel. Beyond Liberalism, Where Relations Grow. New York: Harper and Row, 1977.

CC -- Barry Commoner. The Closing Circle. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1971.

CR -- Samuel H. Beer. The City of Reason. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1949.

EL -- Theodore J. Lowi. The End Of Liberalism. New York: W. W. Norton and Company, 1969.

FPA -- David Easton. A Framework for Political Analysis. Englewood Cliffs, N. J.: Prentice-Hall, 1965.

KP -- Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Knowledge and Politics. New York: The Free Press, 1975.

MDS -- A. D. Lindsay. The Modern Democratic State. London: Oxford University Press, 1943.

NDM -- Reinhold Niebuhr. The Nature and Destiny of Man. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1941.

NE -- Aristotle. Nichomachean Ethics.

PcS -- David Easton. The Political System. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1967.

PL -- Robert Paul Wolfe. The Poverty of Liberalism. Boston: Beacon Press, 1968.

PV -- Sheldin S. Wolin. Politics and Vision. Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1960.

RSPT -- Richard J. Bernstein. The Restructuring of Social and Political Theory. New York and London: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1976.

TG II -- John Locke. The Second Treatise of Government.

 

Notes

1 The good for an individual is not necessarily the same as the good individual. There is a long-standing discussion in philosophical ethics regarding the relationship between happiness and virtue. I will suggest later in this essay that the two are, in a Whiteheadian perspective, coincident, i.e., the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happy person.

2 There is an ancient debate regarding whether all human action (and, therefore, all political action) is solely in pursuit of self-interest. That question is not my present concern. This essay focuses on the nature of self-interest, and that is a different question than whether self-interest is the only possible end of human action.

3 This conclusion is based not only upon the explicit premise that political principles have to do with human relations but also the implicit assumption that human happiness is the telos of politics. That liberal theory has generally affirmed the latter requires, I think, no documentation. A clear presentation of this understanding of freedom as a political principle is found in Milton Friedman, Capitalism and Freedom (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1962).

4 I use the term "matter of preference" to mean a situation of human choice in which there is finally no rational basis for an ethical distinction between the alternatives. Thus, my use of the term is ethical and is quite different from the psychological use according to which "preference" is limited to more or less unreflective matters of want or taste, e.g., a preference for chocolate ice cream.

5 It is an interesting point that preferences need not be private, in the sense of "private" used here. After all, one or more individuals may prefer political participation, in which case human community becomes constitutive of happiness, until those preferences change. Consequently it may be questioned whether a theory such as Easton’s, which clearly affirms the preferential character of happiness, necessarily affirms the private character of happiness. But there is a systematic reason why political theories with a preferential view of self-interest have taken politics to be wholly an instrumental activity. Preferences are irrational in the sense that "statements" about what constitutes happiness are neither true nor false. Since a theory or definition of politics makes a claim to truth, it must be divorced from any specific preference. Consequently, politics must be defined in a way neutral to any specific end but relevant to ends in general, i.e., must be defined instrumentally. If it is said that an instrumental view of politics still permits other kinds of human interaction to be constitutive of self-interest, the reply is that the considerations just reviewed also apply to a theory or definition of human interaction generally.

6 Proponents of mainstream political science might respond that their theories deny the presumption of choice. Action aims at some good only if purpose is real. If, to the contrary, human activity is completely a part of the past, a science of politics can be modeled after natural science and interaction rightly interpreted through a principle of efficient causation. In that event, all talk of preference as well as purpose is massively deceptive. I will not discuss here the thesis that human existence is completely determined, although I think that its problems are considerable. That it prohibits any mention of freedom or purpose in the discussion of political activity is, in my judgment, sufficient to make it suspect.

7 The argument may be rephrased in terms of human action. Suppose that the most general imperative for human action is to maximize beauty and that conformity with this imperative is not necessarily maximal beauty in the present. The latter can be true only because the agent’s contribution to the future waits upon decisions other than his or hers, i.e., the decisions of contemporaries and subsequents. (Insofar as the present has a necessary effect upon the future, those relations are a part of the present.) If these other decisions are unfavorable, it may turn out that an action which sought to maximize beauty is not in fact the choice which would have maximized beauty. The best action, in other words, does not turn out to have been the best action, which is absurd. This is a problem generic to ethical theories in which good action is defined by its consequences. The consequences are, in relevant respects, beyond the control of the agent, but "ought implies can."

8 For the sake of clarity, I should point out that "maximally happy" refers to greatest possible happiness, and the happiness that is possible depends upon the importance of the world inherited. Thus, to say that the maximally virtuous person is the maximally happy person is not to deny that this person could have enjoyed greater happiness if the circumstances of his or her life had been different, e.g., if some of the people to which he or she related had been more virtuous.

9 For another discussion leading to this conclusion, see Lynne Belaief, "Whitehead and Private-Interest Theories," Ethics 76 (1965-66) 277-86.

10 This observation does not settle the issue of whether "temporary aristocracy" might be justified because it maximizes human happiness in the long run. Whether, for instance, the present theory condemns the aristocracy of ancient Athens is a longer discussion.

11 Subhuman existence not only sustains human life, it also enriches human happiness. Nature offers a world to be understood in human science, a world to be used in human construction and art, and a world to be explored, cultivated, and appreciated for its own concrete forms of beauty. Consequently, a Whiteheadian political theory will require the measure of attention to subhuman existence that is consistent with these contributions. In large measure, however, these relations are not preconditions for but properly a part of the public world, i.e., they yield happiness beyond some minimal degree because nature is, as it were, taken into the human community. The use of nature is enhanced by the community of craftsmen and technicians, the understanding of nature by the scientific community, the appreciation of nature by communication among poets and naturalists.

12 Many have commented upon the boredom or "spiritual malaise" experienced by those who most enjoy the economic benefits of liberal society. In large part, I suspect, such boredom is the consequence of the restriction of human freedom. In large part, I suspect such boredom is the consequence of the restriction of human freedom. In recent political thought, the most considered and provocative discussion I know of the freedom which waits upon public participation is found in the work of Hannah Arendt. See, especially, "What is Freedom in Between Past and Future (Cleveland and New York: The World Publishing Company, 1956-61), pp. 143-172. See also The Human Condition (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1958) and On Revolution (New York, The Viking Press, 1963). In citing Arendt, I do not mean to suggest that her thought is in all respects consistent with that of Whitehead. On the contrary, there are, by my reading, profound disagreements, both philosophical and political.

Design-A-Kid

"People will be inclined to give their children those skills and traits that align with their own temperaments and lifestyles," writes Gregory Stock, an apostle of human genetic engineering who heads the program on Medicine, Technology and Society at UCLA. "A devout individual may want his child to be even more religious and resistant to temptation."

Well, that constitutes a vision. Indeed it constitutes a likely vision. Just as we now routinely shuffle the genes of plants and animals to produce a variety of outcomes (smarter, bigger, leaner), so we stand on the very edge of attempting the same thing with human beings. Plenty of scientists anticipate attempts in the near future at "germ-line engineering" of human embryos in an attempt to add or subtract particular traits. James Watson, the éminence grise of gene work whose discovery of the double helix 50 years ago we are celebrating this spring, has called on his fellow researchers to show some "guts" and "try germ-line therapy without knowing if it’s going to work." He has proposed that they try to prevent "ugly babies" and "stupid people" and to reduce the odds that anyone will be shy or a "cold fish." "If we could make better human beings by knowing how to add genes, why shouldn’t we do it?" he asked recently.

Confronted with new technologies, we tend to take refuge in old frameworks. Hence, when we consider "designer babies," we’re most likely to start talking about "playing God," or try to connect the issue to the politics of abortion and reproductive choice, or decide that we should give scientists free rein in the hope that they might remedy some illness or another. But sometimes the issues raised by novel technologies are so fresh that they resist being herded into the old corrals. Rifles, for instance, were on some level a deadly extension of bows and arrows, and you could think about them in some of the same ways. But nuclear weapons weren’t an extension of guns; they raised entirely new questions. Questions about the end of the world, for instance. They refused to fit neatly into the older categories of "just war" thinking; we still struggle to make some kind of sense of them.

