Learning to Pray

Prayer is archaic, anachronistic, against the grain of modern life, solitary and often heartbreaking, embarked on without the certainty of fruit. Prayer does not promise fame, money, and the love of beautiful people. It’s working with blind faith, stubborn hope, dumb love. But the more you pray the better you’ll be.

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Prayer, we read, write, talk and agonize about it, resolve to do it, wish we’d done it more than we actually do it. In this it resembles other pursuits of which people overestimate the intensity, frequency and duration -- such as reading, writing and sex.

Prayer is archaic, anachronistic, against the grain of modern life, solitary and often heartbreaking, embarked on without the certainty of fruit. It demands an expenditure of time that sometimes seems like a waste of time, a waste of self. Bill Gates recently pronounced, "In terms of allocation of time resources, religion is not very efficient. There’s a lot more I could be doing on Sunday morning." Of course, of course. Prayer does not promise fame, money, and the love of beautiful people. It’s working with blind faith, stubborn hope, dumb love.

The tiny, stunted wings of the flightless cormorant of the Galapagos are useless. Yet with hazy, ancestral memories of flight, it spends much of its time standing on rocks near the shore spreading its vestigial wings out to dry in the sun, just as flying cormorants do. Flapping our wings with a sense of futility, a foreboding of failure -- that’s how we feel on the brink of something difficult but exhilarating like prayer. But if the wind suddenly lifted the bird and it sailed through the skies, effortlessly, beautifully -- well, that’s like flight into the realm where, in prayer, "so great a sweetness flows in the breast that we must laugh and we must sing, we are blest by everything, everything we look upon is blest," as William Butler Yeats says in another context.

These blessed states are partly a free gift and partly earned: we travail to forge the metal which lightning may strike. As both a writer and a person who prays, I’ve learned that both writing and prayer take a quiet life, hard work and sacrifice. Henry James captures the pain: "If one would do the best he can with his pen, there is one word he must inscribe on his banner, and that word is solitude." Though there have, of course, been people of prayer who were also gregarious -- one thinks of Teresa of Ávila or Dietrich Bonhoeffer -- and though friendships bring insight, knowledge, self-knowledge and growth, my own experience echoes what T. S. Eliot says in "Ash Wednesday": "Where shall the word be found, where will the word! Resound? Not here, there is not enough silence." Too much extroversion robs me of the inner quiet necessary to view my life sanely. Conversations echo in my head, a dissonance drowning out my own thoughts. In fact, my writing, thinking and praying are inversely proportional to my social life.

"Be still and know that I am God," echoes an Old Testament imperative. In the Book of Kings the Lord appeared to the prophet Elijah not in "the great and powerful wind that tore the mountains apart and shattered the rock," not in the earthquake, not in the fire, but in "a gentle whisper." A whisper, easily drowned in the tumult of an overambitious schedule. The Quaker writer Richard Foster extols the otium sanctum, the "holy leisure," of the Church Fathers. "If we expect to succeed in the contemplative arts, we must pursue ‘holy leisure’ with a determination that is ruthless to our date books," he says.

Holy Leisure. It is indeed the best soil for prayer: a considered, underscheduled life with fallow hours and pruned activities, commitments and friends. Prayer requires a strenuous attempt at detachment from our distracting world of dollars, demands, the telephone, mail, friends and extended family. It’s important especially for women, trained to be "nice," to resist the blandishments of busyness -- "giving back to the community," taking your turn, doing your fair share.

To live a life of prayer is to live with "the broad margin to life" that Thoreau praises, thus making space for the new idea, the transforming insight. When I look at Vermeer’s paintings of young women, pausing in the midst of quiet work to gaze out of the window and muse, I think: "That’s how I want to live my life -- softly, meditatively, reverently." I must tiptoe into the world of prayer leaving behind the nagging old world of people and their irritations, mess in the house, to-do lists, the jagged edges of life jabbing me -- slowly, gingerly, like an immigrant unsure of the language, the customs, the geography of the country. The quietness has a cost, of course, the cost of a sometimes wrenching loneliness. Yet that loneliness is precious and holy.

Here we enter the realm of paradox. Though we need solitude to pray, prayer returns us to the engagement of love. As the refrain of Samuel Taylor Coleridge’s "The Rime of the Ancient Mariner" declares, "He prayeth well who loveth well! Both man and bird and beast.! He prayeth best who loveth best! All things both great and small." The Gospel of John gives us two yardsticks to gauge our spirituality -- growing love for God and growing love for the people in our lives. Real prayer doesn’t so much change God’s mind as it changes us. And in the quietness of prayer we learn the arts of kindness. Thomas Merton writes, "It is in deep solitude that I find the gentleness with which I can truly love my brothers. The more solitary I am, the more affection I have for them. It is pure affection and filled with reverence for the solitude of others. Solitude and silence teach me to love my brothers for what they are, not for what they say.

A fierce yearning -- "God-hunger" -- launches spiritual growth. "You shall seek me, and you shall find me when you seek me with all your heart." These words from Jeremiah were engraved on a plaque on our dormitory wall when I was a novice with Mother Teresa in Calcutta. Yearning and seeking -- but also making time to meditate on scripture, and to exercise discipline in following its wisdom.

When practicing the art of prayer, as in practicing any art, discipline must channel the streams of sweetness, of insight, that may strike and surprise us. In this, as in mastering a craft such as writing or making music, there is no substitute for the long hours of practice and learning. In prayer as in many other human endeavors, quality springs from quantity. "If you want to pray better, you should pray more," Mother Teresa said.

When we train ourselves in the scriptural precept to pray constantly, trying to be continually aware of the quiet presence of Christ, a radiance, a luminosity, like the silent, ever-present ghost in old movies, a quietness begins to sink over our beings, the quietness that engenders creative thought. We must persist in the discipline until it becomes instinctive, until we convert every thought, desire and frustration into a prayer, turning to God as naturally as a flower turns its face to the sun and the butterflies. We must pray until this inward work becomes as necessary as thinking, so essential that a day in which we have not prayed will seem a day in which we have not fully lived.

Often we yearn for acceleration. But spiritual growth is slow and gradual. The good man in the Psalms is compared to "a tree planted by streams of water, which yields its fruit in due season." Yet, though nothing but time can turn a sapling into a large tree, so that the birds of the air come and perch on its branches, there are organic fertilizers for one’s tender spiritual life that will help it grow stronger, lovelier and, yes, faster.

Spiritual directors suggest rituals to nudge the spirit into the presence of God -- -praying in the same place, at the same time each day, reading scripture, or breathing deeply to calm the body and concentrate thought before floating free. The memories of the previous times we have met with God on our habitual holy ground usher us into an expectant quietness. Thomas Merton describes this experience: "My chief joy is to escape to the attic of the garden house and the little broken window that looks out over the valley. There in the silence, I love the green grass. The tortured gestures of the apple trees have become part of my prayer. . . . So much do I love this solitude that when I walk out along the road to the old barns that stand alone, delight begins to overpower me from head to foot, and peace smiles even in the marrow of my bones."

Like a shadow behind the bright yearning for perfection is the inevitability of failure. Failure -- or, theologically, sin -- is the antiphon to our yearning for goodness -- our yearning to be loving, to be righteous. But through it all, through the valley of failure, emerges a faint, pointillist likeness to Christ. We are changed as we seek to imitate Christ and, more, to be merged with him, to be blood brothers in the ancient sense and have his sweet life flow through us as sap through a vine.

Praying is like talking a foreign language. The nouns and verbs in this holy terra incognita are in a softer, lower timbre -- patience, humility, self-denial or turning the other cheek. When I read the New Testament, I’m struck by the "upside-down kingdom" it presents, its reversal of the values even of good people. "Do not repay anyone evil for evil. Love your enemies; do good to those who hate you. Give secretly so that your right hand does not know what your left hand is doing. Invite those to your home who cannot invite you back."

We trust in our ability to work, network, charm, maneuver. But "the wisdom of this world is foolishness in God’s sight," Paul says. In God’s world, the person who trusts in God will be blessed as "a tree planted by the water that sends out its roots by the stream. It does not fear when heat comes; its leaves are always green. It has no worries in a year of drought, and never fails to bear fruit." Our world values action, quick success -- grabbing our desire from the jaws of hostile fate, battering down doors with our will. In God’s realm, we work quietly, knowing that success will come according to God’s will and in God’s perfect timing. When we glimpse the quietness and wisdom of God and even momentarily take a God’s-eye view of our lives, our internal chatter of anxiety and annoyance is silenced as our perspective shifts and our spirits sing in worship.

Humility, an acceptance of unknowing, is a shortcut on the path to God. "If the angel comes, it will be because you have wooed him by your grim resolve to be always a beginner," Rainer Maria Rilke muses. And the support of a community strengthens one in the quest. We invest much time in seeking God without any scientific certainty that God exists. Our only proof is the knowledge of the heart. It helps me to believe when I see Jesus’ great insights proven true, not only in the wrinkles of my own life but in the lives of other Christians.

In my Christian friends I often observe increasing goodness and a slow deepening. And though I do believe deeply, as one does when faith is verified by experience, I am an existentialist Christian when assailed by doubt. I choose to believe like Puddleglum, the Marshwiggle in C. S. Lewis’s The Chronicles of Narnia, who says, "I’m on Aslan’s side, even if there isn’t an Aslan to lead it. I’m going to live as like a Narnian as I can even if there isn’t any Narnia." And so I go to my small church most Sundays to pray and worship with other believers, refiring my distracted heart with others’ fervor.

But being nourished by the faith of others does not necessarily mean imitating them. Writes Thomas Merton: "Many poets are not poets for the same reason that many religious men are not saints: they never succeed in being themselves. They never get around to being the particular poet or the particular monk they are intended to be by God. They never become the man or the artist who is called for by all the circumstances of their lives. . . . They wear out their minds and bodies in a hopeless endeavor to write somebody else’s poems or possess someone else’s spirituality."

Prayer is therapeutic in its search for the difficult truth that frees. The very act of praying calms and focuses us. Often the difficulty lies in just settling down and doing it. As with sex or exercise or good conversation, it can be hard to get going, but once we have we’d like to keep going indefinitely. Good prayer, like good sex or good mothering, demands self-forgetfulness; it means losing ourselves in the other, our subject, our Lord. And the flow of prayer can be jammed and dammed by anxiety, hostility, anger, cherishing untruths, saying no too many times.

We are lured into prayer by the promise of joy. The cost turns out to be more than we ever imagined: "not less than everything," as T. S. Eliot says. We learn the rending cost of denying ourselves, taking up our cross daily, breaking out of the prison of the self and its incessant needs and demands, choosing small deaths, in a sense, so as to transcend ourselves and have a richer, more fruitful life. Jesus understood it: "Unless the grain of wheat falls into the ground and dies, it remains alone. But if it dies, it yields a mighty harvest." .

God as Best Seller

A walk down the aisle of any major bookstore reveals that spirituality sells, and that spirituality is not confined to the "religion" or "Christian inspiration" sections. Diverse though the literature on spirituality is, a body of popular teachings about God -- and how we might experience God -- is emerging within it. If the civil religion and public theologies of mainline Protestantism no longer capture the imagination of the average American, perhaps this new teaching is taking its place. Not identified with any traditional or established belief or practice. it is influenced by a range of sources, including westernized forms of Hinduism and Buddhism, the "metaphysical" beliefs of post-Christian churches (e.g., Unity churches) and 12-step appeals to God "as you perceive him."

Two authors in particular -- Deepak Chopra and Neal Donald Walsch -- have captured people’s imagination. Whether or not one finally agrees with their views -- and Christians of all stripes will have much to argue with in both cases -- they give important insights into the nature of God-talk in our time.

In the 1980s, Deepak Chopra left his endocrinology practice in order to incorporate insights from traditional healing traditions into Western medical practice. He has created a highly successful -- and lucrative -- series of books, videotapes and workshops, among other things. After writing books on health, the "ageless body," creating affluence, overcoming addictions, "healing the heart" and spiritual practices, he turned his attention to God. Though not his latest book, How to Know God is his most explicitly theological work and serves as an exemplar of how a version of Vedanta Hinduism (introduced to the West by such exponents as Swami Vivekananda and Paramahansa Yogananda) has been made popular and accessible.

