A Prodigal’s Return

Set parallel in time, place and theme to Gilead, her prizewinning novel of 2004, Marilynne Robinson's new novel, Home, takes the reader inside the home of retired Presbyterian pastor Robert Boughton for another perspective on Jack Boughton, the black sheep of the family, who left Gilead as a young man after fathering a child. Now, 20 years later, Jack has returned home unexpectedly from St. Louis. He finds his younger sister Glory, 38, also home, recuperating from a relationship that ended badly. As brother and sister proceed to care for the elderly Boughton, they get to know each other for the first time as adults. In this segment, Jack makes an effort to redeem himself in the eyes of his godfather, "Ames"--John Ames, the elderly Boughton's best friend and the central character of Gilead.

Sunday morning Jack came downstairs dressed and shaved, in his stocking feet, carrying his shoes, to avoid waking his father. He looked at Glory and shrugged as if to say, What have I got to lose, and she handed him a cup of coffee. He sipped it, leaning against the refrigerator. Then he went to the money drawer and took two dollars. "For the collection plate," he said softly. "I owe you." He brushed at the brim of his hat. "Do you mind if I borrow your watch? Then I can take a little walk before the service begins." She gave him the watch and he glanced at it and then slipped it into his jacket pocket. "Well," he said, "here goes." He stopped in the porch to put on his shoes and adjust his hat, and he left.

Half an hour later she heard her father stirring, and she took him his tray of coffee and applesauce and buttered toast and the aspirin tablets with a glass of water. She was still in her robe and slippers and wearing a hairnet. He said, "Aren't you feeling well, my dear? No church today? Maybe I should call Ames and tell him we'll have to have dinner another time--"

"No, Papa, I'm fine. I stayed home today so Jack could go."

"Go to church? Jack?"

"Mmhmm."

"Jack went to church?"

"Ames's church. As a gesture of respect, he said."

"Yes, well, that's very good. John can give a fine sermon. That new fellow we've got now, I'm not so sure about him. I might go to the Congregationalists myself. If I went anywhere. Well." He laughed. "This is something. This is quite a day."

He sat perfectly still for a minute, smiling into space, considering. "Just when you're about to give up entirely! The Lord is wonderful!"

"Maybe you shouldn't read too much into it, Papa."

"Read into it! It's just a fact! You go to church and there you are!" He said, "I thought I must have turned him against it all. I really did. I've heard of that in preachers' families. More than once."

"Well, he seems to have had some contact with a church in St. Louis. He says he played piano for them."

"Did he! I wouldn't know that. He doesn't talk to me very much. Never did." He laughed. "Your mother used to ask me, Why do we keep paying for piano lessons for that boy? Because he wouldn't practice, you know. If you tried to make him, he'd just walk out the door. But I said I thought something might come of it. He'd go to the lessons when Teddy went. Yes. I told her I thought we should treat all the children the same, Jack, too." He sat there smiling, his face bright with vindication. "It's wonderful. You make some sort of decision, just a little choice you can't even quite explain, and years later--Well, I knew he was clever. That was clear to me. He was always paying more attention than he would let on. But I knew it, I did." He laughed at the thought of his own shrewdness. "Yes."

Glory said, "He seems to have friends in the church there."

"Friends! Well, I suppose he would. That just happens in a church, doesn't it. He didn't really have friends as a boy, though. He never seemed to want them. I've prayed his whole life that he'd have a friend or two. It often came to my mind, you know, that loneliness of his. And it didn't really occur to me--it honestly never occurred to me--that off in St. Louis somewhere my prayers were being answered! Isn't that something!" He shook his head. "It would have been a weight off my heart, I'll tell you that. I could have spared myself years of grief, just by having a little trust. There's a lesson in that." Then he said, "I do wonder what happened, though. I mean, right now he doesn't strike me as a man who feels he has friends. Then I could be wrong."

"He doesn't tell me very much either."

"Well," he said, "here I am worrying, and this is a remarkable day! I have to bestir myself. Would you mind giving my hair a little trim, Glory? I've been feeling sort of shaggy. It's probably my imagination, mostly." He laughed. "Not much there anymore, I know. Still."

So she brought her father into the kitchen, sat him down, wrapped a towel around his shoulders and tucked it close around his neck. She got a comb and the pair of shears and set to work. His hair had vanished, or was on the point of vanishing, not through ordinary loss but by a process of rarification. It was so fine, so white and weightless, that it eddied into soft curls. Wafted, she thought. She hated to cut it off, since there seemed very little chance that it could grow back again as it was. It was like cutting a young child's hair. But her father claimed to be irked by the prettiness of it. Fauntleroy in his dotage, he said.

So she clipped and trimmed, making more work of it than it was in order to satisfy him that some change had been accomplished, combing it down a little with water so he would feel sleek and trim. The nape of his neck, the backs of his ears. The visible strain of holding the great human head upright for decades and decades. Some ancient said it is what makes us different from the beasts, that our eyes are not turned downward to the earth. Most of the time. It was Ovid. At the end of so much effort, the neck seemed frail, but the head was still lifted up, and the ears stood there, still shaped for attention, soft as they were. She'd have left all the lovely hair, which looked like gentle bewilderment, just as the lifted head and the ears looked like waiting grown old, like trust grown old.

"Yes," her father said, "whenever I thought of him, he was always alone, the way he used to be, and I would wonder what kind of life he could have, with no one even to care how he was, what he needed. I realize that was the one thing I thought I knew, that he would be alone." He laughed. "Yes, that cost me a lot of grief, and I never thought to question it. I prayed about that more than any one thing, I believe."

The screen door opened and Jack came into the porch, then into the kitchen. He looked at her and shrugged. "My courage failed," he said. "I thought if you were dressed you might be able to go late. Sorry."

After a moment her father said, "Come here, son," and held out his hands. Jack set his hat on the table and came to the old man and let him take his hands. "There is nothing surprising in this," the old man said. "Not at all." There was a quaver in his voice, so he cleared his throat. "Many people find it hard to go to church if they've been away for a while. I've seen it very often. And I'd say to them, It's because it means something to you. The decision is important to you. As it should be! So, you see, there's no reason at all to be disappointed. I used to say, The Sabbath is faithful. In a week she'll be here again." And he laughed, sadly, and patted Jack's hands.

Jack looked down at him, tender and distant. "Next week," he said.

Glory combed through her father's hair and then kissed it where it was whitest and thinnest, just at the top of his head. "All done," she said, and took the towel off from around him.

Jack said, "I don't suppose you'd have time for another customer."

"Well, sure." She was surprised. They had always been so careful of him, almost afraid to touch him. There was an aloofness about him more thoroughgoing than modesty or reticence. It was feral, and fragile. It had enforced a peculiar decorum on them all, even on their mother. There was always the moment when they acknowledged this--no hugging, no roughhousing could include him. Even his father patted his shoulder tentatively, shy and cautious. Why should a child have defended his loneliness that way? But let him have his ways, their father said, or he would be gone. He'd smile at them across that distance, and the smile was sad and hard, and it meant estrangement, even when he was with them.

Her father was also surprised. He said, "Well, I'll get myself out of your way here." Glory helped him up from his chair. "I've got to give the paper a little going over, if Ames is coming. I have to be up to the minute in case he starts talking politics." She settled him by the window, and when she came back, Jack was still standing there, waiting.

"You're probably busy," he said.

"Not especially. But I have to warn you, I don't make any claims for myself as a barber. I really just pretend to cut Papa's hair."

Jack said, "If you could trim it a little. I should have gone to the barbershop yesterday. I might have felt a little less disreputable."

"This morning? You looked fine."

"No." He took off his jacket, and she wrapped the towel around his neck and around his shoulders. "I could feel it. It was like an itchiness under my skin. Like--scurrility. I thought it might be my clothes. I mean that they made it obvious. More obvious."

He shied away from her touch. "You're going to have to sit still," she said. "Is it Ames?"

"Him, too. But I can't really say the experience is unfamiliar. It has come over me from time to time. It rarely lasts more than a few months." He laughed. "I shouldn't have asked you to do this. You don't have to." "Sit still."

"You can't commiserate. You have never felt disreputable."

"How do you know?"

"Am I right?"

"I suppose."

"I am right." He said, "In case you're wondering, scurrility seems to be contagious. Be warned. I should wear a leper bell. I suppose I do."

"You're imagining."

"No, I'm only exaggerating."

"You didn't actually go inside the church."

"I didn't even cross the street."

She put her hand under his chin and lifted his head. Had she ever touched his face before? "I can't really see what I'm doing here. You'll have to sit up."

"I suppose old Ames must have seen me there. Loitering. Lurking. Eyeing his flock." He laughed. "What a fool I am."

"Sit still."

"Will do."

"I'm going to trim around your ears. I've got to get it even."

He crossed his ankles and folded his hands and sat there obediently while she snipped at one side and then the other. She tipped up his face again to judge the effect. There were tears on his cheeks. She took a corner of the towel and patted them away, and he smiled at her.

"Exasperation," he said. "I'm so tired of myself."

 

A Preacher Looks Back

(Excerpted from Gilead, a novel by Marilynne Robinson, published this month. © Copyright 2004 Marilynne Robinson. Used with permission of the author and the publisher, Farrar, Straus & Giroux.)

As he nears the end of his life, the Reverend John Ames is writing an account of his life and family for his seven-year-old son. Ames, a Congregationalist, is the son and the grandson of preachers. He thinks back to the years after the death of his first wife and before his second marriage, and refers to his lifelong friendship with Jack Boughton, a Presbyterian pastor.

Thank God for them all, of course, and for that strange interval, which was most of my life, when I read out of loneliness, and when bad company was much better than no company You can love a bad book for its haplessness or pomposity or gall, if you have that starveling appetite for things human, which I devoutly hope you never will have. "The full soul loatheth an honeycomb; but to the hungry soul every bitter thing is sweet." There are pleasures to be found where you would never look for them. That’s a bit of fatherly wisdom, but it’s also the Lord’s truth, and a thing I know from my own long experience.

Often enough when someone saw the light burning in my study long into the night, it only meant I had fallen asleep in my chair. My reputation is largely the creature of the kindly imaginings of my flock, whom I chose not to disillusion, in part because the truth had the kind of pathos in it that would bring on sympathy in its least bearable forms. Well, my life was known to them all, every significant aspect of it, and they were tactful. I’ve spent a good share of my life comforting the afflicted, but I could never endure the thought that anyone should try to comfort me, except old Boughton, who always knew better than to talk much. He was such an excellent friend to me in those days, such a help to me. I do wish you could have some idea of what a fine man he was in his prime. His sermons were remarkable, but he never wrote them out. He didn’t even keep his notes. So that is all gone. I remember a phrase here and there.

I think every day about going through those old sermons of mine to see if there are one or two I might want you to read sometime, but there are so many, and I’m afraid, first of all, that most of them might seem foolish or dull to me. It might be best to burn them, but that would upset your mother, who thinks a great deal more of them than I do -- for their sheer mass, I suppose, since she hasn’t read them. You will probably remember that the stairs to the attic are a sort of ladder, and that it is terribly hot up there when it is not terribly cold.

It would be worth my life to try to get those big boxes down on my own. It’s humiliating to have written as much as Augustine, and then to have to find a way to dispose of it. There is not a word in any of those sermons I didn’t mean when I wrote it. If I had the time, I could read my way through 50 years of my innermost life. What a terrible thought. If I don’t burn them someone else will sometime, and that’s another humiliation. This habit of writing is so deep in me, as you will know well enough if this endless letter is in your hands, if it has not been lost or burned also.

I suppose it’s natural to think about those old boxes of sermons upstairs. They are a record of my life, after all, a sort of foretaste of the Last Judgment, really, so how can I not be curious? Here I was a pastor of souls, hundreds and hundreds of them over all those years, and 1 hope I was speaking to them, not only to myself, as it seems to me sometimes when I look back. I still wake up at night, thinking, That’s what I should have said! or That’s what he meant! remembering conversations I had with people years ago, some of them long gone from the world, past any thought of my putting things right with them. And then I do wonder where my attention was. If that is even the question.

One sermon is not up there, one I actually burned the night before I had meant to preach it. People don’t talk much now about the Spanish influenza, but that was a terrible thing, and it struck just at the time of the Great War, just when we were getting involved in it. It killed the soldiers by the thousands, healthy men in the prime of life, and then it spread into the rest of the population. It was like a war, it really was. One funeral after another, right here in Iowa. We lost so many of the young people. And we got off pretty lightly. People came to church wearing masks, if they came at all. They’d sit as far from each other as they could. There was talk that the Germans had caused it with some sort of secret weapon, and I think people wanted to believe that, because it saved them from reflecting on what other meaning it might have.

The parents of these young soldiers would come to me and ask me how the Lord could allow such a thing. I felt like asking them what the Lord would have to do to tell us he didn’t allow something. But instead I would comfort them by saying we would never know what their young men had been spared. Most of them took me to mean they were spared the trenches and the mustard gas, but what I really meant was that they were spared the act of killing. It was just like a biblical plague, just exactly. I thought of Sennacherib.

It was a strange sickness -- I saw it over at Fort Riley. Those boys were drowning in their own blood. They couldn’t even speak for the blood in their throats, in their mouths. So many of them died so fast there was no place to put them, and they just stacked the bodies in the yard. I went over there to help out, and I saw it myself. They drafted all the boys at the college, and influenza swept through there so bad the place had to be closed down and the buildings filled with cots like hospital wards, and there was terrible death, right here in Iowa. Now, if these things were not signs, I don’t know what a sign would look like. So I wrote a sermon about it. I said, or I meant to say, that these deaths were rescuing foolish young men from the consequences of their own ignorance and courage, that the Lord was gathering them in before they could go off and commit murder against their brothers. And I said that their deaths were a sign and a warning to the rest of us that the desire for war would bring the consequences of war, because there is no ocean big enough to protect us from the Lord’s judgment when we decide to hammer our plowshares into swords and our pruning hooks into spears, in contempt of the will and the grace of God.

It was quite a sermon, I believe. I thought as I wrote it how pleased my father would have been. But my courage failed, because I knew the only people at church would be a few old women who were already about as sad and apprehensive as they could stand to be and no more approving of the war than I was. And they were there even though I might have been contagious. I seemed ridiculous to myself for imagining I could thunder from the pulpit in those circumstances, and I dropped that sermon in the stove and preached on the Parable of the Lost Sheep. I wish I had kept it, because I meant every word. It might have been the only sermon I wouldn’t mind answering for in the next world. And I burned it. . . .

Now I think how courageous you might have thought I was if you had come across it among my papers and read it. It is hard to understand another time. You would never have imagined that almost empty sanctuary, just a few women there with heavy veils on to try to hide the masks they were wearing, and two or three men. I preached with a scarf around my mouth for more than a year. Everyone smelled like onions, because word went around that flu germs were killed by onions. People rubbed themselves down with tobacco leaves.

In those days there were barrels on the street corners so we could contribute peach pits to the war effort. The army made them into charcoal, they said, for the filters in gas masks. It took hundreds of pits to make just one of them. So we all ate peaches on grounds of patriotism, which actually made them taste a little different. The magazines were full of soldiers wearing gas masks, looking stranger than we did. It was a remarkable time.

Most of the young men seemed to feel that the war was a courageous thing, and maybe new wars have come along since I wrote this that have seemed brave to you. That there have been wars I have no doubt. I believe that plague was a great sign to us, and we refused to see it and take its meaning, and since then we have had war continuously.

I‘m not entirely sure I do believe that. Boughton would say, "That’s the pulpit speaking." True enough, but what that means I don’t know. My own dark time, as I call it, the time of my loneliness, was most of my life, as I have said, and I can’t make any real account of myself without speaking of it. The time passed so strangely, as if every winter were the same winter, and every spring the same spring. And there was baseball. I listened to thousands of baseball games, I suppose. Sometimes I could just make out half a play, and then static, and then a crowd roaring, a flat little sound, almost static itself, like that empty sound in a seashell. It felt good to me to imagine it, like working out some intricate riddle in my mind, planetary motion. If the ball is drifting toward left field and there are runners on first and third, then -- moving the runners and the catcher and the shortstop in my mind. I loved to do that, I can’t explain why.

