Chapter 4: The Ministry as Administering

In the current ministerial vocabulary, administration is a dirty word. When ministers get together after hours at a convention, the complaints that are not about money and bishops are nearly all about committees, women’s societies, the telephone, the mimeograph, denominational programs, correspondence, and various related matters all generally classed as "administration."

This commonsense impression received significant reinforcement from the study made by Samuel Blizzard, the full report of which is still unpublished. Roughly speaking, when Blizzard’s five thousand ministers were asked what aspects of their duties were most and least rewarding, they declared preaching and pastoral care to be most rewarding and administrative and executive functions to be least rewarding. But when asked about their actual time schedules, they reported spending more time on the latter than on the former.

So convinced am I of this general ministerial dislike of administration that I believe I know exactly how this discussion could achieve, for me, a peak of popularity. I could begin with tears over the mimeograph and the telephone, make resounding remarks about the minister’s need for plenty of time to study, portray the number of dying persons deprived of pastoral service by committee meetings, and declare warmly that the Word and sacraments should not be encroached on by carbon copies, budgets, and inept church school teachers. I could give a clarion call to the minister to be the minister, as the church is to be the church; and cap the climax by allocating all financial matters to a business administrator, all telephones and letters to a host of efficient secretaries, all committee meetings to something known as a "responsible laity," and all denominational program materials to limbo.

Can you not picture the utopia this would conjure in manifold ministerial breasts, including your own? At last we could get back to real morning devotions to start the day right, not the hasty scriptural snack to which we now seem confined. A productive but useful morning in the study would then follow. Think how rich our sermons would become. And we should, at last, have time to keep up with biography, with fiction, with history, as well as with all the branches of theology. No longer could the names of either Barth or Hemingway make us cringe. We should finally be able to quit pretending that we know who Heidegger is, why Toynbee is to be regarded with suspicion, and what an affluent society really means. When our imagined afternoon is considered, what Christian bliss indeed to make those hospital calls upon patients awaiting eagerly our attentive ear and reassuring word. Later in the afternoon we may rescue a marriage or two, save an adolescent from a criminal career, cure a morphine addict, and a few other similar but daily successes. And when evening comes, then above all we may finally not neglect our home but may play parchesi and backgammon with our adoring family gathered around us. Perhaps one evening telephone call, from some inept committee chairman, could be tolerated. After all, he could simply be told what to do and to take the responsibility for it. But no more. At bedtime what bliss to look back and thank God that one has, at last, had a day worthy of a minister’s vocation: plenty of prayer, plenty of study, plenty of service, plenty of family, and no conflicting demands from any person or group. With such a day behind one, he could give up not only tranquillizers but also his last vestige of relevance to the needs of today’s world.

If we should go back over this utopia with a realistic eye, the previous conclusions must at least be qualified. Our devotions go barren after ten minutes because we are awaiting a call from the hospital or the forms to make out our income tax. Our study is great for an hour; but then, right in the middle of Toynbee, we have to plunge into the consideration of new hymnals. The calls and counseling in the afternoon find one person bitter, another dependent, another recalcitrant; with few if any notches cut into the pastoral gun by tea time. And as to the evening, which child would drop dead first if father had time to play anything, let alone parchesi?

The tone of these remarks so far may appear to be realistic almost to the point of cynicism and exaggerated almost to the point of caricature; and I freely admit, on points like this, a certain initial predilection for excess. Although I shall not continue in such an extreme strain, it is simply my experience that, where some meaningful analysis of administration is concerned, nothing succeeds like excess — at least in getting attention.

Let me put in a quite different way one tact that has already been stated in another way but perhaps so that it sailed by before the reader could grasp it. That fact is that what ministers say they like to do is precisely what they do alone and by themselves without having to consult anyone but God, and that what they dislike doing is consulting and winning and relating to other people in order to get something done. They like preaching and pastoral care. They need not consult a congregational vote concerning the subject for the next sermon, nor have a committee diagnose a particular parishioner’s spiritual needs before they make a call. If they succeed, it is they (and of course God) who did it. If they fail, well, sometimes they fail, sometimes they are not appreciated, and sometimes the people were not ready. But succeed or fail, they have not been compelled to consult. The Lone Ranger rides off into the evening haze.

They do not like administering and executing. Whatever the specific task, the one thing that cannot be done with it is to move simply and plainly from one’s conviction to getting the thing done. A committee has to be called or consulted, and have its shins barked and its theology redecorated. A moribund society has to be revived, since even the Lord is manifestly’ not powerful enough to kill it. Even a letter cannot be answered without con-suiting the encyclopedia, the church secretary, the chairman of the board, or the Heidelberg Catechism. A thousand consultations shall fall at thy administrative right hand, and ten thousand executive encounters at thy left. And they shall make thee tetched.

I simply see no escape from the conclusion that, at least in our ministerial dreams if not in our practice, our patron saint is a combination of Narcissus and Hotspur. We want to do it alone and we do not want to be distracted by other people’s opinion. Perhaps the sign on the ideal ministerial door, if it were honest, would read, "No waiting; painless extractions; privacy assured." To be sure, this is a rather odd motto for the ministry of a church that professes to serve the world, and to do so through a Living Word carried and conveyed by a fellowship and in which priesthood is somehow conceived to be a universal function and not an aristocratic prerogative.

If I thought the distortion we now confront were only a small one, I should not be obliged to bring in the dangerous big guns of satire. But the twisting seems massive. Tinkering will not do. Something fundamental is wrong. And while I do not propose to set it all aright, I do want to take as clear a look at it as possible. For I believe that a hatred and distaste for everything lumped together as administration can be as severe an enemy of ministry as can the absence of the gospel message.

Administration and Poor Administration

In the argument that I shall make from here on, defending administering by interpreting it as no less important than preaching, I shall not, however, attempt to defend everything going under the name of administration. For some administration is poor not because it is administration but because it is poor. And it, for the most part, is what gives rise to the general image that ministers have when administration is mentioned. We may symbolize this by the cartoon image of the minister with rolled-up sleeves cranking the mimeograph machine.

In normal situations, as a matter of fact, this is not a proper image of administration but of the failure of good administration. For it suggests that the minister has accepted, or been beaten into, a hired-man position around the church. If anything involves work, "we pay him, don’t we?" But the fact is that masochism of some type, even the ecclesiastical, is needed to perpetuate such practices. So far as routine duties are concerned, no minister may properly conceive of himself as either a hired hand or a fall guy. Why is he cranking that machine? One reason might be that he cannot tolerate a sense of obligation to anyone; and if he got a good volunteer to handle the machine, he would have to be grateful; and since grateful feelings embarrass him, he cranks the machine, finally, to prevent the embarrassment of gratitude. Another reason might be that he can not bear to request paid secretarial help; for this would involve a need for more money; and thus he would lose his reputation for being such a "spiritual" person. It is also thoroughly possible that none of these Freudian revelations of inverted pride is nearly so important as his not being smart enough to ask the right people in the right way at the right time for the right things in the right tone of authority. But, whatever the reasons, he is not merely doing himself a disservice and building up a greater head of steam against something he thinks of as administration. He is also selling out the ministry of Word and sacraments. He shows that, whatever the reason, he has failed to interpret his function to his people, has not elicited their support and their service to enable him to perform the function; and in this instance has failed to get the people doing the mimeographing who ought to be doing it. This is not administration but poor administration.

We must, then, reject the mimeographing image of the ministry. But we must do so for the right reason. The reason is certainly not that the minister is too good to be caught mimeographing. Suppose that the time is Saturday evening, and that Mrs. Jones, who was to have mimeographed the Sunday bulletin as usual on Saturday afternoon, got a pain about noon and was taken to the hospital. Under these circumstances the pastor might very well be behind the machine for this occasion. No necessary function in the life of the church is foreign to him or beneath him, under special circumstances. But that is very different from making mimeographing normative.

Servanthood, which is so focal in our conception of ministry, always involves a proper relationship between two kinds of elements. On the one hand, since it seeks to serve where service is needed, nothing that serves needs is in principle beneath its notice. But on the other hand, as the notion of "waiter at table" that lies behind the servanthood idea is analyzed, it is clear that some kind of covenant about types of service offered and expected under normal conditions is essential. If there is no covenant, then service is forced into slavery. And if there is no spirit of commitment to meeting needs but only acceptance of specific tasks, then only a job is being performed and there is no servanthood. The minister is not too good to mimeograph. But his covenant should normatively be to things other than mimeographing.

Undoubtedly some poor administration comes from plain inefficiency, fancy laziness, and plain or fancy lack of self-discipline that fails to get some things, like correspondence, done when they ought to be done. But for much of it the motives seem far more complex and hidden.

For instance, let us take a quick look at Pastors A, B, C, and D, each of whom has just reported to a friend, with a mixture of pride and petulance, that he was not home a single night last week. Each complains about committees, conferences, and meetings. But when we take a good subsurface look at Pastor A, we find that he simply dropped in on three of the meetings — "They expect it of their pastor," he says. And on each occasion the chairman of each meeting, at the beginning, middle, and end, has expressed profuse thanks to the pastor for his presence and his wisdom, without which apparently dire events would have occurred. It takes no great psychological penetration to recognize that in Pastor A’s case his petulance about meetings is a bit feigned provided the correct doses of adulation have been doled out.

Pastor B looks at his meetings a bit differently. He fears that one committee, left to itself, might vote against God; another against the prayer book; and the third against the Republican party. Of course, if asked, he would deny that he regards himself as the indispensable man. But the fact is that the load he carries rather obsessively and narcissistically on his shoulders is the one thing that prevents him from admitting his secret self-judgment: that he is a lightweight.

The secret and unacknowledged fear of Pastor C, we find upon analysis, is that the committees will get along beautifully in his absence; and then where will he be? Pastor D, we find, attends the meetings, and then complains privately about them, because if they were not around to distract him, he would be compelled to face an evening with his family, or to make needed calls on parishioners, or to read a book. These latter possibilities all being, under the surface, too dire to contemplate, it is the meetings that receive his attention. Indeed, what would any of these ministers do with their aggressive impulses if there were no committees to blame them on.

There is, I believe, a little bit of each one of these hypothetical pastors in each of us. Some of our own poor administration comes not from ordinary inefficiency but from more subtle motivations about which we have not come clean. Can you, if the situation really calls for it, leave the telephone temporarily unanswered? Do you, in chairing a meeting, find yourself pouring oil instead of helping to clarify conflicts because you yourself feel threatened by the very fact of the conflicts? Do you use your car inefficiently not because you are incapable of plotting out an efficient round of trips but because it has become your real "castle," the one place where you can get away from immediate requests without feeling guilty? Do you complain privately about your secretary — who performs miracles already with the bad syntax of your dictation, but who cannot quite make you sound like Winston Churchill — because, if you took trouble with your syntax, you would be like an ordinary man and not a great spiritual leader? Do you build up inner resentment quietly when asked to do something unreasonable by someone from denominational headquarters, instead of taking the risk of being honest and open and saying no? There is a little bit of yes to each of these, and similar, questions in us all.

All of us are involved to some degree, then, in partially poor administration. But the astonishing fact is that our general conception of administration is determined by what is poor, not by what is good. When we considered preaching, we saw, in contrast, that our image comes from preaching performing its best and proper function, not from its distortions. Now, with administration, we find that pathology provides the norm. That is why the distortion is massive, and why our analysis both of poor or distorted administration and of positive and proper administration is so important. We turn now to the positive image of administering.

Administering as Commitment Through Group

Our proper conception of administration, like our image of preaching, has its modern starting point in the Reformation. It stems from the two closely related doctrines of the universal priesthood of believers and the universality of Christian vocation. Thus, from this perspective, administration was not invented solely in the twentieth century, and it was not a device of the devil. The meaning behind it is, in our Protestant tradition, just as important an interpretation of the meaning of ministry as is the preaching image.

Put in cartoon form, the image is this: a pastor standing slightly behind two other Christians, with a hand on the shoulder of each person.

The first fact that strikes us in this image is that there is a group, and that the group is made explicit. Whatever the persons may be assumed to be looking at, they are all looking at the same thing, in the same direction. It is not simply that they have a common goal. More basically, their actual perceptions share commonality. Further, there are three persons, thus clearly a group. Thus, any false interpretation that might arise if there were but two persons—master and servant, day and night, or even sexual connotations —are set aside by the presence of three. Since three is not a rounding-off number, as Carl Jung has reminded us, three is the proper symbolic number for this group; for they and their task are by no means rounded off. It is a group that is incomplete and with rough edges, just as it should be.

Second, it goes almost without saying that the members of the group are all shown on the same level. We saw that this same point was implicit in the preaching image. Here it is explicit, and there can be no mistake.

Third, the image acknowledges functional differences among the group members but no distinction as to basic task. There is no sentimental groupiness about everyone being as competent about everything as everyone else just because all are on the same level. The minister is shown with his hand on the shoulders of the others. His function is to provide a necessary and welcome guidance. But one may equally turn this statement about and say that the minister acknowledges he cannot move on alone. The need of minister for people, and of people for minister, is equal. And the basic task can be understood only in the light of what they can do together, even though functions are different.

Perhaps someone might want to make something out of the minister’s being a bit behind the laymen. In my cartoon the reason for this is that otherwise he would have to be a contortionist to get his hands on their shoulders, or would have to embrace them, neither of which alternatives gives quite the proper impression. Perhaps there is symbolic significance in the minister’s being just a bit behind. The people are the frontier contacts with the world. At least collectively, they know far more of the details of the world with its sin and sorrow than he individually can know. Perhaps it is proper for him to be taught by them about the world they all, as a group, seek to serve and to save.

When we look at the combined elements of this image, I contend that we are viewing the essence of ministry as administering in exactly the sense that the image of open-Bible — pulpit — preacher gave us the image of preaching.

In tracing the roots of this image of administering, it is clear that the biblical conception of servanthood would come first. Yet it is not serving that makes this image unique; for all proper images of the ministry also demonstrate forms of serving. The unique aspect of the present image comes from the Reformation juncture of universal priesthood and Christian vocation.

The universal priesthood of believers was partly a constructive and partly a polemical doctrine. It did not mean, as has sometimes been hastily and wrongly assumed, that every Christian is his own all-sufficient priest. It did mean two things: that a specially designated hierarchy as a channel of access to God was rejected; and that, under some conditions, any Christian might properly serve as priest to any other. Priesthood in general implies mediation or linkage. The Reformers were too wise to deny that linkage might be needed, even by ordained ministers. But they denied possession of a linkage function by a priestly class. Thus the whole conception of linkage, or human mediation, or of priesthood was changed from a status notion to a functional one. The paradox involved in this redefinition was very effectively prefigured in Paul’s statements about burden bearing. Christians are to bear one another’s burdens: but as he becomes able, every Christian is to bear his own burden.