Drawing on neuroscience, quantum physics and a westernized Hinduism, Chopra states that the brain Is hard-wired to know Cod. The book’s fittingly titled first chapter, "A Real and Useful Cod," explains how all people have direct access to God. The human nervous system has seven biological responses that correspond to seven levels of divine experience (which correlate with popular Hindu teaching about "chakras" -- seven energy centers in the body that contain universal spiritual lessons -- although Chopra does not mention "chakras" in his book),

Chopra conceives of the universe as a three-part construct shaped like a sandwich. God and the material world form the outside layers, and a "transition zone" lies in between. With reference to Einstein, "who made time and space into fluid things that merge into each other," Chopin suggests that the "material world" is made up of objects and events we can identify; the "transition zone" is a quantum reality or domain where energy turns into matter; and the place beyond time and space -- the origin of the universe, the place where God is -- is like a "virtual reality or domain." At this third level God creates and organizes energy and information, turning the "chaos of quantum soup" into "stars, galaxies, rain forests, human beings, and our own thoughts, emotions, memories and desires."

The seven responses to our environment represent seven ways of responding to God -- or making decisions within the quantum realm -- and thus organize our experience of reality. Chopra describes these responses with precision, in ascending order of spiritual development. The "fight-or-flight response" enables us to survive in the face of danger. In this phase, we choose "fear" (along with family, community a sense of belonging and material comforts). The idea of "God as Protector" fits this image of the world -- a hidden God who is vengeful, capricious, jealous and judgmental, meting out reward and punishment, but who is also sometimes merciful.

The "reactive response" enables the brain to create a personal identity by defining the needs of "I, me and mine." Here we choose "power" (along with success, influence, status and other ego satisfactions). "God the Almighty" rules here, a God who is sovereign, omnipotent, just, rational, rule-bound and the answerer of prayers.

In the "restful awareness response," we choose to "know ourselves" (this goes with insight, centeredness, self acceptance and inner silence). At this level God is the "God of peace," a God who is detached, calm, consoling, conciliatory and meditative.

In the "intuitive response" we choose "inner reflection" (along with empathy, tolerance and forgiveness). "God the Redeemer" fits this world -- a God who understands, is tolerant, forgiving, nonjudgmental, inclusive and accepting.

In the "creative response" we choose to create (this entails inspiration, expanded creativity in art, science and unlimited discovery). This is the realm of "God the Creator," a God who is unlimited creative potential, has control over space and time, and is abundant, open, willing to be known and inspired.

In the "visionary response" we choose to love, in order to heal ourselves and others (along with emphasizing reverence, compassion, devotion and service). Here the "God of miracles" reigns -- a God of prophets and seers who transforms, enlightens, and exists beyond all causes.

Seventh and final is the "sacred response." Here, we choose simply "to be" (having wholeness and unity with God). The "God of pure being" -- the "I am" -- belongs to this world, a God who is unborn, undying, unchanging, unmoving, incomprehensible and infinite. This is the highest level human beings can achieve.

In addition to describing each of these levels, Chopra devotes a whole chapter to "strange powers" -- which include such things as inspiration and insight, genius, prodigious powers in children, memories of former lifetimes, telepathy and ESP, alter egos (multiple personality syndrome), synchronicity, clairvoyance and prophecy. But he is most interested in helping people reach the final, transcendent state of an ultimate experience of union with God.

Neal Donald Walsch’s three volumes of Conversations with God and his other books, including, most recently The New Revelation., emerged out of a very different personal situation. Raised a Roman Catholic, Walsch was strongly interested in spiritual questions, though he had deep reservations about "religious" people, who seemed to him to be less joyful and more judgmental and angry than others. After a series of difficult relationships with women (including four divorces), a number of children and a range of careers -- from being a radio station program director to a newspaper reporter to owning his own public relations and marketing firm -- Walsch became sick, jobless and homeless. In a period of deep despair he wrote an anguished letter to God. To his surprise, he received answers from God, he said, and was soon writing down notes that would later become his best-selling Conversations with God books.

While Chopra’s books are meticulously organized Walsch’s ramble. They read like transcripts of late-night college bull sessions or very, very rough drafts of a first-year seminarian’s essay on God. Nonetheless, one can piece together a fairly coherent picture of God and the world from this rambling. According to Walsch, we can discern God’s voice amidst the cacophony of voices that bombard us both within and without because God’s voice is linked with our highest feelings, thoughts and experiences. But God does not force Godself on us. In fact, God doesn’t care about our specific choices -- God has given us free choice to do as we will and is committed to that freedom -- although God cares passionately about the final outcome of our lives.

This dichotomy is at the heart of God’s relationship to us. It is linked to our two most basic emotions, fear and love. We fear because we doubt the ultimate outcome of our lives, doubt that God’s acceptance of us is unconditional. In fact, our very notion of a devil -- that there is a power that can compete with God -- is rooted in such fear as is our notion of a God who rewards, punishes and judges based on what we have done.

In describing this dichotomy, Walsch says that he is drawing on an "eastern" mystical definition of God as the "No-thing" kind a "western" practical definition of God as ultimate reality. God is both "All that Is" and "All that Is Not." "That which Is" -- pure energy unseen, unheard and unknown -- can only experience what it is by creating "What is Not." Thus, God creates a reference point within itself in order to create a space for that "Which is Not." God, then, divides itself into a "this" and a "that" and a "here" and a "there" -- and that which is "not" entailed by either dichotomy. The part of God that finds itself in the second half of the "Am/Am not" equation explodes into an infinite number of units smaller than the whole -- what Walsh calls "spirits" -- and these spirits (what human beings are) have the same power to create that God has. This is what it means for human beings to be created in the image and likeness of God.

Why would a God who is all-perfect and all-loving allow natural disasters, war, injustice, disease and personal suffering and pain? God could not demonstrate what love is without creating its opposite. We may experience things as distinct in our daily lives, conceptualizing them as opposites. But ultimately -- that is, in God -- they are not separated. Further, God does not will that bad things happen even though God allows us to make choices, individually or collectively, that may lead to them. God simply observes the choices we make even as God endows each of us with the capacity to create circumstances that best enact our highest life purpose.

Though we cannot change the course of external events, since these are collectively created, we can change our inner experience of them. By doing so, we take greater responsibility for ourselves, recognizing that nothing happens by accident and that life is not a product of chance. Events and people are drawn to us for our own purposes, whether on an individual or planetary level. We can reduce the pain of this world by changing our consciousness, the way we view life. Choices made at a collective level are as important as choices made on an individual level.

Walsch covers a wide range of themes. He addresses not only topics like personhood, self-creation, loving relationships and awareness and wakefulness, but also themes such as power, conflict resolution, fairness and tolerance, diversities and similarities, ethical economics, and the relationship between science and spirituality.

These books seem to indicate that ours is an age very much like the "religious" age addressed in Paul’s famous speech at the Areopagus (Acts 17). Not only Jews, Christians and Muslims recognize the God who made the world and everything in it. As these authors maintain, all people "seek him and yearn to "feel after him and find him," this God who is "not far from each of us" but is the one in whom "we live and move and have our being" (17:24-28). Indeed, Chopra and Walsch speak about God and our capacity to experience God with the realism and confidence of the ancient philosophers and poets that Luke quotes as he forms this Pauline speech in Acts.

Like many ancients, these modern authors presuppose God’s existence and seek to show people how to overcome their primitive responses to life -- responses that, in Chopra’s words, lead to the "tyranny" or "addiction" that occurs at the two lowest levels of response to the world. Unlike much modern theology neither offers a theodicy -- a justification for how a good God can allow evil. Indeed, both hold the rather traditional view that suffering and pain are here to help us grow spiritually. Neither links the spiritual life with suffering or traditional notions of asceticism (e.g., poverty’s chastity or obedience to authority). Both authors stress abundance and all that goes along with it: wealth, health, sexual fulfillment and, perhaps most important for modem persons. personal autonomy and self-determination. Creativity (Walsch) and one’s capacity for attention (Chopra) are the central points of contact with God. The individual is the locus for experiencing God.

One cannot but think about the French social philosopher Alexis de Tocqueville, who during a 19th-century visit to America observed that individuals in America can so abstract themselves from familial and institutional communities that their lives become undifferentiated, focused solely on fulfilling their own wishes. A kind of pantheism tends to accompany this individualism, The individual generalizes her experience onto the universe as a whole.

There is much in Chopra’s and Walsch’s teaching that directly counters Christian belief and practice. Christians draw a much more radical distinction between Creator and creatures. For Christians, dealing with the gravity of sin and evil, both corporate and individual, requires much more than a shift in consciousness. Jesus, therefore, is not a mere teacher but the Son of God whose incarnation, death and resurrection usher in a new eschatological age of redemption.

And the Christian life is not merely an individual affair. Like the Jewish prophets, Jesus preached a reign of God that entails a strong communal sense of justice and mercy. Since his death, Christians have been baptized into his "body" which means being related not only to the universal community of those crucified and raised in the "body of Christ" but to the larger enactment of God’s reign in the world.

Still, Christians have much to learn from these books. They offer a powerful diagnosis of the "tyrannies" and "addictions" many have experienced in Christian communities where a vengeful and capricious God Is preached, and where that preaching is reinforced by powerful personalities or conceptions of biblical, theological or hierarchical authority. In a time when religious rhetoric accompanies not only much political conflict throughout the world but terrorist acts and calls for military action, this literature offers an image of God’s profound commitment to peace among all people. It easily fills the vacuum left by a tepid and secularized Christianity that has lost a palpable sense of God’s presence and power.

As Paul finally challenged the idolatry of his hearers, so Christians must challenge the idolatry of any attempt to reduce God’s power and presence to our will for self-determination. Yet these books also indict Christian pretensions, either to a vindictive and judgmental God or to a vague, secularized deity that has lost its vitality and power. They remind us of the rich inheritance we have as those "created" in God’s image (Gen. 1:28) and "adopted" as God’s children, having access through the Spirit to all Jesus shared with his Father (Rom. 8:16-17; cf. Gal. 4:6). If we follow Paul’s bold logic, such adoption means being endowed with the "mind of Christ," a mind capable of spiritually discerning even the very depths of God" (1 Cor. 2:10-16; cf. Rom. 8:26-27).

An Interview with David Tracy

With books like Blessed Rage for Order (1975) and The Analogical Imagination (1981), David Tracy became widely recognized as an important revisionist theologian -- one who revised Christian categories in view of modern categories of thought. Tracy, 62, a Roman Catholic theologian who teaches at the University of Chicago, has also been associated with the theological "method of correlation", an approach that, following in the tradition of Paul Tillich, aims to correlate the Christian tradition and the modern situation in a way that is both mutually illuminating and mutually critical.

Lately, Tracy has taken his work in a new direction, focusing more on mystical and neo-Platonic traditions of thought and drawing heavily on postmodern thinkers. His new work speaks of God as "incomprehensible" (drawing on Dionysius, a sixth-century monastic and mystic) and "hidden" (drawing on Martin Luther). He also stresses in a new way the significance of spiritual exercises and suffering -- especially the suffering of the innocent. I spoke with him about his current project and how it differs from his earlier work.

It seems you have taken a significantly different direction from the kind of thinking about God you did in Blessed Rage for Order.

I continue to read and learn from the modern debates on God -- debates on deism, modern theism, modern atheism, modern agnosticism and modern pantheism. And as I argued in Blessed Rage, I think panentheism, the doctrine that all is in God but God’s inclusion of the world does not exhaust the reality of God, is the best way to render in modern concepts God’s relationship to us as described in the Bible.

But I believe such concepts do not provide the way to approach the question of God now. I am not suggesting one can get to "post-modernity" without learning from "modernity." But the real conversation about God intellectually should be with the category of the impossible. I have in mind the sense in which Søren Kierkegaard used this term: It is impossible to have a direct communication with God. God cannot be known by way of persuasion and argument; one either believes in or is offended by this God.

For moderns, the debate over God has been about what is actual and possible. Modern God-talk reflects concrete experiences, either actual or possible. When God is linked with concrete experiences, God can be understood byway of persuasion and argument -- in an appeal to experience, reason or the imagination. Empirical or process theologies stress what is actual, and hermeneutic theologies deal with the possible.