And I would think back on conversations I had had in a similar way, really. A great part of my work has been listening to people, in that particular intense privacy of confession, or at least unburdening, and it has been very interesting to me. Not that I thought of these conversations as if they were a contest, I don’t mean that. But as you might look at a game more abstractly -- where is the strength, what is the strategy? As if you had no interest in it except in seeing how well the two sides bring each other along, how much they can require of each other, how the life that is the real subject of it all is manifest in it. By "life" I mean something like "energy" (as the scientists use the word) or "vitality," and also something very different. When people come to speak to me, whatever they say, I am struck by a kind of incandescence in them the "I" whose predicate can be "love" or "fear" or "want," and whose object can be "someone" or "nothing" and it won’t really matter, because the loveliness is just in that presence, shaped around "I" like a flame on a wick, emanating itself in grief and guilt and joy and whatever else. But quick, and avid, and resourceful. To see this aspect of life is a privilege of the ministry which is seldom mentioned.

A good sermon is one side of a passionate conversation. It has to be heard in that way. There are three parties to it, of course, but so are there even to the most private thought -- the self that yields the thought, the self that acknowledges and in some way responds to the thought, and the Lord. That is a remarkable thing to consider.

I am trying to describe what I have never before attempted to put into words. I have made myself a little weary in the struggle.

The Way We Work, the Way We Live



We are all aware that the word "family" eludes definition, as do other important things like nation, race, culture, gender, species; like art, science, virtue, vice, beauty, truth, justice, happiness, religion; like success; like intelligence. The attempt to impose definition on indeterminacy and degree and exception is about the straightest road to mischief I know of--very deeply worn, very well traveled. But just for the purposes of this discussion, let us say: one's family are those toward whom one feels loyalty and obligation, and/or from whom one derives identity, and/or to whom one gives identity, and/or with whom one shares habits, tastes, stories, customs, memories. This definition allows for families of circumstance and affinity as well as kinship, and it allows also for the existence of people who are incapable of family, though they may have parents and siblings and spouses and children.

I think the biological family is especially compelling to us because it is, in fact, very arbitrary in its composition. I would never suggest so rude an experiment as calculating the percentage of one's relatives one would actually choose as friends, the percentage of one's relatives who would choose one as their friend. And that is the charm and the genius of the institution. It implies that help and kindness and loyalty are owed where they are perhaps by no means merited. Owed, that is, even to ourselves. It implies that we are in some few circumstances excused from the degrading need to judge others' claims on us, excused from the struggle to keep our thumb off the scales of reciprocity.

Of course, families do not act this way always or even typically, certainly not here, certainly not now. But we recognize such duty and loyalty as quintessentially familial where we see it. And if the family is culturally created, what we expect of it has a great deal to do with determining what it will be in fact.

Obviously if we are to employ the idea that behaviors are largely culturally created, we must humble that word "fact." It seems very plausible to me that our ceasing to romanticize the family has precipitated, as much as it has reflected, the weakening of the family. I am sure it is no accident that the qualities of patience and respect and loyalty and generosity which would make family sustainable are held in very low regard among us, some of them even doubling as neuroses such as dependency and lack of assertiveness. I think that we have not solved the problem of living well, that we are not on the way to solving it, and that our tendency to insist on noisier and more extreme statements of the new wisdom that has already failed gives us really very little ground for optimism.

Imagine this: some morning we awake to the cultural consensus that a family, however else defined, is a sort of compact of mutual loyalty, organized around the hope of giving rich, human meaning to the lives of its members. Toward this end family members do what people do--play with their babies, comfort their sick, keep their holidays, commemorate their occasions, sing songs, tell jokes, fight and reconcile, teach and learn what they know about what is right and wrong, about what is beautiful and what is to be valued. They enjoy each other and make themselves enjoyable. They are kind and receive kindness, they are generous and are sustained and enriched by others' generosity. The antidote to fear, distrust, self-interest is always loyalty. The balm for failure or weakness, or even for disloyalty, is always loyalty.

This is utopian. And yet it describes something of which many of us feel deprived. We have reasoned our way to uniformly conditional relationships. This is at the very center of the crisis of the family since the word means, if it means anything, that certain people exist on special terms with each other, which terms are more or less unconditional. We have instead decided to respect our parents, maybe, if they meet our stringent standards of deserving. Just so do our children respect us, maybe.

Siblings founder, spouses age. We founder. We age. That is when loyalty should matter. But invoking it now is about as potent a gesture as flashing a fat roll of rubles. I think this may contribute enormously to the sadness so many of us feel at the heart of contemporary society. "Love is not love / Which alters when it alteration finds," in the words of the sonnet, which I can only interpret to mean, love is loyalty. I would suggest that in its absence, all attempts to prop the family economically or morally or through education or otherwise will fail. The real issue is, will people shelter and nourish and humanize one another? This is creative work, requiring discipline and imagination. No one can be scolded or fined into doing it, nor does it occur spontaneously in the demographically traditional family.

But we have forgotten many things. We have forgotten solace. Maybe the saddest family, properly understood, is a miracle of solace. Imagine that someone failed and, disgraced, came back to his family, and they grieved with him, took his sadness upon themselves, and sat down together to ponder the deep mysteries of human life. This is more human and beautiful than is the help our multitude of professional healers and comforters can give, I propose, even if it yields no dulling of pain, no patching of injuries. Perhaps it is the calling of some families to console because intractable grief is visited upon them. And perhaps measures of the success of families that exclude this work from consideration, or even see it as failure, are foolish and misleading.

We now tend to think of the ideal family as a little hatchery for future contributors to the Social Security system, non-criminals who will enhance national productivity while lowering the cost per capita of preventable illness. We have forgotten that old American nonsense about alabaster cities, about building the stately mansions of the soul. We have lowered our hopes abysmally. To fulfill or to fall short of such minor aspirations as we encourage now is the selfsame misery.

For some time we seem to have been launched on a great campaign to deromanticize everything even while we are eager to insist that more or less everything that matters is a romance, a tale we tell one another. Family is a narrative of love and comfort which corresponds to nothing in the world, but which has formed behavior and expectation--fraudulently, many now argue. It is as if we no longer sat in chairs after we learned that furniture is only space and atoms. I suppose it is a new upsurge of that famous Western rationalism, old enemy of reasonableness, always so right at the time, always so shocking in retrospect.

We have exorcised the ghost and kept the machine, and the machine is economics. The modern Western family was snatched out of the fires of economics, and we, for no reason I can see, have decided to throw it back in again. It all has to do with the relationship of time and money. When we take the most conscientious welfare mothers out of their homes and neighborhoods with our work programs, we put them in jobs that do not pay well enough to let them provide good care for their children. This seems to me neither wise nor economical. We do it out of no special malice but because we have lately reorganized society so that even the children of prosperous families often receive doubtful care and meager attention. Middle-class people are enforcing values they themselves now live by, as if they were not in fact a great cause of the social pathologies of the middle class.

An employed American today works substantially longer hours than he or she did 25 years ago, when only one adult in an average household was employed and many more households were made up of two adults. The recent absence of parents from the home has first of all to do with how much time people spend at work. Some of them are ambitious business people or professionals, but many more patch together a living out of two or three part-time jobs, or work overtime as an employer's hedge against new hiring. Statistically the long hours simply indicate an unfavorable change in the circumstances of those who work. If an aver- age household today produces more than twice as much labor in hours as an average household did 25 years ago, and receives only a fraction more in real income, then obviously the value of labor has fallen--even while the productivity of labor in the same period has risen sharply. So, male and female, we sell ourselves cheap, with the result that work can demand always more of our time, and our families can claim always less of it. This is clearly a radical transformation of the culture, which has come about without anyone's advocating it, without consensus, without any identifiable constituency.

The family as we know it in the modern West has been largely willed and reformed into existence. The case has been made that childhood was invented--which it was, at least in the sense that certain societies began to feel that young children should be excluded from the workforce, and women with them, to some extent at least.

European culture was long distinguished by the thoroughness with which it coerced labor out of its population--slavery and industrialization, phenomena equally indifferent to such inconveniences as considerations of family, were natural extensions of feudalism, only more ambitious and ingenious in their exactions. Working conditions in trades and factories were brutal into the present century. We tend to forget that women of working age were often pregnant or nursing and often obliged to leave infants and small children unattended. Sometimes they gave birth on the factory floor.

Children of working age--that is, as young as five--were spared no hardship. The British documented these horrors quite meticulously for generations: coffles of children driven weeping through morning darkness to the factories; children lying down to sleep in the roads because they were too exhausted to walk home at night; children dismembered by machines they were obliged to repair while the machines ran; children in factory dormitories sleeping by the hundreds, turn and turn about, in beds that were never empty until some epidemic swept through and emptied them, and brought hundreds of new children, orphans or so-called child paupers, to work away their brief lives. It is no wonder that the ideal of mother and children at home and father adequately paid to keep them from need was a thing warmly desired, and that for generations social reform was intended to secure this object.

By comparison with Britain, America was late in industrializing, and its agricultural economy was based on widely distributed ownership of land. Nevertheless, the societies were similar enough to be attentive to each other's reform movements. The decisive innovation was the idea that one wage earner should be able to support a wife and a few children, rather than that every employable person in a household should support himself or herself and some fraction of a baby or two. The idea of "living wage" became much more important in America, where labor was usually in demand and therefore able to command a higher price and to set other limits and conditions governing employers' access to it. Where labor is cheap, the market is flooded with it, assuring that it will remain cheap. Other goods will, over time, be withheld if they do not command a reasonable price, but the cheaper labor is, the less it will be withheld, because people have to live, and to hedge against the falling wages and unemployment which are always characteristic of a glutted labor market. These phenomena have been observed and analyzed since the 17th century. Now they are recrudescent like other old maladies we thought we had eliminated.

It is because the contemporary American family was the goal and product of reform that it was idealized, and that it was so long and so confidently invoked as a common value, as a thing deserving and also requiring political and economic protection. This has had many important consequences for policy and law. Yet for some reason we are convinced at the moment that the ways of our economy should be identical with the laws of the market, and therefore we depart resolutely from norms and customs that controlled economic behavior through our long history of increasing prosperity. No one is more persuaded of the rightness of this course than those who claim especially to cherish the family.

Take for example the weekend, or that more venerable institution, the Sabbath. Moses forbade that servants, even foreigners, should work on the seventh day. If their wage was subsistence, as it is fair to assume it was in premodern societies, then his prohibition had the immediate practical effect of securing for them seven days' pay for six days' work. He raised the value of their labor by limiting access to it. In all its latter-day forms the Sabbath has had this effect.

Now those among us whose prosperity is eroding fastest are very likely to be at work on Sunday because they cannot afford not to work when they have the chance and because they cannot risk losing a job so many others would be happy to take. Absent legal or contractual or religious or customary constraints, workers without benefits or job security or income that is at least stable relative to the economy have no way of withholding their labor. Now all those constraints are gone, in the name of liberalization, I suppose. The last great Sabbatarian institution is the school system, so the quondam day of rest is now a special burden for families with young children or children who need supervision.

Of course, the shops must be open on Sundays and at night because the rate of adult employment is so high and the working day is so long that people need to be able to buy things whenever they can find the time. I would suggest that such voracious demands on people's lives, felt most mercilessly by the hardest pressed, such as employed single parents, are inimical to the family and to many other things of value.

Clearly, a calculation could be made in economic terms of the social cost of this cheapening of labor. It is no great mystery that statistics associate social problems with single-parent families. And social problems--crime, for example--are an enormous expense, an enormous drag on the economy. We are conditioned to think that the issue for single mothers, say, is work or welfare. In fact the issue is decent working hours and reasonable pay. Single mothers hold the world together for children who in many instances have been half abandoned. It is grotesque that their lives should be made impossible because of some unexamined fealty to economic principles that are impoverishing to us all.

In an odd spirit of censoriousness, it is often remarked that American culture was never a melting pot. We are given to know that it was wrong to have aspired to such an ideal, and wrong to have fallen short of it. There seems to me to be little evidence that the ideal ever was aspired to, at least in the sense in which critics understand the phrase. Since religion is central to most special identities within the larger national culture, religious tolerance has been the great guarantor of the survival of the variety of cultures. It was characteristic of European countries for centuries to try to enforce religious uniformity on just these grounds. If earlier generations in America chose not to follow this example, presumably they knew and accepted the consequences of departing from it, that assimilation would have important limits. This strikes me as a happy arrangement, all in all.

Now there is a great anxiety about the survival and recognition of these cultures of origin. I suggest that this sense of loss, which reflects, it seems, novel and unwelcome assimilation, is another consequence of the disruption of the family. Civic life is expected to be ethnically neutral, and at the same time to acknowledge our multitude of ethnicities and identities in such a way as to affirm them, to make their inheritors all equally glad to embrace and sustain them. These are not realistic expectations. One acquires a culture from within the culture--for all purposes, from the family.

And acculturation takes time. Groups that feel unvalued are the very groups most vulnerable to the effects of the cheapening of labor, least able to control the use of their time. They look for, or are promised, amendment in the correction of images and phrases, in high school multicultural days and inclusive postage stamp issues. Such things can never supply the positive content of any identity.

The crudeness of public institutions in their attempts to respond to these demands is clearly in large part due to the fact that they are wholly unsuited to the work that is asked of them. Obviously they cannot supply the place of church or synagogue. The setting apart of the weekend once sheltered the traditions and institutions that preserved the variety of cultures. French Catholics and Russian Jews and Dutch Protestants could teach morals and values wholly unembarrassed by the fact that the general public might not agree with every emphasis and particular, and therefore they were able to form coherent moral personalities in a way that a diverse and open civic culture cannot and should not even attempt. The openness of the civic culture has depended on the fact that these groups and traditions have functioned as teachers of virtue and morality, sustaining by their various lights a general predisposition toward acting well. When the state attempts to instill morality, the attempt seems intrusive and even threatening precisely because that work has traditionally been reserved to family, community and religion, to the institutions of our diversity--a thing we have cherished historically much better than we do now, for all our talk. Or rather, our talk arises from a nervous awareness that our traditional diversity is eroding away, and we are increasingly left with simple difference, in its most negative and abrasive forms.

I do not think it is nostalgia to suggest that it would be well to reestablish the setting apart of time traditionally devoted to religious observance. If there is any truth in polls, the American public remains overwhelmingly religious, and religion is characteristically expressed in communities of worship. To take part in them requires time. It may be argued that there are higher values--for example, the right to buy what one pleases when one pleases, which involves another's right to spend Saturday or Sunday standing at a cash register or to compel someone else to stand there. If these are the things we truly prefer, there is no more to be said. But the choice is unpoetical and, in its effects, intolerant. When we were primitive capitalists we did much better. Now people in good circumstances have their Saturdays and Sundays if they want them. Observance has become an aspect of privilege, though the privileged among us tend to be the least religious. No wonder the churches are dying out.

Those among us who call themselves traditionalists and invoke things like "religion" and "family" in a spirit that makes these honest words feel mean and tainted are usually loyal first of all to a tooth-and-nail competitiveness our history does not in fact enshrine. Religion and family must shift as they will when there is a dollar at stake. But the exponents of these notions are no better economists than they are historians. They are appalled by reforms meant to raise the price of labor. "Think of the cost to the employer!" they say. But what is the cost to the employer of this steady impoverishment of the consumer-- who is, after all, simply someone else's employee, spending what he dares of what he earns?

I think the history of ideas is easily as peculiar as anything that exists on our planet, that its causalities are altogether whimsical. We know that communism was a theology, a church militant, with sacred texts and with saints and martyrs and prophets, with doctrines about the nature of the world and of humankind, with immutable laws and millennial visions and life-pervading judgments about the nature of good and evil. No doubt it failed finally for the same reason it lasted as long as it did, because it was a theology, gigantic and rigid and intricate, taking authority from its disciplines and its hierarchies even while they rendered it fantastically ill suited to the practical business of understanding and managing an economy.

In obedience to the great law which sooner or later makes one the image of one's enemy, we have theologized our own economic system, transforming it into something likewise rigid and tendentious and therefore always less useful to us. It is an American style, stripped-down, low-church theology, its clergy largely self-ordained, golf-shirted, the sort one would be not at all surprised and only a little alarmed to find on one's doorstep. Its teachings are very, very simple: There really are free and natural markets where the optimum value of things is assigned to them; everyone must compete with everyone; the worthy will prosper and the unworthy fail; those who succeed while others fail will be made deeply and justly happy by this experience, having had no other object in life; each of us is poorer for every cent that is used toward the wealth of all of us; governments are instituted among people chiefly to interfere with the working out of these splendid principles.

