Fit For Ministry?

The changing profile of seminary students has been much remarked upon. Whereas 50 years ago almost all seminarians in North America were white men who had recently graduated from college, today women are a major presence in seminary classrooms, as are (to varying degrees) ethnic and minority groups. Today’s students are also substantially older by the time they get to seminary.

Has this change been good or bad for theological education and for the churches’ ministry? On this subject, there is much debate. Some observers believe that there has been a steep decline in the abilities and skills students bring to seminary, a decline that bodes ill for the work of ministry. Others think that the new diversity of theological students brings resources, including maturity and diverse social perspectives, that will strengthen ministry overall.

Who is right? To find out, the Fund for Theological Education asked the Auburn Center for the Study of Theological Education to help document the changes in the student bodies and to test competing hypotheses about what the changes mean. The center surveyed 10,000 students who had entered master’s-level programs in the fall of 1998. About 2,500 responded. The survey was structured to permit comparisons with data from studies of entering law students (dating from 1991) and medical students (1996).

The survey confirmed that current students are older. The average age is 35, and nearly 60 percent of students are over 30. Roman Catholic seminarians tend to be the oldest students, rabbinical students the youngest. All are older, on average, than the sample of law students (26) and medical students (24.3). (See Figure 1.)

Seminary students are also more diverse than they used to be. One-third are women, and in mainline Protestant schools, women number nearly half. There is some racial diversity, though African-Americans (9 percent) and Hispanics (only 3 percent) are both underrepresented compared to their presence in the general population.

On average, students come from the middle of the middle class. About half their fathers and a third of their mothers have college degrees. (Medical and law students come from more highly educated families.) Family tradition seems to have been influential in many cases. Almost one-third say they have a "close clergy relative." (Medical and law students are almost equally likely to have a relative in their chosen profession.)

Perhaps the most striking change documented by the survey is the path by which most students now make their way to theological school. The traditional pattern included childhood church and Sunday school attendance, followed by participation in religious youth programs. Involvement in campus ministries was often the next step, typically at a denominational or private liberal arts college that sent substantial numbers of students on to seminary.

Today, students’ religious backgrounds are more varied and less stable than in the past: half switched denominations at least once before enrolling in seminary. They do not report being heavily influenced by youth or campus activities. There are few "feeder" colleges supplying substantial numbers of students to seminaries. Today’s students also have a very wide range of academic backgrounds. Only one-third majored in the humanities (including theology and religion) and about half in the liberal arts. Only one-fifth entered seminary immediately after college and only about one-third had decided to attend seminary by the time they graduated.

The evidence strongly suggests that today’s theological students are steered toward seminary as a result of post-college involvement in congregational life rather than by persons or studies in the college milieu. On average, students begin to consider seminary at about the age of 25; they do not enroll for another decade. In the interval, most work and about one-quarter earn a master’s degree in another field. A great deal of their nonwork and nonfamily activity after college and before seminary is related to the life of a local church. Congregational clergy, along with spouses and friends, are reported to be influential in their decision to attend seminary.

Students come to theological schools in pursuit of a wide range of goals. Though 80 percent say they are preparing for a "religious" profession, fewer (60 percent) plan to be ordained. Ministry in a congregation or parish is the primary goal of less than one-third of master’s-level students and of only half of students in master of divinity and other ordination-track programs. Counseling, chaplaincy and other forms of ministry to groups and organizations are also attractive, and more than a quarter of entering students are headed for teaching, social service or administration.

Unlike previous generations, many students today do not attend full time. One-quarter of all students report that they enrolled part time in their first year. About the same number report working more than 25 hours a week. On average, entering students work outside the seminary 11 to 15 hours a week, though about one-quarter do not work at all. (Anecdotal reports suggest that the longer students remain in seminary, the more they tend toward part-time attendance and toward taking on heavy loads of paid work; also, the longer students stretch out their programs, the less likely they are to graduate.) Sixty percent live on or near campus. About half of all students are married or have partners; 60 percent report having dependents (2.3 on average).

How capable are today’s seminary students? This is a difficult question to answer, given the difficulty of defining skills and talents. One noteworthy bit of evidence is the relative lack of selectivity on the part of theological schools. The median acceptance rate for Protestant seminaries is 87 percent. Students are evidently well aware of this reality, since most students apply to only one school, and 90 percent say the school they are attending was their first choice. Very few (15 percent) of those who are not attending their first choice say they were rejected by schools they preferred. By sharp contrast, almost all law students (85 percent) make multiple applications; only 46 percent are attending their first-choice school; and 87 percent of those not attending first-choice schools say those schools did not accept them.

Seminaries share a general definition of quality, though they may weigh various factors differently. For entrance into master’s programs, most require academic ability signaled by at least a B average in undergraduate work. Most look for evidence of good character and interpersonal skills, or the potential to develop them, especially in students headed for ministry, priesthood and the rabbinate. Applicants for professional programs are often required to give an account of their faith, though standards of orthodoxy or religious maturity are rarely imposed on entering students. Similarly, students in master of divinity and other professional programs are usually asked about vocational goals; strong interest in ordained ministry is, of course, welcome, but fewer institutions now than in the past require that all students in ministry programs be sponsored or approved by ordaining bodies.

Finally, most institutions apply criteria to the profile of the whole student body, hoping that their student bodies will incorporate a variety of experience and perspectives based on gender, race, ethnic ties, social class and prior occupations and involvements. Diversity in all these areas is widely believed to create better conditions for learning and to help religious communities meet their needs for leaders of different kinds.

If we keep all these measures of quality in mind, can we say that students are good enough to meet the demands of contemporary ministry? Some critics say that today’s students lack the quality of younger students in the past. Others argue that the diversity of today’s student body brings new strengths.

To test these judgments, Auburn compared younger students (30 and younger) with the rest. Men and women and minorities and nonminorities were also compared on a wide range of measures.

The analyses show that younger students often do bring certain strengths to theological study that older students lack. Younger entering students have significantly higher grade-point averages than older students have. Younger students are more likely to have received college graduation honors and other awards and to have been elected to a national honor society. (See Figure 2.) They are stronger on all these measures, even when compared with older students who earned graduate degrees before seminary.

Almost two-thirds of younger students (62 percent) decided before or during college to attend seminary, and they first considered a religious vocation at an average age of 18.5 years, compared with 29 years of age for the older students. Not surprisingly, then, younger theological students are far more likely than their older counterparts to have chosen one of the undergraduate majors usually recommended as the best preparation for theological study: theology, religion, philosophy or other subjects in the humanities. Older students are much more likely to have majored in a scientific or technical subject.

Considering all these measures, it can be argued that today’s student bodies, with a majority of older students, are less able than they would be if the total group were to include more younger students.

Older students also contribute considerable racial and gender diversity to the total population of theological students. Older students are more likely to be female and more likely to be African-American than younger students. No doubt the backlog of women who did not attend seminary earlier because their presence was not welcome is still bolstering seminary enrollments of older women. In the case of young African-Americans, it is very likely that vigorous recruitment efforts of other professions deflect many from careers in ministry.

It is important to note that older students who contribute the most to making student bodies diverse contribute the least to the gap in academic ability. Even though many women, African-Americans and Asians are older than other students, there are no significant differences between them and other groups on various measures of academic performance.

The most dramatic difference between the older and younger groups is in social class. Educational levels of parents, a standard indicator of social and economic class, differ markedly for younger and older theological students. Eighty percent of fathers of younger students have some education beyond high school; only 53 percent of fathers of older students have that much education. Differences for mothers are comparable. On this variable, younger theological students closely resemble law students, about four-fifths of whose fathers also have education beyond high school. Parents of younger theological students are almost as well educated as medical students’ parents.

Further, older students are more than twice as likely as younger students to have attended a vocational or technical high school or a two-year or community college, and much less likely to have attended a private, nonreligious grade and high school.

Other differences between the two groups may be linked to class status. Though younger students are much less likely to be married than older ones -- and although marriage in this and other Auburn studies is closely and positively associated with students’ economic comfort levels -- younger students are much more likely to be full-time students. (Ninety percent are full time, compared with 74 percent of older students.) These statistics suggest that younger students have found the means (from family resources or perhaps from the prospect of future wealth) to pursue theological study without simultaneously working full time. Older students are also much less likely to live on or conveniently close to campus (49 percent, compared with 75 percent of younger students) and less likely to say they have adequate time for study.

In summary, though the Auburn survey shows that older and younger theological students both have strengths, it also strongly indicates that there is a problem overall. Some students in each group have the full range of abilities and characteristics that define "good" students, but many come to seminary with serious limitations. Older students’ previous academic work often has not been strong or is not the most helpful preparation for theological study. In many cases, their religious commitments, though intense, are not long established. At the same time, younger students often lack interest in ministry, especially congregational ministry, and although they more often grew up in religious communities, they are currently less involved in church life.

Some students in both groups have all these deficits. Yet most theological schools maintain enrollments by accepting almost all applicants who meet minimum standards. This poses a great challenge for theological schools and a danger for religious communities. Because seminaries are not selective and because they dismiss very few students for any reason except noncompletion of work, religious communities cannot assume that a professional degree from an accredited theological school guarantees genuine promise for ministry.

Theological study and ministry do not rank high among the chosen professions of college graduates. By the time the average theological student begins to think about a religious profession (at age 24.6 years), the average medical student is already in medical school and the average law student has taken the LSAT exams. In other words, most future lawyers and doctors are set on their professional course before most future ministers have begun to consider theirs. For this reason, some persons who might make good religious leaders are lost to the profession simply because they made early decisions to take other paths. Those concerned about quality in the ministry must devise ways to persuade substantially greater numbers of college students to consider the ministry.

To do so, theological schools and religious bodies will probably need to make major, long-term investments in recruitment. Other professions have had great success with programs of "early identification," such as summer and co-curricular programs for student in high school and early college years. Foundations have recently sponsored a few such programs for prospective theological students. Denominational and other clusters of institutions should continue to make these opportunities available. Such programs are especially important for mainline Protestant and Roman Catholic schools, which have the most difficulty attracting younger students, and for any theological school that wants to recruit younger women and African-Americans -- groups that are scarce in the student bodies of most schools.

Schools should also offer special support to the ablest older students. Though intensified recruitment of younger students is needed, it would be a mistake to ignore older students. They bring important strengths, especially commitment to ministry and diversity of background. Since older students are already interested in theological study in significant numbers, aggressive recruitment is less important than financial support during seminary. Older students are far more likely than younger ones to be enrolled part time, to be working full time or nearly full time, and to live at a considerable distance from campus. Additional aid would make it possible for them to concentrate their efforts on study and to focus on ministry practice. Such aid would also make it possible for them to finish seminary in a shorter time, lengthening their period of service.

Such steps will probably make a measurable difference, but they will not make ministry an easy sell in our culture. Religion is pervasive in North America, but more and more it is individualized, privatized and diffuse. Almost all religious organizations except the newest and most effervescent are struggling, and even new organizations encounter difficulties as soon as the process of institutionalization begins. The marginal status of organized religion is very likely the basic cause of the difficulty of attracting leaders for religious organizations. People of ability, especially the young, seek social roles that position them to make a substantial difference. The internal weakness of many religious organizations and their lack of influence in the wider society limit the amount of impact their leaders can expect to have.

First, encourage respect for the profession of ministry by increasing compensation and by other means. The clearest measure of the value that religious groups place on the profession is the low pay scale for Christian ministers and most other religious professionals. Most religious groups justify low pay as the outworking of such values as simplicity and financial restraint, but pay rates for many religious groups are so low they make even a simple life difficult. Many ministers cannot afford to contribute to their children’s college education or to retire with any measure of financial security.

Is low pay a significant barrier to the recruitment of able persons into the ministry? The Auburn survey produced significant evidence that it is -- evidence found in the comparison between rabbinical students and others. Though their course of study is longer and their debt load higher, rabbinical students, as a group, have most of the characteristics of "quality" that other groups say they want. They are almost uniformly young, headed for ordained service, seeking positions in congregations, and of high academic ability. (See Figure 3.) Compared with Christian students, they are religiously well trained and enculturated. A number of factors account for these striking differences, but certainly key among them is the high status of the rabbinate, which goes hand-in-hand with starting salaries as much as twice as high as beginning salaries for Christian ministers.

Other factors may also make the rabbinate attractive, including the esteem in which Jewish congregations hold their rabbis and the freedom, even encouragement, rabbis have to be active in civic and cultural activities. Pay, however, is a sound indicator of how much religious communities care about the quality of their leadership. If Christian religious organizations really care about ministry, they will express their priorities in financial and other concrete forms.

Second, theological schools should raise entrance and completion standards. The obstacles to any such move are formidable. Most seminaries admit as many students as possible to generate much-needed tuition income or to justify their existence. Sponsoring religious bodies expect and sometimes require them to accept marginal students. These pressures make it improbable that any effort to achieve higher minimum standards by regulation would succeed.

Further, unlike many other professional schools, seminaries do not form a unitary system, and therefore it is not possible to limit strictly the number of schools in the system or the number of places for students in those schools, as medical schools do. Given the diversity of seminaries, neither would it be fair to rank them comparatively based on selectivity and other factors that are goads to quality in fields such as business and law.

There are, however, things that theological schools can do to address the question of quality. One approach deserving exploration is the creation of an honors track within existing programs. This would signal an emphasis on quality while not requiring any school to exclude from its basic program students who are sent to them by their sponsoring religious body. If, in fact, the programs produce abler graduates, employers will seek them out, thereby motivating schools to recruit and educate more students by the honors route. The impact on quality would be slow but real, especially if accrediting standards were created to ensure that the honors designation is more than decorative.

Without minimizing the difficulties, theological schools and the religious groups they serve must ask themselves the hard questions: Do we care about the quality of religious leaders we educate? If so, how shall we join forces to set higher standards and to meet them?

Theological Publishing: In Need of a Mandate

There is a widespread tendency to take book publishing for granted. People assume that the publishing of serious books -- unlike other cultural activities such as serious music, dance, theater, art and even television and film, all of which are widely acknowledged to require philanthropic support -- will happen more or less automatically, the natural result of the supply of manuscripts meeting the demand of interested readers.

But recent publishing developments suggest that this assumption is no longer true. Changes in the structure and economics of book publishing have diminished the chances that the smaller markets formed by readers with specialized interests will be served. The mainline Protestant audience of academics, clergy and laity who read books on a variety of theological subjects (biblical studies, ethics, pastoral ministry, church history, systematic and constructive theology) make up one such market. Currently the market is served by an assortment of publishers: presses sponsored by the mainline denominations, large and small commercial publishers and some university presses. Various factors, however, make it no longer clear what publishers will be willing and able in the future to produce serious theological books for a mainline Protestant audience.

Two years ago, troubled by mounting evidence that denominational commitment to and resources for serious publishing were decreasing, Christopher Walters-Bugbee, editor of Books and Religion, and I decided to study the situation. With support from a grant from the Lilly Endowment, Inc., which viewed our study as part of its larger investigation of mainline Protestantism, we interviewed representatives of those firms that publish theological books and studied the catalogs that their houses have produced over the past 30 years. We focused particularly on the denominational publishers. Though book publishing for a mainline Protestant readership has always been a shared effort between denominational and independent publishers, the former have been the core of the enterprise. During the past 20 years, most of those houses have faced serious difficulties. One (Seabury) has been sold, another (Judson) has drastically reduced its book publishing activities, and several others have become considerably weaker. They have accepted fewer ambitious projects, have published fewer books overall and have not considered themselves financially secure.

Therefore, to assess the state of denominational publishing we visited the largest mainline presses (Abingdon, Augsburg, Beacon, Fortress, John Knox, Pilgrim and Westminster) and interviewed their directors, editors, and business and marketing executives. We also interviewed most of the denominational officers to whom the directors of these presses report. We met with publishers and editors from the independent houses that are increasingly active in Protestant theological publishing, including large trade houses (Harper & Row) and small and medium-sized privately owned presses that specialize in religion (Cowley, Eerdmans, Crossroad/Continuum) , and we visited three diverse university presses (Chicago, Indiana, Mercer) that publish religious books.

Denominational presses have a long and intricate history. By the middle of the 19th century, impelled by the Second Great Awakening’s evangelical energy, almost all Protestant -denominations had established boards to publish tracts, materials and books for the burgeoning network of Sunday schools and other educational institutions. Most contemporary denominational publishing houses trace their origins to these early educational boards.

The fortunes of the Protestant church-owned presses oscillated until the 1940s, when the work of American theologians began to command international attention and sales of theological works mushroomed, reaching a broad national and international audience. The popular audience for religious books also expanded dramatically. In 1949, four of the five best-selling nonfiction books -- excluding books on canasta -- were religious titles, and though independent publishers produced many of these books, the popular interest in religion benefited the denominational publishers as well. Building on a cultural mood hospitable to religious ideas, the denominational presses developed diverse and energetic publicity programs during a two-decade period of unprecedented prominence and success. In several denominations, presses grew into publishing houses of considerable size and wealth to meet the denominations’ needs for a wide variety of church goods.

By 1970 the boom had ended and the denominational presses felt pressure from two sides. First, the cultural climate had shifted. Though many religious books continued to sell well, those intended for mainline Protestants did not. Almost simultaneously, the presses had to cope with a severe national economic recession. Suddenly, several prominent and recently prosperous presses were in serious trouble. The Century (April 28, 1971) wrote ominously of "decline but not demise" in Protestant publishing. For some, even demise was a prospect. In the late 1970s, adverse conditions led the board of trustees of the Unitarian Universalist Association, owner of the venerable Beacon Press, to vote to sell the press. (The board was later dissuaded by the denomination’s larger governing body.) In 1983 the Episcopal Church sold Seabury to Winston Press. Several other houses faced extinction, but survived in a reduced state.

In the past ten years economic conditions have improved, but the mainline audiences that in the 1950s were easy to reach with both popular and more serious and specialized books have dispersed. Thus even the more stable presses work in difficult circumstances. The strains of publishing for a market that is relatively small and difficult to reach show in the new priority placed on fiscal stability. In several houses religious publishing has been reconceived. In the 1940s and 1950s publishing was chiefly a cultural activity, driven by editorial and educational considerations; now it is first of all a business, in which "product lines" (to use the terms of one denominational publisher) are "developed" and marketed.