Perhaps the thrust of the universal priesthood doctrine may appear more clearly if we think of some partial parallels. For instance, except for the unfamiliarity of the term, it would not be inappropriate today to call the best relationships in small groups of workers "the foremanship of all workers." We might even conceive of the "universal vice-presidency of all junior executives." Bernard M. Loomer once spoke of the "deanship of all instructors." Such terms connote something quite different from the "dictatorship of the proletariat," the "kingship of all lords," or the aristocracy of everybody who is not "in trade." They do not deny the importance of a focusing or guiding or leading function, and of its incarnation in foremen, vice-presidents, or deans. But just as the foreman’s function can be performed only through and in cooperation with the workers, so the function of the workers can be performed only as they acknowledge and responsibly live up to the "foreman" dimensions of their jobs.

The related Reformation doctrine was Christian vocation, which also had a constructive and a polemical dimension. Polemically it was denied that only priests are called by God to what they are doing. Instead, every Christian is called to his total functions in life: what he does in the church, what he does at home, and above all what he does in his work. True, the modern use of the term "vocation" as a synonym for working occupation is a serious distortion. But it was certainly the most radical aspect of the Reformation vocation doctrine to link a Christian’s calling explicitly with the way he earned his living. His vocation was a significant, and often the major, aspect of his ministry.

Every Christian. asserted the vocation doctrine, is called an active ministry. From church and Bible, through Word and sacraments, he receives the grace that makes him a believer. But the life of a believer is ministry. The inevitable response to a true "hearing" some kind of action — first in worship, to be sure, but then just as surely in service of God through serving the needs of the world. The Christian may of course go out from church and testify to others in the world, verbally, of the riches of his faith. He may perform special kinds of service, philanthropic, foot-washing, or their equivalent. But the radical declaration of the Reformation doctrine, while not denying either foot-washing or verbal testimony, was that a man’s principal ministry, in response to his vocation, was in the course of his common life. If he is husband and father, let him minister there through the quality of his common service to his family. If he is an artisan, let him glorify God and serve mankind by the excellence of his work and its products. To serve God he does not have to dream up some special daily good deed. Let him do well what he normally does in the common life, and this will be the principal indication of his hearing God’s particular call to him, and of carrying out his particular ministry as a result.

With universal priesthood and Christian vocation both in mind, let us backtrack to the administering image and reexamine it. A minister and two other Christians, with the minister’s hands on the shoulders of the others, all facing in the same direction. In the image universal priesthood is in the foreground. All are committed to the same basic task; but there are differences of function among them; and each needs the others if the common task is to be performed. There can be no lone-wolfishness or going-it-alone. Ministry involves commonality of basic task and mutuality of appreciation of different functions in performing that task. In terms of functions performed, the other Christian may be said to be as truly ministering to the minister as he may be said to be ministering to them. All three, jointly, seek to minister in Christ’s name to the world that stands beyond them.

But the Christian vocation notion, while not in the forefront of this image, is not absent from it either. How does each person express his response to God’s call? What the image does show is that each person expresses it according to his gifts or abilities or assignments, that is, functionally. The image denies that any one means of functional expression is inherently better than any other. Do what you are capable of doing — provided that it is seen as movement toward performance of the common task — and you are fulfilling your vocation.

Since the cartoon image is not a filmstrip, it does not go on to show the three Christians about their specific duties in the world. But that is implied. They do not simply stay in church. They do not remain as a literal proximate group twenty-four hours a day. Each goes out into the world to exercise his vocation, partly on special service, to be sure, but mainly through his participation in the common life, which is also ministry, if he so understands it.

When we look at the image from the point of view of the ordained minister, which is unapologetically our focus in this book, it becomes clear why this is an image of administering. For what the minister wants to get done cannot possibly be done by him alone. It must be done through and with — above all, in consultation with — other Christians. Precisely who should do what is not, so to speak, fixed in advance of the consultation. If the situation were always such that the minister allocated responsibilities to the others, then one assumes that he could go happily back to his lone-wolf duties except for the occasional periods of referral. But the actual situation is not like that. The result of the consultation may be to give him new responsibilities, or to give him a new sense of responsibility about guiding the others in the exercise of their functions. The results of true consultation are never wholly predictable. Thus real consultation is an enemy of that kind of mental economy that wants to know, now and forever, precisely what pigeonholes are for what pigeons. The administering image declares such a compulsion to be incompatible with true ministry.

There is one additional way in which all this may be put from the perspective of the ordained minister. The image tells us that the unique thing about the minister’s vocation is his responsibility for guiding the Christian vocations of others. But if this is so, and if, as is also true, he is minister of the Word and sacraments, then it must follow that guiding the Christian vocations of others is as indispensable an aspect of receiving responsibly the Word and sacraments as is preaching or pastoral care. If administering is being properly done, one does not, therefore, leave it in order to get back to the true ministry of the Word when he enters the pulpit or the study or the counseling room. Either administering is an essential mode of ministry of the Word, or else the Reformers were entirely wrong about universal priesthood and Christian vocation.

The Psychology of Administering

So far as time and insights permit, we have demonstrated in summary the theological bases of administration as an essential dimension of ministry. It is evident that the psychological attitude making possible the risk of investing one’s most precious projects unto others in consultation involves some basic surrender of the notion that ministry is what one does by himself. Conversely, inability so to invest, or the more frequent grumbling about the investment, are rooted in an attitude that at some level still regards basic consultation as an enemy of ministry.

This point brings us full circle to the reported fact that what ministers most dislike is their administrative and executive duties. In attempting to correct this point of view, I have so far drawn on two main lines of argument. The first is the injunction to efficiency in administration, lest administration be wrongly equated with poor administration. The second has been to give some vision, with a theological searchlight, of the context in which administration should be understood. I turn now, third and finally, to one additional line of argument in attacking the prejudice against administration; namely, a direct attack to expose the partly hidden motives of the administration-hater.

He who dislikes administration has a feeling, somewhere inside him, that this sort of thing is "secondhand." There is no direct pristine line from pastoral intention to ecclesiastical performance (as there seems, deceptively, to be in regard to preaching and pastoral care). Instead, one has to enter a labyrinth. Instead of the committee’s clear, well-informed, and spontaneous formulation of a plan that executes perfectly and automatically what the minister had in mind, one has to listen to that garrulous Mr. Jones, whose knowledge of the Bible is abysmal and whose preoccupation with the surgery he had two years ago is unflagging, and to Mrs. Smith, who has always found some odd thing in some odd church magazine that she thinks we might try here and which is always irrelevant to the business at hand, and to Dr. Brown, who has a big income himself but seizes every opportunity to ensure that the minister shall prove his piety by his poverty. How could God conceivably believe that a true ministry should involve working with committees that contain people like this? In putting it this way, a minister is of course saving that he is too important and his time is too valuable to waste in educating or changing or shepherding people while he is engaged in consulting them. Thus he has no inner readiness for consultation at all. He may talk about encounter, but he demonstrates his ignorance of its meaning. There can be no I-Thou relationships with rubber stamps or sycophants.

Another related thing we may say about the administration-hater is that risks make him fearful. To commit one’s time and energies, and his best interpretations and arguments, to decision in which others share must inevitably be an anxiety-inducing business unless one has a bit of a psychological free-swing about him. But one can have this kind of attitude only if, in fact, he is not inwardly compelled to feel defensive about his work and its results. If one feels securely that he has been given a treasure, and the treasure is not of the kind that is dissipated by sharing, then he can risk (within some prudent and intelligent limits) freely and even gladly. Psychologically speaking, he learns that even his aggressive energies are meant for the service of God, no less than his tenderness and his concern. But if he feels threatened, he cannot risk. And in that case his first question to himself should be not how to get out of the administrative involvement but exactly what does put him on the defensive. There surely must be some connection between the fear of risk and what I believe to be the fact: that the administration-haters are also the ministers who complain most bitterly about the reluctance of laymen to assume responsibility.

There is likely to be also, among the disapprovers of administration, quite a bit of perfectionism. There is always a certain nobility of aim in even the most disastrous perfectionism. What one does should be done well, it says. But it turns out ordinarily that what one wants to be able to do well is what no one else can evaluate; and hence the motive behind the perfectionism is not excellence of performance but freedom from appraisal. Of all the aspects of ministry, administering is that in which appraisal of the minister is most open and unconcealed. The minister who cannot receive appraisal with some kind of objective but serious ear is in a poor position to guide his people to find their Christian vocation, for that too rests upon appraisal.

Finally, I think there is a kind of "merit-badge" psychology at work in those who dislike administration. In a way one can, after a sermon or a pastoral interview, attach another bar to his pin. He knows he has been a minister; he preached or acted as shepherd. But with a committee or a pile of letters, no merit badge. In the terms of Gestalt psychology, one has not got "closure." Everything is open-ended. Now, without necessarily being against merit badges in the proper setting, which is for Boy Scouts, for adults to have their professional self-respect dependent upon their equivalent suggests at the least some deep interior doubt about the integrity of one’s commitment. On this point, as on the others, I do not intend merely to cast aspersions on those who hate administration (for some part of all of us feels this way), but rather to compel our rethinking of our motivations.

One other kind of comment is needed on the psychology of administration. No doubt you have already been thinking, "But what about those ministers who get so delightedly involved in the machinery and the wheels that they become no good at all about preaching, pastoral care, or anything else?" I would agree that this is a serious question, most of all in American churches. My argument for the essentiality of administering is in no way an invitation to neglect sermons, pastoral care, or anything else that is crucial in a total ministry.

But just what, from a psychological point of view, happens with the man whose delight is in the law of wheels turning round? He has, if I may use a psychoanalytic term, demonstrated that we may have "reaction-formations" in the ministry. In psychoanalysis a reaction-formation is said to appear when the automatic defense that is brought to bear against something that cannot be admitted takes a form precisely the opposite of what is being denied, as when a compulsive neatness appears on the surface to ward off riotous interior desires to be messy, or when effusive sweetness in words covers up an unadmitted desire to dominate. The minister wholly occupied with turning wheels is, in all probability, distracting himself from the emptiness he believes he would find if he took his mind off wheels and put it onto ministry. Even if such a person is called a good administrator, I believe that this is seldom true according to the criteria suggested in the present discussion. He is not so much working through and with other people in a common task, about which he bears particular kinds of responsibilities, as he is keeping himself so busy that he need not ask what is unique about ns vocation. Thus, he is least of all prepared to understand the present discussion. In contrast, the minister with a bit of administration-hating in him is far more likely to make enough change in his outlook to become a proper administrator as an aspect of his total ministry.

Limitations of the Administering Image

Finally, let me remind you that the administering image, valuable as it is when it is rightly understood, is still a cross-section, a cartoon, that has temporarily neglected some things in order to give proper emphasis to other things. Let us make sure that we beat off in advance some possible misinterpretations.

Someone might say, "How do we know that this picture is a Christian one? Could it not just as well be a picture of a democratic society?" As stated, it could indeed be so. But this is no handicap in a cartoon if we grasp both its intent and its context. Indeed, the preaching image simply showed an open book, and we had to imagine the right context in order to see that this book was manifestly the Bible. To try to make clear our administering image, of course we might put all three men on their knees. But not only would that require the minister to be a contortionist in putting his hands on the shoulders of the others; it would also mean that the men would have to bow their heads, and the reference in the actual image to their work to be done in the world might be clouded. Perhaps each layman could be carrying a Bible; or one layman a Bible and the other some symbol of service such as a cup. Yet all such suggestions really miss the point. No cartoon image can present the whole context in which it is to be understood. To try to make it do so makes it lose its power.

In similar vein, someone else may ask, "How do we really know the difference between the minister and the others, when they are all dressed alike?" If it suits the sartorial aspects of the fellowship, I suppose I can concede a robe or a reversed collar. But certainly not a frock coat. Such queries could be endless. Why are they all men? Why not a woman and a child? An older person? Someone who is ill? All such questions do indeed remind us that we are dealing with a cartoon, with an attempt at emphasis that must, for the time being, leave certain other things unexplicit. But this procedure is, in actual fact, the way the human mind works — from a vague, diffuse, and blobby kind of general perception, in the direction of increasing specificity, and then back to a much more accurate and articulated whole. Our cartoons are neither the first nor the last word. But they are very important somewhere in the middle.

I conclude with a rather risky word about God. A great part of the content of our Christian faith declares that God, although free to do otherwise, did actually create us in his own image, which includes some significant measure of freedom and of capacity to love; that we have individually and collectively misused our freedom and not cultivated our love capacity; that an astoundingly radical procedure was used to get us humans out of our predicament; and that it is the constant privilege and duty of the church to testify to the salvation already wrought and to bring all men and ourselves to receive it. But when we look at actual existence, we have to begin theologizing, that is, acknowledging the complications. And at that point there is no reflective Christian who has not at some time asked the question, "Was God out of his mind to entrust this most precious treasure to people like us and churches like ours?" And if he has answered the question rightly, he has finally said, "Yes, we are as bad as that; but God was willing to risk it, and he must know what he is doing."

If even God felt it wise and right and essential to risk his purposes and his love through fallible human instruments, who is a minister to be unwilling to acknowledge that his ministry must be risked through fallible human beings who are, in actual fact, no more fallible than he?

Chapter 3: The Ministry as Preaching

Ever since the days of the Reformation, the dominant image of the Protestant ministry, often so obtrusive that it threatened to eliminate all others, has been that of the preacher. In cartoon-image terms it has shown1 a preacher in a pulpit with an open Bible before him.

It will be suggested later on that the total Reformation conception of the ministry was more subtle than this cartoon suggests, and was more complex than it became in some later periods. But it is certainly a fact that this image was primary, both at the time of Luther and Calvin and in most subsequent periods of most Protestant groups.

The preacher in the Pulpit with an open Bible before him represented a considerable shift from the image that had been dominant during the Middle Ages. In that era the dominant image, as H. Richard Niebuhr rightly noted, was of a priest before an altar.

Before we come to an exposition of what early Protestants were trying to say positively with their new image, it is important to understand precisely what struck them as negative about the image of the Middle Ages.

The medieval image was rejected for two basic reasons. First, Protestants wanted to reject completely any possible notion that the original sacrifice of Jesus Christ on the cross could or should be repeated in any form 1n order to make it efficacious for the salvation of men. Whether or not they were right in attributing the motif of efficacy through repetition to the Roman Catholic Church is a question for historians to answer. At any rate, they believed so, and they believed it so strongly that they rejected every image that could carry even a residual flavor of sacrificial repetition. For in the medieval image the priest was not merely praying; he was also offering a sacrifice.

Second, the early Protestants wanted to deny that the priest had a place before God that other Christians could not have. God’s saving grace in Jesus Christ was so incomparably great, they believed, that any man trusting solely in it might and should approach its throne. Every trace of the notion that the keys of the Kingdom, or the resources of grace, were held by a particular group of men had to be pushed away. In the medieval image it was the priest alone who belonged before the altar. Hence this image had to go.

The basic reasons for rejecting the dominant medieval image of the ministry were, then, compelling; and, if we leave aside the details, I suspect they still are. And yet there were other meanings symbolized in the medieval image that Protestants did not reject, or at any rate ought not to have rejected. But since the image had to be rejected as a whole, these positive meanings had to go, along with the negative ones; and the loss has not always been in Protestantism’s favor.

