The Man Who Belongs to the World

The following article is excerpted from the concluding chapter of historian Jaroslav Pelikan’s book titled Jesus Through the Centuries: His Place in the History of Culture, scheduled for October publication by Yale University Press. The book examines the impact of Jesus on the cultural, political, social and economic history of the past two millennia. Studying the images of Jesus cherished by successive ages -- from rabbi in the first century to universal man in the Renaissance to liberator in the 19th and 20th centuries -- Pelikan suggests that the way a particular age depicted Jesus is an essential key to understanding that age.

Nazareth was what is known in colloquial English as a hick town, an insignificant village. It almost sounds like a proverbial saying when in the Gospel of John, Nathanael asks (John 1:46), "Can anything good come out of Nazareth?’’ Thus Jesus of Nazareth was a villager and a provincial. Whatever may be the historical status of the story of his flight to Egypt as an infant with his parents, he never as an adult traveled beyond the borders of the Levant. As far as we can tell, he did not command either of the world languages of his time, Latin and Greek, although both are said by the Gospel of John to have appeared in the inscription on his cross (John 19:20). The only reference to his having written anything in any language, when he stooped to write with his finger on the ground, comes in a passage of dubious textual authenticity, which most manuscripts include somewhere in the Gospel of John (John 8:6, 8). He spoke of how "the rulers of the gentiles lord it over them, and their great men exercise authority over them’’ (Matt. 20:25), but as of a phenomenon belonging to a world far removed from his own. And even when, in an appearance after the resurrection, he is represented by the author of the Acts of the Apostles as having referred to the outside world, it was as a provincial might, dividing the world into the immediate environs and everything that was elsewhere: "Ye shall be witnesses unto me both in Jerusalem, and in all Judaea, and in Samaria -- and unto the uttermost part of the earth" (Acts 1:8). Therefore his cosmopolitan detractors in the Roman Empire were able to sneer that he had put in his appearance "in some small corner of the earth somewhere," and not (to borrow a modern phrase that seems appropriate) out here in the real world.

Jesus of Nazareth may have been a provincial, but Jesus Christ is the Man Who Belongs to the World. By a geographical expansion shattering anything that either his cosmopolitan detractors within paganism or, for that matter, the author of the Book of Acts within Christianity could have imagined, his name has moved out far from that "small corner of the earth somewhere" and has come to be known "unto the uttermost part of the earth." In the words of the paraphrase of Psalm 72 by Isaac Watts.

Jesus shall reign where’er the sun

Does his successive journeys run,

His kingdom stretch from shore to shore

Till moons shall wax and wane no more.

People and realms of every tongue

Dwell on his love with sweetest song.

When that hymn was published in 1719, the most dramatic growth in the extension of his influence ever known was just beginning. Because of that quantum increase, the best-known history of Christian expansion in English devoted three of its seven volumes to the 19th century alone, calling it The Great Century (Kenneth Scott Latourette, A History of the Expansion of Christianity [Harper, 1939-45]). The sun never sets on the empire of Jesus the King, the Man Who Belongs to the World.

Not coincidentally, the great century of Christian missionary expansion was also in many ways the great century of European colonialism. As in past centuries of Christian conversion, the missionary and military sometimes went hand in hand, each serving the purposes of the other, and not always in a manner or a spirit consonant with the spirit of Christ. The medieval method of carrying on Christian missions was often to conquer the tribe in warfare and then to subject the entire enemy army to baptism at the nearest river. That pattern continued to appear in modern missions, despite the many differences between their methods. Consequently, although Jesus himself had lived in the Near East, it was as a religion of Europe that his message came to the nations of the world and the islands of the sea -- a religion of Europe both in the sense of a religion from Europe and, often, a religion about Europe as well. Indeed, at the end of the "great century," and on the eve of the First World War, the provocative aphorism was coined, apparently by Hilaire Belloc: "The Faith is Europe and Europe is the Faith" (Europe and the Faith [Paulist. 1921], p. viii).

The identification of Europe and "the faith" implied, on the one hand, that those who accepted European economic, political and military domination and who adopted European civilization thereby came under pressure to undergo conversion to the European faith in Jesus Christ. It likewise implied, however, that faith in Jesus Christ must be on European terms, take them or leave them, and that the forms it took -- organizational, ethical, doctrinal, liturgical -- must be, with as much adaptation as necessary but as little adaptation as possible, the ones it had acquired in its European configuration.

Although it has become part of the conventional wisdom in much of contemporary anti-colonialist literature, both Eastern and Western, it is an oversimplification to dismiss the missions as nothing more than a cloak for white imperialism. Such an oversimplification ignores the biographical, religious and political realities running through the history of Christian missions during the "great century" and long before, as missionaries have, in the name of Jesus, striven to understand and learned to respect the particularities of the cultures to which they have come. It should be noted, in addition, that there was historically a sharp difference on this count between the missionary methods of the Eastern and the Western churches. When Constantine-Cyril and Methodius came as Christian missionaries to the Slavs in the ninth century, they translated not only the Bible but the Eastern Orthodox liturgy into Slavonic.

By contrast, when Augustine had come to the English in 597, he had brought with him not only the message of the gospel and the authority of the See of Rome but the liturgy of the Latin mass, and he had made the acceptance of this a condition of conversion to faith in Christ. While Greek-speaking missionaries like Cyril and Methodius did not teach their Slavic disciples to read Greek, Western missionaries had to provide the nations they converted with the rudiments of Latin and the means of learning it. In the Carolingian period, "the use of Latin was everywhere and irrevocably narrowed down to liturgy and the written word," and Latin became a "purely artificial language." Nevertheless, it was also the ‘‘sole medium of intellectual life’’ and could become again, incidentally to the process and quite unintentionally, a way of access to the heritage of pre-Christian Roman culture and classical Latin literature (Erich Auerbach, Literary Language and Its Public in Late Latin Antiquity and in the Middle Ages [Pantheon. 1965], pp. 120-21).

The most celebrated instance of the Christian understanding and respect for a native culture, however, was in the work of a Roman Catholic rather than of an Eastern Orthodox missionary, the Jesuit Matteo Ricci, in China. He has been called by a modern English historian of Chinese culture "one of the most remarkable and brilliant men in history" (Joseph Needham, in Science and Civilization in China, 2 vols. [Cambridge University Press, 1961], 1:148). The first generation of Jesuits, under the leadership and inspiration of Francis Xavier, made the mission to China a major item on their agenda. But in carrying out the mission, the Jesuits had followed the medieval pattern of the Western church, introducing the Roman Catholic liturgy of the mass, forbidding any of the Chinese vernaculars in worship, and enforcing the use of Latin. With Ricci’s arrival at Macau in 1582, that strategy underwent drastic revision. Ricci adopted the monastic habit of a Buddhist monk, then the garb of a Confucian scholar, and became a renowned authority both in the natural sciences and in the history and literature of China.

This erudition enabled him to present the person and message of Jesus as the fulfillment of the historic aspirations of Chinese culture, in much the way that Jesus had been presented by the early fathers as the culmination of the Greco-Roman faith in the Logos and by the New Testament as the fulfillment of the Jewish hope for the Messiah. The Chinese, Ricci maintained, "could certainly become Christians, since the essence of their doctrine contains nothing contrary to the essence of the Catholic faith, nor would the Catholic faith hinder them in any way, but would indeed aid in that attainment of the quiet and peace of the republic which their books claim as their goal" (quoted in Jonathan D. Spence, The Memory Palace of Matteo Ricci [Viking. 1984]. p. 210).

Already in his lifetime and even more in the years of the "rites controversy" over the legitimacy of "accommodationism" that followed his death in 1610, Ricci was accused of having compromised the uniqueness of the person of Christ. But the upsurge of interest in his work has made it clear, on the basis of such theological works in Chinese as The True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven of 1603, that Ricci was and remained an orthodox Catholic believer, whose very orthodoxy it was that impelled him to take seriously the integrity of Chinese traditions. Although with a less dramatic involvement in native thought and culture than Ricci’s, both Roman Catholic and Protestant missionaries in the 19th century often managed to combine a commitment to evangelization in the name of Jesus with a deep (and ever deepening) respect for the native culture and indigenous traditions of the nations to which they had been sent.

As in the past, Christian missions in the 19th and 20th centuries have involved many social changes as well as changes in religious affiliation. Perhaps the most important of these changes for the future cultural development of the nations was the close association between the missions and the campaign for world literacy. A monument to the importance of that achievement for the history of the Slavs is the very alphabet in which most Slavs write, which is called Cyrillic, in honor of Saint Cyril, the ninth-century "apostle to the Slavs," who, with his brother Methodius, is traditionally given credit for having invented it. . . Not only among the Slavs in the ninth century, but also among the other so-called heathen in the 19th century, the two fundamental elements of missionary culture for more than a millennium have therefore been the translation of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, and education in the missionary schools.

In one after another of the nations of Africa and of the South Seas, Christian missionaries found, upon arriving, that none of the native languages had been committed to writing, and that therefore it was necessary, for the sake of the translation of the word of God, to reduce one or more of those languages to written form. In many cases, therefore, the first efforts ever at a scientific understanding of the language, by native or foreigner, came from Christian missionaries. They compiled the first dictionaries, wrote the first grammars, developed the first alphabets. Thus it came about that the first important proper name to have been written in many of these languages must have been the name of Jesus, with its pronunciation adapted to their distinctive phonic structure, just as it had been in all the languages of Europe. The Protestant missionary Bible societies, especially the British and Foreign Bible Society and the American Bible Society, owed their origins to Christian missions in the 19th century. During the 19th and 20th centuries, they have put at least the Gospels, and sometimes the rest of the New Testament and of the entire Bible, into more than a thousand additional languages, which averages out to more than five new languages per year.

In the memoirs of Asian and African leaders who were graduates from these schools it has become almost obligatory, as part of an attack upon white Christian colonialism, to express bitterness and recrimination about the loss of native roots that came as a by-product of missionary education and of imperialist schools both in the mission field and in the home country. Jawaharlal Nehru, for example, was educated at Harrow and Cambridge, becoming, in his own eloquent English phrase, "a queer mixture of the East and West, out of place everywhere, at home nowhere’ and sensing a profound alienation between himself and the religion of the common people of India -- an alienation from which he never quite recovered (Toward Freedom: Autobiography [Beacon, 1958], pp. 236-50). Nehru could have been speaking for several generations in many nations, some of them committed Christians and others merely deracinated Asians or Africans, who were "out of place everywhere, at home nowhere." Thus it was with a grim literalness that there was fulfilled, in the life of entire cultures and not only of individual families, the alienation described by the saying of Jesus in the Gospels: "I have come to set a man against his father, and a daughter against her mother, and a daughter-in-law against her mother-in-law; and a man’s foes will be those of his own household’’ (Matt.10:35-36).

Significantly, Jesus was seen as a Western figure, and in the early religious art of the "younger churches" he often continued to be represented as he had been in the evangelical and pietist literature of the missionary movements in Europe, England and America. Beginning already with Ricci and even earlier, however, Christian art in the mission field recognized the need to present the figure of Jesus in a form that was congenial to his new audience

Yet evangelicals and pietists, too, early recognized, sometimes far more explicitly in the mission field than at home, that it was not enough to bring pictures of Jesus, even pictures of Jesus with native features, or words about Jesus, even words about Jesus in the native vernaculars, to the non-Christian world. It had not been enough in the days of Jesus, either, and so he had come as a healer and not only as a teacher. Similarly, the mission of his followers in the second and third centuries had been one of help and healing, not of evangelization alone. For the word "salvation" -- soteria in Greek, salus in Latin and its derivative languages, Heil in German and its cognate languages -- meant "health."

In an age in which the healing of the nations from the ravages of hunger, disease and war has become the dominant moral imperative, Jesus the Healer has come to assume a central place. It was an emblem of the central place of Jesus when, under the terms of the Geneva Convention of 1864 for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick of Armies in the Field, the international organization created to carry out that moral imperative took the name ‘‘Red Cross Society"; its symbol, based on a reversal of the colors of the Swiss flag, is a red cross on a white background. Yet the connection between evangelization in the name of Jesus and the mission of help and healing has also been an issue for debate, especially in the 20th century. This debate, too, comes as a commentary on the literal meaning of a word in the Gospels: "Whosoever shall give you a cup of water to drink in my name, because ye belong to Christ, verily I say unto you, he shall not lose his reward" (Mark 9:41).

It has almost seemed that in every epoch there were some who were primarily interested in naming the name of Christ, clarifying its doctrinal and theological meaning, and defending that meaning against its enemies -- but who named the name without giving the cup of water. Yet it has seemed possible for others to give the cup of water, to provide the healing, and to improve the social lot of the disadvantaged -- but to do so without explicitly naming the name of Christ. Does that saying of Jesus mean that each of these ways of responding to his summons is only a partial obedience to this dual command? In the answer to this question, much of the debate over the primary responsibility of Christ’s disciples in the modern world has concentrated on the disjunction between the two components of the imperative.

A growing feature of the debate has been the stress on cooperation rather than competition between the disciples of Jesus and those who follow other ancient Teachers of the Way. Those followers of Jesus who advocate such cooperation insist that they are not less committed to the universality of his person and message than are the advocates of the traditional methods of conquest through evangelization. But the universality of Jesus, they have urged, does not establish itself in the world through the obliteration of whatever elements of light and truth have already been granted to the nations of the world. For whatever the proximate and historical sources of that truth may have been, its ultimate source is God, the same God whom Jesus called Father; else the confession of the oneness of God is empty.

Criticism of many of the elements of historic Christianity, especially of its dogmatism and cultural imperialism, led to the suggestion that it had much to learn, as well as much to teach, in its encounter with other faiths. Jesus was indeed the Man Who Belongs to the World, but he was this because he made it possible to appreciate more profoundly the full scope of the revelation of God wherever it had appeared in the history of the world, in the light of which, in turn, his own meaning and message acquired more profound significance. In the paradoxical formula of Archbishop Nathan Söderblom’s Gifford Lectures of 1931, "the uniqueness of Christ as the historical revealer, as the Word made flesh, and the mystery of Calvary," which are an "essentially unique character of Christianity," compel the affirmation that "God reveals himself in history; outside the Church as well as in it" (The Living God [Beacon, 1962], pp. 349, 379). The most complete statement of that position was the thought-provoking and massive report, Re-thinking Missions: A Layman’s Inquiry after One Hundred Years, published in 1932 by a Commission of Appraisal representing seven American Protestant denominations.

Having carried out an extensive survey of world missions, particularly in Asia and in Africa, the authors of this "laymen’s inquiry" reviewed, in seven volumes of data, the state of evangelization and Christian world service, recommending far-reaching revisions not only of specific strategy but of underlying philosophy. They concluded that the stress upon the particularity of Jesus and the absoluteness of his message had been, though perhaps necessary, a temporary element in the program of the missions. As one historian of missions has summarized the position of Re-thinking Missions,

The task of the missionary today, it was maintained, is to see the best in other religions, to help the adherents of those religions to discover, or to rediscover, all that is best in their own traditions, to cooperate with the most active and vigorous elements in the other traditions in social reform and in the purification of religious expression. The aim should not be conversion -- the drawing of members of one religious faith over into another or an attempt to establish a Christian monopoly. Cooperation is to replace aggression. The ultimate aim, so far as any can be descried, is the emergence of the various religions out of their isolation into a world fellowship in which each will find its appropriate place [Stephen Neill, A History of Christian Missions (Penguin, 1964), p. 456].

So drastic a revision of the traditional Christian understanding that "there is salvation in no one else than [Jesus]. for there is no other name under heaven [than the name of Jesus] given among men by which we must be saved’ (Acts 4:12) would inevitably evoke vigorous discussion and extensive controversy, especially coming as it did just when the theology of Karl Barth was emphasizing again the uniqueness of Jesus and the centrality of his claims.

In connection with the World’s Columbian Exposition held at Chicago in 1893 to commemorate the 400th anniversary of Columbus’s discovery of the New World, there was held a world parliament of religions, whose purpose it was to draw the religious implications of the discovery that the human race was not exclusively European and therefore not exclusively Christian, but global and universal. Despite the phenomenal successes of Christian missions during the 19th and 20th centuries, it seems incontestable that the percentage of Christians in the total world population is continually declining and therefore it seems inconceivable that the Christian church and the Christian message will ever conquer the population of the world and replace the other religions of the human race. If Jesus is to be the Man Who Belongs to the World, it will have to be by some other way.

Perhaps the most remarkable document to come out of this deepening sense of a new universalism was not Re-thinking Missions of 1932, but a decree published a third of a century later, on 28 October 1965, the Declaration on the Relationship of the Church to Non-Christian Religions, Nostra aetate, of the Second Vatican Council. In a series of succinct but striking paragraphs, the decree described the religious quest and the spiritual values at work in primitive religion, in Hinduism, in Buddhism and in Islam; and in a historic affirmation the council declared:

The Catholic Church rejects nothing which is true and holy in those religions. She looks with sincere respect upon those ways of conduct and of life, those rules and teachings which, though differing in many particulars from what she holds and sets forth, nevertheless often reflect a ray of that Truth which enlightens all men (John 1:9). Indeed, she proclaims and must ever proclaim Christ, "the way, the truth, and the life" (John 14:6), in whom men find the fullness of religious life, and in whom God has reconciled all things to Himself.