When you shift to God-centeredness, however, you shift to the mystical and prophetic approaches -- and therefore to notions of hiddenness and incomprehensibility. Hence the shift to "impossibility." It used to be embarrassing to speak of the impossible. For modern thinkers like Weber, Dewey and Habermas, to introduce the category of the impossible was to provoke laughter. But it is a deeply meaningful category.

I want to attend to two namings of God: God as incomprehensible, in which case I am trying to rediscover the mystical tradition, especially from Dionysius, and God as hidden, in which case Luther offers a classic Christian expression.

Would you characterize this shift as a move to the "postmodern"?

I don’t care about the word postmodern. I do care about the shift to the other and not the self. The shift is about undoing the arrogance and limits of modernity, especially reason. In this shift, the category of the impossible is again very important.

What is the major innovation in this approach to God?

I am trying to develop a theory of the religious fragment, the form best suited for the impossible. The fragment is something that sparks into the realm of the infinite yet disallows a totalizing approach, and at the same time opens up material realities -- which we have learned from liberation and political and feminist theologies is very important. First forged by Romantics to disclose the "sparks" of the divine, the peculiar form of the fragment became for more and more artists, and then for philosophers and theologians, a form well suited to challenge any totality system, especially that of modernity. It is time for theologians to join this literary and philosophical discussion of fragments and to reflect on them in uniquely theological ways.

How can you develop a theory of fragmented forms?

I used to emphasize the distinction in religious forms between manifestation and proclamation. This distinction was based on issues of participation and distancing. When one has a radical sense of participation in a religious form, one has a "manifestation," as in a sacrament or ritual. When you have the breaking or the fragmentation of the whole, you have "proclamation" in a word or prophetic witness.

The danger of the manifestation form is that it moves toward becoming a totalized system -- it presumes to offer a complete and absolute account of all reality This is why the prophetic tradition remains so central to Christianity, Judaism and Islam. With proclamation, you have a fragmentation of totality and an emergence of a witness, a word, that the prophet must speak.

The next step is more reflective and yet more explicit in history and experience -- this is when the religious form becomes either prophetic or meditative. The prophet always insists that it is not the prophet but God who proclaims. In fact, prophets usually don’t want to become prophets. The meditative or contemplative form is found in the wisdom tradition, such as the wisdom books of the Old Testament and the Gospel of John in the New Testament.

Prophecy and wisdom can either be generalized or intensified. If the prophetic tradition is generalized, it becomes primarily an ethical tradition. I have always thought there is an intrinsic connection between modernity and liberal Protestantism, which is why Jews and Catholics tend to be far less troubled by the turn to postmodernism. Following Immanuel Kant, liberal Protestantism, Reformed Judaism and liberal Catholicism generalize the prophetic tradition and tend to collapse the religious and the ethical.

On the other hand, if the wisdom tradition is generalized, it moves toward the aesthetic realm. Iris Murdoch’s novels are an example of how for many people art becomes the form of the good -- in an almost religious sense. This is not bad, but it is inadequate.

When the wisdom tradition is intensified it becomes apophatic, or mystical. When the prophetic tradition is intensified, it becomes apocalyptic -- especially when prophecy fails.

From its beginnings in Origen and Clement of Alexandria, apophatic theology seeks union with God by moving from physical sensations and concepts to their negation in the divine darkness that lies beyond experience and concepts. Apocalyptic theology, which has roots in Jewish eschatology, hopes for a reign of God on earth that can be established only as a result of a divine irruption into the present order that overthrows its evils.

Christian theology needs to recover its own classical fragmentary forms, especially the highly suggestive fragmentary forms of apocalyptic and apophatic.

If the ethical and aesthetic modes are "modern," would you call apocalyptic and apophatic religion "postmodern"?

These are the two things that matter to me in postmodern thinking: 1) breaking the totality systems, especially triumphalist ones, which Christianity is always tempted to be, and 2) attending, both intellectually and spiritually, not to the self but to the other.

What do apophatic and apocalyptic theologies look like?

The two most examples we have are that of Dionysius, who spoke of the incomprehensibility of God, and Luther, who spoke of the hiddenness of God.

Of course, there are great debates over how to read Dionysius. Is he Christian? Is he Platonist? Does Dionysius’s apophatic theology suggest that reality itself is to be understood as a "gift"? These debates aside, Dionysius’s writings not only fragment and negate all positive language for God but also insist that the thinker become a worshiper and enter the language not of predication but of praise and prayer. We move with Dionysius (and this is why the post-moderns read Dionysius) to an excessive language, that is, excessive in relation to all predicative namings of God, positive or negative. We stutter God’s name by oscillating back and forth in praise, in hymn, in prayer, in contemplation between positive and negative namings of God in the ever more fragmentary language Dionysius believes is present in mystical union with the incomprehensible God.

Luther rejected Dionysius and started instead with suffering and sin, and utter fragmentation. He had this extraordinary and profound sense of the cross -- that we understand God through weakness. But he also had this second sense of the hiddenness, this very strange sense of God beyond the word of the cross. When I think of what that must mean, there is no theoretical solution. You must flee back to the cross. If one wants to see this second type of hiddenness beyond the word, look at the great artists. See an early Ingmar Bergman film -- like the one in which the minister screams that God is a spider. If you start with this Lutheran theology of the cross, and this apocalyptic sense of history, then your focus is exactly where it should be: you can’t have a totality system; you must focus on the other. As Luther would say, you must focus on the neighbor.

Your early work was concerned with how to think about God. How do you think about God in apophatic and apocalyptic terms?

Most of the discussion on God, including my approach in Blessed Rage, has concerned panentheism. That is a valuable discussion. But I don’t begin there any longer -- especially if the spiritual is deeply involved with the theological. I begin with the categories of the "void" and the "open." I am persuaded to think about God not simply in modern terms but in terms of the categories of faith. When you talk about God you are talking about two "impossible" options. Lucretius and Nietzsche talk about the void, but there is no one better on the subject than Luther. History is apocalyptic for him. It is a series of openings into the abyss. Nature is that too. The "void" has to do with experiences of extreme suffering, injustice, terror, despair or alienation.

And there is no one better than the apophatic mystics with respect to regarding God as "open." I first called this category the "gracious void" but realized this was too Christian a term. So I use the term "the open." The experience of the open happens when you "let go." That’s why Buddhism is such an attraction to so many contemporary people, including postmodern thinkers. It’s the "let-go" aspect of faith. Even Aristotle speaks of the mystery of religion as a genuine experience.

The experience of "the open" either happens or it doesn’t -- or it can happen suddenly -- but spiritual disciplines can prepare you for it. The "open" has to do with experiences of the sheer giftedness of life -- the sense of awe and wonder one might have about the beauty of the natural world or the sheer happiness one might find in human relationships.

Are we simply left with fragments -- and with the opposition between the "void" and the "open?"

Part of my project involves gathering the fragments. In this effort, I will draw explicitly on biblical and liturgical metaphors. Though you can’t have a totality of symbols, you do need to order and gather them -- without losing the sense that religious expressions are simply fragments. The three principle "gathering forms" I use to do this are the narratives of the Gospels, doctrines and liturgy.

Narrative is the basic form. Yet there are four basic narratives in the New Testament, and you don’t have to choose between them. The narrative in Mark is different from that in Luke. Luke stresses continuity; Mark does not; John’s Gospel is a meditation. In the rediscovery of narrative, many people seem to emphasize Luke -- as if all the Gospel narratives are a kind of realistic narrative. But there isn’t just Luke; there are three other stories as well.

The basic form of Christianity in the New Testament is narrative. But already in Matthew and the Epistles you encounter doctrines. In the reception of the Gospels through history, the most influential Gospel was Matthew, because the community was trying to organize itself and its beliefs. Doctrine is an important form, though to make it a central form, as many theologians have done, is disastrous.

The third form is liturgy. Eastern theology structured its insights around liturgy. And Dionysius’s mystical theology must be connected to what he was doing liturgically and with ecclesial structure. Liturgy always has both form and structure, and we don’t have to accept Dionysius’s ecclesiastical and liturgical hierarchies to see that forms of worship structure our thoughts. This is why liturgical theologies are so valuable.

Where does Christ fit among these "gathered forms"?

We believe in "Jesus the Christ with the apostles" This is not simply a "Christ principle." It has to be related to Jesus. But it’s not simply historical reconstruction either. It is the Jesus narrated by these confessing communities. And it’s not "in" the apostles but "with" the apostles, beginning with the apostles’ writing and the Hebrew Bible as time Christian Old Testament.

How does this Christology differ from the Christology you presented at the end of The Analogical Imagination?

In The Analogical Imagination the main symbols were incarnation-cross-resurrection. Now I would add apocalyptic. When I was young, no progressive theologian would dare speak about the apocalyptic. Talk of the apocalyptic was handed over to fundamentalism. Bultmann, Rahner and others preferred to speak of the "eschatological." in The Analogical Imagination, I spoke of the apocalyptic as an important "corrective." I no longer say that. For me, the Second Coming is as critical a symbol as incarnation, cross and resurrection. The Bible for Christians ends with "Come, Lord Jesus." We are still messianic. Yes, Christ has come for us as Christians, but in an important sense he still has not come vet. We don’t know who or what Christ will be or when his coming will happen.

I fundamentally trust the Christian tradition because as far as I can see the formulations of the Council of Chalcedon about the nature of Christ make perfect sense. The point really is Jesus Christ, the God-Man. The thing that will trouble sortie people is that I think Chalcedon is a beginning and not an end. We need a new language and new categories. Chalcedon and the other early ecumenical councils, whose work I fundamentally believe amid trust, don’t refer to the Second Coming. Amid they don’t make much room for the Spirit, which relates to the Second Coming.

Another shift I’ve made has to do with the Trinity. I used to think Hans Urs von Balthasar and Jürgen Moltmann -- and to some extent Eberhard Jüngel -- were too speculative for bringing reflection on the narrative of Jesus into rethinking the trinitarian relations. To an extent I still think that. But I have been driven to think that some such speculation is needed if we are to speak of the immanent Trinity. If the narrative of Jesus informs us about how to name God -- who is incomprehensible and hidden -- as love, then I don’t see any way to do that without allowing Christology to encourage some modest speculation on the Trinity.

You have said you are envisioning a three-volume work. Where is it all headed?

If the second volume is accurate about Christology, Trinity and anthropology, and justification and sanctification, then I need also to discuss the. Spirit and the question of how Christianity is theologically to be understood in view of the other religions.

Those of us who have been following your work know spiritual exercises play an important role in this three-volume work. Can you say more about that?

Pierre Hadot, who wrote about spiritual exercises and ancient philosophy, gave me the insight that modern Western culture is bizarre when compared to other cultures in the way it splits spiritual practices from theory and even theology and philosophy. If you were a Stoic, you would perform exercises related to your beliefs and theory of life. Theology is about the vision of life and a way of life. We should never have split practices and theology.

In addition to spiritual exercises, experiences of suffering have also become very important for you. Can you say more?

Suffering, and especially innocent suffering, demands attention. The death of the self is not as important as the death of the other, especially those who have been devastated by the history of triumph, including the triumph of Christian churches. Attentiveness to such suffering -- and hearing and learning from those who suffer -- is crucial.

Spiritual exercises lead, by way of detachment, to an attentiveness to the giftedness of life; and suffering cries out in lament, awe and sometimes terror, exemplified in the lament psalms or the Book of Job. The first is linked with apophatic-mystical theologies, the second with apocalyptic-prophetic theologies.

Can you relate these concerns to the current resurgence of interest in spirituality?

If there is one thing religions all agree on, it’s that the ego is the problem, not the solution. I agree with Nietzsche: our souls are too small. The turn to religion among many distinguished figures -- and apparently in the population as a whole -- is a very ambiguous sign. It can either be a turn to the self or a turn to the other. In terms of the work of the Spirit among genuine Christian groups, I would point to the fact that when you go into the really terrible neighborhoods, you’ll find Christians serving there. And they’ve always been there. The hope for our culture as a whole -- and not only the Christian church -- is a recovery of that kind of spirituality.

Radical, Orthodox

Every once in a while a person comes along who reconfigures a field of study. John Milbank of the University of Virginia, formerly of Cambridge University in England, has done just that in theology, spearheading a movement that has become known as "radical orthodoxy." At the heart of Milbank’s work is the premise that modernity has ended and with it all systems of truth based on universal reason. Milbank does not lament this end, however, for he sees it as the opportunity for Christian theology to reclaim its own voice.