What were the positive aspects of the medieval image that ought not to have been lost sight of when the image as a whole was rejected? First, there should be no objection to the priest’s facing God, especially if he is on his knees, provided only that he is not, in principle, alone. There is everything to commend in the attitude of humility, or thanksgiving, or petition, or intercession before God, so long as the person with the attitude is not usurping prerogatives either of God himself or of the whole congregation of Christians. If the priest, kneeling, had been joined by a nonpriest Christian or two, there should have been no objection to the image.

Second, I believe the early Protestants should have had no objection to priest and people kneeling before some kind of table, provided the table or even "altar" is understood in terms of commemoration and communion and thanksgiving and not as a symbol of pretentious repetition. Indeed, one must go further and say that there is every merit in the reminder that the most extreme sacrifice has been made unto man’s salvation. It is not the reality of blood and suffering that is to be eliminated or cleaned up, but any suggestion that the sacrifice by Jesus Christ is not sufficient.

Although this is only a footnote to the main line of this address, we may properly note in passing that some of Protestantism’s subsequent difficulties with prayer and the devotional life, and with religious symbolism, come from neglect of those aspects of the medieval image of ministry that ought not to have been set aside.

We can, then, conceive the possibility that early Protestants, instead of creating a wholly new dominant image of ministry, might have corrected and cleaned up the medieval image. The priest could have been joined, in the revised image, by other Christians. The altar could have become a table or a praying station. Perhaps a cross, if rude enough, could have symbolized the once-for-all character of the sacrifice being recalled. But the fact is that the Reformers, who felt they were confronted with a revolutionary, all-or-nothing situation, were in no mood to tinker and amend. They had much bigger apologetic fish to fry, and for their purpose an entirely new dominant image was needed.

The Intent of the Preaching Image

The new image was a preacher before a pulpit with an open Bible. The positive intent of this preaching image was as follows.

First, the presence of the Bible showed the centrality of the Word of God. This was not, as we shall see on further analysis of the image, a naive biblicism that equated God’s Word with the literal words of the Bible. But it did rightly declare that the Word of God comes to men through the Bible, and hence the Bible is indispensably present in the image. If men are to be at all attentive to the Word, they must do so through attentiveness to the Bible, not necessarily exclusively but always normatively. The Bible is both the primary communication medium and the criterion of truth.

But the image, second, is not confined to the portrayal of the Bible. There is present also a human being, a preacher. To human beings the Bible is not automatically self-interpreting. Whatever the Word may be, it is not an automatic answer that comes through the Bible as the solution of a complex problem in mathematics today comes through a giant electronic computer. The Word requires human communication. The Bible, giving testimony to the Word, requires human interpretation. Thus the preacher in the Reformation image was not excess baggage. He was not a concession. He was not present simply to symbolize human beings as receivers of the Word, although he was indeed also a receiver. He and his function are declared, by the image, to be necessary to the proclamation, communication, reception, and assimilation of the Word. It is clearly out of order to make apologetic statements about the presence of a preacher in this image. He is just as important to the whole intent of the image as is the Bible, and this fact should be stated authoritatively.

Third, the image also contains, in addition to the Bible and the preacher, a pulpit. In modern language the intent of the pulpit is to symbolize connectives or connectors. The pulpit is a connector in two senses. On the one hand, it is the means of relating the preacher and the Bible; and, on the other hand, it is a means of relating the Word from the Bible through the preacher to the people, including the preacher as, along with the people, also a receiver. Thus the pulpit is not simply a symbol of any old kind of connection, but of a connection that is proper and patterned. If we had a Bible and a preacher but no pulpit, the kind of connectedness that might exist between preacher and Bible, and hence between people and Word, might be quite arbitrary. Or, to use modem language, it might be professionally irresponsible. The pulpit symbolizes responsibility to the people. Even the truest of words, to put it sharply, are not enough if they contain no responsible attempt at communication. Thus the pulpit too belongs in the image. It is as indispensable as the Bible and the preacher. The total image conveys the many and subtle relationships among this triad: Bible, preacher, and pulpit. Without exhausting the image, at least a few additional aspects of the subtle symbolism of the image may profitably be mentioned.

There is, for example, the fact that the Bible is open. We may hope that it was not opened for the first time only when the preacher approached the pulpit. Certainly, as early Protestantism made clear, it had to be studied, as diligently and intelligently as possible, well in advance of any specific attempts to preach. And yet such study, the image tells us, was never to be rounded off in such fashion that the preacher could dispense with the open message during his preaching. The Living Word is a contemporaneous Word. It is not enough even for the preacher to have been attentive to it an hour, or fifteen minutes, before preaching. Even a recently warmed-over Word is still a leftover; and no matter if it were once cooked with gas or even radiant heat, it is still unfit for human consumption if the covers are closed around it now.

The fact that the Bible is open during the preaching says something to the people. It says that the preacher is contemporaneously, right now, attentive to the Word as it works right now, and not merely to recollections, intimations, memories, impressions, or other historical data. It suggests that every point he makes is, right now, checked against the message of the Word conveyed through the Bible.

But the Bible’s being open has also a symbolic message to the preacher. The coincidence of open Bible and open mouth comes in that order, and not in reverse! Revelation precedes otolaryngological demonstration. Geographically speaking, his preaching is always over and through the Bible, since it is open. It is never merely about or across the Bible. If the Word does not, right now as well as in previous study, speak to him, it cannot speak through him to the people. But let him have no feelings of deprecation about manifesting his tonsils. The open mouth is necessary, proper, and good, regardless of its dental aesthetics. Even smelly molars or tonsils laden with staphylococci, while not recommended, cannot impede communication of the Word in preaching. If the Bible is truly open, the mouth may also be open — Another subtlety of the image is about who holds what. The Bible is held by the pulpit, not by the preacher. And that which holds the pulpit, whether it be floor, dais, or chancel, also holds the preacher. The preacher has no standing not shared by the pulpit. And the Bible is so supported that the preacher need not worry about its falling. Both preacher and pulpit have a common foundation.

The symbolism of all this is virtually self-explanatory. The pulpit, which represents both the people and the preacher’s professional responsibility, not only shares its foundation with the preacher but is also on the same level as he. The people are not inferior. The preacher is no better than they. He stands where he stands, which is an uplifted position, because of his functional responsibility, not because of his character or his merit. It is not he who is lifted up but his function; but since he is lifted no higher than the pulpit, so are the people lifted up in their function of hearing and receiving the Word. Whatever lifting there be is shared.

Yet another suggestion of the total image concerns the way in which living and non-living realities are to be joined in human life and for human salvation. The Word is a living Word, but it is testified to and conveyed through a Book which, as book, is not organically alive. The preacher is a living human organism, as are the other people to whom the Word is also life and salvation. Preacher — Word — people: these are all alive. Discourse — Book — behavior: these are all, in a significant sense, dead because they are nonorganic. But life, the image suggests to us, is never to be apprehended with simple directness, alone and in itself. The order of the Word is "no angel visitants, no opening skies." it is, instead, through death to life, through the nonorganic to the organic, through the Book to the Living Word, through the three dead homiletical points to just possibly a receptive heart or two. Homiletically speaking, in the midst of life we are in death; and only if we learn to tolerate death — a Book and not an angel, an idea and not just a feeling, a conviction and not merely a charitable impulse — can we approach life.

The Reformation and Medieval Images

Having now set forth at least the principal meanings and symbolic implications of the dominant Reformation image of the ministry, we may return to a comparison and contrast of this image with that of the medieval period: preacher — pulpit — open-Bible in relation to priest-before-altar.

We are at once constrained to ask of the Reformation image: What has happened to knees? Are we not to confront God, or is it enough to confront one another? And why are no people but the preacher shown? Let us consider these questions in order.

We begin with knees, housemaid’s or otherwise. Can the dominant Reformation image of the ministry be tenable if nobody is on his knees? Can even God tolerate a people and a preacher who have presumably taken his work in the sacrificial and costly atonement of Jesus Christ, his Son and our Lord, if their leading image of ministry and servanthood is devoid of genuflection? Is it "stiff-necked" to substitute stand-up talk and sit-down listening for the thanksgiving and confession that call for some other posture? Perhaps the priest in the medieval image had an inflated notion of the power of his knees. But at least he acknowledged by his kneeling. God’s transcendence. In the preaching image, who acknowledges any transcendence to anything? The preacher is looking horizontally, alternating between a dip at the open Bible and a stance toward the people. But in neither instance is he truly bowing his head or raising it in adoration.

In the Reformation image there is a book instead of an altar. An altar at least implies sacrifice, once-for-all or otherwise. But a book — paperback, hard-cover, first edition, or translation — may mean almost anything, or nothing. How can a book, even the Book, substitute for the clear and concrete symbolism of sacrifice on the part of our Lord Jesus Christ, Son of God, who became flesh and suffered on the cross for our sake? Surely a book is poor even as a reminder of what, through sacrificial atonement, has given us life. And the preacher in the Reformation image, whose sides have not been riven, is hardly a compensation.

The only sustainable answer to these objections is that the Reformation, while frying its particular fish, expected the toaster and the coffee pot and the sandwich broiler to be going on as usual. It was not against kneeling or atonement or prayer, or looking upward to God. It thought that it took such things for granted. But their absence from the explicit image of ministry is not above reproach, and we may continue to ask about knees and transcendence.

When something is taken for granted and not articulated, it may cease to serve as a check on various possible kinds of distortions. Thus the absence from the dominant image of the ministry in Protestantism of the permanent truths in the medieval image helped later Protestant rationalism and intellectualism to become stiff-necked and rigid and even arrogant; pietism to become detached and legalistic and self-righteous; emotional and anti-intellectual groups to become aesthetically barren and theologically illiterate; and some liturgical-minded groups to conclude that the calluses on their knees entitled them to wear plugs in their ears.

There is certainly nothing in the Reformation image itself that gives warrant for rigidity, legalism, obscurantism, or wooliness. The fact that the preacher is standing before the open Bible and pulpit is not a negation of prayer and adoration but is making central the communication and reception of the Word of God. The fact that the Bible is open on the pulpit is no denial that forehanded Bible study is needed. The presence of the pulpit in an elevated position is no invitation to arrogance or dogmatism, but a symbol that both preacher and people are lifted up to hear the Word of God. And the fact that a human being is a necessary communicator of the Word surely does not make his communications infallible.

Yet it is unmistakably true that some of the distortions of the preaching image have resulted, directly or indirectly, from the loss of positive elements of the medieval image which were discarded, along with the unacceptable elements, when the new Protestant image was created.

Pathologies of the Reformation Image

The most serious, troublesome, and subversive distortions of the ministry in Protestantism have come, however, from literalizing some single aspect of the preaching image and ignoring the indispensability of all the parts and the subtlety of their symbolic interrelationships.

Some of the pathologies of the ministry have already been alluded to, but we shall now try to be more systematic. First and most obviously, there is distortion when any one of the three main elements in the preaching image is lifted out of its context and set forth uncritically. If this is done to the Bible, even to the open Bible, it leads to biblicism or fundamentalism. The Book is confused with the Word. The preacher becomes a cross between a detective and a district attorney. And the pulpit becomes nothing but a reading stand. Surely this is pathology.

An exclusive emphasis on pulpit is also a distortion. This may mean such an exaltation of worship or of church edifice as the setting for preaching that the missionary nature of the church is forgotten and the Word is brought only to the supposedly faithful. Even more disastrously, it may mean that the central function of ministry is felt to be a discourse on Sunday morning, containing a lead, three points, and a thought for next week, not to exceed twenty-five minutes in length, set forth in a tone any self-respecting human being would reject if approached privately. Again, wrenching pulpit out of context may make it into a kind of barricade, so that utterances from behind it are impenetrable to criticism except by God, who has, with this kind of performance, undoubtedly slept through the whole thing and is too bored to criticize.

When the preacher is taken out of the context of the preaching image and treated as the whole ministerial cheese, the results are the most dire of all. This may lead to preacher cults, which are not ordinarily started by ministers but are too often gratefully received by them. A preacher who is very short on theological acumen, biblical understanding, existential relevance, and human sensitivity may nevertheless receive adulation if be has something that will probably be called "personality." Without advocating drabness or monotony, and certainly not the denial of the minister’s individuality, we may properly look askance when both Bible and pulpit receive only conventional nods and neither is permitted to stand in the way of the preacher’s rapport with his audience. And it is, in this instance, aim audience, and neither a congregation nor the people of God.

It has always interested me that the principal point made in the account of the first group of run-of-the-mine Christian preachers, the seventy, is aimed precisely against this distortion in the outlook of the preacher. When the seventy returned from their first engagements, they reported, in astonishment and delight, that the tools and powers given them by their Lord in his commission had actually worked. They were told by Jesus, "Do not rejoice that the spirits are subject to you; but rejoice that your names are written in heaven."

To take any one of the basic elements of the preaching image of the ministry, therefore, as exclusive, or to lift it out of context of the whole, produces pathology; and hardly anything that can be imagined has failed to happen in actual life. But there have been other distortions of the ministry when the delicate relationships among the elements of this image have been lost sight of. We shall note a few of them.

One such distortion is a kind of premature closure on this image as if it represented the whole goal of Christian faith and life instead of what it actually is, the basic mode of ministry to evoke faith and life. One of the real glories of the preaching image is its unabashed concern with means as essential to the achievement of ends. It shows its faith that the goals will come if there is faithful attentiveness to the communication of the Word. Its suspiciousness of goals, inattentive to the means of approaching them, is thoroughly dynamic, entirely correct, and certainly biblical.

But the preaching image of ministry is not the goal of either Christian faith or Christian life. One distortion, of which such a sophisticated theology as Barth’s is not entirely innocent, is so to cloud the distinction between the preaching image and the faith and life of the people, including the preacher in the world, that speaking and hearing a reasonable facsimile of the Word of God is in danger of being confused with the mission of the church to the world and the vocation of Christians before God but to the world’s need. If you want more cartoon images, as my mind always does, think of this particular pathology as the "hydraulic fallacy." The Living Water of the Word, by this analogy, gushes down from heaven by spiritual gravity and divine love, and pulpits are or ought to be its fire hydrants. So far, the analogy has much to commend it. I also like the general suggestion that the congregation can do with a drenching, provided it is conceded that all properly human hydrants have a leaky valve at the rear, to assure that the preacher also gets wet. But from here on, hydraulics is deceptive. People and preacher will get dried off, at least until next Sunday; and the water runs down drains or ruins carpets, doing no one any good in particular.