The two passages from the Gospel According to John quoted in the decree clearly identify the issue. For it is in that Gospel that Jesus speaks of himself as "the way, the truth, and the life" and says that no one comes to the Father except through him. And yet that same Gospel provided the epigraph for the universalism of the Enlightenment’s portrait of Jesus; for the Gospel of John declares in its prologue that the Logos-Word of God, incarnate in Jesus, enlightens everyone who comes into the world. By citing the authority of both passages, the Second Vatican Council sought to affirm universality and particularity simultaneously and to ground both of them in the figure of Jesus.

A special issue at the Second Vatican Council and throughout Christianity, especially since World War II, was the relation between Christianity and its parent faith, Judaism. The Holocaust took place in what had been nominally Christian territory; moreover, the record of the churches in opposing it was not the noblest page in Christian history. Among both Roman Catholics and Protestants in Germany there were those who, as the New Testament says about the apostle Paul’s involvement in the martyrdom of Stephen, were "consenting to the death" of the Jews (Acts 8:1), and many more who were (as it seems now, by hindsight) blindly insensitive to the situation. The Second Vatican Council "deplores," it declared, "the hatred, persecutions, and displays of anti-Semitism directed against the Jews at any time and from any source," which would appear to include the official sources of the church’s past. And it condemned any attempt to blame the death of Jesus "upon all the Jews then living, without distinction, or upon the Jews today," insisting that ‘‘the Jews should not be presented as repudiated or cursed by God."

It was in 1933, the beginning of the Nazi era in Germany, that there appeared, also in Germany, the first volume of one of the most influential biblical reference works of the 20th century, the multivolume Theological Dictionary of the New Testament, edited by Gerhard Kittel. Probably the most important scholarly and theological generalization to be drawn from the hundreds of articles in the Kittel Dictionary has been that the teaching and language of the New Testament, including the teaching and language of Jesus himself, cannot be understood apart from their setting in the context of Judaism. It was once again in the Gospel of John, despite the hostility of some of its language about Jews, that Jesus, speaking as a Jew to a non-Jew, was described as saying: ‘‘We [Jews] worship what we know, for salvation is from the Jews’’ (John 4:22). Directly he went on to say, in the very next verse: "But the hour is coming, and now is, when the true worshipers [which, obviously, refers to both Jews and gentiles] will worship the Father in spirit and truth." Once again the theme is universality-with-particularity, as both of these are grounded in the figure of Jesus the Jew.

By a curious blend of these currents of religious faith and scholarship with the no less powerful influences of skepticism and religious relativism, the universality-with-particularity of Jesus has thus become an issue not only for Christians in the 20th century, but for humanity. As respect for the organized church has declined, reverence for Jesus has grown. For the unity and variety of the portraits of "Jesus through the centuries’’ has demonstrated that there is more in him than is dreamt of in the philosophy and Christology of the theologians. Within the church, but also far beyond its walls, his person and message are, in the phrase of Augustine, a "beauty ever ancient, ever new," and now he belongs to the world.

Beyond the Feminist Critique: A Shaking of the Foundations

Feminism may well be the most radical challenge ever to arise within the church. For while previous challenges pronounced judgment upon doctrines or practices by recourse to the original tradition, many feminists pronounce judgment upon the tradition itself. Many in the modern church find this radical posture institutionally and personally threatening.

Psychological and sociological criteria alone indicate that this sense of threat felt by many in the church is normal. Their reaction is grounded in the belief that feminism poses the threat of greater potential loss to Christianity than any conceivable gain. If that is truly the case, these reactionaries would be fully warranted in resisting changes.

However, by facing feminism’s challenge to the tradition, the church, I believe, stands to gain much more than it conceivably could lose. For feminism opens the door for the most serious and radical rethinking of the nature of religious experience that the West has known since the inception of Christianity. This radical mandate comes closer to the intensity and comprehensiveness of primitive Christianity itself than has any subsequent phenomenon in Western history. Rather than provoking Christians to alarm, this "shaking of the foundations" should be welcomed as an opportunity to re-examine every aspect of the church’s life and faith -- indeed, even of the nature of the religious life itself.

If there is one truth at the heart of both Judaism and Christianity, it is that no representation of the divine -- either visual or verbal -- is finally adequate, and that failure to accept this judgment leads to idolatry. This is the central message of the tradition. But to exempt the tradition from this judgment would in essence be to deny the central message itself. This may seem a hard truth -- one that finally reduces religion to a relativism. But it is

a truth fully appreciated in many historic segments of Christianity that have chosen to live with the fragility of this truth, rather than with the certainty -- and presumed finality -- of magisterial truth. Their position does not, however, succumb to subjectivism, for the sanctorum communio is no private, single vision, but a living testimony to a living tradition. Its "life’’ is manifested not in a self-protective obscurantism, but in the act of "breathing life" into whatever is worthy in a given time and place.

In one sense (and one sense only), the tradition is judgmental: it judges all "traditions’’ growing out of itself. But this fact does not resolve the issue as to which of the "traditions" best represents "the tradition" -- assuming that this issue is crucial. Rather, the judgment essentially says that none of the traditions ever finally measures up to the tradition, just as no criticism or critical interpretation of a work of art ever equals the original itself.

Pronouncing judgment on the tradition is not, in itself, anti-traditional. Rather it is fully consonant with the tradition’s spirit of judging all claims to religious finality. It follows that the tradition is not threatened by any well-intentioned and informed critiques of representations of religious reality. That is perhaps the heart of the truth that the tradition is "living."

What, we may now ask, are the implications of feminism’s deep reconsideration of the nature and function of religious language?

What would be the consequence of accepting the feminist proposal but extending its scope? If the names "Father" and "Lord" are woefully inadequate, do they become more nearly adequate when supplemented with or replaced by other nouns/names? The problem is not -- as the feminists often say -- one of the inadequacy of certain nouns/names, but of the inadequacy of any naming of the deity. It is no accident that the closest analogue to religious language is profanity; for without naming the deity, neither religious nor antireligious sentiment can be expressed. In fact, as Judaism learned early on, it may be impossible to pronounce the name of the deity without profaning it. Western Christianity, however, has exhibited a Promethean attitude about the adequacy of its verbal representations of the divine. Viewed purely ecumenically, the issues raised by feminism may lead the West into a greater appreciation of the apophatic tradition, like that found in Eastern Orthodoxy.

From a transcultural standpoint, the feminist challenge opens the West to what is perhaps an even wider perspective. To illustrate. I shall attempt to drawn same lessons from Hinduism. In Hinduism, theology is ancillary to metaphysical truth. The most persistent idea in the Vedas and the Upanishads is the claim that Brahman is above "name and form" (namarupa). All things named and nameable -- even the gods -- are creatures. This essential teaching of original Hinduism constitutes a fundamental difference from both Judaism and Christianity, and it may prove to be a hard but necessary truth for the West to accept. The language of theology is filled with the rich diversity of namarupa, but Brahman stands as the final judgment over whether any name or form is adequate to represent reality.

This insight allows the problem of evil to be resolved without resorting to theodicy, as the West must, since its theology (language of the divine) is intrinsically metaphysical. And because of the nature of their theology, Judaism and Christianity easily fall prey to the self-indulgence of "paying metaphysical compliments to the Deity" (Whitehead). Such a practice as not some anomaly an our religious tradition; rather, it is an inevitable consequence of the fact that for Judaism and Christianity, religious language functions as the language of ultimacy; i.e., it functions metaphysically. The importance of monotheism in Western culture is a consequence of the metaphysical intentionality of its theological language.

Lest it seem as though I would subordinate religious to metaphysical language, thereby reinforcing the Western rationalistic critique of religion, I hasten to point out that in Hinduism, philosophy never developed in opposition to religion; the philosophical critique of energy that never ceases to preoccupy Western culture could not arise in a culture like Hinduism, where the language about the gods -- what we call mythology -- was never denied its rightful place in the scheme of things.

Feminism’s dissatisfaction with some pronouns could be interpreted as a mandate to dispense with pronouns altogether. Given the implications of the feminists’ attack on nouns, replacing third-person masculine pronouns with their feminine counterparts seems only to point to the final inadequacy of any pronouns used in referring to deity.

But pronouns may prove to be a different matter altogether. One need not probe fully the reasons why third-person pronouns in the West were made gender-specific, while first-and second- were not, in order to know that such an exploration could lead us more deeply into the heart of religiosity. To the extent that prayer is distinctive of religious experience, we should inspect the function of pronouns in this modality.

Martin Buber may be our best modern teacher on this subject. Without anticipating the later issue of the gender of third-person pronouns, he wisely located what is fundamental about reality, human and divine, in the word-pair I-Thou. Buber represented the loss of this reality by employing the neuter third-person pronoun "It"

Buber expressed his great insight into the nature of true spirituality in the contrast between talking to God (first- and second-person pronouns) and talking about God (third-person pronouns). His famous -- though not universally well-received -- statement is something of a confession: "If to believe in God means to be able to talk about him, then I do not believe. But if to believe in God means to be able to talk to him, then I believe" (Meetings. Open Court [1973], p. 44). Talking "about" God requires only third-person pronouns; whereas talking "to" God requires only the first and second: "I and Thou."

If the feminists’ assault on the tradition awakens us to this essential character of the deepest and most intimate spirituality, the overall gain shall exceed whatever may have to be given up along the way. But the journey toward these deeper insights may prove to be arduous, and all must commit themselves to it, abandoning what may appear now to be defensive postures and special interests.

It may be objected that what I have stated to be the gain serves only general spirituality, not historical Christianity. However, Christianity is never finally threatened by any increase of insight into true spirituality. Rather, it is enriched by it.

A Christian Scholar’s Dialogue with Muslims

Dr. Küng was invited by the Goethe Institute in collaboration with the Ministry for Islamic Affairs to travel to Tehran last March to speak on Islam and Christianity. As the first Western theologian to be invited to Iran after the Islamic revolution, he had the opportunity to engage in theological discussion with leading ayatollahs and Muslim scholars concerning the relationship between Christianity and Islam. He reports here on his personal experiences with Christian-Muslim dialogue in various lands.

Despite the escalation of the war, Professor of Islamics Josef van Ess, a Tübingen colleague of mine and I considered it important to accept the invitation to this colloquium in order to see and hear for ourselves, there on the spot; it is obviously better to receive information directly rather than simply to sit and criticize or speculate in one’s easy chair.

"With which Muslims do you wish to carry on a dialogue? I don’t know any, " a well-known publicist stationed in the Near East said to me a short while ago in a television discussion concerning Christianity and World Religions, a new book by van Ess and myself. This lack of acquaintance is widespread since Islam drew itself back into its traditional values in an Islamic renaissance that is not unique to the Shiite Iran of Imam Khomeini, but is also happening in some Sunni lands. With whom, then, should a Christian ecumenical theologian speak if he or she is concerned about dialogue not only among the Christian confessions but, in a time of growing world unity, also among the world religions, especially with the other two Abrahamic religions, Judaism and Islam? "Muslims who are prepared to dialogue are people from yesterday, not from today," commented even such an important expert on contemporary Islam as Peter Scholl-Latour.

And yet this impression is deceptive. Dialogue is possible even under today’s more difficult conditions, and in fact it takes place. Of course, the until-now traditionally European-centered Christian theologians -- like the often too politically, militarily and economically oriented news correspondents, who hardly ever made contact with the really decisive spiritual representatives in Iran -- have taken practically no notice of that fact. At the same time, one would have to admit that theological Germany has not found itself precisely in the vanguard in dialogue among the religions. In the theological faculties of both Christian confessions, this dialogue, often disconcerting and demanding, is largely avoided. Of course, for some time now there has existed the "Standing Conference of European Jews, Christians and Muslims," which under the inspiration of Rabbi Lionel Blue (London), Dr. Salah Eid (Cairo) and Pastor Winfried Maechler (Protestant Academy of West Berlin) launched its efforts in the early 1970s. However, until now, it has received far too little public attention. Since the oil crisis and the collapse of the strongest, most Western-oriented power in the Near and Middle East, Iran, as a result of the Islamic revolution there have been many conferences on Islam, particularly in the Protestant and Catholic academies. Individual Muslim participants have been invited to them.

Nevertheless, in comparison to what takes place in North American universities, for example, this progress is much too meager. Since theology and religious studies have for a long time not been so sharply and dogmatically divided in North America as they are in Germany, the overcoming of the isolation of Christian theology and the establishment of ongoing dialogue is much more solidly based there. In the past year I have participated in public dialogues with Muslims at the University of Toronto and at Harvard and Temple universities, where stimulating discussions on central theological differences took place and in which clear positions were expressed by all sides with sympathy and mutual understanding. In addition, within the framework of the American Academy of Religion there exists a working group which pursues the "trialogue" among Jews, Christians and Muslims.

Of course, the question remains: What is the situation of dialogue in the Islamic countries themselves? Is there even the least openness to a dialogue which is worthy of the name? Answer: Islam is no monolithic block, no closed system. There are gigantic differences among the Islamic nations, each of which would have to be handled separately. But by even the grimmest assessment, there are certain positive signs that cannot be overlooked. Many agree with Egyptian President Anwar Sadat, who was murdered by Muslim extremists, that peace is impossible in the Near East without a resolution of the religious problematic. At least in the moderate Muslim lands, including Jordan, where leading representatives of the country have recognized the significance of religious values and of interreligious dialogue better than have some Western statespeople, there is already no small degree of openness to an honest dialogue with Christians who are capable of looking beyond the borders of their own religion. In England I recently took part, along with Josef van Ess, in a several-day-long symposium conducted between leading Muslims from the moderate countries (from North Africa to Malaysia) and high-ranking Christian church leaders (even a representative from the Vatican!), as well as theologians and religious experts. This dialogue will be renewed very shortly in the Near East.

And in the conservative Islamic countries in which the "Islamicization’’ has taken drastic forms? I have no illusions concerning the scarcely democratic political conditions of these countries, which have difficult times behind them and probably -- as the present war in the Middle East underlines -- lying before them. The Western press has written much about re-Islamicization -- in the view of the Iranians. often with little fairness and with unwarranted indignation. So thought Minister for Islamic Affairs Erschad Khatami in Tehran, in a long conversation in response to my complaints (which nevertheless were not retracted). I especially took exception to the reception given Christian pastoral work in Iran and the scandalous treatment of the Baha’i. Khatami argued that it is hypocritical of Western politicians, particularly those in the United States, to become excited over the violations of human rights in Iran, which in the aftermath of the Islamic revolution and in the midst of war finds itself in a transitional phase. Iran has already improved a number of situations. In their own spheres of influence, from Korea to South America to Africa, Western powers have long supported brutal dictatorial regimes with all means available and have shrunk from violent interventions in insubordinate countries just as little as the Soviet Union has.

In fact, it is only through the power of the United States that a regime like that of the Muslim Gaafar Mohammed Nimeiri in the Sudan was able to stay in power. It was he who recently hanged one of the most important Islamic reformers of our time, the engineer, legal expert and mystic Mahmud Taha, often called the "Gandhi of Africa." at the age of 75. After many more arrests, Nimeiri carried out still further public executions under the eyes of the press and television. Islam has thus often -- exactly as Christianity has -- become a force for repression and a legitimation of the existing power relationships, whereas it could and should be a force for liberation.

I do not deceive myself about what the immediate theological results of such conversations with Muslims in these lands might bring. The goal of such interreligious conversations clearly is not conversion experiences, but rather genuine dialogue conducted with accurate knowledge and trust with a view to long-range effects.

In Pakistan. where I was one year ago. I found an extraordinary interest among leading scholars in dialogue with those of other beliefs. This interest persisted, or perhaps was even newly awakened under the present authoritarian regime. In Pakistan, unlike the nearby Soviet Union, there is complete freedom to carry on public dialogues and to report on them in the press. It is evident that the Goethe Institute does well in Iran not to limit its public activity to musical or purely literary presentations and "harmless’’ lectures. Philosophical and theological ideas, which can sometimes be more tactfully raised by foreigners than by the local scholars, are often of much more burning interest.

In any case, the unusual presentation of the Goethe Institute in Lahore, featuring a number of Islamic personalities in public life, drew a large audience. The discussion was conducted in an extremely pleasant atmosphere, without the feared eruption of arguments. The same can be said of the programs which have been put on by the Institute for Islamic Culture and the Islamic Philosophical Society, both likewise in Lahore; of a meeting at the Christian Studies Centre in Rawalpindi; of conversations with professors at the Quaid-e-Azam University and with theologians at the Islamic University in Islamabad, as well as a discussion at the Quaide-e-Azam Academy in Karachi. Everywhere the difficult theological differences between Christianity and Islam came under debate, and everywhere there was manifested an extraordinary readiness to listen, to enter into arguments and to make a contribution to understanding. An Islamic-Christian dialogue group was shortly thereafter founded, and its publications are being prepared. The image of the stubbornly dogmatic Muslim is as foolish as it is a fatal cliché.