Milbank’s intent is to overcome what he calls the "pathos" of modern theology, a pathos that lies in its humility. Modern theology, he argues, has surrendered its claim to be comprehensive. Theology has felt it must conform to secular standards of scientific "objectivity." But with the advent of the postmodern critique of reason -- and the recognition that all thought is situated in specific cultural and linguistic systems -- theology has an opportunity to reclaim its own premises. Indeed, Christianity’s fundamental doctrine that God created the world out of nothing is consistent with postmodern philosophy: it presupposes that all reality is without substance and is in flux between nothing and infinity. Theology can therefore embrace its historically conditioned nature without negating its claim to speak of transcendent reality. Theology can ground its claims in the terms of its own language of belief.

In calling theology to reclaim its voice as a "master discourse," Milbank systematically uncovers how the concept of the "secular" emerged. Rather than show how theology makes sense in light of secular philosophy, he aims to show how secular philosophy is a countertheology or an inadequate offshoot of Christian theology. This effort is the burden of his most substantive work to date, Theology and Social Theory.

Milbank contends that the secular worldview emerged from two sources: one heretical" (that is, fundamentally Christian but not in line with orthodox teaching) and one "pagan" (that is, not Christian at all). Both perspectives share a crucial assumption: that reality is constituted by a fundamental conflict or chaos. They differ chiefly in how they respond to this conflict.

The "heretical" version of the secular (evident in, for example, the philosophy of Thomas Hobbes) contends that law is needed to restrain the competition of individuals as they seek dominance over one another. The roots of this view lie in late scholastic nominalism (the doctrine that general terms or abstract concepts exist only as names and have no objective reference) and voluntarism (the doctrine that the will is the fundamental principle of individuals or the universe). The "pagan" version of the secular (exemplified by Machiavelli) takes the form of prudential political management by which a ruler indifferent to moral considerations can achieve and maintain power in the face of conflict. The roots of the "pagan secular" lie in early humanist appeals to ancient Greek or Roman pagan myths, myths which idealized not justice and mercy but strength, beauty and the capacity to outwit one’s opponent.

This analysis of how the modern concept of the "secular" arose from "heretical" and "pagan" roots sets the stage for Milbank’s critique of modern sociology and political and economic theory. Milbank is critical of the way the sociology of religion (in the work of Peter Berger, Robert Bellah and others) reduces theological phenomena to social functions. Milbank also notes that the concept of "society" as used in the sociology of religion has a content similar to that of the theological term "providence" -- a point he makes in his "archaeology" of the work of Èmile Durkheim, Talcott Parsons and Max Weber.

He offers a similar critique and archaeology of liberation and political theology (focusing on the work of Juan Luis Segundo, Clodovis Boff and Gustavo Gutiérrez), pointing out that the precursors of the liberationists, Hegel and Marx, posit an "original violence" at the center of their "myths" of conflict and progress. Milbank’s critique of liberation and political theology centers on his intriguing analysis of "integralism," a concept significant in Roman Catholic theology and influential in liberation and political theology.

Integralism presupposes that there is no such thing as "pure nature" -- that is, creaturely reality standing apart from God. Rather, all of life is already infused by divine grace. Milbank appropriates this concept after criticizing what he considers to be a false form of it. Specifically, he rejects Karl Rahner’s form of integralism, contending that all it does is "naturalize the supernatural." While I don’t think this is a fair reading of Rahner, it does bring to light a key difficulty in some forms of liberation and political theology: the tendency to reduce theology to politics.

Rejecting the classical and modern philosophy that presupposes a fundamental chaos or conflict at the heart of reality and which seeks to counter it with a transcendental principle -- the rule of reason and law (which he calls a "totalizing reason" or the "violence of legality") -- Milbank offers an alternative theological vision. At the heart of reality is not chaos and violence, but a "sociality of harmonious difference" grounded in God’s creation. He seeks to retrieve Augustine’s insight that despite their many differences, all creatures are related to God and so to one another. In view of this fundamental "sociality," violence (that is, any form of chaos or conflict) must always be secondary, and "peace" (that is, living in "harmony" with one another) must always be primary.

In presenting Christianity as a response to classical and modern philosophy, Milbank rejects any notion of universal reason or law; this is where he differs from MacIntyre. He contends that all that can be done in response to chaos or conflict is to offer the virtue of nonviolent Christian practice, a practice that cannot be grounded in anything external to its own activity. This "ungrounded" premise links him to Derrida. Nevertheless, his argument for the "sociality of harmonious difference" is clearly different from what he sees as the nihilism of Derrida’s position. Milbank contends that Christian theology can "master" social theory only by "nonmastery," that is, through the enactment of a peaceful, reconciled social order that lies beyond any supposedly absolute, objective or universal understanding of reason or law.

Milbank has fleshed this position out in essays published in the journal Modern Theology, in a volume he has co-edited titled Radical Orthodoxy, and in a collection of his essays, The Word Made Strange. The latter work offers a view of what systematic theology might look like given his approach.

The organizing aim of The Word Made Strange is to trace the theological roots of the turn toward language in contemporary thought while demonstrating the relevance of this turn for reenvisioning classical theological topics (God and creation, God the Son, the incarnation, the Holy Spirit, the Christian life and Christian story). As in Theology and Social Theory, Milbank opposes the establishment of an autonomous secular terrain independent of theology. Kant is identified as the source of this establishment, though Milbank focuses most of his energy not on the philosopher but on Kant’s impact on theologians.

Milbank distances himself from a contemporary postmodern theologian like Jean-Luc Marion because even Marion -- working in the tradition of Martin Heidegger -- presupposes an autonomous human realm that exists prior to the reception of divine gift. Milbank makes it clear that the "post-modernity" of his own work is not to be linked to the Heideggerian and Nietzschean lines that have so influenced postmodern nihilists. Instead, he appropriates a set of Christian thinkers such as G. B. Vico, J. G. Hamann, J. G. Herder and F. H. Jacobi, who combine analyses of language and culture with trinitarian and christological presuppositions. Milbank draws on these thinkers in order to rethink Augustine’s and Aquinas’s understanding of how all things are related to one another and to God.

It’s important to note that in appropriating the Augustine-Aquinas tradition, Milbank radically redefines Aquinas’s "analogy of being," positing instead an "analogy of creation." According to Aquinas’s analogy of being, every individual creature finds its purpose or true "being" in the pattern that exists in the mind of God. For Milbank, however, it is our ability to "create" that defines us as God’s creatures, made in God’s image. We might recall here his difference with MacIntyre on the question of a universal pattern of reason and law and his appropriation of Derrida’s insight into the self-grounding character of creativity and power.

Especially intriguing is the way Milbank turns to language and aesthetics to rethink classical Christian doctrines. The most radical effort of this kind is his revision of the doctrines of atonement and incarnation. Seeking to avoid simply accepting these doctrines as propositions dropped from heaven, Milbank offers "intrinsic" reasons why they are central to Christian faith by way of an "ecclesial deduction" of their rationale. The incarnation, he argues, makes sense only if Jesus is understood to have founded a new community whose eschatological arrival is identified with the enactment of Christ’s divine person-hood in ecclesial worship and practice. In turn, the atonement is best understood if the efficaciousness of Jesus’ death is defined in relation to the way he inaugurates the political practice of forgiveness as the mode of the church’s social being. Milbank’s focus on ecclesial practice in interpreting Christ’s person and work indicates the significance of his doctrine of the Holy Spirit and specifically his understanding of the Holy Spirit as the church’s reception of the Son’s testimony about the Father.

In addition to reconstruing classical theological doctrines, Milbank offers a new understanding of ethics and politics. He is especially critical of any mode of ethical reflection that assumes violence and tragedy are part of fundamental reality -- a view that puts him at odds with a "realist" like Reinhold Niebuhr.

Overall, Milbank offers a stinging critique of modern theologies, whether liberal or neo-orthodox, for their submission to pagan or heretical traditions, and he proposes a comprehensive and internally coherent alternative. His argument is brilliant, his references wide-ranging, and he maps out a highly persuasive intellectual history. But even those who would affirm the direction of his thought, as I would, may wonder if he overstates his case.

In redefining theological arguments in terms of creativity, he offers a corrective to much modern theology that has so emphasized God’s truth and justice that it has tended to slight God’s power and beauty. But one wonders whether Christian theology, especially in an age that already measures things according to what "works" or "persuades," should not measure itself by other criteria. The very theological warrants that undergird Milbank’s argument (his doctrines of the Trinity, creation and the incarnation) have traditionally derived their force from the fact that they reflect the way things "really" are, regardless of whether they "work" or are "appealing." This is why patristic and medieval theologies employed not only the idea of "beauty" in describing God but "truth" and "goodness" as well. In other words, an argument that relies solely on aesthetic and pragmatic approaches may not do justice to its referents -- especially its chief referent, God. And the form of such an argument shows signs of the very nominalist, voluntarist and prudential presuppositions Milbank himself rejected in his critique of the "secular."

Also, in his desire to "supernaturalize the natural," Milbank may lose Aquinas’s important distinction between nature and grace, or reason and revelation -- or what Luther and Calvin called law and gospel. Even Augustine, who has deeply informed Milbank’s argument, has a place for the ordinary virtues (though they are transformed by the theological virtues) and the temporal city (though it is embedded in the celestial city). These distinctions have classically been maintained to help Christians think through how God’s justice and mercy actually impinge upon complex political, ethical and ecclesial questions.

In tandem with this point, major traditions within Christianity have (following Romans 1:18-22) presupposed that there is a universal law that all human beings perceive, a law holding them morally accountable for their actions, regardless of who they are ethnically or even religiously. Indeed, this point, which Christians share theologically with Jews and Muslims, stands in sharp contrast to all forms of contemporary historicism. One can affirm this point without positing an autonomous realm of the "secular" separate from God.

Milbank risks downplaying the reality of sin in the world and in the church, and the fact that God’s justice (which is not a "totalizing reason" or an impersonal "legality," though it can be perceived as such by sinners) stands in absolute judgment of that sin. Augustine himself offered a complex analysis of distorted loves (cupiditas) alongside his discussion of the proper love of God and human beings (caritas). One need not be a dualist to recognize the power of sin and the fact that even though we live in the plenitude and power of Christ’s resurrection, we still struggle with what St. Paul called the "old Adam" and God’s universal judgment on him (Rom. 3:23).

Milbank offers a powerful vision of the Christian community as the place Christ’s forgiveness is to be enacted. But as many who have lived and worked within Christian communities know, it is Christ who enables the church to be this kind of place, not the church in and of itself. Even if one holds to a strong sense of the church as a sacrament of Christ’s presence, one must still affirm that it is Christ’s incarnation that enables it to be a sacrament and his atoning death that validates the church’s practice of forgiveness, not the other way around. Finally, it is the Spirit who breathes power into the church’s witness to the Son, a Spirit that always transcends, even as she most intimately indwells, the church. In other words, Milbank’s high ecclesiology would be much stronger if accompanied by an even bolder depiction of Christ’s and the Spirit’s work within and at times against Christian communities.

Reading Milbank is like having a conversation with a very bright new convert who is brimming with energy and a fresh way of seeing things. His theology is the most compelling I have encountered in a long time. But new converts have to face the complexity entailed in being human (even if redeemed) and sinful (even if forgiven). The rise of globalization and technological prowess does not simplify this complexity. Nor does the fact that some of Christian theology’s deepest challenges in this century revolve not around secularism but conflicts among Christians and between Christians and those of other faiths.

Nevertheless, Milbank jolts mainstream theology out of complacency, forcefully suggesting that it has been neither robustly Christian nor rigorously intellectual in its engagement with modernity. He challenges us to think hard about what is most ancient and contemporary about being Christian.

The Hopeful Years: Children of the South Bronx

April 10. A sunny afternoon, but cool. The kids are in the big room at St. Ann’s, an Episcopal church in New York’s South Bronx. They are finishing their homework during the after-school program.

Pineapple is struggling with the electric pencil sharpener next to the closet on the left side of the room. Eight years old, she huffs and puffs as she keeps putting the same pencil back into the sharpener, then looking at the point with obvious dissatisfaction, then putting it back in again, until it’s down to almost nothing. She keeps staring at it with an irritated look, as if she knew that this was going to happen.