At greatest risk in this uncertain situation is serious theological publishing. The denominations that sponsor presses have an immediate need and ready market for congregational items -- curriculum materials, Bible study guides, official documents and handbooks, and popular literature that nurtures piety. There is much less pressure to produce books which, though by no means unique to

the mainline, are one of its distinguishing marks: studies that conjoin affirmations and questions of Christian faith, on the one hand, and the methods of critical reflection and scholarship from a wide range of fields, on the other. Traditionally, some studies that are seriously theological in this sense have been produced as scholarly works; others, just as serious and original, have been framed for a wider audience of thoughtful lay readers. Though audiences for both kinds of books still exist, it is not clear whether denominations will exert the effort required to serve them. The readership for serious books crosses denominational lines, so the internal communications channels that churches have developed will not serve as the primary medium to sell serious books, which require special, more expensive marketing strategies. And because the readers for such books do not form a denominational constituency, a denomination has few political incentives for directing its publishing efforts in that direction.

Compounding concern for the future of serious theological publishing is the fact that, currently, four of the seven largest mainline presses face complete reorganization as a result of denominational mergers. Westminster and John Knox will combine their operations, and Augsburg will be joined with Fortress. The fate of Fortress is particularly important. Over the past 20 years it has become the workhorse of theological publishing. Judging from the 1985 catalogs of all seven denominational publishers, Fortress published over 40 percent of the total list of serious theological books. The effects of its pairing with Augsburg, a financially powerful press whose major success has been in popular publishing, are difficult to predict, but the prospect has caused considerable anxiety among authors. Last summer New Testament scholar Helmut Koester wrote to Lutheran scholars and church leaders across the country urging reconsideration of "new plans" that might do "serious damage" to Fortress, which he characterized as "an important instrument of theological scholarship" of which the new Evangelical Lutheran Church in America should be proud.

Some of those who take this instrumental view look on book publishing chiefly as a source of revenue, and indeed, some presses do contribute what surplus they have to the denominational treasury or to special causes such as clergy pensions. Though most presses do not make such contributions, there is still pressure, says one director, to "chase dollars" at the expense of "serious, substantive publishing." Other church leaders think the press should be chiefly a service center for the denomination, producing materials closely matched to denominational program priorities and specifically designed for use in the denomination’s congregations. One executive who supervises publishing says the primary purpose of his denomination’s press is to supply the church’s "crying need for identity."

A much smaller group of executives and elected officials think a publishing program that aims to reach not only the denomination’s members but also the broader public is itself an important form of the church’s mission. However, this group is divided. Most of those who understand publishing as mission think the denomination’s role is to improve upon the independent publishers’ popular offerings, producing "more responsible" devotional and self-help books. Serious theological publishing, said an executive who takes this view, is an "elitist" undertaking to which substantial church resources should not be devoted, since it benefits only a few. Only a handful of interviewees disagree with him. Unitarian Universalist President William Schulz is one. "A denomination does not deserve to be taken seriously," he insists, "if it does not have a commitment to serious publishing as a contribution to a broader, corporate religious view." Lurking in the majority view of mainline leaders that serious theological publishing is optional -- something that a denomination may do provided that the effort pays its way and consumes none of the denomination’s mission funds -- are some deep and dangerous assumptions. One is the prevalent and persistent fallacy that market forces will ensure that any books that have an audience will get published. Those who continue to argue in this vein say that as the denominational publishers have weakened, others have turned their attention to the Protestant mainline. It is the case that large- and middle-sized for-profit publishers and university presses as well as a number of new small presses now publish substantial numbers of books by mainline Protestant writers. But commercial publishing is hardly a safe haven. Independent presses operate increasingly in a market dominated by what veteran editor Ted Solotaroff has called "the literary-industrial complex."

One element of the complex, according to Solotaroff, is the handful of large corporations that have bought long-established, prestigious publishing houses in order to transform them into more profitable producers of best sellers. The other element is the chain bookstores, which sell a limited number of books, including best sellers at discount, often crowding out of the market the independent bookstores that have traditionally sold a wide variety of books of high intellectual and literary quality. Some of the independent publishers, such as Harper & Row, which have already been acquired, have continued their commitments to theological publishing, but they remain vulnerable to sudden changes in direction and ownership. Some firms can fend off acquisitions because families, universities or religious orders own them, but even they are affected by the workings of the "complex," especially by the difficulties of selling through chain stores, which have little interest in books that, however high their quality, appeal to a limited audience. Thus, though independent firms currently play an important role in serious theological publishing, there is no assurance that they would fill the gap if denominational publishers were to abandon the field. Nor are university presses in a position to take over the responsibilities of strictly religious publishers. Many operate with academic boards that direct them to publish studies in religion but not in theology. And most, as relatively small publishers of "good books," encounter the same financial and marketing problems that the denominational presses face. A second dangerous assumption, embedded in the complacent and sometimes disdainful attitudes of denominational leaders toward theological publishing, is that the present challenge confronting the mainline denominations is not fundamentally theological. What denominational leaders want most from their presses -- greater revenues and materials specific to the denomination’s "own" programs -- strongly suggests that they view Protestant renewal chiefly as an organizational matter: build a stronger organization, one with increased financial resources and more evangelistic "team spirit," and decline will be arrested. The combination of chauvinism, mechanism and pietism built into this approach seems to contradict essential elements of the liberal Protestant character, especially its commitments to free and open inquiry, ecumenical theological ventures, and the critical exposure of what Paul Tillich called "distortions" of all kinds, including those built into its own structures.

We began our study convinced that denominational presses needed scrutiny and advocacy because they can be one important means among others for a renewed sense of Protestant purpose. But the publishing situation is also a revealing symptom of what has gone wrong in mainline Protestantism. It seems that denominations that do not understand their obligation to publish a wide array of challenging theological ideas for the broadest possible audience have forgotten some of the central insights of the Reformation traditions in which they are grounded.

These two presses are very different. Fortress, which was one division of the Lutheran Church in America’s separately incorporated Board of Publication, under two decades of strong leadership has drawn on wide European connections to build a high-quality program (especially strong in biblical studies and theology) that has had a central role in Protestant publishing. Beacon’s history has been more mercurial. In the 1940s it was a widely respected source of both general trade books and works of liberal philosophy and religion, publishing figures like Albert Schweitzer, James Baldwin and Arnold Toynbee. Then, in the 1960s and 1970s, it lost its sense of editorial direction and its finances faltered. But in the past seven years it has re-established itself with a talented staff and strong denominational backing, and again offers a varied list of philosophy, current affairs, social criticism, liberal theology and belles-lettres. Alone among the denominational presses, it has successfully "crossed over" into the general market for books of good quality.

Different as these two presses are in history, structure and focus, they have certain features in common, features that suggest what a denominational press requires to do substantial, serious theological publishing.

Most critical is clarity of mission and unambiguous support from the sponsoring denomination. The publishers that have made distinguished contributions have consistently exhibited seriousness of intent and the determination, in the words of Clayton Carlson, vice-president of Harper & Row, "to do what no other set of publishers is well placed to do: leaven our hurly-burly world of religious publishing with a clear standard of excellence." Further, they have understood their mission broadly, as the obligation to publish for the widest possible audience. For these presses, publishing is not chiefly a "service center" for the denomination, but a ministry to the religious and intellectual world beyond (as well as within) the denomination’s bounds.

High standards and breadth of scope, along with firm denominational support, give a press concrete advantages. Important authors in a specialty field like theological studies choose a publisher on the basis of its reputation. They want editors who can recognize and help shape excellent work, and they want their books to appear in the company of other important contributors. And authors want to know that -- and this is where denominational support is critical -- the publisher will remain committed to a high standard well into the future, keeping their work and others’ in print as long as possible. Denominational commitment is also crucial for the press itself. Many serious projects take years to develop, and they cannot be undertaken if there is a chance that, by the time they come to fruition, the denomination will have withdrawn its support.

Resources must back up a strong, denominationally ratified sense of mission. Though serious publishing can "pay its own way" if properly managed, nonprofit presses have difficulty obtaining the operating capital that a business like publishing requires. Most denominational houses have come to rely for that kind of support on staples such as hymnals, service books and curricula which after their initial development produce regular income and require little attention. Several church executives question these arrangements and suggest that the income stream that these projects produce should be diverted to more denominational purposes. If church officials or publishing house executives act on that suggestion, they will cut into the support base that makes serious denominational publishing financially secure.

Not even fervent advocates of serious publishing favor lavish denominational subsidies. Publishing is much more than the Printing of good books; it also entails building a public for those books. The requirement to sell what one prints is a powerful incentive to build a public. Thus denominational publishers, in light of the struggles of Fortress, Beacon and others, are healthiest when they are a little bit hungry. But if they are starved, cut off from a regular, easy-to-earn source of capital for expansion and new projects, they will not continue to exist. Finally, serious publishing requires both freedom and enlightened oversight from the denomination. This requirement has been the most difficult for the denominations to meet. Though editorial freedom is essential for good publishing, denominations, like other large organizations, are not used to granting subsidiaries they "own" a high degree of autonomy, especially when that freedom may lead to controversy. As a series of famous incidents has shown (for instance, Westminster’s decision in 1977 to publish John Hick’s Myth of God Incarnate, despite intense protests from some church members) , a denomination’s self-restraint in decisions about publishing particular titles is an essential concomitant of support for publishing. Presses are most likely to achieve distinction when they are permitted to work without interference in editorial judgments.

A denomination must do more, however, than simply leave its hands off editorial decisions. It must also structure its relationship to the press so that the press can operate easily. Budgeting and reporting requirements should be fitted to the rhythms of publishing; often routines designed for denominational agencies hamper the work of the press. Equally important is the matter of who sits on the board that oversees publishing. If the press’s mission is properly conceived, its public will be broader than the denomination’s membership. Therefore, some of the members of its governing body should represent the interests of that broader public. Again, denominations have difficulty disciplining themselves to make these special arrangements, for few immediate political rewards orient the press to the world beyond the denomination.

Werner Mark Linz, director of Crossroad/Continuum, summed up these requisites for serious denominational publishing in a formula: "Give the press a mandate, means and freedom. That’s all it takes." Recently, there have been some encouraging signs from denominational presses and their sponsors. Abingdon has opened a new office in Atlanta, specifically for editing academic books; Westminster/ John Knox has affirmed its interest in serious theological publishing; and Augsburg Fortress has sought to reassure those concerned about the future of the Fortress tradition. What is not clear, however, in these and ether cases, is whether the denominations stand behind these efforts, ready to give "mandate, means and freedom" for the extended time it takes to build a distinguished publishing tradition. In the ideal, one would hope for even more: for the mainline Protestant denominations to recognize that the work of serious theological publishing offers a splendid opportunity. At a time when these denominations feel that their social impact has declined, publishing is an important channel for their continued participation in the pluralistic conversation about intellectual, cultural and social values. Rather than begrudge their presses the support and resources they require, mainline denominations should promote them with enthusiasm.

True Confession: A Presbyterian Dissenter Thinks About the Church

I have a practical problem. I joined the Presbyterian Church as an adult, in significant measure because I admire this denomination's theology of the church and its processes for making decisions. Today I find myself in strong disagreement with the Church about an important matter. How shall I conduct myself now that I think that my denomination has taken the wrong side on a serious issue?

The particular matter about which I disagree with the Presbyterian Church is this. The denomination has declared that homosexual acts are invariably sinful. I think that homosexual acts are morally equivalent to heterosexual ones. In some circumstances, both may be deeply sinful. Under other conditions, both may be used in God's service.

Homosexuality is not my assigned topic this afternoon, but before I turn to my subject, which is how those of us who disagree with the church on any serious matter should behave, I want to add four brief qualifications to what I just said, chiefly for the benefit of a few members of this denomination who regularly twist honest statements of conviction into propaganda.

First, my views about homosexuality are not the position of the Covenant Network. The Network is a loose association of persons who would like to see Amendment B removed from the Constitution for a variety of reasons. Some of them--some of you--share my perspective on homosexuality and the firmness with which I hold it. Others hold different views or have not decided what they think about the issue. The Covenant Network welcomes all who, whatever their views about homosexual practices, seek openness and tolerance in the Presbyterian Church.

Second, I want to make clear that I hold my position because of the Bible, not in spite of it. In my best moments, when, as Paul says, I accept the grace to want "what I want" (Romans 7:14-20), what I truly want is to live my life in alignment with God. Since I like Paul am not naturally inclined to do that, I cannot imagine how it would be possible without scriptures that judge and contradict as well as comfort and affirm. I need scripture to say what it says, not to agree with me or confirm my preferences. In this case, I know that some passages put homosexual practices in a negative light, but these like the many precise Biblical injunctions that Presbyterians do not observe are overridden by much more blatant testimony. God rules everything. Through the whole history of God's dealings with us, God has exercised God's freedom to demolish categories we invent for our own convenience. I am convinced that God is doing this today, demolishing the categories of homosexuality and heterosexuality which we constructed for our peace of mind, not God's glory. I want to testify here is that I did not learn about this deconstructive activity of God from some liberal political handbook. I learned it from the scripture that deconstructs me, freeing me, as Paul says, to delight in the law of God.

Third, I want to affirm that, as conservative Presbyterians emphasize, the Christian life is a disciplined life. On this matter, I am a conservative too. We follow Jesus Christ, who gave his life for the life of the world. If we want to live in his light and walk in his way, we too will be called to sacrifice, and among the things we are likely to be required to give up--some of our wealth, some of our power--are immediate sexual gratifications that would cause injury or pain to others. Foregoing something as pleasurable as sex is not easy. We need God's help, through the church, to find the grace to do that. Far from helping, however, the church's current teaching on sexuality militates against sacrifice and restraint. Homosexuals get no help at all in making moral decisions about their sexual behavior; all of it is simply dismissed as bad. Heterosexual relationships get off lightly too, if they are monogamous, because we think they are God's favored form. I am convinced that the equal treatment homosexual and heterosexual relationships, including the recognition that marriage is God's gift for both, would strike a blow, not for sexual license, but for much-needed sexual discipline.

My last qualification is addressed to those on all sides who say that the debate over homosexuality is not important enough to consume as much attention and energy as it does, that this is an academic matter (a phrase people use to minimize an issue) that does not affect the real life and mission of the church. I disagree. This is no small or limited difference. Presbyterian teaching about homosexuality shapes its current policies on ordination and marriage, which in turn shape and I think distort the church and the lives of its members. And I believe that this teaching does great harm beyond the Presbyterian Church. Non-Presbyterians are understandably unconvinced when we say that persons who are morally unfit for leadership in our organization should have rights of full participation in every other social undertaking. Because those outside our fellowship think that we judge all practicing homosexuals to be morally defective, we actively contribute to the hatred of homosexuals that is rampant in this society, hatred that leads to crimes of discrimination and violence. The Presbyterian Church's teaching about homosexuality is not a matter of academic theory. It is a matter of life and death.

I have spelled out my views about homosexuality not to persuade--that is an activity for other settings--but to illustrate that I have a serious disagreement with my church, one on which I feel I must act. But how? Non-Presbyterian friends who know the distance between what I think and what the denomination teaches about homosexuality cannot understand why I continue to associate with a religious group that is wrong--dead wrong and deadly wrong in their view--on an important question. They push me pretty hard. One of them asked me recently whether I would join a club that admitted African-American members but would not let them hold office. At the same time, many Presbyterian friends push me just as hard, telling me that the only course for those who really love the church is to abide by its decisions and wait patiently as the whole body discerns where the Spirit is leading.

My guess is that most of you feel this same tension. You are here because you want the church to change, if not its doctrine on sexuality, then its policies on ordination, or its sometimes literalistic ways of reading the Bible, or its ethos, which seems to be increasingly inquisitorial and intolerant. All these are serious matters, and I would venture that you too feel you must do something about them. But what?

This dilemma is not ours alone. Those who don't fit under the umbrella of the Covenant Network face it too. If Presbyterian News Service reports on the Coalition meeting in Dallas in September are accurate, Presbyterians on the so-called other side are beginning to realize that, as long as Amendment B remains in the Constitution, the issues it was designed to settle are not going to go away, because Presbyterians like us won't let them. For some Coalition members, the prospect of investing major effort, every year, to preserve a law that is, as they see it, patently the will of the Presbyterian people and the will of God, is just as untenable as living in a church governed by Amendment B is for some of us. They long for a church in which this matter is settled, as do we, and they don't know any better than we how to achieve that. Shall we leave graciously, they are reported as asking, to search for such a church, or stay and renew the one we've got--a option that means, of course, facing challenges to Amendment B as long as it exists?(1)

When it comes to the topic of the church, the Covenant Network and the Coalition are in the same boat. All of us are steering through dangerous straits, with sirens on both banks luring us toward the toward the rocks and shoals with powerful arguments. The argument from one side goes like this: the Presbyterian Church is, after all, just a denomination, not the whole church. What finally matters is not our Presbyterianism but our Christianity. Therefore those who have honest and serious disagreements with the denomination may and perhaps should find or create another expression of the church that they believe is more faithful in its doctrine and discipleship. From the other shore, the song is equally compelling: the Presbyterian Church is, after all, an expression of the holy, catholic church. As such, it has authority from God. While working to repair any flaws in the church, we must not substitute our authority for God's. Therefore, while we who disagree with the church try to improve it, we should abide by its laws and keep its peace.

So: how shall Presbyterians who disagree with the church about a serious matter (as it turns out, that's a sizeable and very diverse group of us) behave? Ecclesiology--theories of the church--is Douglas Hall's assignment, not mine, but I cannot make headway on my practical problem, how to act in and toward the church, unless I begin with some basic definitions of what the church, as reformed protestants understand it, is and does. In the next few minutes, I will review some reformed ideas about the identity of the church and its purpose, with sidelong glances at other Christians' ideas in order to clarify ours. Doing this quickly will, of course, require a lot of generalizing and simplifying. I apologize for this, but it's necessary, because I want quickly to return to the practical questions that weigh so heavily on our consciences and our hearts.

What is the church? There is remarkable unanimity among Christians of different stripes about the terms that best express the church's fundamental identity. All of us affirm that the church is the community of those who through baptism become, in all their diversity, one body, and in all their human finitude and sinfulness, Christ's body. Different Christian traditions, however, inflect these definitions--community of the baptized, body of Christ--very differently.