Concerning Iran: "Instead of dispute, dialogue." This is the astounding phrase that I heard in Tehran right at the beginning of a seminar at the Institute for Philosophy, in which a number of ayatollahs, leading members of the Revolutionary Council of Culture, of the Ministry for Islamic Affairs and also of the family of the leader of the revolution, Khomeini, took part. The counsel to carry on dialogue is indeed a new insight after all of Iran’s aggressive revolutionary slogans. The new mood might be partially motivated by a political concern to break out of isolation: nevertheless. I am convinced after the very personal conversations I had that it is primarily religiously motivated, that it will persist after the present time of war and that it will bear fruit in the not-distant future.

Does an interreligious dialogue, however, have any meaning whatsoever for believing, conservative Muslims, who no less than traditional Roman Catholics hold fast to the conviction that they possess the true doctrine, indeed, the whole of truth, and are convinced that their religion is a da’wat, an "invitation" to all of humankind to become Muslim?

Of course, Muslim theologians also proceed on the assumption that humanity is pluralist and that the thought worlds of millions of human beings are different from theirs in speech, culture and religion. How then should Muslims under these circumstances make their Islamic faith understandable to non-Muslims when they are not able to confront their concepts, their ideas or their teachings with those of Christians? According to Muslim interpretation, as was persuasively portrayed in the foundation-laying lecture by a mullah who knew Germany quite well, something like a table of comparisons between the concepts, ideas and teachings of the two religions is needed, which, however, cannot be put together by Muslims alone if it is to be objective. No, Christians must determine what their own concepts, ideas and teachings mean. Only thus can it be meaningful when people come together and in trusting conversations compare, clarify and evaluate.

What could Muslims set from such a dialogue? Three points of view were expressed in Tehran:

First, such a dialogue would enable Muslims to understand Christianity better, for there is taking place within Christianity a very significant transformation, concerning which most Muslims are scarcely aware, though it is extraordinarily important even for them.

Second. in the process of secularization, modern Christianity has had negative as well as positive experiences which Islam in its unavoidable modernization quite possibly might also have lying before it. That is particularly true in regard to dealing with the modern critique of religion, as, for example, by Feuerbach, Marx, Nietzsche and Freud.

Third, numberless theological misunderstandings (with regard to the essence and the externals of Islam, the person and the significance of the prophet and qur’anic revelation) and also the religious wars (all the way from the earliest conflicts through the Crusades up until the most recent confrontations) have poisoned the relationships between Muslims and Christians throughout the centuries. Such misunderstandings, indeed hostilities, could be clarified only through encounters and scholarly solutions. What has occurred already to a great degree in Western oriental studies and theology must be expanded through corresponding Muslim efforts.

If Judaism, Christianity and Islam are in fact religions of the one God and religions of the Book -- and Muslims place a great weight on this -- then they have a common basis of faith: the three Abrahamic religions would be able to know and recognize each other as religions of the "unity of God" only if they had come to understand each other as such. Without broad mutual information, without human contact, without dialogue in its various forms this cannot happen. Therefore contacts with Western scholars should he multiplied and deepened.

First, we Christians can no longer look upon Islam as a path to hell -- as did the earlier Catholic teaching and as many conservative Protestant churches still do today. Rather, we should view it as one possible path to eternal life (which, since Vatican II, is possible for the Catholic Church, but is still disputed by some within the World Council of Churches). Islam, too, is therefore a path of salvation.

Second, we may no longer dismiss the prophet Muhammad as a false prophet, but rather must pay conscientious attention to his prophetic function, which has been extraordinarily successful in bringing hundreds of millions of human beings who live in the gigantic area between North Africa and the Soviet Usbekistan and from there to Indonesia to the faith in one God. Muhammad, therefore, is a post-Christian prophet, a "warner" of the one God of Abraham.

Third, we may not discredit the Qur’an as a derivative mixture from old Arabic-Jewish-Christian ideas, but rather we should place its obvious power as the word of God for the faithful in a correct light: the Qur’an is an effective word of the all-forgiving, merciful God for believing Muslims.

Until now all of these positions have been little discussed by a very self-aware, but in reality quite provincial German theology. Even "political theology." largely concentrated on Latin America, expresses only limited world-political dimensions. Without intensive scholarly wrestling with the existing questions. no headway can be made in dialogue. And only if one takes the demands of the Muslims seriously has one the right to put questions to them -- as I did in the discussions in Tehran: In what sense can the Qur’an be viewed as the word of God? Is this holy book in fact literally dictated by God to the prophet Muhammad, as this was also earlier unquestioningly assumed by Christians in regard to the "five books of Moses’’ (concerning creation, the fall of humanity, the history of the patriarchs and the people Israel)? Is, therefore, only a literal understanding of the Qur’an allowed, or can one also view the Qur’an seriously, if, like the Bible, it is not to be taken literally? Is perhaps the Qur’an not also at once the word of God and the word of humanity: the word of God in human words? All of these are questions of the greatest practical and also political relevance. For how should the often much-too comprehensive interweaving of faith and politics in Islam, as well as the gruesome medieval Islamic penal law, be corrected if everything in the Qur’an (and also the therefrom derived Shar’ia, or Islamic canon law) -- to the chopping off of hands and feet -- is literally a command of God which may not be touched? Politicians should also note that to try to approach Muslims with solely political, juridical or social-psychological arguments is to miss the decisive point.

The discussion in Tehran, which even on these questions that have been vigorously disputed for centuries between Christians and Muslims did not result in the feared explosion, uncovered as they expanded into the still more difficult questions concerning Christology and the doctrine of the Trinity a genuine willingness on both sides to learn, a search for new solutions, a clear will to understanding. If only political conferences now and again could take place in such a spirit!

What are the immediate results of this first theological contact after the Islamic revolution? One, the dismantling of a mutual mistrust and the creation of a good trust basis for a further exchange of thoughts between Muslims and Christians. Two, the publication of all presentations in the Persian language. Three, the continuation of contacts with German scholars and consideration given to establishing a dialogue center in Qum, the "holy city’’ of Islam in Iran.

It is to be expected that other Islamic lands will likewise show an interest in a more intense interchange with Western scholars. My experiences in Tehran should encourage theologians to take advantage of every opportunity for dialogue wherever it presents itself. Of course, academic theologians who are invited to such dialogues have it easier than the local Christian churches, which are struggling for their status. I am convinced, however, that such dialogues will also work for their immediate benefit. And one may not say that as a theologian, I misread the political realities of the country and might possibly be used in order to cover up the true religious-political relations. Whoever speaks in favor of going to East Berlin, Prague, Moscow or Peking should not be morally or politically indignant over a journey to Tehran which had clear, limited goals. Whoever is interested in the relaxation of Iranian political tensions (in both domestic and foreign affairs) must also speak up for the relaxation of religious tensions. Indeed, perhaps a relaxation of political tensions can come about only if a relaxation of religious tensions begins to take place. This one point is clear: there can be no peace among nations without peace among religions. Peace is indivisible!

Abortion and Moral Consensus: Beyond Solomon’s Choice

Indeed, Geraldine Ferraro’s candidacy as the first woman running for vice-president on a major party ticket flushed out the power issues that divide the American public: to use George Bush’s elegant phrase, we are preoccupied with "kicking ass," whether it is in domestic relations or in Central America; we resist the demands of the exploited for power-sharing and comparable pay, whether in the global economy or in the male establishment at home; above all, we are divided over the issue of whether women are to be granted reproductive autonomy.

The smog generated by the debate over "religion and politics" obscured the fundamental anxiety that lay beneath all the sniping, posturing and manipulating: anxiety over patriarchal power’s waning influence in our national life, whether as U.S. hegemony abroad, or as family "headship" and male entitlement in our domestic institutions. In this collective smog the abortion issue acts as a kind of volatile precipitant, causing all the various elements of angst in church, state and society to condense and focus themselves with a terrible intensity. Geraldine Ferraro caught a good deal of the fallout. More recently, 24 nuns have been threatened with dismissal from their religious orders if they do not retract their support for a statement on "Pluralism and Abortion" that appeared during the election campaign.

The persistence and coherence of this angst and its potential for divisiveness and violence have been demonstrated by the recent wave of attacks on abortion clinics, as well as by the waning prospects for passage of the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA). Those who are most opposed to the prochoice position and to the ERA seem to be those who have the most to lose from the empowerment of women, either psychologically and politically, or in terms of authority or financial resources. Thus, for many men there is a consistency between their privileged position in the family and society and the value placed on fetal life, over which they have no intrinsic control. This may help to explain the curious contradiction in the views expressed by some churchmen and politicians who are so intransigent on the issue of abortion, over which men have no physical control, and so tolerant of killing in war, over which men have always had control.

Many women who espouse the prolife position do so, at least in part, because they have internalized patriarchal values and depend on the sense of identity and worth that comes from having accepted "woman’s place" in society. Thus, the polarization between the prolife and prochoice groups results in different value languages that allow no compromise. Because the two positions are so invested with the strong emotions aroused by power relations, there is little likelihood that rational argument can change them.

Carol Gilligan’s study of the differences in the ways whereby men and women reach moral decisions suggests another reason for intransigence on this issue (In a Different Voice [Harvard University Press, 1982]). Typically but not exclusively, for men the frame of reference of moral decision-making lies in the primacy of principle, in the values of truth and fairness -- inevitably a perspective that focuses on people’s rights. For women, the frame of reference is decidedly relational, lying in the primacy of the values of caring for and of not hurting others -- a perspective rooted in particularity and contextuality.

Thus, the matrices in which moral and political attitudes are embedded tend to be skewed by gender-related values. Our public discourse is dominated by a male-enculturated point of view that is characteristically abstract or morally solipsistic. Gilligan suggests that women, far more than men, invest ethical decisions with more particularity and with a better sense of their effects and consequences.

The male perspective, based on principles and rights, informs both the dominant prolife and prochoice views, both of which protect male hegemony, but in different ways. As a result, it is likely that the two sides on the abortion issue will remain intransigent and deadlocked indefinitely, like two bucks with their antlers intertwined. And in the impasse, other issues -- child care, research on contraception, sex education and, increasingly, the specter of reproductive technology -- are neglected or distorted. The prospect of what some have called "the colonization of the womb" and the enormity of the problems looming on the horizon should stir us all to outrage at the concentration of so much energy and so many resources, so much sound and fury, on the abortion issue. It reminds one of those who, after World War II and Hiroshima and Nagasaki, were still arguing over whether or not submarine warfare was moral.

Ten years ago Margaret Fancy, an ethicist at Yale Divinity School, attempted to inject some clarity into the escalating polarization in political discourse on the abortion issue when she called attention to the "bad faith" evidenced on both sides. I would like to expand her application of that notion -- limited as it was by the 1974 social context -- and apply it to the present moment and to the factions now arrayed in opposite camps. By "bad faith" I mean that Sartrean sense of self-righteousness, self-projection and non-engagement which promotes exclusivism and intransigence. All manifestations of bad faith are alike in that they are characterized by absolutism. This is not to question the "good faith" that also exists on both sides: the sincerity of their claims and the validity of their issues.

Several ethical norms are currently shaping our attitudes toward abortion. One might be called the individualistic norm, a view that is typical of early liberal and radical feminism. It is fundamentally prochoice. Until now this perspective has treated women’s autonomy as an absolute value. Political hardliners still use the pro-choice position as a litmus test for judging political candidates. The bad faith that can infect holders of this position becomes apparent when feminist cries of "femicide" and "previctimization" over the selective destruction of female embryos curiously lapse into silence at the random destruction of embryos (abortion on demand) or at multiple abortions (abortion as a contraceptive).

This rights-based ethic is being challenged by the growing recognition among feminists that the notion of "choice" may be a myth; that not only social attitudes but public policies that promote so-called "free choice" can be subtly coercive. For example, does Medicaid funding give some women only one option? Has the easy access to abortion clinics compromised conscience formation? Similarly, to the extent that the idea of choice promotes unrestricted experimentation on genetic material and on fertility mechanisms, it may actually work against the good of women and of future generations. Reproductive freedom must increasingly be considered from the perspective of the long-term consequences of uncontrolled medical experimentation.

Ironically, much of this rethinking has been precipitated by recent expositions of the prochoice argument coming in the wake of mature feminist scholarship. Beverly Harrison’s Our Right to Choose (Beacon, 1983), for example, is an excellent defense of the position that people have an inalienable right to make intentional choices concerning their reproductive lives. The right to choose abortion is grounded in claims to moral agency and bodily and psychic integrity. Harrison’s view assumes a world of rational choice and volitional privilege.

The flaw in her argument is perhaps more one of bad anthropology or psychology than of bad faith. It leaves no room for the unexpected, for serendipity, for mystery, ambivalence or transformation. Some women do change their minds about whether or not they wish to carry a pregnancy to full term. Many "unwanted" children do become "wanted." If for women reproductive behavior is, finally, an issue of control and intentional management, then we would seem to be mimicking the male culture’s instrumental relationship to nature. Furthermore, Harrison’s perspective seems to skirt consideration of the legitimate interests and claims of the body politic. It is an elitist argument, one that ignores people’s limitations and the complexity of their lives. Nevertheless, her ethic is the best current defense of each woman’s intrinsic right to moral agency in her reproductive life and, especially, in the process of forming intimate attachments and relationships -- since a woman’s willingness and ability to nurture a child is the ultimate issue in the decision about whether or not to have one.

Another ethical perspective on abortion might be described as the altruistic norm, clearly represented on the political spectrum by the prolife contingent. The most visible and articulate proponents of this view are the Catholic Church’s magisterium and the religious New Right. They treat all fetal life -- early and late -- as possessing absolute value and full human rights. The bad faith that has come to characterize this perspective is clearly evident in the role that many prolife advocates have played in a confrontational, often obstructionist, single-issue politics, often bordering on fanaticism and ignoring the wider spectrum of prolife issues.

Although the Catholic hierarchy has attempted to redress this imbalance, bad faith also plagues its position. The church’s stand on abortion is a "moral teaching" -- it is not a doctrine of faith. The church has at times changed its moral teachings -- for example, it condemned slavery after having accepted it for centuries. Its traditional teaching on abortion and contraception has by no means been marked by consistency.

Nevertheless, the church currently persists in treating the prohibition of abortion as if it were a fundamental Christian doctrine. It places an absolute value on fetal life as full human life from the moment of conception. Yet in its own definitive formulation of the issue in the 1974 declaration by the Sacred Congregation, it acknowledged the impossibility of determining the precise moment of "ensoulment." The declaration states that while there is no certainty, the possibility that the fetus might be ensouled precludes risking an act that might be homicide.

Carol Tauer, a philosopher at Minnesota’s St. Catherine’s College, has recently challenged the moral logic of this declaration, as well as of the current pastoral teachings on abortion, in an incisive and thorough analysis of the tradition of probabilism -- a theory of practical decision-making that is accepted in Catholic moral teaching. She points out that the church is at odds with its traditional way of making moral determinations, whether in questions of fact or of law (Theological Studies, June 1984).

That the embryo does not progress to individuation before the fourth week, as embryological research on twinning and recombination has proven, is crucial to determining whether or not it should be treated as a person. Similarly, our knowledge of cortical development provides sound biological as well as philosophical reasons for treating hominization as delayed. (Some opinions mark the tenth week as the onset of true hominization.) Tauer notes that in the earliest tradition of the church, abortion was not considered homicide until the fetus was "formed." She concludes by invoking the probabilistic criterion that the "rights of an uncertain subject are automatically uncertain rights," and, therefore, for all practical purposes do not exist -- or at least do not have the same status as the rights of those unequivocally recognized as persons. In any case, current embryological research now allows us to draw moral hypotheses with much more precision than we could in 1974.

Why is the Catholic Church so reluctant to follow its own tradition of moral logic and allow the benefit of a doubt in early abortions? As Lisa Cahill, Joan Timmerman and other theologians suggest, its position may have as much to do with mistaken analogies as with logic. For example, the church’s teachings on abortion and on sexual morality in general seem to have been contaminated by the mythology of the "sacredness of sperm," which dates back at least as far as Aristotle and is known to have persisted through the 19th century in the United States. Theologians also point out that, in contrast to the church’s teachings on social ethics and justice, its stands on sexual morality have been governed more by absolute abstract norms than by references to the human condition and experience. Here again, one notes the absence of woman’s moral perspective, with its sensitivity and proximity to contextuality and consequences. Another evidence of bad faith has been the Catholic hierarchy’s failure to emphasize contraceptive options and education. Their lingering proscription of contraception inevitably trivializes abortion.