So it is with these new techniques. They raise entirely new questions about human beings, ones that we’ve never faced before. Most basically, they force us to ask if human life will have any meaning once they have come into common use. What I mean is, imagine you are the child whose parents have engineered you for piety and devotion, as Stock proposes. (Do not allow yourself the out of believing such a thing is necessarily impossible. We’ve pinpointed those regions of the brain that "light up" in moments of prayer and meditation; we’ve changed the sociability patterns of many animals. It is by no means uncertain that, sooner not later, we’ll know how to tweak the stretches of the genome that produce the proteins that make us tend toward devotion.) Now, you live your life of obedient faith -- but obedient to what? To the proteins coursing through your cortex? What possible meaning would such faith have? A kind of literal brainwashing would have taken place, and the free will that makes you real would have been, if not eliminated, then perhaps overpowered.

And the same with a thousand other traits. Stock imagines musical parents turning their children into prodigies, and a parent who "feels so good about his optimism and energy that he may want more of it for his child." Others have isolated stretches of DNA that seem connected to thrill-seeking, to aggressiveness, to happiness. The latter seems connected to a "dopamine D4 receptor, which contains a hypervariable coding in its third exon." An Israeli research group found that certain variations of the gene made people much more likely to affirm such statements as "I bubble with happiness" and "I am a cheerful optimist."

Dean Hamer, the chief of gene structure and regulation at the National Cancer Institute’s Laboratory of Biochemistry, wrote recently in Scientific American about his vision of a not-too-distant future in which an imaginary couple, Syd and Kayla, got to tweak the emotional makeup of their fetus. "They pondered the choices before them, which ranged from the altruism level of Mother Teresa to the most cutthroat CEO. In the end, they chose a level midway between, hoping for the perfect mix of benevolence and competitive edge. . . Syd and Kayla, however, did not want to set their child’s happiness rheostat too high. They wanted her to be able to feel real emotions. If there was a death, they wanted her to mourn the loss. If there was a birth, she should rejoice.

In one sense, of course, this is no different from what parents already do -- try to mold their children into their vision of the good or successful person. But the story of growing up is at the moment mostly the story of rebelling against that vision, or taking parts of it and molding them with your own aspirations. In the future, in the words of Princeton geneticist Lee Silver, "Parents can gain complete control over their destiny, with the ability to guide and enhance the characteristics of their children, and their children’s children as well." It’s hard to rebel against the proteins pumping forever from your cells. In some ways it’s as if your parents drugged you from birth. Some do that now -- and for some children it’s a blessing. But part of the blessing of Prozac is that you can stop taking it.

I think the next great question humans will face is whether to proceed with germ-line engineering -- with designer babies. But before we can make the choice, we need to understand that such a ban would not rule out making use of genetic knowledge in other ways. For instance, scientists have already begun to pioneer so-called "somatic" gene therapy -- injecting healthy genes into patients with diseases in an effort to cure those problems. The early results have been mixed but show real promise -- and without the same kind of existential threats posed by enhancing embryos. Far more medical researchers are using our new understanding of genetics to finely tune cancer therapies or other treatments. And for couples who carry rare genetic diseases, screening of embryos now allows them to pick the ones that won’t grow up with cystic fibrosis or early onset Alzheimers.

Even controversial ideas like harvesting stem cells won’t take us into this sad new world, at least if we’re careful. Fetal stem cells, which may turn out to be useful for treating conditions like Parkinson’s, need to be cloned -- that is, researchers need to take a cell from a body, put it in an embryo, and grow that embryo to a certain small size before harvesting the stem cells. Some abortion opponents have trouble with the whole idea of growing embryos as a source, as it were, of spare parts. But more worrisome is the fact that once you’ve cloned the embryo to get its stem cells, you could instead decide to grow it to full term -- to produce an actual clone. Which is not only a big leap over the threshold of this empty new world, but also makes it much easier and more likely that we would go on to design babies, not just make copies. Still, such threats can be guarded against -- a national panel recently recommended a temporary moratorium on stem-cell cloning until safeguards can be worked out to make sure it’s used for medicine, not for reproduction.

At the moment, that sensible compromise is stalled in Congress, caught between the right-to-life movement and the medical-research lobby. But in the long run, as I’ve said, it’s too novel an issue to be stuck in such a narrow hole. And in fact, many environmentalists, human rights activists and feminists -- all of them worried about designer babies -- have begun to join with certain conservatives in common and sensible cause. Led by the Council on Genetics and Society (genetics-and-society.org), they’ve signed petitions, sponsored legislation and joined with similar groups across Europe and around the world. A new political battle is joining -- not that we really needed another item on our agendas. But the world doesn’t wait for quiet moments.

Nonetheless, if we are to stand up to the challenge presented by this kind of’ technology, it will take more than coalitions and petitions. It will require a long hard look at ourselves. It will require deciding if we’re essentially good enough as we’ve been made, or if we need to move beyond humanness as we have known it toward some more exalted realm.

In early August 1999, a man named Max More stepped to the podium of a California conference hall. (He’d been christened Max O’Connor, but chose his new name as a sign of commitment to "what my goal is: always to improve, never to be static. I was going to get better at everything, become smarter, fitter and healthier. It would be a constant reminder to keep moving forward.") He looked out over the audience of his fellow "Extropians," gathered for their fourth convention (he’d chosen the name as the opposite of "entropy"), then delivered a talk titled "The Ultrahuman Revolution: Amendments to the Human Constitution." Taking the form of a letter to Mother Nature, it began by offering brief thanks to her for "raising us from simple self-replicating chemicals to quadrillion-celled animals." He went on, however, to list the "many ways you have done a poor job with the human constitution. You have made us vulnerable to disease and damage. You compel us to age and die, just as we are beginning to acquire some wisdom. . . . You held hack on us by giving us a perceptual range less than that of other animals. You made us functional only under narrow environmental conditions. You gave us a limited memory, poor impulse control and tribalistic and xenophobic urges. And you forgot to give us the operating manual!"

As a result, More continued. "We have decided that it is time to amend the human constitution. . . . Over the coming decades we will pursue a series of changes in the human constitution, initially through biotechnology, and guided by critical and creative thinking." He proposed seven such amendments, including: "We will take charge over our genetic programming and achieve mastery of our biological and neurological processes . . . refining and augmenting our physical and intellectual abilities beyond those of any human in history" and "we will cautiously yet boldly reshape our motivational patterns and emotional responses. . . .We will seek to improve upon typical human and emotional responses, bring about refined emotions." Taken as a whole, he said, "these amendments to our constitution will move us from a human to an ultrahuman condition,"

More, whose coterie includes many of the big names in these new sciences, listed all the particulars of this new creed. (It’s important to remember that, to one extent or another, every item on his list has already been accomplished in the lab with other animals, We have worms living seven times as long, and mice running mazes twice as fast. He’s talking big, but not impossible.) But beyond that, he captured the basic dogma; that human beings simply must push on. Forget all the practical arguments why this work is inevitable -- the difficulties of surveillance, the cheapness of the equipment, the lure of big money. At bottom, the advocates insist, it’s inevitable because human beings inevitably move forward, expanding their powers. In 1492 Columbus sailed the ocean blue; in 1969 Neil Armstrong took "one giant leap for mankind"; and sometime very soon there will be a baby born with improved hardware. By our nature we must crack the nucleus of the cell -- from the human we jump to the "ultrahuman" and someday doubtless the doublesuperultrahuman.