Our Roman Catholic colleagues, for instance, frequently speak of the body of Christ as mystical. Different strands of Catholic tradition mean somewhat different things by this. Hierarchically-minded theologians like Cardinal Ratzinger, as Miroslav Volf explains in his wonderful new book, After Our Likeness (on which I'll rely at several points as I sort theories of the church) believe that the institutional church and especially the successors to the apostles who govern it are imbued with Christ's own kind of power.(2) On some readings, this power extends even to salvation: "No salvation outside the church" means not only that the church is the location and mediator of salvation, but even its agent.(3) As the actual body of Christ, mystically empowered to function as Christ in the world, the church does the saving, or at least some of it. Catholic spiritual writers place a different weight on the word mystical. For them it signifies a realm above and beyond natural reality where the church is fully and truly itself. It is a mystical realm into which Christians are sealed at their baptism. What these views have in common is their emphasis on the church, as Volf says, "from above," transhuman, Christ's body risen, free from the bonds of earth and death, ruling in power.

Free church traditions define the church as Catholics and other Christians do, as the body of those baptized into Christ, but, in their view, the body is far from mystical. Wherever two or three are baptized into fellowship in the name of Christ, says the free church, there is the church. The church is not larger than, above and beyond any actual human gathering, but fully present in each one, in all its earthy reality.

Again, there are multiple strands within this tradition. Baptists emphasize the gathering in Christ's name, the profession of faith that precedes sealing in baptism. If there is no profession, there is no baptism and no church. Congregationalists emphasize the gathering itself: the church is constituted as the Spirit brings two or three into community through baptism. What these and other free views have in common is their humanity. "We are the church," exclaims Miroslav Volf, who himself stands in this tradition. God gives faith and the grace to gather in community, and the church can grow very close to God, but the free church is at its core a human reality, from below, not a divine reality from on high.

Where are we on this very rough spectrum? Reformed traditions seem to me remarkable less for their differences from these other Christian views than for their high degree of agreement with both. Calvin's favorite term for what God accomplishes in baptism is engrafting. We finite and deeply flawed human beings are joined by grace and the faith it enables to Christ in his goodness and glory, joined to create a single organic whole, the body of Christ. In the event, we remain who and what we are--the grafted part produces its own kind of fruit, not the host's. In this we join the free church: baptism does not set us on a course toward superhuman powers like infallibility or extract us from grubby human community to float above it in a mystical one.

But the grafted branch no longer lives on its own; it draws its very being from the host. The body of Christ for us is no mere metaphor for an organization with different but complementary parts, as it seems to be for some free churches. We like the Catholics believe that in baptism we become part of a church that is Christ's living body today. In baptism, says Bonhoeffer, "we are...set down in the midst of the holy history of God on earth." (4) Our engrafting into Jesus Christ means that everything that has happened to him has happened to us. In reformed traditions, the church is both a fully human community--all churches, says Calvin, are "blemished," and also Christ's very body. (5) Holding these two dimensions together yields a rich, complex picture of the church's identity, all the more mysterious for not being mystical, all the more compelling for not being fully explainable in human terms. I think this picture of the church is just right, and I became a Presbyterian to affirm it.

Let turn now to the second basic issue: what is the body of Christ called to do? What is its purpose? Here too there is ecumenical consensus. The purpose of the church is worship, the giving of thanks and praise to God. We modern activist Christians are tempted to say ministry or mission, but the root of ministry is worship: our chief end is to glorify God. At the heart of worship--on this Christians also agree--is eucharist.

As we all know, worship and eucharist look very different in different Christian branches. For the Catholics and others who emphasize sacraments, the meal is paramount: Christ's delegates, with Christ's own special, more-than-human power to make the bread and wine substantially different, are to feed the faithful. The whole ministry of church, including teaching, governance and mission, is an extension of this act of feeding: significantly, those who have special power through the apostles to prepare and serve the meal are usually in charge of the other functions as well.

In free church settings, eucharist not a transformational event so much as a reenactment. Someone once said that at the lowest end of the church spectrum eucharist is something like a patriotic play: it portrays an important historical event in order to instill values and foster loyalty. The free churches view the Lord's Supper as edifying for believers. It reminds them that as Jesus Christ has claimed them, they have claims on each other. At the table, they are joined in even closer fellowship: the community of the saints becomes stronger and more accountable, and each of its members truer in faith, holier in living, more righteous in discipleship.

We, the reformed, again drawing from both sides, take eucharist literally. The word means giving thanks. The church is called out of the world for the purpose of giving thanks for what God is doing in the world. We have our own doctrine of real presence, Jesus Christ known surely enough in the breaking of the bread that we are impelled, in Christopher Morse's graceful phrase, to "thank God for loving all the world." (6)

In order to do this, to give thanks and praise for God's accomplishments, it is necessary to discern the work of God--what God has done, is doing and will do. Hence the heavy reformed emphasis on confession, teaching the truth, and preaching, proclaiming the Word. For us, these are eucharist too. Avery Dulles, in his careful catalog of various Christians' models of the church, identifies ours as "herald," because, he says, we "emphasize faith and proclamation over interpersonal relations and mystical communion." (7) The metaphor fits, though Dulles misunderstands, I think, when he concludes that we believe that the chief and maybe only purpose of the church is to talk. Some Presbyterians may have given that impression,(8) but most of us know that giving thanks through hearing and proclaiming the Word of God has, as Volf says, a performative as well as declarative aspect.(9) Everything we do in gratitude to God--service and social action, prayer and sacrament, as well teaching and preaching--is true confession, the living word instantiated in our lives as much as heard from our lips.

Let me quickly extract two themes from this reformed picture of the church that I have sketched that will help us, I think, as we return to the practical problem of how we should behave when we disagree with the church.

The first is very obvious in reformed thought: God's initiative. God gave the church--Calvin, a one-covenant man, says it was given to Abraham--and God continues to give it to all who enter the covenant. We human beings engrafted into Christ's body make up the church, but we cannot unmake it. "Denials, betrayals and corruptions" of Christ's body, as Christopher Morse puts it, cannot prevent its resurrection.(10) Christ is the head of the church. We can do terrible things in and to it, but we cannot remove its identity as the church.

The second theme is not often recognized in the famously chilly ethos of Presbyterian and Reformed churches: the importance of community. (Garrison Keillor says that Calvinists are people who think that warmth, comfort and having a good time with others makes you stupid.) Neither covenant nor confession is possible without other people. God's love is more generous than ours, never exclusive. In binding us to God in Christ, God also binds us to others in covenant community. And because Christian truth is a person, writes Thomas Torrance, it is not something we can tell ourselves.(11) It must be communicated to us by other persons. Our confession is social too: if it is not spoken by others to us and us to others, it is no confession at all.

* * * * *

So: if I really believe these reformed affirmations, that we are engrafted at God's initiative into the church, an all-too-human body of us and other persons that is nevertheless Christ's own body, not ours; and if I really believe that our duty and privilege, as people called out by God's costly effort, is to testify, in community and as a community, to the mighty and merciful acts of God: if I really believe these things, how then shall I prosecute my disagreement with the Presbyterian Church?

I think these convictions about the nature and purpose of the church require me to observe two principles.

First, tell the truth. If the church is, indeed, constituted by grateful confession of true faith, then we have no choice but to say what, by the power of God's word and spirit, we deeply believe to be true. Humility is of course advisable. In the case of homosexuality, for instance, someone is wrong, and it could be me. But I'm pretty sure I am not wrong, and an increasing number of Presbyterians hold views similar to mine. Our identity as confessing Christians requires that we say so.

Not enough of us have been doing that. When Joseph Small visited the Coalition and Covenant Network conferences last year, he was struck by the apparent unwillingness at the gathering of this group to speak our minds about the issues that divide the church, especially homosexuality--the elephant in the living room, to use his image, that, he thought, we go to special lengths not to mention even though it's sprawled on our ecclesiastical couch and will not go away. There is an historical explanation for what Joe Small accurately observed. The Covenant Network was created to promote Amendment A by people who had among them various reasons for wanting to see it pass. It made sense to focus on the common concerns, such as openness and tolerance, rather than our particular causes, and we have continued in that mode, emphasizing the generalities we share rather than the specifics over which we differ.

But meanwhile circumstances have changed. Immediate and decisive repeal of Amendment B seems less likely now than when Amendment A was before us. In this light, I have come to agree that a sabbatical period in which we refrain from legislative action and judicial confrontation is a good idea, though not for the reason most often given for standing-down: because the church is tired of debating homosexuality and associated issues and needs time out to rest. If the church lives by the truth of its confession, then we its members get no vacation from any issue in which truth and life are at stake. In fact, in my view the only good argument for this sabbatical period is to make time and conserve attention for the searching reflection and honest speaking that political fights often do not permit.

It is time for us, the Presbyterians who have been specializing in tact, to say what we think, civilly and reasonably--diatribes accomplish nothing--but also persuasively. We all do not think the same things. Those of you whose minds are not made up on the pivotal issues must frame your questions sharply. Those who have strong views about ordination and polity must state them with clarity and precision. And those who think, as I do, that homosexuality is the basic issue and that the church is in error when it teaches that God abominates homosexual acts committed in the context of covenant faithfulness while blessing heterosexual ones in the same situation--those of us who think that need to speak up, in clear, reasonable and inviting terms that stand a chance of changing the church's mind. Unity-and-diversity conferences are an excellent start, but the church must be sure that it gets around to talking about the full range of issues that divide us. It goes without saying, I hope, that there should be no penalty in a teaching church for the candid exchange of theological views.

Will vigorous conversation about these matters unsettle the church and upset some of its members? Probably it will, but that is no reason to hold back. The peace of Christ is not a sentimental blanket in which we hide and smother our differences. It is genuine reconciliation, obtained for us at a very high price, and we must expect to sacrifice some of our tranquility to discover it among ourselves. A confessing church is a struggling church. Honest expression and careful argument are God's work, and we should do more of both in the days to come.

A second principle for action also stems from reformed conceptions of the church: stay put. Separation from the body in which we have grown into Christ should be almost unthinkable. Calvin was adamant on this point. In one of his finest rhetorical passages he points to the church in Corinth, where "almost the whole body had become tainted..., where some hold the resurrection of the dead in derision, though with it the whole gospel must fall..., [and] where many things are done neither decently nor in order," and then asks how Paul responded. "Does he seek separation from them..., discard them from the kingdom of Christ, strike them with a final anathema?" No, Calvin answers, "He not only does none of these things, but he acknowledges and heralds them as the Church of Christ, and a society of saints."(12)

Calvin had very pragmatic reasons for his position: "By refusing to acknowledge any church, save one that is completely perfect, we leave no church at all."(13) Press reports tell us that some in the Coalition came to a similar conclusion as they surveyed alternative churches they might join if they decide to leave this denomination: they too have concluded that there are no church bodies without serious problems and flaws.

On our side of the aisle, there are additional pragmatic arguments for staying put. The most compelling for me, given my concern about homosexuality, is the fact that this denomination, with its history, social status, and many influential members, has impact far beyond its own organizational boundaries. As I noted earlier, our condemnation of homosexual practices reinforces hatred of homosexuals throughout this society. Former moderator John Fife once said that every time a gay teenager commits suicide, there is a sense in which that goes on the Presbyterian Church's chart. If a small group of dissenters with views like mine decamps to another denomination or starts a new one, that will have limited and temporary effect on the social tragedy we have helped to create. But if the Presbyterian Church (USA), changes its official teaching on homosexuality, it will go a significant distance toward changing the message that moderate religion broadcasts to the world. Maybe even homosexual teenagers will hear it, and think differently about the meaning and value of their lives. One important reason to stay is that the harm that the PC(USA) has done can only be undone by the PC(USA).

The theological arguments for staying if we possibly can are even stronger than the pragmatic ones. Being engrafted into the church is no ordinary admissions process. Baptism is not a chummy bonding with those with whom we would naturally gather in clubs. It is not an easy process, as our constant use of bland terms like inclusiveness sometimes suggests. I am one who thinks that inclusiveness is a concept with a rather short theological shelf life. We stand in a tradition that has emphasized not automatic inclusion but God's choice. Granted, God chooses more generously and less conventionally than we do, but still, election is a strenuous and painful conjunction. Because of the price God paid to be joined with us, and because we are born into new life with God and each other as we are baptized into Christ's death, baptism accomplishes what other initiations do not. It joins us in Christ to those with whom we have few if any interests, background characteristics, preferences or opinions in common. It breaks down the barriers that divide, making people who can't stand each other fellow citizens and members of the household of God, because Christ died for all of them--and us.

If I want to testify, then, to what Jesus Christ has done for me, bringing me to him in this unique community that is his body, it follows that my chief reason for staying in this denomination is not my tie to people like you who share my taste for progressive ideas and moderate manners. I would hang out with you anyway, denomination or no denomination. My deepest bond, ironically, is not to you but to two groups with whom I am acutely uncomfortable but to whom, in Christ, I am inextricably joined.

One of these groups is those whom I have injured. My disagreement with one church policy does not change the fact that I have more power in the church because others have less. Homosexuals, minorities, and women not as lucky as I to find an institution that will accept their leadership are what Biblical scholar Ellen Davis calls our Ishmaelites, "the great nation less favored" of those to whom the church, by policy or practice, denies full benefits of membership and opportunities for ministry.(14) Sometimes, the less favored lash out in legitimate anger at the unfairness their situation. Much more often, sustained by the God who has saved their lives in the wilderness, those whom we have mistreated exercise amazing forbearance. They endure the prejudice and unjust laws we impose on them, sticking with us, who exercise power that should have been theirs, and struggling not only for their rights but also for our integrity. As long as they stay, as so many of them do, ministering in love and faith to me their oppressor, how can I walk away?

The other group with whom I am deeply enmeshed, not by my choice but by God's sometimes puzzling providence, is my opponents, Presbyterians who hold some theological and religious ideas that are antithetical to mine. By "sheer grace," says Bonhoeffer, we are joined in Christ as firmly to those who do not meet our standards of doctrine and piety as to those who do.(15) I have had the privilege of experiencing this connection first hand. Over the last decade, I have studied conservative protestants, including Presbyterians, hanging out in their groups and institutions and getting to know them. I have learned three things about my kinship with them.

First, though there are indeed people in this denomination who are bent on making mischief and doing harm, there are many more who are well-intentioned, and they are found in all parties and factions. I know because I have formed Christian friendships, which mean more to me than I can say, with some conservative Presbyterians.

Second, I have learned that liberal, moderate and conservative Presbyterians share a deep deposit of faith. In the course of my research, I have listened to dozens of sermons by evangelical Presbyterians, and most of them treat the scripture they proclaim in ways I would have had I been preaching or in ways I wish I had thought of. Our unremitting focus on issues that divide, to the exclusion of large numbers of theological convictions on which God has given us a common mind, is ungrateful. Perhaps God is judging our ingratitude by withholding further mutual understanding until we show some appreciation for the community of faith we've got.

Third, at the points we are irreducibly divided, and they are very real, my opponents still minister to me because they, unlike my allies, almost always see my faults and offenses and name them. Without this ministry of our opponents, Bonhoeffer reminds us, we can easily become "proud and pretentious," cutting ourselves off from the work of grace by judging our faith and practice to be so correct that we don't need grace.(16)

So: because I have opponents who care about me as a Christian, who share with me one faith, one Lord, and one baptism, and who help to save me from self-righteousness, I conclude that I should remain in a church with them for my own good.

Tell the truth and stay put. One footnote to these two principles, and one last word. The footnote: I said that separation from the part of the body into which one has been engrafted should be almost unthinkable. What would make it thinkable? One condition might be restrictions on the freedom and opportunity to testify to the truth. Some Presbyterians live under such restrictions. Unlike the rest of us, they cannot both lead reasonable lives and be ordained to positions of governing and teaching authority. As I just said, the generosity of those who stick with us even so puts us the rest of us in their debt. At the same time, others who make the painful decision to leave because the Presbyterian Church will not permit them to respond to God's call deserve our support and admiration for their courage.

Are there other reasons to leave that might apply to those of us who do have full rights in the church? At those rare and dangerous moments when the church deserts its profession of faith on a wholesale basis--apostasy is the term for such moments--all Christians have to decide whether to separate themselves, either leaving or taking actions that will get them expelled. Without in any way minimizing the seriousness of our mistake about homosexuality--it is a deadly mistake; it must be corrected--I have to say that I do not think the Presbyterian Church is anywhere near that point. This is still God's church. Our denomination presents to the world a true confession that contains some serious error. While working correct the error, we have ample foundation for worshipping and serving God together, with full and glad and grateful hearts.

One last word. It is a tall order--telling the truth, sticking together even though we disagree. It is easy to get discouraged. How can we sustain our spirits in this difficult time? Let's try leaning on the promises of God. Last spring, I fell under the spell of an obscure passage of scripture on which I have now preached twice. It fits again here. In it, Zephaniah tells a familiar story: the political and religious leaders of God's people in Jerusalem have made the usual mess. A wrathful Lord pronounces judgment on their crimes. Zephaniah quotes the Lord: I will pour out my indignation; in the fire of my passion all the earth will be consumed. But God's plans and Zephaniah's prophecy do not end there. Speaking again for the Lord, Zephaniah utters this remarkable promise, which seems to apply to the whole city, errant leaders and their victims alike:

I will remove disaster from you. I will change the speech of the peoples to a pure speech, that all of them may call upon the Lord and serve him with one accord. They shall do no wrong and utter no lies. Then they will pasture and lie down, and no one shall make them afraid.

It's a promise to all of us. All of us--Covenant Network, Coalition, More Light Presbyterians and the great non-joining middle--all of us: With God's help, we shall call upon the Lord and serve God with one accord. We shall do no wrong and utter no lies. We shall pasture and lie down, and no one shall make us afraid.

ENDNOTES

1. Alexa Smith, "Despite Frustrations, Presbyterian Evangelicals Say They'd Rather Fight Than Switch: 200+ Gather for Presbyterian Coalition Gathering IV," News Briefs, Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), Issue No. 9926 (October 8, 1999), 8-11.

2. Miroslav Volf, After Our Likeness: The Church as the Image of the Trinity (Grand Rapids, MI: Wm. B. Eerdmans), 1998.

3. Volf, After Our Likeness, 164, N. 29. Volf cites Lumen Gentium as a source for the view that the church is "a subject" of salvation.

4. Dietrich Bonhoeffer, Life Together: A Discussion of Christian Fellowship, trans. John W. Doberstein (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1954), 53.

5. John Calvin, Institutes of the Christian Religion, trans. Henry Beveridge (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans, reprinted 1998) Book IV, Chap. I, 14; Beveridge II, 292.

6. Christopher Morse, Not Every Spirit: A Dogmatics of Christian Disbelief (Valley Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994), 297.