In the absence of any consensus about abortion, a third ethical norm may prevail by default: the therapeutic/technological norm. This inexorable force, driven by the desire for profit and control, could result in the medicalization and commercialization of human reproduction. Paradoxically, the new technology makes women vulnerable to exploitation at the same time that it promises them the illusion of choice. Sperm banks, frozen embryos, artificial placentas and surrogate mothers are opening a breach between women and their reproductive processes -- a breach that makes women extremely vulnerable to exploitation. Lawyers, physicians, legislators, counselors, consultants, matchmakers, middlemen, marketing strategists, entrepreneurs and opportunists are already rushing in. One manager of a "bionetics" company in California has suggested that Mexican and Central American women would be ideal, low-cost "host mothers." In some Third World countries, sex-selection techniques already are resulting in the mass destruction of female embryos. Elsewhere, drug companies and genetic engineering firms are engaged in "ova snatching," embryo transfer techniques, transnucleation and ectogenesis. The potential for the exploitation of such technologies begins to acquire almost surreal proportions.

Another new medical development may provide an ambiguous solution to the abortion dilemma: home health-care kits for diagnosing and treating oneself have been welcomed as an antidote to "medicalization." It is anticipated that a low-priced suppository or pill that can induce abortion in the early weeks of pregnancy will soon be available. If such a product is marketed, it is likely to become a popular form of contraceptive -- not only discouraging research on other contraceptives, but making abortion a completely privatized and commercialized act.

Neither a narrowly conceived prochoice nor a prolife agenda can provide an adequate standard for the future. Neither the imperial self nor the imperialism of dogma and sanction (law) can solve the abortion dilemma. A responsible new ethic must certainly take into account the primacy of personal conscience and of women’s experience, as well as the effects and consequences of reproductive choices on the common good. Perhaps, for want of a better term, it might be described as an "ethic of cocreation." Such an ethic would assume that we exist as individuals only within larger life systems. These constitute concentric envelopes of responsibility. Our relationships to the earth, to our culture and to our families of origin are not intentional -- we did not choose our planet, our civilization or our ancestry. But this absence of choice does not excuse us from taking responsibility for all that these areas encompass. An ethic of cocreation would counterbalance our tendency to a rationalistic and individualistic bias. It would make us more open to exigency and to the unpredictable -- to creation as surprise. It would also help us to regard death, imperfection and dissolution as normal phenomena in the continuum of life. At the same time, it must be based on the moral agency and autonomy of women, the primary guardians of life for the species. For too long we have had to make either-or choices about whether to regard the fetus as a person or a nonperson. Could we not assign, instead, a unique value to this nascent human life, without criminalizing and traumatizing those who, caught in overwhelming predicaments, choose not to carry it to term?

Marking the boundaries of the onset of personhood in fetal life is, in a sense, a superficial aspect of the abortion debate. What is at stake is a post-Enlightenment, rights-based ethic that tends to objectify fetal life at a very early stage, reducing the abortion dilemma to a conflict of rights -- some favoring those of the fetus, some favoring those of the woman. A truly Catholic ethic might show more respect for the symbiotic nature of very early uterine life by regarding a woman and her fetus as a single organism, with one informing consciousness -- that of the woman. Our tolerance for such ambiguity seems to diminish as our culture’s tendency to objectify everything accelerates.

A truly Catholic ethos emphasizes the sacrality of matter and substance; it nuances everything, from our understanding of the Eucharist to sexual experience. As Americans in a pluralistic society, however, we must create a milieu for moral decision-making that is somewhere between value conferred by intention or relation alone, and the abstract mystical fetishism that deifies the substance of human life in and of itself. This is not to understate in any way the dignity and value of human life, indeed of all life forms.

For women making decisions about having abortions, moral agency is often a luxury canceled out by social, economic and psychological suffering. Clearly, assuring women’s moral freedom and establishing a social policy that provides them with real options so that they can take responsibility for life and make authentic decisions of conscience ought to be the priority for both the prolife and the prochoice groups.

We should be grateful that the Catholic Church, among others, continues to preach the protection of innocent and defenseless life. On the other hand, we should be outraged that some of the Catholic hierarchy are so recalcitrant that they continue to harass conscientious men and women who support prochoice public policies, and so squinting in their vision that they may oppose the ERA simply because the amendment might allow women the right to choose abortions. It is too bad that so much of the energy of one of the greatest engines of conscientization the world has ever known -- the Catholic Church -- should be spent on regulating women’s anatomy instead of promoting their autonomy and empowerment as moral persons.

Ironically, it is the Catholic tradition that today proclaims so forcefully the epistemological privilege of the poor. In the many senses in which the gospel speaks of the poor -- materially deprived, disempowered, marginated, overburdened, helpless -- women often have been the poorest of all. Their experiences and perspectives, therefore, have a special claim on our attention. Women’s experience will be the hermeneutic of the future. Solomon’s wisdom is worth remembering: let those who are most intimately affected by the consequences of a decision make that decision.

Are ‘Mother’ and ‘Father’ Appropriate Titles for Protestant Clergy?

As more and more women enter the ministry, the question emerges in a new way. The issue has become especially problematic in the Episcopal Church, where more than 800 women have been ordained since 1976 into a priesthood whose ranks include many called "Father."

What do you call a woman priest? Two Episcopal priests, Julia M. Gatta and Eleanor McLaughlin, argue in an article by that title (Episcopal Times, October 1981) that "Mother" is the appropriate form of address. Gatta and McLaughlin cite precedents ranging from maternal images for the church and its ministry (Matt. 23:37 and Gal. 4:19) to the Christian practice of calling charismatic women in the desert communities "amma" ("mother") and heads of monastic communities of women "abbess" ("mother").

The authors argue that other possible formal titles -- "Sister," "Mrs.," "Miss," "Ms." and "Doctor" -- put women in subordinate, diminutive or secular roles. Only "Mother," they conclude, "can most easily incorporate [ordained] women into the ongoing tradition of the Church -- a tradition which has recognized the spiritual motherhood of saintly women and of the God whom they served" (p. 4).

Linguist Donald D. Hook also endorses "Mother" as the most appropriate title ("‘Mother’ as Title for Women Priests: A Prescriptive Paradigm," Anglican Theological Review [October 1983], pp. 419-424). Finding that Episcopal usage lacks the parallel titles for men and women clergy, Hook sets up a prescriptive paradigm to facilitate the acceptance of the "best possible title." For Hook that word is "Mother" -- a title, he asserts, that is at once not only familiar and descriptive but also reflects for clergy "the right relationship between man and woman in Christ.’’

Gatta, McLaughlin and Hook speak for the growing number who advocate ‘‘Mother" as the appropriate title for Episcopal women priests. Yet the many Episcopalians who resist using "Father" can likewise be expected to oppose the use of "Mother." And most Protestants would undoubtedly reject both titles. "A wall goes up whenever I hear clergy addressed as ‘Father’ and ‘Mother,"’ a Protestant churchwoman recently told me.

Such opposition, however, is ironic in the context of church history. For American Protestants regularly called their clergy "Father" 200 and 300 years ago, and some continued to do so a century ago. And during the same years, Protestants addressed venerated women in their churches as "Mother."

The title "Father" was used in four ways in addressing clergy (see my article, "Fathers and Brethren," Church History [September 1968], pp. 298-318). In early America "Father" was a title of respect for elderly men. Although, for example, "Mister" (the designation of a gentleman and a college graduate) was the normal title for Puritan clergy in colonial New England, Congregationalists. Baptists, Methodists and German Reformed commonly addressed older ministers as "Father" well into the 19th century.

Furthermore, Protestants also employed the title for younger ministers who influenced Christian commitment and served as spiritual fathers. This usage is evident in the correspondence between early American ministers and their theological students. The journals of Methodist circuit riders as well as the records of Protestant missions to Indians and seamen also indicate this usage. Herman Melville, for example, based his character Father Mapple -- the whaleman-chaplain in Moby Dick -- on Father Edward Thompson Taylor, the Methodist pastor of Boston’s Seamen’s Bethel.

Protestants of earlier centuries also addressed founders of denominations and religious communities as "Father." American Methodists, for example, referred to John Wesley not only as "Mr. Wesley" but also as "Father Wesley." Following the custom in both genders, the Shakers called their matriarch ‘‘Mother’’ and their male leaders "Father."

Closely related was the custom of calling missionary pioneers "Father." In the 19th century, Presbyterian, Baptist, Congregationalist, German Reformed, Methodist and Universalist missionaries were given the title throughout the New South and West. And American Lutherans used "Father" for their pioneer pastors, their first missionary to India, and their patriarch, Father Henry Melchior Muhlenberg.

Few in Protestant churches of earlier generations would have seen a theological problem in addressing spiritual fathers, founders or missionary pioneers as ‘Father." Just as the author of I John addressed as "fathers" the elderly who were advanced in the knowledge of Christ (I John 2:13-14), so Protestant churches applied the title to experienced ministers who had been long in the service of the church. "Fathers and Brethren" sat in ecclesiastical assemblies, and in the New Testament "Father" denoted the difference between generations.

Moreover, if calling clergy "Father" had violated biblical norms, the Christian Church and Disciples of Christ surely would have opposed it, for these groups were formed in an attempt to restore not only the doctrine and practice of primitive Christianity, but also its very nomenclature. Warren Stone’s motto was "Bible names for Bible things." And Thomas and Alexander Campbell stood on the phrase, "Where the Bible speaks, we speak: where it is silent, we are silent." Ridiculing "Reverend" and "Doctor" as "unscriptural," Alexander Campbell even employed the words of Jesus in Matthew 23:8-10 as a motto for his magazine, the Christian Baptist.

Yet church history clearly indicates that members of the Restoration Movement commonly addressed both the Campbells and Stone as "Father." Furthermore, the three founders used the term for their own clergy as well as for each other. And none of the movement’s opponents ever seemed to exploit a contradiction in the movement’s use of "Father" as a clerical title. They apparently saw no contradiction.

The use of "Mother" for Mother Ann Lee of the Shakers, for Mother Mary Baker Eddy of Christian Science and for Mother Ellen Gould White of the Seventh-day Adventists clearly illustrates that some 19th-century women religious leaders received the title. And from the time that Protestant denominations began ordaining women in the 19th century, some women clergy have been addressed as mother.

But in the mid-19th century, Protestants began to drop the titles. By the 1920s, only Roman Catholic, Eastern Orthodox and some Episcopal clergy and nuns were being addressed as ‘‘Father’’ or "Mother." The evidence suggests three reasons for this change in nomenclature.

Most significantly, the decline of "Father" in Protestantism coincides with the rise of Irish immigration to the United States in the 1840s. Before that time, Roman Catholic priests in America were usually addressed as "Mister," for most were secular (nonmonastic) clergy with roots in Europe or England, where Roman Catholic practice restricted "Father" to priests of monastic orders. Secular priests were called "Mister," "Monsieur," "Don" or other vernacular equivalents.

Irish Roman Catholics, however, addressed all priests -- whether secular or monastic -- as "Father." And by the end of the Victorian period, the Irish had influenced English-speaking Roman Catholicism to call every priest "Father."

This change clearly influenced Protestant usage. Catholic priests called "Mister" and protestant clergy called "Father" had lived side by side in America. Following the Irish immigrations, however, Protestants began to see the title as redolent of priestcraft and popery.

The reaction was quick. As early as the 1840s, a venerable Congregationalist pastor in Massachusetts suddenly rejected being called "Father" because he "hated every rag of the scarlet lady" (Proceedings at the Celebration of the Fiftieth Anniversary of the Ordination and Settlement of Rev. Richard S. Storrs . . .[Boston, 18611, p.83). As the 19th century progressed, such reactions became more common.

Second, a literalist, increasingly polemic interpretation of Matthew 23:9 ("And call no man your father upon the earth: for one is your Father, which is in heaven" [KJV]) supported the change in nomenclature. Like the Reformers, early American Protestants tended to believe that the Matthean passage condemned pharisaic vainglory rather than specific titles. That interpretation was natural, for a literal interpretation of the surrounding verses would also forbid Christians from using "Teacher" and "Mister."

Nevertheless, as more and more Irish Catholic priests moved into the United States, Protestants began to assert that "Father" was unbiblical. The literalist interpretation of Matthew 23:9 became a standard weapon in the arsenal of anti-Catholicism. "He didn’t like to be called Father," wrote a minister about a colleague in 19th-century Massachusetts.

"He wanted to be called Brother Jones. He often used to say: Call no man father upon the earth"’ (Richard Eddy. Universalism in Gloucester, Massachusetts [Gloucester, 1892], p. 98). As a result of this reaction, the 20th century brought generations of American Protestants who knew nothing of ministers addressed as "Father."

Finally, "Father" seems to have died out because it was replaced in Protestant clerical circles by "Doctor." During the colonial period, American colleges conferred few honorary D.D.s or S.T.D.s, and then only on ministers of considerable distinction. From 1636 to 1776, Harvard and Yale together awarded only four S.T.D.s and one D.D.

In the 19th century, however, new denominational colleges proliferated across America. To acquire respectability -- and financial support -- they awarded numerous D.D.s. Standards declined, and ministers openly sought the degree. In 1875 alone, church colleges in America conferred 138 honorary D.D.s -- more than the grand total conferred by all American colleges during the colonial period.

Thus the title of ‘Doctor" gradually replaced "Father" as the professional expectation for Protestant parish clergy. Most Protestant ministers now looked forward to being called" Doctor," honoris causa, so "Father" (and its companion "Mother") virtually disappeared from Protestant use.

In a class by itself is "Reverend." The most common designation for contemporary Protestant clergy, it also seems the most objectionable. To be sure, "Reverend" is gender-free. But it possesses neither a biblical nor a patristic lineage. The King James Version employs the word only once (for God, in Psalms 111:9), and modern versions change even that translation. The title was not used for Christian clergy until the 15th century. And above all, calling only the minister "Reverend’’ seems to contradict Protestant teachings about priesthood and vocation.

On first glance the unsexed noun ‘Doctor" would seem to be an appropriate title. It, however, comes from the academy; as such, as Gatta and McLaughlin declare, it fails "to dramatize the unique and intimate relationship" that clergy have with the community of Christians. A whiff of vain-glory may also surround expectations that church colleges should reward service to Christ with a doctorate.

On first glance also, the simple "Mr.," "Mrs.," "Miss" and "Ms." (or the British honorific "Dame") seem acceptable. By using these, women clergy receive a title parallel to those of their male colleagues. That all of these titles were heavily class-oriented in earlier centuries seems a small matter today.

But an overriding problem remains: Titles like "Mr." and "Ms." are secular and unecumenical, and hence remain open to the same criticism as academic titles. As Hook points out, they fail to portray "esteem, trust, and significant pastoral and family-type relationships."

In contrast, "Brother" and "Sister" seem far more appropriate. They place authority within the context of a family, and they are biblical in origin. The titles are historical and ecumenical; Roman Catholics, Eastern Orthodox and most other Christian traditions (including Anglican evangelicals) have used them. Given the words of Jesus in Mark 3:35, the titles could also prove exhortative.

Yet "Brother" and "Sister" carry with them an almost insurmountable practical problem: the expectation that both clergy and laity will receive them. Such a thoroughgoing reform of congregational language seems improbable, if not impossible, in many denominations.

As for "Father" and "Mother," any argument for their revival must overcome at least three obstacles.

First, Protestants seek biblical warrant for doctrine and practice, and there is no scriptural evidence that early Christians used "Father" or "Mother" as titles for ordained people. When it emerged as a church title in the patristic period, "Father" applied only to bishops. To be sure, Paul refers to himself as the "father" of some Christian communities and individuals, but only because he nurtured them in the gospel. No congregation called him "Father Paul."

Second, during the centuries when American Protestants addressed ministers as "Father," they conferred the title voluntarily on deserving ministers; they did not automatically bestow it on every 25-year-old ordinand. Finally, Protestants addressed not only deserving clergy but also revered laity as "Father" and "Mother".

Hence the quest for an appropriate title is elusive. However, one title may -stand out from the others: "Pastor." "Pastor" is at once biblical, historical, gender-free, reflective of a deeply caring relationship, and consistent with Reformation teachings about priesthood and vocation. It is also the most ecumenical of all possible titles, being used by Christian clergy from storefront preachers to the pope.

But until or unless the other major Christian traditions adopt the title of "Pastor," all Protestants might consider lowering walls and contributing in a small but significant way to the ecumenical movement by voluntarily calling their clergy "Father" and "Mother." Protestant churches in America conferred "Father’’ and "Mother" voluntarily without controversy for 200 years; they could surely do so again. And lest ministers "make their phylacteries broad and their fringes long and . . . love . . . salutations in the market places" (Matt. 23:5-7), the titles should remain voluntary.

"Father" and "Mother" do not violate biblical nomenclature, and they have the sanction of Protestant tradition. Neither sacerdotal nor conventual, they have been employed by fervent Baptists as well as by biblicist Disciples of Christ. Not terms of self-exaltation, they were used voluntarily by congregations and colleagues to express affection and respect. More than "Mr.," "Mrs ," "Ms.," "Dame" or "Dr.," "Father" and "Mother" portray the strong familial nature of Christ’s church.