This is such a radical obliteration of culture and tradition--let us say, of Jesus and Jefferson--as to awe any Bolshevik, of course. But then contemporary discourse is innocent as a babe unborn of any awareness of culture and tradition, so the achievement is never remarked. It is nearly sublime, a sort of cerebral whiteout. But my point here is that unsatisfactory economic ideas and practices which have an impressive history of failure, which caused to founder that great nation California, which lie at the root of much of the shame and dread and division and hostility and cynicism with which our society is presently afflicted, are treated as immutable truths, not to be questioned, not to be interfered with, lest they unleash their terrible retribution, recoiling against whomever would lay a hand on the Ark of Market Economics, if that is the name under which this mighty power is currently invoked.

There is a great love of certitude implicit in all this, and those impressed by it often merge religious, social and economic notions, discovering likeness in this supposed absolute clarity, which is really only selectivity and simplification. Listening to these self-declared moralists and traditionalists, it seems to me I hear from time to time a little satisfaction in the sober fact that God, as our cultures have variously received him through the Hebrew scriptures, seems to loathe, actually abominate, certain kinds of transgression. Granting this fact, let us look at the transgression's thus singled out. My own sense of the text, based on more than cursory reading, is that the sin most insistently called abhorrent to God is the failure of generosity, the neglect of widow and orphan, the oppression of strangers and the poor, the defrauding of the laborer. Since many of the enthusiasts of this new theology are eager to call themselves Christians, I would draw their attention to the New Testament, passim.

I have heard pious people say, Well, you can't live by Jesus' teachings in this complex modern world. Fine, but then they might as well call themselves the Manichean Right or the Zoroastrian Right and not live by those teachings. If an economic imperative trumps a commandment of Jesus, they should just say so and drop these pretensions toward particular holiness--which, while we are on the subject of divine abhorrence, God, as I recall, does not view much more kindly than he does neglect of the poor. In fact, the two are often condemned together.

I know that those who have taken a course in American history will think this merger of Christian pretensions and bullyboy economics has its origins in Calvinism and in Puritanism. Well, Calvin and the Puritans both left huge literatures. Go find a place where they are guilty of this vulgarization. Or, a much easier task, find a hundred or a thousand places where they denounce it, taking inspiration, always, from the Bible, which it was their quaint custom to read with a certain seriousness and attention. We have developed a historical version of the victim defense, visiting our sins upon our fathers. But I will say a thing almost never said among us: we have ourselves to blame.

Communism demonstrated the great compatibility of secularism with economic theology, and we may see the same thing now in the thinking of many of our contemporaries. On the assumption that American society is destined to extreme economic polarization, certain brave souls have written brave books arguing that those who thrive are genetically superior to those who struggle. They have higher IQs.

So we are dealing with a Darwinian paradigm, again, as people have done in one form or another since long before Darwin. The tale is always told this way--the good, the fit, the bright, the diligent prosper. These correspond to the creatures who, in the state of nature, would survive and reproduce. But--here our eyes widen--civilization lumbers us with substandard types who reproduce boundlessly and must finally swallow us up in their genetic mediocrity, utterly confounding and defeating the harsh kindness of evolution. This peril once posed itself in the form of the feckless Irish. But they became prosperous, enjoying, one must suppose, a great enhancement of their genetic endowment in the process, since I have never heard that the arts and professions have had to stoop to accommodate their deficiencies. This theory is so resilient because it can always turn a gaze unclouded by memory or imagination on the least favored group in any moment or circumstance, like the Darwinian predator fixing its eye on the gazelle with the sprained leg, perfectly indifferent to the fact that another gazelle was lame two days ago, yet another will be lame tomorrow.

The Social Darwinist argument always arises to answer, or to preclude, or in fact to beg, questions about social justice--during trade wars or in the midst of potato famines. We are not quite at ease with the chasm that may be opening in our society, and some of us seek out the comforts of resignation. And these comforts are considerable. Viewed in the light of science, or at least of something every bit as cold and solemn as science, we see manifest in this painful experience the invisible hand of spontaneous melioration, the tectonic convulsions meant to form the best of all possible worlds.

But, at the risk of a little discomfort, let us try another hypothesis, just to see if it has descriptive power as great or even greater than the one favored by sociobiology. Let us just test the idea that our problems reflect an in- ability to discover or prepare an adequate elite. Obviously the thought of deficiency at the top of society is more alarming than deficiency at the bottom, but that is all the more reason to pause and consider.

When we speak of an elite, do we mean people of high accomplishment, people who do valuable work with great skill, people who create standards and articulate values? Are we speaking of our brilliant journalists, our noble statesmen, the selfless heroes of our legal profession? To be brief, what part of the work of the culture that is properly the responsibility of an elite actually functions at the level even of our sadly chastened hopes? Are our colleges producing great humanists and linguists? Is spiritual grandeur incubating in our seminaries? How often do we wonder if the medical care we receive is really appropriate?

For the purpose of these sociobiologists, membership in the elite seems to be a matter of income. But doctors and professors and journalists are so much a part of the morphology of our civilization that they will be with us until goats are put to graze in our monuments, and will probably be pulling down a decent salary, too, by whatever standards apply. Their presence in roles that are ideally filled by competent people does not make them competent. "But IQ!" they will answer. Yes, and since our society is, statistically speaking, in the hands of people with high IQs, we have no trouble at all finding a good newsmagazine, and we can always go to a good movie, and we are never oppressed by a sense of vulgarity or stupidity hardening around us. "But that is condescension to the masses," they will say. "You have to do things that are very stupid to make enough income to qualify for a place in this elite of the bright and worthy." Yes. That accounts, I suppose, for the rosy contentment of the man in the street.

Or perhaps they would offer no such tortuous defense. Perhaps they would say that if an elite is defined as a group of highly competent, responsible people with a special gift for holding themselves to exacting standards, we have at present rather little in the way of an elite. Then perhaps a high IQ correlates strongly with the sharpness of the elbows, and simply obtains for people advantages to which they have no true right. Qualities consistent with the flourishing of the individual can be highly inconsistent with the flourishing of the group.

We have forgotten that democracy was intended as a corrective to the disasters visited upon humanity by elites of one kind or another. Maybe the great drag on us all is not the welfare mother but the incompetent engineer, not the fatherless child but the writer of mean or slovenly books. When our great auto industry nearly collapsed, an elite of designers and marketing experts were surely to blame. But the thousands thrown out of work by their errors were seen as the real problem. No doubt many of these workers figure among the new lumpen-proletariat, as the Marxists used to call them--people who just are not bright enough.

These grand theories are themselves no proof of great intelligence in the people who formulate them. Obviously I am shaken by the reemergence of something so crude as Social Darwinism. But my point here is that regrettable changes in our economy may not simply express the will of the market gods, but may instead mean something so straightforward as that those whose decisions influence the economy might not be good at their work. If they were brighter, perhaps no pretext would ever have arisen for these ungracious speculations about the gifts of the powerless and the poor.

It seems to me that something has passed out of the culture, changing it invisibly and absolutely. Suddenly it seems there are too few uses for words like humor, pleasure and charm; courage, dignity and graciousness; learnedness, fairmindedness, openhandedness; loyalty, respect and good faith. What bargain did we make? What could have appeared for a moment able to compensate us for the loss of these things? Perhaps I presume in saying they are lost. But if they were not, surely they would demand time and occasion--time because every one of them is an art or a discipline, and occasion because not one of them exists except as behavior. They are the graces of personal and private life, and they live in the cells of the great cultural reef, which takes its form and integrity from them, and will not survive them, if there is aptness in my metaphor.

Why does society exist, if not to accommodate our lives? Jefferson was a civilized man; clearly it was not his intention to send us on a fool's errand. Why do we never imagine that the happiness he mentioned might include a long supper with our children, a long talk with a friend, a long evening with a book? Given time, and certain fading habits and expectations, we could have comforts and luxuries for which no one need be deprived. We could nurture our families, sustain our heritages and, in the pregnant old phrase, enjoy ourselves. The self, that dear and brief acquaintance, we could entertain with a little of the ceremony it deserves.

It will be objected that we are constrained by the stern economics of widget manufacture. Perhaps. If that argument is otherwise persuasive, there is no real evidence that it is true. In either case, we should at least decide when such considerations should be determining. There is a terse, impatient remark in Paul's letter to the Galatians: "For freedom Christ has set us free." And why are we, by world and historical standards, and to the limit of our willingness to give meaning to the word--why are we free? To make hard laws out of doubtful theories, and impose them and obey them at any cost? Nothing good can come of this. Great harm has come of it already.



Hauerwas Represented: A Response to Muray

If one wishes to dialogue with, say, Islam, the thing to do is to talk with a Muslim. Depending on where one lives, this task is either difficult or easy; but in any case one knows whom one seeks. For Muslims are theologically and sociologically identifiable: they visit a mosque, hold certain beliefs about Allah and Muhammad, pray daily facing Mecca and so on.

But suppose one wishes to dialogue with the thought of Stanley Hauerwas. Whom should one talk to? An obvious first choice would be Hauerwas himself. But suppose he is unavailable. Are there such things as "Hauerwasians?" If so, what do they look like? Where are they to be found? What distinguishes them from other run-of-the-mill philosophers and theologians?

I have on occasion been called a Hauerwasian, but I must confess to an uncertainty about what this means. Hauerwas was my teacher in graduate school and remains a close friend and intellectual conversation partner. Yet I have significant disagreements with him, and I know as well that he has significant disagreements with himself, particularly as he looks back to things he wrote at the beginning of his prolific career. (Perhaps even Hauerwas himself is not a Hauerwasian!)

It is important for me to say this before responding in any detail to Leslie Muray’s paper, for at least two reasons. First, I wish to make clear that I do not speak for Hauerwas or even as a Hauerwasian but rather as one who is familiar with Hauerwas’ thought and sympathetic with many of its basic thrusts. I also speak as a fellow theologian with Muray who has been asked critically to respond to his paper. Secondly, I wish to register further that in this respect there appears to be something of a formal dissimilarity between myself and Muray. For frequently he refers to "process thought" which has "basic tenets" (88), or to "process thinkers" (89), or "a process understanding" (91). So Muray appears to speak for a school of thought, whereas I in this response do not.

This second point leaves me in something of a predicament. For Muray’s paper is a good bit taken up not so much with Hauerwas’ ideas but with Muray’s own positive proposals regarding character, virtue and the like that he means to put forward as appropriate extensions of process thought. If I am not a Hauerwasian, I am even less a process-relational thinker; hence I am ill-equipped to judge the merits of these proposals on the basis of their coherence with certain basic tenets of process-relational thought -- which seems to be the main basis upon which Muray wishes them to be judged since his paper is otherwise fairly thin on more general philosophical or Christian theological arguments for the views he puts forward. (I might say in this context that I find Muray’s apparent criticism of Hauerwas on the point that the latter focuses too much on Christianity’s "internal criteria of truth without reference to publicly accessible criteria of common human experience and rational inquiry" (87) somewhat ironic.)

I take it as my task as a respondent selected because of my association with Hauerwas to respond particularly to Muray’s appropriation and criticism of his theology and ethics. So I shall reserve more space -- roughly section B -- for comment on those passages in Muray’s text that are given over specifically to that. It does not appear to me that Muray’s positive proposals depend in any direct way on Hauerwas; he seems rather to wish to put forward a process treatment of some of the general themes Hauerwas has emphasized. As such he does not so much build on as offer an alternative to Hauerwas’ thinking about virtue, character and Christian theology.

But I do not mean to short-change Muray here. If I am ill-equipped to respond to these proposals as process proposals, perhaps I can say something briefly about them from my own and what I take to be Hauerwas’ perspective. Thus, in section 1 of this response I attempt to lodge a critical point or two against Muray’s positive account. Deliberately I choose points that I think display the differences between Hauerwas’ thought and Muray’s. My hope is that this will contribute to the dialogue we are attempting here and, perhaps, challenge those who speak from a process perspective on points where a challenge can prove profitable.

I

I do not find significant disagreement between myself and Muray on what appear to be the conclusions of his investigation into virtue. I think it is important and good for Christians (and others as well) to cultivate their capacities to be empathetic, sensitive, compassionate, receptive, creative, gentle and so on. Hauerwas would agree as well, I’m sure. However, it does strike me that what Muray appears to be up to in these sections where he develops his own account of the virtues -- not so much the conclusions he reaches but how he goes about moving toward them -- is profoundly "un-Hauerwasian," if that term has meaning. And this is not just a matter of style, but of philosophical and theological substance.

I think I can best and most succinctly display why this is so by focusing on two brief passages which appear almost as asides in the midst of Muray’s own positive account: (1) "While these notions seem terribly abstract, nevertheless, in the case of Christianity, we see them operating as we acknowledge the disharmony as well as deprivation of greater richness in the sexism, racism and anti-Judaism of its inherited tradition" (93). (2) "Confessional postmodernism, with its emphasis on images and narrative, which are more evocative and efficacious than concepts, touching deeper recesses of our psyches, fleshes out what tends to be rather abstract in the process-relational vision which, on the other hand, provides the former with a cosmological complement" (90).

Both quotes confess that the language Muray uses throughout is "terribly abstract." With this I heartily agree. For example. I have a great deal of difficulty even imagining what sentences such as the following could mean: "Beauty is the balance between harmony and intensity; their opposites, disharmony and the trivialization of experience, are manifestations of evil" (89). What is "harmony," "intensity," "the trivialization of experience?" How can I know I am seeing these (do I see them?) when I do? Muray tells me that a necessary (but not sufficient?) condition of "intensity" is that "a pattern of contrast needs to be present?" (88). But what does this mean? What would be an example of something in which no pattern of contrast is present?

I recognize, of course, that a good deal of Whiteheadian metaphysics is presumed here; but if Muray is interested in speaking to people who are not Whiteheadian metaphysicians then he needs to do some explaining, to give examples, to tie this language down, convincing the rest of us that something in fact is being said here. He is to be credited with recognizing that his language is unduly abstract, but I do not see that this recognition has led to any attempt toward correction.

Interestingly the second quotation above suggests that Muray hopes Hauerwas’ "confessional post-modernism" can be of help just on this point. Yet I am not so hopeful. Indeed, I suspect that the supposition that it can betrays a misconstrual of Hauerwas’ thought. For the latter does not emphasize "images and narrative" as a sort of strategy to be more "evocative or efficacious." While others may treat them in this way, for Hauerwas stories are not enfleshed propositions, Whiteheadian or otherwise. As he has put it,

"[W]e tend to think of "stories" as illustrations of some deeper truth that we can and should learn to articulate in a non-narrative mode . . . . I think this is a dire misunderstanding of the narrative character of Christian convictions. My contention is that the narrative mode is neither incidental nor accidental to Christian belief. There is no more fundamental way to talk of God than in a story." (PK 25)

My impression is that this is a very difficult point for process thinkers to see, as is a second point linked to it that also emerges in what I have quoted from Muray above. Note that he speaks of Christianity as a "case" in which certain notions operate. This is language Hauerwas would also reject. If we extend the above thinking about the importance of stories, we see that the Christian story is not something we hop in and out of. We are story-formed, and those of us who are Christians are formed (or transformed) by the Christian story. To suppose that we can and should hold Christianity at arm’s length and make value judgments about it from a perspective entirely independent of it -- so that it becomes a "case" of something or other -- is to make an epistemological error that is nothing more nor less than the error of "modernism" which "post-modernists" are lately seizing upon. Hauerwas prefers to identify this as an error of "liberalism" or of the Enlightenment and is not predisposed to refer to his own thought as "post-modernism," which is Muray’s label. While there are similarities between what is generally called post-modernism -- say, the thought of Rorty, Foucault or Derrida -- and that of Hauerwas and other Christian theologians like him, I think it is improper to link them directly, for two reasons. First, Hauerwas learned his emphasis on narrative primarily from Christian theologians such as H. R. Niebuhr and Hans Frei, and only secondarily from (secular) literary criticism. Hence, and this is the second point, it is not a truth-relativizing category for Hauerwas at all, as it is for these other thinkers. Hauerwas has never wavered from declaring that Christian convictions -- which are necessarily in the narrative mode -- are true. And so we can understand the ever-present normative thrust of his work, as we cannot understand it in these other "post-modern" thinkers.

I wonder, actually, just how process thinkers such as Muray will escape this point. How is process thought unlike the modernism post-modernism means to criticize? (This is not to say "post-modernism" has won the day. It seems to me that the thing for process theologians to do, as for example does my friend Philip Devenish, is defend the Enlightenment vision Hauerwas disparages and criticize his narrative talk on its basis.) As thinkers in moral philosophy such as Bernard Williams and Alisdair MacIntyre -- upon whom Hauerwas draws extensively -- contend, there is no Archimedean point, no tradition-independent perspective from which value judgments of the sort implied by Muray’s charges of sexism, racism and anti-Judaism can be made. This is not to say no value judgments can be made, nor that Christianity has not sometimes fallen into these moral errors. Rather it is to say that it is a mistake to think, as Muray appears to think, that it is possible to identify them as moral errors from some abstract point of view such as "fundamental reality itself" (91), or "whatever contributes to the enhancement of relationality and creativity" (92) of this reality or even such a pseudo-concretization as "the challenges of today" (92).