When she’s done, she passes out the pencils to the children at her table, saving the one she’s sharpened to a stump for last, then giving it to a boy she doesn’t like because he teases her for being plump.

"This is s’posed to be a pencil?" asks the boy.

"Don’t answer him," she tells the other children.

Grown-ups who spend time here with Pineapple comment on the confidence with which she uses her assertiveness to issue little orders like this to the other children. I can never tell why they obey her. Pineapple doesn’t seem to understand the reason either, but she never seems reluctant to accept the power that the other children, girls especially, invest in her, and she deploys it with comedic ease, as if she finds it funny that they let her exercise so much authority in coming to decisions.

"You sit here. You can sit over there," she says, arranging children at a reading table in one of the study rooms upstairs.

"Why is Raven way down at the end?" I ask.

"I don’t know why. She asked me where to sit. So I said, ‘Sit right there!"’

She doesn’t seem to suffer any grave concern about the fact that she’s so plump. She talks about it more with puzzlement, or petulance, as if she thinks that unknown forces in the world conspire to expand her waistline but that her healthy appetite has no connection with this.

"She has a nice compactly packaged personality," the pastor noted once as we were watching her among a group of other children. A pleasant kind of managerial assertiveness is very much a part of the completed package.

She can be assertive also when she talks to grown-ups and seems unaware that she is often going just a bit too far. She talks to me at times as if, between the two of us, she is the one in charge of things and simply asks me for a small degree of logical cooperation.

"Please tell me to do my work," she says to me one afternoon.

"Okay," I say.

She pats the seat beside her; I sit down. Next, she opens a spiral pad in which she’s written her assignment for tonight and places it in front of me. Then, with her pencil in her hand, she waits for me to read her the assignments.

"Spelling book -- pages 65 and 66."

She opens her spelling book and finds the page, looks up, and asks me, "Next?"

"Mathematics -- pages 83 and 84."

She opens her mathematics workbook.

"Next?"

"Phonics lesson -- ’ess’ sounds. Write them out."

She digs into her backpack, finds the phonics book, and spreads it open on the table. Finally, with all three books in front of her, she gives me her "approval" sign -- thumb and finger in a circle -- and begins to work.

She works for 25 or 30 minutes, asking me a question when she runs into an obstacle. She gets confused, for instance, in her mathematics homework, which is four-column subtraction, and she now and then reverses letters when she does her spelling lesson, studying a word she’s copied out and telling me she thinks that "it looks funny," then erasing it and doing it correctly; but, for most of the half hour, she works on her own and moves each book aside once she is done with it.

When she’s finished, she places her notebook against her mathematics workbook and aligns them with each other, then aligns them with her spelling book and phonics book and slips them all into a certain section of her backpack, which she then zips shut. The neatness in the way she does this and the close fit of the three books and the notebook in the space she has assigned them seem to give her a good feeling of completion. When she zips her backpack shut, it feels definitive.

"Okay. That’s it," she says. "I’m done."

She puts her pencil and eraser in a side compartment of the backpack and gets up and, in this way, she brings the period of work to its conclusion.

She can speak sarcastically to other children and can, frankly, be a bit too blunt at times. "Your face is shiny, girl!" she said one afternoon to somebody whose mother had rubbed oil on her skin. "You could borrow the sun’s job!" Usually, however, there’s an element of foolishness that rescues her sarcasm and her jokes from real destructiveness. Like many of the children, she’s alert to times when other children are too fragile to sustain the give-and-take of repartee; and when, as often happens at the after-school, one of the younger children suddenly begins to cry, or seems to be right at the precipice of tears, she switches gears almost immediately.

One afternoon she and seven-year-old Elio finish their homework. Nancy lets them go upstairs with me and with a girl named Piedad to play a spelling game before it’s time to eat. Just as the three of them are getting settled in their chairs, however, Piedad begins to cry. There’s a cubbyhole between some colored cardboard boxes that are piled up to function as bookcases. The seven-year-old child climbs right in somehow and curls up in a ball and doesn’t answer when I ask what’s wrong.

Pineapple stares at her a moment in the cubbyhole, then crawls right in beside her. Her feet stick out, but most of her is squeezed into the cubbyhole with Piedad. I was alarmed when Piedad refused to speak and was about to go downstairs to get Katrice [who helps run the afterschool] or Mother Martha, the priest at St. Ann’s. But Pineapple makes her "okay" signal to me with her thumb and finger -- and she winks at me! -- so I get out the spelling game and sit with Elio. Within another minute or so, the two girls come out of the cubbyhole, and both of them are laughing.

"I wasn’t really crying," says the younger girl.

Elio says, "You were pretending?"

"It was a game is all," Pineapple says.

I don’t think that this was true; but Piedad’s tears are gone and I don’t want to bring them back, so I pass out the dice and spelling cards and we don’t speak of this again.

Children do things like this for each other that an adult doesn’t understand but knows he cannot do himself. Pineapple was eight years old that spring and I was nearing 62. But I felt powerless when Piedad began to cry, while Pineapple appeared to know exactly what to do.

I still don’t think that Piedad had been pretending. She cries at times for reasons no one knows. When she cries, she sobs; her body trembles. Teachers who have spent their lives with children of this age know what to do when things like this occur. They’ll sometimes get down on the floor and take the child in their arms and, if they need to, hold her like that for awhile. I guess I didn’t feel I had the right to do this; perhaps I didn’t think that Piedad would have accepted it from me. She did accept it from Pineapple.

There’s a great deal of this automatic and insightful kindness in the hearts of many of these children who have been acquainted with unusual degrees of loss and sorrow by the time the/re eight or nine years old. They show it with their eyes and with their words, and rapid touches of their hands, and, when it’s absolutely needed, with their arms wrapped tight around each other. They’re good at being silly, but they’re also good at being gentle.

Gentleness and generosity, however, will not help these children much in overcoming many of the problems they will face as they grow older and attempt to find their way around the academic obstacles that stand before poor children of their color in our nation. Most of the children here, no matter how hard they may work and how well they may do in elementary school, will have no chance, or almost none, to win admission to the city’s more selective high schools, which prepare their students for good universities and colleges.

In a city in which four-fifths of all the public high school students are black or Hispanic, only 8 or 9 percent of students at Stuyvesant High, the city’s most selective high school, are black or Hispanic; and the children of the St. Ann’s neighborhood have, statistically, the lowest chance of winning entrance to that school of all the 1 million children in the city’s schools. Most of the children here end up at one of three or four large segregated high schools in the Bronx, where 1,900 to 2,000 children are enrolled but only about 90 make it to 12th grade and only about 65 can graduate. That’s the way it is for many children in our northern cities now. Some of these children seem to cry for no good reason. They don’t know much about the world at this point in their lives, but they may know more than we think.

In general, I think the "differentness" of children at St. Ann’s is overstated. Again and again, visitors remark upon the fact that relatively little of their syntax and the intonations of their speech -- and very little of their selectivity, or whimsicality, in choosing things they want to talk about -- supports the stereotypes in movies, for example, or sometimes in TV news, that tend to shape impressions about inner-city children in our nation. Some of the children do make use, at times, of syntax that some people call "Black English" (not only black kids do this, the Hispanic children do as well, because so many of their playmates are black children); but it isn’t done continually or helplessly, as if they didn’t know what standard English is. It seems more often to be chosen as a style suitable for certain listeners, but not for others.

If there is one area in which the children as a group do seem to differ somewhat, in emotional reactions, from the children that I meet in wealthier communities -- and even here I would be very cautious not to overstate this -- it is in their sensitivity to other children’s moments of anxiety and their acute awareness of emotional fragility and of the tipping point between exhilaration and depression. I think that they’re more worried about darkness and that many children here respond more thoughtfully than other groups of children do to times when little candles -- sweetness, solidarity -- need to be taken out of secret places and illuminated quickly.

At these times, they also seem to draw upon religious faith more deeply, and more openly, than many of the children that I knew, for instance, in the public schools of Newton, Massachusetts, where I taught fifth graders after my initial stint of teaching in the Boston schools. Here too, however, many obvious exceptions come to mind, and I’ve had conversations on the subject of religion with the children in suburban schools that aren’t so different from the talks I’ve had with children here.

The emphasis on "differentness" in inner-city kids has been a part of sociology as long as inner cities have existed, I suppose. When I was a young teacher, "the culture of poverty" was an accepted phrase. Similar phrases have been canonized in decades since. There have always been sufficient differences in some forms of behavior and some patterns of expression to make large distinctions seem legitimate. The distinctions always seem too large to me, however; and the more time that I spend with inner-city children, the less credible and less legitimate these large distinctions seem.

The wholesale labeling of inner-city children was, at least, resisted strongly in the past by influential and respected intellectuals; much of that resistance has collapsed in recent years, and many of these suppositions about "differentness go almost uncontested. Some writers even raise a question as to whether children here may constitute a group so different from most other children, with a set of problems (or, we are told, "pathologies") so complicated, so alarming, so profound, that they aren’t "children" in the sense in which most of us use that word, but that they’re really "premature adults," perhaps precocious criminals, "predators," we are told by those who are supposed to know. It strikes me as a dangerous exaggeration that may seem to justify a differentiation in the pedagogies and the social policies that are enacted or applied within such neighborhoods, with greater emphasis on rigid discipline than on the informality and intellectual expansiveness that are familiar in the better schools that educate the children of rich people.

One of the things I have respected most in Aida Rosa, principal of the elementary school P.S. 30, and the teachers that I talk with on her staff is that they look at children here as children, not as "distorted children," not as "morally disabled children," not as "quasi-children" who require a peculiar arsenal of reconstructive strategies and stick-and-carrot ideologies that wouldn’t be accepted for one hour by the parents or the teachers of the upper middle class. Still, ideologies like these are having their effect on many schools in urban systems now. Sticking labels -- and, especially, collective labels -- on the foreheads of the children makes it easier to treat them in a way we’d never treat the children of the privileged.

It has another effect as well, I am afraid. To some observers, it appears to justify the routine sequestration of these children in the tightly segregated neighborhoods in which they dwell, because this sequestration makes it possible to localize the "special" services that are believed to be appropriate to children who are seen as being absolutely and entirely different from our own. The children are already isolated geographically and racially. There are only 26 Caucasian children in a student population of 11,000 in the elementary schools that serve this district of the Bronx. To isolate them also diagnostically, and then to concretize their isolation with a veritable formulary of prescriptive certitudes, removes them one step farther from the mainstream of society.

It is true that the conditions of their lives are different in innumerable ways from the conditions of existence for more favored children in our nation. Their breathing problems (hospitalization rates for asthma are among the highest in the U.S.) and the absence of many of their fathers in the prison system are two of the most obvious distinctions. But the ordinary things they long for, and the things that they find funny, and the infinite variety of things they dream of, and the games they play, and animals they wish they could have, and things they like to eat, and clothes they wish they could afford to buy, are not as different as the world seems to believe from what most other children in this land enjoy, or dream of, or desire.

Some of the Guatemalan, Puerto Rican and Honduran children here eat rice and beans with many of their meals. When they have a choice, however, most will opt, alas, for hamburgers or pizza; and when Pineapple drags her little sister with her to the corner store to buy a treat between meals (which she does more often than she should), she usually reaches for the same big Hershey bars or packages of Twizzlers -- reddish licorice sticks that kids buy at the local store in my hometown in Massachusetts. Some of the teenagers watch Hispanic or black-oriented programs on TV; but they almost all watch Sesame Street when they are small, and more than half of them, I’ve found, were introduced to interesting rituals like hanging up your jacket in the closet and then puffing on your sweater before siffing down to have a conversation by the same soft-spoken man who introduced these things to three- and four-year-olds all over the United States.

When Mr. Rogers came here, there was a stampede of children wanting to be close to him. They treated him as if they’d known him for along, longtime -- which, in a sense, they had. He treated them as if he knew them too. He didn’t make a lot of general remarks about them later on. He spoke of individuals.

He knows so much more than most people do about the lives and personalities of children; but he didn’t let himself be drawn to any overquick conclusions. He asked the children many questions. He asked the mothers and the grandmothers questions too. He also gave them time to answer. I never thought about "prescriptive overconfidence" while he was here. I thought of someone walking in the woods and being careful not to step on anything that lives.