7. Avery Dulles, Models of the Church , Expanded Edition (New York: Image Books, Doubleday, 1987), 76.

8. Old School Presbyterians, for instance, gave pride of place to teaching the truth in propositional form. In an extreme expression of this view, J. Gresham Machen wrote, "Christian doctrine is not merely connected with the gospel; it is identical with the gospel" (quoted in Bradley J. Longfield, The Presbyterian Controversy: Fundamentalists, Modernists and Moderates [New York: Oxford University Press, 1991], 141-42). Dulles criticizes the emphasis on verbal witness over action in the theology of Barth and others who place priority on proclamation, the Word as event, kerygma as a happening.

9. Volf, After Our Likeness, 149.

10. Morse, Not Every Spirit, 300.

11. Thomas F. Torrance, "Introduction," in The School of Faith: The Catechisms of the Reformed Church (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1959), xxxiii.

12. The whole passage, Book IV, Chap. I, 14, reads as follows: "They [who "look for a church altogether free from blemish"] exclaim that it is impossible to tolerate the vice which everywhere stalks abroad like a pestilence. What if the apostle's sentiment applies here also? Among the Corinthians it was not a few that erred, but almost the whole body had become tainted; there was not one species of sin merely, but a multitude, and those not trivial errors, but some of them execrable crimes. There was not only corruption in manners, but also in doctrine. What course was taken by the holy apostle, in other words, but the organ of the heavenly Spirit, by whose testimony the Church stands and falls? Does he seek separation from them? Does he discard them from the kingdom of Christ? Does he strike them with the thunder of a final anathema? He not only does none of these things, but he acknowledges and heralds them as a Church of Christ, and a society of saints. If the Church remains among the Corinthians, where envyings, divisions, and contentions rage; where quarrels, lawsuits, and avarice prevail; where a crime, which even the Gentiles would execrate, is openly approved; where the name of Paul, whom they ought to have honored as a father, is petulantly assailed, where some hold the resurrection of the dead in derision, though with it the whole gospel must fall; where the gifts of God are made subservient to ambition, not to charity; where many things are done neither decently nor in order: If there the Church still remains, simply because the ministration of word and sacrament is not rejected, who will presume to deny the title of church to those to whom a tenth part of these crimes cannot be imputed? How, I ask, would those who act so morosely against present churches have acted to the Galatians, who had done all but abandon the gospel (Gal. i. 6), and yet among them the same apostle found churches?" Beveridge II, 293.

13. Book IV, Chap I, 17. Beveridge, II, 295.

14. Ellen Davis, "Sermon for Tuesday of 4th Epiphany, Year 2," Marquand Chapel, Yale Divinity School, January 30, 1996, unpublished.

15. Bonhoeffer, Life Together, 25-27.

16. Bonhoeffer, Life Together, 27.

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Why Liberals Need Conservatives

I’m uncomfortably aware that this room contains very different groups of Presbyterians -- both of which have ministered to me. One is made up of gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgendered people. The church has developed the bad habit of talking about this group as if it is a problem for the denomination. Let me address you directly. You have not been a problem for me. Quite the opposite: you have provided me with luminous examples of how to live a Christian life under very adverse conditions.

This denomination’s policies toward its GLBT members are restrictive to the point of cruelty. It tells many of you who want to offer sacrifices for the good of the church -- countless hours of volunteer service as elders and deacons or a lifetime in demanding and low-paid pastoral ministries -- that your life choices are so much more sinful than the rest of ours that we’ve had to erect special barriers to keep you from laying your gifts at the altar.

Our church’s teaching that all same-sex acts are wrong, no distinctions, has downright perverse effects. The more you conform to the practices the church blesses and honors for heterosexuals -- public pledges of fidelity to another person, family commitment to the nurture of children -- the less likely that you can be ordained and that you will be welcomed to work out your discipleship in most Presbyterian congregations.

Yet here you are in this denomination, or eager to be, if only we had a place for you. You keep on witnessing to the truth of Christ in your lives. You keep on offering help that the church desperately needs but is too proud and stubborn to accept. You show us your anger -- I take that as a compliment, a sign of trust. You keep on ministering, with tender compassion, to me and to many others who have the approval and privileges that have been denied to you. Your unselfishness lifts my sights. It makes it difficult, however, for me to lecture you about the future, because many of you live your lives better in the present, under far more difficult conditions, than I do.

The other group in this room is made up of evangelical and conservative Presbyterians. Richard Mouw is here as their chief proxy, but others are present as well. I stumbled into the evangelical world by a kind of accident 15 years ago when some colleagues and I wanted to understand how the culture of a seminary shapes the ministers who are formed there. I could not have been more of an outsider if had gone to do my research in Bali. I grew up in a home so liberal that when Dwight Eisenhower was elected president, I couldn’t believe it. In my eight years of life I’d never met a self-identified Republican. How could a party with no members elect a president? My liberal Catholic girlhood and liberal Protestant adult life were similarly sheltered.

I had definite expectations for what I would find in the evangelical world. I believed that the only reason anyone would choose to become or remain a religious conservative is lack of the psychological strength to confront the ambiguity and uncertainty of the world. (I have since learned that evangelicals harbor a corresponding theory about liberals: liberals lack the moral fortitude to confront the truth and live by it.) I also expected evangelical conservatives to be theological dinosaurs, mired in precritical questions long ago settled and forgotten by the rest of us.

I discovered that you evangelicals -- I will also address you directly -- are no more fearful and unstable than the rest of us. Some of you are much better than I at looking at yourselves and the world with unsparing honesty and at changing your minds and behavior when warranted. I also learned that theology in your world is diverse. Some of it indeed concerns fossilized debates that most Christians, even many evangelicals, don’t care about any more. But there is also lively theological conversation in the evangelical world, and it has reminded me how much gold is to be found in the classic Christian tradition and how it still enriches all of us, including liberals.

The biggest surprise was that my experience in the evangelical culture strengthened my faith. Despite your best efforts, you have not changed my opinions. But early on in my relationships with evangelicals there was a moment when I knew, and knew that the other knew, that we were hearing the same gospel. I am not proud of the fact that my evangelical friends spoke first, affirming my faith before I affirmed theirs. I’m not proud that I failed to take the initiative, but I’m grateful that they did.

The two groups I have named, which have been the church in a powerful way to me in recent years, are also two groups that generally can’t stand each other. Each is deeply fearful that it and the wider church will suffer if the other gains any more power or prominence.

What can I possibly say about the church in the presence of these two groups? How about this: "They confessed that they were strangers and foreigners on the earth, for people who speak in this way make it clear that they are seeking a homeland. If they had been thinking of the land that they had left behind, they would have had opportunity to return. But as it is they desire a better country, that is, a heavenly one" (Heb. 11:13-16).

What if we not only acknowledge the fact that we are strangers to others in our own denomination, but even give thanks for it? Instead of denying our estrangement or bemoaning it, why not embrace it as a gift from God? How’s this for a model of the church: a company of strangers, who like Abraham and Sarah set out for a new place because "from a distance" all of us, in our own weird ways, "have glimpsed the promises of God and greeted them"? (Heb. 11:13).

This image of the church as a band of strangers who accept discomfort with one another as God’s way of moving us forward may seem grimly Calvinistic. It certainly flies in the face of the best marketing advice about how to increase membership in a church or denomination: create a warm, friendly enclave where like-minded people can find refuge from the tensions of contemporary life. A church something like that is what the proponents of a cool, clean division of the denomination claim to have in view. (They are dreaming. Having just studied the bloody split of the Presbyterian Church in the U.S.A. in 1837 under circumstances not all that different from our own, I am certain that peaceful or gracious schisms are not possible.)

I suspect that even those of us who hate the idea of an outright split have a secret hankering for a church in which the most irritating of the others won’t be around to make our lives miserable. If we can hammer the other side long enough, perhaps it will be cowed into silence, give up or go away, and then we will have an improved if not purified church.

I want to advocate an alternative: a tense, edgy, difficult church made up of zenoi, strangers, who cling to each other for dear life in the same chilly, rocky baptismal boat because we are headed toward the same destination: a better country. I think I could make the full-blown ecclesiological case for a church of strangers. For now I’ll focus on three practical advantages: strangeness is better for us, better for the church, and better for the world than the warmer and cuddlier options.

A church that contains members whom we think are strange, even barbaric, is a healthier setting for Christian formation. Familiarity and affinity breed bad habits as well as virtues. As Richard Mauw points out, conservatives are contentious enough among themselves. If this denomination splits, within minutes the new conservative church will be organized into warring factions. Aggressiveness is part of conservative religious culture; it’s both the secret of its effectiveness and its downfall.

As for liberals’ bad family habits: We are often smug. We are pretty sure that our views are advanced and others’ views are outmoded. When everyone else grows up, we believe, they will look and think like us. You could say that our progressive openness to the world, which is where this sense of being ahead of the curve comes from, is the secret of our effectiveness and also our downfall. In my experience, we are less likely to slide over into snobbishness when "they" -- those we have defined as inferior -- are in the room us, thinking as clearly and acting as maturely as we are.

The strange members in our midst make us self-conscious. They make us less likely to display some of the uglier traits of our subgroup and perhaps more aware that if we want greater righteousness for the church and all of us in it, we may have to fix ourselves as well as those others.

The church is better off -- more productive and more faithful -- when the strangers in it hold on to one another This denomination has a lot of important work to do; and though we would like to see all of it accomplished our way, the fact is that none of the factions, including our own, has the capacity or the skills to do it alone. Questions about Christology, for example, are ones that estranged groups in the church could profitably work on together. The most audible version of christological debate often takes place at the level of bumper stickers: "Jesus Is the Only Way" or "Many, Many Paths to God." We can do better than that.

Our various parties and caucuses have different kinds of specialized knowledge: liberals are practiced in learning from other faith traditions; evangelicals have expertise in nurturing and sustaining intense personal relationships with Jesus Christ. There are some in the churchwomen, gays and lesbians, racial and ethnic minorities -- who have experienced what it is like to suffer at the hands of the civic and religious establishment. That also is valuable insight into what it means to be the body of Christ. Instead of battering each other with our different perspectives on Jesus Christ, we might listen for what complements and corrects our own view in what others have to say about their knowledge and love of him. Perhaps, if we did that, we could represent him more fully and accurately to a world that doesn’t know him very well. I think that he would be honored if we pooled our efforts in his behalf.

Discussing the issue of homosexuality will be enormously difficult. On this matter, we really are strangers, far apart and mystified about each other’s outlook and convictions. I believe God invites GLBT persons into full membership, committed partnerships and church leadership on the same basis as everyone else. But those who make this case tend to leave It at that, to give the impression that inclusion Is the end of the story. Of course It is not. God incorporates us into Christ’s body for a reason: transformation.

Evangelical theology and culture place heavy emphasis on that next step. Our side doesn’t have to agree with conservatives about what God is seeking to change or redirect or squelch -- namely, all same-sex impulses -- or about who is first in line for change. (I suspect that God’s priority is the privileged and powerful, including in the present instance those of us self-indulgent heterosexuals who have full church and society support for the promises we make, yet still don’t keep very well.) But we can stand our ground on these points and still let the evangelicals help us balance our word to the church: inclusion and acceptance, but also metanoia and new life.

Who knows? If evangelicals listen intently to the testimony of faithful GLBT persons, and if our side accepts evangelicals’ prompting to admit our need and desire to be renewed, maybe we can strive together for a church as just and generous -- and holy -- as God’s grace.

In struggling through their disagreements, Presbyterian strangers show the world that there are alternatives to killing each other over differences. As long as we continue to club the other Presbyterians into submission with constitutional amendments, judicial cases and economic boycotts, we have no word for a world full of murderous divisions, most of them cloaked in religion.

In 1869, the two Presbyterian denominations that formed in the bitter split 40 years before came back together. Seeking, said their reunion plan, to create a church marked by "diversity and harmony, liberty and love," both assemblies met in Pittsburgh in separate halls from which their members marched to opposite sides of a broad avenue. Their moderators and clerks then stepped into the street and met in the middle. They "clasped hands," according to one account, "and amidst welcomes, thanksgivings and tears, they locked arms stood together in their reformed relations."

It was a powerful moment, but I can imagine a more powerful witness: we could skip the split. We Presbyterians, who share so much -- a confession of faith, a rich theological heritage, the advantages and the burdens of wealth and social power -- could covenant to stay together, to labor with each other, in love, for justice and truth. It would be very arduous and painful, much more so than splitting or drifting apart. It would be worth it. The world would take note of what the gospel makes possible for those who confess their dis-ease with each other but still keep going, strangers locked in covenant, toward the better country of diversity and harmony, liberty and love.

It is, of course, along trip. We have only glimpsed what that better country might be like. But God, says the Letter to the Hebrews, was not ashamed to be called the God of those who stepped out in faith. Indeed, God has prepared a city for them. God has prepared a city for us strange Presbyterians and for all the other foreigners God loves. I pray that with God’s help, we will get there together.

The Faculty Members of the Future: How Are They Being Shaped?

An old story tells about a philosophy professor who, despite his long tenure and large classes, remembered every student he had ever taught. Late in his career he approached a middle-aged woman at a reunion of graduates. "You are Mary Smith," he said to her. "You took Philosophy 101 in 1967. You sat in the third row, on the window side of the classroom, four seats from the aisle."

"Wow!" said the woman. "That's amazing. How could you possibly remember me? That was almost 30 years ago! And," she added, "who are you?"

The story has its charm, but it is not at all illustrative of the educational experience. Students remember faculty more than they remember anything else about their education. While the administration often personifies a school for its faculty for students the school is the faculty This was strikingly evident in the two institutions several colleagues and I studied during the past decade (a study which recently appeared as Being There: Culture and Formation in Two Theological Schools). Students, we found, barely notice what administrators do and say, unless students encounter them as teachers, and most students have no idea who constitutes the board of trustees. But faculty play a pivotal role in students' lives, not only imparting information and demonstrating how to think, but also teaching by example how to treat people, what to wear, what jokes are funny and what art and music is good. Students adopt some of the ideas and habits of their teachers, reject some, and adapt some to their own circumstances.

It matters a lot, then, the sort of faculty schools have and will have. During the past five years, Auburn Seminary's Center for the Study of Theological Education (with support from Lilly Endowment Inc.) has been intensively examining theological faculty. In one project, which I codirected with Katarina Schuth, O.S.F., we surveyed current theological faculty and all current graduate students in theology and religion. We also interviewed cohorts of junior faculty in three theological schools over a three-year period, as well as assorted junior faculty in other seminaries. In addition, we conducted case studies of four theological schools that have reputations for being good places to work. And we studied faculty compensation, the history of the faculty role, and the special challenge of recruiting and retaining minority faculty.

We began the study because so many people -- seminary deans and presidents in particular -- told us that they were worried about whether theological schools would be able to recruit enough qualified faculty to replace the many who soon will be retiring. Between the beginning of this decade and the middle of the next, about two-thirds of those who were teaching in 1990 will have retired.

Our research soon convinced us that there are enough people to consider for faculty slots. Doctoral programs in theology and religion contain more than enough students to fill the number of available jobs.

But will these people be trained and formed in ways that equip them to prepare religious leaders? Deans and presidents have doubts and anxieties about this. Religious studies, they fear, is coming to dominate doctoral programs in the field. Some of the largest programs are housed in universities that have no seminaries; several are in public institutions. Administrators worry that doctoral students increasingly will be trained in the history of religion or comparative religions rather than in Bible, theology, ethics, church history and practical studies -- the traditional fields of theological education.

That a number of newly minted Ph.D.s do not hold the M.Div. degree, are not ordained and have no hands-on pastoral experience gives rise to worries about whether theological education will adequately maintain its church connections. Deans and presidents fear that doctoral programs are emphasizing research at the expense of teaching. Added to these worries are the perennial complaints of bishops, denominational executives and prominent pastors that faculty live in academic ivory towers, preoccupied with guild concerns and insulated or even alienated from church life.

Our evidence suggests that many of these anxieties are not warranted. Many widely held impressions and assumptions are inaccurate. We made three especially surprising discoveries.

(1) The popularity of religious studies has not substantially reshaped the training of theological faculty. About two-thirds, including the younger, more recently hired teachers, are trained in 25 doctoral programs, almost all of which were also among the top 25 faculty-supplying programs 30 years ago. There have been a few changes -- Hartford and Johns Hopkins have faded, Emory and Fuller have emerged, and far fewer faculty, especially Roman Catholics, are trained in Europe--but every program on the list still is located in a seminary, a religiously related university or a university that has a divinity school. Religious studies programs in institutions that are not related in any way to the church or to ministry preparation do not play a substantial role in training theological faculty.

Many more younger than older faculty lack the M.Div. degree, but almost all the non-M.Div.s got a theological master's from a seminary or divinity school rather than, or in addition to, an academic master's from a religious studies program. (If theological schools don't like having fewer faculty with M.Div.s, they have only themselves to blame for creating an alternative degree.)

Also, theological ways of organizing doctoral study are still dominant. Many more current graduate students locate themselves in theological studies than in religious studies (49 percent versus 37 percent, with the remainder rejecting the terminological division). An even larger number are studying in one of the traditional theological fields. About three-quarters want to teach in Bible, theology, ethics, Christian history or ministry studies rather than religion or something "of' religion. Strikingly, three-fourths of doctoral students, whatever their own interests, report that Christian studies dominates the curriculum of their doctoral program. And more than 90 percent of current graduates say they would seriously consider teaching in a religiously affiliated college or university or a divinity school. More than 80 percent would teach in a denominational seminary, indeed, denominational seminaries ranked highest among first choices of places to teach.

Our survey does not, of course, tell us whether religious studies has changed the way that "theological" subjects are taught and studied at the doctoral level (no doubt it has had some effect). But the worry that the pool of future faculty will be dominated by graduates of religious studies programs whose whole training is outside the fields and institutions of theological study and who would not want to be associated with such schools is misplaced.

(2) Most theological faculty are not primarily absorbed in academic research and scholarly publishing for narrow guild audiences. The single most often reported research "area" is interdisciplinary research. Fewer than 10 percent of theological faculty report that the pressure to publish interferes with their teaching responsibilities. And scholarly publication rates are not notably high. About one-third do little or no scholarly research. One quarter are highly productive scholars, but almost all of these also produce publications for a general audience. These self-reported rates and types of publication for theological faculty are almost exactly the same as the rates reported by undergraduate faculty. Given that theological education is a graduate enterprise, one is inclined to wonder not whether faculty spend too much time walled up in the library but whether they do enough scholarly research.



(3) Virtually all theological faculty are heavily involved in religious practice. Four out of five have served in a professional ministry position, and three out of five have done so full time. Almost all attend worship services often, and many regularly lead them. Half of the ordained faculty and 40 percent of all faculty say that they lead worship at least once a month, and one quarter of the ordained faculty (who are 75 percent of the total) do so weekly.