I do not quite know how to save this figure of spiritual hydrology for the Kingdom of God without a bit of silliness. But if you will stand that, it can be done. Suppose that both preacher and layman are equipped with living water sacs. Today, of course, these would be leak-proof, flame-proof, loss-proof, and thermally insulated. Each sac will be no bigger than the person can handle. But each sac will also have a good spiritual sprayer attached, wholly free of technical complications. As we might say today, fully dynamic but with no moving parts — which is nice work if you can get it. Anyhow, each sac, in our imaginative picture, is used to spray living water during the next week precisely where it has the greatest chance to do good. Thus, the real box score of the act of ministry symbolized by the preaching image is not back there at all, but is rather in the appraisal of the remote and mundane hydrolysis the next week. To be sure, I agree that all this carries hydraulics a bit too far. But II am a bit tired of contemplating those drenched parishioners back in their pews. If they are stupid enough to sit there until they get pneumonia, let them not blame it on the Word. No doubt they will be prudent enough to dry themselves. But the fact is that the living water is not just for them; it is for their ministry to the world. If we really want to perpetuate this hydraulic analogy, we must go all the way with it; and I have the appalling fear that the end product may be a new kind of hosanna!

Less popular than the hydraulic notion of ministry but even more reprehensible, if you will continue to permit these analogies from elementary physics, is what may be called the "gaseous image of ministry." According to this, and no doubt in the name of something misrepresented as Spirit, everything becomes vaporous. The Reformation image, with a heavy Bible, a weighty pulpit, and an overweight preacher, all fades into some kind of aura. The gaseous goal of ministry is the creation of some kind of subjective feeling. Commonly this feeling may be described as good, as comfortable, as relieved, as positive, or even, so help us, as Christian. But it may be more subtle. It may be a feeling of "Thank God he beat me to a pulp" when the preacher has let loose with some version of fire and brimstone, even the cellophane-wrapped kind of our day. In any event, the gaseous figure of ministry limits its conceptions of the functions of ministry to subjective feelings as experienced here and now. I find myself too gravely tempted to comment, and cannot resist, that the individual molecules of a gas are wholly unpredictable and that we can predict only their mass behavior, Thus the gaseous figure of ministry is, despite its disclaimers, inherently impersonal and anti-individual. The true preaching image of ministry is not.

I have dealt with liquids and gases, and you may well wonder if I have anything to say about solids. Of course I do, but it is a bit anticlimactic. In the Reformation preaching image the Word of God may wrongly be equated with the solid lines of type in the book; the solidity of the pulpit may be misrepresented as the authoritativeness of something or other; and the preacher’s power to interpret may be mistakenly equated with some kind of weight — not necessarily the girth of his stomach, but perhaps the athletic cut of his shoulders, or more probably the weightiness of his voice. You may, if you like, pursue the figure of solids, and profitably. But these implications are, if I may say so, "duck soup." Liquids and gases, on the other hand, are elusive, and deserve the greater attention they have been given.

Let me remind you that the immediate point has been pathologies in the conception of ministry arising from subtle distortion of the relations among the three elements in the dominant Reformation image of ministry: Bible, pulpit, and preacher. I have turned to the most elementary notions of physics to get at some of these. With equal profit I might have turned to elementary chemistry and shown, for example, that our useful and harmless table salt comes from two deadly poisons, sodium and chlorine. To be sure, in that case I might have to put on an argument to demonstrate that the Bible and the preacher are both deadly poisons — but I think that I finally could manage this.

In this brief account of pathologies of the preaching image I might of course have gone lightly on figures and analogies and moved heavily toward literal description. Since the Bible does not change, and the pulpit changes only aesthetically, that would have meant describing one or another kind of distorted attitude in preachers. Preacher attitudes may be narcissistic, solipsistic, arrogant, aggressive, masochistic, dependent, detached, wistful, whimsical, smug, snobbish, threatened, and so on to the limits of the dictionary of pejoratives. But is there any real value in a systematic categorization of all the attitudinal ills that preacher flesh is heir to? Perhaps there might be. Certainly all preacher flesh including my own, needs to think in self-appraisal about such matters. But the elaboration of this notion is not my task at this point, however important it may eventually be to our common concern.

For now, it is enough to acknowledge that the very best image of the ministry, which might or might not be Bible-pulpit-preacher, is always subject to pathological distortions. If it were not so, somebody like John Calvin would have assured us. Since he did not, we must make the best of it, and resolve to analyze the pathologies.

Preaching and...

I have indeed attempted to interpret and defend the basic Reformation image of the ministry, with its representation of preacher before open Bible on pulpit. There is nothing in any age — be it atomic, anxious, organization-man, or one-world — that renders this image superfluous, if we understand it aright. No apologies are needed for its projection into 1975.

What this image properly declares is that the Living Word of God is relevant and decisive for all sorts and conditions of men provided they will hear and heed; that the Word comes through men who, even until the eleventh preaching hour, study and try to be receptive to it as given through the Bible in dialogic reflection upon life experience; and that the pulpit is the juncture point of Word and interpretation. This image is basic but not exhaustive. It assumes things that are not made explicit in it.

Backward, it assumes a Christian community that comes to church not solely to feel better but also to find its Christian duty and vocation. Forward, it assumes empowerment and guidance on what the Christian — every Christian — actually does in and to and for the world.

No single image can get all that in. Every image must be a cross-section. It is like a color slide. Perhaps this is why, with all my concern for movement and dynamics, I have finally given up home movies and have concentrated on stills. Properly presented and interpreted, stills also may be dynamic, as the preaching image shows.

Like every other image of ministry that will come before us for serious inspection, the preaching image emphasizes some things and neglects others. Always, in order to understand properly the emphasis a cartoon image is making, it is necessary mentally to add to it what it assumes but does not make explicit. In the preaching image we need especially to add the following items. First, a congregation is to be added. It is now presupposed. Second, add a previous view of the preacher working on the open Bible in his study before he comes to preach from it in the pulpit. Third, add a later view of preacher and congregation all going out into the world, to serve its needs and to communicate the Christian gospel to it. Fourth, add some befores and afters that include prayer, adoration, singing, and communion. The preaching image is properly set in this larger context, and we distort it if we are unaware of that context. But of course if we insisted on the literal inclusion of all these elements, we should have no image at all but only a kind of filmstrip. Let us, by all means, keep the image. But let us be aware of why it emphasizes what it does.

Preaching and Pastoral Care

The continuing utility of any particular image of ministry depends partly upon what we find, on analyzing it, that it truly represents, and how important we believe that to be. But it may depend also upon our ability to separate from the image some kinds of meanings that may have become attached to it and which conflict with meanings of other important images that we wish to retain. In our day one of the most important questions about the preaching image is this: Does it conflict with pastoral care? Even though our account has not yet set forth the image of pastoral care, we can still make a preliminary appraisal of the preaching image to see whether, as is often charged, it is in opposition to the ministry of pastoral care.

The question is sometimes posed in this way. In preaching the minister is supposed to speak from the Word of God, and he is not to please or placate any man. He is to speak the truth in love as God gives him to see the truth. But in pastoral care we are to listen to people, to accept them, to be sensitive and considerate to see things from their point of view. Can these injunctions be reconciled? Or must a minister be one kind of person in preaching and quite another in pastoral care?

We may begin to get toward an answer to this question — and I believe there is one — by first making a longer statement of the question from each perspective.

In preaching the minister must indeed speak the whole gospel — not in every sermon, but eventually. Indeed, each partial speaking should point beyond itself in the direction of the whole gospel. And the minister should speak with humble authority; that is with an authority that transcends his person but is humble in its awareness of the limitations of that person. He humbly acknowledges himself to be a kind of midwife, and yet he knows he is charged to perform that function creatively. He cannot simply tell a congregation what it may want to hear, whether that is a coddling or a spanking. He must do his best to let the gospel speak truly, let the chips fall where they may. Even when he speaks "comfortable words" as appropriate parts of the gospel, he must remember that such words are to "enhearten" and not to make easy.

In pastoral care it is certainly necessary, whatever the minister may try to do eventually, that he begin by getting as far inside the frame of reference of the person as the person permits him to do. Not only is this necessary for any understanding of the other person in his concreteness. It is also necessary if the pastor wants to convey to the person acceptance that undercuts conflicts and divisions and doubts and fears. Acceptance is required not only at the horizontal level of interpersonal relationships but also in order to convey, beneath all the difficulties, the acceptance by God himself. If the pastor rejects part of the person, then it is difficult to demonstrate what God’s total acceptance may mean. And thus in pastoral care we do attempt to listen, to understand, to accept, and to clarify. We do not sound off lightly, telling the person what we think he should do with no notion of how, from the inside, he looks at life.

Are these two approaches as restated, then, incompatible? Do they require two different kinds of minister? Or is the apparent difference between them only situational and not fundamental? I believe the last to be true.

The preacher is indeed to preach the whole gospel. But as our image analysis has shown, he preaches nothing to other people that he does not also preach to himself. If that is so, he cannot possibly, on psychological grounds, treat the gospel as if some aspects of it merely called down vengeance on people. He can preach the critical, wrathful, or law aspects of the gospel to himself as well as to other people only if these judgmental dimensions are understood in a context of love that transcends or undercuts them. So understood, they may at times be negative, sharp, or hurting, but never simply so, and never out of context with a deeper love that makes the hurt or the sharpness both tolerable and acceptable.

Only the man who knows he has been forgiven can know the enormity of his sin. Only the preacher deeply aware that even God’s judgment is a manifestation of his love can acknowledge its reality, for himself and others, and realize that the very capacity to acknowledge it is itself a demonstration of the grace that guides it. And since he is communicating this subtle relationship to others as well as articulating it for himself, he cannot possibly succeed unless he gets inside the frame of reference of others. If they view God’s judgment as a simple negativity, and react defensively against it, he must acknowledge and articulate this error, and demonstrate that it is an error. Even his most prophetic utterances cannot remain unconcerned with the frame of reference of others. He may indeed try to alter opinions, to correct errors, to demonstrate truth. And some people may reject his interpretations. But a God whose judgment is only a situational difference within the context of his love cannot properly be represented, at any point, as intending a simple negative.

When we turn, in the light of these preaching comments, to pastoral care, the critical question is whether the attempts to understand and accept, to get inside the other person’s frame of reference, to apprehend and help to clarify the nature of his specific conflicting feelings, all together imply the absence of judgment. The answer is certainly not; instead, this is the one framework in which judgments in the Christian sense can be realized and accepted.

Suppose that you or I, in exercising our pastoral care function, have done all the things that my books on this matter have advocated and which I sometimes remember to carry out myself. Suppose that we have been understanding; that, without probing or pressing, we have grasped the subtle and specific nature of the interior and conflicted viewpoint of the person, and have begun to help him sort out and clarify all these inner feelings. Certainly the person, with this kind of help, will begin to feel some kind of release. But release is never unaccompanied by exposure. The joyful awareness that some shackles have been removed is at once followed by the recognition that the old defenses and excuses, previously justified by the shackles, will no longer do. One is tempted, despite his new joy in freedom, to revert, to deny that the more realistic self-judgment is meaningful and relevant. The critical and decisive stage comes when he either accepts the new judgment as benevolent or retreats from it. He simply cannot enjoy the gains of freedom without accepting the responsibilities it brings. With pastoral help, he may take both.

Thus, the true manifestation of acceptance and understanding in the relationship of pastoral care is not some simple positivity, as if one felt two degrees better today and four degrees tomorrow. There is no simple upward line. If genuine, learning to feel joy means, should the situation warrant it, equal increase in ability to feel sad. In pastoral care all this has little or nothing to do with who says what to whom. The experience of assimilating judgment is impressively important. The pastoral utterance of judgmental words may or may not be relevant to this end, and certainly is not relevant if the context appears to be rejection or misunderstanding.

Preaching is not, procedurally speaking, pastoral care to larger numbers of people. Pastoral care is not, procedurally speaking effective preaching to one person. Such literalistic notions distort both functions. But in terms of fundamental aims and attitudes there is astonishingly little difference between preaching and pastoral care or pastoral counseling. Both make progress as that which is unpleasant but necessary becomes capable of assimilation because of the context, environment, atmosphere, and conviction that manifests the love within judgment, the grace within or beneath law, the freedom within responsibility. And in preaching and pastoral care alike, apparently these things can appear only in relationship.

There are many procedural differences between preaching and pastoral care. Both involve realms of expert knowledge that must be studied directly and cannot merely be inferred or derived. But if these learning processes have been undergone, through experience as well as thinking, then it is unthinkable that preaching and pastoral care, rightly understood and humbly practiced, can be in fundamental contradiction within the functions of the Christian minister.

Chapter 2: The Nature of the Ministry

This book focuses upon the functions of the ministry as seen through cartoon-like images. It attempts a reasonable degree of comprehensiveness about those functions, but it does not exhaust them. It makes no apology for setting functions in the front row — instead of, for example, the aims of the ministry, the biblical bases of the ministry, the theology of the ministry, the history of the ministry, the structures of the ministry, or many other possible approaches. Good books have been written about the ministry in all these categories, and my discussion is attentive to them. Certainly all these perspectives upon the ministry, and others, are of great importance.

From my experience of leading literally scores of ministers’ conferences, however, I have become convinced that most American ministers — scholars though they may be — are functionalists at heart. I do not call us pragmatists (for I belong to this group) only because that then connotes a certain opportunism that I deny. "Functionalist" seems a milder and more descriptive term. We think and feel and work our way into even the most recondite of theoretical matters only by first exploring them in relation to our functions of ministry.

I believe that a similar functionalism is the great strength of American intellectual life in general. In our own field of concern, as in others, a native functionalist approach does not stop with functional analysis. It does move on to basic theoretical issues. And the increasing breadth and originality of American science and scholarship in general demonstrate that a functional beginning, among imaginative people, is a motivator for many things, including function, and not a quitting point.

In the sense that my own mind happens to work this way anyhow, beginning with a look at functions, I am a typical American minister. My own explorations into various theoretical realms — including psychology, psychiatry, philosophy, and theology itself — have all been pushed on by my functional beginnings.

I can never think something without thinking of doing it. Even the carpentry of the typewriter table upon which these words are being written (the top was made from an old and discarded wooden organ pipe from Miller Chapel of Princeton Seminary) was something I got into in terms of principles only after I had begun some "functions." I believe most American ministers are functionalists, at the start of their inquiries, in the sense I have been describing.

I have, therefore, girded up the loins of my typewriter and decided to breeze ahead — without having a first chapter on the ministry in the Bible, a second on the ministry in the early church, a third on ministry in the Middle Ages — and so on until finally we might get to the present. Of course such studies are of the greatest importance, and I am not ignorant of them. But a functional approach begins at another point and, if it is informed, goes back to the Bible and various stages of history not only for confirmation but also for needed correction. Within the limits of space and knowledge, I believe I have done this in the pages that follow. But if Professor S believes that nothing sensible can be written about the ministry unless the first chapter is called "The Ministry in the Bible," then I shall have to disappoint him. His insights may be even more important than mine. But he got worked up in one way, and I in another. And, if I am not mistaken, most American ministers got worked up through their functions, just as I have.

In every chapter that follows, beginning with the images of preaching, the analysis starts from function; but I trust it never stops there, but leads back to Bible and history and forward to potential creativity. But I do feel an obligation to say first some words from a theological and historical perspective about the minister whose functions are to be examined. That is the excuse of the present chapter. If the reader is already familiar with the current biblical, historical, theological, and new-dimensions discussions of the ministry, let him skip on quickly to the next chapter, where my own creative thinking begins. For those not familiar with many recent studies, however, from perspectives other than my own I present a kind of summary — but it is, of course, from a functional point of view. It asks finally: So what does that say about ministry in the light of what the ordained minister actually does?