Like Columbus sailing west, we have only the vaguest notions of where we might be heading. An "unboosted human brain" could never have a real conversation with one of the coming immortals, writes Damien Broderick, and could never know "what vast issues" it was considering. Oh, we can guess at the wonders, just as Columbus anticipated spice and gold. One of More’s colleagues, a Swedish philosopher named Nick Bostrom, took to the podium at the same conference to predict "orgasms and aesthetic-contemplative pleasures whose blissfulness vastly exceeds what any human has yet experienced," as well as "love that is stronger, purer and more secure than any human has yet harbored" and "values that will strike us as being of a far higher order than those we can realize as unenhanced biological humans." But in fact the final destination hardly matters -- what’s important is the trajectory, the surge, the momentum. Forever upwards, forever more, forever restless. That’s the reason, in their view, that we have minds -- to push forever ahead, transforming ourselves ever and again into something new. If our destiny lies ever further on, always just out of our grasp -- well, who are we to argue with destiny? Homo sapiens will be left behind on the accelerating curve of progress, and our descendants will be off to the stars or the computer banks or some other place too complicated for us to understand in our current primitive state.

But if all this sounds grandiose, it’s in fact just the opposite. The reason the technotopians can talk so casually about the "posthumnan" future is that they find nothing particularly significant about the human present. According to them, we don’t engage in this constant push forward because we’re so high-minded or passionate or special. We do it because we’re not special at all. Because we literally have no choice. Nothing about us sets us apart from other organisms. Our bodies are "nothing more than biomolecules interacting." As Robert Haynes, president of the 16th International Congress of Genetics, told his organization, "for at least 3,000 years, the majority of people have considered that human beings were special. . . What the ability to manipulate genes should indicate to people is the very deep extent to which we are biological machines. . . . It’s no longer possible to live by the idea that there is something special, unique or even sacred about living organisms." This is no small point. Provided you believe it, you can stop worrying about human meaning disappearing because it wasn’t really there to begin with.

That humans still believe in something mystical is an anachronism, these prophets believe -- one that will fade as we turn these new discoveries into technologies. "Who will need an eternal life-giving God when eternal life is available by alternative and real means?" writes one futurist. Eve, Prometheus and Pandora all shrunk the domain of the gods -- and now we shall do so again, finally, permanently. Who would you worship as your creator if your genes came from Pfizer? Eventually, like all other meanings, religion would wither away, except perhaps for those poor souls programmed for piety, nodding away over their beads. That’s a lot of human legacy to dispense with, but we might well do it. In fact, according to the technotopians, we will do it. We have no choice; we inevitably push forward. It is our destiny, and destiny is inescapable. We can’t be in control. We aren’t special.

Except for one thing. Just one small thing that the apostles of our technological future have overlooked. One small thing about us that actually does set us apart.

What makes us special is that we can restrain ourselves. We can decide not to do something that we could do. We can set limits on our desires.

Consider the beavers that live behind my house, the beavers I hear slapping almost every night on the marsh they’ve built in the aptly named Beaver Brook. Beavers, slapping their tails against the threat of passing canoes, possess a kind of goofy charm -- they’re about my favorite animal, Still, there is something remarkably compulsive about them. One year a family built a small lodge on our pond, and the male swam across each evening on his way to work. He was as regular as a Swiss train, five o’clock each afternoon; you expected to see him carrying a lunch bucket. He and his crew build dams. They need to, in order to make sure that the holes to their lodges stay safely below water, And they need to gnaw on trees, or else their teeth will keep growing till they wedge their mouths permanently open. These needs have turned into what we call instincts. Strong instincts. If you want to see a beaver here’s all it takes: Sneak out to a dam and pull a couple of logs out (easier said than done --beavers are remarkable builders). The sound of water trickling down the dam will, within a very few minutes, bring them from their dens. They need to staunch that flow.

Now, we all have that beavering drive within us. (In fact, we have it in spades. Beavers content themselves with one dam at a time. No beaver has chains of dams, They don’t franchise dams,) When the engineers say that we are driven constantly to surmount any limit, we know what they’re talking about. Robert Frost once wrote a poem about a man who planted a peach tree outside his New England home, and then spent the coldest night of the year wondering if it was surviving the chill. "What comes over a man, is it soul or mind/That to no limits and bounds he can stay confined? . . . Why is his nature forever so hard to teach?" asks Frost. Only the advent of spring will tell if the tree has survived. "But if it is destined never again to grow/It can blame this limitless trait in the hearts of men." This "limitless trait" has led each of us to both glory and shame; it is integral. Even the saints feel it; indeed, in their struggles they feel it more than most of us.

But this limitlessness is not all there is to us. We are also the creature that can say no. The creature that, in Erazim Kohak’s lovely phrase, can "subordinate greed to love."

Take dams, for instance. We build them too, obviously -- build them higher than beavers do, build them stronger. I’ve seen the largest earthen dam on the globe, built by Hydro Quebec on the LaGrande River near Hudson Bay. A dam so mighty that its spillway could carry the combined flow of all the rivers of Europe. On the other hand, we also don’t build dams. The modern environmental movement got its start when John Muir formed the Sierra Club to battle the dam planned for a California canyon called Hetch Hetchy. He lost that fight but in the process saved Yosemite, just as David Brower, the great late-century American environmentalist, saved the Grand Canyon from a plan to plug the Colorado. They were able to rally people by appealing to the other parts of our nature, the parts that aren’t always striving and questing and grasping. Not the limitless parts, but the limiting parts. The parts that understand beauty and scale, the parts that sympathize with the rest of creation, the parts that can imagine sufficiency.

Hydro Quebec built that huge dam on the LaGrande, but so far its plans for even bigger dams have been stalled; across North America, people concerned about the rights of the Cree Indians, about the caribou, about the sheer existence of a vast wilderness, have scrapped and battled to rein in the project. In 1999, Interior Secretary Bruce Babbitt pushed the plunger to dynamite the Edwards Dam on the Kennebec River in Maine -- the first operating hydroelectric dam in the nation ever to be intentionally destroyed, in this case to make way for fish. "This is a statement about our capacity to honor and respect God’s creation, the sacramental commons, and to live not just in the past, but in a visionary and different future, in a way of harmony and balance with creation," said Babbitt.

It’s this ability to limit ourselves, to recognize that something may be perfectly understandable and yet be wrong, that makes us different from the other animals. Not better. You could argue that the rest of creation manages to observe these limits with enormous elegance -- automatically, without even lying. But different, as birds with their hollow bones are different, and dogs with their sense of smell. We are the creatures that can voluntarily rein ourselves in. We are, in some sense, the sum of our limits.

And though it galls the apostles of technology, this idea of restraint comes in large measure from our religious heritage. Not the religious heritage of literalism and fundamentalism and pie-in-the-sky-when-you-die. The scientists may have drowned the miracle-working sky gods with their five-century flood of data. Copernicus and Darwin deprived us of our exalted place in the universe. But this older, deeper, more integral religious idea survives. Indeed, it thrives whenever man is knocked from his pedestal, for it has always held that meaning matters more than size, that we are great precisely as we are able to make ourselves small. It is Yama, the King of Death, explaining in the Upanishads the choice between preya, that which is pleasant, and shreya, that which is beneficial. It is Gilgamesh, the great hero, reminded that immortality is not for man. It is Job, finally silent and satisfied before God and the splendor of creation. It is Jesus, tempted in the desert by the nanotechnologist of his day; "If you are the son of God, command these stones to turn into bread." And refusing, in words that still carry a charge, "Man does not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of God."

In this long tradition, meaning counts, more than ability or achievement or accumulation. Indeed, meaning counts even more than life. From this perspective, Christ’s resurrection is no more important than his willingness to die, to impose the deepest limit on himself for the sake of others,

The entrepreneurs of the germ-line have found their house preachers, of course. For instance, Richard Seed, a Chicago scientist and "serious Methodist," was one of the first to announce he would set up a cloning lab: "God intended for man to become one with God," he said. "Cloning and the reprogramming of DNA are the first serious steps in becoming one with God."