That younger faculty are markedly less likely than their older colleagues to hold the M.Div. degree, be ordained or have professional ministry experience is largely due to the entry of many women into the field. Women are not eligible for ordination in the Roman Catholic Church and in many conservative Protestant churches. Mainline Protestant women report that they sometimes are advised not to try to do both ministry and teaching. Perhaps this advice is good. It is very difficult, according to women who have done both, to fit seminary, parish ministry, doctoral study, teaching, publication and child bearing into the two decades between college graduation and the age -- the early 40s -- at which tenure usually is granted.

Theological faculty also are active in their denominations and in ecumenical agencies. They spend an average of 15 days a year in such activity in addition to their other church involvements. Figures like these convince me that the standard proposal of church leaders -- that seminary faculty regularly spend sabbaticals or other periods of leave as ministers in congregations -- is misguided. Most already invest a great deal of time that way. In contrast, they allot very little time to civic and community activities or to recreation and leisure. My strong impression, based on these data, is that faculty tend to spend too much rather than too little time in church activities, and that scholarship and involvements beyond the church consequently sometimes suffer.

Though these findings led our research team to conclude that many standard concerns about theological faculty are not well grounded, all is not well. Our study produced evidence of problems -- or at least strenuous challenges -- that do not yet worry church and seminary leaders but probably ought to. These problems are linked to a major social and cultural shift that affects all the professions. I call the shift commodification.

Not long ago professions were understood as the social roles in which occupation and vocation combined. One committed one's whole self to the profession. Character and spirit were as relevant to professional practice as knowledge and technical skills. Because the profession was what one was as much as what one did, the commitment to it was usually for life. The institutions that professionals served demanded this kind of dedication and often returned it, giving many the chance to work in the same place from the beginning to the end of their careers. Committed to a calling for life and to particular institutions for extended periods, professionals were expected to be both experts in their fields and social leaders.

Increasingly, however, professionals now are viewed as vendors of highly specialized services. The profession is considered not an identity but a marketable capacity to be sold to the highest bidder. A person's character and commitments and the larger purpose of his or her life are irrelevant as long as the professional product meets the standard set in the contract for services. If the market for one kind of service weakens, the professional may well refit herself to offer a different one.

Institutions no longer expect a major personal commitment or a long tenure, and in their quest for the most and best service at the lowest cost they make fewer commitments to those they employ. Vocation and occupation have been uncoupled. Professions are more and more viewed simply as high-level jobs.

In college and university education and in fields like medicine, where these developments have received more attention than they have in the church and seminary, both sides tend to assign blame to the other. Institutions accuse young professionals of self-centered careerism. They are preoccupied with their own security and advancement, or so the indictment goes; their commitment to the welfare of the persons, institutions and wider society they serve is secondary at best. Young professionals, for their part, say that the institutions that employ them care most about finances and will readily exploit their employees and sacrifice the quality of the institution's work to ensure positive financial results. Because institutions no longer offer the opportunity for long-term commitments or sometimes even full-time work benefits, professionals have to give priority to taking care of themselves.

I doubt that either side is chiefly or exclusively to blame. Rather, both participate in a culture in which security, independence and financial success for the individual and the institution are more highly prized than the common good -- both in its collective aspect and in the emphasis on nonmaterial goods. That these changes are widespread does not make them desirable. It seems quite clear from the experience of doctors working for managed-care companies, of engineers and other technical specialists who live from one short-term consulting contract to the next, and of permanent adjunct faculty that this model of professional life is scary and unsatisfying. The toll on institutions may be high as well.

Something important for our social health and strength is missing from commodified medicine, even if the new arrangements are not yet raising mortality rates. Companies that downsize their employees and replace them with contractors and consultants often see the quality of their product suffer, and some discover that they are not saving much money either. I think we will soon see that schools in which professors are not fully committed to teaching and the life of the mind do not form the characters or intellects of students and may not be effective even in imparting technical skills. Commodification of the professions is a trend to be challenged and resisted.

Is commodification a problem in theological education? Our evidence suggests that it is. Schools increasingly rely on adjunct and part-time faculty. In 1970 among schools in the Association of Theological Schools there were 12.4 students per full-time faculty member; in 1990 there were 22.3 students for each full-time faculty member. In the 20-year interval, the number of full-time faculty increased 5 percent and the number of part-time faculty 129 percent. More and more these part-time and adjunct faculty not only supervise field work, as they did in the past, but also teach core courses.

Our studies of graduate students and junior faculty show that they often view themselves as service providers rather than professors on a long-term mission. From one perspective it is welcome news that almost all graduate students will teach in almost any kind of institution: it means that schools get to choose their faculty from a very large pool. It also seems salutary that most doctoral students, wherever they locate themselves, have positive views of both religious and theological studies. Perhaps the hostilities that other research has documented between camps of senior faculty split along these lines will not be as fierce in the next generation.

But these findings are also cause for concern. Both graduate students and new faculty say that they decided to pursue the doctorate in religion or theology because they became keenly interested in a subject -- Bible or ethics or anthropology of religion. Our interviews suggest, however, that many are not committed to any broader purpose, such as shaping the next generation of religious leaders, or molding undergraduates into citizens who understand the importance of religion whether or not they practice it, or making the case for theological perspectives in intellectual circles where theology is viewed with suspicion.

As long as these young scholars can teach and do research on their chosen subject matter -- as long as they provide, that is, their specialized services -- they will do it for almost any institution and any purpose, rather like engineers who will offer their skills to build either medical equipment or weapons systems, depending on who offers them the better job. Our graduate students and newest faculty increasingly have fields and specialties -- services to sell -- but not vocations to make a particular kind of difference in the church or the world.

Will theological schools have the faculty they need for the future, faculty who will shape the educational mission of the institutions and make their programs more influential? They will have such faculty only if they can temper the process of commodification. We propose two steps in that direction.

First, institutions should aim to have as high a proportion of their faculties as possible be full-time, tenure track or continuing. There are heavy pressures in the other direction. A school can get a lot of course-teaching services for the salary of a full-time faculty member who draws fringe benefits and earns sabbatical leave. Institutions that must staff courses given at distant sites and odd hours are especially tempted to lean heavily on occasional teachers rather than regular faculty, many of whom don't like to move around or to teach after dinner. But there is a high educational cost in replacing faculty on regular appointment with other kinds of teachers. However able occasional faculty may be, students do not revere them. In the two seminaries we studied, it was the students' sustained exposure to the professors who were a consistent presence that gave them examples of character, behavior and deep convictions against which to measure themselves. Only in that testing and measuring process did genuine learning -- including content learning -- occur.

Second, institutions should nurture faculty members' sense of vocation, giving special emphasis to junior faculty. The single least expected and most significant finding of our study of junior faculty was that their success -- defined as tenure or extension of contract -- is a function not of how well they perform but of decisions the institution makes before they arrive. Early in the three-year study, before we knew what would happen to those we were following, we noticed that some junior faculty had what we came to call "valuable jobs." They were doing things that key faculty members thought important. Others had what we called "junky jobs" -- a collage of tasks no one else wanted to do but that had to be done to please accreditors or political caucuses in the school or in outside constituency groups.

We also noticed that some junior faculty had been carefully chosen for their potential to fit the school's culture; these usually got a lot of attention from powerful senior faculty after they arrived. Others were hastily appointed and usually ignored. Not surprisingly, most of the carefully chosen junior faculty were serving in valued positions and most of the haphazardly appointed in junky jobs.

It was also not surprising that most of the first group were tenured or promoted or both, and the others weren't. If one of the schools we studied had not had a financial crisis, the correlation would have been almost perfect. In only one or two cases did sponsored faculty in good jobs mess up so badly that their colleagues did not want to retain them; and in only one or two instances did junior faculty manage to overcome the handicap of appointment to a junk job.

The success or failure of new faculty, then, is largely determined before they begin to work for an institution by the way that institution has shaped the position and the care with which it selects the occupant. The reason for this, I'm convinced, is that new faculty -- though very smart and well read (and probably better educated than most of their senior colleagues), though religiously observant and already experienced in teaching, though flexible, open and good-humored -- have not found a vocation, do not know what purpose they want to serve. If administrators and senior faculty set their assignments with real seriousness and adopt them into the company of educators with great care, that invitation can function as a genuine call to profession. and many of those so called will find their calling.

If, however, schools cobble together positions purely for their own convenience and select the occupants carelessly new faculty will see that offer for what it is: a contract to buy their services. The work will probably get done, but the relationship will not be happy or lasting.

 

Exercising a Christian Intellect

The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarshipby George M. Marsden. Oxford University Press, 142 pp., $22.00.

"It is time to face the fact, long suppressed in the highest intellectual circles, that a religiously diverse culture will be an intellectually richer culture. It is time to recognize that scholars and institutions who take the intellectual dimensions of their faith seriously can be responsible and creative participants in the highest levels of academic discourse." With this statement, George Marsden pretty well sums up his main argument: Christian scholars should cease being Christian merely in private, as though their faith were no more than a hobby, unrelated to their scholarly pursuits. They should integrate faith and intellect, thus becoming whole in their minds. Rather than being scholars who just happen to be Christians, they should be Christian scholars. And the academic community should accept them as such, just as it accepts scholars committed to secular ideologies such as feminism or Marxism. Marsden aims, above all, at breaking down the antireligious bias he sees in present-day universities and colleges.

Marsden's argument involves three claims. The first concerns the reigning ethos in 20th-century American universities, an ethos which Marsden calls "a virtual establishment of nonbelief." Scholars who are Christians are trained by the dominant academic culture to keep quiet about their faith as the price of full acceptance in the academic community. As a consequence, "something very much like 'secular humanism' is informally established as much as Christianity was in the 19th century." Marsden would readily grant that there are exceptions, such as Calvin College, where he once taught, or the University of Notre Dame, where he teaches now. But these only prove the rule, which is a surprisingly inflexible and widely prevalent insistence that faith and learning be kept apart.

Marsden's second claim is that this rule is unfair. Universities often make a considerable show of "celebrating diversity," but Christians are not welcome to stand under the diversity umbrella. Feminists, Freudians, Nietzscheans, Heideggerians and many others are admitted to the scholarly community without question, but not Christians. All that can reasonably be demanded of Christians is that they obey the established rules of scholarly discourse, and Christians are perfectly willing to do this. Although their Christian orientation is based on faith, their conduct of intellectual disputation can be and normally is as rational as that of any other scholars.

Marsden notes how ironic it is that Christians are rigorously judged against the standard of rational objectivity at a time when the very possibility of rational objectivity -- as an inheritance of the Enlightenment -- is under widespread attack.

Marsden's final and perhaps most important claim is that the world of scholarship, far from being somehow threatened or impoverished by the presence of Christians in its midst, would be enriched. Faith makes a difference to whatever scholarship it inspires and sustains, although the difference in no way compromises intellectual integrity, as the secularists who govern our universities seem to fear. The Christian faith may, for example, alert scholars to subjects worthy of investigation; thus (my example, not Marsden's) a great deal of empirical research into the influence of religious beliefs on political behavior is being conducted by Christian political scientists. In many cases these scholars can understand the beliefs they are investigating better than those who have never, so to speak, been inside them. Further, religious faith may prompt a scholar to ask questions that another scholar might neglect -- concerning nuclear war, for example, or medical ethics.

In addition to orienting scholarly research in directions that might otherwise be ignored, Christian faith may provide useful hypotheses. For example, Christianity presupposes a more pessimistic view of human nature than is held by many people. This view may provide a useful framework for investigating areas of human behavior, such as politics, in which typical behavior is worse than behavior anticipated by more optimistic views. One of the most helpful hypotheses set forth in our time (again, my example) is Reinhold Niebuhr's concept of "original sin."

If Christian or other religious commitments make differences of this kind in the conduct of scholarly inquiry, the scholarly community makes itself poorer by its ban on religious expression. Marsden's plea to secular scholars is not simply "Be fair!" but also "Consider your own best interests!" These interests dictate that scholars listen to every reasonable voice and rule out no argument unheard.

Marsden's position is well founded. I wonder whether there is a single Christian in American academic life today who would deny "the virtual establishment of non-belief." While there are openly professed Christians in American universities (a few of them well-known scholars and in prestigious universities), professing one's Christian faith in an academic setting is not an easy undertaking. Recently I found myself advising a Christian graduate student in a renowned university who was facing interviews for faculty positions not to go out of his way to make his Christian faith known. A Christian acquaintance on that university's faculty fully concurred.

What about Marsden's claim that this antireligious bias is unfair to Christians and impoverishing to academic life? On the issue of fairness, unbelievers would probably be more reluctant than believers to agree with Marsden. Still, if I interpret him accurately, he gives little cause for disagreement. In no way does he question the validity of the established rules of scholarly discourse. We must address one another on the basis of reason. Christians have no business asserting that something is true because God says that it is. They must support whatever positions they take with evidence and reasons that non-Christians can rationally weigh. It is hard to see what nonbelievers have to fear: they are not asked to compromise their scholarly integrity in any way but only to extend to Christians the courtesies that, in this era of exultant diversity, they extend to every sort of secular persuasion.

Can the scholarly realm be enriched by the presence of Christians? No doubt many nonbelievers will remain unconvinced, but Marsden's response to their doubts might be phrased as a question: What harm can come from giving religious scholars a hearing? Or, recalling John Stuart Mill, Marsden might ask: On what rational grounds can you reject arguments you have never heard? One suspects that some of the difficulty in winning non-Christian academicians over to a viewpoint like Marsden's derives from the fact that they are not well acquainted with Christian writings. They are often unfamiliar with the works of even the greatest Christian writers such as Thomas Aquinas or Karl Barth. They do not realize the high order of rationality and learning that is displayed in such works.

A theologian in their eyes is somewhat like a dragon -- strange and alarming--and they shrink from the prospect of facing such a creature in scholarly debate. But their doubts have little to do with the real nature of the Christian intellect or with the intrinsic merits of the viewpoint Marsden is arguing.

Marsden's manner is persuasive. He is unfailingly civil with his readers; sarcasm does not seem to be in his intellectual arsenal. And in fashioning his polemic, his style is one of studied moderation. But this moderation and civility may have led him to be less bold than is warranted by the strength of his case.

Why, for example, should Christian scholars want to join secular scholars in a single community of inquiry? What can they learn from secular scholars? Why shouldn't they heed Paul when he urges Christians to separate themselves from the company of unbelievers and to stand apart? Marsden tends to say only that Christian participation in the world of secular scholarship is a matter of rendering to Caesar the things that are Caesar's. In everyday life, believers and nonbelievers alike "routinely move from one field of activity to another, each with its own set of rules." Such adaptability is "fully consistent with Christian commitment."

Something stronger might well be said. If Marsden does not say it, or says it only very faintly, it may be because of his moderate and civil spirit, not because of his convictions. Christianity is concerned with the truth above all else, and truth for Christians is not an esoteric doctrine, as it was with the Gnostics, but is the Logos pervading the universe. In entering the realms of rational inquiry, Christians are not in alien country. However uneasy secular scholars may be in the presence of Christian scholars, Christian scholars can be quite comfortable in the presence of secular scholars. To whatever degree they possess authentic truth, secular scholars are on common ground with Christians. Christians can in good conscience listen to them and learn from them. I wish that Marsden has pressed his argument in this direction.

He might have pressed it in another direction as well. Marsden's exhortation to his secular colleagues is minimal: be fair, don't discriminate unreasonably against professed Christians; be reasonable, recognize that you can learn from Christian scholars. Sometimes he seems to say even less -- that Christian scholars, once admitted into the arena of the secular intellect, will prove to be harmless. Some of his most interesting arguments, however, suggest that secular universities are far more dependent on Christian insights than he wants to say explicitly. He notes that many professors have "deep moral and political convictions" but are unable to defend them because they are captives of moral relativism. With their belief in a divinely grounded, hence absolute, moral law, Christians are in a good position to help them.

A similar situation exists in the field of epistemology. "Human perceptions," Marsden writes, "are notoriously limited and, with God excluded from consideration, it is difficult to find a point of reference for establishing any certainty in what we claim to know." Hence, with the spread of postmodern relativism, secular scholars today are "up a creek without an epistemic paddle." Christian scholars have a paddle they could lend to secular scholars; they have transcendental resources for resisting deconstruction and other such corrosive forces. Finally, in the godless universe of secular academics, "humans loom as the ultimate creators of reality. The self, or perhaps the community or the nation, is inflated and absolutized." Christian scholars can help bring a sense of proportion into intellectual debate; they can remind us from time to time that we are human and not divine -- a reminder scholars need perhaps more than some other groups.

Marsden is not clear about how these services can be performed without making a direct appeal to revelation -- which, of course, the rules of scholarly discourse preclude. The key point, however, is that if the secularized academic community cannot on its own terms sustain moral standards, gain epistemological assurance or avoid the virtual deification of the human, then far more than fairness and open-mindedness is at stake in its relationship with Christians. The viability of the scholarly community is at stake.

This may seem an extreme way of speaking, but the plight of the secular university invites such speech. A research community that has no moral standards for directing its investigations or judging the results, that has no way of knowing whether it really knows anything at all, and that saddles human beings with expectations and demands that they (being human and not divine) are constitutionally incapable of fulfilling is in desperate circumstances. Marsden is aware that his analysis hovers on the edge of such conclusions. This is shown by the very first sentence of the book: "Contemporary university culture," he declares, "is hollow at its core." However, it's as if, having said that, he clapped his hand over his mouth and resolved to be more discreet. Never again does he speak so plainly, even though he provides himself with ample grounds for doing so.

Finally, it is arguable that Marsden makes too little of the chasm dividing Christian and secular scholars. He writes as though most nonreligious scholars will recognize the common sense informing his argument and will accordingly revise their attitudes toward Christian scholarship. Having suggested that Christians are more realistic in their assessments of human nature than are their secular colleagues, Marsden is not very realistic in his assessment of his secular colleagues. He ignores the fact that one of the prime motives behind secular hostility to religion is pride. Even Christian scholars may be reluctant to admit how clouded and unsure the human mind is, and how dependent on revelation. How much more so non-Christian scholars! To have been explicit on this point would of course have necessitated speaking of sin -- a delicate if not impossible task in this context. It would, however, have brought to light conditions to which Marsden gives insufficient attention. In view of the intractability of sin (maintaining its hold, presumably, on both sides of the chasm), relationships between Christian and non-Christian scholars are unlikely ever to be free of serious tensions.