Erik Erikson alerted us, now more than 40 years ago, to what he called the dangers of "destructive forms of conscientiousness." Imposing global preconceptions on the multitude of diverse personalities and motivations in a given group of children may be one of them. Rushing ahead too much to fill up silences when children hesitate while trying to explain something about their lives to us may be another. Children pause a lot when reaching for ideas. They get distracted. They meander -- blissfully, it seems -- through acres of magnificent irrelevance. We think we know the way they’re heading in the conversation, and we get impatient, like a traveler who wants to "cut the travel time." We want to get there quicker. It does speed up the pace of things, but it can also change the destination.

Mr. Rogers told me once that he regrets the inclination of commercial television "to replace some opportunities for silence" in a child’s life "with universal noise." At quiet times, he said, "young children give us glimpses of some things that are eternal" -- glimpses too, he said, "of what unites us all as human beings." He also said that after 40 years of work with children he does not believe that being clever is the same as being wise. These seem like observations that are easy to agree with and then, just as easily, dismiss. I hope we won’t.

Falling Behind: An Interview with Jonathan Kozol

Beginning with his 1967 book Death at an Early Age, Jonathan Kozol has been a sharp critic of American education. In Amazing Grace (1995), Kozol described the residents of Mott Haven in the South Bronx, the poorest congressional district in the U. S. In his most recent book, Ordinary Resurrections, Kozol continues his account of the children of Mott Haven. We spoke with him about the schools of the South Bronx and about contemporary debates on education.

You’ve spent a lifetime concerned with children and educational policy. What’s changed in education since you began writing and working?

The greatest difference between now and 1964, when I began teaching, is that public policy has pretty much eradicated the dream of Martin Luther King. In fact, the public schools today are every bit as segregated as they were in 1964. In those days at least we had the sense that the government, the courts and public opinion were on the side of racial integration. Lyndon Johnson himself stood before Congress and said, "We shall overcome. We don’t hear political leaders speaking in those terms anymore. And there is a general sense that society no longer intends to bring black and Hispanic children into the mainstream of society.

How do the schools in the South Bronx reflect this segregation?

In the South Bronx 99.8 percent of the children are either black or Hispanic. Two-tenths of one percentage point marks the difference between legally enforced segregation in Mississippi 40 years ago, and socially and economically enforced segregation in New York today. Children in these schools don’t know any white children and white children don’t know them.

Their schools are also grossly unequal. A little girl like Pineapple, whom I first met when she was in kindergarten in the South Bronx, receives about $5,000 in education money each year. If you could lift up Pineapple in your arms and plunk her down in the richest suburb of New York, she would receive $15,000 to $20,000 every year. Add to that the fact the children in this section of the South Bronx virtually never get to attend preschool. Only 20 percent of the children in this neighborhood can be admitted to Headstart because there is so little money available for the program. Meanwhile, the children of the affluent are getting two and sometimes three years of full-day developmental preschool. So children like Pineapple are already one to three years behind middle-class children when they enter public school. Then we spend on them only about half or a quarter of what we’re spending on wealthy children.

What perpetuates this situation?

We have a meritocracy of money in which good public education is passed on from one generation to the next. With privilege goes the opportunity to earn enough money so that you can live in a wealthy suburb and perpetuate this inequality by passing it on to your children. So long as these kinds of inequalities persist, all of us who are given expensive educations have to live with the knowledge that our victories are contaminated because the game has been rigged to our advantage.

I have friends who are political and economic conservatives, wealthy people who send their children to private schools in New England at a cost of $25,000 to $30,000 a year. They ask me, "Can you really solve these education problems by spending more money?" I generally respond by saying, "It seems to do the trick for your children, doesn’t it?"

If high salaries for school teachers and small class size and attractive spacious buildings equipped with beautiful libraries and computers are good for the son or daughter of a president or a member of the Senate or a CEO, then they’re also good for the poorest child in the Bronx. At heart this is a theological issue. I happen to be Jewish, but I’ve read the Gospel where Jesus says, "If you love me, feed my sheep." He didn’t say only the sheep that dwell in the green pastures. He didn’t say only the sheep whose parents make smart choices.

In Ordinary Resurrections you suggest that even the atmosphere and language used in educational debates have changed in recent years.

When I was a young teacher, we used the verb "educate" to speak about what we were doing with the children of poor people as well as the children of rich people. Today in the inner city, the operative verb is not "educate" but "train." Both school officials and business leaders fall into this pattern. The pressure is to train black and Hispanic children to be suitable employees. Business leaders will say to me, "I’m on your side, Jonathan. I want to do something for those children. I see them as my future entry-level workers." This is a devastating change. I frequently suppress the wish to answer, "If you need entry-level labor, why don’t you train your own children to be entry-level labor and educate children like Pineapple to be the next CEO?"

Even President Clinton has subscribed to the "school-to-work" program. The idea is that children will be trained from as early as sixth grade to function in a specific industrial or commercial operation. At ages 12 and 13, children in the South Bronx are being pushed to choose a middle or junior high school corresponding to the career that they intend to enter. It’s outrageous to ask a child to choose her destiny. Even worse, however, is the idea that we’re valuing these children only for their future productive contribution to our society. It devalues childhood. Instead of seeing these children for the blessings that they are, we are measuring them only by the standard of whether they will be future deficits or assets for our nation’s competitive needs.

It’s a profoundly racist agenda. We would never speak about our own children this way. We educate them to go on to universities and acquire the broad, sophisticated base of knowledge from which they can make real choices, and change their choices many times. But for the children of the poorest people we’re stripping the curriculum, removing the arts and music, and drilling the children into useful labor. We’re not valuing a child for the time in which she actually is a child.

The liberals who advocate for more money for good programs like Head-start tend to go along with this corporate agenda. I’m ashamed to say that I used to sit in front of a House or Senate committee on Capitol Hill and say, "Every dollar you invest in Headstart will save $6.00 later on in higher productivity or in lower prison cost," or some other obscene argument of that sort. I’m ashamed that I made such arguments. Why not invest in them because they’re babies and deserve to have some joy in life before they die? Why not do it because we’re a rich country and we can afford to bless them when they’re children? Why not do it because they come to us as blessings? Children are not simply commodities to be herded into line and trained for the jobs that white people who live in segregated neighborhoods have available. I find that offensive.

If you were an adviser to one of the presidential candidates, which issues would you insist that he address?

I would advise the candidate to reopen the dream of Martin Luther King. King did not say I have a dream that some day we will give more exams to children in our inner cities. He did not say I have a dream that some day we will hold children whom we have cheated accountable for their failure. He did not even say I have a dream that we will put more computers and better software into segregated schools, which is pretty much what the candidates are talking about. I would like to see a presidential candidate resolve to fight the enormous forces within the banking and real estate industries and the media that have locked us into a shameful and perpetual apartheid.

Second, I would ask the candidate to abolish the local property tax as the source of school funding and instead fund the public education of every American child out of the federal income tax. Then a child’s education would not depend on whether she was born in the poorest white rural section of southern Ohio or the richest white suburb of New England. After all, when we ask children to pledge allegiance to the flag, it’s not to the flag of the South Bronx or Beverly Hills, but to the American flag.

Do you see proposals for vouchers helping or hurting the cause of education?

I am opposed to the use of public funds for private education. If we allow public funds to be used to support our relatively benign, morally grounded schools, we will have to allow those public funds to be used for any type of private school. Vouchers can also be used for a David Duke school or a right-wing militia school or a Louis Farrakhan school -- any type of ethnically or ideologically extremist school with a hateful and divisive agenda. This would rip apart the social fabric of already fragile cities like Los Angeles, Chicago and New York, with their multiplicity ofethnic, political and ideological groups. It would be the last nail in the coffin of public education.

Many of those who argue for vouchers say that they simply want to use competition to improve public education. I don’t think it works that way, and I’ve been watching this for a longtime. What tends to happen is that the families that are drawn off into private schools tend to be the more sophisticated, even among the poor. Or the more aggressive among the poor. Even when these schools are not consciously selective, they tend to be self-selective and drain off not only money from the public schools, but also strong parental activism. The private schools take away the very parents we need most as passionate PTA leaders. What happens to the children who are left behind?

To End the Bloodshed

According to the consensus among American commentators, reflecting the views of the administration and Congress, a peace process that was on the verge of a breakthrough a few months ago has broken down because of the Palestinians’ intransigence. Instead of responding to a generous Israeli offer, they have turned to senseless violence, putting Israel under siege and bringing calamity on themselves.

No part of this oft-repeated formula corresponds to the reality on the ground.

A "peace process" of nine years has produced only negative results for the Palestinians, as is evident from a glance at the map, which shows dozens of Palestinian-controlled islands comprising less than 18 percent of the West Bank and about 60 percent of the Gaza Strip surrounded by a vast sea of continuing Israeli occupation. In terms of virtually every index, whether per capita income, freedom of movement or otherwise, the lives of ordinary Palestinians have gotten worse since the current "peace process" began in 1991.

Israel has violated every one of the seven agreements it signed with the PLO since 1993. It failed to halt settlement expansion and the seizure of Palestinian land and the building of Israeli-only "bypass roads." It failed to release Palestinian prisoners, establish safe passages between the West Bank and Gaza Strip, open a seaport at Gaza, or to carry out a third withdrawal by May 1999, as agreed, from the entirety of the occupied territories except the settlements, military bases and specific access routes. The violence which has broken out has been a natural response of a people desiring its independence from this continued occupation, which involves an Israeli siege of Palestinian cities and towns, not vice versa as is so often claimed by the media.

Moreover, Israel’s offer at Camp David was by no means generous. It would have led to Israel’s permanent annexation of 8 to 12 percent of the West Bank as well as a large area of settlements around Jerusalem, plus the long-term "lease" to Israel of the Jordan River Valley, plus Israeli "security control" (which is another way of saying "continued occupation") of the vast swathes of territory on which lie the bypass roads connecting the settlements. An Israeli military and settlement overlay would thus have continued to dominate a quilt of Palestinian Bantustans.

As for Jerusalem, Barak’s "generous offer" gave Israel sovereignty and full control over its illegally built settlements in about 40 percent of East Jerusalem, plus the Jewish and Armenian quarters of the Old City, the Mount of Olives, the Palestinian Silwan district and the Haram al-Sharif precinct, all of which would have remained under Israel security control.

Israel would have admitted no responsibility for the expulsion of the Palestinian refugees in 1948, would have accepted the "family reunification" of only 10,000 per year for a decade (out of a total of over 3 million), and would not have paid compensation to them.

The way in which this offer was made was as unfair as its contents: after Israel refused to negotiate seriously on these or any of the other complex "permanent status" issues for nine years, Ehud Barak presented a take-it-or-leave-it offer at Camp David. When the Palestinians balked, President Clinton took the same basic offer and presented it as an American proposal, also on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.

Although the Palestinian Authority did not respond immediately to these proposals (as it probably should have), it continued trying to negotiate, postponing a planned Palestinian unilateral declaration of independence in September, and attempting to find a formula whereby real give-and-take could take place over these issues. It repeatedly discussed with Egypt, the U.S. and Israel compromise proposals for dealing with the issue of sovereignty in Jerusalem.

What were the real reasons for the failure of the "peace process"?

• It went on for too long and achieved too little: after nine years and seven agreements, 82 percent of the West Bank is still under Israeli occupation, while 1.4 million Palestinians are denied access to nearly 40 percent of the Gaza Strip, where Israeli troops protect the luxurious lifestyle of 6,000 settlers.

• Israel has never shown willingness to confront the settlers’ movement, evacuate settlements and end the occupation, and with it the stifling system of control of the life of ordinary Palestinians. The contrary has happened: Palestinians are even worse off than before Oslo, not one settlement has been dismantled, tens of thousands more acres of Palestinian land have been seized, and nearly 80,000 more Israelis live on that land than was the case in 1991.

• Arafat and the PA, whose popularity has been declining since 1995, have been further discredited, having failed to obtain self-determination and independence, or to end Israeli settlement and land seizure, while imprisoning Palestinians for attacking Israel, as part of a one-sided bargain which Israel has never respected.

• The US. has played a disgraceful role throughout, failing to serve as an honest broker. It has consulted with Israel before every step in the negotiations, pressuring the Palestinians shamelessly and ignoring the land-for-peace formula which was supposed to be the basis of the process, while freezing out any other potential mediators.