How Jesus Put an End to Sacrifice

Christians are often urged to get over their exclusive focus on Christ’s death. There have been numberless crucifixions, numberless religious sacrifices, we are told. It happens all the time. Yet Christians talk about this death as ‘once for all." They sing: "For my pardon, this I see, / Nothing but the blood of Jesus; / For my cleansing this my plea, / Nothing but the blood of Jesus." Christians are fixated on Jesus’ death and will accept no other like it. The accusation is perfectly correct. To believe in the crucified one is to want no other victims. To depend on the blood of Jesus is to refuse to depend on the sacrificial blood of anyone else. It is to swear off scapegoats. Sacred violence promises to save us from retaliatory catastrophe. But what will save us from sacred violence? Only some event that may achieve once for all what sacred violence attempts by endless repetition.

The mechanism of sacrifice is the way the powers of this world contain their own violence. But Jesus and the Gospel writers do not intend to endorse or comply with that mechanism.

Seen from this perspective, the somewhat enigmatic actions of Christ make complete sense. To resist victimization by means of counterviolence would be to reinforce the very evil that sacrifice seeks to contain. And it would only feed the demand for sacrifice. On the other hand, to submit passively to the sacrificial mechanism would do nothing to change it. That only smoothes the way for future victims and condemns them to invisibility. Such is the dilemma, the malignant wisdom of an evil that we seem doomed to serve whichever way we turn. Humanity is caught in this bondage, caught without even being able to name it directly. We know not what we do.

This bondage is presented dramatically in the person of Peter in the Gospels, who successively occupies all of these fruitless positions. At Jesus’ first announcement of the passion, Peter objects. This fate must never happen to Jesus. It is incompatible with the role of a victorious Messiah, who presumably must defeat the opposing powers by a direct battle. Later he reverses course and tells Jesus that he is ready to go and die with him. At Jesus’ arrest in the garden, he draws his sword and attempts to violently defend Jesus against the cross. In the first and third cases he is rebuked by Jesus, and in the second Jesus predicts that far from dying with him, Peter will deny he even knows Jesus.

The incomprehension of the disciples is not hard to understand, for we have been reproducing it ever since. How to hold together these apparent contradictions? What is happening to Jesus is wrong, but Jesus must not avoid it. It is shameful that not even one of the disciples will stand up for Jesus, but their abandonment is one of the things that makes the revelation even more complete. God would never build a world on innocent sacrifice, but since humanity did, God will find a way -- once -- -to turn to good what we have founded in evil. We who still find it so hard to make sense of the cross can hardly patronize the stupidity of the disciples.

God steps into this double bind and overcomes it. No other could. Jesus does not encourage his disciples to think they might do what he is doing. This task is appointed to him alone. No ordinary victim can change this process, can uncover what is obscured in the constant practice of scapegoating.

Redemptive violence -- violence that claims to be for the good of many, to be sacred, to be the mysterious ground of human life itself -- always purports to be the means of overcoming sin (removing pollution, punishing the transgressor who has brought disaster on the community). The sin that it characteristically claims to overcome is the offense of the scapegoat, the crime that the victim has committed. But in the passion account set forth in the Gospels the sin in view is that of the persecutors. It is not the sin of the one that jeopardizes the many, but the sin of the many against the one. In the passion narratives, redemptive violence stands forth plainly and unequivocally as itself the sin that needs to be overcome.

Any human being can be plausibly scapegoated (we are all sinners), and no human can prevail when the collective community turns against her. It is not sufficient to simply instruct us about our situation, for we are all too fully enclosed in the scapegoating process to be able to break the spell. It is historically hard to come to see this process for what it is. And it is much more difficult for us to recognize our own actions as scapegoating.

It is an extraordinary step even to arrive at an awareness of our own susceptibility to that dynamic, as is expressed by the disciples at the Last Supper. When Jesus predicts his own betrayal, they piteously ask him, "Is it I, Lord?" A hardheaded reader would object that at this late date they ought to know if they are going to betray him or not. But they have understood enough to know that they can’t be sure. They are not exempt. When the cock crows the third time for Peter, it crows for us, to state the truth that when we become part of a mob, we too will likely be the last to know.

Only one whose innocence can be undeniably vindicated may, by suffering this sacrifice, reverse it. Here we gain an interesting additional perspective on the church’s commitment to a high Christology. The work of the cross is the work of a transcendent God, breaking into a cycle we could not change alone. It is a saving act of God, a victory over the powers of this world, a defeat of death.

If we limit Jesus’ work to that of a human exemplar, the crucifixion becomes more of a prescription for suffering than if we grasp it as the work of the incarnate one, once for all. The place of the ritual victim is open to all, and refilled perpetually Jesus’ role cannot be replaced and therefore should not be.

The human situation is not just one of ignorance about the mythic process of scapegoating, though even at this level it is hard to see how people can "think their way out." From inside the process, the misrecognition of what is happening, the invisibility of victims, is difficult to overcome because, though the process operates on lies, no one is consciously telling any. Everyone acts in good faith in the sacrificial system, and no clues are left to stir up trouble.

But the problem is a good deal more serious than this. Even were people to grasp the situation, there would still be no way out of it. The testimony of the gospel is that only God has had the power to solve this dilemma of human bondage, the no-win choice between using violence to stem violence (which is only more of the sacrificial prescription) and simply joining the line of victims. It is God alone who can reveal the entire reality of the sacrificial process, reverse through resurrection its obliteration of victims, and structure an alterative option for human solidarity.

This is why Christ is explicated in the New Testament as the truth, the life and the way. Each of these tasks requires an act of transcendent power and wisdom. It is a complete misunderstanding to suppose that what we have been discussing might be reduced to some sociological or anthropological insights, clothed in symbolic, religious terms. Anomalous as such knowledge might be, it would hardly be sufficient to save and reconcile humans in the midst of such conflicts.

True teachings are dangerous, the Buddha is supposed to have said. And the best teachings are the most dangerous. The theology of the cross an be the best or the worst. The two are poised close together. The cross is a kind of intersection, where different atonements meet.

The Romans are at odds with the Judean Jews. Jewish factions are at odds with each other. The Romans are afraid of rebellion. The religious leaders are afraid of repression. Pilate is ready to make Jesus a politically redemptive sacrifice, to keep his contagious preaching from stirring social crisis. Some of the chief priests are ready to make Jesus a religiously redemptive sacrifice, to keep his blasphemy and sin from contaminating the community.

They all expect Jesus’ death to have a reconciling effect on this situation.

That seems to be precisely what Caiaphas and Pilate have in mind. Jesus’ death makes enemies like Pilate and Herod friends before it even happens. There’s nothing like a little redemptive violence to bring us all together. This is atonement of a sort, but the New Testament was not written to commend it.

Mel Gibson’s movie The Passion of the Christ missed a momentous opportunity to illuminate these aspects of the passion. There are scenes where the occasion to do so lies painfully close at hand. One key point comes when Jesus is brought back before Pilate and the crowd after having been whipped and brutalized. The plot goes to and fro, with Barabbas being released and Pilate temporizing. As things draw on, the throng grows more restive. Pushing and shoving break out in the front ranks between the Roman soldiers and members of the crowd. Conflict is rapidly escalating. This moment of crisis is the catalyst. Things snap. Crucify him, Pilate says.

Satan is a visible figure in Gibson’s film. With that convention, this is the one moment Satan certainly should have appeared (but doesn’t), moving in the crowd and whispering, "We’ve got to get rid of Jesus or he’s going to bring the Romans down on us." And moving among the Roman soldiers, saying, "We’ve got to get rid of Jesus or there will be rebellion and blood on the streets." And nudging up to Peter and John and Mary, advising, "Don’t say anything -- do you want to get killed like that too?" And standing behind Pilate: "It’s for everyone’s good. We have to stop the violence." Satan is the advocate for reconciling persecution, orchestrating it from all sides in an age-old snare that closes around Jesus in a fit of unanimity.

So is this the way God works? Is God really just another member of the crowd, full of wrath at the whole human race and in need of a victim to vent that anger, a victim around whom God and his former enemies can gather in peace? Is this God’s plan, on a cosmic scale, to avoid killing us all?

We have gone astray if we think that God endorses the mechanism of scapegoating sacrifice and that the crucifixion is just the largest and most powerful example. Such a view leaves the mechanism unquestioned and focuses instead on the special qualities of the victim: God feeds a bigger and better victim into this machinery to get a bigger payoff. But that is not the truth. Jesus’ accusers intend his death to be sacrificial business as usual. But God means it to be the opposite.

I have perhaps made this sound more complicated than it needs to be. It is not as though it has not been expressed often enough, and in a way children can understand. C. S. Lewis did so in his Christian allegory the Chronicles of Narnia. In the land of Narnia the evil powers have imprisoned creatures by turning them to stone, one by one.

These powers have been aided by a human traitor, Edmund, who has gone over to their side, but whom they now intend to sacrificially slaughter. He is rescued at the last minute and returns to fight on the side of the Christ-lion Aslan. But the evil powers under a flag of truce insist that Edmund must be handed over to them, that there must be retribution for every treachery, death for death. The Christ-lion Asian agrees to be handed over and killed in Edmund’s place, on the condition that the evil powers renounce their claim on his life.

This law of retribution and the sacrificial process of exchange based on it (in which an innocent one may die on behalf of others and so protect them) are known to all from the earliest times. Lewis calls it "Deep Magic from the Dawn of Time." This has been going on for ages. There is an ancient stone altar on which Edmund was to be killed, and upon which Asian is actually sacrificed. The act has a mysterious, sacred aura and an air of inevitability. The evil powers love this arrangement and, incidentally, have no intention of keeping their bargain. Once Asian is dead, they intend also to kill those he meant to save. This treachery is a key point, because it tips off the reader that this exchange itself cannot be the final word, nor the substance of the divine plan. It is a decidedly lower magic.

The resurrection comes into this story as an unexpected development, from what the book calls "Deeper Magic from Before the Dawn of Time," something about which the evil powers know nothing. The violent mystery of sacrifice goes back to the dawn of human time, but it has no purchase on the original blessing of creation that stands even further back still.

And when AsIan rises from the dead, the ancient stone altar on which the sacrifice was offered cracks and crumbles in pieces, never to be used again. The substitution of Asian for Edmund cannot save if it is simply a variation on the same sacrificial theme rather than an act to overthrow the process altogether. The stained stone may have been the centerpiece of religion and sacred awe in human history. But it was not God’s altar. The gospel is not ultimately about exchange of victims, but about ending bloodshed.

The terms and structure of scapegoating sacrifice are laid bare in the Bible. This is the first side of the cross. In the Bible, particularly in the passion narratives, the terms are actively turned against themselves. That is the second side of the cross. In the traditional practice of sacrifice, the divine powers typically stood on the side of the crowd and endorsed its violence. But the God of Israel becomes a God who sides with Job and with the persecuted victims of the Psalms, the God of the prophets. And in the New Testament God becomes the scapegoat. The afflicted one was always assumed to be punished by divine wrath as well as by unanimous human judgment. In this case it is God who is condemned by consensus, who is punished as an enemy of God. It is God who undergoes the sacrificial process in order to turn it inside out. Sacrifice is turned against sacrifice.

A Different Kind of Islamic State

Delegates to the World Council of Churches’ Faith and Order Commission meeting in Kuala Lumpur in August had the novel experience of seeing their sessions covered in the Malaysian media with the intensity that normally attends national elections or the latest developments in the "Malaysian Idol" competition. Malaysian Christians enjoyed this unprecedented public attention given to their church life. The government and most media celebrated the event -- the first major WCC meeting ever held in a Muslim country -- as testimony to the country’s diversity and harmony.

As the world goes, Malaysia is an undeniable and unusual example of multicultural success. The country’s Muslims, who are of Malay origin, constitute 55 to 60 percent of the population. Some 25 percent are of Chinese origin and another 10 percent are of Indian origin. Christians constitute 7 percent of the population, and there are significant Hindu and Buddhist communities. Malaysia holds a rare place as an Islamic country viewed with hope by many Muslims as well as many non-Muslims around the world. The government has firmly opposed Islamic extremists -- though reportedly some extremist groups, including al-Qaeda, have used the country as a staging ground for attacks carried out elsewhere.

In the streets of Kuala Lumpur, Western tourists and business people mingle with many young vacationing Saudi couples, typically a man in T-shirt and blue jeans and a woman enveloped in black save for her eyes. Our acquaintances frequently took pains to explain that this extreme of Muslim dress typically marked foreigners, whereas the dress of Malaysian women runs a gamut from discreet but relaxed to actively fashionable.

Malaysians of various backgrounds extolled the country’s harmony and endorsed its basic social contract. This sentiment did not exclude awareness of real problems, one of which is the condition and status of large numbers of foreign workers (half of them illegal) from Indonesia, the Philippines and India.

The positive outlook appears to be rooted in two factors. The first is a lively lack of complacency. Malaysians look around and know that the peace they enjoy is fragile. At independence in 1957, many predicted racial or religious civil war for the country, and a communist insurgency was put down only after a major struggle. The second factor is the Malaysian economic miracle. As one of the Asian "tigers" alongside Singapore, Hong Kong, South Korea and Taiwan, Malaysia has seen development lift all ethnic boats. And everyone understands that ethnic conflict could reverse that reality, driving off the foreign investment, tourism and multinational corporations that have been carefully courted.

On the current world stage Malaysia looms larger than its size, as an example of an authentically Muslim state that is also religiously and culturally diverse, economically successful, educationally advanced, democratically governed and politically moderate. Currently chairing both the nonaligned movement and the Organization of the Islamic Conference, Malaysia prides itself as a country forging an Islamic model very different from that in Saudi Arabia or Iran. It is hard to imagine those countries allowing, much less welcoming, a meeting of the World Council of Churches. According to some definitions of Islam (within the Islamic tradition or outside it), Malaysia is a country that ought not to exist. Its robust reality is a hopeful sign.

This is not to downplay the often difficult situation of non-Muslim religious minorities. Nor is it to deny that some among them sense a steady pressure toward the greater Islamicization of a society that a Western observer would already regard as lacking certain fundamental religious liberties. A man who marries a Muslim woman must adopt Islam. Proselytism of Muslims is forbidden by law, and what might count as such proselytism is in principle quite broad. On many points, decisions of Islamic religious courts have the force of national law (a touchy issue when a dispute involves a Muslim and a non-Muslim, or when one spouse in an existing marriage converts to Islam and makes the other members of the family subject to Shari’a determinations on matters such as child custody).

In a very interesting way, Malaysian governmental practice has integrated some features of the traditional dhimmi status prescribed for non-Muslims in a Muslim state by using the quota structure of an affirmative-action regime. Everyone has an ethnic identity (which highly correlates with religious identity) stamped on his or her passport, and a positive discrimination policy reserves quotas of government jobs and university places for Malays.

On the other hand, non-Malay citizens are free to maintain their own private institutions (Chinese schools using the Chinese language, for instance) and many do. The result is a society without full formal equality of individuals before secular law, but with strong community institutions, a robust economy and interlocking patronage structures.

The Malaysian prime minister, Abdullah Ahmad Badawi, took the dramatic step of making a formal visit and address to the Faith and Order Commission, staying afterwards for a luncheon with its officers. This visit was front-page news everywhere in the country, and many papers published the text of his talk. His address hailed the group’s presence in Malaysia as an important act of dialogue between Christianity and Islam, in a context of deteriorating relations that he bluntly said left many Muslims convinced that the "Christian West is once again at war with the Muslim world." And he charged that "the reluctance of the West to recognize and address root causes of terrorism seems to confirm the view that Muslim grievances are not important," with the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as the prime example.

But the dominant point of Abdullah’s talk was the necessity of dialogue, and above all the necessity for those in all faiths to promote moderation in their traditions. He said: "Many people practice their faith in absolutist terms. . . . They refuse to take into account the modem world in which we live. They refuse to understand that so much of religious teaching is shaped by the context of the society in which it originated. For those who are rigid, dogmatic and absolutist, it does not matter whether you are in the tenth century or 21st century, you must live according to the literal teachings of your religion." This rebuke clearly if implicitly targeted Islamic radicalism, along with those of other stripes.

Abdullah’s predecessor, Mahathir Mohamad, was well known for his stinging critiques of the West and for a famous anti-Semitism-laced speech delivered at an Islamic summit conference in 2003. That talk merits close attention. It is sobering in its sense of grievance ("We are all Muslims. We are all oppressed. We are all being humiliated") against "Europeans and Jews." It is sobering in its martial imagery. Its most quoted portion in reference to the Jews runs as follows: "We are up against a people who think. They survived 2,000 years of pogroms not by hitting back, but by thinking. They invented and successfully promoted socialism, communism, human rights and democracy so that persecuting them would appear to be wrong, so they may enjoy equal rights with others. With these, they have now gained control of the most powerful countries and they, this tiny community, have become a world power. We cannot fight them through brawn alone. We must use our brains also."

While Mahathir played on some of the most unsavory notes in contemporary Islamic culture, few commentators at the time noted that he struck those notes in service of doctrinal moderation, in the call for a progressive and reformed Islam, one less captive to narrow traditionalism and more open to science and philosophy. The speech was a brutally frank assessment of the state of Muslim societies as weak, divided and ineffective, with the proof being that "over the past 50 years of fighting in Palestine we have not achieved any result. We have in fact worsened our situation."