These tensions can easily be seen if we note how unavoidable it will be for Christian scholars to appeal, at least occasionally and tacitly, to revelation. Can a Christian scholar affirm absolute morality without in some way introducing the proposition that the moral law is revealed and underwritten by God? This is doubtful. Even the concept of natural law, which probably lends itself to rational definition and defense more readily than any other theological version of morality, makes little sense without God as its ultimate premise. And can a Christian scholar offer any sort of "epistemic paddle," that is, any assurance that human knowledge can attain absolute truth, without at least implying that such knowledge must be checked and completed by revelation? Again, that is doubtful. But to fall back on the authority of revelation is sure to cause offense.

The propriety of appealing to revelation in public debate is a complex issue. On the one hand, it seemingly does no harm as long as all participants are free to follow reason and conscience. Moreover, what one person affirms on the basis of revelation, another person may accept on the basis of reason or of personal intuition; such an exchange is particularly easy to imagine in the area of moral inquiry. On the other hand, if the ultimate criterion in scholarly disputation is reason, then publicly claiming prior authority for revelation is a breach of ethics and is rightly reprehended by secular scholars.

In any case, Marsden too casually assumes that Christians can always make a rational case for beliefs they regard as revealed. To begin with, it is doubtful that revelation can, even in principle, always be supported by reason. And even if it could, it is doubtful that in the heat of scholarly disputation it always would be. When Christians and non-Christians take part together in intellectual inquiry, revelation is almost bound to be there, just under the surface, as a potential source of trouble.

Marsden characterizes his outlook as Augustinian. Just as Christians should fill a responsible role in earthly affairs even though they are citizens in a transcendental community, the City of God, so they should be "full-fledged participants in the secular academic institutions of the day, yet be free of illusions about those institutions." But the truth may be more radically Augustinian than Marsden grants. For Augustine, given the tenacity of human wickedness, no earthly city can be expected to realize the form and spirit of the City of God. In like fashion, we probably should not expect the realm of scholarly discourse closely to resemble the kind of truth-seeking dialogue imagined by great religious thinkers such as Martin Buber, and by great secular thinkers such as John Stuart Mill.

Even so, as Augustine would advise, while living on earth we should direct our eyes sometimes toward heaven. The Outrageous Idea of Christian Scholarship is a heavenward glance. The scholarly community, secular and Christian alike, cannot but be the better for it.

Everything I Know About Writing I Learned in Sunday School

I am a storyteller whose themes are informed by faith, but I do not preach it. In fact, one reader mailed back one of my novels complaining that it was filthy; with a magic marker she had blacked out everything she found offensive. When I saw that the first casualty was the mere mention of Jack Daniels bourbon, I knew there was no need to look any further. I mailed her a refund check.

Such readers want literature to set a good example. They want writers to pretend that people do not drink, shack up or commit incest and blasphemy. They want us either to take sin out of our fictional world entirely or to punish it more thoroughly than real life does: to stop that tower of Siloam from falling on the innocent and to make sure that every Job gets new wealth and a just-as-good replacement family.

Flannery O’Connor wrote that a writer who believes that human beings have been "found by God to be worth dying for" must use shock to make her Christian faith visible to a reading audience that does not share it. "To the hard of hearing you shout," she wrote, "and for the almost blind you draw large and startling figures." Like mothers and kindergarten teachers, I find that whispering is also sometimes effective, and even with the volume turned down I hope my theology can be heard in my stories. Most church libraries contain more "shout" than "whisper" authors. The volume is turned up high in a Christian bestseller like Frank Peretti’s This Present Darkness.

Annie Dillard once warned that in serious American literature today, to be called "religious" would be a "death knell," and one reviewer said Frederick Buechner wrote from an "unfashionable center." When Publishers Weekly, in its religion section, talked about one of my novels and one of John Updike’s as crossover books by mainstream writers, I doubt that our editors at Knopf were pleased. On the other hand, some religious book publishers actively require their authors to produce what I consider bad prose: obvious, sentimental, contrived, cute and preachy.

Yet despite the cutesy guardian angels and New Age metaphysics that seem to dominate popular culture, I do hear in current serious fiction a whisper of that still, small voice for which our faith has taught us to listen. A recent novel I admire is Ron Hansen’s Atticus. Though reviewers have treated it as a literary detective story, all biblically literate people will recognize the parable of the prodigal son in this story of a contemporary father who searches for a son who once was thought to have died in Mexico but then is alive again. I also like a collection of essays by Thomas Lynch, a poet who is also a funeral director, called The Undertaking. One reviewer said irritably, "This book has little to offer the secular humanist."

When a British magazine recently listed what its editors considered the best young American novelists, it noted that writers were turning back to childhood, growing up and family relationships as subject matter—what some grumbling critics called "the Norman Rockwellization of the novel." Yet such life stories are the most apt to raise questions of ultimate meaning. I hear a "whispering hope" when the erudite Reynolds Price writes openly about his vision of Jesus during his cancer ordeal, or when thousands buy his translation of three of the Gospels; when books of interviews with writers—like Susan Ketchin’s The Christ-Haunted Landscape or Dale Brown’s Of Fiction and Faith—seep into the academy. Mary Gordon’s disclaimers finally give way to her admission about priests and nuns: "Nevertheless I can’t quite give up what they stand for." Cormac McCarthy writes about a blind amputee who is arguing with a street preacher. The beggar says, "Look at me, legless and everything, I reckon you think I ought to love God." The preacher answers, "Yeah, I reckon you ought. An old blind mess and a legless fool is a flower in the garden of God."

Many writers, wherever they may be located on their own pilgrimages, also admit how much the Good Book and the Good News still whisper to them. They are still haunted by the statement Goethe’s Faust struggles with: "In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with God and the Word was God." We children destined to be writers took that word literally before we knew a logos from a hole in the ground. In Genesis, the whole universe is called into existence by God’s imperative sentence, "Let there be light!" That moment when humans are created in his image must be the very evolutionary moment when vocal chords and brain were linked to produce language. The other million species on earth speak not a word.

The Bible, from the creation story onwards, is a cornucopia of language. Were the Ten Commandments not inscribed into a stone by God’s hot finger itself? Did not the burning bush speak, the moving finger write on a despot’s wall, the Tower of Babel confound language and, thus, communication, the Pentecost bring tongues of fire that translated love into each listener’s native language? Didn’t Philip climb into a chariot to teach the Ethiopian the meaning of what he was reading? And though the church, like its members, has sinned, did it not keep words alive through the Dark Ages and illuminate and make beautiful even the alphabet?

In this film and video age that emphasizes pictures, some people think that if Jesus had wanted us to take heaven seriously he would have brought along snapshots instead of telling stories. But those stories taught us the power and magic of words. The Bible taught us the uses of metaphor—"I am the vine, you are the branches." In Sunday school we absorbed the effectiveness of repetition and echo ("He maketh me to lie down in green pastures; he leadeth me beside the still waters").

The Bible differs from other sacred texts such as the Qu’ran and the Hindu Veda in the way its cosmic story becomes the all-too-personal story of us all. For us, too, there was a childhood garden before the snakes came, and we keep trying to get back to that innocent garden, as the hippies sang at Woodstock. Like the Israelites in Egypt, some of us have been enslaved. Listen to Africans singing "Go Down, Moses" so that Pharaoh in the plantation house can hear. Listen to the enslaved crack addict. Sometimes we travel the long way through the wilderness, stopping off at the shopping mall to worship a golden calf. Sometimes the tyrant we fight is named Nebuchadnezzar, sometimes Nero, sometimes Hitler. In every major city there are streets as wicked as some in Babylon.

Besides teaching us to appreciate language and to see the patterns of our lives, the Bible also taught us the techniques of fiction. Like the Iliad, it opens with a great booming omniscient voice: IN THE BEGINNING GOD CREATED THE HEAVEN AND THE EARTH! If the reader asks, "Who says so?" there’s no answer, just as we don’t know who booms out "Sing, muse, of the wrath of the son of Peleus Achilles" at the beginning of the Iliad. The great l9th-century novelists also write with the godlike authority conveyed by this omniscient point of view. But the Bible also teaches us how to use more limited and personal voices. In the 23rd Psalm, the point of view shifts from the first-person my shepherd leading me, to the third-person he and then all the way to the intimate second-person thou when things get tough in the valley of the shadow of death.

A pastor taught me all I know about characterization in a sermon with the text "Thou shalt love they neighbor as thyself." I yawned when he announced that text. Been there; heard that. But then the pastor said, "Bear in mind that you do not always love yourself. Sometimes you dislike yourself and are embarrassed by your own behavior; sometimes you may even hate yourself. Even then, what do you do? You make excuses. You put your own conduct into a favorable context. ‘I wouldn’t have said that if I hadn’t had this headache,’ you say. Or, ‘Well, actually, he asked for it!’ And so on."

The Golden Rule asks of writers the same thing it asks of all who are trying to love their neighbors: to put themselves inside others, inside their characters, even the villains; to know what excuses they would make for themselves; to imagine how it feels to be Shylock or Hamlet or Anna Karenina or Willy Loman. Writers love their characters as themselves. They remember, as one minister put it, that "we’re all related to God on his mother’s side."

The Bible doesn’t concentrate on one-sided, goody-goody characters. Career thieves get redeemed at the very last minute. God seems to love human beings, warts and all. A trickster like Jacob and an adulterer like King David are of great interest to Yahweh; doubting Thomas and cowardly Peter are important to Christ. Will Campbell once stated it bluntly: "We’re all bastards, but God loves us anyway."

The Bible also teaches the power of the concrete. The 5,000 eat not generic food but five loaves and two fishes. Jezebel’s death is not merely "unpleasant." Rather, dogs devour all of her body except her hands and feet. But the Bible not only teaches us the effectiveness of detail, it also teaches us the importance of omission. It leaves us with questions. How did Bathsheba feel when she got old? Why didn’t Lazarus tell us what death was like? Did Ishmael remember being cast out into the desert and curse the henpecked Abraham? Where was Delilah when she heard about the collapse of the Philistine temple? What effect did the crucifixion have on Pontius Pilate during the three remaining years of his rule? Like all serious literature, the Bible tells us that mystery remains a part of every story, every life.

Scripture even teaches irony, as when God sarcastically addresses Jonah, who is complaining about the collapse of his bean vine: "Should I not spare Nineveh, this great city, wherein are more than six score thousand persons that cannot discern between their right hand and their left hand, and also much cattle?"

And Sunday school gave us basic training in the value of allusion, at first by showing us how the New Testament refers to the Old, and then by getting us ready to see how the scripture still whispers through most of the literature of the Western world. As one man complained, "I can’t stand to read the Bible. It’s full of quotations."

Though I’m not an overtly devotional writer, I agree with Charlotte Brontë’s assessment of Christianity’s effect on her work—and, in my case, of the effect of old-fashioned Calvinism as taught in Associate Reformed Presbyterian Sunday schools: "It all went through me and through me, like wine through water, and altered the color of my mind."

Kierkegaard has reminded us that we are not all called to be apostles; we are not all fitted by nature to stand in the pulpit. But all Christians are called to do what they can for the faith. I hope a few of my stories are one more mustard seed, one more widow’s mite.

The Theological Use of Scripture in Process Hermeneutics

What follows are reflections on two marvelously rich and suggestive sets of essays, one dealing with "New Testament Interpretation from a Process Perspective’ (JAAR, March, 1979) and the other dealing with Old Testament Interpretation from the same perspective. It is important, I think, to set candidly into the record (what will be clearly enough revealed in what I say, anyway) that my standing in the process philosophy game is strictly amateur. Because of that, and of my rather more long-standing interest in how theologians argue in defense of their theological proposals, these reflections will deal far more with formal questions about the use of process categories and doctrines than with material questions about the cogency or truth of process theses. After reading these essays, I find myself with three major questions about "process hermeneutics." I will state them briefly now, and then develop each of them in turn.

One: What makes interpretation of a Biblical text an exercise in process hermeneutics -- that is, is it the application of process theory of interpretation, or that it involves the use of process categories?

Two: These essays seem ordered to at least two quite different ends. Is "process hermeneutics" an equivocal notion, naming quite different enterprises?

Three: If process hermeneutics is important to process theology in order to make clear its rootage in Scripture, is process hermeneutics able to provide any guidance to what is normative in Biblical texts?

It will be useful at the outset to distinguish two matters that the very title of this response tends confusingly to run together, viz., (1) "Hermeneutics," in particular hermeneutics as shaped by commitments to the conceptuality and doctrines of process philosophy, and (2) the use of Scripture-as-interpreted in the course of doing theology. Questions about hermeneutics, I take it, are questions about what is involved in understanding, especially in understanding Biblical texts, questions often answered by developing a theory about understanding. Questions about the use of Scripture in theology are questions about how the texts, once they have been understood, are to be brought to bear on the making of (Christian) theological proposals. Answers to the first set of questions do not necessarily answer or entail answers to the second set; nor do answers to the second set answer or entail answers to the first. They seem to be logically separate sets of questions. With regard to what these essays say and do concerning hermeneutics, it will focus the discussion to ask two diagnostic questions: (a) What does a process perspective tend to lead one to concentrate on in the Biblical texts? What about the texts is taken to be of central importance? (b) What kind of logical force is ascribed to Biblical texts insofar as they are important for theology? Are they taken to have the force of descriptive reports, or the force of injunctions, the force of emotive expressions, or some other kind of force? And secondly, with regard to what these essays say and do concerning the bearing of Scripture thus construed on doing theology, it will focus the discussion to ask two further questions: (a) How are Biblical texts brought to bear on the making of theological proposals? (b) Why focus on the aspect of the Biblical texts that is focused on? What is it about Scripture-as-construed that makes it important to attend to in this way?

I. Hermeneutics from a Process Perspective

(a) What does a "process perspective" tend to lead one to concentrate on in the Biblical texts?

One of the claims made on behalf of a process hermeneutics is that it can invite and empower the interpreter to be equally attentive to all aspects of Biblical texts. That is, in contrast to various phenomenological hermeneutics (notably, in the Bultmannian tradition) which systematically constrain the interpreter to attend only to that in Scripture ("kerygmatic" statements) which can be shown to be an expression of certain modes of subjectivity (e.g., "faith") and not to that in Scripture which seems to describe the cosmic context of human life (except insofar as such descriptions can be shown to be culturally conditioned, archaic and misleading expressions of modes of subjectivity), process hermeneutics leads one to attend to both. And in contrast to structural hermeneutics that constrain the interpreter to attend only to formal binary patterns in the text and not to the relation between the text and its author’s intent or to the relation between the text and its readers, process hermeneutics leads one to attend to any or all of the above. This inclusiveness is exhibited everywhere in these essays.

This raises my first critical question: Is this inclusiveness of other methods of interpretation in the actual practice of interpreting text really rooted in a hermeneutics properly so called, or is this hospitality to any and all disciplined methods of interpretation simply an ad hoc collection of exegetical tools? That is, is the hermeneutical pluralism reflected in these essays rooted in a distinctive process theory of meaning or, perhaps, to put it less misleadingly, a process theory of interpretation that systematically synthesizes the central theses of alternative (and perhaps more one-sided) hermeneutics? The issue is not whether there is a process theory of interpretation. If nothing else, the fact that there are published efforts to lay out a process theory of meaning is evidence that there is such a thing. The question is whether the pluralism of methods of interpretation in these essays claiming to exhibit a process perspective is in fact rooted in such a theory. If it is, then these essays can fairly be said to exhibit that a process theory of interpretation can in fact be applied (and so is not so abstract or vague as to turn out to be vacuous when applied to cases) and that it is fruitful when it is applied. On the other hand, if the pluralism is simply an ad hoc collection of exegetical tools, then, for all their several excellencies, these essays do not show much of anything about whether there is a useable process hermeneutics. My uncertainty about how to answer this question can partly be brought out by turning to the second question.

(b) In these essays, what kind of logical force is ascribed to Biblical texts insofar as they are important for theology?

There seem to be two quite different kinds of answers given to this question in these essays.

One answer takes Biblical texts to function as "lures for feeling." This is explained and warranted by Whitehead’s doctrine of "propositions." In their theoretical essays in JAAR Beardslee and Woodbridge sketch the theory. The theory is relied on explicitly in Beardslee’s and Pregeant’s exegetical essays in the same volume, and it seems to me it is implicitly at work in Coats’s essay in the OT collection. As I understand it, the relevant features of a "proposition" are these: A "proposition" is a "concrete possibility ; it is abstracted from some objective event in the actual world; it is proposed as a possibility that an entity may want to consider for itself in a future moment in its process of self-creation; it is apprehended by the entity in "feeling" and so is preconceptual and largely preconsciously apprehended; it stands in a complex of relationships with other "propositions," and the set of propositions presupposes a systematic universe; its "interest" (as "lure") is more important than its "truth." Given all this, one knows that every Biblical text expresses a proposition, indeed may express several propositions. That is, Biblical texts, even when they might plausibly be said straightforwardly to be describing some objective event or state of affairs, are to be construed as having he force of proposing deal possibilities. A conscious conceptual account of these possibilities would include an account of the actual objective "systematic universe" they presuppose. But that account of the actual universe would somehow be derived from the "possibilities" expressed by the text and not from the text directly -- for even if the text seemed on the face of it to be offering a description of the universe, that description is not what is important or interesting about it; rather "propositions" or ideal possibilities it expresses is what is important about it.

In the essays by Beardslee, Pregeant, and Coats, the various exegetical methods employed do seem to be governed by a hermeneutical theory central to which is the process doctrine of "propositions." Here there does seem to be evidence that there is a process theory of interpretation that can be fruitfully applied to the interpretation of texts. These same essays do go on to offer conscious conceptual accounts of some of the possibilities presented by the texts they study, construing the texts as expressions of "propositions." The accounts are explicitly cast in terms of process categories. But note: What makes them exercises in applied process hermeneutics is not that they explicitly use process categories to describe the "propositions" expressed by the text and to describe the systematic universe presupposed by those propositions, but rather what makes them exegetical studies that exhibit the applicability and fruitfulness of process hermeneutics is that they more or less implicitly rely on a process theory about understanding, central to which is the doctrine of "propositions."