I remain respectful of but unintimidated by the notion of the "ministry of the laity." Whatever Christ and the Church need to get done can of course never be done by ordained ministers alone. But neither can any of it be accomplished, especially in our modern world, by some people vaguely known as "laymen" unless the functional leadership activity within the church does something responsible of itself and with the laymen. I suspect that one of the reasons why the Continental churches are now making so much of the "ministry of the laity" is that they have had so little of it. In America we have, happily, had a lot of it. We should, therefore, be able to analyze the ordained ministry and its functions without having to nod every three minutes to Jerusalem or Mecca about the "layman."

The discussion that follows is about the biblical bases and the historical development of the ordained ministry, which means not special privilege but particular responsibility. After that, I shall get on with the central concern of the book—namely, functional analysis, through images, of the functions of the ordained ministry.

History of the Ordained Ministry

Scholars agree that the general structural form of what we now call the "ordained ministry" — according to which a particular person is given general oversight of all the activities of a particular Christian community — did not emerge in the church until early in the second century. This general overseer was at first called a "bishop," which simply means "overseer." The bishop’s principal associates at that period were "elders" and "deacons"; so that these three constituted a kind of multiple-staff ministry, but with the bishop as clearly the general coordinator or chairman. There were of course other Christians performing many functions of ministry or service; but they seem not to have held "Offices" in the same sense as bishops, elders, and deacons.

What is known about the ministry during the period of the first century must largely be inferred from the letters of Paul and the Pastoral Epistles. There was probably a good deal of variation in the organization charts. It is clear that ministry at first referred to all the services rendered by the Christian community, regardless of who rendered them. And since becoming a Christian in the first century meant a commitment affecting radically every aspect of life, it seems probable that the actual ministries were complex.

In terms of structure, however, it seems likely that the people who bore various titles in the first century — such as bishop or elder or healer or teacher — were not "officials" holding formal offices, as the bishops, elders, and deacons came to do in the early second century. It is not a correct inference to take Paul’s list in I Corinthians 12:28 — first apostles, second prophets, third teachers, then workers of miracles, then healers, administrators, speakers in various kinds of tongues — and see all of these as "set-aside" persons performing such functions on a specialist basis. The apostles had a special status as long as they lived, because they had known the Lord personally. Apparently the prophets and teachers did have an informal kind of status. But the other groups, such as the healers, were clearly not "officials."

The first-century picture is further obscured through the fact that Paul does not mention "elders" in relation to ministry; yet other parts of the New Testament show that the elders were prominent in Jerusalem and other places.

The best general inferences that can be made about the first century are as follows. First, the complex and often widely scattered Christian communities were so busy and joyful in performing the necessary functions of ministry that they handled the structural aspects informally, without constitution and bylaws — giving some status depending on the extent of the contribution but not regularizing this. Second, the exception in terms of clearly ascribed status was to the apostles, a point that is of special importance because of Paul’s regarding himself as one of the apostles even though he had not known Jesus during his earthly life.

It may certainly be argued from the biblical and first-century data that every Christian, in some appropriate ways, was to exercise ministry, that is, diakonia. But there is no evidence that leadership of a proper kind was scorned, or of sheer equalitarianism that failed to appreciate particular talent, even though leadership was not regularized into formal offices.

Many attempts through the history of the church have been made to use the New Testament and the first century as witnesses and prototypes of this or that particular structure of ministry. In the light of modem scholarship, these are bound to fail not only because of the paucity of data but also because the Christians of the first century were not preoccupied with ministry as office. What can properly be permanently inferred about the ministry from what we know of the first century seems as follows.

1. Ministry in general is always the total service of the total Christian community, whether in relation to its own members or to others.

2. Any kind of ministry must, however, be organized, so that leadership is always needed.

3. Leadership should be according to competence, however this be defined. The competence is ultimately functional, i.e., the combination of abilities that can best get the lob done.

4. While ministry focuses on communities and their outreach, special respect is to be accorded to the ministry that forms lines of communication among local groups. Witness Paul’s own work as chief example.

Beyond points like this, the first century does not tell us what the ordained ministry should be. It has sometimes been argued that the placing of prophecy and teaching in Paul’s list immediately after the apostles, with oversight following as a bad seventh, is a structural pattern that should be emulated. The conclusion seems unjustified. The vitality of the community might well rest primarily upon the prophetic witness that curried no favor, and upon the educative processes that cemented understanding of the gospel and commitment to it. But overseer or bishop or administrator ought properly to be interpreted as seeing that those things come first, no matter who performs them. First-century thinking, however, was simply not like that.

From the early part of the second century onward there have been only rare deviations from the notion that a local Christian community should have a general overseer, by whatever name he might be called. This is the principle that we still use in Protestantism about the ordained minister. He is not to perform himself all the functions that are needed. He is not to be a king giving orders without consultation, nor a hired man performing only such functions as the community votes. But he is local "bishop," overseer, supervisor, or facilitator of the total work of the total community.

It is instructive to contrast this almost uniform sociological conception of the ordained ministry in Christianity, Catholicism and Protestantism alike, with the history of the rabbinate in Judaism. Today in Western Europe and America the rabbi is a general leader and overseer just as priest and minister are in Christianity. This has been, however, a recent development. In the long centuries of Jewish life since biblical times the rabbi was the teaching leader but not the general leader; i.e., he was not responsible for overall supervision of affairs. And although there is not time here to deal with the data, I believe a case can be made that Christianity is alone among the religions of the world in this conception of ordained ministry as primarily general oversight over a local religious group, with the consequent obligations about training and competence that call the minister (whether he makes it or not) to some knowledge and skill about all the kinds of functions that will subsequently be discussed in this book. Perhaps it may turn out that the unique structural contribution of Christianity to group life is its implicit conception of "supervision."

During the second and third centuries of the Christian era the office of bishop was taken out of the local community and made into an area or district job. Succeeding the bishop in general oversight of the local group was the priest, the term itself actually deriving from "presbyter," meaning elder. The deacon remained as the principal associate of the priest.

From the third century onward the picture of the ministry was complicated by the rise of monasticism. After the early experiments by individual persons, the group life of special dedication that we know as monasticism began to grow; so that nearly every geographical area had both local churches for people in general and special Christian communities for monks. The abbots became the general overseers of the monastic communities in the same sense that priests were, by this time, general supervisors of general Christian communities. As monasticism grew, it had to have higher supervisory officials over larger areas; and so, under various names, the equivalent of monastic bishops developed. Both power and dignity tended to be ascribed in proportion to territory covered; the larger the area, the greater the status.

As the Middle Ages moved on, the church, including monastic life, became "big business." A group of monks who had entered the order to work (in the field for instance) and pray found that the serfs (tenant farmers) would take care of the fields. Monastic wealth built up, and the monks became entrepreneurs — an early version of secularization of the church. It was against this kind of situation that orders like the Franciscan and Dominican developed at the height of the Middle Ages. They were recalling the church from its newfound privilege of the ministry to diakonia and service; and they generally included friars or brothers, since monk or priest had come to connote privilege rather than service.

When the Protestant Reformation appeared, it criticized many things about the priesthood and monasticism as these had developed, but it did not question the monoepiscopal principle; that is, that any Christian community should have a general overseer or supervisor. Attentive to the New Testament conviction that ministry was service, to be exercised by all Christians appropriately, it developed both the doctrine of universal priesthood and that of Christian vocation of all Christians. At the same time it acknowledged "the ministry" as an office, as set apart, requiring preparation and special competence. The office was to be, however, conferred only by the selection of the community — set-apartness, but not imposition. The community to be served had a share in who their general overseer was to be. While the Reformation declared continually that all Christians hold the "keys" in common (not a prerogative of priest or bishop), nevertheless these keys were to be exercised only when authorized by the community. This was a check and balance system. Without an overseer, there would be anarchy. But if the overseer forgot that his exercising of the keys was by the explicit approval of those he served, he would or should be in trouble.

In its conception of ministry, therefore, Protestantism was trying to be realistic about power, yet to recall that all ministry is service. With its strong emphasis on preaching and teaching it paid tribute to functional competence as essential to significant service. And it worked to educate ordained ministers as the church had never worked before. It saw ministry as the exercise of supervisory responsibility but with the emphasis on service rather than privilege — and it saw the content of this mainly in terms of preaching. To separate itself from what it felt was the Roman "privilege" notion, it advised its ordained ministers to wear the Schaube, the gown of the secular scholar in the university. But it did, even in dress, acknowledge the speciality of the minister.

When North America was settled, the various churches at first simply carried with them the forms of ministry developed in Europe. But adaptation came very quickly — first to the wilderness, then to the cut-offness from the old countries, and finally to the movement westward of the frontier. Forms of church government differed; but nobody except the Quakers challenged the notion that a religious local community needed a general overseer, no matter whether he lived in (like the Baptist preachers who farmed during the week) or out (like the circuit riders of Methodism).

In America all churches had to begin as new congregations. Hence the function of oversight, of genera] administration, became crucial in a way it had not been in the state-related churches of the Continent and the British Isles. Changes and alterations were many. But everybody insisted, even while making the most radical changes, that nothing new was being introduced. The functionalism was good. But much of the theory about it was not.

As Christian churches developed in America — and many more kinds of them with the establishment first of religious toleration and then of religious freedom — the ordained minister tended to become more dependent on his relations with his local congregation than was true in Britain or on the Continent. He had to win not only their souls but also their money. If he were not to get fired or become neurotic, he had to develop a political and diplomatic expertise that was unnecessary to his opposite numbers in Europe or Britain. Thus, he had to become more sure of what he was about and of his competence to carry it out; or face more potentialities of disaster. The ministry, too, had its days of "rugged individualism," not in the sense of riding roughshod over other people but in terms of standing up to lonely leadership in a degree that no other group of ministers in Christian history had had to do.

The history of the ministry in America has rightly been called a movement of constancy in the direction of "evangelicalism," at least until the present century. This meant that the church and the ministers serving it were to save souls above all else. It is easy to criticize or even ridicule some of the soul-saving notions and tactics of those days. But the provincialisms should not blind us to the fact that this American evangelicalism was functional in its estimate of the ministry. Not: What is your status? But: How many souls have you saved? Don’t tell me your position. Tell me what you have done.

With the emergence of new concern in our own century for the people caught in problems of urbanization, racial discrimination, industrialization, and the like, the churches moved first — through the so-called social gospel movement — to correct the previous emphasis on soul-saving as dealing only with individual persons. In a more articulate way the tasks of ministry came to include work for justice, reconciling beyond the individual’s inner self and his family relationships. Perhaps all this at first was a bit too collective, and maybe it believed that progress could be made if you put your mind to it. But it was an essential development.

The social gospel did not talk much about the ministry. But it either exhorted ministers to get to work on social injustice, or encouraged laymen to prod their ministers — so that it accepted fully the fact that the ordained minister was the general overseer of a particular community of Christians.

By the time we reach our own generation, the first major bombshell about the ministry was detonated by Reinhold Niebuhr. We cannot simply go on with our evangelical concern for the person, he implied, and let other people and other institutions take care of social justice. All efforts for social justice are less than pure or sure, he continued. But the church and the minister must be in on them, even if only 51 percent convinced. The Sermon on the Mount must never be forgotten, but it is an "impossible possibility." Just make sure that our devotion to its ideals does not deter us from getting on with what needs to be done in this contingent world.

After Niebuhr’s shattering critique we began to get the impact of the big B’s: Barth, Bultmann, and Brunner, and eventually of Tillich. In a loose sense, this movement was called neo-orthodoxy. Its principal instrument was the Bible as understood by modern technical means of scholarship, attempting to be faithful to the biblical message beyond the biblical provincialisms. It tended to emphasize the ministry as proclamation of the Word of God, and sometimes became irrelevantly verbose in the process. Its virtue was the recapture of the biblical message with time-bound elements shorn away; and thus it had a spirit equally compounded of scholarly honesty and theological commitment.

Neo-orthodoxy challenged the pallid commitments to "ideals" and moralistic interpretations of them. It caught the minister up short when he said we should "love one another" and failed to show that love in this sense is an impossible possibility," or at least very difficult. It told the ministry to stop being so smug about what it had done and to listen to the Word of God about what it might do. It even made a few passes at taking modern science and other knowledge into account.

But neo-orthodoxy, despite its great virtues as corrector, has not been able to achieve a viable reinterpretation of the ministry. It has been shockingly unconcerned about what a minister does — except the ambiguous "proclamation" of the gospel. Eduard Thurneysen has tried to redefine pastoral care as appropriate proclamation of the Word to individual persons and families. All this breaks down. It is an excellent critique that has not found a way of constructing.

In the very recent past, many of the discussions of ministry have been efforts to remind us that ministry is diakonia, or service, and relates to all members of the Christian community. This is true and necessary, but such discussion has tended to evade the question: So what, then, is the task of the ordained minister?

As in the long history of the church, we are not today without special interest groups — many of them of merit in what they do — in interpreting the nature of the ministry. Some of them still carry old denominational convictions; for instance, about continuity in the Anglican Church, the rejection of a set-aside ministry in parts of the Society of Friends, the parity of the ministry in the Reformed tradition, and no ordination without a call from a local church as in much of Lutheranism.

The ecumenical movement has stimulated many discussions of ministry that face forthrightly the differences among Christian groups, almost always held by each group to be consequent upon its theory of the church. These differences must still be taken with great seriousness. And yet they are astonishingly little connected with function and service, and are very obviously related to status and privilege. I do not yet know of a serious ecumenical discussion of the ministry that has consistently put function and service in the foreground. Important as they are, discussions of the ministry of the laity, the total people of God, are not substitutes for asking, if the minister is a servant, just what his unique service (and not privilege or status) is to be, and what competence does he have to carry it out. In this book I hope I may be nudging an ecumenical discussion or two to take function seriously, instead of making exhortations about diakonia and then discussing ministry in terms of status rather than function.

Some of the special emphases on the ministry today differ, however, from those of the past. Some of these positions flow from concern to minister to people in special situations or settings: the inner city, the hospital, military service, college campus, mission field, and others. It is argued (rightly I believe) that ministry in all such settings requires special knowledge and skills that may not be parts of the traditional preparation for the ministry, and that such education should at least be added to the traditional materials. Up to this point I agree. Some advocates, however, seem to believe that the new kinds of knowledge and skill make the old ones unnecessary. I strongly disagree. In the field I know best, hospital chaplaincy, the best chaplaincy work increasingly performs a wider, and not a narrower, range of the total functions of ministry. I see no reason why this is not relevant to ministry in the other special settings.