Though Mahathir presumed that non-Muslims are on every side seeking to subjugate and humiliate the Muslim community, he argued that the true root of its weakness was internal. It stemmed from a fateful turning point that came at the height of medieval Islamic civilization, with the advent of "new interpreters of Islam who taught that acquisition of knowledge by Muslims meant only the study of Islamic theology. The study of science and technology was discouraged. Intellectually the Muslims began to regress. This is Mahathir’s view of a "fall" of Islamic tradition into the hands of literalists and dogmatic traditionalists.

Although his speech may share the rhetoric of Islamic extremists, it is completely at odds with the schools of law favored by the Taliban or Wahabism. Only an Islam open to new learning and contextual interpretation can embrace science and technology and so defeat its Jewish and Western enemies. This may not be quite how most Westerners frame progressive Islam, but Mahathir’s analysis received a standing ovation from the representatives of Islamic states and attracted much support. It reflects something important about Malaysia’s role in the Muslim world.

The current prime minister is a different personality, much less given to Mahathir’s confrontational idiom. But there is unbroken continuity in the government’s commitment to reform of the tradition. Near Kuala Lumpur the government has built a new International Islamic University, a truly impressive complex with students from all over the Islamic world (many subsidized), sparing no expense to build state-of-the-art programs in areas like electrical engineering and mathematics, as well as in Islamic studies. The religion faculty (many with degrees from top-flight Western universities) combines an inflexible affirmation of the perfection of Qur’anic revelation (and solidarity with global Muslim political grievances) with a very sophisticated interpretive attempt to moderate any aspect of the tradition that stands in the way of economic and technological advance. The university thus offers the world Muslim community assurance of its Islamic purity at the same time that it promises a new era of development.

The newspapers that reported on the WCC meeting were also discussing "Islam Hadhari"(roughly translated as "civilizational Islam"), the phrase the government has given to its vision of a modernized faith. The prime minister’s office is soon to release its first official document outlining this approach, which will be used, among other things, for instructing and directing Shari’a judges in the country, encouraging less traditionalist rulings in some areas.

Just two days after appearing before the World Council meeting, Prime Minister Abdullah gave a keynote address at the General Assembly of the Islamic Da’wah Council of Southeast Asia ("Da’wah" is a rough equivalent of the Christian idea of "mission"). To that audience, he made the same strong plea for moderation, going so far as to indicate a need for new and evoking fatwas (legal edicts) to guide Muslims in new situations. What this means in practice is far short of’ what American Christians might understand as liberal interpretation, for there is no question of considering the Qur’an itself or the model of the Prophet as in any way corrigible. Flexibility is sought in reference to the established deposit of subsequent law and interpretation. The "Islam Hadhari" initiative is being strongly opposed by the most conservative Islamic parties, which regard it as the institution of a new school of law and a departure from Islam. It is regarded with suspicion by some religious minorities who fear it is the umbrella for a more thorough imposition of Islamic norms on all citizens.

Over the days that Faith and Order delegates debated and discussed the many causes of Christian division, they also pondered the promises and tensions of the religious pluralism around them. The people of Malaysia clearly have cultivated a mutual forbearance and harmony capable so far of gentling conditions that elsewhere have speedily degenerated into conflict and violence. Just as clearly, the country is a precious historical experiment. In the post 9/11 world, the future course of that experiment is a matter of global concern. The World Council of Churches representatives grappled with the faces of the Christianity to come in this new millennium, aware that just as much is at stake in the faces of Islam to come, and in the relations that can be forged between the two religions. Well acquainted with the diversity and contradictions in the Christian world, they left with a broader, and ultimately more hopeful, view of the options in the Muslim world.

Before we left Kuala Lumpur my wife and I visited the Islamic Arts Museum of Malaysia, a stunning new building that exhibits a range of exquisite historical objects, scientific as well as artistic. The glories of past Islamic civilization, so pointedly evoked by the prior prime minister, were on abundant display. Almost as interesting was the museum shop, where beautiful reproductions shared space with works of fervent Islamic devotion for all ages and numerous books attacking the theory of evolution. It was as if one had toured the Metropolitan Museum of Art and then browsed through its offerings of Sunday school curricula and creation science booklets.

Malaysia is a country rich in such juxtapositions, sometimes jarring to sensibilities formed in other cultures. The juxtapositions suggest that historical processes rarely repeat themselves identically and that our familiar constellations of ideas and movements are not fixed. They are subject to reformulation. What is under way in Malaysia is one possible future for Islam. And with that Islamic future Christianity may, God willing, have a fruitful and a peaceful appointment.

A Trinitarian View of Religious Pluralism

Christians believe in a complex God, three co-eternal persons living a single enduring communion. The divine life has varied dimensions and allows human interaction with the triune God to take different forms. God’s channels are open on many frequencies. Christian belief in the Trinity originates in the conviction that only such a complex view of God can account for the relation with God that takes place in Christ, the incarnate Word -- a relation that does not replace that of creature to creator, for instance, but adds to it. Only a complex God could take up this radical form of relation with us (becoming one of the creatures within God’s own creation) and offer this peculiar form for our relation with God (communion with God and others through Christ).

In the triune God, the varied dimensions of God belong to all of the persons together, not to any one. Human interaction with the Trinity can "tune" itself to one or more of these dimensions.

There cannot, then, be only one simple way of relating to God. The Trinity is a map that finds room for, indeed requires, concrete truth in other religions, because it allows for a variety of ways of relating to God. It is impossible to believe in the Trinity instead of the distinctive religious claims of all other religions. If Trinity is real, then at least some of these specific religious claims and ends must be real also. If they were all false, then Christianity could not be true.

The simplest way to express this is to consider three dimensions of human relations and three Trinitarian analogies. First, humans can have impersonal relations with each other. For instance, one person receives blood from another person she may never have met. The life processes of the two relate in a very fundamental and physiological way. This is not a "personal" relation in our normal terms, but it sustains or saves human life. Second, humans can have personal encounters with each other, exchanging intentions and feelings, speaking and acting in response to communication from another. These interactions may be face-to-face exchanges, or they may use a medium like writing or art so that it is possible to have a "personal" relation with someone you have never met. Third, there is the human relation of communion. Here you not only encounter and relate to another as a person, but in some measure you share in that person’s life. Empathy and familiarity with someone gives rise to a vicarious capacity to experience his responses, a kind of second nature. These arise in us not instead of our own reactions, but alongside them. Relations of deep love or intimate friendship often reflect this communion.

The polyphony of the three Trinitarian persons is a single divine life that manifests three frequencies analogous to those we have just described. Any one of these dimensions can be the avenue for a genuine relation with God. The distinctive religious ends of various traditions correspond to relations with God in which one dimension conditions or limits the rest. This reality provides the basis for Christians both to affirm the reality of other religious ends and to distinguish them from salvation -- the specific fulfillment Christians seek.

The impersonal dimension of the Trinity: The three divine persons have an impersonal dimension to their relations with each other. Below the level of active agency, life is shared and exchanged among the persons. The life within a single organism or community cannot be isolated in any one place: it exists in the process of the whole. In the Trinity, this is the constant exchange of immanence and emptiness by which each divine person indwells the others and makes way for their indwelling. People who are in close proximity register the physical activities of others, an awareness that need not be conscious. Just as human personhood is not discernible at the level of the molecular interactions in our bodies, so God is impersonal when encountered solely in this dimension. In scripture this dimension of the Trinity is reflected in manifestations of God as wind, fire or a kind of raw, dangerous power, like high-voltage electricity.

God’s relation with creation displays two sides of this impersonal dimension. The first is the "withdrawal" in which God makes space for creation’s own being and freedom. This reflects the continual process in which each triune person continually empties itself or "makes space" within the divine life for the unique identities of the others to be expressed. The second is the immanence with which God sustains creation, reflecting the way that each triune person is fully present in the others. Humans can thus tune in to this dimension of God in two ways, each with its own integrity. God’s contraction to make way for creation makes possible a valid human insight into the insubstantiality of all being. If creation is examined rigorously on this frequency -- through meditation or science -- we can rightly find "emptiness" at its base. Quantum physics provides an illustration, an account in which matter itself seems to dissolve into energy, or mathematical probability. All enduring, distinct identities seem to dissipate.

Such insight, and rigorous practice based on it, result in a religious fulfillment described by Buddhists as nirvana. This insight is far more developed in Buddhism than in any facet of Christian tradition. To realize such emptiness is to cling to nothing, not even an identity, and to be surely delivered from all suffering, estrangement and relationship. Salvation is a distinctly different end, seeking plainly for enduring participation in the dimensions of relation from which nirvana offers release. This Buddhist vision is an accurate description of one of God’s relations with the world. It also grasps an ultimate reality in the divine life -- the emptying of each triune person in relation to the others.

A second way to tune to this frequency is to focus on God’s identity with the world rather than God’s withdrawal from it. In this frequency, the constant flow of the divine life is taken as the substratum of one great self, whose body is the universe. From this perspective, it is a mistake to take emptiness or flux as the real story. Every individual part may change and pass away, like cells in a body, but the one self goes on. When we look deeply into ourselves or nature -- by meditation or science -- we find an underlying reality, present alike in all that is. Quantum mechanics may seem to dissolve matter into "no thing," but in this view all things rest on an underlying order.

The Vedanta tradition of Hinduism expresses this perception powerfully. Brahman, the one unshakable reality, sustains all things by pervading all things. If pursued intensely and separately, this insight suggests an end in which the small "I" of the particular creature resolves into a perfect identity with the one existing "I" of the absolute being. This end is plainly different from salvation, for it relinquishes the distinct identity and reality that God has granted the creature. But it is grounded in a true dimension of God’s own nature and of God’s relation with the world. The creature can realize the impersonal immanence of the divine as his or her sole being, and yield back all unique identity and relations.

Either of the apprehensions we have described can lead reasonably to the conclusion "I am that." The boundaries that mark off any persons or creatures from others are only apparent. All things, including me, are empty or literally one being. The convictions that samsara is nirvana and that atman is Brahman are two distinctive religious conclusions born of such insight. They point to two distinct religious ends, tuned to aspects of the dimension of the divine life we have been discussing.

The personal dimension of the Trinity: Within the Trinity, each of the three persons encounters the others in freedom, with a unique character. The triune God as a whole also encounters humanity in this dimension. It is the impersonal dimension that makes the personal dimension possible. God withdraws and blends in, setting the stage for a free and historical encounter of humans with God as a single "Thou" in the drama of history. In the dimension of personal encounter, relationship with the divine is marked off from oth and acts with humanity er possibilities. This encounter is the characteristic shared feature of biblical and Q ur’anic traditions an encounter with a personal God who speaks and acts with humanity.

What distinguishes this dimension as a whole from the impersonal one is that it allows for, indeed requires, contrast and tension. Encounter points to the fact that the divine is not empty nor is all being already in perfect identity with it. There is a distance between us and God, between us and our religious end, which must be traveled. This dimension has a strong moral emphasis, a drive toward transformation. The motto is not "thou art that," but ‘become what you are called to be."

A trinitarian perspective suggests that what is apprehended in these cases is the external unity of the Trinity, its cooperative unity in willing the good for creation. Faithful response to this encounter can lead to distinct religious fulfillments. Such ends are distinct from the personal communion that constitutes salvation, but they are authentic responses to God’s expressed purpose, grounded in God’s personal character.

Christianity characteristically extends its grasp of the personal dimension of God in two ways. The first is in its conviction that the crucial locus for personal encounter with God is the living person, Jesus Christ. The second is the understanding of God as Trinity, which finds this single divine "I’ grounded in a communion of persons.

The communion dimension of the Trinity: The triune persons do not only share one divine life process. They do not only meet as distinctive others, honoring and enacting their identities. They also enter into communion with each other, indwelling each other as different persons. The incarnation is a window into this trinitarian communion, and the path to participate in it.

This is the dimension of the divine life that constitutes salvation, the dimension that conditions Christians’ participation in the other frequencies of relation. In human experience we know that there is communion so real that a person can rightly say of certain aspects of her own willing, longing or loving that they seem to arise more from the indwelling of the other person than from any purely isolated individuality of her own. The typical feature of this communion is the discovery in ourselves of an openness or response to a third person that we can hardly credit as coming from us, except by virtue of the indwelling of a second in us.

The effect of communion is openness to communion. It is not an accident, of course, that this reflects the classic trinitarian formula that sees in the unity of any two of the triune persons the implied participation of each in the third. The motto of this dimension is "transformation through communion."

Participation in Christ is an instance of communion that opens believers to proportionate participation in all of the dimensions we have discussed. Salvation is a complex state, for in it a person is open to each of the dimensions of the divine life that we have described. That is why it requires sharing with others: it is crucially dependent on intersecting communions. No individual can or could realize the complete fullness of possible relation with God in all these dimensions in a self-contained way. But she or he does approach that fullness through communion with other persons and creatures, each of whom in their relations with God and with others fill out aspects that would be lacking for any one individual. Salvation is actually much more than the sum of any individual perfection.

The way we can most deeply participate in a divine fullness that literally overflows our finite capacities is through mutual indwelling with other persons. Humans’ communion with each other is also an instrument of the fuller communion with God. This is rather like a set of parallel computers or processors that together can solve a problem beyond any one alone, or that can together produce a graphic image of depth and! resolution impossible otherwise. Keeping the trinitarian pattern in mind, we may say quite seriously that the divine nature is so great that even God cannot encompass it except through sharing. Our finite receptions of the triune self-giving multiply each other, in a kind of spiritual calculus that deepens each one’s participation in the communion of the triune life itself.

"Saints" are as much those who have learned to participate by communion in other's communion with God as they are those who have perfected their individual faculties for unity God. This is precisely what the communion of the saints is about. This is also why in Christian tradition the community, the actual concrete body of the church, has been regarded as fundamental to the Christian life, even to salvation itself.

The only truly unique component of the Christian identity is communion in Christ. But we should! not frame this uniqueness as simply one separate kind of relation with God over against any other mode of relation with God. If its distinguishing feature is precisely a relation that reconciles these various dimensions of relation with God in a unity-in-difference, then it must embrace these dimensions as they can be found concretely in other religions. Communion cannot function as an identity of contradiction.

If God is trinity, the various relations with God we have outlined are themselves irreducible, rooted in permanent coequal dimensions of the divine nature. Anyone who clings to the truth of one of the relations in isolation can never be forced from it by pure negation (by being proved flatly wrong); one can only be attracted by the possibility of enhancement. All three dimensions of relation connect with the Trinity's own reality, though not to the same cumulative extent. All three are a feature of the triune God’s integral reality but contact with God in a single dimension does not compel one to participate directly in all dimensions. Participation in God by communion has its own limitation, precluding the intensity and purity of those religious ends that take other dimensions as ultimate and regard! communion as unreal or transitory.

Christians can understand the distinctive religious truth of other religions as rooted in connections with real dimensions of the triune God, I am convinced, for instance, that the Theravadan Buddhist end is, in fact, as that tradition claims, a cessation of suffering. in that concrete respect. it is similar to salvation. But realization of this end relinquishes (as unreal) a whole range of possible relations with God and others whose presence is essential to the end that Christians seek. In that respect the Buddhist end is similar to what Christians mean by loss. The fact that it may be "the same ultimate reality" behind distinct religious experiences does not by any means require that they result in the same religious end.

It is popular in some circles to envision the afterlife as a parliament of world religions—where Jesus and Buddha and Shankara and Muhammad and Confucius and Mahavira and Moses, along with shamans, bodhisattvas and spirit guides of all descriptions would converse and commune together. They would share appreciation for one awesome divine reality, each seeing and celebrating the value of the other’s truth. We rarely note the heavy Christian bias in such a picture.

The charge of Christian bias may seem strange, since many Christians understandably recoil from blending Jesus into such a crowd. What I mean is that this is a vision of personal and interpersonal relation in difference. As such it is an outright rejection of many religious traditions’ ultimate aims. By virtue of its very categories, this picture of a final human end would be unacceptable or inconceivable for Buddha or Shankara, the great sage of Vedanta. In fact, for many religious traditions, this scenario could be at most a kind of kindergarten metaphor, a preliminary and quite unsatisfactory state. Of course, it is not an adequate description of salvation in Christian terms either, but it encompasses many of salvation’s categorical essentials: relation, the integrity of personal selves, communion-in-difference, even a personal relation with Jesus for everyone.

I have tried to sketch the way in which different religious ends might be related to the triune God. This is plainly a Christian description: the faithful in these traditions do not understand themselves and their practice in trinitarian terms. A benefit of this particular description is that it makes clear how other religious traditions would describe Christian experiences in their terms, and why Christians could view those "outside’ descriptions as rooted in real religious truth.

The particular value of this approach for a Christian theology of religions is that it recognizes truth in the convictions of these other traditions in the terms concretely stated arid believed by those within those traditions, and it recognizes their status as true alternatives to Christian faith. This is a fruitful Christian basis for both dialogue and witness.

Recognizing such difference would mean that Christians could understand other religions as something other than secondary means of being Christian. Surely persons may navigate from within any tradition toward the salvation Christians seek, but those traditions are ordinarily and primarily means of attaining their own unique ends, not salvation. Their different ends give them the purchase to interpret the Christian aim as penultimate, and to witness to Christians that they should seek a better way.