This point can be made more directly and theologically as a criticism of process theology. Is process theology essentially or incidentally Christian? That is, does the Christian story (or Christian doctrines, if one prefers) nicely illustrate the truths of process theology -- truths which could and have been illustrated differently without crucial loss -- or are the Christian story and these truths absolutely inseparable? I suspect the answer is the former. If it is, this question follows: Out of what tradition do process theologians speak?’ Or -- what comes to the same question -- on what basis do process theologians (like Muray) decide what "contemporary needs" should be met or from which part of its past Christianity "needs to be liberated" (93)?

II

Muray’s specific treatment of Hauerwas’ work, while brief and somewhat sketchy, is pleasingly arranged around three points -- what he calls Hauerwas’ "tripod" -- and three corresponding critical characterizations, namely that Hauerwas is a "substantialist" about the self, an "essentialist" about Christianity and a "separatist" about the Christian church. I shall in a moment comment on the relations Muray claims to have found between the legs of the tripod and on each of the critical characterizations. Before doing so, however, I should like to make a general point about the nature of Muray’s critical strategy. Suppose he is right that Hauerwas is a substantialist, an essentialist and a separatist -- and suppose we are all clear about what it means to be these things. What’s wrong with substantialism, essentialism and/or separatism other than that they are "inadequate and counterproductive for process-relational thought" (94)? Besides this Muray gives us no clear reasons why we should reject them.

Please do not misunderstand me. Given a certain understanding of each of these I can think of a number of things I take to be wrong with them. But I do not know if Muray’s reasons for rejecting these are anything like mine, for he does not tell us why he thinks they are not so good; he merely uses the terms as if they were obviously pejorative, like the term "racism." They may be pejorative for process thinkers, but not necessarily for the rest of us.

Setting this general point aside and concentrating on the sections of the paper where Hauerwas’ work is explicitly taken up, I think there is much to say for Muray’s explication in terms of the tripod he discovers there. He helpfully assembles a string of quotes from A Community of Character (84). It seems to me that both Against the Nations and The Peaceable Kingdom, the two books Hauerwas has published since which directly develop his views in Christian theology (he has published other books in the time on other topics), can be read in the light of them. For the burning question for Hauerwas is now clearly this one: How can the Christian church live with integrity and in faithful witness to the God revealed to it in the history of Israel and the life, death and resurrection of Jesus in the midst of modern liberal society where narcissism and nationalism threaten its very existence? The Peaceable Kingdom is an account of what it means for the church to live faithful to its God. while Against the Nations is an extended theological critique of the liberal society in which the church currently lives, at least in the first world.

Connecting the first and second leg of the "tripod" is also a helpful service performed by Muray. Indeed, if we were to attend to the historical development of Hauerwas’ thought we would discover that his early emphasis upon virtue and character led him to ask questions about just what sort of character we should strive after and, further, how it is that we can acquire it.2 And the answer which emerges is, of course, that we must be formed after the character of our God by the remembering and enacting of the Christian story in the community (the church) which calls us to and nurtures us in this (trans)formation of character.

While the movement from the first to the second leg of the tripod is nicely done, I do not think Muray’ s characterization or development of the third leg is correct. Here is where he criticizes Hauerwas for being a "separatist." It is correct, of course, that Hauerwas employs the language of "separateness" frequently, but attending carefully to how he does this and what are the reasons for the "separateness" he recommends is crucial. This Muray fails to do.

It seems to me that the first thing to consider about "separatism" is what I have already said: Just what is so wrong about it? Consider that if we are to form our characters in a certain way to embody certain crucial virtues (tripod leg number one) and if this formation demands that we participate in a community that seeks to live out in its corporate life the very life of God, i.e., the life lived out for us in the stories of Israel and Jesus (tripod leg number two), then why is it not quite appropriate for us to live a life of separateness in this community?

But now here is where we must attend to Hauerwas’ position carefully, for he does have a strong answer to the question about the wrongs of separatism -- but it is an essentially theological one rather than the one we might expect from a liberal trained in the insipid virtue of "tolerance" we moderns love so well. For we discover in the story of Israel and Jesus that God does not separate Godself from the world; God loves the world and seeks to redeem it, to restore within it God’s peace -- to the point even of dying for it. God’s presence in the church is measured just in the degree that as a people it is ready to follow this pattern of life in all of its activities, to be a peaceable people not apart from but in the midst of a warring world.

Talk of separateness for Hauerwas always has this context. Sometimes conditions are such that the church must "separate" itself from the world, but it does so not for the sake of separateness itself but for the sake of faithfulness to God and for the sake of the world God loves. In this light, Muray’s third quotation from Hauerwas is apropos: ". . . if the church is to serve our liberal society or any society, it is crucial for Christians to regain an appropriate sense of separateness from that society" (84). What Muray fails to appreciate is the first clause of this quotation. Indeed, when he uses it again (87) he entirely leaves it out!

This misreading of Hauerwas’ separatism combines with Muray’s earlier charges of "essentialism" to lead him to what I consider the most ill-advised criticism of Hauerwas he makes. As he puts it, "In effect, the ‘essence’ of Christianity for Hauerwas, in my view, is separation from the world" (87). Aside from the fact that, as I have just argued, Hauerwas is decidedly not interested in separation for separation’s sake, this charge leaves me puzzling about just what "essentialism" could mean for Muray. For I am sympathetic, as is Hauerwas, to criticisms of views of Christianity which attempt to distill it into a single, exact, and (usually) propositional essence. His emphasis upon narrative should be understood just in this context. But I am beginning to gather from statements in Muray’s paper -- such as that Hauerwas thinks "there is an unchanging core to the tradition" (86), which he means as a criticism -- that Muray’s anti-essentialism affirms that in fact there is nothing very definite to Christianity at all, meaning, I should think, that it is either everything or nothing -- which in the end comes to the same thing. This seems to me to be an absurd view. I can only answer it with the following rhetorical question. Suppose you return in 1000 years to earth to find a group of religious people who call themselves "Christians." You strike up a conversation with them about the life, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ, but they look puzzled and ask curiously "Who’s that?" Now, is what they believe and practice Christianity?

Given this extremely strong anti-essentialism which apparently Muray holds, I have yet further difficulty understanding his criticism as it is put here. For suppose someone (not Hauerwas) did think that "separation from the world" was the fixed essence of Christianity. The world, presumably, changes -- constantly and eternally. And so also (it seems) would separation from it. Where, then, is the fixed essence?

I am worried that there are some very deep confusions here.

But let us leave the criticism of Hauerwas’ work as "essentialist" and "separatist" and turn to the first leg of Muray’s critical response to Hauerwas’ tripod, namely that of "substantialism" regarding the self. Here I think is where Muray’ s critical points are best made. I think he is right to say that "while Hauerwas goes to great lengths to show that humans are self-determining agents, just how they are free and self-creative is never described" (85). And his suggestion that "a conceptual elaboration of the relationship between efficient and final casualty would have been helpful in clarifying the issue" (85) is, I think, quite promising. (It should be said, however, that it is far from the case that Hauerwas makes no attempts to deal with this problem, that is, the problem of just how we should understand the free and creative self; and it should be noted just what a perplexing problem it is -- one I do not think anyone has solved. Indeed for Hauerwas it is an enduring problem, and one he has worked on imaginatively, even if sometimes rather unsystematically?)

Muray is to be lauded early on in his essay for putting his criticism on this point carefully. Since, he says, Hauerwas is a bit unclear on just how the self is free and self-creative "his view of the self is prone to a substantialist interpretation" or "lends itself to a substantialist interpretation" (85, emphasis added). (Substantialism is for Muray roughly the view that the self is a substance to which certain properties, such as that the self is in community, only accidentally adhere.) Here it is not that Hauerwas is a substantialist about the self -- indeed, it should be obvious to anyone who reads him carefully that substantialism about the self is just what he wishes to break free of -- but rather that since his escape from substantialism is less clear than it might be he yet leaves room for its reemergence. And all this might be quite correct. However, nearer the end of his essay (e.g., 90, 94) his tone subtly changes and he begins to write as if Hauerwas is a substantialist to which the process-relational, non-substantialist view is to be contrasted. This contrast is unwarranted, for Muray has not shown -- neither is it possible to show from Hauerwas’ writing -- that he has anything like a substantialist view of the self. Indeed, while he might not put it just like this, I think Hauerwas would wish quite strongly to agree with Muray’s own affirmation that "the self is a relational or social self . . . Any human is constituted by his or her personal past, the past of the universe, and more immediately the cultures and environments of which we are a part" (91).

III

Perhaps this last critical point, i.e.’ that Muray overstates the substantialism in Hauerwas, allows us to end on a somewhat hopeful note about the future of dialogue between those of us who are strongly influenced by and continue to work in the light of the writings of Stanley Hauerwas and those who call themselves process theologians. It would be a mistake to minimize our differences; indeed, I have tried not to do this in my response to Muray. But there are two points at least that emerge in this essay -- and perhaps a third -- that I consider to hold promise for future discussion. Beginning with the point just mentioned, these are:

(1) The attempt on the part of both process and Christian virtue thinkers of Hauerwas’ ilk to struggle anew with questions of the self and to shed the Cartesianism (substantialism?) that has led us to think for the past three hundred years that we are primarily and fundamentally individual, isolated selves.

(2) The commitment in both camps to reunderstand God’s agency and power as essentially noncoercive. Nicely, Muray has already spotted this affinity (90). Our question to each other should perhaps now be: where concretely does this commitment lead? For Hauerwas it has led to an affirmation of the truth of Christian pacifism. Perhaps for process thinkers it will lead to something like this as well.4

(3) Muray in this essay seems to be seeking a basis for a radical critique of modernity, something that Hauerwas quite evidently also seeks, and thinks he has found. I do not find this so strongly in other process thinkers, and insofar as Muray will not be more specific than that the criterion for reconstituting a tradition is "whatever contributes to the enhancement of relationality and creativity that are true of the fundamental character of reality itself" (93), I do not think he will much like the basis of Hauerwas’ critique, namely the stories of the history of Israel and Jesus as they continue to be remembered and enacted in the Christian church. But we should be careful here and elsewhere not to shut off the conversation before it has begun -- and to hope that in fact it will turn out to go further than either camp might have at first expected.

 

Notes

1For the meaning I wish ‘tradition" to have, consider MacIntyre’s definition: "A tradition is an argument extended through time in which certain fundamental agreements are defined and redefined in terms of two kinds of conflict: those with critics and enemies external to the tradition who reject all or at least parts of those fundamental agreements, and those internal, interpretative debates through which the meaning and rationale of the fundamental agreements come to be expressed and by whose progress a tradition is Constituted." Whose Justice? Which Rationality? (Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 1988), 12.

2 It is helpful to refer to the publication dates of Hauerwas’ books listed at the end of Muray’s article to get a sense of the historical development of his thought; although the important qualification must be added that Vision And Virtue was actually published first in 1974 and therefore, besides Character and the Christian Life (which Muray does not mention), was the first of his books. At the time of its writing Hauerwas had only just begun to read John H. Yoder, who became a pivotal influence. It was from Yoder that Hauerwas learned to think ecclesiologically, which in turn provided him a way to see his nascent pacifism (which he also learned from Yoder) as a radical Christian politics which stands over against the politics of liberalism. These themes of course emerge strongly in his later work.

3Virtually every major book Hauerwas has written has a chapter dealing specifically with problems of the self as he has struggled to see more clearly what it might mean to think of "The Self as Story" -- which is the title of a seminal chapter in Vision and Virtue. Consider, for example, "The Idea of Character" in Character and the Christian Life, "Character, Narrative and Growth" in A Community of Character, or "On Being Historic: Agency, Character and Sin" in The Peaceable Kingdom.

4 See my "Christian Pacifism and Theodicy," Modern Theology 5, no. 3 (April, 1989): 239-255, for a treatment of how the pacifism of John H. Yoder opens to a specifically Christian account of God’s power as essentially noncoercive,

Eco-minded: Faith and Action

BOOK REVIEW: Earth Community, Earth Ethics,b y Larry L. Rasmussen. Orbis, 425 pp., $30.00.

In an article published in Science in 1967, Lynn White called Christianity the root historical cause of our ecological crisis. This infamous indictment has now been qualified by the response of many theologians who, while admitting Christianity's complicity in our environmental plight, have pointed out its considerable resources for ecological thinking. Some presses, such as Orbis Books, now publish several series of books on the environment and Christianity, and offer a book list as long as your arm.

It is not yet clear, however, that Christian theology and the environmental crisis have genuinely come to terms with each other. It has been difficult for the authors of the new "ecobooks" to resist either the trendy and jargonistic enthusiasm that typically accompanies a social movement or the crisis mentality that attaches itself to this one. For an illustration of the former problem, consider the following passage from Howard Clinebell's Ecotherapy:

Discovering, befriending and intentionally developing one's profound rootedness in the life-giving biosphere is the process that produces what is called healthy biophilia and ecobonding. Ignoring, denying or rejecting this inherent earth-rootedness is called ecophobia and ecoalienation. Ecobonding involves claiming and enjoying one's nurturing, energizing, life-enhancing connection with nature. Ecophilia is the love of life associated with this bonding with the earth. Ecoalienation involves seeking to distance oneself from our inescapable life-giving dependence on nature. Ecophobia is the fear of claiming one's dependence and bonding intimately with nature.



Clinebell also points out the gap that exists between the judgments of theology, Christian or otherwise, and some of the new trends: "Divisive religions with exclusivistic beliefs that only their understanding of faith has spiritual validity tend to block the cooperative global earth-saving and peacemaking efforts that will he required to reverse the ecological crisis." Clinebell doesn't name the divisive religions, yet the generality of this claim in a book that is otherwise so accepting tells us that while Clinebell is interested in many things, he is not drawn to theology unless it can be reunderstood in terms of "religion" or "spirituality," terms with which he has no quarrel. "The terms religion and spirituality in this book are used as rough synonyms and are defined generically from a perspective of the disciplines of psychology of religion and sociology of religion. They refer to whatever beliefs about ultimate reality and values people use to provide themselves with some sense of meaning and direction."



Though Clinebell and other writers combine a concern for ecology with a concern for religion/theology, this interest does not ensure a happy relationship between the two. Some "ecologians," as author Thomas Berry prefers to be called, have considerable reason to dispense with past religious traditions. They believe that the stories from these traditions cannot correctly express the relation between human beings and the earth. These thinkers frequently point out that the ecological crisis is involved and multidimensional. It touches, evidently, on the scientific, the moral, the political and the religious. And it calls, therefore, for a broad response that can be bound by no particular set of past loyalties.



It is hard to argue about the depth of our current trouble; we all know that we have dug ourselves into a large ecological hole. Yet the conceptualization of the issue in such broad terms has led many of these new writers into quicksand. In our time a moral crisis takes a predictable form. First, the problem is stated in all its force, and people's consciousness is raised. Then we look for a solution, considering various inadequate responses along the way, pointing out their inability to effect deep and sweeping change.



One need not quarrel with this structure per se in order to notice a difficulty it creates for theological thinking. The immensity of the environmental crisis and the felt need to do something about it quickly sends us scurrying for an answer. We may look to theology, but we do so with some idea in mind of what will count as a solution to the crisis, particularly in its global nature. Thus the theology in the new ecobooks is often thin, rushed and generally custom-molded to the various authors' understanding of the nature of the crisis. Moreover, because the required theology is linked with radical change, it demands significant revisions of traditional Christian notions. For example, as Michael Northcott says in The Environment and Christian Ethics, the new ecotheologies have frequently swept aside the key Christian and Jewish notion that while the universe is the good creation of God, it is yet distinct from God. A more pantheistic picture is appealing, partly because of the desire to abolish the instrumentalism of the predominant Western picture that nature is worth only what human beings can use it for. Therefore the ecologians, in Northcott's words, determine to "remake" Christian beliefs in the light of the environmental crisis.



Unlike some of the books just characterized, Larry Rasmussen's Earth Community, Earth Ethics proceeds patiently and thoughtfully. It is finely, even exquisitely crafted, and in places is breathtakingly written. Moreover, it is intriguingly structured. Three sections--"Earth Scan," "Earth Faith" and "Earth Action"--unfold into chapters bearing evocative titles such as "Sweet Betsy and Her Avalanche" or "The Vine Languishes, the Merry-Hearted Sigh."