But that kind of enthusiasm barely touches the core of our religious understanding. In the Western tradition, the idea of limits goes right back to the start, to a God who made heaven and earth, beast and man, and then decided that it was all enough and stopped. "And on the seventh day God ended his work which he had made," At the time that we were told we were made in the image of God, all we really knew about him was that he thought the world was good, that he wanted us to take care of it, and that it was time to take a rest. We take that rest still -- Sabbath, Shabbat, is the weekly reminder of this other religious tradition, Not the one that puts us at the center, but the one that asks us to move ourselves out of the center. The same tradition that stretches back to the Buddha and runs up through Thoreau, the constant countercultural witness, the never-ending whisper in our ear that we’d be happier, more satisfied, the more we laid aside our hopes for immortality, for power, for wealth. If we turned the other cheek.

This tradition has never disappeared -- but it’s never carried the day, either. Most of us mature only part way -- we learn, hopefully, to place our family or our community or our deity nearer the center of our lives, but only in rare cases do we really vanquish that limitless quality, that striving, that grasping. And in recent centuries we’ve come to embrace our selfishness -- our hyperindividuality -- with an almost religious fervor. A few epidemics of questioning have occasionally swept the land -- the countercultural ‘60s, for instance -- but they didn’t last long, and were easily co-opted. Sunday means football and shopping as much as it means rest. The choice between enough and more has always been a choice we could put off a little longer, in our own lives and in the life of our civilization.

But now it’s crunch time. Faced with a challenge larger than any we’ve ever faced -- the possible quick erosion of human meaning -- we need to rally our innate ability to say no. We will be sorely tempted to engineer our kids, but it’s a temptation that we need to resist as individuals, and to help each other resist as a society.

The choices we face, in fact, will settle this question of specialness once and for all. If we cannot summon our ability to use self-restraint, or if it proves too weak, we will leave our specialness behind forever. Because once we start down the path of turning ourselves into machines. of writing ineradicable programs for our proteins, then there will be no way, and no reason, to turn back. We’ll do what our programming indicates, never knowing how much choice we really have. We’ll be like obsessive compulsives. For them, some accident of wiring or chemistry has overridden their ability to choose. They feel as if they have no choice. (But tough as their condition is, it can yield to the liberating effects of reflection, therapy, medicine.)

It won’t be faulty wiring, though, that robs the engineered of their agency -- it will be intentional programming. We’ll do what we’re supposed to do -- we’ll be brainy or brawny or pious. We may not feel sad -- we won’t necessarily want to be liberated from the way we are programmed -- but we’ll live in a world where our specialness really has vanished. The tensions, in other words, between our limitless nature and our capacity for self-restraint would simply disappear. We’d be on the "more" track, If you’re designed to be athletic, more speed and power will always be your choice, and your choice for your children. The tension between that athletic part of you and the other parts will simply disappear -- you won’t question yourself at mile 23 of the marathon. If you’re designed for piety, the temptations of the world may barely arise. Because, of course, those tensions are inefficient. They keep us from being all one way, one thing. From specializing emotionally.

But that inefficiency, that tension, that tug in different directions is what we call consciousness. It explains novel-writing and rock-climbing and churchgoing, and it explains both the difficulties and the glories of family and community and love. Machines don’t have that tension, and the other animals have replaced it with a kind of grace. Consciousness doesn’t make us better than robots and rhinocerii. It just makes us different. It just makes us human.

The idea that by escaping the body we will become "everything" fits very nicely with the economic worldview that we can never be sated, with the scientific paradigm of eternal progress. But in the back of our heads a much older wisdom whispers "escape your limits and you become -- nothing."

Driving Global Warming

Up until some point in the 1960s, people of a certain class routinely belonged to segregated country clubs without giving it much thought -- it was "normal." And then, in the space of a few years, those memberships became immoral. As a society, we’d crossed some threshold where the benefits -- a good place to play golf, a nice pool for the kids, business contacts, a sense of status and belonging -- had to be weighed against the recognition that racial discrimination was evil. Belonging to Farflung Acres CC wasn’t the same as bombing black churches (perfectly sweet and decent people did it) and quitting wasn’t going to change the economic or social patterns of the whole society, but it had become an inescapable symbol. Either you cared enough about the issue of race to make a stand and/or you didn’t. If you thought we were all made in God’s image, and that Jesus had died to save us all, it was the least you could do.

For the past decade, buying a sport utility vehicle -- an Explorer, a Navigator, a CRV a Suburban, a Rover, and so on down the list -- has seemed perfectly normal. Most people of a certain station did it. If you went to a grocery store in suburban Boston, you would think that reaching it required crossing flooded rivers and climbing untracked canyons. In any given parking lot, every other vehicle has four-wheel drive, 18 inches of clearance, step-up bumpers. They come with a lot of other features: leather seats, surround sound, comfort, status. Maybe even some sense of connection with nature, for they’ve been advertised as a way to commune with creation.

But now we’ve come to another of those threshold moments. In January, after five years of exhaustive scientific study, the International Panel on Climate Change announced the consensus of the world’s leading experts: if we keep burning fossil fuels at anything like our present rate, the planet will warm four or five degrees, and perhaps as much as 11 degrees, before the century is out. Those temperatures would top anything we’ve seen for hundreds of millions of years. Already we can guess the effects. The decade we’ve just come through was the warmest on record in human history: it saw record incidence of floods and drought (both of which you’d expect with higher temperatures). Arctic ice, we now know, has thinned 40 percent in the last 40 years. Sea level is rising steadily.

And what has the SUV to do with all of this? Well, it is mostly a machine for burning gasoline. Say you switched from a normal car to a big sport "ute" and drove it for one year. The extra energy you use would be the equivalent of leaving the door to the fridge open for six years, or your bathroom light on for three decades. Twenty percent of America’s carbon dioxide emissions come from automobiles. Even as we’ve begun to improve efficiency in factories and power plants, our cars and trucks have grown bigger and more wasteful: average fuel efficiency actually declined in the 1990s, even as engineers came up with one technology after another that could have saved gas. That’s a big reason why Americans now produce 12 percent more C02, the main global warming gas, than they did when Bill Clinton took office.

If you drive an SUV, then you’re "driving" global warming, even more than the rest of us.

In Bangladesh people spent three months of 1998 living in the thigh-deep water that covered two-thirds of the nation. The inundation came because the Bay of Bengal was some inches higher than normal (as climate changes, sea level rises because warm water takes up more space). That high water blocked the drainage of the normal summer floods, turning the nation into a vast lake. No one can say exactly how much higher that water was because of our recent fondness for semi-military transport in the suburbs. Maybe an inch, who knows?

But the connection is clear. If you care about the people in this world living closest to the margins, then you need to do everything in your power to slow the rate at which the planet warms, for they are the most vulnerable. I was naked and you did not clothe me. I was hungry and you drowned me with your Ford Explorer.

Here’s more: Coral reefs the world over are dying as warmer sea water bleaches them to death -- by some estimates, this whole amazing ecosystem, this whole lovely corner of God’s brain, may be extinct by mid-century. In the far north, scientists recently found that polar bears were 20 percent scrawnier than they’d been just a few years before. As pack ice disappears, they can’t hunt the seals that form the basis of their diet. And on and on -- according to many experts, the extinction spasm caused by climate change and other environmental degradation in this century will equal or surpass those caused by crashing asteroids in geological times. But this time it’s us doing the crashing.

If we care about creation, if we understand the blooming earth as an exhibit of what pleases God, then we’ve got to do what we can to slow these massive changes. "Where were you when I set the boundaries of the oceans, and told the proud waves here you shall come and no further?" God asks Job. We can either spit in the old geezer’s face and tell him we’re in charge of sea level from here on out, or we can throttle back, learn to live a little differently.