In this perspective, the religions play a truly providential role. They reflect the fact that every human response to any dimension of God’s manifestation and revelation meets from God only affirmation, only God’s "yes" of grace. Every response to the divine initiative has its reward. Every quest for relation with God that proceeds on the basis of some dimension of God’s self-giving to us meets the fulfillment for which it aims and hopes. even if it cannot be persuaded to hope further. Insofar as realization of relation with God in one of the dimensions we have discussed excludes communion as a permanent, coequal dimension, it leads to something other than salvation, And, of course, so long as Christians insist on clinging to distinct identities, relations and communion, they will fail to realize the distinctive religious ends of other traditions.

If God had offered creation only one or only all of these other religious ends, God would have done well. And, to sound Pauline, we would have nothing to complain of. The Christian gospel is not about a God who stints on goodness. It is like that first of Jesus’ miracles, when the guests look up in surprise: "You have kept good wine till last."

The Pluralism of Religious Ends Dreams Fulfilled

Imagine for a moment that we meet an angelic visitor who can tell us the future, and we ask whether some person we know will be "saved." Suppose our visitor says, "No, she will not be saved; instead she is going to get everything she truly wants." Suppose, on the other hand, that our visitor says, "Yes, she will be saved, though she will never come to know Christ or have communion with the triune God."

If we are Christians, both of these predictions may seem a bit odd. They point up an ambiguity in our use of salvation. We use the word as if it could refer to only one thing, containing all possible good, and as if there could be only one alternative to it, completely evil. Salvation as a Christian term, referring to a concretely Christian hope, is thoroughly blurred with the notion of some general positive possibility. But not all religions share the concept of salvation, nor would they necessarily find salvation all that attractive.

Both extreme liberal and extreme conservative theologies agree that there is and can be only one religious end, one actual religious fulfillment. They then fight fiercely over the means to that end: Is there one way or many ways? The dogmatic pluralist believes that the particularities of all religions are insignificant. The dogmatic exclusivist believes that the particularities of all religions but one are insignificant. There are good reasons to think that both these positions are mistaken.

It is hard to see how we can take religions seriously and at the same time regard all the distinctive qualities that are precious to each as essentially unimportant in terms of religious fulfillment. Religious traditions agree that the ends they seek are closely linked with the distinctive ways of life that they prescribe. We are often told that it is important to study traditions in their unique texture, to understand them on their own terms. But it is hard to see why that should be so if we already know in advance that specific differences do not correspond to any variation in religious outcomes.

Is there a perspective that honors the distinctive testimony of the various faith traditions as religiously significant? Are there conditions under which various believers’ accounts of their faiths might be extensively and simultaneously valid? If we can give a positive answer to these questions, then we can affirm the various religious traditions in a much more concrete sense than either liberal or conservative theologians allow.

The key to gaining such a perspective is recognizing that religious paths may in fact lead people to the distinctively varied states that they advertise. If different religious practices and beliefs aim at and constitute distinct conditions of human fulfillment, then a very high proportion of what each tradition affirms may be true and valid in very much the terms that the tradition claims. This may be so even if deep conflict remains between the religions regarding priorities, background beliefs and ultimate metaphysical reality.

Two religious ends may represent two human states that no one person can inhabit at the same time. But there is no contradiction in two different persons simultaneously attaining the two ends. Adherents of different religious traditions may be able to recognize the reality of both ends, though they are not able to agree on the explanation of how and why the two ends exist or on the priority they should be given. On these terms, salvation (the Christian end) may differ not only from conditions humans generally regard as evil or destructive but also from those that specific religious traditions regard as most desirable and ultimate. We can avoid the stale deadlock of the instrumental question over what will get you there -- "One way or many ways?" -- by asking with real openness, "Way to what?"

Gandhi wrote, "Religions are different roads converging to the same point," and asked, "What does it matter if we take different roads so long as we reach the same goal? Wherein is the cause for quarreling?" (Actually, it is all too easy to quarrel even given exactly this assumption, as bitter conflict within a single religion shows.) But I ask, "What if religions are paths to different ends that they each value supremely? Why should we object?"

A famous verse of the Bhagavad Gita is often quoted on the presumption that it indicates the identical goal of all religions: "Howsoever people approach Me, even so do I welcome them, for the paths people take from every side are Mine." But Krishna’s declaration in the voice of supreme Brahman would seem to be an equally good charter for a diversity of religious ends, affirming that people will receive different receptions corresponding to their different approaches to ultimate reality. If human beings form their ultimate desires freely from among many options, and then through devotion and practice are able to see those desires actually realized, there is no reason to complain about the process but ample room to differ over which end we should seek. Pluralism looks real. The best explanation for this appearance is that it is real.

Salvation is communion with God and God’s creatures through Christ Jesus. It is the Christian religious end, we might say. This does not mean that there are not other religious ends, quite real ones. It only means that Christians believe that God has offered greater, more inclusive gifts. Christians believe that salvation, the God who offers it, the relations it presupposes and its priority in divine purpose are objectively real. But salvation has to be accepted. It has to be evaluatively true, or it is not realized. Other religious traditions can legitimately take the same reciprocal view of their own religious aim: it is real and supreme, but it can be realized only by those who accept it as so.

A religious end or aim is defined by a set of practices, images, stories and concepts which has three characteristics. First, the set provides material for a thorough pattern of life. It provides a framework that encompasses all the features of life, practical and sublime, current and future. Second, at least some of the elements in the set are understood to be constitutive of a final human fulfillment and/or to be the sole means of achieving that fulfillment. For instance, for Christians, there is a texture of such elements making reference to Jesus Christ. Relation with Christ is believed to be integral to the deepest human fulfillment itself.

Some Buddhists may maintain that all the teachings and instruments used to follow the dharma way are ultimately dispensable, even the eightfold path itself. But they can only be discarded after use, and nothing else is fit to serve the same purpose. One may pass beyond them, but everyone must pass through them.

Third, for any individual or community the religious pattern is in practice exclusive of at least some alternative options. Living in accord with the set of stories and practices necessarily involves choices. "The ascetic life leads to peace" and "The sensual life leads to joy" may both be true reports. But we can practice one pattern comprehensively only at the expense of the other. For our purposes it makes no difference that some may claim that a combined practice of asceticism/sensuality will lead to peace and joy This is itself a practice which, if followed, rules out either the ascetic path or the sensual path in its particularity.

Some fulfillments may be similar enough that the paths associated with them reinforce each other to some degree, as typing and piano playing may both train the fingers. Some ends may simply pose no direct obstacle, one to the other, save the intrinsic division of finite effort needed to pursue both -- like marathon running and single parenthood.

Yet other ends are so sharply divergent that a decisive step in the direction of one is a move away from the other: for example, strict nonviolence and participation in armed revolution. It is obvious that many goods or secondary goals may overlap on the paths to different religious realizations. Discipline is a quality essential to learning the piano or a new language. It is connected with both these different ends, but it is not identical with either of them. If discipline itself were the primary aim, then music or a language would themselves become instrumental means and not ends at all. What for some is an instrument is for others an end.

There is an interesting dynamic balance in the relation of religious ends. The more similar the aims, the more sharply contention arises over whether one path should supersede another. If the aims are nearly identical, this tendency is very powerful. To take a trivial example: If the end in view is word processing, few would not take sides between computers and typewriters as the more adequate tools. On the other hand, the more incommensurable religious ends appear, the less they contend for the same space. Losing weight and learning Spanish are separate aims with distinct requirements. Because they have less concretely in common, there is a proportionally smaller impetus to substitute one for the other. These dynamics are key elements in understanding religious conflict and the possibilities for mutual understanding.

It is certainly possible to fail to actualize any religious end. Instead of achieving one among alternative fulfillments, a person may attain none at all. There are human conditions, whether contemporary or eschatological or both, that no valid religious view seeks as its final end or regards as consistent with its end. Such would be states of perennial suffering, thorough ignorance, or malicious destructiveness toward self or others. On this point there is ample room for common cause among the faiths, for spiritual and practical cooperation to overcome these conditions, even from differing perspectives. There is an enormous difference between a lack of religious fulfillment of any description and the achievement of some religious fulfillment.

In its simplest form, the hypothesis of multiple religious ends is not committed to any particular metaphysical view. Obviously, the universe does have some ultimate character or order. One or more of the religions may in fact describe that order more accurately than others. Each faith’s conception and pursuit of its end is inextricably bound up with these ultimate empirical questions. The answers determine which religion or religions, if any, provide the ultimate and more inclusive framework for the truths in others.

Though we cannot now resolve the differences among religions at this level, religions may prove able to reciprocally recognize the actuality of multiple religious ends. The hypothesis affirms the reality of different experiential states of religious fulfillment. It does not require that all the elements a tradition associates with attainment of that state are empirically true. There is no logical reason why universe with a single religious ultimate might not also encompass a variety of religious ends. The variety could arise because some people establish a primary religious relationship to something other than the religious ultimate, because there are distinctly different ways to relate to that ultimate, or for both reasons.

Recognition of diverse religious ends is the condition for recognition of the decisive significance of our religious choices and development, a significance that the particularistic witness of the individual religions collectively affirms. We can expect a fulfillment in line with the "one and only" path that leads us to it. There is no cogent reason to assume that all people -- the vast majority against their prior conditioning and desires -- will experience only one among these religious ends or some undefined condition beyond any of them. Whether in an eschatological future or here and now, our conditions of religious fulfillment are significantly constituted by the expectations, relations, images and practices that we bring to them.

The lives that lead to the rewards of a Buddhist monastic, a Muslim imam, a Hindu Brahmin priest or a Baptist deacon have unique textures. It is not hard to note generic similarities in these cases: textual devotion, communal structures, ritual practices. But for any person who wishes to attain a religious fulfillment, generic elements alone are entirely insufficient. The person will need particular texts, a specific community, discrete rituals.

In the characteristic religious dialectic, as we progress toward the realization of our aim, we at the same time develop an ever deeper and clearer desire for that end itself above all others. Religious consummation is the entrance into a state of fulfillment by one whose aspiration has been so tuned and shaped by particular anticipations of that state, and by anticipatory participation in aspects of that state, that this end represents the perfect marriage of desire and actuality. It is a dream come true for one whose dream has been tuned to the specific desire for that particular gift and no other. In other words, religious ends are not extrinsic awards granted for unrelated performances -- like trips to Hawaii won in lotteries. To take a Buddhist example, no one is unhappy "in" nirvana or arrives at it unready. This is because the state of cessation of desire is an achievement that life on the right path makes possible. The end is not "enjoyed" until a person becomes what the path to the end makes her or him. The way and the end are one.

We can certainly point to great figures in varied religious traditions who exhibit some common moral and spiritual qualities. But we can hardly deny the different textures of these achievements. If our selected devotees all strike us as having a claim to be good people, it still appears that one would have to choose between one way of being good and another. It is also clear that people in various traditions pursue and claim to participate in religious attainments other than or in addition to moral transformation.

There are, of course, interesting cases in which religious traditions are combined -- cases in which people may follow both Buddhist and Confucian paths, for instance. This only reinforces the point we have been making: Were they not exclusive paths to unique ends, there would be no need to follow two ways, since the same range of ends could be achieved in either one alone. Both are practiced because each constitutes a unique pattern, yielding distinct benefits, benefits in this case regarded as compatible and complementary.

If we give "religious end" an abstract meaning -- the achievement of some religious fulfillment among several possible alternatives and/or the use of religion to serve some generic social role -- then we can say that many if not all paths truly achieve religious ends. There is an "any way" sign at most forks on the religious journey. Each road will get you to a real destination -- but not the same destination. If on the other hand "religious end" is a religious fulfillment of some determinate nature, as described by one of the traditions, then it is clear that it is constituted by certain features to the exclusion of others. There is an "only way" sign at many turnings on the religious journey.

In either case we must acknowledge that all these paths link with each other, that crossover travel is a real possibility. At most points a "two-way traffic" sign is appropriate. Roads can bear travelers over the same ground toward different destinations, whether those travelers pass in opposite directions or go side by side for this overlapping leg of their trip.

This hypothesis of multiple religious ends offers the most coherent foundation to ground three elements I believe are essential for an effective understanding of religious pluralism, even if they are ordinarily thought of as incompatible. The first element is the religious significance of careful study of faith traditions in their particularity. The second is the recognition of distinctive and effective religious truth in other religions, truth that contrasts with that of my own faith. The third is the validity of witness on the part of any one faith tradition to its "one and only" quality, and indeed to the superiority of its end in relation to others. An authentic religious pluralism acknowledges a diversity of religious ends. This implies that religious witness is also in order. Where witness can have no meaning, it is doubtful that dialogue does either.

This approach shifts the focus away from flat claims of truth and falsehood and toward concrete religious alternatives. We ask not "Which religion alone is true?" but "What end is most ultimate, even if many are real?" and "Which life will I hope to realize?"

Let us presume for the moment that the following ends are actual possibilities: the cessation of self, the realization of an absolute single self which is "nondual," and communion with the triune God. These are real human possibilities, whose attainment depends significantly on the practice and aspiration of the person who attains them. The ends are not identical, and in reaching one we will not automatically attain others. That is, in approaching religious differences emphasis falls on the contrast of their positive ends.

As a Christian, it appears to me to make perfectly good sense to say two kinds of things. First, we may say that another religion is a true and valid path to the religious fulfillment it seeks. We may agree with the Dalai Lama, for instance, when he says, "Liberation in which ‘a mind that understands the sphere of reality annihilates all defilements in the sphere of reality’ is a state that only Buddhists can accomplish. This kind of moksha or nirvana is only explained in the Buddhist scriptures, and is achieved only through Buddhist practice." There is no way to the Buddhist end but the Buddhist way.

Second, we may say what the Book of Acts says of Jesus Christ, that "there is salvation in no one else, for there is no other name under heaven given among mortals by which we must be saved" (Acts 4:12). There is a relation with God and other creatures made possible in Christ that can be realized only in communion with Christ.

On these terms, each tradition can acknowledge the reality of the religious end sought by the other, in terms largely consistent with those used by that tradition itself. After describing the Buddhist end, the Dalai Lama says, "According to certain religions, however, salvation is a place, a beautiful paradise, like a peaceful valley. To attain such a state as this, to achieve such a state of moksha, does not require the practice of emptiness, the understanding of reality. In Buddhism itself we believe that through the accumulation of merit one can obtain rebirth in heavenly paradises. . ." The Christian end, then, is something like one of the pleasant interludes that Buddhists may enjoy between births as a reward for merit on their path toward true release. As a kind of mirror image, a Christian might say that Buddhists do not attain Christian salvation, as their aim does not lead to that personal relationship with God which is salvation. Instead they attain peace, cessation of all desire and emptiness of self. The Buddhist end is then something like a transitory mystical state that Christians might experience in the course of their path toward personal communion with God.

These are classically inclusivist views, which interpret other faiths ultimately in the categories of the home religion. But each recognizes the distinctive reality of the other’s religious end, and so recognizes a diversity of religious ends. Each regards the other’s ultimate as penultimate, leaving open the further possibility of transformation. There is no necessary contradiction in these two accounts of possible human ends, though there is a decisive divergence in their evaluative frameworks for these ends, and there are contradictions in the metaphysical assumptions associated with each framework. Both accounts could be flatly wrong. But there is no logical reason that both cannot be descriptively correct. In fact, if one of the writer’s characterizations is correct, it implies a very substantial measure of truth in the other. Accepting different religious ends allows for mutual recognition of extensive concrete substantive truth in another tradition. Ironically, this degree of mutual agreement about particulars is ruled out by those who insist that the Buddhist end and the Christian one must be the same.

As I have noted, the hypothesis of multiple religious ends is not committed to any particular view of the religious ultimate. My interest in the hypothesis is grounded in part in the way that it validates particularistic Christian confession, but as such the hypothesis also supports those in other religious traditions who are committed to the distinctive truth of their confession. I believe that the true order for religious diversity is rooted in the triune God of Christian confession. In my next article I will explore this explicitly Christian way of grounding the variety of religious ends.

Why Does Jesus’ Death Matter?

Why is the death of Christ significant? Some of the church is sure it knows the answer, while much of the rest of the church is deeply uncomfortable with the question. The publicized comment by a feminist theologian at the "Re-imagining" conference a few years ago is only one example of the discomfort: "I don’t think we need a theory of atonement at all. I don’t think we need folks hanging on crosses and blood dripping and weird stuff…"

That statement sparked a lot of reflex outrage, which seemed to confirm that a very sore point had been touched -- as if to say, "This is a painful topic, and we don’t appreciate your bringing it up." Much of the positive response to the "re-imagining" statement bore the mark of relief and recognition: "So I’m not the only one who never got it or bought it."

The meaning of Christ’s death is hardly a peripheral issue. No image calls Christianity to mind as a cross or crucifix does. Christian faith is incoherent if there is not something special about the death that image represents.