Another kind of position about the ministry, which now seems likely to be adopted to a certain extent by the Roman Catholic Church, is to create a group of subministers, who are permitted to perform nearly (but not quite) all the functions of the priest, but who will be trained much more quickly. This might turn out as successfully as has the relation of practical nurses to registered nurses. But the problem is far more difficult, and the parallel far from exact because all nurses work under the general direction of physicians. It is difficult for me to see what functions of professional ministry can be mastered without professional education. Very many functions of the church, under professional supervision, can be done by those not professionally trained. But again, the issue is: ordained ministry, or the office or offices of set-aside ministry.

A third kind of modern position about the ministry (and here there is a variety of views) relates to specialism. The number of persons exercising their ministry through concentration on special functions has greatly increased. In my own church it is now estimated that 20 percent of our ministers are specialists in this sense. Functional specialism may make for much more effective service. But is a functionally specializing minister protected from keeping his mind on anything except the area of his specialty? If he is a Christian educator, does he simply forget that, even for him, preaching and pastoral care are aspects of ministry from which he cannot disidentify himself even if his time spent on hem is less than if he were not a functional specialist? Although I am all for functional specialization in the interest of more adequate total ministry, I am entirely against any conception of specialized ministry that tries, thereby, to "protect" people from identification with ministry as a whole. I am even more against those who regard this or that functional specialty as having a special status of its own, whether they be seminary teachers or pastoral counselors.

Also involved in the arguments about specialized ministries today is how specialized workers in the employ of churches and church organizations, when they are not ordained ministers, shall be related to the churches. In the field of Protestant overseas missions, there are far more nonordained than ordained people. Business managers, social workers, and many others also work for the churches at home. In theory I would hold that, while it is excellent to have such workers, the general oversight should be by an ordained minister — who presumably takes into account all the kinds of needed functions that the Christian community should be performing. In actual fact this may not be good policy in specific instances. Some of the best pioneering contributions of the churches shade some functions and emphasize others. And one expert in the emphasized functions may there be the best general overseer. One of the challenges today is to retain intact the function of general supervision or oversight, in the name and for the sake of the totality of functions of the church, and yet to have some nonhierarchical way of using persons with the needed special knowledge in the work of the church — all over and above the voluntary service of every Christian. The more we can take and understand general oversight as function and not as status, the easier will be the solution to this problem.

In reminding myself as much as my readers of what seem to me principal highlights in the history of the ordained ministry, I have not hesitated to let my position in favor of monoepiscopacy — a general overseer and supervisor in each operative Christian community — be clear. But I have also tried to show that, in Christianity as in no other universal religion (with very minor exceptions), there has rarely been a question about this. There have been thousands of problems. In any local Christian community the minister, no matter what he was called, might interpret oversight as domination, as exuding charm and doing nothing, or in many other irritating or obstructive ways. But only under direst distress have such communities decided to have no overseer at all.

The great historic quarrels about ministry have been, so to speak, geographic. Is the local community its own final authority? Does the overseer of the area have the right to order thus and so of the local community? Or does some kind of representative assembly of a wider area take precedence over any one supervisor or any one community? Today each of these systems of polity (which means political systems) has been qualified, although there are still divisions among them. But there is increasing recognition that whatever their merit — and there may be a bit in each — they are not so much theories of the ministry as theories of ministerial geography. This book is devoted to ministry, not to ministerial geography.

The Ordained Ministry and Functional Competence

Even I, although I have argued throughout this chapter for understanding the ministry basically from a monoepiscopal point of view, have sometimes been nostalgic about the first century, where everybody seemed so keen and enthusiastic (literally filled with God) that things got done and "offices" were not established. But then I get second thoughts about Paul, who, with both his genius and his humility, was nevertheless going to fight all corners who said he was not a true apostle — even though he did not meet the formal apostolic criterion of having known Jesus in his earthly ministry. Had I been in one of those Christian communities back there, I am sure I would have appreciated Paul’s visits and his letters to my local group. But I think I would have wondered how he put himself so completely above the political battle. When we reach the postapostolic age, we find, happily, the emergence of the monoepiscopal conception of the ministry, according to which somebody around the place has to keep his eye on whatever is cooking.

There is only one alternative to having a general overseer or supervisor to any kind of local group, church or otherwise, provided there is to be some continuity and performance of functions. That is to have so many codes, rules, regulations, and rituals that everybody involved knows exactly what he is to do — and is of course, therefore, likely to do no more. The Christian church of the early second century lived in this world, and knew that an "organic" body of Christ demanded some kind of organizing. As all subsequent history, including the Protestant Reformation, shows, however, general overseers are likely to stress their status and power and diminish their functions as service. Even though we are more democratic about it all than previous ages, we are far from immune to the same tendency. Thus, if a minister today is not in process of being ousted, is regarded by at least many of his people as a wonderful Christian, a helpful preacher, a diligent pastor, and so on, he may rest content in this kind of status even though privately he is disturbed at all the kids who drop out of church school, at the inattentiveness of the church to its neighborhood, at the virtual neglect of older people, and at the bourgeois aroma that infects everything. I have met a very few ministers who are relatively unprincipled politicians, but very few indeed. The overwhelming majority fall back into a status not because it has power but rather because they want to be "settled." Today, I think, too many ministers settle for too little power. Some kind of power is needed if service is to be performed. This ought not to be "power over," in the sense of overriding anybody without consulting him seriously. But the retreat to "just doing my job" violates the whole conception of ministry, from the first and the second centuries alike.

With some exceptions, although they are decreasing, the ordained minister today of any Catholic or Protestant church except the fringe groups has had a college or university education, and then an education in a theological school or seminary. Beyond his arts course he has studied an incredible variety of subjects. There is usually both the Greek and Hebrew languages, so he can read the Bible in its original tongues. There is biblical history, theology, archaeology, "criticism," and hermeneutics (what happens to the Bible at the modern end of the sausage grinder). He has studied the history of the Church and churches, and hopefully also a bit about the history of religions other than Judaism and Christianity. He has done systematic theology, historical theology, the philosophy of religion, and maybe even the sociology and the psychology of religion. He has studied preaching, corrected his speech, delved into religious education, and had a go at pastoral care. He has worked on ethics and ecumenic and the "secular society." Maybe — but it is doubtful — he has had some study of how to be an overseer, which is to be the focus of his job from here on no matter what its setting. He has been exhorted to keep on reading, not only "theology" (and what a mixture he has already got) but also novels, history, biography, and every contemporary journal that can get him into the mind of society and the problems of the world.

All this is great; but if his head is spinning — well, why shouldn’t it? And nobody knows better than the intelligent minister of today that, whatever he has been able to devour of all this, he has not "mastered" anything. to say nothing of the whole of it.

I admire the modern minister’s realism and humility. But mostly I don’t like what he does with them. He tends to use them as barricades. In a strange way, and one unjustified by the actual knowledge he has and the skills he rapidly acquires, he tends to become defensive in a professional sense. By running down his own abilities, he unintentionally runs down the ministry. Then along comes some article about "Why I Left the Ministry," or "More Christianity and Fewer Churches," or "The Creative Ministry Without Local Churches," or "Ministers Don’t Know Why They Are" — and the poor fellow buckles. Nonsense! No professional man today, even the doctor, has "mastered" his field. Knowledge is expanding too rapidly for that. A great number of ministers are catching on to whatever is valid new knowledge. Some others are throwing in the sponge. But the fact is that nobody can master it all. Perfectionism will not do. The attitude is more important than the achievement.

Happily, continuing education opportunities for ministers are increasing by leaps and bounds, even though far too many of them still are more hortatory and "hand-holding" than they should be. And most of them are too short. In my judgment, a good continuing education course for the minister should begin where the minister has his problems; that is, with an issue of function, of service, of how you do this or that, and then go back to basic principles, wherever you can find them, to shed light on whatever it is. Far too many courses of continuing education insult the minister, even if he does not realize it, by refusing to organize the material in this way. They insist that he take a look at, let us say, Old Testament theology, or pastoral counseling, in their own categories — instead of asking first the functional questions of both Old Testament theology and pastoral counseling.

Perhaps the sessions themselves are good. But if the minister leaves with nothing but a sense of what he does not know, then something is wrong. He is not, after all, trying to become a research expert in special theological disciplines. Can he be helped within his knowledge, but utilizing every swotch of it, to use it more effectively in his ministry? That is the question that should be posed to all programs of continuing education. Most of them, in reply, I believe, are not so good. They may do an excellent job on content of this area or that. But when anybody asks "How?" they tend to fade into the distance. Why should not such a program be able, with illustrations, to speak to "How"? Please, brother minister, do not let the august leader off the hook at this point. If he doesn’t know how then he does not know his subject. No formulas. But "hows" are more than formulas. Stand up for your rights.

Conclusion

I have written this chapter under the internal duress of respect for the communicative process. My discussion of the ministry which follows is about the functions of ministry. So far as I can see, in any proper kind of logical sense, functions are what follow from diakonia. In my judgment, every minister is at all times sufficiently sensitive to all these functions as appropriate to ministry that, according to the situation, he responds with a dominant emphasis on this function or that. If he has been smart enough to enlist other people to perform many functions of the total diakonia within the church and to the world, that is commendable. But he is still, regardless of the setting of his ministry, responsible for appraising what is going on, stimulating more where needed, and encouraging the changing of forms and patterns when the old have outlived their usefulness.

Not only do I believe in the monoepiscopal ministry. I see this conception as also unique, structurally, to Christianity. It has many temptations, all of which have been fallen for in the history of the church. It can become power over, or detachment, or authoritarianism, or busy-work, or much else, in its pathologies. But you cannot have a competent and moving local Christian community without a supervisor, an overseer, who, while dependent upon his community, is nevertheless free at critical points to transcend it. He must be with his organization, but he cannot be merely an organization man.

In the chapters that follow, my implicit argument all the way through is that a lot of the modem arguments about the ministry can be solved if they are approached through the analysis of functions of ministry. No automatic harmony guaranteed. But try it on for size.

Chapter 1: Ferment in the Ministry

By analogy "ferment" means stir, agitation, unrest, commotion, excitement, or tumult. But the original context from which this metaphor comes, wine-making, includes such characteristics as only intermediate phases of a process whose aim is a stronger product. There is a kairos to wine-making. If fermentation goes on indefinitely, the product is useless. If the proper moment of arrest is seized, however, then the intermediate stirrings and agitations may be seen as necessary stages in the making of a better product.

I believe that "ferment" is a better description of what is happening in the ministry today than are such other terms as "crisis," "maceration," "breakdown," or "upset." Crisis means a point of compelled decision. It implies red and green lights, whereas in fact there is also an amber light that can mean anything from muddling through to new hope. Maceration means softening. It implies a kind of errand-boy failure of nerve, whereas in fact there is probably as much courage in the ministry today as at any time in Christian history. Breakdown means the machinery has failed. It implies that nothing is being done. The fact is, however, that whatever may not be running, it is not the machinery. Upset means being stood on the head. It implies disproportion, misdirection, and even a feeling of tipsiness. In fact, however, most ministers are more puzzled than tipsy. I prefer ferment, with its two clear implications: first, that the stage of agitation may be both necessary and anxiety-inducing; and second, that the result may be very good if the commotion is stopped in time.

The time has come, I think, to move beyond the guerrilla-warfare criticisms of the ministry that have been plentiful in the past ten years. The ferment that they have both expressed and induced may be a very good thing. Such benefits should not be lost. An attempt to return to older certainties will not do. But we should be able to take this particular vintage out of the vats — even if we use a new supply of grapes to start some new fermentation.

The central constructive thesis of this book is that analysis of the functions of ministry (through the idea of images) shows the ministry to be, both psychologically and theologically, a unity — although a complex unity with a variety of types of activity. If the minister grasps this sense of unity within complexity, then he need not feel pulled in sixteen directions. He must still make decisions, hard decisions, about the investment of his time and energy. And he must still be sensitive to the idiosyncrasies in his particular situation. But he will not feel that his job is impossible, or inherently frustrating, or nothing but anxiety. This thesis will be spelled out in many ways throughout the chapters that follow.

The "gimmick" used throughout the discussion is the image, by which is meant a cartoon-like picture that selects central points in the foreground and neglects photographic-like detail that could detract from the needed impression. A large jaw and a cigarette holder could stand, in cartoons, for Franklin D. Roosevelt. A cigar in a determined profile represented Winston Churchill. I believe that, in this cartoon-like sense, the human mind carries out much of its work of perceiving. The trick comes in whether what is selected really is what is most important or not.

The notion of image is not used here in some senses that are, in other contexts, legitimate. It is not used as a mirror-like reflection. Nor is it used as a die-stamp. Nor as a replica. It is not used either as in some modem psychology, as a "self-image," meaning the total view one has of himself. It is used, instead, as an attempt to objectify, with cartoon-like pictures, the inner conception of function, i.e., what one is trying to accomplish. Beginning in Chapter 3, the reader will be carried into the details of my image-clutching.

Since I believe that my complex unity of the ministry thesis, argued out through analysis of images of function, has a chance of getting the wine out of the vats before fermentation has gone on too long, I intend in this volume a message both of hope and challenge for the ministry. That this is a measured conviction, and not hortatory or sentimental wishfulness, I shall try to demonstrate in the present chapter by a brief discussion of the current negative charges against the ministry. None of these charges is without a modicum of truth. But they are all one-sided, and neglectful of the renewal that is going on through the ferment.

Ministers Are Leaving?

The charge is that so many more priests and ministers are leaving the ministry than at any previous time that the ministry must be an impossible vocation. So far, reliable general statistics are not available. But it is probably true that the proportionate number of persons leaving the ministry in recent years is in fact higher than at any time in our century. The actual number, however, is still proportionately small, despite scare stories in the press.

How many of these demittings, however, represent either failure of ministry or failure of man, and how many represent some advance on the part of the persons involved? A few are, perhaps, failures. The majority, I am convinced, are quite otherwise.

I think of two ministers who left the ministry, with whom I have counseled at some length in recent years. Needless to say, my brief accounts of them are designed to conceal all identifying information while also presenting the essence of their respective situations. Minister A was brilliant and had great potential as a theologian. But in a personality sense he was brittle. He was minister of a conservative denomination which had impeded him, throughout his theological studies, from actively relating theology to life and the world. Suddenly he got a new vision about theology, that it was most precisely related to life and the world. He felt released. For the first time, his own faith related to his life. Had he been more of a leader, and less brittle, he might well have returned to his denomination and been a leader in its movement ahead. But some things are irreversible. In a curious way, his leaving the ministry restores his Christian faith personally. I feel certain that God has called him to what he is now doing, which is a kind of secular ministry. He demitted the ministry. But what he is now doing is more for God, and himself, than if he had remained in the ordained ministry.

Minister B was a live-wire social reformer, not exactly hotheaded but certainly precipitate. He was in no sense thrown out of his local church, and indeed continued to be greatly respected by most of his people. But he grew impatient in dealing with the socially conservative minority who objected to his forays into the problems of the world. If he had had more "tension capacity," he would have realized that he could proceed along the lines of his intention, winning some converts and remaining in tension with others, but without jeopardy to his program. Psychologically, however, he was not inwardly strong enough to sustain this tension. Had he continued in the ministry, he might well have broken under it. With his many talents he had no difficulty getting a job with an excellent secular agency; and so far he has done well. Someday he may of course face partial disillusionment in his present work. There are bound to be ups and downs. In a curious sense, despite his single-minded devotion to social reform, his character was too dependent to manage this through the ordained ministry. He needed fewer ambiguities. For the moment at least, he is in such a situation, and I am sure the Lord approves.