The Madrid-Oslo process has come to an end. A new one must provide a balanced and fair framework for negotiation (probably with Israel and the U.S. on the same side of the table and a real mediator in the middle), based firmly on international law and UN resolutions. The process must have ironclad deadlines and fixed objectives: a rapid and phased end to occupation, the complete removal of settlements, Palestinian self-determination and statehood with Jerusalem as a capital for both Palestine and Israel, and a real security framework for all nations of the region.

Such new terms may seem unrealistic, given the nonsensical consensus in the press and in Washington, and will be hard for the Israelis to accept. But they are unlikely to find Palestinian or Arab interlocutors for anything less, and it is only through negotiations that this problem can finally be solved. In fact, anything other than a formula along these lines is unrealistic -- and a recipe for more bloodshed.

Formed for Ministry: A Program in Spiritual Formation

"I want my seminary experience to form me as a person of prayer." We had never heard a student state this desire so eloquently and succinctly. We sensed in this comment something much more than a first-year student’s desire for greater piety in the school environment. This student had done extremely well at a college with a strong undergraduate program. She was mature, intellectually able, and eager to study. Yet she perceived a need in her soul that she wanted addressed in her seminary education.

About this same time Duke Divinity School was focusing on the theme "The Love of Learning and the Desire for God," a phrase borrowed from Jean Leclercq’s classic study of monastic education in the Middle Ages. We were convinced that the knowledge and the love of God is, or at least should be, central to theological education. Therefore, effective theological formation of women and men for ministries in the church and world, and for doctoral education in the university, should involve deepening their lives as lives of prayer.

Theological education ought to be about forming people for ministry, not simply conveying information. Information is important, but theological education must shape ministerial identity. Forming ministerial identity requires attention to the care and nurture of souls beyond the classroom as well as in it. Education and formation in prayer requires time and focus.

Even though we believed in the close connection between a love of learning and a desire for God, we had not fully understood or anticipated how much students felt the need to be formed through an intentional program of spiritual nurture. We saw that the one student had beautifully articulated a longing that many students inchoately shared. As a result of her passion and commitment, and with strong support from the administration, a number of students organized voluntary spiritual formation groups.

Without such student initiative, we might have been hesitant to develop, much less require, a new program for students, especially one that demands more from their already busy lives. The students convinced us that more explicit attention to spiritual formation was crucial.

From this humble beginning, Duke Divinity School has developed a program of spiritual formation that addresses three pressing needs. First, students need more intentional reflection on the practices of the Christian faith. Among philosophers and theologians there is a growing awareness of the inseparability of identity and social-cultural practices. This helpful development provides an opportunity for theological education to move beyond placing students in the worn-out categories of theological liberals and conservatives. Such categorization often results in intellectual stereotyping that disrupts the process of equipping students for ministry.

Rather than being preoccupied with whether students are theologically liberal or conservative, we believe it is better to have students consider this question: What are the practices and convictions that form, nurture and strengthen Christian identity and life? This question compels students to learn to nurture themselves and others by a life of prayer that joins together the knowledge and love of God. Our spiritual formation program has the goal of deepening and widening the prayer vocabulary of students as well as building their confidence in providing spiritual direction to others. We want students to be excited about rendering spiritual and intellectual leadership in ministry.

Second, students need to nurture the interrelation of prayer, study and service. Theological education in this country, especially among Protestants, has not consistently held these activities together. However, we have found at Duke that theological education as a whole must be a consistent explication of the statement, "We are Christians." We must illumine beliefs and practices in such a way that one does not exist intelligibly without the other.

A seminary’s success or failure ought to be measured by how well the interrelation of beliefs and practices is articulated, forming students to see their study prayer and service as a complex, integrated whole. Much of North American church life and seminary life presses a wedge between Christian beliefs and practices. Our spiritual formation program aims to make students more intentional about living out the deep connections between Christian beliefs and practices. Hence, we have asked our students to reflect in their spiritual formation groups about the impact of their service (in local congregations, social ministries or mission teams) on their study and their prayer.

The third need is to grasp the significance of "life together" (to borrow a term from Bonhoeffer) as the fundamental shape of the spiritual journey We are keenly aware of the persistent individualism in popular Christian piety. Many students arrive at divinity school convinced that spirituality is an individualistic endeavor that may be pursued in commodified, consumerist terms. They need to discover that, while prayer and the spiritual life are profoundly personal, involving a person’s relationship with God, any personal relationship is also determinatively communal.

Through our spiritual formation program, we want students to keep important issues before them, including what it means to serve Christ in the church and the world, and what radically faithful witness to Christ entails. In the context of community, we want students to face themselves and each other by looking carefully and prayerfully at their past, present and future. This includes their lives of service, study and prayer, as well as their own journeys of Christian vocation. We believe the seminary experience should be a time of confrontation and embrace, challenge and growth, in the context of Christian community. The spiritual formation program intends to help students enter into self-reflection before God and God’s people.

How does the program work? Building on the voluntary groups, as well as a (no longer existent) first-year course requirement that included a small-group component, we have formalized a program that requires all students to participate in spiritual formation groups throughout their first year. All of our master of divinity and master of church ministries candidates are placed in groups of six to nine students each. Students are not allowed to choose their small group. We want students to be placed in a setting that will allow them to experience Christian community with people whom they might not have chosen as friends. We also want the groups to reflect as much as possible the diversity of our student body and the church.

One of the crucial decisions we made was to ask area ministers to be the primary leaders of these groups. We have sought clergy who are recognized in the community for their leadership, their spiritual maturity and their wisdom, We have sought people who have completed their seminary training and have been in full-time Christian service at least five years. These ministers reflect the diversity of the church in age, gender, race, denominational identity and theological perspective. Included are mainline Protestant clergy from a variety of denominations and a Roman Catholic nun and a priest.

The structure of the small groups is very simple: they meet together once a week for an hour to reflect on their life together in service to Christ. The leaders are asked to share their own joys and struggles in ministry and to encourage sharing by others. The group time must include some portion devoted to prayer and other spiritual disciplines. Some groups have adopted formal covenants, others have utilized the practice of reading scripture prayerfully through the lectio divina, while others have drawn on traditions of free prayer.

Students receive a grade of pass or fail for their engagement with this important work; attendance and participation determine the grade. To graduate, students must complete a full year in the spiritual formation groups. We believe that formal evaluation, though not graded, is crucial for stressing the importance of this aspect of theological education.

Finding group leaders for the first year of the program was surprisingly easy. Most of the ministers we contacted agreed immediately, However, some leaders were a bit uneasy about what to do in the small groups, and many of the first group of students shared that unease. This seemed an unusual requirement for them as students, and they were unsure also meets one-on-one with students to provide spiritual direction and other support.

In this second year of the program, we have seen a marked difference in our incoming students and our returning students, Both groups seem much more open to the weaving together of beliefs and practices, especially as that weaving is shaped by the small groups. Many returning students are participating in voluntary spiritual formation groups, and new students are integrating their experiences into what was supposed to happen. Yet at the end of the first year, the vast majority of students offered overwhelmingly positive assessments of the spiritual formation groups. The consistent refrain we heard from students was that this experience was the glue that held together their first year in seminary.

A surprising response came from the group leaders. The ministers consistently reported that being with the seminarians was one of the highlights of their week. Many spoke of being strengthened in their work. They often invited their groups for meals in their homes, and many groups gathered for more than the required one hour a week.

One of the most remarkable stories came from a pastor who said that, when he began working with his small group, he was fatigued and burned out. At the end of the year, we assumed that he would not be interested in leading another small group the next year. However, once the group ended he realized that it had revitalized him over the course of the year. At the end of the summer, when we were putting together the small groups, the pastor called and said that he would greatly welcome the opportunity to work with the students again.

To be more intentional about spiritual formation, we have appointed a faculty person in that area and created the position of chaplain for the divinity school. The newly appointed chaplain, an African-American United Methodist pastor with experience in a multicultural congregation, helps to coordinate the spiritual formation groups as well as the worship life of the community. She also meets one-on-one with students to provide spiritual direction and other support.

In this second year of the program, we have seen a marked difference in out incoming students and out returning students. Both groups seem much more open to the weaving together of beliefs and practices, especially as that weaving is shaped by the small groups. Many returning students are participating in voluntary spiritual formation groups, and new students are integrating their experiences into their course work in significant ways. This greater weaving of beliefs and practices has occurred partly because of a changing culture in the divinity school, but also because we are doing a better job of reclaiming in our classes the close relationship between theological reflection and prayer that has too often been sundered in modernity.

This year we have also invited lecturers to deepen students’ reflection. In the fall semester, Soul Feast author Marjorie Thompson spoke to spiritual formation participants about what it means to lead God’s people in worship and spiritual care. This spring we are welcoming Joseph Small, director of the Office of Theology and Worship for the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), who will speak about the use of prayerbooks and the relationship of extemporaneous and written prayer.

A maxim from the Eastern Orthodox tradition indicates that "The person who prays is a true theologian and the true theologian is one who prays." We believe that a serious and intentional program of spiritual formation in theological education is crucial to cultivating the love of learning and the desire for God. Such love and desire is shaped by, and in turn shapes, lives of transformative service to, for and with God’s people.

Our program flows from the vision that Dietrich Bonhoeffer embodied so powerfully in Finkenwalde in the 1930s and described in his classic Life Together. "The aim," Bonhoeffer wrote, "is not the seclusion of the monastery, but a place of the deepest inward concentration for service outside." We hope, and believe, that significant attention to spiritual formation intrinsic to rigorous theological education will enhance our deepest inward concentration for service in the church and the world.

Men Without Women: An African-American Crisis

Blood Rituals: Consequences of Slavery in Two American Centuries

By Orlando Patterson. (Civitas/Counterpoint, 330 pp.)

The title of Orlando Patterson’s book refers most immediately to the racially motivated lynchings in the old South, which he discusses the second of the three interlocking essays that make up the text. But it also may speak sharply to the quasi-ritualistic categories in which current ideological debates on race and cultural are embedded. Both old-line liberals and conservatives will object strongly to many of Patterson’s claims, and few who are seriously interested in the problems he confronts will be entirely comfortable with what he says. Everyone, however, should find his book challenging and helpful.

The book is the second installment of a trilogy on the legacy of race and slavery. The first, The Ordeal of Integration, marked points of progress in race relations. Blood Rituals examines the social distortions that took form during slavery, were perpetuated through institutionalized racism and continue to plague both the country and the African-American community. Though the book is organized around the plight of the African-American male, it transcends African-American issues. In the final essay, "American Dionysus," Patterson points out that the current image of African-American men, when decoded and examined, illuminates the entire landscape of modern American popular culture. To understand this image, Patterson argues, is to uncover some of the most enduring sources of our resistance to social progress.

Patterson’s arguments are both brilliantly insightful and, at times, speculative. In his first and most controversial essay he diagnoses the African-American situation and shows that the African-American family is in trouble. According to Patterson,

African American men and women of all classes have a terribly troubled relationship. Slavery and the system of racial oppression engendered it, and poverty, economic insecurity, and lingering racism sustain it. But blaming these injustices alone will get them nowhere. Not only because it is Afro-Americans themselves, especially men, who now inflict these wounds upon themselves -- through the ways they betray those who love them and bear their progeny, through the ways they bring up or abandon their children, through the ways they relate, or fail to relate, to each other, through the values and attitudes they cherish and the ones they choose to spurn, through their comforting ethnic myths about their neighborhoods, through their self-indulgences, denials and deceits -- but because only they as individual men and women can find the antidote to heal themselves.

Patterson dispels the myth of the coherence and the effectiveness of the extended family in the African-American community. "[African Americans] do not enjoy the main benefits that usually come with dense networks -- the security and support of kinsmen," he insists. "For, contrary to conventional wisdom and ideology, their networks have the smallest proportion of kinsmen of all native-born Americans.

Although this myth may make people feel good, Patterson contends, an overestimation of the extended family’s health and coherence masks the community’s fragmentation and the epidemic loneliness and isolation it spawns. It grossly overstates the cultural resources available to the community as it confronts a host of continuing difficulties. While Patterson’s realism places him in tension with historian Herbert C. Cutman and others, seeing a difficult problem realistically is an important step in solving it.