Yet one still feels the nagging tension between explicitly theological categories and those of the environmental crisis and deep ecology. In Rasmussen's case, however, this is not because theological concepts are radically revised but because theology is not the primary language of the book. While Rasmussen does a bit of theology here and there, the book lacks a theological structure. He never decides to consider systematically or historically what Christian theology has to say about ecology, the earth or even creation. As a result, there is no theological context into which the reader can place the book's otherwise quite interesting reflections about our environmental troubles.



Not that Rasmussen ignores theological voices; in the second section of the book, Luther and Bonhoeffer are consulted frequently. Yet these voices are mingled with the voices of others who speak from no particular theological perspective. This is possible because the primary criterion for inclusion into Rasmussen's choir is essentially aesthetic or evocative. He is principally concerned not with whether an idea or text is theologically astute but with whether it moves our spirits.



It is best to understand the book as a valiant attempt at art. It contains arguments, but they are laced together not by a theological position, but by their evocative effect. This opens the book up to a different standard of judgment. It scores high, for instance, in "The Gifts of Darkness," in which Rasmussen combines recollections of nighttime in his child's room and in sleepless modern cities, the Jewish understanding of Sabbath rest, and the poetry of Langston Hughes. Sometimes it doesn't work, as when a long and confusing excerpt from Toni Morrison's Beloved is presented as if it were an appropriate summary of Bonhoeffer's interpretation of Paul on the hope of the resurrection.



Structurally, the book opens with the global crisis. What is the appropriate way for us to live in the face of our current environmental condition? Rasmussen proposes "sustainability" as the correct goal for human interaction with the earth. But he also notes that this description is prone to abuse, for it has been too easily twined with expansionism. Even such organizations as the United Nations have been drawn in by the facile notion--which also carries the name "sustainability"--that economic development, or the expansion of capitalism and its accompaniments, will lift up the poor even as it heals the earth. In a variety of convincing examples, Rasmussen demonstrates the unsustainability of this idea of "sustainability." He rejects the presumption that the earth exists to host human economic activities, and calls the idea scientifically and spiritually untenable. We have recently discovered how complex cycles of nature are; we must abandon the idea that humankind can organize and manipulate them to achieve some neat, predetermined end. The fluctuation of fish populations in the Atlantic, for example, does not seem to correspond to factors that we can predict and therefore manipulate. Furthermore, the model underlying earlier presumptions about easy manipulation and continued economic development perpetuates the picture of humankind as external to nature. The book's first section takes aim at this tenacious misconception.



For Rasmussen, the right sort of sustainability requires a change of heart. We must understand ourselves and our eco-nomies to "be part of that comprehensive nature." For this change, more "knowledge" will never be enough. "Not just knowledge (scientia) but wisdom (sapientia) and the psalmist's contrite heart and humble spirit are requirements of sustainable community itself. Issues of sustainability are as much dispositional and ethical as they are technical." It is here that the tenets of an "earth faith" must be explored.



Rasmussen's knowledge of scientific and economic literature is impressive. Yet by training and reputation he wears the mantle of theologian; consequently the cogency of the second "earth faith" section will determine the full success of the book. Can Rasmussen sustain a deep theology as he deepens our ecology? The answer is mixed; in the second section the presentation both soars and falters, not so much because Rasmussen's theology is untenable, but because it is secondary.



Rasmussen calls for an "adequate cosmology" to provide the dispositional and ethical resources for the right sort of sustainability. The form of this call is dangerous, as I have suggested, because it goes looking for an answer from theology (or elsewhere) that will be "adequate" in terms already specified by a certain understanding of the environmental crisis. This leads Rasmussen summarily to pronounce that "theological luminaries" both ancient and modern are cosmologically inadequate. "In short, neither existentialism, neoorthodoxy, liberalism, common church practice, nor society at large in the North Atlantic world has a cosmology worthy of the name in many influential circles." In addition, Rasmussen acts as if what we need to do is look for a religion according to its cosmological adequacy, whatever that is finally judged to be. Since "degraded religion degrades religion" you must "choose your religion and cosmology carefully."



Fortunately for the book, Rasmussen does not proceed to choose his religion but dives into the rich symbols of his own Christian faith and of its Jewish mother faith. For example, consider trees. We can discover in Hebrew scripture, particularly in the poetry of the Psalms or the prophets, rich reminders of the sturdy cedars of Lebanon. This is a background that can be filled in with newer evocations--such as the Christian's vision of the tree of execution, the cross, as the tree of life.



The tracing of symbols through time and tradition is not unfamiliar to Christian theologians; the church fathers and many later medieval theologians did this frequently. There is a difference, however. In that earlier context, the intent was to display a doctrine or practice more fully, such as the doctrine of salvation or the practice of Christian baptism. So a discussion of trees (as in the cross) or of the ubiquity in life and nature of water (as in baptism) deepened and in some cases redirected existing belief and practice. But in Earth Community, Rasmussen uses the Jewish and Christian sources as a jumping-off point, extending the symbol to include a variety of poetic expressions. The literature is impressive, but the criterion for inclusion of this or that bit is not theological but aesthetic.



We can see this feature most clearly when Rasmussen deals with scripture. He integrates it with other works in an imaginative rather than authoritative way. Scripture is only one of a variety of places Rasmussen goes to find passages about the earth that will grip us. Although this makes for stimulating reading, it cuts off a main route to theological reflection.



There is good reason for the theologian to begin reflection about God's earth with the story and doctrine of creation. In so doing, she signals the story's authority, one which sets a standard of judgment for the subsequent integration of other doctrines and stories. The new doctrines or stories can interpret, criticize and even change the starting point. Nonetheless, it retains authority because it has established the theological terms of the debate.



This authority is missing in Rasmussen's approach because he has traded theology for aesthetics. This move creates another problem: What to do when we find ourselves untouched by the stories or poetry he serves us? Were a theological argument unfolding, an evocative misstep could be taken in stride, since something larger would sustain our interest. If we found ourselves disagreeing, we would know what to do, namely, argue out the point.. But when our tastes in art and literature don't match Rasmussen's, we shift into neutral and wait for something more appealing to come along.



Theology plays a greater role in the later chapters of this crucial second section, where Rasmussen considers a variety of different ways in which the human-nature relation has been expressed in Jewish and Christian theology, including concepts such as dominion or stewardship. Without being dismissive of other models, he decides that "an evolutionary sacramentalist cosmology offers the richest conceptual resources for addressing earth's distress, if infused with a profound earth asceticism and married to prophetic efforts aimed at the 'liberation of life from the cell community.'" Although rather heavy-laden, this statement introduces some of Rasmussen's most astute reflections.



In "The Beginnings," a chapter drawing upon law and prophets, Rasmussen displays how the governing order of the universe is not perceived therein as fixed. With the God of the Hebrews, "ordinary people--indeed the apparently powerless--can subvert deeply entrenched powers and help effect a new world." Hence, for many of the biblical writers, "the grandeur of creation goes hand in hand with the transformation of the social world."

Here is a fitting place to begin forging a theological response to the questions raised by a concern for an economics in which earth and human community are laced together seamlessly.



The book reaches its high point here, as Rasmussen displays his theological stuff, interacting primarily with Luther and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. With Bonhoeffer, Rasmussen unflinchingly reaffirms that we are a "piece of the earth" even in the face of the perverse blood-and-soil faith of the Nazis. The language cannot be given up precisely because we are--and God has become--body. Any other faith, particularly the spiritualism to which Christianity is often tempted, draws us back, hovering over earth as if it is inert and thus instrumental to our separate purposes.

Unfortunately, these suggestive reflections are too brief, and we are led back to less original points. The lesson of evolutionary science--that we are all interconnected--is replayed to no clear end, and the book concludes with suggestions for "earth action" that are largely borrowed from other sources. The comparative brevity of the final section makes it feel more like an appendix (even if some of the practical suggestions taken from Wendell Berry or, intriguingly, the Common Bread Restaurant and Bakery in South Minneapolis are worth hearing). The book ends without a full display of its theological ideas.



Despite its deficiencies, Earth Community, Earth Ethics is a valuable and interesting work. It confirms that Rasmussen is a gifted writer and a scholar of considerable range, and that, theologically, he has something important to say. Unfortunately, since he gives theological reflection a secondary place, one gets the idea that he is not yet sure how to exercise the office of Christian theologian in the face of the ecological reorientation. One hopes that Rasmussen will write more, and that the dives he takes into a Christian theology are a preview of a full submersion. .





Religion and Liberty: From Vision to Politics

The French Catholic poet Charles Péguy once remarked that politics begins in mysticism, and mysticism always ends in politics. Or as I would paraphrase it: every form of "politics in depth" begins in a religious vision, and every vision that is incarnated in history must end in politics.

What we normally think of as politics, familiar to us from the daily press, concerns the public business of securing interests and exercising power. It is constituted by the actions of officials, administrations, agencies, parties, factions and citizens. What I am calling "politics in depth", consists of the convictions that seem self-evident to citizens. These in turn are the legitimating principles of politics. In the United States, the Declaration of Independence articulated these legitimating principles. "We hold these truths to be selfevident, that all men are created equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain unalienable rights, that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness."

The problem that faced the framers of the Constitution 11 years after the Declaration was how to incarnate that vision in everyday politics. Granted such self-evident truths, how do we constitute a government worthy of the free persons so described? Although the revolutionaries had been given a "New Beginning," in a sort of "New Eden," they had every reason to fear that their actual conduct would subject them to the mockery of humankind.

In recent times we have learned that it is possible for humans to be free even in the prisons of the KGB. I have heard Soviet exile Natan Sharansky. for example, testify how he retained his liberty even in solitary confinement. Like so many prisoners before him, Sharansky discovered personally what Jefferson meant by calling human rights "unalienable." All the KGB required of Sharansky was that he confess his error, admit that he had been wrong. Yet Sharansky felt more powerfully the requirement of his own conscience, in the presence of another Judge. The KGB could restrict Sharansky’s diet to bread and water, and could impose a series of other punitive measures, but it could not alienate him from his fundamental liberty. Sharansky maintained the freedom to say No. As he has testified, he found a nourishing, strengthening liberty at the very heart of creation, a liberty to say Yes to the God who made him -- and made him free -- and No to his tormentors.

This liberty of conscience transcends any and all political orders. Human freedom rooted in God declares that all states and all political orders are under God, limited not omnipotent. States can crush or kill human beings, but they cannot alienate them from their responsibility to God and conscience.

But precisely because this freedom transcends all politics, it does not of itself constitute an order within which the liberties of human beings are secured. The purpose of instituting governments, as the American framers noted, was not to enumerate human rights but "to secure these rights."

Thus, the fact of religiously grounded liberty, when confronted with concrete, social conditions, leads directly to the question of how such liberty ought to be ordered. How should a this-worldly order be constituted so as to be worthy of the free persons for whom it is introduced? A prison liberty is not sufficient. An ordered, institutional, routine liberty must also be imagined and secured. In tackling this problem the Constitution’s framers were well aware of one crucial lesson taught by Judaism and Christianity: human beings, however good, are always moved by appetite, disordered will, passion, ignorance, even bigotry, intolerance, enmity, greed and narrow self-interest. Russell Kirk, in a splendid study of the Constitution, The Roots of American Order (Open Court, 1974) , writes:

A conviction of man’s sinfulness, and of the need for laws to restrain every mans will and appetite, influenced the legislators of the colonies and of the Republic. Thomas Jefferson, rationalist though he was, declared that in matters of political power, one must not trust in the alleged goodness of man, but "bind him down with the chains of the Constitution."

A principal difference between the American Revolution and the French Revolution was this: the American revolutionaries in general held a biblical view of man and his bent toward sin, while the French revolutionaries in general attempted to substitute for the biblical understanding an optimistic doctrine of human goodness advanced by the philosophies of the rationalistic Enlightment. The American view led to the Constitution of 1787; the French view, to the Terror and to a new autocracy [p. 29].

Fearing "the tyranny of the majority" as much as they feared any tyranny, the framers recognized the need to check the democratic principle by the republican principle of representative government. They sought to provide new "republican remedies" for each of the "republican diseases" apparent in history. They took care to "see that ambition be made to counteract ambition."

This policy of supplying, by opposite and rival interests, the defect of better motives, might be traced through the whole system of human affairs, private as well as public. We see it particularly displayed in all the subordinate distributions of power, where the constant aim is to divide and arrange the several offices in such a manner as that each may be a check on the other -- that the private interest. of every individual may be a sentinel over the public rights [Federalist Papers, No. 51].

The framers saw little point in designing a "new order" for saints. There are too few of them, and they are often the most dangerous tyrants of all. Therefore, they hedged liberty around with institutional checks and balances.

The framers also paired the notion of limited government and the notion of government under law and under God. Regarding this second pair of notions, they decided, on the one hand, to limit the powers of government so that it could not intrude into the realm of religion or conscience. They resolved, on the other hand, to hold government accountable to the moral and religious conscience of free citizens, as expressed both individually and through existing communities of belief. Government may not impose upon conscience; on the contrary, government must be under conscience.

The framers recognized, in other words, that humans’ unalienable liberties entail transcendent obligations. Liberty means responsibility both to conscience and to the source of conscience, God. As a result, the framers often distinguished true liberty from false. To act in ignorance, in bigotry, in the inflamed passions of a mob or in brutality is not to act in liberty but in bondage. To act in liberty is to act from reflection and choice.

True freedom, then, requires a high level of human virtue, to which it is difficult for humans to ascend. Liberty has a price, and that price is the virtuous life, which the ancients of Greece and Rome with good reason regarded as the standard for civic behavior. An early version of the Seal of the United States showed the word "virtue" inscribed where, in the final version, the words Novus Ordo Seclorum were placed.

Without broad practice of the virtues appropriate to a free polity, the novus ordo, the new order, could not possibly survive. The reality of that new order is not protected by "parchment barriers," as James Madison noted, but by the virtues and institutions of its citizens.

The framers’ "in depth" view of liberty operated, then, on several levels. On the most immediate, practical level, these men saw the necessity of protecting the free conscience from its own tyrannical tendencies, which protection they achieved by separating the power of religious establishments from the power of the state. This is the political level. On a somewhat deeper but still visible plane the framers saw that the originality of the novus ordo -- what made it, in fact, a new order -- lay in the unprecedented degree of liberty each citizen possessed to define the course of his or her own "pursuit of happiness." This is the ethical level. On the most profound level, however, the framers recognized that ordered liberty depends mightily upon certain habits, virtues and practices -- that is, upon a moral culture of a highly developed type. This is the cultural level.

It was not for the framers to codify these moral prerequisites. In these intimate cultural matters they were prepared to rely upon the vigilance, moral seriousness and wisdom of their fellow citizens. But they knew that to lose this cultural undergirding would be to lose liberty. As Clinton Rossiter observes:

Whatever doubts may exist about the sources of this democracy, there can be none about the chief source of the morality that gives it life and substance. . . . [From the Hebrew tradition, via the Puritans, come] the contract and all its corollaries; the higher law as something more than a ‘brooding omnipresence in the sky"; the concept of the competent and responsible individual; certain key ingredients of economic individualism; the insistence on a citizenry educated to understand its rights and duties; and the middle-class virtues, that high plateau of moral stability on which, so Americans believe, successful democracy must always build [Seedtime of the Republic (Harcourt, Brace, 1953, p. 55)].

Citizens must take care to practice all the virtues that permit their daily action to spring from reflection and choice, in a manner worthy of their freedom, lest their exercise of liberty become a mockery, a parody, of liberty. The face on the Statue of Liberty is not that of a libertine, but of one seriously, resolutely, purposefully, seeking light, in the manner of one who tries always to walk in the light of the law, which is a lamp to her feet. As the hymn "America" enjoins: "Confirm thy soul in self-control, thy liberty in law."

Though both the conception of human liberty and the virtues necessary to its true exercise sprang from biblical teachings, the framers were careful not to endow biblical religion, or any religion, with state power. But their alternative to a society with an established religion was neither a society with no religion at all nor a secular society. A state without power over religion is not necessarily a secular state. Though for a time social scientists gave credence to the secularization hypothesis, which predicted that American religion would become ever more privatized and American society ever more devoid of religion, this hypothesis appears to have been disproved. Both in private and in public, religion seems more vigorous today than at earlier periods in American history.