Even though Protestants have held, from the Reformation, that every Christian has a "calling" from God, and that ministers are no better in God’s eyes than any others, a curious Protestant cloud has looked upon leaving the ordained ministry as something like adultery or divorce. Perhaps it is true that, with some new freedom in this area, some precipitate decisions to leave the ministry or priesthood have been made without adequate exploration of the factors involved. But the freedom itself is good, even if on occasion it may be abused. The new climate requires that the churches, separately or together, provide "vocational counseling" service for ministers of a kind that the past has not known. Some real experiments in this direction are under way, as in my own Presbyterian Church. With some few ministers, we rejoice when they have the guts to leave the ministry. Past ages would have given them no choice, and they would have had to continue in chains to no good of themselves or of the church.

Ministers Are Breaking Down?

There are times when I wish more ministers were breaking down — with heart disease, blood pressure, cancer, psychoses, or criminal impulses. If they did, it might show that they were unhappy victims of commitment to their difficult and complex jobs. The fact is, however, that ministers are the most long-lived of all professional men, and their incidence of serious mental illness is low.

The Board of Pensions of my own church, the United Presbyterian, entered into a relationship with the Menninger Foundation some four or five years ago according to which any minister or his wife or minor children might go to Kansas for a psychiatric evaluation lasting one to two weeks, with most of the bill paid by the Board. No details need be given to the Board; and once the evaluation is completed, the Foundation reports only to the persons involved. Thus privacy is fully respected.

For the period immediately following the initiation of the plan, a number of ministers (together with wives and children) took advantage of the opportunity and were demonstrated to have real mental or emotional problems. In all instances sound counsel was given about steps from that point onward. But after the early rush a new kind of fact came to light. Ministers appeared who, after investigation, proved to be no more mentally ill than other people, but who really hoped that the psychiatrists could call them such — because then the relational problems in the church, or in the family, would not have to be taken as their own responsibility. One could almost say that unconsciously they wanted to be regarded as "sick."

This situation of course points to a relative lack of proper vocational counseling services within the United Presbyterian Church, which we are in process of amending. But from a "breakdown" point of view, the curious fact is that many of these men who were not broken down at all would have, however unconsciously, welcomed a "breakdown" diagnosis.

Since ministers and priests are as human as other people, a certain proportion are bound to have mental and physical ills, in all degrees, regardless of their dedication to their faith and their work. The astonishing fact is how seldom these ills become really serious. When they do, then expert help is needed. Roman Catholics are realistically operating some special treatment programs for priests who become alcoholic or otherwise mentally ill. In the sense of the Presbyterian-Menninger program, Protestants have begun on the same kind of needed and realistic course. Ordination is not a guarantee of continuing mental health. And many excellent persons can be saved by proper programs. Even severe mental illness need not be permanent.

Overall, the "breakdown" theory of the ministry has very few legs to stand on.

The Local Church Is Dead?

Let ministers get into the inner city — in store-front churches, neighborhood gangs, health centers, drug-addict operations, and many other places — and there the church is truly at work. Or let them go into a corner of the globe where there is need, forget the faith temporarily except as a motivator, empathize with the needs of the people, and help the people do whatever is needed to better their condition and obtain more justice. Or let them go, militantly, into any place where they can minister without risk of contamination from existing ecclesiastical structures. We do need ministers in all such spots. What they do may be enormously important. Such sites are the modern equivalent — no matter what the geography — of the foreign missionary movement of the previous century.

The fact is, however, that just like the previous century’s overseas missionary movement, none of this is possible if there are not "home churches" to support it. What can we make, then, of those who want to kill the duck that shells out the silver eggs? Why the extreme antipathy, on the part of a few ministers and seminarians, to the "local church"?

I have no new wisdom on this problem, and it is indeed a serious current problem. I am impressed, however, that at my own seminary the best attitude-changer in this regard is actual experience, under competent supervision, in some kind of church situation. It makes no difference whether the theological student is in a local church (and no matter what kind), an inner-city situation, or a hospital. If he is competently supervised, and thus enabled and forced to learn of ministry from reflection on his actual experience, then he becomes positive — although also properly critical — of the ministry of the local church. If, on the other hand, he manages to evade such supervised experience, or has the bad luck to land a situation with poor supervision, then he goes on arraigning the local church.

In connection with our Princeton field education program, we have two suburban local churches where the senior ministers are unusually competent supervisors, owing to both training and natural gifts. Each of them takes a group of three or four students (part-time, of course). The students stick out their respective necks, do what they can in programs assigned to them, and then have the same kind of supervision and feedback that they would have in a clinical pastoral education program. Every one of these students has become enthusiastic about the local church! Part of the reason is surely the competence of the supervision, the selection of graded activities for the students to assume responsibility for, and the acceptance of the students as genuine working sub-ministers. But not a little of it is due also to their being in a group where they can, as peers, exchange all kinds of gripes and praises and critiques among themselves, with or without their minister-supervisor around. They learn leadership through participation. The usual field-work situation of one student provides no such opportunity.

Under the leadership of the late Dean Samuel H. Miller, the Harvard University Divinity School has for some years past invited some minister of a local church to the campus for an intensive couple of days with the students. There have been well-known ministers, and others never heard of by Time and Life. How many conversions from teaching to the local church have been made I do not know. But the idea and the program are excellent. What is going on in our local churches — with all its obscurity and ambiguity — is the future of the church, for good or for ill. And, in my judgment, not so ill. My guess is, nevertheless, that any of the ministers invited to Harvard have had long thoughts both fore and aft. They could not say no, anymore than one can to the White House. But what kind of weak ethos was Sam Miller getting them to shore up? They must, in fact, have done very well; for to my astonishment I have heard that a few Harvard Divinity graduates have actually gone into local churches.

I know there are local churches that regard their minister as a hired man, others that regard him as a functionary to be dealt with today but happily gone elsewhere next year, and even some that get his political voting record and his children’s marks in school before they issue a call. Not all of this caution, incidentally, is bad. Its exercise, since no perfect minister ever shows up, thank God, may lead the church members and leadership into the realization that they too have some responsibility. They cannot ask that the Rev. George do it all. In the interim, however, unless the Rev. George has guts, the fermentation may include some sour apples.

A minority of theological students, when confronted with the complexities of any local church in any site, will want to retreat to something simpler like nuclear physics, where there is some semblance of predictability on the part of neutrons, protons, electrons, and mesons, in contrast to the complexities of both people and church organizations. Supervision may make a decisive difference. Even so, some will find they cannot stand the ambiguity. If so, wonderful that the truth has been discovered so early. The vast majority, however, especially under competent supervision, if they have got this far will go farther.

A minister who cannot tolerate ambiguity cannot tolerate a local church. In many respects, as we now know, the capacity to tolerate ambiguity is a kind of final mark of mental health. One may be low on it and still mentally healthy if the external situation can be arranged to make it unnecessary. But for all complex services and positions, this capacity may make the difference between success and failure. If a minister has very little such capacity, then that is the situation; and the Lord will obviously want him working elsewhere than in a local church. But the capacity, if it exists at all, may be developed. He may "feel ferment," while in actual fact this may be productive adaptation.

Laymen Are the Real Ministers?

Through its pronouncements and its collective actions, the church does some affecting of the ills of society. But what is done to this end through church members, in their various slots of social responsibility, is undoubtedly more significant. The responsible J. B. Somebody, who lives in the suburb of Skewed Gardens, a paradise unknown to the poor of Central City, may nevertheless be the chairman of the Improvement Committee of Central City — and mostly because his church has given him some faith and conscience. Maybe the proletariat, Negro or otherwise, will some day skew his gardens in the suburbs. But their chances are much better to get to him and, if necessary, get him to take a more radical line to help them.

Unless I am mostly blind, I see far more responsible and widespread participation of laymen in the churches of the United States than in Europe and the British Commonwealth. Here, our churches have had to support themselves almost from the beginning. The minister has never been able to retreat to a position disclaiming concern for finances. This is in contrast to churches which, at least in the past, were supported by taxation, and where the minister could "forget money." On Stewardship Sunday, of course, this fact can make us look like Madison Avenue if it is badly done. But I think more German churches would have education rooms and kitchens if they had ever had to fend for themselves except during the Hitler regime.

There can be no possible question that the influence of the church upon the ills and evils of the world is carried out through laymen — or not at all. The unhappy aspect about the present ordained breast-beating is that this point is used, surreptitiously, as if it let ordained ministers off the hook about "supervising" what is going on in the impact of the church upon the world. Supervision is not bossing. It is not directing in the sense of giving orders. It is supporting attentiveness, not devoid of criticism, but fundamentally encouraging. Quite literally in heaven’s name, why pit ministers against laymen? Why not give each his job description — which was once referred to as his "vocation"? We have had romantics about the ministry before, and we have them now. Once we had Baptist farmer-preachers, who preached on Sunday and farmed during the week. Once we had Methodist "itinerants," like Peter Cartwright, who traveled from place to place on horseback and made a point of never settling. If you settled, or made your "living" from ministry, you were suspect. While respecting the motivations of such men, we can see today, nonetheless, the romantic underpinnings of these attitudes. The minister must face the world in all its ambiguity, including his income from the church, and do what he can.

Latterly, both John A. T. Robinson and James A. Pike have been advocating a ministry that earns its living somewhere else and works for the church on its "nonreimbursed time." If some ministers can manage this feat, God bless them. But as a general pattern this seems to me a product of romanticism, taking with insufficient seriousness the "materialism of Christianity," as William Temple called it, and quite likely to produce the wrong kind of guilt feelings in competent young people who are in or who are considering the ministry — as if this activity were not worthy of economic support.

I hope that our local churches will become livelier places than many of them now are, no matter where they are located. Could "The Church" survive without them? By having the courage to close out all local churches that are moribund, unneeded, unduly competitive, and so on, the Church could help to protect the meaning and significance and program of "the local church." But close them out indiscriminately? What nonsense!

No appropriate ministry of the laity can conceivably be in fundamental opposition to the ordained ministry, unless there is a screw loose on either side of the board.

The Church Is the Establishment?

How do we look at the "Establishment" history? Is it the left-wing Thomas Aquinas, Martin Luther, George Fox, Martin Luther King, Jr., Eugene Carson Blake, and others? Or is it the Spanish Inquisition, the anti-Bonhoeffer German Christians, the John Birch Christians, and others? When is the Church part of the Establishment, and when is it a liberal critic going beyond what exists? Every student of church history must give his own verdict. As for mine, with all the reaction that has often been in evidence, I see the basic action of the churches as against reaction and for progress.

The current critique charges the Church and the churches with being part of the Establishment, white, middle-class, tax-free, economically secure, insensitive to the needs of minorities, smug in wealth, sot in structures, bureaucratic in organization. Who, in honesty, could deny a certain amount of truth in all such charges?

At root, however, this charge is not much above the level of the hippies. It implies a first-century romantic bias against the second-century need to find secretaries and treasurers and chairmen — without a St. Paul to appeal to! Specific criticisms of what the denominations are doing, individually or collectively, must always be in order. But the assumption that what they are always up to is reaction and holding the line is clearly unwarranted. I am all for specific criticisms of the churches and what they are or are not doing. But global negation of the church as "Establishment"? Nonsense! Nothing can have influence if it has no kind of "establishment" beyond its "first century."

Most seminary students are still in process of winning psychological freedom from their parents or guardians. Talk in the air about the "Establishment" may, depending on the individual student, either provide him with an excuse for not breaking the dependent ties or enable him to find a respectable intermediary object. When I talk with a student, I try to be alert to how much of one and how much of the other is involved. In a way, the same criterion holds for young ordained ministers. If they have no criticism of the status quo, probably ecclesiastical rigor mortis has set in. But in that case, I probably do not see them. They come back to Princeton only when they have a problem and a hope. The question, then, is whether their view of their ministerial problem is open to what they can do, and they are not mainly interested in getting excused from what they cannot do.

The Establishment — any Establishment — is always full of holes. Anybody with a brain and a conscience must be discriminatingly critical of every Establishment. But global rejections — as if the world should have no establishments of any kind? Nonsense!

Isolation from the World?

Next Sunday, in the First Church of Nixie, New York, or the Saint Waldemar’s Church of Proxie, Alabama, I am sure the respective ministers will declare that love is a wonderful thing, that Jesus agreed with their opinions; so why doesn’t everybody get on the bandwagon and love one another — taking it easy, of course, with Negroes, minority groups, homosexual persons, criminals, the mentally ill, and many others? Love them of course, but not too fondly!

How much is the church isolated from the world — both the social problems like race and poverty and the psychological realities like hostility and aggression? The answer to both segments of the question, unhappily, is: Still a good deal — but rapidly decreasing. On the first segment we still have many churches trying to do business as usual, as if they could forget the tough situations and let the government or somebody take care of it. Where this is the attitude, usually the people involved are those who most resent it when the government or somebody does in fact try to do something about it. In my judgment, while these groups and churches are real, they are a minority. The much more frequent situation involves the church that does want to do something about it but does not know how its slender resources can make a legible contribution.

There are two aspects of this church and world business, viewed contemporaneously and functionally. On the one side, it is possible for the church to let the rest of the world go by — and for the minister to concern himself mainly with his pulpit robe equipment, the shape of the baptistry, the architecture of the sanctuary, and perhaps the related facilities such as the educational rooms and the kitchens. All these things are good in themselves if set in proper perspective. On the other side, it is equally possible for the church to become so "worldly" that sermons become trash, worship becomes an outdated rite, and the church becomes so "relevant" as to have nothing to contribute once it gets there.

I still feel profoundly disturbed by the story of the able Lutheran minister in the Midwest who fought through, over a year or more, the necessity of his church to involve itself fully in the problems of the Negroes of the community and environs. He did a great job. But when the one kind of victory — compromise — that a Christian can count on was in sight, he resigned. Of this resignation I remain critical. Did he not know that we live in this world and not in an ideal world? If he had had no courage, we could wipe him off. But he had! Nevertheless, he apparently had a perfectionism that wanted to deal with the world all at once or not at all.

In this country above all others, whatever the defects of the Church and churches, they are not isolated from the world. Consult your pastor about a problem of marriage or neurosis or delinquency, and hardly any minister will demand that you get it set in "religious" categories before he tries to help you. Since I believe there are always religious and theological dimensions of any such problem, I am not at this point advocating a sterile secularism. But the point is: No conditions — come as you are! When I see some modern miniskirts and slacks, I am tempted to qualify this principle. But so long as decency is preserved, I stand by it. In contrast to my days of youth and vigor, I now have more trouble with the late-middle-aged woman who ought to know better than to wear slacks than I do with the beautiful young thing who fills them admirably. I get along better when I am tempted.