Some of the essays, however, seem to ascribe a quite different kind of logical force to the texts they examine. Certainly in Janzen’s essay, probably in Weeden’s (cf. pp. 114-17), and possibly in parts of Beardlee’s exegetical essay (cf. p. 68f.), the texts studied seem to be taken as having the force of straightforward descriptions, even ontological descriptions, of actualities (in contrast to ideal possibilities). Collins quite rightly points out (1.13) that Janzen’s exegesis presumes that Hosea 11 gives metaphysical information about God. Similarly, Weeden sometimes, and perhaps even Beardslee sometimes, seem to presume that NT texts give metaphysical information about the Kingdom of God. In these essays the exegetical methods are as plural as are those employed in other essays. But the judgment that the texts are to be construed to have the force of giving (metaphysical?) information does not itself seem to be warranted by any theory of interpretation, process or otherwise. The process perspective" comes into play at quite another point. It comes into play as process categories are used to provide an alternative, presumably more sophisticated and precise, statement of the "same" metaphysical descriptions. This second way of construing the force of Biblical texts, viz., as giving descriptions of actualities, seems part of a quite different enterprise than the first construal of the force of Biblical texts (viz., as expressing "propositions" that are "lures for feeling"). I suggest that it really is not "hermeneutics" at all, neither "process" hermeneutics nor any other, although it nonetheless is certainly a kind of theology, even a kind of "Biblical theology." To exhibit that, it is necessary to turn from hermeneutics to the topic of the uses of Scripture in theology once the Scripture is interpreted.

II. Uses of Scripture in a "Process Perspective"

(a) In these essays how are Biblical texts brought to bear on the making of theological proposals? It seems to me that Biblical texts are put to two quite different uses in these texts. It is as though there are two quite different claims that are being defended.

  1. Some of the essays seem designed to argue in defense of some claim such as this: Such-and-such a theological tenet is a truly Biblical tenet, that is, is part of the doctrinal theology of a Biblical writing. Thus: (Beardslee)

 

 

Pages 184 to 185:

Text (Data) shows that Tenet in Biblical

Theology (Conclusion)

Gospel sayings about finding The theology of this text

and losing life construed includes a tenet in which

as expressing both a these two are held up

"proposition" re breaking up together in a framework

continuity of my existence of "rightness" or

"creativity"

and
"proposition" re a context creativity

giving meaning to my response

of breaking continuity

if: one can rely on the doctrine of "propositions as lures for warrant for the move, as backed by Whitehead’s entire theory of perception.

Or: (Coats)

Text (Data) shows that Tenet in Biblical

Theology (Conclusion)

Balaam story combines a Obedience is life-in-

legend re Balaam as saint blessing in which the

and a fable re Balaam as saint remains free to

sinner obey or not; disobedi-

ence is life-in-curse

in which the sinner

is (relatively) unfree

to obey.

if: one can rely on the doctrine of "God as lure" for warrant for the move as backed by Whitehead’s process cosmology. (So too, so far as formal matters go, in Pregeant’s essay on Romans 2:6;13).

In these arguments the move from data consisting of Biblical texts construed in a certain way to conclusions concerning what truly is a tenet in some Biblical theology is warranted by process hermeneutics, strictly understood, i.e., a process theory of understanding.

(2) Some of the essays seem designed to defend a quite different kind of claim. It is some such claim as this: Such-and-such a doctrine in process theology is truly in accord with tenets of some Biblical theology. Thus: (Janzen)

Process Doctrine (Data) shows that (Conclusion)

Without losing ontological Process doctrine of

identity, God undergoes God is compatible

growth in God’s knowledge and with a Biblical

therewith change in God’s description of God

"being." undergoing "existen-

tial" development

via changing God’s mind.

if: one can rely on an interpretation of Hosea 11 as a description of God’s "growing" through asking Godself an existentially decisive question, backed by (Janzen’s) exegetical analyses and arguments.( P. 185.)

Note the difference: The first kind of argument mounted under the banner of process hermeneutics supports a claim that such-and-such a theological tenet is authentically a tenet of "Biblical theology" in the sense of being a statement of what the text in its present complexly layered and polysemous form says on a theological topic. It is a hermeneutical remark resting for its warrant and the warrant’s backing on a distinctively process doctrine of interpretation.

By contrast the second kind of argument mounted under the banner of process hermeneutics supports a claim that such-and-such a tenet of process theology is "Biblical theology" in the sense of being compatible with what some Biblical texts say on a theological topic. This is "Biblical theology" in quite a different sense of the term. It is not itself a hermeneutical remark, process or otherwise, about Biblical texts.

The way in which it might be part of "process hermeneutics" in a derivative sense of the term, can be shown by considering how these two sorts of argument might be related to each other. The second sort of argument, designed to show that certain process doctrines are compatible with certain Biblical texts, was warranted by interpretations of certain Biblical texts that were hacked by exegetical studies. It is always possible for someone to challenge the bearing of that backing (exegetical studies, say of Hosea 11) or the warrant it is alleged to back (a given overall interpretation of Hosea 11, say). In that case, a second argument would need to be mounted to show that the exegesis really supports the generalizations made about what the text says. But that is precisely what the first sort of argument does! The first sort of argument is designed to show that what functions as warrant in the second sort of argument is indeed the conclusion one should come to from certain data that function as backing for the warrant in the second sort of argument. In short, the first sort of argument is supportive of the second. If the first sort of argument itself is warranted by the doctrine of "propositions" backed by Whitehead’s theory of perception -- if, that is, the first sort of argument itself is warranted by process hermeneutics, and then it in turn is used to support a second sort of argument about the compatibility of various process tenets with tenets of Biblical theology -- then in a derivative sense of the term the second argument too is an exercise in "process hermeneutics." But only, it must be stressed again, if it relies on a process theory of interpretation to show that its backing does indeed support its warrant (and that is precisely what our instance of this second sort of argument -- Janzen’s discussion of Hosea 11 -- does not do and does not seem to need to do; and perhaps so too Weeden’s argument).

Note how very modest is the achievement of this structure of argument. At most it demonstrates that certain process doctrines are compatible with certain alleged tenets of the theology of some Biblical writings. It does not tend to establish the truth of the process doctrines; Collins surely is correct in saying that their truth would have to be demonstrated on their own terms and not in this way. It does not show that process theological doctrines are somehow more compatible or more broadly compatible with some or all of the tenets of some or all identifiable Biblical theologies than are some alternative (and rival?) theological positions (say, Tillichian, Rahnerian, paleo-Thomistic----to confine the list to positions couched in ontological conceptualities). Nor does it tend to demonstrate the superiority of a process hermeneutics, i.e., a process theory of interpretation. It merely shows that given process theological doctrines are indeed compatible with certain tenets in some Biblical theology.

The (in my view) modest outcome of all this labor prompts me to ask the final, and in some ways most troubling, question in this section: If one is concerned to interpret Biblical texts, why bother with process doctrines and conceptuality? Why should exegetical Davids encumber themselves with philosophical Sauls’ armor?

The obverse of that question needs to be asked too, of course. Why should process theologians concern themselves with the Bible? In their Introduction to the JAAR collection of essays, Cobb, Lull, and Woodbridge say that "Any form of systematic theology is fundamentally truncated where its rootage in Scripture is not clear and strong" (p. 25). Why so -- from a process perspective? That leads into our fourth question.

(b) What is it about Scripture-as-interpreted that makes it important to attend to in this way? I am aware I am making some large assumptions here, but I venture the guess that the reason a systematic theology is truncated when its rootage in Scripture is not clear has something to do with the question of what is normative for a Christian theology. I use the term "normative" deliberately, to avoid the enormous conceptual confusions and red-herrings attendant to, say, "revelation." So my question is: Is there a distinctively process doctrine about how and why Scripture is related to and normative for Christian theology that would explain why it is important to attend to Scripture in these ways?

Woodbridge points out that "Hermeneutics has been founded on the distinction between what the text meant and what it now means. All too often this temporal and epistemological distance has been viewed as a negative factor to be overcome" (p. 124). He goes onto note that the traditional way to "overcome" this negative factor was to try to establish what the text meant at or near the time of its composition and treat that as a kind of "essence" of the text’s meaning which thereafter is taken as the retrospective norm by which all proposals of what the text might mean now are to be assessed. This generates the assumption -- which I take to be very misleading -- that contemporary theological proposals ought somehow to be translations of the "meant" into contemporary idiom -- translations that convey over the ugly ditch of long history the same self-identical "meaning." That is objectionable on at least two grounds. It is demonstrably false historically: There is constant material change through the history of doctrine. Newer formulations change and do not simply "translate" the "old" meanings. And the old formulations, when used in later times and contexts, "mean" different things. And it is a view objectionable on religious grounds. It suppresses the freedom of the Spirit to bring new truth out of the texts: it forbids the religiously exciting possibility that what the text might come to mean could be more important than what it has meant.

In these essays process philosophy is employed to cope with this problem in two ways. In some of the essays, process philosophy seems to be commended on the grounds that its categories do better what the categories recommended by alternative hermeneutics (notably, Bultmann’s demythologizing by way of "existential interpretation") do poorly. I submit that that is a very dangerous move for process hermeneuticians to make because it threatens self-contradiction. It seems to me that almost all of the alternative hermeneutics propose to do precisely what we have agreed cannot and ought not to be done: provide a conceptuality into which to translate what the texts originally meant in such a way as to preserve that self-same essence of meaning but render it more intelligible today. It would be self-contradictory to press process categories into service to do better a task that process hermeneutics itself sees is misguided from the outset!

In a few of the essays process philosophy is used to cope with the meant/ means problem in quite a different way. Cobb sketches a process theory about historical change and historical movement, grounded in Whitehead’s notion of "living historic routes." He argues that this theory allows one to make all the points that can be made about theological changes through history by using Robinson s notion of "trajectories," but without its postulation of some "essence" of meaning that perdures through the change. And Richards sketches an application of this theory in the interpretation of Lev. 27:1-8. This theory has clear systematic connections to the doctrine of propositions as "lures for feeling" which are linked with possibilities as "a line to creative emergence in the transcendent future." That is, it clearly is integral to a process theory of interpretation, a process hermeneutics in the strict sense of the term. I find it a very suggestive and rich way to describe the process of historical change from "meant" to "means."

My question is whether the theory about the process of historical change that seems to be ingredient in process hermeneutics can also serve as a theory about what is normative for Christian theology. I can only say that I do not yet grasp its normative import. The issue is crucial. For if a process theory of interpretation does not include a theoretical basis for judgments about what is normative (in this case for theology) in the texts being interpreted, then it is entirely unclear how a process hermeneutics is going to head off the truncation of theology whose roots in Scripture are not clear. For the roots cannot be simply genetic in the historical order; they need to be normative in the logical order.

To summarize: I find myself with three major questions after reading these two sets of essays.

One: What makes a mode of interpretation of texts an exercise in precisely process hermeneutics -- that it is the application of some distinctively process theory of interpretation, or the use of a characteristically process conceptuality to formulate a proposal about the "meaning" of a text?

Two: It seems that these exercises in process hermeneutics are done as exercises in Biblical theology; but it is "Biblical theology" in two quite different senses of the term (although they could be interrelated).

Three: If these essays are written to deepen process theology as a mode of systematic theology on the supposition that a theology is truncated if its rootage in Scripture is not clear, then it is crucial to be clear -- in ways in which these essays do not make it clear -- how process hermeneutics warrants any judgments about what is normative for Christian theology.

The Difference Jesus Makes

Just as he turned eight, a boy I will call Sam became totally paralyzed and spent three months on a respirator in a coma. The rest of the year he spent in a children’s rehabilitation hospital. He emerged with minor brain damage, learning disabilities, complex emotional problems and severe behavioral problems.

Under the strain of trying to cope with Sam, the family began to disintegrate. His mother suffered a psychotic break and was briefly hospitalized. At first when she returned home she was very depressed. Because neither the public school system nor his family could manage him, when he was 12 Sam was placed in the first of a series of residential schools that combined academics with programs of behavior modification.

Several weeks after Sam’s mother returned home from the hospital her depression lifted enough that she felt she could take a part-time secretarial job. She continued in the care of a very able psychiatrist and seemed to be managing increasingly well. Then she killed herself.

Twelve-year-old Sam was certain that his mother had committed suicide because she was upset by his bad behavior that, he believed, had caused him to be sent away to school. He began acting out in dangerous ways, was deemed suicidal himself and was placed in a children’s psychiatric hospital. He lived there, attending the hospital school and fortunately being helped by a skillful therapist, until he was 15. The mother’s suicide, of course, was also deeply traumatic, if in less dramatic ways, for Sam’s two sisters and his father.

What earthly difference could Jesus make to this particular situation? There are at least three familiar ways, or models, to imagine the difference Jesus in his passion can make for terrible situations like that of Sam and his family: 1) evil as punishment; 2) perfection through suffering; 3) Jesus as the fellow sufferer who understands. Each of these models is finally, however, unhelpful in imagining how Jesus could redeem the situation in which Sam’s family finds itself.

Evil as punishment. This traditional view is widespread in popular Christianity, although I am hard-pressed to name one major Christian thinker who defends it in this form. It reflects a deeply rooted primal response that many people have to experiences of evil, whether their own experiences or those of others: Maybe, so the thinking goes, I am (or they are) being punished for something.

This perspective is older than Job and his friends. It imagines evil undergone as punishment for misbehavior according to an unfailing rule by which the degree of punishment is proportionate to the seriousness of the misbehavior.

If the evil we experience is imagined as punishment for our sin, then the evil that Jesus undergoes in his passion must also be imagined as punishment. However, what Jesus undergoes cannot be imagined as punishment for Jesus’ own sin, for he is held to be sinless. If Jesus’ passion must be imagined as punishment for sin and yet he is himself sinless, whose sin can it be that he is punished for if not ours?

In this way of imagining the redemptive difference Jesus makes, he takes on the punishment that our sins have deserved. Instead of us, he undergoes the full extent of that punishment. Whatever evil does befall is nowhere near proportionate to the magnitude of our sins. Punishment proportionate to our misbehavior would be unimaginably greater than anything any of us in fact suffers. That our suffering is not more severe is because Jesus suffered what he did in his passion for us. The evil that Jesus undergoes redeems us from the full punishment our sins deserve. It also gives meaning to the evil we do suffer by showing it to be our way of participating in what Jesus suffers. Thus, we can say that Jesus’ passion redeems us, not only from our sin but also from the evil we undergo, or at any rate from its meaninglessness.

Clearly, this way of imagining redemption of the evil that Sam’s family has experienced would erase the distinction between the redemption of evil the family undergoes and the redemption of the sin they commit. In this picture redemption of evil follows from and depends upon redemption of the sin for which the evil was the punishment.

This understanding is entirely unhelpful not just in the case of Sam and his family but in every case of horrific evil undergone by anyone. What happened to Sam’s sisters and parents was largely the result of what happened to Sam. It is impossible to imagine that seven-year-old Sam had committed any sins of such seriousness that what happened to him and his family was proportionate punishment. It is even harder to imagine that what happened to Sam and his family was not terrible enough to count as "proportionate" punishment, so that Jesus’ passion can and must supplement it to redeem them from additional punishment. This way of imagining the redemptive difference that Jesus can make simply does not fit them. It is unhelpful to their case to try to imagine how Jesus in his passion can redeem the evil that befell them merely by redeeming the sin that they, and Sam in particular, had committed.

Furthermore, the Jesus whose redemptive difference is imagined in this tradition is reported to have explicitly rejected its basic image. In Luke, for example, Jesus says: "Do you think that because these Galileans suffered in this way they were worse sinners than all other Galileans? No, I tell you; but unless you repent, you will all perish as they did. Or those eighteen who were killed when the tower of Siloam fell on them -- do you think they were worse offenders than all the others living in Jerusalem? No, I tell you; but unless you repent, you will all perish just as they did" (13:2-5 NRSV).

Here Jesus may even be challenging the very notion that sin can be quantified and compared as greater or lesser. In challenging the quantifiability of sin and the image of evils suffered as punishment proportionate to sins done, Luke’s Jesus challenges this entire way of imagining the redemptive difference that Jesus can make in his passion.

Perfection through suffering. There is a clearer New Testament basis for a second traditional way of imagining the difference Jesus can make for awful situations like those that Sam’s family underwent, although I think it also is finally unhelpful. This way of imagining the difference Jesus can make goes as follows: In his passion Jesus is the exemplar for Sam and his family of why God sends suffering. The world is an arena of soul-making. Human beings are distorted, impure, imperfect. God sends suffering as part of the process of our redemption from spiritual and moral imperfection, and it is particularly through suffering that human souls are purified and made perfect. The proof text for this has been Hebrews 2:10: "For it is fitting that he, for whom and by whom all things exist, in bringing many . . . to glory, should make the pioneer of their salvation [Jesus] perfect through suffering."

According to this way of imagining redemption, Jesus as pioneer of salvation (read "redemption") is the example of someone becoming perfect through suffering. He shows Sam and his family the point of accepting all that befell them as God’s gift. And he shows them how to go through such suffering faithfully.

This tradition has a long history in Christian thought and piety. It received a powerful new lease on life in 20th-century Christian circles through C. S. Lewis’s widely influential early book The Problem of Pain, especially in its first edition. Lewis’s thesis comes through in a few brief quotations: "We cannot know … that we are acting at all for God’s sake, unless the material of the action is contrary to our inclinations, or (in other words) painful." And: "The redemptive effect of suffering lies chiefly in its tendency to reduce the rebel will."

There is something right about this way of imagining redemption. There is a "self" that needs to he "abdicated." It is the self that Jesus has in mind in saying in Matthew 10:39: "Those who find their life will lose it, and those who lose their life for my sake will find it."

It is important that we be as clear as possible about just what or who that self is. Much of the time for a few of us, and perhaps a little of the time for all of us, the self that we need to lose really is a "rebel" self that refuses to commit itself to live with God and neighbor in love and insists on reorganizing the cosmos as though the self were God.

However, the notion that human beings are inherently titanic figures storming against God is almost comically overdrawn. Most of the time most of us are far too confused and indecisive about what we most want, too passive and self-protective, to fit such a description. Most of us don’t want to storm God, let alone be God; we want to be inconspicuous enough to keep out of God’s way.

More often the self that needs to be abdicated is an insular self that is complacently oblivious of the particular reality of other creatures. It is not that it denies that there are realities other than itself. It is aware that there is that which is "other" to itself, including God, but it lacks interest in the other realities for themselves. Lacking interest, it fails to attend to the concrete particularity of each "other" as a reality in its own right which is independent of the self. Like the first version of the self that must be abdicated, this one is also profoundly self-centered. Its self-centeredness, however, is not a willful challenge to God’s primacy, an aggressive seeking to substitute itself for God, but is rather mindlessly passive, inattentive to other realities and oblivious of the way in which in their particular actualities they are independent of the self.