Given these peculiar circumstances, one cannot assume that the American experiment could be easily duplicated elsewhere. The establishment of appropriate institutions to order religious liberty in the daily political life of nations depends heavily on a practiced local eye, skilled in finding local remedies for local ailments and in matching local checks and balances to local ambitions.

Americans, for their part, should appreciate how much the Jewish and Christian traditions have provided the vision and context for creating and maintaining a society of ordered liberty. The belief that every human person possesses unalienable rights to liberty derives from a vision first introduced into history by Judaism and then taught to Christianity. Both Judaism and Christianity, despite historical sins and failures, cherish the religious liberty of even those who say No to their revelations. Both believe that true faith arises only in voluntary consent. Conscience can be neither feigned nor coerced. And the perfectionism to which Judaism and Christianity are committed is always both realistic and progressive. It respects particulars and concrete limitations but presses human efforts forward to the next, realizable steps. Unlike utopianism, Judaism and Christianity do not posit a sinless world. Russell Kirk in The Roots of American Order cites an illuminating passage from Neal Riemer’s The Democratic Experiment:

Because freedom from slavery and oppression were dominant themes in the Old Testament, the legacy of Israel and Judah nourished American liberty. It warned -- as in the story of the Tower of Babel -- against Man’s attempt to be God. It forced Man -- as in the story of Adam and Eve -- to recognize his mortality and fallibility and to appreciate that there can be no Utopia on earth. Again and again, it inveighed against the belief that Utopia can be captured and made concrete in idolatry. On the other hand, however, it left ample room for effort to make life better. This is the central meaning, as I read it, of God’s Covenant with Noah and its reaffirmation with Abraham, with Moses, and with the later prophets [p. 47].

Jewish and Christian resistance to utopianism rests upon bitter historical lessons about the weight of human sinfulness. In this experience of sin lies the root of the principle of limited government, and of the balancing of systems and powers, so that the instruments of potential tyranny do not fall into a single set of hands.

Upon first thought, and according to ancient conceptions, such a fragmentation of social powers might seem to deprive societies of the integrative power of religion. If religion cannot integrate culture from above, will it not lose its rightful place? In practice, however, when religion is prevented from falling into tyranny from above, its historic temptation, a great burden is lifted from its shoulders. When religion is saddled with direct political responsibilities its judgments necessarily become political as well as religious. When freed from this obligation, religion accumulates a yeasty power in the dough of culture, and the light it offers consciences is purer. When its influence upon political power is not direct but indirect, religion becomes a guardian -- perhaps a guardian primus inter pares -- of a regime’s ethical power.

The relations between religion and liberty are complex and operate upon many levels at once. But 200 years after the constitutional convention, Americans can be grateful for the religious vision embodied in our political arrangements. Without that vision, we would be far less free than we are.

The Closet Socialists

Seldom have 1,200 words of mine generated so much attention as “A Closet Capitalist Confesses (Washington Post, March 14, 1976). Bruce Douglass’s temperate and reasoned reply in the Century’s pages (“Socialism and Sin,” December 1, 1976) provides a rare opportunity for discussion. On grand themes like “capitalism” and “socialism,” much passion is generated. Arguments are theological rather than empirical, for the reality of any economic system is larger than the universes of empirical fact. When “systems” are in conflict, there is pitifully little room outside them where one can find a vantage point of neutral observation.

Douglass was wise to suspect at first that I was “putting us on -- that it was all tongue-in-cheek”; but upon mature reflection he was also perceptive enough to see that I was serious.” I have difficulty believing in socialism; I cried out in the dark for help. Douglass thinks the 1970s an inauspicious time for capitalism; my weak faith found these years inauspicious for socialism. The spectacle of Great Britain’s becoming less than Great, the terrors of the Gulag Archipelago. Ingmar Bergman’s problems with the Swedish tax bureaucracy, the disastrous socialisms of the Third World, the flight of economic resources from socialist-leaning Quebec, the perfidy of political planners in New York city, efficient tyrannies from Cambodia to Czechoslovakia -- these do not inspire me with confidence in the practice of socialism. As a religious vision, socialism has my respect. As a practical way of arranging human political and economic affairs, it evokes my skepticism. I find that even candles burned to St. Michael Harrington (my socialist patron saint) fail to quicken sluggish faith.

I

On reflection, I realized that I had never read an intelligent description, let alone a defense, of democratic capitalism. Persons trained in the humanities, history and sociology -- my usual contacts in the literary and intellectual worlds -- tend to speak disdainfully of capitalism, profits, business and Detroit. They tend also to be as economically illiterate as I am, who long could not read a balance sheet, do not understand “the dismal science,” find business a foreign world. The only theoretical materials I ever encounter are socialist.

So it hit me: Socialism -- to play on the Volvo slogan -- is the thinking man’s economics. They go together, socialism and intellectual life. Capitalism is abandoned to practical men and women of affairs. Democratic capitalism as we experience it in the US. has no “manifesto,” and pitifully scant theoretical interests. There are many fundamentalist preachers of the creed -- in Rotary clubs, at the AMA -- but there is no serious theology accessible to the ordinary reader. All the fashionable theoreticians -- John Kenneth Galbraith, Robert Lekachman, Michael Harrington and a scattering of others -- are socialists and review each other’s books.

According to the prophetic tradition, one ought to warn oneself to think against prevailing winds. It is one thing to be a nonprofit thinker; nonprophet thinking is worse indeed. It is not really very “radical” for a theologian to promote socialism; it is the expected niche. In A Theology for Radical Politics I did not urge forms of socialism, but only those forms that strengthen rights and liberties and extend our own tradition. No doubt our own form of democratic capitalism has accepted many socialist elements over the generations; Peter Drucker’s work on the effects of “pension-plan socialism” is only one such evidence. It is an advantage of our system that it is subject to continual modification -- “creeping socialism,” as some call it.

Intellectually speaking, a theologian should be critical of both capitalist and socialist tendencies. It is by no means plain from the historical record that all virtue and truth reside on one side. Among businesspeople, one would perhaps want to raise one set of reflections; among socialist-inclined intellectuals, another. In recent years the balance of highly respected public rhetoric has plainly tipped toward the socialist side. Wisely? Critically? Or in “bad faith”?

The wisest course for a theologian today, I believe, is to be suspicious of the two ideologies -- of, as Peter Berger puts it, those twin Pyramids of Sacrifice -- and to start thinking carefully about one’s own economic experience. It is necessary to begin reading economics. As I argued in Ascent of the Mountain, Plight of the Dove, economic system, are the most profound institutional enforcers of the prevailing “sense of reality.” Economic institutions are more basic than political institutions. Sophistication in “political consciousness” must give place to sophistication in “economic consciousness. But economic consciousness is not to be gleaned solely from books of propaganda. Experience is a more reliable criterion by far. We must move from “political theology” to “economic theology.” We might even speak of “the economy of salvation,” if liberation theology had not already made that particular connection. But in launching out in these directions the greatest weakness of us theologians is how little we know about economics.

II

Douglass’s defense of socialism is unusual for its modesty and pragmatism. His essay is one of the best I have read on the subject. One can sense his care to submit to the evidence, not to he stampeded by desire. Still, one need not look at the evidence from within his horizon. Looked at from another standpoint, his evidence does not help a doubter.

Douglass really has only two points to make, and one of them confirms the central point of my essay. He says it best: “Democratic socialism still remains, therefore, much more a vision than a demonstrated possibility.” It is a vision. One must approach it as one approaches a religion. Even its claims -- as Douglass correctly reports them -- are religious: it will generate a new type of human being, more rational, people who “acquire only what they truly need.” At stake in the choice between democratic capitalism and democratic socialism “is a fundamental moral distinction” [italics added]. Dr. Douglass resists my phrase “secular religion” in order to rebut the “secular” part; it was the “religious” part that caught my attention.

“Under socialism.” he writes, “no one goes hungry: everyone who is able works; those who work receive benefits commensurate with their social contribution; and there are not the radical disparities in wealth and opportunities characteristic of capitalism.” My own minimal travels abroad teach me no such facts about the practice of socialism. Do most persons in say, Czechoslovakia meet U.S. minimal standards of nutrition? By our definition, are they above the poverty line? As for unemployment, forced labor can end that anywhere. I believe I have seen evidence of “radical disparities of wealth and opportunities” in every socialist nation I have visited, even independently of reading Yugoslav social critic Milovan Djilas. As for social cooperation, here is how Soviet MIG-25 flyer Viktor Belenko, who defected to Japan, described American crewmen at work on a carrier: “I’ve never seen men work with such proficiency and coordination.” They moved so casually, he marveled, “without ever being given an order and without anyone shouting at them.”

The problem is that socialism is now several generations old; it is no longer merely a vision or a dream; it has a historical record and is embodied in actual systems -- scores of them around the world. Characteristically, intellectuals deal with ideas and visions when writing of socialism -- and then suddenly become ruthlessly concrete when describing the capitalism they know. This hardly seems fair, until one recognizes that democratic capitalism lacks the texts, theories and visions that might be compared point for point with those of socialism. As a body of ideas, socialism has a coherent beauty and the elaborate casuistry theologians love. That alone makes me believe that it is too good for this frail, sinful world -- that it is lacking in practice and is too beautiful by half to supply a useful guide to actual human behavior.

III

Still, one tries to believe. Wouldn’t it be wonderful if an economic-political system delivered everything: not only productivity sufficient to alleviate poverty, disease and ignorance, not only freedom for science and intellectual pursuits, but also citizens tutored to “acquire only what they truly need”? My experience with socialists suggests that they are any. body’s equal as consumers, connoisseurs of good foods and expensive foreign cars (built by multinational corporations), and not detectably less greedy than the capitalists I have known. My hunch -- ingrained cynicism, perhaps -- is that the coveting of goods antedates capitalism and outlives socialism. In addition, my limited international experience (both travel and reading) does not indicate that socialist systems are more “rational” or even more ‘humane” in the allocation of resources than capitalist systems.

As a vision, socialism encourages my longing to believe. As a system well advanced in historical experience, it prompts me to ask myself: Would I want to live under such a system? Would I like for the U.S. to become one? Until a better apologist gets to me, I will have to confess, shamefaced (since this confession proves me less humane, less just and less visionary than those with faith), that my flesh and my experience will not let my spirit soar so high.

Temporarily, therefore, I confess as a matter of considered judgment that democratic capitalism is not only a more humane and rational economic-political system than socialism has yet produced but also the most advanced human form of liberty, justice and equality of opportunity yet fashioned by the human race. When a better system comes along, or when genuine internal improvements are, imagined for it, I will most happily support such. For ours is obviously a deficient human system. Nonetheless, actual socialisms are, without exception, worse.

IV

I have even formulated some reasons for this dreadful conclusion, to which my head, despite the heart’s yearnings, forces me.

First, liberty. Democratic capitalism “is indeed flexible,” to cite Douglass once again. It is endlessly reformable. Freedom of ideas prevails, private initiatives are encouraged, and practicality has great weight. “As Michael Harrington keeps insisting,” Douglass warns us, “as long as the means of production remain in private ownership, there is a fundamental structural obstacle to the realization of socialist objectives” -- and also, it might be added, to total state tyranny.

I seem to lack the necessary confidence in bureaucrats, political, leaders and state ownership. On reflection, I prefer a world in which private ownership is both possible and effective. I prefer the liberation of private spheres of economic activity, so that economic and political orders are kept in tension. It’s ideologically impure of me, I know, but it does seem that “socialist objectives” may not be worth destroying that tension for, and that they could not survive its disappearance. In a word, the socialist dream seems not only unworkable in practice but also deficient in theory. Countervailing forces in the economic order are indispensable.

Second, equality. Recently I heard civil rights spokesman Bayard Rustin ask an audience (predominantly black) which nation of the world a black would rather he living in now. Is there more opportunity for self-realization for a young black -- or Hungarian, or Indian, or Dominacano -- in any other existing system? The American ideal is not, of course, equality of results but equality of opportunity; but even in the (humanly unrealizable) sphere of equality of results, what system in existence draws as many immigrants year by year, or counts as “poverty” annual incomes unparalleled elsewhere? (The average grant to a welfare family in Harlem last year was $6,100.)

Last summer I watched a bicentennial parade in Cresco, Iowa, a town just over 100 years old. The earliest farm implements were resurrected. Three generations ago, one saw vividly, America was an underdeveloped nation. No tractors, no power machines. Then, in this same midwest, industrial invention flowered as nowhere else. (My wife’s grandfather himself invented the extension ladder, the grubbing machine -- for pulling up stumps -- and a special lightning rod.) A great historical miracle occurred. Democratic capitalism nourished it. The whole world now has new horizons.

Disparities of wealth and power, within the United States and outside it, cannot by any means be understood simply as evidence of “oppression” of sins against “equality.” The subject is a complicated one. Some use inequality of results as prima facie evidence of inequality of opportunity on the one hand, or of “oppression” on the other. Would that life were so simple. Equality of results is neither a natural, nor a virtuous, nor a creative, nor a free condition. Egalitarianism is, in practice, egalityranny; it must be enforced. Its social costs -- in inventiveness, initiative and creativity -- are exceeding high.

Third, justice. I fail to see any practicing socialist state whose schemes of justice exceed those of democratic capitalism. Justice is never fully achieved by human institutions, but in no land known to me -- or to former militant Eldridge Cleaver -- does the steady advance of justice have as creditable a track record as in ours. The demands we Americans characteristically make on our social institutions are both extraordinary and exorbitant. We even expect them to make us happy. Justice in Czechoslovakia? Forget it.

V

And so on. Perhaps it is best, by way of conclusion, to show how Dr. Douglass’s second point -- the irrationality and inhumaneness of capitalism, so disappointing to our academic socialists -- fails to help my lack of faith.

1. Detroit’s automobiles. Dr. Douglass can buy a car of virtually any size from Detroit, or from any other auto-producing nation. Has any socialist a wider range of choice than he? I do not share his enthusiasm for mass transportation; neither the Long Island Railroad, nor the Bay Area Rapid Transit, nor New York city’s subways, nor the Paris Metro, nor Eurail, nor any other system can quite match the liberty of action and distribution of costs of the personal automobile. Social costs of various sorts will force us to live differently in the future. You and I will pay for them.

2. Food production. The problem is not one of underproduction. for no economic system in the world is so productive, but one of international distribution. One need not buy foods containing additives; the fastest-growing group of food stores is the “independents” catering to the advanced and purified tastes of (among others) intellectuals. Our artificial foods do not seem to lead to shorter life-spans than those of our ancestors.

3. The energy crisis. Having discovered oil and its uses, we will now have to find other cheap sources of energy, and live differently. Socialist nations will no doubt suffer even more than we from higher oil prices.

4. The consumption ethic. The most highly educated Americans -- who happen to be the most affluent -- provide the best markets by far for consumer goods. Who else has so much discretionary income? My socialist friends drive expensive foreign cars and have habits in consumption that are not quite so “conspicuous” as to be vulgar, but are actually even more expensive. In a society like ours, there is also freedom not to consume. One can teach such restraint to one’s children and one’s students, if one practices it. One need not care too much about the sinfulness of one’s neighbors. Some like consumption, some pornography. Let them.

5. “Public penury.” Douglass’s comment about “underpaid teachers, police. men, firemen and social workers” is probably intended ironically, so far as New York is concerned; but even in Washington federal salaries are notoriously high. In any case, the public pays. Government is not an efficient provider of many services. Where there is government, there is corruption -- and also high motivation, well, to shrug.

Douglass wants “a rational plan” rather than “the whims of investors.” Look at this meaning of “rational.” Would you be satisfied with someone else’s “rational plan” if you had a better idea? Investors are rather more careful about their own money than the word “whim” suggests. It seems to me more intelligent -- and vastly more creative -- to develop and utilize our productive capacities on the basis of the intelligent self-interest of investors than on the whims of planners (to invert a Douglass sentence). Socialist planning has not become the laughingstock of socialist citizens for nothing.

Douglass would like a world without economic accountability: “If you choose to do something which does not lead to profits and which requires substantial financial support, your chances of being frustrated are rather high” Such chances are high in any case in this imperfect world. But the amount of money available for nonprofit work, with substantial financial support, in this nation of all nations in history is astronomical. Dr. Douglass and I draw remarkable salaries from nonprofit universities, for example. Has any civilization ever paid so many so well for being nonproductive?