Not so differently. Giving up SUVs is not exactly a return to the Stone Age. After all, we didn’t have them a decade ago, when people with large families transported themselves in considerably more fuel-efficient minivans or station wagons. The only reason we have them now is that the car companies make immense profits from them. Ford’s lucky to clear a grand selling you an Escort, but there’s $10,000 clear profit in an Explorer. Save for a very few special circumstances, we don’t need them -- nine in ten SUVs never even leave the pavement. Where I live, in the Adirondack mountains of New York, we have snow and ice six months of the year, bad roads and steep mountains. But we don’t have many SUVs because no one has the money to buy one. Somehow we still get around.

Sometimes people cite safety as their cause for buying a behemoth. They reason that they need them because everyone else has them or because in an accident the other car will suffer more (a position that would probably not pass the test with many Christian ethicists). But, even that’s a flawed argument. It’s true, says the New York Times, that in a collision an SUV is twice as likely as a car to kill the other driver. But because the things roll over so easily, overall "their occupants have roughly the same chance as car occupants of dying in a crash."

The big car companies are starting to sense that their franchise for mayhem is running out. Last fall, after fuel prices soared and exploding tires killed dozens, the big car companies said that half a decade from now they would try to increase their fuel efficiency by 25 percent. Which is actually a nice start, but also sort of like the country club board of directors saying, "Wait five years and we’ll find a few token blacks." Twenty-five percent better than 13 miles per hour is still a sick joke. Already Toyota and Honda have hybrid vehicles on the lot that can get 50, 60, 70 miles to the gallon. And we don’t have five or ten or 15 years to wait.

No, the time has come to make the case in the strongest terms. Not to harass those who already own SUVs -- in a way, they’re the biggest victims, since they get to live in the same warmer world as the rest of us, but have each sent 40 grand to Detroit to boot. But it’s time to urge everyone we know to stop buying them. Time to join the SUV protest in Boston on June 2. Time to pass petitions around church pews collecting pledges not to buy the things in the future. Time to organize your friends and neighbors to picket outside the auto dealerships, reminding buyers to ask about gas mileage, steering them away from the monster trucks.

Time, in short, to say that this is a moral issue every bit as compelling as the civil rights movement of a generation ago, and every bit as demanding of our commitment and our sacrifice. It’s not a technical question -- it’s about desire, status, power, willingness to change, openness to the rest of creation. It can’t be left to the experts -- the experts have had it for a decade now, and we’re pouring ever more carbon into the atmosphere. It’s time for all of us to take it on, as uncomfortable as that may be.

Calling it a moral issue does not mean we need to moralize. Every American is implicated in the environmental crisis -- there are plenty of other indulgences we could point at in our own lives, from living in oversized houses to boarding jets on a whim. But there’s no symbol much clearer in our time than SUVs. Stop driving global warming. If we can’t do even that, we’re unlikely ever to do much.

Climate Change and the Unraveling of Creation

Ten years ago I wrote a book called The End of Nature, which was the first book for a general audience about the question of global warming. At the time, climate change was a hypothesis. By burning fossil fuels and thereby emitting great quantities of carbon dioxide, human beings would trap heat near the planet's surface, changing its weather. A strong hypothesis, but a hypothesis nonetheless. The appropriate response to that hypothesis was more study, general concern, and the beginning of modest action in the event that the hypothesis was correct. I was, on the one hand, extremely scared by the research I'd done; on the other hand, I was confident that, at the very least, a serious discussion was under way.

Ten years have passed since global warming first appeared in the general consciousness. And in that time science has done its job, which is to turn hypothesis into either truth or falsehood. In this case, the vast -- the overwhelming -- scientific consensus is that global warming is real, dangerous and immediate. The International Panel on Climate Change, a body of the world's foremost climatologists convened by the UN, has concluded that we will raise the planet's average temperature four or five degrees in the next century.

What's more, those ten years have seen the world begin to change in the most fundamental ways. This decade has had seven of the ten warmest years on record. Last year, by a very large margin, set new records for heat. And when you change the climate, you change everything else. Warm air holds more water vapor than cold air: hence you have more evaporation and more precipitation. That is to say, more drought and more flooding. Which is just what we have seen this decade: last year alone, for example, 300 million human beings (about one in 20) had to leave their homes for a week, a month or forever as the result of some "natural" disaster. This is by far the highest number on record.

The total property damage from such events topped $96 billion, beating the old record -- set in 1996 -- of $60 billion. Hurricanes are becoming more powerful and more common; the ranges of plants and animals are shifting north, often into oblivion; disease-bearing insects are spreading to new places; agriculture is becoming ever riskier. Think of the speed with which this is happening. Spring now comes a week earlier across the northern hemisphere than it did 30 years ago. This is an unbelievably large change for such a basic physical phenomena. And all this with about one degree of global average temperature rise -- a fourth or a fifth of what we can expect in the lifetimes of many of us.

Or, to use a different phraseology:

In the beginning there was a lush and green earth, and it swarmed with so many creatures that no one could start to count them. It was filled with the drama and delight of the whale and the coyote and the swarming bee, of the monarch butterfly and the human child and the towering white pine. Then people said: we will burn coal, vast quantities of it. And as the temperature rose, the waters began to bleach the coral reefs, wiping them out by the score and the hundred and the thousand.

And then people said: we will burn oil, vast quantities of it. And the temperature rose, and with it both the level of the sea and the chance of deluge. And so, for instance, the people and the animals of the Brahmaputra Delta in Bangladesh found their area submerged under three and four feet of water for months on end -- poor people pushed even farther out on the margin.

And then the people said: we will drive cars everywhere we go -- the bigger the better. And as more energy was trapped near the earth's surface, the great forests of the planet began to dwindle, stressed by the heat that left them rooted in what had become the wrong place. And the permafrost of the tundra began to melt, and the great g1aciers of ice and rock.

We are engaged in the swift and systematic decreation of the planet we were born onto. And does God look at our actions and pronounce them good? I doubt it. Forget the sterile debates about whether we were given dominion over his planet. Grant that we were. The question is, what have we done with that dominion? In the past 30 years we have ever more rapidly destroyed its inventory of life: whole chains of DNA are wiped out each day as tropical forests fall,, chains of created life that will never be appreciated even by a lonely taxonomist in some university. We are wiping out whole ecosystems -- coral reefs, the cloud forests of the Andes. In 40 years, Glacier National Park will have no glaciers. Even the seasons have been altered by our species in one generation.

Different eras produce different questions of moral transcendence, questions so urgent that they must be answered then and there. The first part of the 19th century saw the question of slavery, long a routine part of human history, become an issue of such transcendent importance that it ignited a horrible war. That fight was mandatory; to duck it was to choose sides.

The middle of the 20th century saw the rise of Hitler. Our parents and grandparents did not ask for him to come, but come he did, and there was no choice but to vanquish him. It was a struggle of moral transcendence -- exactly how transcendent we discovered in its aftermath, with the liberation of Dachau and Auschwitz.

In this nation, in the years after the war, the civil rights movement confronted us with the same kinds of inescapable moral questions, demanding the same kinds of engaged answers. It is a struggle that continues to this day, as more and more oppressed people demand their liberation.

I suggest that in our time the morally transcendent question is whether we will stop this decreation before it goes further; whether we will take the steps -- and some -- of them will be difficult steps -- to preserve God's creation in as intact and integral a form as is still possible. Or whether we will watch as it unravels -- which is what we are doing so far.

You will notice, though, that the environmental question is different from the other morally urgent questions I have described in that it does not center on the relationship between peoples but.. between people and nature. Is it nonetheless a theological question, a question for people of faith and of the Bible? It is, I think, and our tradition is full of resources to help us understand that. We've focused for millennia on the relationship between peoples, and between people and God. But this third relationship -- between people and the natural world, and thus indirectly with God and with other people -- has suddenly emerged as an emergency.