Here lies what is right about this traditional way of imagining the redemptive difference Jesus can make in his suffering and death: Suffering does accompany the deep change in the pattern of our lives that comes with redemption. Furthermore, the suffering caused by horrendous events, events in which we "hit bottom," can be the occasion for beginning to learn how to attend to others with the attention that is "perfect love."

This point must be made carefully, however. It is one thing to say that suffering regularly accompanies the changes in our lives which are brought by redemption and to note that deep suffering is sometimes the occasion for starting to learn to attend to others in their particularities and for their own sakes. It is quite another thing to say that suffering as such is inherently redemptive. That is simply not true; so it cannot be true that Jesus’ passion is an example of the redemptive power of suffering as such.

Suffering as such does not necessarily have the power to perfect lives, Suffering can also disintegrate people and corrode their relationships. What befell Sam’s family did just that to Sam, to his mother and to the family itself. So, as far as Sam and his family are concerned, we must set aside as unhelpful the story of Jesus’ passion as the exemplar of redemption-as-perfection-through-suffering.

The fellow sufferer who understands. There is a I distinctly modern way of imagining the redemptive difference Jesus can make in his passion, and variations of it are omnipresent in late-20th-century, pastorally enlightened, empathic Christian talk. It is imagined this way: In Jesus’ passion God is present among us in the midst of our suffering as -- in Alfred North Whitehead’s fatuous phrase – "the fellow sufferer who understands."

Although this argument also is ultimately unhelpful in imagining what difference Jesus could make in his passion, there is something right about it too. It is important to know that someone understands what we are going through. If God’s relating to Jesus and Jesus’ relating to God are both essential to Jesus’ personal identity, then in Jesus’ passion God is in some way participating in what Sam and his family undergo. God is in solidarity with them in their suffering. So it can be affirmed to Sam and his family: God does understand what you are going through; God is going through it with you.

All the same, left at that there is something profoundly inadequate about this way of imagining redemption. As David Tracy remarked, characterizing God as the fellow sufferer who understands risks making God in the image of an Edwardian gentleman who, stereotypically. is benevolent in a generalized sort of way. with a sensibility so exquisitely refined that he registers the distress of each fellow creature -- he is well intentioned but terminally ineffectual.

If "the fellow sufferer who understands" is the best way to imagine Jesus’ redemptive effect in his passion, then Sam and his family would be fully justified in saying to the God who works in and through what Jesus does and undergoes, "Sir, we really appreciate your concern and your understanding. It does strengthen us to survive. But couldn’t you help change things a little?"

The image of the fellow sufferer can be revised in a helpful way. One difference that the afflicted and crucified Jesus can make for Sam and his family is to free them from the power that distorts their personal identities in a living bondage. Whether or not one’s identity is distorted by such bondage turns, I suggest, on how one answers the question, ‘What makes life worth living?" Correlatively, the way Jesus’ passion can make a difference turns on the same question.

Perhaps most of us answer that question as follows: A life that has a certain dignity which commands respect is a life worth living, and this respect derives from the quality of things we do. In particular, perhaps most of us live trusting -- it is a kind of faith -- that our lives will have value and so be worth living if we do what a responsible citizen, a productive member of society, a provident parent, a loyal friend, a decent person would do in our circumstances and social roles.

Every human society teaches its members a set of such roles, and it also teaches the rules by which to assess the degree of excellence with which those roles are filled. The closer we come to satisfying the rules, the more excellent our performance of the roles we take on~ the more excellent our performance of the roles, the more clearly valuable our lives; the more valuable our lives, the more firmly grounded our sense that the time and space we take up living is justified and that this life is worth living. I am not saying this is a policy that people adopt explicitly and intentionally. Rather, I am talking about a pattern and dynamic that people’s lives show whether they are conscious of it or not. It is a pattern that many cultures, and ours in particular, reinforce from earliest childhood onward.

What I am describing is the idea of living our lives trusting that they are justified by works that satisfy some law. When the apostle Paul inveighed against justification by works of the law, the law he had in mind was quite specifically Torah. Reiterating the polemic, the Reformers understood the law more broadly as moral law, whatever its source and grounding. In modern Protestant theology the law has been understood even more broadly as any social convention that serves as a criterion of excellent performance.

According to each of these variations on the theme, living in trust that our lives are justified by what we do in accord with standards of excellence lies at the very heart of sin. What we do sinfully need not even be immoral; even if what we do is morally good, it is sin if we trust the doing of it to show that our lives are worth living.

It was Paul’s point that sin -- that is, trusting works done in accord with a law to justify our lives -- will lead only to a living death. If we define who we are by the excellence of what we do, as measured by a law, our life is in bondage to that law. But, Paul insisted, the law cannot give life because trying to satisfy it perfectly is a never-ending project. If the worth-whileness of one’s life depends on completing the project, life is impossible; only failed life, only living death, is possible.

A second way in which people at least implicitly answer for themselves the question, "What makes life worth living?" also values respect. In this case, people suppose that what shows that life is worth living is that something about them commands respect.

One way to gain that respect -- ~ though frequently derided nowadays -- is to define oneself above all as a victim. One lives on the supposition that what justifies the time and space one takes up living is the respect one commands simply because one has been victimized by some unspeakable evil. This pattern need not be adopted with sell-conscious intent; what matters is the pattern to the way people live, whether they are aware of the pattern or not.

Defining oneself as worthy of respect because of ones victimization is sometimes rightly derided because it seems to be a way to wallow in self-pity, to manipulate other people’s pity, and to avoid taking responsibility for oneself. Nonetheless, people do adopt this pattern of life because, however briefly, it can evoke the respect that reassures them that their lives are worth living.

Away at school, separated from his family, Sam learned that he could win sympathy and present himself as deserving his classmates’ respect and even awe by telling his story as one not only of unique victimization by a frightening disease, but even more as a unique story of being abandoned as a result of his mother’s suicide. Sam was living on the supposition that what made his life worth living was the respect owed him because of the uniquely terrible things that had made him their victim.

There is another general way in which people seek to show that because their lives command respect their lives are worth living. It shares with the first version only the fact that the people who adopt it have undergone terrible events. In this case, however, what commands respect is not that persons have been victimized, but rather the horrific events themselves. Horrific events evoke a terrified awe in those who watch or hear about them. Those who pass through such events then command a certain respect. Their persistence through those events and their sheer presence now are in themselves mute testimony to just how terrifyingly horrendous the contexts of our lives can in fact become. That testimony receives deep, inarticulate respect.

Consider, for example, the respect accorded Holocaust survivors. It is respect evoked not by victimization, but by survival. Here too the pattern need not be adopted with self-conscious intent. What matters is the pattern to the way people live, whether they are aware of the pattern or not.

Soon enough both Sam and his father were living in different variations of just that pattern. It may be that Sam’s sisters did also; however, since I know this story chiefly from the perspective of Sam and his father I can comment only on them. Separated from his family, entering adolescence and unskilled in relating to his peers, Sam learned to define his identity in terms of the terrible things that had happened to him. He lived his life as though his identity were simply that of the kid who had that terrible disease, who has that scary tracheotomy scar on his throat, whose mother killed herself. That identity commanded not just pity, but a measure of respect that helped counterbalance the animus he regularly generated by his obnoxious behavior.

For his part, Sam’s father, overwhelmed by the responsibilities of being a single parent and his apparently unlimited liability in the face of Sam’s seemingly interminable dependence on him, lived his life as though his identity were simply that of the man whose son has an appalling medical history, whose wife has committed suicide, who alone is responsible for caring for his almost unmanageable son for the rest of his life.

On plenty of occasions both of their personal identities were steeped in self-pity, although it would be too simple to say that Sam and his father defined themselves merely as victims. They certainly did in part, but their identities were also defined as survivors of horrific situations. The sheer horror of those situations commanded respect. Both Sam and his father lived on the tacit supposition that that respect underwrote the worth of their lives. This pattern in their lives was another way to justify the time and space they took up living.

This pattern is not to be confused with the pattern of justifying life by the quality of its achievements. Strictly speaking, the pattern of Sam’s life and his father’s is only analogous to the pattern of lives seeking justification by works. Granted, to survive a terrible situation is to do something, to perform some sort of work. However, what is at issue here is not bad things done but bad things undergone, not sin but evil. More exactly, the issue is not the sinful living death of a life of self-justification by works that accord with a standard of excellence, but rather the distortion of personal identity by its bondage to evil endured. Accordingly, our question is not "What difference can Jesus make in regard to their living death in sin committed?" but "What difference can Jesus make in regard to their identities distorted by evil undergone?"

A problem with defining personal identity in the way Sam and his father do is that it distorts one’s identity by binding it to horrible situations in the past. The problem lies not so much with the horror as with the pastness. If what justifies one’s life and shows that it is indeed worth living is surviving a set of horrendous events, then everything that happens later and everything one does later must be interpreted and shaped by reference to those past events. One’s future is defined by, and so is in bondage to, an event in the past.

So, for example: As Sam slowly becomes more capable of managing his owi~ affairs, he still cannot allow himself to live more autonomously because of who he is. He has defined his identity as that of one made dependent on others by his disabilities. When possibilities arise that could expand the range of his life, he leaves them unexplored because they don’t fit his definition of who he is. When he gets part-time jobs for which he longs, he sooner or later sabotages himself by faking seizures. Although he wants to work the way everybody else does, and looks forward to the little bit of extra income it brings in, working does not fit his definition of himself as a person disabled by horrendous events. After a certain number of seizure episodes, his employers always let him go.

Sam shows some artistic talent. But when he is admitted to the school system’s adult education art class, he fakes seizures and is asked not to enroll again. He lives as though he must keep his self-definition as a survivor of horrendous events continually in the public eye. His old identity must not be eclipsed by the appearance of a new identity as "ordinary worker" or "talented young adult." As he matures in his ability to make and keep friends Sam does not form a social network for himself, for it is essential to his identity that he is one who has lost family. "Lacking a support system" is part of his identity.

So too with Sam’s father. Even when in young adulthood Sam’s life is supported and structured by a network of social agencies, his father continues to organize his own life in such a way that everything else is arranged around the edges of his perceived responsibility for Sam. Being endlessly responsible for Sam defines who he is.

Neither Sam nor his father could imagine or allow any new joyful event, any new creative accomplishment, any new friendship to be more definitive of who he is than the terrible events to which his identity has been bound by definition. Theirs are distorted identities, frozen in time and closed to growth.

The difference that Jesus in his passion can make to Sam’s and his father’s distorted personal identities can indeed be imagined in terms of "the fellow sufferer" if we follow the Evangelists’ description of Jesus’ personal identity. It is important to stress that God’s fellow suffering in, through and under Jesus’ passion is not just God’s way of understanding what we go through. It is God’s own odd way of going about loving us, God’s concrete act of loving us in the midst of the most terrible circumstances we can go through. It is just that love that can redeem personal identities like Sam’s and his father’s from their distorting bondage to past events, for it is God’s love for them that grounds the worth of their lives. Neither the excellence of what they do as measured by some set of rules nor their awesome survival of horrifying events can do that. It is only God’s concrete act of loving them in the midst of the most appalling situations that makes their lives worth living. That alone can justify the time, space and resources they take up in living.

God loving them in Jesus’ passion is the most embracing context of their lives. That love, not the horrors they have been through, is the context that defines who they are. That context is defined not by any past, but only by God’s free and loving creativity now. Sam’s and his father’s identities are opened to the future and freed from bondage to the past when they are defined by that love now.

They have only to live into that context for their identities to be redeemed from imprisonment to the horrendous events they have undergone. They have only to live in trust that it is God loving them in Jesus’ passion that makes their lives worth living. Living in that trust, living into the embracing context of that love, will take time. It is not the trusting that will redeem them from the distortion of their personal identities. It is God loving them that will do that.

The apostle Paul’s words to the Philippians are the word of God to Sam’s family and to everyone living in a horrific situation in its concrete particularity, reminding them that it is God who is at work in them: "Work out your own salvation with fear and trembling, for it is God who is at work in you, enabling you both to will and to work for his good pleasure."

What’s Theological About a Theological School?

A school is "theological," I suggest, to the extent that everything done in its name has one overarching goal: more clearly to understand God and to understand everything in relation to God. This answer is almost embarrassingly obvious. By definition, a theological school is about theology in its broadest sense of the term: logos, speaking thoughtfully or thinking articulately and clearly about theos, God. Theological schools are communities engaged in a lot of practices which have the same ultimate goal: to increase our understanding of God.

It is conventional to distinguish between theological schools that focus on the education of ministers by attending to the "heart knowledge" of God that people have through their Christian experience, through their piety or spirituality, and theological schools that focus on the education of Christian intellectuals by attending to the "head knowledge" of God that people have through critical intellectual inquiry. This is a false dichotomy. To be sure, heart and mind can distort each other, but neither is whole without the other. Faithfulness to God involves loving God with the whole person—heart, soul and strength along with the mind.

Therefore the theological school must reject the dogma that religious engagement and critical inquiry are mutually exclusive. It must welcome religiously engaged scholarship that is also rigorously critical scholarship. Even though this conjunction makes academic life more complicated, there is no reason to have to choose between "rigorous scholarship" that is needed to educate future scholars and "religious engagement" that is needed to educate future ministers.

Jesus said, "You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, and with all your soul, and with all your mind, and with all your strength." You shall love the Lord your God with all your mind: the idea of a distinctively intellectual love for God is an old idea in Judaism and Christianity. It reminds us that love for God is not only an emotion, a passion and a willed commitment to the Beloved, but also a fixed attentiveness on trying to understand the Beloved.

But in the biblical traditions, God cannot be understood directly. The God whom we seek to understand ever more truly is not a datum lying around waiting to be understood. Moreover, human beings cannot simply and directly perceive God, lest they die. According to the biblical witness, God can be known only when and where God gives Godself to be known. God communicates indirectly, and our efforts to understand God must move in a corresponding indirection. So we modify our answer: a school is truly theological to the extent that it is a community of persons seeking to understand God, and all else in relation to God, by studying other matters that are believed to lead to that understanding.

Those other matters are concrete. For Christians they center on the figure of Jesus Christ in the context of God’s covenant people Israel. But our access to Jesus in his context is itself indirect, mediated mostly by scripture’s diverse witnesses. And scripture’s witnesses are properly understood only in the context of the social, cultural and historical circumstances from which they come. Moreover, scripture’s witnesses never speak directly to us but are mediated by traditions of interpretation. And those traditions are not simply intellectual traditions but integral parts of complex practices of speech, thought, worship and morally responsible action. In these practices, communities of faith attempt to respond faithfully to the God who has been graciously faithful to the world.

In hopes of a deeper understanding of God, we study such subjects as Jesus Christ and Israel, scripture in tradition, the history of practices of interpretation of scripture and practices of response to God in worship, moral responsibility and institution building.

We study all these topics because they shape the practices that constitute the common life of contemporary communities seeking in faith to respond appropriately to God.

In order for it to be fruitful, our study must be disciplined. Our indirect road to deeper understanding of God must include our formation by several critical disciplines of inquiry—the disciplines of the philosopher and of the textual critic, of the historian and the scientist. Each of these studies is intellectually important and interesting in its own right, yet they are not in themselves theological studies. They become theological studies when we push beyond the demands of each critical discipline and its subject matter to ask: What does this inquiry suggest about how to understand God and how to understand our lives in relation to God? In a theological school, we cannot leave answering that question to one department or field. The question is the responsibility of every aspect of a theological school.

This approach collides with another piece of conventional wisdom about theological education. Many claim that the deepest challenge to American theological education is to figure out how to integrate theory and practice. This wisdom supposes that what makes theological schools theological is that they train the members of a profession called "the ministry." "Theological" is defined not by reference to God but by reference to one profession among many. Ministry, in turn, is defined as the set of capacities required to provide the services that the profession of ministry is expected to offer. Hence "truly professional" ministers must have skills in counseling, educating young children, educating adolescents, educating adults, preaching, conducting liturgy, building community, fund raising, and management of small nonprofit volunteer organizations.

According to this picture, theological schooling is a movement from generating abstract theory to applying theory in concrete practice. It is as though the underlying picture of theological schooling came from engineering: we receive theories from "pure" scientific research, generalize applied theory from parts or from implications of the "pure" theory, and then devise techniques and technologies governed by the applied theory to solve well-defined practical problems. In theological education it is assumed not only that psychology and other human sciences generate useful theory, but that historical studies and theological reflection on doctrine and ethics should yield theories that are relevant to ministry and can be applied in practice.

This picture of theological schooling leads to intractable problems. If it were correct, there would be so many bodies of relevant theory that one would not be able to learn the theories and test them critically in a three- or four-year course of study.

Let there be no misunderstanding. It is essential that leaders in communities of faith learn how to preach, how to counsel and how to manage an organization mostly staffed by volunteers. This critique is not a matter of the "academic" side of the school dumping on the "practical side." What makes a theological school theological is neither the cultivation of academic skills nor the cultivation of practical capacities. Learning to talk knowledgeably in an Augustinian or Cappadocian way, or in a Rahnerian or Barthian way, no more constitutes a theological education than does learning how to preach well, counsel or run a Sunday school. Teaching and learning these things make for truly theological schooling only when they are done in the service of a further end: learning so to love God with the mind as to come to understand God more deeply and more truly.

When we picture theological education as a movement from theory to the application of theory in practice, we focus on the bodies of theory as the ultimate subject matter to be studied. We focus not on matters that we believe will lead us to a deeper understanding of God, but on matters that we must master in order to become skilled in certain professional techniques. When that happens, the study of a theory takes on a life of its own, and the curriculum becomes a clutch of unrelated courses instead of an integral course of study. When theological schooling is conceived in this way, it is structurally impossible to integrate theory and practice because it is humanly impossible to integrate all the relevant bodies of theory.

However, if the subjects of study are concrete networks of human practices by which communities of faith attempt to respond to God faithfully, and if they are practices which mediate an understanding of God, then the movement of theological schooling is more like an engaged meditative gaze than it is like problem solving. It is more the circular movement of patient and appropriately disciplined attention toward complex "goings-on": What is going on in these communities of faith? What are they doing here? What are we doing here? What is God doing here? We move from these questions to insights and then test the insights by our further attention to what is going on.

Theological schooling is not movement from theory to the application of theory in practical techniques. Seeking to understand God by critically disciplined attention to those concrete realities through which God makes Godself known begins not with theory but with messy concrete realities. Theological schooling makes use of bodies of theory to keep itself self-critically honest, but it does not generate much theory. Instead, it seeks to generate the insight and wisdom that shape lives.