VI

There is scarcely a sentence of Douglass’s modest defense of socialism and calm attack upon capitalism which -- much as I admire it -- does justice to the complex facts of my own experience of democratic capitalism. Capitalism “builds upon and in fact encourages selfishness” -- but also extraordinary generosity, a sense of service, voluntarism, giving. “A capitalist environment naturally inclines us to believe that people must be addicted to a greedy, competitive individualism.” But how, then, explain the extraordinary innocence and moralism of Americans, so many of whom seem to believe in the essential goodness of humanity and are so deliciously outraged by each example of “greedy, competitive individualism” they encounter in the news? Dr. Douglass argues from what the socialist books say Americans must be like -- not, I think, from the way his friends and associates regularly behave.

A very large proportion of Americans do not seek upward mobility; are content to stay at the salary level they have attained; do not work in order to consume; are not greedy, or even competitive; nourish their families and like their neighbors. The top 10 per cent, the ambitious, of course, do otherwise -- and pay the high personal costs. The democratic capitalist conviction is that such individualists will -- subject to the checks and balances of our society -- do more good than harm. The record seems to support this rather optimistic assessment of human liberty, this method of “harnessing human egoism.” As to “cultivating a better human nature,” those of us who are Christian leave this slim possibility to the miracle of divine grace and meanwhile do not set too much store by the chance of its happening in history.

Dr. Douglass makes the best case against capitalism and for socialism that I have yet encountered. His vision sounds noble, moral, heroic even. At night, faith wavering, I still thumb through pictures of Sweden, Albania, China, Yugoslavia, Nigeria and other socialist experiments, trying to awaken a dying light. How fortunate are those who still believe.

The Challenges of Adulthood for a Liberal Society

"Confirm thy soul in self-control," the hymn about the blessedness of America instructs

us. For liberal societies, intellect and liberty are intimately related. Liberty is

symbolized by a woman -- not a warrior (nor a guerrilla with a submachine gun); by the

light of intellect; and by a book.

The American concept of liberty -- symbolized by the statue in the Harbor -- entails

light, not darkness; learning, not nonchalance; seriousness, not dissipation; purpose, not

scatteredness; character and integrity, not lies, duplicity or fraudulence. Thus the

highest liberal symbol in New York City is the statue, not the sex shows on 42nd Street.

Alexander Solzhenitsyn is wrong to judge liberalism by the pornography in Times

Square. Like the rain that falls upon just and unjust alike and the wheat and tares that

grow together, liberalism tolerates license. But it aspires to liberty -- the liberty founded

in light, inquiry and self-mastery.

The first people to call themselves liberals stood for three liberations: political liberty

from tyranny and torture; economic liberty -- not total, but with an unprecedented

degree of freedom from state control over economic transactions between consenting

adults (and, thus, liberty from poverty); and liberty of conscience, inquiry, ideas and

information. These three liberations -- political, economic, moral-cultural -- suggest

why the classic liberal flag is the tri-couleur.

Book, torch, wit and conscience are crucial to all three liberations. Intellect brings the

wealth of nations as a society is shaped to promote invention, discovery, enterprise, wit

and (well named from the Latin word caput, or head) capitalism. The self-mastery that

humans achieve when they govern their passions and their sensuality with intelligence

rings about a working democracy, for unless each person can govern self,

self-government by all is impossible.

In its youth, liberalism stood for liberty from the ancien regime. Now, in its maturity,

liberalism is the regime. In its youth, liberalism understood liberty (mostly) as rebellion

from. Now, in its maturity, liberalism must decide what it is for. The challenge for

liberals now is to learn how to use liberty. In our possession is an unprecedented range

of liberties. As a youth, liberalism could claim that sex shops on 42nd street represented

emancipation. As an adult, liberalism no longer has that excuse, since there is no

"ancient order" against which to rebel.

Today there are only rebels! Even those who are now conservatives are rebels. They see

themselves as outsiders looking in and fighting against a heavily entrenched,

wall-to-wall liberal establishment.

It follows that both American liberals and conservatives face a parallel problem:

pluralistic societies are not morally comfortable for anyone. The beliefs and convictions

of practically everyone are offended either by the license insisted upon by some or the

constraints demanded by others. Gunnar Myrdal observed 40 years ago that nearly

every day Americans say to each other, on the one hand, "This is a free country, no one

can tell me what to do!" and, on the other, "There ought to be a law against that!"

In this context, a mature liberal order needs to think anew about two themes: (1) liberty

and law, and (2) liberty and responsibility. Law and responsibility are quite different.

Sometimes it is the law that distinguishes liberty from license, decadence or complicity

in evil. That is, an abuse of liberty is identified, and the law is expanded to cover it.

But liberty may also be distinguished from license, decadence and complicity in evil in

another way: by a responsible public treating certain behaviors with disdain, contempt

and mockery. It is not always necessary to pass a law in order to diminish the public

scope of certain behaviors; raised eyebrows, ridicule or a touch of satire are often

sufficient.

The central point is that any mature society -- including a mature liberal society -- must

choose against some behaviors. To act as a free society is always to choose; and human

choice is, necessarily, for some things and against others. Adulthood means learning to

choose -- learning to say No. Liberalism has slowly been learning this lesson -- as it

must.

In the political order, liberalism is not for laissez-faire, but for checks and balances. In

the economic order, liberalism is not for laissez-faire, but for political economy that

assigns many crucial economic roles to the state. Similarly, in the moral-cultural order,

liberalism is not -- and cannot be -- for laissez-faire. Just as liberals now oppose air and

water pollution, concern will increase in the near future about our moral environment.

A liberal society already makes moral choices. It chooses against racism, sexism and

other such habits. And these choices are appropriate, for a liberal society values liberty

(insight to see and will to choose) for each person. To demean what Martin Luther

King, Jr., called "the content of their character" is to treat people as empty of their

humanity.

Thus, the danger of free speech is that it can be extremely costly to the freedom of

others. Speech that is racist, antisemitic, antifundamentalist, antiwoman, or in other

way demeaning, injures others and undercuts the speaker's own humanity.

Choosing against such abuses need not always mean imposing new laws. In this society

-- as in all societies -- there are some things that the public does not (often for quite

good reasons) permit one to say. A liberal society has long lists of things enlightened

persons ought never to say. We impose these quite effectively -- even apart from law.

I return to my prediction: In coming years, our liberal society will think more and more

about the virtues that free persons ought to have, about the moral environment that we

choose to create, and about the type of people that a free liberal society chooses to

encourage. A mature society chooses its own moral models -- models of liberty, not

license.

Two other issues must be confronted by a maturing liberal society today. The first is

terrorism. A traveler to Europe will note that ancient European cities are walled. They

are walled because, before there were cities (and, hence, civilization), entire

countrysides belonged to brigands, robbers and murderers. Civilization is little but a

constant struggle against terrorism -- an effort to build layer upon layer of protection

against the worst that is in every human breast. In this century, two powerful regimes --

Lenin's and Hitler's -- were explicitly built upon terror, which they regarded as an

ultimate secret of the human heart.

How can we fight against organized, state-supported, international assaults upon

innocent civilians and civil institutions, especially when the terrorists use our free

speech to further their purposes?

Nearly all terrorists today claim to represent a higher ideological cause. This end, they

claim, justifies murder. Then, instead of discussing such people as murderers, many

among us are seduced into talking about the "causes" of terrorism. But the causes lie in

the will of those who choose murder. No further causes should be sought.

The Statue of Liberty has a book in her arms. Those who genuinely seek liberty will

find many other routes to it than the direct, willful, deliberate murder of civilians.

Those who choose murder should be held in the respect that murderers deserve.

The other issue that confronts liberalism today is freedom of the press when that

freedom conflicts with matters of national security. What is an adult liberalism to do?

For those people who are confident in the security of the United States and take its

survival for granted, the main good to be concerned about is the freedom of the press.

But what if liberty does not survive? What if in 100 years none of the currently free

nations -- about 35 of 165 -- has retained its liberty, and tyranny reigns everywhere?

Everyone has always said that the United States is living out an experiment. Lincoln

said at Gettysburg six score and three years ago: "We are testing whether any nation, so

conceived and so dedicated, can long endure." Suppose that this experiment -- the

noblest that human beings have ever conducted -- were to end like a comet that blazed

through history for 200 years and then went out? I do not think it is hard to imagine the

oil of the Middle East falling into Soviet hands via the fall of Iran; or to imagine the

Finlandization of Europe; or to imagine the United States being surrounded by hostile

satellites of the Soviet Union.

One weakness of liberal societies is their reluctance to confront evil directly.

Complacence is liberty's besetting danger -- just as vigilance is its hope.

These reflections do not alter the importance of freedom of the press in all aspects of

national security. Rather, my point is that the press may be constrained from discussing

crucial aspects of national security, not only by constraints imposed by government

officials, but also by those imposed by prevailing myths of American omnipotence. This

happened in the 1930s; neither Europe nor America was prepared for Hitler.

When was the last time you read an article describing how the Soviets might defeat us,

and how liberty might perish in this world? We do not think much about that. Why not?

Liberty and mind are linked. Liberty depends on vigilance of mind. That is why the

statue carries a light and a book.

 

Ecological Degradation As The Judgment of God

Earth in the Balance: Ecology and the Human Spirit. By Al Gore, Houghton Mifflin, 407 pp., $22.65.

The Age of Missing Information. By Bill McKibben, Random House, 261 pp., $20.50.

In an essay in this journal 50 years ago, "War as the Judgment of God," H. Richard

Niebuhr argued that the Jewish and Christian "interpretation of history centers in the

conviction that God is at work in all events. Our powers of ecological destruction had

not yet matured when Niebuhr wrote, so it is not surprising that he stressed God's action

in history. Today, however, we must recognize that God's sphere of activity includes

natural events and processes as much as historical ones.

To see God's love and action in the world today we must look beyond the end of the

cold war or the slow demise of apartheid to the complex modes of interspecies

interaction that sustain our ecosystems. We must look in gratitude to an ozone layer that

shields us from solar radiation and to the vast water and oxygen cycles which allow

plants to grow and mammals to breathe.

To see God's grace acting in nature also means seeing in ecological destruction a sign of

divine judgment and anger. Niebuhr saw "the act of God in war"; we would do well to

see the act of God in our increasing war against nature. God's judgment is evident as

governments and peoples take only timid or reluctant steps in restraining economic

patterns of growth that promote further ozone depletion, global warming, species

extinction, decertification and jungle destruction. As Niebuhr suggested, to see the

world in this way is to "stand where Isaiah stood when he discerned that Assyria was the

rod of divine anger."

It is out of fashion, however, to speak of divine anger and judgment. Such language is

seen as anthropomorphic and crude. But if God is for creation, is there not divine

sadness at our damage to creation and divine judgment upon our irresponsibility? God's

judgment is not some primitive vengeance. Rather, divine judgment and anger are

rooted in love and aimed at redemption. Divine judgment is a way of chastening sinners

and encouraging a new direction. Such judgment clarifies our vision by the painful

reminder that many of our productive and consumptive practices are out of balance with

planetary limits.

Vice-President-elect Al Gore and Bill McKibben have given us excellent books which

in different ways map the significance of this great drama and suggest reasons why so

many are ignoring it. Gore provides a rich historical account of our impact on the

ecosphere. McKibben meditates on the distinctive ways that TV impoverishes our

culture by cutting us off from vital information about God that earlier generations once

received from the farm, the woodlot or the starry night sky. Gore details major areas of

ecological concern and focuses on how entrenched notions of economic health, national

security, moral value and religious truth block our attention to ecological issues.

McKibben's book is centered in an experiment. On May 3, 1990, he had the entire

output of the country's largest cable TV system -- almost 100 channels -- videotaped. In

the following months McKibben viewed almost every film, episode and commercial on

the tape. His book probes the nature of electronic media and how it reduces the sort of

information that we receive. He intersperses this account with reflections on the

information presented to him on an overnight stay in the Adirondack Mountains.

These books share three overriding commitments. First, they both believe that what we

are doing to the earth is the great drama of our time. Second, they understand that our

ecological problems are rooted in an inattention to the natural world that has eroded

serious moral concern and committed action. Both books constitute an extended

reflection on obstacles to vision and the costs of not seeing. Third, Gore, a Baptist, and

McKibben, a United Methodist, write out of a Christian stance and stress that the

ecological crisis is grounded in an inability to relate the natural world to the sacred.

While Gore's presentation of the data doesn't break new ground, his emphasis on the

need for both planetary and personal balance situates the data within a compelling

framework. Gore begins by charting our disruption of various spheres -- climatic

patterns, atmospheric content, water cycles, soil and forest cover, genetic banks. He is

frustrated with those who dismiss the environment as a "fringe" issue, and he critiques

our political system for responding only to short-range concerns like elections and

immediate economic growth while ignoring our long-range environmental security.

In the book's second part, Gore probes the reasons for our myopia about the ecological

crisis. Where many in the environmental movement have advocated big-government

solutions, Gore reminds us that some of the worst ecological damage can be found in

the former Soviet Union and in Eastern bloc countries. He concludes that "an essential

prerequisite for saving the environment is the spread of democratic government to more

nations of the world." Gore's ethic links stewardship of the earth to our political

"stewardship of freedom" and "self-determination."

While noting problems with the Judeo-Christian heritage, Gore argues that this tradition

has been wrongly charged with supporting a domination ethic. He agrees that

Judeo-Christian communities have been slow in responding to the ecological crisis, but

he believes that the biblical heritage sustains an ethic of kindly stewardship of nature

rooted in the admonition to give glory to God. "How can one glorify the Creator while

heaping contempt on the creation?"

Gore concludes by outlining a detailed plan of action. We must make "the effort to save

the global environment the central organizing principle of our civilization." Where we

once pulled together to defeat totalitarianism, so we must commit ourselves to defeating

the "ideology of consumptionism." This is a much tougher fight, for consumptionism is

more seductive and tends to dilute a sense of responsibility. Where some believe that

ecological stewardship is simply not compatible with capitalism, Gore believes that

ecologically responsible policies are much more likely to develop in societies that are

enjoying democracy and free markets.

Gore calls for a new "global Marshall Plan" committed to "stabilizing world

population," "developing and sharing appropriate technologies," changing our economic

accounting to make visible the social and ecologic costs of productive and consumptive

practices, negotiating and approving a "new generation of international agreements,"

and developing a worldwide program to re-educate peoples about our participation

within, and responsibilities for, the planetary ecosystem.

Gore often hurls so many data, dates and concepts that one feels a bit guilty for being

unable to remember it all. McKibben's style is looser. Where Gore wants to provide a

comprehensive "state of the world," McKibben wants to talk about what he saw on TV

and what he saw on an eastern mountain and the sorts of information each experience

provided. And whereas Gore is optimistic that democracy and free markets are

compatible with ecological responsibility, McKibben sees capitalist societies promoting

an insatiable lust for economic growth and consumerism.

McKibben notes that the average American home has a television set on for seven

hours a day. TV-channeled information drowns out the quieter truths of nature -- truths

about limits, simplicity, virtue and the sacred. TV teaches us that place no longer

matters, that consumption is the chief value and that economic expansion is the source

of the good life. In a TV-dominated culture, we are kept abreast of stories and news

from around the world at such a frenetic pace that it overloads our ability to care or to

reflect deeply upon events.

McKibben asks: "What habits of mind and body" do TV ads and jingles "help produce"?

Sloppy habits, he concludes, where we cease to be mindful of how we are connected to

a finite earth.

McKibben is often poetic, but his analysis remains forceful and realistic. It won't be

easy to change our habits or to promote long-term ecological sustainability at the price

of short-term economic sacrifice. There are vast incentives to continue with our binge

of high-energy consumption, high mobility (cars and planes) and high economic

growth. Overcoming these incentives will require discipline and a transformation of

values.

Gore's book is the best general introduction I have seen to the range and gravity of these

problems. It is aimed at a broad literate readership and would serve admirably as a text

for concerned citizens, church study groups or college classes. Whatever environmental

action Gore takes as vice-president, he has already made a major contribution with this

book. McKibben, too, has given us much to ponder and rightly points us to the powerful

media and cultural forces which distract us from ecological degradation.

It is not surprising that Gore's book is being hit hard by conservatives who suggest he is

a wild-eyed "liberal" bent on pushing a "big government" agenda of environmental

protection. They argue that our current data about global warming are not sufficient to

justify costly changes in consumptive and transportation policies. It is odd and

disturbing how ecology issues have come to be perceived as "liberal" concerns.

Conservative virtues of prudence and vigilance were repeatedly invoked during the cold

war to justify the vast sums spent on national and global defense. Though the precise

magnitude of the threat was not certain, prudence seemed to require us to prepare for a

worst-case scenario. The town on the river does well to build a levee to handle not only

the once-every-20-year flood but also the every-100-year disaster. The leaders who for

so long justified economic sacrifice to resist the Soviet threat seem unable to see that

ozone depletion, global warming and species extinction constitute genuine threats to

national and global security and thus warrant defensive steps, even if such steps entail

significant national sacrifice.