For me, its theological meaning can be summed up as follows: One species is now beginning to control everything around us. The only "acts of God" left are earthquakes and volcanoes; those are still "natural disasters," but everything else is at least in part our handiwork. And that results in, and will increasingly bring, very different-feeling world.

Let's turn for a moment to the Book of Job, which will be to the emerging environmental theology what Exodus was to the theology of liberation. God's speeches from the whirlwind represent the first nature writing and probably the best. Since it was written, Job has troubled the rabbis and the theologians because it is unlike anything else in the Bible. To me, it seems like a time-capsule message, hidden in our tradition for this moment in time, designed to show us precisely the outlines of our current folly.

Job was not a patient man. When he was plagued by troubles, he demanded an interview with God. And he got it. In fact, he got by far God's longest speech. And what was it? A gorgeous and sarcastic tour of the physical universe, designed to show Job that man was one small part of a very large picture. (The translation is from The Book of Job, by Stephen Mitchell.)

Where were you when I planned the earth? Tell me, if you are so wise.

What were its pillars built on? Who laid down its cornerstone, while the morning stars burst out singing and the angels shouted for joy!

Were you there when I stopped the waters,

as they issued gushing from the womb? When I wrapped the ocean in clouds and swaddled the sea in shadows? When I closed it in with barriers and set its

boundaries, saying, Here you may come, but no farther; here shall your proud waves break.

Have you seen where the snow is stored or visited the storehouse of hail Where is the west wind released and the east wind sent down to earth

Who cuts a path for the thunderstorm and carves a road for the rain, to water the desolate wasteland the land where no man lives

to make the wilderness blossom and cover the desert with grass

Who gathers up the storm clouds, slits them and pours them out turning dust to mud and soaking the cracked clay?

Always before this logic was insurmountable. Job pretty much said, Can I sit down now?. . sorry I bothered you. But no longer. Who sets the boundaries for the oceans? Increasingly, we do. The best estimate is that the sea will rise about three feet in the next century. And even a one-foot increase is enough to bring the sea in 90 feet across most American beaches. Who determines when it rains, and how much? Increasingly we do. The most recent studies show that extreme precipitation events--rainfalls greater than two inches in 24 hours--have increased percent across this hemisphere. As Thomas Karl of the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration said, "When we look out the window now, some of the weather we see is caused by us. In 50 years, a lot more of it will be caused by us." No need for us to endure God's sarcasm: Rain r Us, Snow r Us, Warmth r Us. We have unhinged the most visible reminders that we are creatures of God. Some of that is by design -- the spread of genetic engineering with barely a thought for its meaning should give us great pause. But most of it is by accident, with our disruption of planet's climate and hence its fauna, its flora, its hydrology.

If you do not think that will represent a severe challenge to our understanding of what it means to be children of God, I invite you to go through the hymnal, crossing out the songs and stanzas that witness to God's power through thunder, wind, sparrow, whale, sunlight, springtime. There are, of course, other evidences of God's love around us, principally the unselfish love of humans for other humans. But perhaps this does not exist in such overabundance that we can afford to jettison the testimony of creation. If we create a world without wilderness -- and that is precisely doing--then we lose a critical locus for the radical encounter with the divine. The Jews needed the wilderness. Jesus needed the wilderness. We don't.

It is true, thank God, that as some sense of our troubles has begun to spread, people have begun to respond. There have been books. Theologians and physicists have collaborated on new cosmologies and conferences by the hundreds and the thousands. We have worked hard on the personal, on helping start a change in consciousness that will lead, someday, to less consumption. (See my "Who stole Christmas?," December 2, 1998.) Although our efforts are nowhere near enough, they will eventually pay off; it is hard to imagine that a hundred years from now we will still be entertaining ourselves with manic and often joyless consumption.

But we do not have until "eventually" to deal with climate change. We have the next 5, 10, 15 and 20 years to make the basic decisions. A coal-fired power plant built next year will spew carbon dioxide into the atmosphere for at least four decades; once it is built, the cost of its construction alone will guarantee that it will be used, that its output will not be replaced with solar-or wind-generated energy. We have already wasted a decade. In 1990, President Bush at Rio promised that in the year 2000 we would release no more CO2 into the atmosphere than we did in 1990; it was a pledge that President Clinton repeated on taking office -- a modest but prudent promise, given the level of uncertainty that then marked the science. But even as the science has grown unimpeachably solid, the political response has grown less vigorous. Clinton and Gore did next to nothing -- as our economy boomed, so did our use of fossil fuels, so that next year we will release nearly 15 percent more CO2 than we did a decade ago.

The time has come to take those cosmologies and conferences, those books and speeches, and start the work of translating them into politics. Just as at some moment the rhetoric and passion and sheer truth of the civil rights movement had to be translated into the Voting Rights Act, so we must now figure out how to force real and quick change. The solutions are not impossible to

The solutions are not impossible to find. In fact, everyone knows what they are. We need to end the subsidies for, and increase the taxes on, fossil fuels so that their price will rise and alternative clean technologies will become competitive. And we need to spread those clean technologies abroad, with a giant program of international aid and cooperation, so that the developing nations do not follow our energy path. And we must do it fast, for every year that we can speed the process will allow us to lower the final zenith of CO2 in the atmosphere, allow us to prevent some damage, allow us to hasten the time when humanity again can become just one player in a created world.

As a first step, we must make Congress consider the Kyoto treaty, which calls for a 5 percent reduction in carbon emissions by 2010. It's not a great treaty -- in fact, since scientists say we need to cut emissions by 80 percent immediately, it's barely a start. And at the moment, the Senate, dominated by entrenched corporate forces, would defeat it. But that is OK -- voting rights did not pass the first time either, and it took several iterations of the act to make it strong enough. At least we would have started.

How to do it? The powers in opposition are strong, but they are not omnipotent. Sooner or later the coal lobby will be beaten; the job is to do it sooner. We need teach-ins and sit-ins, letter-writing campaigns and political campaigns, loud speeches, anger, humor, desperate work.

And we need the church. In some of the struggles I've described, the church has led the way -- abolition and the civil rights movement were both inextricably linked to the church. In the case of the environment, the church's leadership is absolutely mandatory. There is no other force left in our society that is able to say: Some things are more important than endless economic growth. Some goals are more important than endless accumulation.

Our story begins with the account of creation. Since we happen to be alive in the two- or three-decade period of decreation, we have to do all that we can, whatever the cost, to defend God's work. Forget about teaching creation in the schools; in our time the task is to preserve creation on the planet. Creation is not an artifact of history. It is all around us, and it is being destroyed. Saving it is our task,

Food Fight

Book Review:

The Essential Agrarian Reader. Edited by Norman Wirzba. University Press of Kentucky, 256 pp.

 

The farmer’s diner in Barre, Vermont, serves the foods you would expect at a diner -- ham and eggs, home fries, hamburgers, milkshakes. And it serves them at prices you would expect -- the average check is about $7.50. Almost all of the food comes from within a 50-mile radius -- which you also might expect, given that Barre as surrounded by good farmland, supporting pigs, chickens, potatoes, steers and dairy cows. But the fact that the food it serves is locally grown actually makes this place decidedly weird, the strangest diner in the country.

To open his restaurant Ted Murphy had to buck every American agriculture. He had to buy his own smokehouse, persuade schoolkids to raise pork and find someplace to get chickens slaughtered. He had to try to relocalize farming.

At the moment American agriculture is anything but local. The average North American supper travels 1,500 miles between farm gate and dinner plate. Depending on your perspective, this might seem a kind of miracle. Our farms are so vast and efficient that they provide us with mountains of cheap food even though less than 2 percent of us work on them -- fewer Americans than inhabit our jails. The other 98 percent of us have been freed to do something else: write software, preach sermons, collect tolls.