Protestants historically take their stand on the confession that they can be reconciled with God because of the sacrifice of Christ: "We preach Christ, and him crucified." Roman Catholics point to the same event as the sacramental center of Christian life, with the words from the Gospel of John, "the Lamb of God, who takes away the sins of the world." Eastern Orthodox position the significance of the death in relation to resurrection, proclaiming in the Easter liturgy that "Christ has risen from the dead, by death trampling upon death and bringing life to those in the tomb." The Gospels, the heart of Christian scripture, are in large measure passion narratives. The central Christian liturgical act, the celebration of the Lord’s Supper, points insistently to the death. The peak of the Christian year, at Good Friday and Easter, revolves around it.

The pattern is seeded through the forms of every Christian tradition. The hymn "There Is a Green Hill Far Away" contains the familiar line: "He died that we might be forgiven, he died to make us good, that we might go at last to heaven, saved by his precious blood." The Book of Common Prayer prescribes statements before reception of each element in communion. The content if not the wording is familiar to most Christians. "The Body of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was given for you. . . Take and eat this in remembrance that Christ died for you, and feed on him in your heart by faith, with thanksgiving. The Blood of our Lord Jesus Christ, which was shed for you. . . Drink this in remembrance that Christ’s blood was shed for you, and be thankful."

Belief that Christ’s death has fundamentally changed the world seems so integral to the grammar of faith that its absence amounts to a debilitating speech defect. A church that falls silent about the cross has a hole where the gospel ought to be.

But silence, or discreet mumbling, on this subject is far from unusual. This is nowhere so notable as in the celebration of the Lord’s Supper. In many Protestant congregations this event has become a solemn ritual affirmation of the spiritual equality of the participants, their mutual commitment to one another; and their shared hope for a future society with a just distribution of resources. Even the Roman Catholic Eucharist, once steeped in sacrificial emphasis, can now be encountered in forms that seem primarily celebrations of community, with a moment of silence, as it were, for the untimely demise of our late brother.

In many instances these changes in ritual practice reflect important efforts to recover a liturgical fullness which a narrow focus on sacrifice had distorted. So, for instance, the landmark ecumenical document Baptism, Eucharist and Ministry, developed by the World Council of Churches’ Faith and Order Commission, treats the meaning of the Lord’s Supper under five headings: thanksgiving, memorial of Christ’s death and resurrection, invocation of the Spirit, communion of the faithful, and feast of the future fulfillment of God’s reign. Each denomination can find elements in the list that have been absent or stunted in its own practice. But often such elements have been embraced not so much as a welcome broadening of a particular tradition as a welcome way of changing the subject.

Certainly Christian faith is as unimaginable without Jesus’ life (his actions and teaching) as without his death. No clear notion could be formed of Jesus’ death without a concrete life as the context and presupposition for it. From the early time that gospel became the primary Christian scriptural form, the seamless unity of the life and death was clear. Christians err when they give the impression that the only truly important thing about Jesus’ life is its end.

At the same time, modern attempts to construct a view of Jesus that omits any emphasis on the death -- focusing instead on a message or practice Jesus taught without reference to his own fate -- are implausible as history and often lack distinctive Christian character. John Dominic Crossan’s strained reconstruction of the historical Jesus is a case in point, and a highly popular one. It goes to the extreme of insisting the disciples knew virtually nothing of the facts of Jesus’ death and stitched together the better part of the Gospels in an inspired burst of scriptural imagination. In other words, the cross is not a crucial event whose meaning in any way constitutes Christian faith. The Christian faith, says Crossan, is not Easter faith. Not based on a resurrection afterwards, it has no need of a cross beforehand. Meaning comes entirely from other parts of Jesus’ life: his healings, his social egalitarianism, his disdain for spiritual middlemen. Early Christians drew on this vision to "invent" the story of the cross in the Gospels as one metaphor; as it were, for the message. If that image doesn’t work for you, or competes with the real message, drop it. Nothing essential is lost.

Crossan’s work fits well with a widespread disinclination to dwell on Jesus’ death, either in fact or theory. As fact, represented in tradition, literature and art, many find it a morbid theme. In Australia, a state education department recently banned a passion play -- a ruling, an official said, which showed that the state "will not tolerate violence in the schools." Ironic as it might seem after a glimpse of the TV, movies and video games that surround us, Christians can find the crucifix an embarrassing, primitive barbarism. And the theory or doctrine most strongly associated with emphasis on the cross evokes its own uneasiness.

That doctrine, substitutionary atonement, can be summarized this way: We are guilty of sin against God and our neighbors. The continuing sins themselves, the root desires that prompt them, and the guilt we bear for making such brutal response to God’s good gifts -- all these together separate us from God and are far beyond any human power to mend. Someday we might finally become truly righteous; our wills might finally be remade to trust God with delight; we might even reverse the mortality that followed from sin. Even if that happened, this perfected love, faith and hope would not change the past, nor would they make restitution of anything but what we owed God to begin with. The criminal who becomes a saint can never undo the terrible loss of his victims.

We can conceive a kind of crude recompense that adds something on the other side of the scales, as it were: the reformed offender can now sacrificially treat some people much better than simple justice would require, as before he treated some much worse. However; it is not possible to do this with God, since we owe everything to God to begin with. Thus a gap, a price, remains to be reckoned with. Christ stands in this gap, pays this price, bearing the punishment we deserve and he does not. In so doing, Christ offers something on our behalf that could never be expected or required, Christ offers the "over and above" gift that clears the slate and brings sinners into reconciled relation with God.

There are many reasons to be uncomfortable with the doctrine of substitutionary atonement and with atonement theology generally. First, few can be unaware that the cross has been the keystone of Christian anti-Semitism. The libel that charges Jews with Jesus’ death draws its virulent strength from the companion assumption that this death was somehow uniquely horrible and uniquely important.

Second, the language of sacrifice to many people is either empty because it is unintelligible, or offensive because it is morally primitive. The first time I visited the Kali temple in Calcutta, I literally stepped in pools of blood from a sacrificed goat. I was shocked, but I saw the irony in that shock. I have attended worship services all my life that talked and sang regularly about blood. I had never walked away with any on my shoes before.

Most people are no more likely to regard Christ as a sin-offering who removes our guilt than they are to consider sacrificing oxen on an altar in the neighborhood playground as a way to keep their children safe. We can hardly imagine God planning the suffering and death of one innocent as the condition of releasing guilty others. And it would be worse if we could do so, for a God about whom this is the truth is a God we could hardly love and worship. A good part of atonement theory today for Christians consists in conjuring up some idea of sacrifice that we can half-believe in long enough to attribute meaning to Christ’s death. Once it has served that transitory purpose, we drop it as swiftly as possible as, at best, a metaphor.

Third, transactional views of Jesus’ death depend upon categories that themselves pose problems. Legal or economic understandings of atonement frame human sin in terms of a debt that must be paid. Feudal terms present sin as an offense against God’s honor that must be satisfied. Such categories explain Jesus’ death, but in such a way as to pose further intractable questions. If the debt is actually paid, in what sense is God merciful? If it is God who in fact pays the debt humans owe, how is justice truly satisfied?

Fourth, an awareness of world religions and mythology has put Jesus’ death in an unavoidably comparative context. The Gospels attribute unique significance to the cross. Yet since the rise of modern anthropology we know that tales of dying and rising gods are commonplace. Christian nearsightedness comes from standing so close to just one cross in a forest of others. We are told that these dying and rising gods express symbolic truths about the cycles of nature, the quest for psychic wholeness, the healing of inner wounds. And we are often also told that non-Christian myths convey these truths much more elegantly and nonviolently, neither marred by the crude literalism and moralism of the Christian passion stories nor vexed by fixation on an actual historical event.

Fifth, there is what we might call an internal problem in the biblical understanding of the cross. Someone who wanders into a pew for the duration of Lent may rightly be perplexed by the New Testament’s somewhat schizoid outlook on a simple matter: Is the cross a good thing or not? Jesus sets his face to go to Jerusalem. Jesus teaches his disciples, to their horror or disbelief that he must die. Despite his own reluctance, he goes to his execution out of obedience to God -- "not my will but thy will be done" -- and does not lift a finger to oppose it. Yet the Gospels are equally emphatic that Jesus is innocent, that his arrest and killing are unjust, that those who dispatch him are quite indifferent to truth and treat Jesus as a pawn in larger political or social conflicts, that it is shameful for his friends to betray and abandon him. Jesus says, "The son of man goes as it is written of him, but woe to that man by whom the Son of man is betrayed. It would have been better for that man if he had not been born" (Mark 14:21).

In short, Jesus’ death saves the world and it ought not to happen. God’s will is the same as that of evil men. Are Herod, Pilate and Judas criminals or saints? It is not only the stranger in the pew who may wonder, "Does the Bible have its story straight?"

Sixth, we readily suspect that emphasis on the cross fosters toxic psychological and social effects. In exalting Christ’s death, do we not glorify innocent suffering and encourage people to accept it passively "in imitation of Christ"? By making the cross God’s recipe for salvation, do we paint God as a violent and merciless despot? Does the church’s theology, which has the divine Father punish his innocent child to redeem the world, look uncomfortably like a charter for child abuse? Is the invitation to identify with Christ’s death and suffering a kind of therapeutic malpractice, fostering morbid fantasies? The cross has been carried at the head of crusades and pogroms, even as it was offered to the weak as a model of how they ought to accept their suffering. Perhaps now it should carry a label: this religious image may be harmful to your health.

All these criticisms have strong voice within the churches as well as outside them. It is little wonder that oldline Protestant congregations especially strike very uncertain notes on this subject. Responses have fallen into two main categories: those that defend a revised understanding of Jesus’ death as a redemptive sacrifice on our behalf and those that attempt to articulate the significance of the cross without recourse to sacrificial terms at all.

Many who would maintain the substitutionary understanding of Christ’s death do not deny that it has been and continues to be subject to abuse. The battered wife sent back to her husband with a pastor’s exhortation to bear her cross as Christ did is sadly no figment of imagination.

Yet it is also true that for a supposed charter for oppression and abuse, the theology of the cross has a peculiar history among the poor and the marginalized. The testimony of numberless such persons indicates that they do not see in the cross a mandate for passive suffering of evil. What they see, in the midst of a world that regards them as nobodies, is the most powerful affirmation of their individual worth. That Christ, that God, was willing to suffer and die specifically for them is a message of hope and self-respect that can hardly be measured, and that transforms their lives. That God has become one of the broken and despised ones of history is an unshakable reference point from which to resist the mental colonization that accepts God as belonging to the side of the oppressors.

The liveliness of substitutionary atonement theology in the storefronts and barrios may, as some contend, stem from "false consciousness." Or it may arise because they know what they are talking about, those powerless ones who find the Jesus crucified in their place a source of self-respect that the rulers of this world cannot take away.

Some protest that this affirmation comes at a cost: You cannot receive it unless you first abase yourself as a hopeless and helpless sinner in need of redemption. It is insult added to injury to ask those who are weakest to focus on their own shortcomings in this way. Of course, the oppressed are rarely unaware of their weakness, and if anything they have less means than the advantaged have of deceiving themselves about their need or their sins. They may be less offended that atonement theology presumes a human situation of bondage and moral need which they know all too well than grateful that the cross meets them precisely at this place, with the extraordinary insistence that nevertheless they are loved, worthy and precious.

Major efforts have been made to rework atonement theology to meet the various criticisms. Jürgen Moltmann is a key example. He has focused on the tendency of substitutionary ideas to set God, as the one who requires an expiatory death, over against Jesus, the one who suffers it. If orthodox Christian teaching is to be believed, Moltmann points out, this account cannot be right. Jesus is God. In fact, in the title of Moltmann’s important book, Jesus is the crucified God. Whatever the reason for the offering, it is made by God and what is offered is God’s own self.

Trinitarian theology, which attempts to explicate the Christian conviction that it is God who suffers and is punished, can only further the confusion at times-now it is the Father who insists on blood and the Son who sheds it. Moltmann’s work makes the striking argument that the sacrifice of the cross is not a punishment to appease God’s justice, but God’s act of identification with humanity and the source of a new hope for the human future. The sacrifice is not directed to God: it takes place within God. There is no difference in will between the Father and the Son; both act out of passion for human redemption. And there is no difference in suffering. Both suffer, only they do so in different dimensions of the same event, and in this way they enter into the depth of human loss most fully.

The incarnate Word suffers what it is to die. The Father suffers what it is like to lose the beloved to death. Everything that makes death more bitter to the one who dies -- brutality, injustice, arbitrariness -- heightens the terror and suffering of that death to the ones who remain. There is no impassive God who observes and accepts Jesus’ death. There is only the God who knows both the agony of losing one’s self at the cross and the agony of losing the beloved there. Let those who have seen the pain of two loving spouses, one dying and one living, judge which half of the broken heart is lighter.

For all the breadth of Moltmann’s work, many fault him for leaving the language and the machinery of substitutionary theory largely intact. He may wring from them the least toxic results possible; nevertheless, the complaint is made, the premises themselves will continually lend support to abusive notions of self-sacrifice and surrogate suffering. From this view, one must look to other ways to articulate the meaning of Jesus’ death.

And in fact there are a variety of images in the tradition. Some, like patristic ideas of Jesus’ death as a ransom to the devil or a clever trap for him, are largely museum pieces for most Christians. But others are much in evidence.

If there is a major alternative to the substitutionary theory in the churches, it appears as an eclectic mix of several elements. One of these elements is the so-called exemplarist view associated with medieval theologian Peter Abelard and many later Protestant liberals. In this understanding, Jesus’ death is heroic: it demonstrates perseverance in the right to the supreme limit of a human life. Jesus’ death demonstrates God’s love to us because it shows the extent to which God is willing to identify with our lot as suffering and mortal humans. It is a kind of shock therapy, appealing to the human conscience in the same way that Gandhi’s willingness to suffer sought to awaken his opponents shame and repentance. The tone is expressed in the line from Isaac Watts’s hymn, "Love so amazing, so divine, demands my soul, my life, my all."

The exemplary view has a somewhat different flavor depending on whether the emphasis falls on Jesus as an example of human faithfulness toward God or on the incarnate God’s humble appeal to humanity. But in either case, the death is not a transaction but an inspiration.

Another alternative element is the "Christus Victor" view, prominent in writings from the early church and reemphasized in the 20th century by Gustaf Aulén. Here Jesus’ death is seen as a key part of God’s victory over the evil powers arrayed against the divine aim. This view is reflected in the Easter hymn which says, "The powers of death have done their worst, but Christ their legions hath dispersed." These powers are often now understood as economic, social and political in nature rather than demonic. Much more than virtuous endurance, Jesus death is a moment of active resistance to evil. His death is the nobly lost battle that is prelude to final victory in the war; when the resurrection comes and others take up the struggle for justice on Christ’s behalf.

This element has a strong affinity for liberation perspectives. Like the activist or guerrilla martyr, Christ’s death is an apparent defeat that is in fact the leading edge of a new society in which the powers behind this death will themselves be overthrown.

In both of the elements just mentioned, Jesus’ death acquires its significance by connection with other aspects of Jesus’ life that are regarded as fundamentally saving. It may be Jesus teaching that is most significant, and so the death is the seal of the integrity of that teaching. Or it may be the social project or the struggle against the powers that is the real work of Christ, and so the death draws its meaning as the last measure of devotion to that struggle.

A third approach views the incarnation as a whole as the saving work. It is God’s transit of the fullness of human life -- from conception and birth to friendship and struggle to suffering and death -- that transforms humanity. The incarnate Word breaks a path through human nature, one might say, and thus changes the journey for all others who travel the human road. On this view, Bethlehem is as much the saving event as Calvary Jesus’ death has a special character because here the path has been made through the deepest baffler. It is God’s presence in the human condition that saves. Death is notable only as the most unlikely aspect of that condition for God to share, the extreme instance of the general rule of the incarnation.

These three elements each have roots in the Bible and in tradition, and they can be freely combined in various proportions. Such a mixture is often recommended for its explicit nonsubstitutionary character. However, it is also true that all these elements can be readily incorporated by advocates of substitutionary atonement. In other words, these elements have no internal logic that makes them a strict alternative to transactional views. If we affirm them instead of transactional views, it must be because we insist we want only these ideas and no others, not because they themselves exclude such an addition.

The main appeal of "atonement lite" derives from the problematic ideas that have been subtracted. This subtraction does in large measure mute the critiques aimed at transactional views of sacrifice. The drawback to this approach is that it leaves large amounts of scripture and tradition at the heart of Christian faith unappropriated. The language of sacrifice, reconciliation and redemption is avoided or discounted, even while it remains inextricably lodged in Bible, liturgy, sacrament and hymnody.

This approach tends, then, to set up transactional views as "atonement plus," and to lend weight to their claims to be more biblical and more authentically Christian, since they deny nothing in the other approaches but include positive readings of the central sacrificial texts and images of the tradition.

If there is to be a compelling theology of the cross, one that is a true alternative to views of Christ’s death as a sacrificial punishment administered by God, it must be one that does not abandon these texts and this language, but offers a different vision of their meaning. We shall consider such an approach next week.