For Patterson, another dangerous myth, the myth of the "hood," amounts to "the belief that viable informal friendship patterns and communities exist, compensating for the breakdown or absence of more formal institutions." African-Americans, he writes, "should stop undermining their own best interests by misguidedly favoring policies that preserve their ghetto neighborhoods, especially in light of the fact that the ‘hood’ itself is not what it has been made out to be." Elsewhere he states simply, "There are no ‘hoods’ out there, which is precisely why murderous gangs, like opportunistic cancers, rush in to fill the vacuum.

In his third essay Patterson extends this badly needed de-idealization to such cultural forms as rap. He places rap squarely at the center of a hip-hop culture that reinforces patterns of ignorance and misogyny, and links it to larger cultural forces that debase the popular images of African-American men. He agrees with Martha Bayles’s statement that rap has reduced African-American music to a "minstrel version" of violence-obsessed white rock bands. But, he writes, "an even greater tragedy has befallen Afro-American music: it is the fact that while the mass of Afro-American music lovers have embraced the misogynistic, self-loathing noise of ‘gangsta’ rap now sponsored mainly by Euro-American companies -- they have largely abandoned the authentic music of the blues and jazz."

At the heart of the difficulties plaguing the community -- the rise in abusive patterns of child rearing, the festering problems of chemical dependency and violent crime and the self-destructive patterns of African-American lower class youth (particularly male) -- lie deeply disturbed gender relations: "For without consistent and lasting relations between men and women, and without a durable, supportive framework within which children are brought up, a group of people is in deep trouble." Patterson presents an impressive range of statistical data to support that conclusion. "Not only are Afro-Americans marrying at declining rates, but their marriages are extremely fragile and dissolve at greater rates than those of other groups," he writes.

To make his point, Patterson traces the problematic nature of African-American manhood throughout American history, from the systematic emasculation of men during slavery through the legal and social destruction of the roles of husband and father. Behavioral patterns that arose during slavery continued to undermine gender relations and the family during the area of Jim Crow. But Patterson’s ringing moral indictment of contemporary African-American men for the perpetuation of these problems is the most controversial aspect of his book. This indictment is worth quoting at length.

Indeed, if one must assign blame, the major part must surely be placed on the men who so wantonly impregnate these mothers, then abandon them and their children. It is hard to imagine a more execrable form of immorality and irresponsible behavior than that. The worst part of all is that the fathers’ immorality and irresponsibility are reproduced in their own sons. The economic deprivation, loneliness, social isolation, stress, and emotional and physical exhaustion of mothers that account for the mother-child syndrome I have . . . analyzed are all, in the first place, either largely caused or else critically exacerbated by the natural father’s betrayal and abandonment. When these factors are added to a tradition of weak child-rearing skills inherited from a traumatized past the resulting disastrous offspring is well nigh inevitable.

Though Patterson points out that what he says here is true only of roughly 35 percent of the African-American population, he often seems to condemn most of the community, and his figures are not always consistent. At one point he argues, more sweepingly, that "sixty percent of Afro-American children are now being brought up without the emotional or material support of a father. This is so because the great majority of Afro-American mothers have been seduced, deceived, betrayed, and abandoned by the men to whom they gave their love and trust."

Insightful and stimulating as Patterson always is, his moral reflections, as distinct from his sociological analyses, leave me uneasy. Not all of his conclusions seem reliable, and his distribution of the weight of culpability can be challenged. He has correctly identified some serious moral issues for the African-American community, but he often oversimplifies a complex problem. In fact, the moral dilemma that Patterson perceives is far more multidimensional than his description of it would suggest. His indictment is largely based on a traditional Christian moral framework and a traditional understanding of the family that centuries of hypocrisy have undermined for many. Larger social processes directly impact the moral quality of individual choices.

That Patterson recognizes this in his second chapter, where he reflects on how the difficulties of the South during the "transitional period" led to the activities of lynch mobs, makes even more striking his disinclination to extend this objectivity to African-American men. He fails to take into account the ongoing "legitimation crisis" of the dominant American tradition within the African-American community -- a crisis that has spawned a deep resentment and contempt which undermines constructive moral choice. The popularity of the Nation of Islam and of Islam in general, especially among the community’s young men, is only one sign of this crisis.

Patterson’s failure on this point is particularly disappointing since he is in a position to offer a rich moral argument that ventures into territory that remains unexplored by both the moralistic stance of the right and the language of victimization on the left. By integrating his sociological analysis with his moral reflections, Patterson would deepen his discussion of both gender relations and the "criminal" dynamic that is an equally justifiable object of his moral scorn. As it is, he tends to reduce the reasons for ghetto violence and the disproportionate crime rate among African-Americans to dysfunctional families. He goes so far as to argue that since "married or otherwise stably partnered men commit far fewer crimes than single ones.., the far greater crime rate among Afro-American men must in great part be explained by their unmarried and largely unpartnered existence." But it actually might be true that both the unpartnered state and the disproportionate crime rate are rooted in a common source -- the crisis in legitimacy of once-accepted religious and moral traditions.

While many will regard Patterson’s unflinching position that personal responsibility has a part to play in the resolution of African-American difficulties a defection to the enemy, I find his candor encouraging. For both many African-Americans and many white liberals, to speak openly of this personal responsibility is, in effect, to exonerate European Americans for their complicity in deeply embedded racist practices. But Patterson’s position highlights the need for African-Americans to struggle against forces of disintegration personal as well as social, internal as well as external to the African-American community.

The enemy is not always on the other side of the line. Sometimes he walks in your territory and looks just like you. A consequence of the systematic brutalization of a people is that they sometimes turn on each other, making the oppressor’s task easier and the road to freedom harder. Far too little attention has been paid to this internal dimension of racist oppression.

The cultural climate that supports this inattention makes Patterson’s project courageous. Many African-American leaders and self-styled public intellectuals have been too soft on the pathogenic dynamics that have taken root as a result of racism. "Community is celebrated, especially by urban community leaders and activists," Patterson writes, but "the truth is that Afro-Americans lead the nation in their unconnectedness to community support groups. The isolation of adult Afro-Americans from each other generates, in turn, numerous psychological, physical and social problems."

There has also been a tendency to romanticize or idealize African-American culture and institutions -- to read cultural responses simplistically as heroic reactions to oppressive external forces. Ignored is the internal transfiguration of African-American life that often plays itself out within the community in powerfully destructive ways. This romanticizing often obscures the ugliness of complicity and shared culpability.

Patterson himself seems to fall into this romanticization when he fails to require the same personal responsibility of "victimized" African-American women as he does of African-American men. "True, it takes two to be unfaithful, and single Afro-American women who have affairs with married or cohabiting men, especially those with children, should do better," he writes. But then he concludes that "the marriage market is so bleak for Afro-American women that their behavior in this regard is understandable, if not to be countenanced."

He convincingly illustrates the distance between African-American women and men on key issues -- such as attitudes toward sexuality and commitment to traditional moral codes -- that directly impact the health and longevity of heterosexual relationships. Ignorant, self-destructive modes of thought and behavior are glorified in the burgeoning African-American popular culture. A strategy for meeting challenges such as these, however, cannot be based on a theoretically premature moralization of the issues. Patterson, quite justifiably, wants to assume a problem-centered approach -- one that doesn’t lose sight of the real practical problems. But in keeping with his overall objective and his guiding metaphor of "diagnosis," he must not omit from his moral analysis factors that are essential to a full understanding of the crisis. The absence of a full description of the problem and its implications will undermine any formulation of an effective strategy for dealing with it, and deflect the potential impact of his well-intentioned and badly needed project.

Evil works its most sinister designs and weaves its most intricate webs in the lives of the most vulnerable -- those who are stressed to the point of moral exhaustion. As John Crossan points out, demonic possession flourished among the lower, oppressed peasant class to whose health and liberation Jesus devoted his life. That this point is missed by many African-American thinkers is nowhere more evident than in the treatment of the African-American church by black theologians and religious thinkers. It is aptly and embarrassingly illustrated by the failure of contemporary African-American church studies adequately to analyze the recent scandal in the National Baptist Convention, U.S.A., Inc.

The reluctance of African-Americans to "air dirty laundry" in public is grounded in a justifiably defensive posture. Anyone growing up in America should be aware of the twisted nature of those bent on preserving the notion of white supremacy. They should be aware that it is in the presumed defective moral nature of "blacks" that the most sinister forms of reactionary racism remain embedded. African-Americans know all too well how likely reactionaries are to twist the kinds of things Patterson points out to their own ends and use his "blackness" to enhance their credibility. But a diagnosis of the malady sickening the African-American community must courageously run that risk. There will always be "knaves that will twist your words to make a trap for fools." Patterson demonstrates that he is prepared to take on that challenge.

Wisdom Famine (Proverbs 9:1-6; Ephesians 5:15-20)

In this information age, a steady stream of input is bombarding us. Like water from a fire hose, information overwhelms and numbs us. But are we any wiser? Are we any closer to God, or to God’s design or intentions for life? Are we humbler? Are we learning anything about the way life really works? I fear the subtitle of a book by C. John Sommerville sums up our situation: The Dearth of Wisdom in an Information Society. As one observer notes, we are in a "wisdom famine."

Who wants to be wise anymore? People want to be right, rich, popular and in control. But wise?

In sharp contrast, the Proverbs passage pictures a wisdom feast. In this allegory full of poetic images, wisdom is personified as a woman -- a kind of hostess with the mostest. She’s prepared a lavish feast and sent out formal invitations. "Come, eat of my bread and drink of the wine I have mixed." All that you need to do is RSVP. Just show up! Come on in, sit down and feast on wisdom!

Later in chapter nine we meet another woman, "a foolish woman" who lives down the road. She wants our company too. But her place is not a mansion but a dive, and the sustenance she offers is meager, even deadly We need to be careful, because she represents foolishness, and foolishness is dangerous.

Proverbs 9 seems to suggest that someone might be tempted to bypass wisdom’s feast and try to survive on the thin gruel of folly (or information). Why would anyone want to do that? Clearly, wisdom has more to offer: she’s the better person, offering the better feast. But we are to choose.

Ephesians 5 is a call to wisdom too, although it comes across less as an invitation and more as a kick in the backside: "Be careful then how you live, not as unwise people but as wise. . . do not be foolish." And the text even gives some specific ideas of what wisdom looks like, examples of what a wise person does, things like "make the most of the time" or "understand what the will of the Lord is" or "don’t get drunk" and "be filled with the Spirit."

Of course, the Book of Proverbs gets down to specifics too. The first nine chapters describe how wisdom works in general, but the proverbs in chapter ten concern the nuts and bolts of godly living. As someone has pointed out, a proverb is "a short sentence based on long experience." Some proverbs are real zingers. They’re plain truth, brought home with the gentleness of a sledgehammer.

Maybe that’s why I’ve never been overly fond of the genre. When was the last time you recommended "wisdom literature" as a must read? Much of it seems like a cross between reading a Chinese fortune cookie and an Ann Landers column. It’s advice I didn’t ask for and don’t need. I need good news. I don’t need to try harder to conform; I need to be transformed.

Fortunately, Proverbs knows this. Fourteen times we’re reminded that "the fear of the Lord is the beginning of wisdom." Wisdom and godly living begins with letting God be God. In that sense, Proverbs is not for the general public. Proverbs is for God’s people, calling them beyond the theoretical to the practical, beyond the intellectual to the actual, beyond abstractions to application, and beyond beliefs to behavior. In contrast to Greek wisdom -- which is about philosophy and ideas and intellectual thought -- biblical wisdom is about what to do day by day.

In 1989 the U.S. hosted Lech Walesa, leader of the former Solidarity labor movement and the newly elected president of Poland. During his visit, Walesa spoke candidly to the U.S. Congress. Speculating about how Americans might respond to the astounding events taking place in Eastern Europe, he said that we must remember that "there is a declining world market for words." In an information age, there is a declining market for words, While what we say is important, words are not enough. Spoken words, even a mouthed confession of faith, mean nothing without the behavior to back it up. "Lay aside immaturity, and live, and walk in the way of insight" -- of understanding, of wisdom. Ephesians 5:15 (in some versions) cautions us, "Be careful then how you walk."

Information is fast, loud, superficial, numbing. We can’t get away from it. Wisdom is slower, deeper, lasting, more elusive. We can begin to make our way toward wisdom by clearing out the data smog -- by fasting from TV, computer, cell phone and pocket planner long enough to talk with a friend face-to-face, read a book or simply sit still and listen for the way of wisdom.