But you could look at this another way -- as more of a curse than a miracle. You could see rural communities emptied, and farms dependent on the unsustainable use of chemicals and fossil fuel. You could see animals concentrated in such massive numbers that abuse is a synonym for existence. You could see cheap, subsidized food wrecking the lives of peasant farmers around the world. You could see tasteless, overprocessed "food products" filling our supermarkets and inflating our bodies. You could see urban and suburban Americans robbed of any connection to the source of their sustenance. This is the perspective of the persuasive group of authors collected in The Essential Agrarian Reader, which is an unhysterical but thorough indictment not just of American agriculture but of the larger American culture of which it is a diminished part.

Many of the pieces in this book originated as a tribute to Wendell Berry, the Kentucky farmer and writer who 25 years ago published The Unsettling of America. Berry’s essays have proven to be seminal, in many ways even more long-lasting and deep-reaching than E. F. Schumacher’s Small Is Beautiful. With an authority that stretches from the practical to the moral, his words have done more than any other force to launch the wave of farmer’s markets, community-supported agriculture and small organic experiments that have enlivened our dinner tables in recent times.

In a larger sense, however, Berry’s work must be counted a failure, As in the effort to get Americans to protect the climate, small victories have been overwhelmed by crushing losses, As Berry points out in the opening essay, America now has half the number of farms it had in 1977. Farm communities are poorer, suburban sprawl is uglier. "The large agribusiness corporations that were mainly national in 1977 are now global, and are replacing the world’s agricultural diversity which was useful primarily to farmers and local consumers, with bioengineered and patented monocultures that are merely profitable to corporations." A thousand edible nasturtiums may have bloomed in a thousand farmer’s markets, but Monsanto, Cargill and ADM have blighted a million villages with their crushing industrial farming. So far the momentum is going the wrong way.

This volume attempts, mostly successfully to broaden the discussion, to build the ranks of those who would support a new agrarianism -- a localized, careful, beautiful, reined-in agriculture (and forestry and fisheries) that builds dignified lives and strong communities. Brian Donahue is a professor at Brandeis University not one of America’s foremost ag schools. But he writes a remarkably smart and hopeful essay imagining a compromise between the arcadian and the agrarian -- a countryside composed mostly of suburban dwellers who nonetheless support and benefit from a healthy working farm community in their midst.

Taking his cues from the many New England communities that have experimented with the widespread use of easements and conservation land to protect working landscapes, he envisions a new commons taking hold. Travel through most American farmland, he notes, and you’ll see vast stretches of unpopulated fields waiting for the occasional visit by crop duster or combine. "Then we reach the beltways surrounding our cities, and see tract housing going up at a furious pace, often on prime farmland." Wouldn’t it be nice, he writes, "if all of that eerily unsettled rural countryside were instead dense with diversified 100-acre farmsteads, with their grain and hay rotations, livestock and pastures embedded in a landscape of protected forest, wetland, and prairie," and in turn supporting an infinity of small villages, connected to the world via all our modern communications pipelines so that people could work at a variety of jobs, but remain connected to the real world by sheer immersion in a particular landscape.

This appealing vision is not only impossible. Small versions of it can be seen in parts of the Berkshires of Massachusetts and in parts of Vermont, not to mention wide areas of France and Italy. But since the journey toward such a future is daunting, it is good that this volume includes the thoughts of systemic economists like Herman Daly, formerly a senior analyst at the World Bank. Daly continues the argument that has marked his many books -- the economy is no longer behaving economically. That is, our huge level of throughput is now increasing environmental and social costs faster than it magnifies benefits. It makes us poorer, not richer, as most attempts to develop quality-of-life indexes have indicated for the past decade.

Vandana Shiva makes, this point in more detail with regard to the social systems of developing countries -- the Green Revolution, she writes, has in fact impoverished most of the people it sought to help, and the Gene Revolution now following on its heels will only increase the damage. Her evidence is powerful, right down to the names of particular villagers in one tiny Indian town who sold their kidneys to pay their farm bills. And Wes Jackson, the Kansas agronomist, makes the same point in connection with physical systems -- particularly the prairie soils continuing to bleed brown into the Mississippi and every other river system that drains farmland. Globally, he writes, "nearly one-third of land devoted to farming has been lost to erosion in the last 40 years and continues to be lost at a rate of some 25 million acres per year."

Jackson and Shiva are more than critics, however. They know what kind of agriculture they want to see. Shiva envisions a return to the network of small and intensively managed holdings still visible in much of Bengal; Jackson is hard at work developing new grain strains that can be grown in perennial polycultures, ending the need for annual plowing and irrigation. They are joined by others in this volume. The ever-optimistic Ohio farmer Gene Logsdon, for instance, makes a persuasive case for returning to grass-feeding steers, hogs, chicken, dairy cows and sheep instead of the concentrated feedlot farming favored by industrial agribusiness. He marshals a long list of statistics to demonstrate that farmers would make more money and produce healthier, tastier food if they could scale back and grow their animals on grass, not corn. This vision, too, is spreading -- I know farmers across the country who have taken notice of the widespread and profitable return to pasturage in New Zealand, and who have begun their own experiments with it.

If we really wanted such a world, mechanisms to bring it about exist, or could be fashioned by innovative economists. Susan Witt, who runs the invaluable Schumacher Society, offers a variety of possible mechanisms for supporting an emerging community economics, such as local currencies and community loans. And law professor Eric Freyfogle proposes a variety of lega1 changes to the way we own land which would encourage responsible stewardship. But as he readily acknowledges, change will not come easily. The ethic of individualism that makes any community effort so difficult is, perversely, stronger among farmers than almost any other group save Silicon Valley CEOs.

At the close of his essay Gene Logsdon asks, "Could humankind for once end an old cycle and begin a new one based on a pastoral food system without an intervening decline or collapse of the economy and civilization?" I fear the answer may be no, in part because of the enormous power of the established order -- the great grain companies are as powerful, if not as visible, as the great energy companies. And in part because the collapse of at least some parts of our food system may be even nearer than many suspect.

In recent years, the environmental statistician Lester Brown has been almost alone in his attempts to warn us that grain production appears to be nearing a crisis point. His most recent works cannot be read without a tremble. Water tables around the world are dropping dramatically -- in China by meters a year -- as diesel pumps relentlessly draw water to the surface to irrigate grain. Meanwhile, the heat waves associated with global climate change are suppressing grain production in one region after another -- this year Europe was especially hard hit. As a result, human beings have eaten more grain than they’ve grown for the past four years in a row. The substantial stockpiles with which we began that period are essentially gone. Any shortfall in coming years may cause rapid price rises, and horrific pinches in areas of the world that depend on cheap exported grain.

In the short run, such traumas will probably only lead to more intensification of agriculture, as we attempt to produce our way out of our problems. But the efforts this book chronicles are vitally important because they provide a counterexample -- a small demonstration plot. They hold out the possibility of an un-Hobbesian future, one that more and more of us can work toward, gradually but persistently. These writers and innovators are, in some sense, Noahs, and the arks they are building may help us ride out the storm, or at least reestablish our civilizations on a different basis once the waters recede.

For those who want to get started now, there are many possibilities. For example, one of the worst effects of the nationalization and globalization of agriculture has been the demise of local infrastructures for farmers. Say you have a good crop of tomatoes and the idea that you could make a reasonable amount of money turning them into salsa. In most places the community kitchens where that work -- or pickling, canning and the like -- could be done no longer exist. On the other hand, most of our rural communities are dramatically oversupplied with Protestant houses of worship, which might be good places to use for work of this kind. The sanitary laws imposed on us by the giant monopolists would make this hard, but not impossible. I love the idea of churches playing a role in building this wider communion, just as I yearn for the day when half our steeples boast windmills to catch the breeze that God sends across the land.