Fragile ecosystems the world over suffer from human encroachment. All around us this

great drama surges. We are undercutting key elements of the structure of creation, yet

we do not acknowledge what we do and what is at stake. Economic growth has become

the political mantra, the last word, in all nations. But how long can the planet continue

to support our rates of growth? In this century the world's population has tripled and our

annual global industrial production has increased 50-fold. Most of this production has

been made possible through the accelerated burning of fossil fuels.

High material consumption is not a rich enough goal to provide individuals with

meaning or even to sustain communities over time. We may come to renew our spiritual

energies and convictions through a commitment to a mission much greater than

ourselves. McKibben and Gore are right to emphasize the vital role that religious

communities can play in invigorating a critique of our consumerist system. As

McKibben stresses, they are among "the few institutions potentially capable of

elevating and celebrating sacrifice, or embracing some goal besides human material

progress."

 

Auden’ s Moral Comedy: A Late-Winter Reading



The trouble with W. H. Auden’s poem For the Time Being is that in subtitling it “A Christmas Oratorio,” Auden condemned it to being treated primarily as an inspirational holiday ritual -- akin to watching “Charlie Brown’s Christmas” on television with the kids or spiking the eggnog. A hurried Christmas reading tends to misconstrue Auden’s message as just another cheerful reflection on the meaning of the Nativity. Likewise that type of reading tends to trivialize Auden’s humor as an attempt to get laughs, to add to the merriment of the holiday season.

Late winter, however, when the chilling winds and numbing routine have taken their toll, is actually the best time to read Auden’s Christmas poem. For Auden, our ordinary existence is lived out in a post-Christmas world where “The Christmas Feast is already becoming a memory. . . . And the kitchen table exists because I scrub it.” His concern in the poem is not simply to speak of the Nativity events but rather to draw out their incarnational impact upon the mundane world of the everyday. And what could be more boring, more deadeningly mundane, than the cabin-fever periods of February? Only a late-winter reading allows access to the deeper layers of meaning in the poem, because for Auden Christmas is more than simply a discrete peak event -- a holiday -- distinct from the rest of the year; it is an annual reminder that God has acted and is acting “to redeem from insignificance” the monotonous sludge of our everyday routines. Auden’s point is that Christmas has more to do with the serious confrontation with emptiness in late winter than with holiday good cheer in December.

A post-Christmas reading discloses the depth of Auden’s incarnational vision and by so doing helps illuminate how Auden uses comedy and humor -- not merely for laughs, but to promote and sustain honest moral reflection. While most moralists and literary critics of this century have viewed comedy as frivolous, a hindrance to serious thinking, Auden used it in the service of morality. In “The Christmas Oratorio” his comic witnesses of the Nativity train attention on our common human foibles and show that the general drudgery and pettiness of our lives may contain an underlying dimension of significance and worth.



Auden wrote For the Time Being in the years 1941-42, during a pivotal period in world history and in his own career. He had angered many of his English compatriots by emigrating to America, an act some considered disloyal and cowardly in the face of the imminent war. Auden changed not only his residence but his views on religion and politics in this era. Even his poetic style had been gradually shifting for some time. Not all of his early admirers appreciated these changes.

Auden had achieved recognition in the late ‘20s and the ‘30s for his haunting images of the anxiety and tension in Europe between the wars. As his friend and critic Stephen Spender has observed, Auden’s stance in his early poetry is that of a diagnostician: he describes the symptoms of the social and spiritual problems of the age and prescribes love as the proper cure. Throughout his life, love was always Auden’s remedy, but in these early years he described it sometimes in Freudian terms as a release from repression, sometimes in Marxist terms as authentic existence through social action.

In his early secular period Auden sought to attain a detached tone in his poetry, in order to emphasize the accuracy of his diagnoses. He sought an elevated perspective; as he put it, he wished to see “as a hawk sees it or a helmeted airman.” And from this height, Auden emphasized the large-scale, the political dramas of a collapsing world, the tragic epic of the West, even as he used the images of the tortured dreams, fears sand drives of the psyche to describe them.

But by the late ‘30s Auden began to experience a general loss of trust in his secular prophets, and he slowly came to retrieve and to deepen his childhood appreciation for Anglican Christianity. In “A Thanksgiving,” written near the end of his life, he describes his slow conversion to religion:

Finally, hair-raising things

That Hitler and Stalin were doing

Forced me to think about God.

Why was I sure they were wrong?

Wild Kierkegaard, Williams and Lewis

Guided me back to belief.

 

Along with this slow conversion came a shift in Auden’s choice of scale, from the epic and tragic to the intimate, the domestic, the familiar. The tense elliptical voice he made famous fell silent, and he began to pick up a relaxed, friendly, often humorous tone. The note of strident propheticism and political critique gave way to quieter, more patient harmonies. To many he seemed to have turned his back on politics. He wrote of nature in “In Praise of Limestone” (1948). He seemed far from public problems when he trained his attention on the significance of the different rooms of his house in “Thanksgiving for a Habitat” (1962-63).

Left-wing critics who had adopted Auden as their poet laureate now deplored his return to the church. They saw it as an act of intellectual cowardice, and disowned him. Liberal intellectuals who had once applauded Auden’s passionate dissection of the social traumas of the ‘30s now snorted that his new humorous, relaxed style was frivolous and irrelevant -- hopelessly bourgeois. One mockingly asked in the title of a review, “What’s Become of Wystan?” Another joked of Auden’s “inverted development.”

In recent years essayists and biographers have been more sympathetic to Auden’s journeys and much more positive in their assessment of his intellectual career. Indeed, something of an Auden renaissance seems to be stirring. Nathan Scott, in The Poetry of Civic Virtue (Fortress, 1976), outlines the coherence of the mature Auden’s poetic program. Likewise three excellent biographies of Auden have recently been published, each capturing his warmth: Charles Osborne’s W. H. Auden: The Life of a Poet (Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1979); Edward Mendelson’s fine Early Auden (Viking, 1981); and Humphrey Carpenter’s acclaimed W. H. Auden: A Biography (Houghton Muffin, 1981).



No doubt Auden’s return to the Anglican Church won him new Christian admirers; converts flatter us by imitation. But while Christians have appreciated Auden’s message, they have often remained deeply ambivalent toward his comic imagery. Neither Marxists nor moralists are known for their funny bones. In the view of Marxists, humor distracts us from participating in the vital movements of history: it is bourgeois and decadent. Moralists see humor as shallow and silly. Humor subverts the seriousness and gravity which mark moral reflection and decision-making.

For the Time Being was written on the heels of Auden’s conversion. It offers not only Auden’s most explicit and lengthy statement of his Christian vision but also an insight into why he chose to articulate it through comic imagery. Auden believes that far from hindering Christian moral reflection, comedy illuminates the human penchant for self-righteousness and self-deception, and thus actually promotes such reflection.

Auden’s central point is that the Christ Child addresses us not so much in the holiday times of warm companionship and celebration as in the flat stretches of our lives. Thus the title For the Time Being operates on many levels. First, it refers to the period in which we all live. Our time. Home. The world which never quite measures up to Christian ideals or Hollywood portrayals. It is the post-Christmas period “between the times.” As Auden describes the movement from the religious fervor and sense of renewal of the holidays to the post-Christmas depression:

The streets are much narrower than we remembered;

     we had forgotten

The office was as depressing as this. To those who

     have seen

The Child, however dimly, however incredulously,

The Time Being is, in a sense, the most trying time

     of all.

 

Second, the title refers to the significance of historical existence, which is becoming infused with the power and possibility of the incarnation. The day-today is being redeemed, and the task of Christians is to participate in this slow work. In Auden’s words:

In the meantime

There are bills to be paid, machines to keep in repair,

Irregular verbs to learn, the Time Being to redeem

From insignificance.

 

Third, there is an implication that the “Time Being” also refers to the Logos-Child, the Divine Word made flesh in history. Thus Christian moral action is always an act of gratitude for this sacred gift.

Auden locates the events of the Nativity within the vast sweep of history made sacred through the incarnation. In disarming fashion he describes the events from the often bewildered perspective of the wise men, the shepherds, Joseph and Herod. He emphasizes their humanity -- their dignity, strengths and gifts and all of their foibles and quirks. He shows Joseph worrying that gossips will say Mary was sleeping around. Auden gently mocks Joseph and our own desire for conformity and propriety in his prayer, “O pray for us, the bourgeoisie.”

The wise men become scholars and scientists, rather befuddled and reluctant in their strange adventure.

At least we know for certain that we are three old

     sinners.

That this journey is much too long, that we want our

     dinners,

And miss our wives, our books, our dogs,

But have only the vaguest idea why we are what we

     are.

 

Herod, in one of Auden’s funniest passages, appears as a well-intentioned bureaucrat proud of his accomplishments.

Barges are unloading soil fertilizer at the river wharves. Soft drinks and sandwiches may be had in the inns at reasonable prices. Allotment gardening has become popular. The highway to the coast goes straight up over the mountains and the truck-drivers no longer carry guns. Things are beginning to take shape. It is a long time since anyone stole the park benches or murdered the swans.

Herod fears that this infant the wise men are calling God will replace objective reason and order with subjective visions and social chaos.

Naturally this cannot be allowed to happen. Civilization must be saved even if this means sending for the military, as I suppose it does. How dreary. Why is it that in the end civilization always has to call in these professional tidiers to whom it is all one whether it be Pythagoras or a homicidal lunatic that they are instructed to exterminate. 0 dear, why couldn’t this wretched infant be born somewhere else? Why can’t people be sensible? I don’t want to be horrid.

Before ordering the massacre of the innocents, Herod gets an attack of the “why me’s”: “I’ve tried to be good. I brush my teeth every night. I haven’t had sex for a month. I object. I’m a liberal. I want everybody to be happy. I wish I had never been born.”

Auden’s genius is shown not just in his obvious gift for comedy but also in his insight that serious Christian moral reflection may be promoted through comedy. The mistake many of his critics and most moralists -- Christian, liberal or Marxist -- make is that they have a one-sided understanding of what morality is all about. They think that morality is concerned primarily with decisions, deeds, policy options and remedies for problems. The individual stands at a fork in the road and chooses one path. It is the stuff grand epics are made of, and comedy and humor are seen as utterly inappropriate responses to a tense situation requiring a serious moral decision. From this perspective, Auden’s comic voice sounds frivolous and chatty, like a favorite uncle who talks too much. So the left-wing critics labeled Auden bourgeois, and Christian moralists dismissed him as a bit silly. Both groups believed that his moral vision and his comic expression were mutually incompatible.



In recent years, however, many have challenged the decision-point model of morality. “Character ethics” emphasizes that the foundation of our decisions lies in the peculiar virtues and habits that each of us brings to a moral problem. Character ethicists think the decision-point model of morality is reductionist, because it ignores how difficult it is to discern the nature of relevant facts in the first place.

Prior to making a decision based on facts, one must see them accurately. The proponents of the standard decisional model of morality often don’t recognize the difficulties involved in simply “seeing.” Facts are thought of as solid blocks which all rational agents will perceive in the same way.

Against this view, Iris Murdoch and others have used the insights of psychology and literature to focus on the common experience in which two people looking at an event see totally different things going on. Murdoch stresses that perception is not simply a passive process whereby the objective world of facts makes itself perfectly known to us. The relevant facts of most moral problems are far more slippery.

Perception is an active process in which a person trains attention on part of the world and struggles to filter out irrelevant detail so as to discern the important features of the “facts” and to locate them in their context of meaning. Seeing thus involves constantly evaluating and relating facts to each other, to disclose significant patterns of meaning. The picture thus derived is often colored by life history, prejudices, insecurities and defenses.

For those who speak of an ethics of vision or character, the main problem of the moral life is not so much the rational calculation of the rightness or wrongness of actions as it is the self-deception and egocentrism that can arise from insecurity to block honest self-awareness and to distort our vision of others and the world about us. This concern leads character ethicists to emphasize a set of problems which the decisional account of ethics tends to ignore. This group of thinkers tries to inculcate respect for certain attitudes and virtues. They are not really concerned about prescribing norms for action; the terrain they are concerned about lies in the realm of life-stance, truthfulness and responsibility.

Murdoch, an Oxford philosopher and a fine novelist, calls our attention to a virtue which modern moral philosophy has almost completely ignored: humility. Because the standard model of morality focuses on the moment of decision, it sometimes makes the moral dimension of our lives sound far more exciting and dramatic than it really is. It paints a picture of tragic vigils, of Byronic heroes overcoming moral ambiguity. Somewhere along the way the simple things like humility get dropped out of this moral philosophy. In The Sovereignty of Good Murdoch argues that genuine realism is a “moral achievement” and that right conduct flows from true vision. Moral progress requires an end to self-deception. It requires humility to silence narcissism, to relinquish egoism. As Murdoch puts it, only “the humble man, because he sees himself as nothing, can see other things as they are.”



Character ethics helps us understand how Auden can insist on articulating his Christian moral vision comically. His incarnational theology emphasizes the divine redemption of the mundane. As many a TV situation comedy has demonstrated, human finitude can be very funny, and Auden heightens the humor by suggesting that the humdrum is caught up in salvation history.

No longer does Auden want to see from a detached vantage point -- as the helmeted airman -- for that stance implies a superiority, a self-righteousness which denigrates the worth of the mundane realm. Humor from this detached perspective can only become a weapon. It becomes cynical, malicious. It kills. But in For the Time Being we see Auden come down from the heights and embrace the world in all its brokenness and finitude. For Auden the doctrine of the incarnation means that when the Word became a “Time Being” and was made flesh, the foibles and limits of the world became strangely graced. At heart, Christianity is a robustly materialist religion, for it affirms that the sacred has entered the mundane. Christians are justified in taking up a comic perspective as a means of respecting the cosmic joke of the incarnation. For if Zen Buddhists have their notorious “laugh,” Christians too deserve a good chuckle at our collective historical surprise that the Divine Word would sneak into history as a babe at Bethlehem. Humor reminds us that since the incarnation, even the tedium of our daily chores is blessed. While the human realm, “the moderate Aristotelian city/ Of darning and the Eight-Fifteen” still remains filled with the same old drudgery, and we still remain weak, ignorant and often silly, our attitude toward the world and ourselves must remain open to wonder and possibility.

Auden’s comedy then is not simply for laughs. Rather it is an instrument whereby he punctures our pretension and self-deception, as in his poem “Grub First, Then Ethics.” We are neither pure nor perfect, and we can wreak havoc when we attempt to soar too far above ourselves. When he jokes about the bumbling wise men or the bourgeois Joseph, Auden laughs at those traits in himself and teaches us that it is necessary to laugh at ourselves, too.

Reinhold Niebuhr used to say that sin arises more from common insecurity than from any primal human maliciousness. Similarly, the self-deception of narcissism and egoism is often a defensive response to anxiety and self-doubt. As therapists have argued, these sorts of problems can’t be resolved by direct challenge. It doesn’t help to tell someone not to be so insecure.

Because of this peculiar intransigence in the plumbing of the psyche, Auden’s comic expression of his moral vision is important. It does not confront us directly, as normal moral statements do; rather, its humor relaxes our guard. Comedy subverts our defensive posture, and heals by offering the fundamental affirmation that human finitude is good. Perhaps through laughter we can, for the very first time, come to see- ourselves as we are. The central irony of the moral life is that by simply not taking ourselves so seriously, we may become more serious moral agents and more serious Christians.

Comedy challenges those foolish gnostic escape artists of every era who wish to flee conditioned existence for some pure realm of light and truth. Gnosticism has a long heritage of nasty judgments about the corruption of our bodies, our eating habits, our daily chores, our normal lives. Typically, gnostics hold that the sacred realm, the realm of perfection, is utterly estranged from the mundane, everyday world. Hence our world is worthless.

While few fully subscribe to this vision today, many embrace a gnostic view of morality: they are so accustomed to thinking of the moral life in the flash-and-bang terms of dramatic decisions and heroic choices that our daily routines and quiet virtues are regarded as morally insignificant.

But Auden is no fool. His humor is designed to remind us that our attitude to our own limitations may govern how we respond to the harsh times of tragic choices. Auden’s comic voice reminds us that patience may well be a quiet form of courage, and self-awareness and humility contain a silent power all their own. In redeeming the everyday, he reminds us that moral heroism need not always be dramatically displayed.