Tod Murphy imagines licensing others to run Farmer’s Diner restaurants on his model around the country, each one buying its food from its own local family farmers. This is work that congregations -- and land trusts and environmental groups -- could do cooperatively, raising the capital to spread such experiments far and wide. When I saw Wendell Berry not long ago he was talking, albeit a little wearily, about his campaign to convince the Kentucky state government to help fund small slaughterhouses throughout the state.

For a very long time we have had the luxury of not thinking about where our food comes from. Or at least we have considered it a luxury, though we have paid for our ignorance and indifference in diminished lives, lousy dinners and strained landscapes. Now we may again need to think about where our daily bread comes from. It is a question of ultimate, and potentially lovely, moral depth.

On Not Living Too Large

Not far from Siena, in the Tuscan hill town of Montalcino, is the Abbey of Sant'Antimo. It was first built in--well, no one's certain. It was there by the ninth century. What you see now is a modern reconstruction, modern meaning 12th century. In other words, it's a part of the landscape.

And the landscape is a part of it. As I sat in the pews one afternoon earlier this summer, listening to the monks chant Nones in sonorous harmony, I kept looking past the altar to two windows behind. They framed prime views of the steeply raked farm fields in back of the sanctuary--one showed rows of dusty-leaved olive trees climbing a hill, the other rank upon rank of grapevines in their neat rows. With the crucifix in the middle they formed a kind of triptych, and it was easy to imagine not only the passion, but also one's cup running over with Chianti, one's head anointed with gleaming oil.

And easy enough, I think, to figure out why this Tuscan landscape is so appealing to so many. Its charm lies in its comprehensibility--its scale makes intuitive, visceral sense. If you climb one of the bell towers in the hill towns of Tuscany, you look out on a compassable world--you can see where the food that you eat comes from, trace the course of the rivers. It seems sufficient unto itself, as indeed it largely was once upon a time. And in the ancient churches it's easy to construct a vision of the medieval man or woman who once sat in the same hard pew--a person who understood, as we never can, his or her place in the universe. That place was bounded by the distance one could travel physically--save for the Crusade years, it was probably easy to live a life without ever leaving the district. (Florentines speak of living an entire life in view of the Duomo.) And it was bounded just as powerfully by the shared and deep belief in the theology of the church. You knew your place.

Which is a phrase with several meanings. You would have been deeply rooted in that world--it's hard to imagine there the identity crises that are routine in our world. You would have been considerably more rooted than we're comfortable with. You knew your place in the sense that you were born into it, and there was little hope of leaving if it didn't suit. Peasants were peasants and lords were lords, and never the two met. Inequality was baptized, questioning unlikely. The old medieval world made sense, but it was often an oppressive sense--hence the 500-year project to liberate ourselves in every possible way.

And though Tuscany still looks comprehensible--and is thus a suitable backdrop for profitable tourism and powerful travel fantasy--it's now mostly sham. The farms remain, largely supported by farm subsidies from the European Union and the wine-buying habits of affluent foreigners. The villages are mostly emptied out, with only the old remaining--on weekends traffic swells as Florentines and Romans head to the country house. Even the churches are largely relics. Stop in for afternoon mass and you're likely to find three or four old women listening to an African priest limp along in halting Italian--there aren't nearly the vocations necessary to fill these pulpits. Even the chanting monks at the Sant'Antimo abbey are imports--a French brotherhood that took over the church a decade ago.

Still, it's so alluring, this idea of rootedness. Especially for those of us who live in places that make no sense at all. Where food travels 2,000 miles and arrives at a Wal-Mart. Where God lives at a megachurch without the tradition or culture to give worship much weight. How we thirst for places that make sense.

Which is why it was such a pleasure, a few days later, to find myself in a very different kind of church, this one compact, ultramodern, made of glass. Oh, and Lutheran. The ground floor, on this Thursday, was a day-care center filled with parents and kids; the second floor was all offices; and the third housed the sanctuary, a kind of window-girded nest. And when I looked out past the small cross, what I saw were the canals and sidewalks of Hammarby Sjostad--another place that makes sense. Real sense.

Hammarby Sjostad, a ten-minute ferry ride from the center of Stockholm, used to be an industrial brownfield, toxic and unpopulated. When Sweden bid to host the 2004 Olympics, it was slated to become the Olympic Village; the bid failed, but the momentum for a new neighborhood was enormous, and ground was broken seven or eight years ago. It was designed from the start to be an ecological gem, where the average person would live half again as lightly as the average Swede, who is already among the most ecologically minded citizens of the developed world. The whole place is a closed loop--food waste is turned into biogas, trash is burned for energy, water is recycled. None of it is outrageously high-tech; it's just all thought out.

And the fancy piping is actually only a small part of what makes the place work. The town requires an uncoerced but very real willingness to cooperate, to be part of a community. For instance: by the lobby of each apartment is a series of portholes built into the wall, each one connected to a pneumatic tube. You put food waste in one, paper trash in the next and so on--everything is sucked off to the right processing center. But if you put plastic in with banana peels, the system breaks down. So there's a little graph above the chutes showing how many times each building screwed up the month before. Building 7 (five stories high like most of the blocks in the development), 3 errant bags. Building 8, one. Building 9, none at all.

Or say you want to wash your clothes. There's no washing machine in your flat--much energy is saved by having a wash house shared by a few buildings. You walk in and wave your key over a sensor, and up pops a digital display. You use it to book a time in the next few days to do your wash in the high-tech machines.

It's a reminder of why most places in the U.S. make so little sense. Cheap energy has led Americans to sprawl endlessly out. We rattle around enormous houses and enormous suburbs, distant from each other in every sense of the word. (The average American eats meals with friends, family or neighbors half as often as he or she did 50 years ago.) Cheap fossil fuel has turned us into the first people in human history who have essentially no need of each other--a kind of hyperindividualism has replaced community.

So maybe Hammarby Sjostad's way of doing things would chafe a little--the American cry has become "Don't tell me what to do," and it's hard to imagine us sharing washing machines with our neighbors. We don't even want to travel together--or at least we didn't until high gas prices began pulling us from our single-occupancy SUVs.

But the responsibilities come with deep pleasures. To stroll the streets of this town is to realize that you've stumbled into a low-key paradise. On a fine day it seems as if all 25,000 residents are out and about, strolling the boardwalks and paths, oblivious to car traffic because it's almost nonexistent. (Parking is expensive, and who needs it--there's a fast ferry to town and a tram that comes by every few minutes.) The community was planned with bars every few blocks, with a community kayak dock, with playing fields and community centers, with shared barbecue pits. Swedes may not be gregarious, but there's the steady hum of community--clusters of moms pushing prams, for instance. (And if you want proof that this place works, the number of families with kids is higher than expected--they're having to build extra schools.) What I'm trying to say is, the place make sense.

The place makes sense in the world, as well. Here's the cost: the flats are relatively small, between 600 and 1,000 square feet. That's two or three rooms plus a modest kitchen and a balcony. You can't have endless stuff because there's not room (everyone has storage space in the basement, and there's a special room for bikes). So there's way less space than we've come to consider normal--it's about like living in a trailer, maybe a double-wide.

But that's OK. When the community is an extended home recreation center, you don't need a special warren in your dwelling. What it means is a resident of Hammarby Sjostad is able to live, more or less, at a level calculated to be sustainable for all of the world's 6 billion humans--as compared with the American lifestyle, which would require five additional earths if it were extended across all humanity. This is a place where people aren't drowning Bangladesh or spreading malarial mosquitoes or doing all the other things that come with living too large.

Which brings us back to the church. The state built it--Lutheranism is the official religion in Sweden. And though I wasn't there on a Sunday, to judge by the number of chairs in the sanctuary, the congregation is a small percentage of the neighborhood. Still, there was a powerful sense that the gospel had been consulted in the construction of this town, if only instinctively. The rooted, practical gospel, the one that centers on loving your neighbor as yourself. I've never been in a place that made more sense.