Anyhow, this charge about the isolation of the church from the world cuts both ways. It contains truth in many instances. But the answer to it can never be just caving in, either by retreating into itself or by forgetting its uniqueness.

Should the Church Care — or Fight?

Pastoral care or social action? If the church helps someone to adapt to his situation, is it guilty of depriving him of motivation for standing up against the status quo? If the church, on the other hand, leads him to believe that social action will solve his problems, is it concealing from him the psychological ambiguity he must face in order to live in this ambiguous world?

When should the church care and when should it fight? The one possible general answer is: according to the nature of particular situations. Thus, the harm comes whenever a penchant for one at the expense of the other takes over altogether.

My own professional career began near the start of the modern pastoral care movement. In the early days we were regarded as radical. The seminaries and denominations gave us little attention or help. By the 1960’s, however, this movement had won respectability so thoroughly that it is sometimes regarded by the current crop of social action leaders as simply part of the Establishment.

Ever since the beginning of the social gospel movement early in this century, the churches have been seriously engaged in social action. But it seems probable that the pace of this was slowed down for a number of years by some of the so-called neo-orthodox trends in theology. The 1960’s have certainly witnessed more fighting activity on the part of churches and ministers.

What I seem now to detect, most noticeably on seminary campuses, is a new, largely unconscious, and rather dangerous notion about what is masculine and virile and worthy in ministry — as against what is held to be feminine, weak, hand-holding, playing into the status quo. The ultimate question I have been asked is, "What do you want us to do, hold old ladies’ hands?" And my answer is, of course, "Under some conditions, that is an essential part of the ministry; and besides, old ladies are safer than young ones."

Since the exercise of ministry involves both caring and fighting, according to the situation, the minister who is acutely uncomfortable with either will have a tough time of it. Perhaps each of us tends to lean a bit toward one side or the other; but we can shore up our weak side. The damage comes only when one or the other is renounced.

Theology for Ministry?

It has been charged that finding a viable theology for ministry has become a virtually impossible task. Most pulpit theology, it is held, has never even caught up to neo-orthodoxy, is suspicious alike of John A. T. Robinson’s Honest to God and Joseph Fletcher’s Situation Ethics, and simply says a flat No to the recent radical theologies without understanding the problem they are trying, however ineffectively, to solve.

On the other side, the charge is made by many ministers that today’s theologians are giving them little help. They tend to write and speak to one another rather than to ministers and church members, it is contended. Even though the issues with which they are dealing are no doubt important, why, it is asked, can they not put their thoughts so as to provide theological help for the minister?

I suspect there is some real truth in both charges. Ever since the frontier began moving westward in this country, there has been a lot of anti-intellectualism in the ministry. And it is clear that in recent years professional theologians (mostly professors) have become far more of a guild than ever before. These are long-term trends that shall require increasing attention and some appropriate correction.

In my judgment, however, it is much more possible for a minister today to find and build a theology for ministry than it has been at any time in my professional career. What has happened is that many of the old taboos or caveats, often unspoken, have either disappeared or been sharply reduced in force. Thus, the minister is freer than he has ever been to build and use a theology that truly makes sense to him. Perhaps the difference is that today he is obligated to work this out himself no matter how many aids he uses. He cannot now merely rely on something given and objective as wholly constituting his theology, as if the Bible or the creeds or the prayer book or Karl Barth or Paul Tillich or Martin Luther were all the theology he needed.

In a way, then, the theological crisis of the ministry is methodological in character. Authorities are still needed; but the authority question is no longer a simple matter of which one. Whatever the authority or authorities looked to, they are insufficient in building a full theology for ministry. One’s own part in the task, with all the risks entailed, is now inescapable. This kind of ferment is long overdue. And if we do not move toward iconoclastic radicalism on the one side, or retreat to positive-thinking theology on the other, the interim period will have been worth it.

From Ferment to Function

With the completion of this chapter, and except for side discussions here and there, this book is finished with the prevailing negative charges against the ministry. In speaking to them in such brief compass, I am sure I shall not have answered all the questions of all readers about them. None of the charges, I have tried to suggest, is without foundation. Yet any of them, pushed beyond a certain point, tends to falsify the situation of the ministry today.

I like the metaphor of "fermentation" for the situation of the ministry today. It has been and still is in a stage of agitation. But if we can arrest this particular vat in time, we can get from it an excellent product. The fact that new vats, as always, will soon be needed does not make less important the fact that we had best soon turn this one off.

Forward

Beginning about ten years ago and lasting through the present, we have had a new kind and volume of criticism of the ministry and the situation in which it finds itself today. Even on a second look, none of these books and articles is without validity and merit. It was charged that the ministry had been softened, that ministers were breaking down, that ministers were getting out, that the job description was impossible, that the ministry was a slave of the Establishment, and so on.

These critiques began in the Eisenhower era, and reached their peak in the brief Kennedy period. Under both of these regimes things seemed secure. Pejorative criticism, even if it carried traces of positivisitic Philistinism, could still regard itself as having constructive intent — because, overall, all seemed well. In good times, prophecy about the stench may very well regard itself as constructive.

All this was, however, before our serious involvement in Vietnam, before the race riots in our cities, before the two Kennedy and one King assassinations, and before the incredible fact of the nation’s increasing wealth and yet the horrible poverty of many of our citizens had become clear to the public.

This is neither a political nor an economic book, and I have no solutions to suggest for either the nation’s wealth or its poverty. But I hope I do have something to say about priests and ministers as we work in this complex situation. We have been going through a period of "failure of nerve," to use the phrase applied originally by Gilbert Murray to Hellenistic civilization. We have become conditioned to listen, Pavlov-fashion, to every conceivable critique of the ministry (and of course of the church as well). Unlike the men who handle jets on our airports, we have had no earplugs that could enable us to separate the sheer noise and push from the genuine problems. Consequently, we have become inclined to listen to the worst we could hear; and, while never taking it wholly, we regard it as a mark of Christian repentance to meditate on the charges as a theological work of merit. Most of us have got on with our jobs of ministry, but with a kind of unexamined uneasiness that does neither God, the church, the world, nor ourselves any good.

For myself, I am through with this well-intentioned but misdirected kind of oblique repentance. Whatever its faults, the ministry in virtually all our churches is more able, better educated, more sensitive to the actual situations of need, and better informed about its tradition, than ever before. It is also, as I shall analyze in the first chapter of this book, in "ferment." But ferment is a stage in the process of wine-making which, while full of agitation and bubbles, comes out at a constructive point if it is not taken as a finality.

I believe I am offering some kind of solution to this failure of nerve in the ministry. My thesis is that the ministry is a unity, a complex unity to be sure, but a unity nevertheless. A complex unity implies some ambiguity, at least temporarily. Therefore, the practical solution to the present failure of nerve comes with a better understanding of the complex unity of the ministry, and capacity to confront the ambiguity of the complexity without losing sight of the unity. I shall argue this thesis during most of the book through cartoon-like images of the actual functions of ministry, attempting to demonstrate that, although details of function differ, they are attitudinally coherent and integrated.

There are new forms and settings of ministry, and new challenges. I trust that my discussion will give them due attention. But to whatever group of general or particular need, and in whatever setting, and no matter who pays the bill, the ministry is finally a general (or "monoepiscopal," to use the scholar’s phrase) leadership of any Christian community that is trying to do something significant. New forms of ministry are peculiarly needed in our own day. But if their practitioners have to denigrate all other forms of ministry in order to defend their own, then there is a psychological screw loose somewhere.

This book has been in preparation for almost ten years. In 1958, when I was at the Chicago Theological Seminary and the Federated Theological Faculty of the University of Chicago, the director of the mid-winter conference for ministers twitted me into discussing the ministry today. Thus began the notes from which this discussion evolved. My next excursion into the material was at the summer ministers’ conference at Union Theological Seminary in New York in 1960. Then at Brite Divinity School of Texas Christian University in 1961, and at the annual conference of the United Church of Canada on evangelism in 1962. Through these "tryouts" I had only notes.

My first on-paper chapters were for the Cole Lectures at Vanderbilt University in 1964, where four of the chapters were presented in substantially their present form. All the remaining chapters were written in 1967 and 1968, and none of them has been presented in lecture form. I am indebted to my doctoral seminar at Princeton Theological Seminary during the past year for helpful criticisms on the discipline chapter.

In writing a psychological analysis of the contemporary ministry during the past year for the Temporary Commission on Continuing Education of the United Presbyterian Church, which will make its report to the General Assembly in May of 1969, 1 drew upon the work I had done for this book, but there are no identities of text. In lecturing this past spring at Christian Theological Seminary in Indianapolis, I also drew upon these materials, but also with no identity of text.

My fundamental presentation of a theory of the ministry was made in my book Preface to Pastoral Theology (1958). There the theoretical apparatus and reasons for it are obtrusive. In the present volume I am rather more like a pamphleteer. I think the ministry is in much better shape than most of its critics allege. I am trying, although hopefully with some objectivity, to argue this thesis throughout. Hence I have even dispensed with references because I want nothing at all to interfere with my deeply felt conviction that the ministry can make it with a bit of understanding here and there. As any reader of my previous books knows, I must be worked up to dispense with references.

Because of the piecemeal way in which this book has been put together, I have never had a whole copy I could lend to anybody; hence I cannot thank anyone for reading the whole thing except the readers of the book itself. But I do want to thank, and warmly, the folks at Vanderbilt, Brite, Union, Chicago, Toronto, and Indianapolis for their responses to the aspects of this material that they heard.

I want, finally, to put in a word of appreciation to my Princeton colleague W. J. Beeners, the sole Princeton faculty member who is a better carpenter than I am. When I discovered that, with all its projections into the technological future of civilization, the great IBM Corporation did not make a case that would enable me to take my typewriter to Maine to finish this book, I appealed to Professor Beeners. Between us, we are ahead of IBM; for the typewriter has both gone and returned in perfect safety.

SEWARD HILTNER

Epilogue

Since the impetus for process theism has primarily come from the philosophies of Whitehead and Hartshorne, it is not surprising that most process theology heretofore has been largely preoccupied with the problems and questions they have left us. It is time, however, we fleshed out the thinness of these philosophical abstractions with the concreteness of the biblical witness to God’s interaction with Israel and with the church. For process theism recognizes both the necessary and the contingent aspects of God. Philosophy properly and adequately analyzes God’s necessary aspects, but cannot tell us what his contingent aspects are, other than the bare assertion that there are such contingent aspects, features of God’s activity which happen to be so but just as well could have been otherwise. The Bible’s insistence upon historical and geographical particularity (e.g., Abraham, Israel, Zion), often an embarrassment to theological universality, has marked it out as the primary source for man’s witness to the involvement of God in history. The radical contingency of this involvement, known to us through the Scriptures, thus precisely complements the abstract conceptuality process theism offers, while this conceptuality in turn illumines the way in which we today can appropriate this rich heritage.

If this common history of God and man is truly contingent, then man’s free response is an essential element in the story. This in turn undercuts the traditional assumption that God controls the future (or at least knows it in detail), and has everything already planned out (chapter 2). God’s power is persuasive, not controlling. His is the power of the future operative in the present, providing those possibilities which, if fully actualized in our creaturely response, will bring about the achievement of the good. This is the power of divine lure, expressed in the vision of the future reigning of God (chapter 3).

This divine persuasion reached a critical point of intensity in the event of Jesus, where through his life, death, and resurrection a new level in the creation of the world was achieved, the transhuman reality of the living body of Christ (chapter 5). "Christ" for us is not simply identical with the Logos, the second member of the Trinity, which is the totality of the rational features of God available for (partial) actualization in the world. Christ is that divine Word effectively addressed to the human condition. Since our existence and condition are radically contingent, so is that divine address, which can only be discovered through revelation (chapter 4). That contingent divine address may be variously understood, but we have interpreted it in terms of the emergent body of Christ.

In speaking of Jesus’ resurrection in terms of the body of Christ, we mean to steer a middle course between two opposite extremes. On the one hand, we wish to challenge the implicit individualism inherent in the traditional understanding of the Risen Christ as a separate individual existing apart from his Christian followers, either in some resuscitated form during those forty days Luke speaks of (Acts 1:3) or as assimilated within the Godhead. On the other hand, we do not wish to be misunderstood as claiming that the Risen Christ is merely the collective spirit of the church, as if it were just the dynamism achieved through the merging of many humans in a common task. The analogy of a living animal organism might be helpful here. The collective spirit of the church would be like the common life of the body, which is simply the merging of the vitalities of the individual cells. It could perhaps be enough to explain the activity of the body, were it only sleeping. But when it is awake and alert, any animal body is coordinated in its activity by its mind. To be sure, this mind may not exist apart from its body, but neither can the body fully act as an alert living organism apart from the mind. The Risen Christ is just such a mind for his body. And just as the higher forms of mind enjoy consciousness, we should expect that the mind of this transhuman reality enjoys an even more intense form of consciousness of its own, distinct from temporal humans. It is also distinct from God’s consciousness, for there was a time, namely, at the resurrection, when this consciousness came to be.

Jesus’ death bears ultimate significance for us because of the resurrection. Without that stamp of divine approval, his death would have been another of the deaths of the martyrs. But the death of God’s chosen One reveals the depths of anguish and suffering of God at the hands of creaturely evil, for he has pledged to accept the unacceptable, even at such cost. The cross also marks the defeat of God, momentarily stymied from effecting his purposes, but the resurrection shows that God is able to triumph over such defeat (chapter 6). This, as we have just seen in the preceding chapter, is our ultimate basis for hope in the future course of the world under God.

The Christian community’s concern for the role of Christ within a strictly monotheistic economy gave rise to the traditional problem of the Trinity. Since we conceive of the Risen Christ with his body as a level of reality distinct from both God and man, our solution is closer to Paul’s original subordinationism (God-Christ-Spirit) than to the eventual coordinationism (Father-Son-Spirit) adopted at Nicaea. Yet the doctrine of the Trinity also expresses some speculative insights most congenial to Christian philosophy which process theism can appropriate (chapter 7). The classical description of the Father begetting the Son before all worlds can also describe the way in which God, in the Whiteheadian conceptuality, creates himself by envisaging all the pure forms as constituting the metaphysical order God and the world exemplify. Moreover, the Logos (=Son) and the Spirit are closely correlated with the two natures of God whereby he exemplifies that order, the primordial and the consequent natures.

Besides all this, the specific relation between the Father and the Logos is most important in safeguarding two truths, often obscured in theology’s ongoing dialogue with philosophy:

(1) God does not simply transcend all rational structures whatsoever, but stands revealed in the Logos. This insures that philosophical analysis of the nature of God is both possible and proper. As we have seen, such knowledge is not sufficient for it cannot speak effectively to our human contingent condition, but this does not mean that in its own sphere it is not necessary and valid.

This stricture is often honored in its breach, as in mysticism, Neoplatonism, the negative theology of the early Greek fathers, or in the contemporary insistence by Tillich that the divine being-itself is beyond all beings. All such formulations implicitly elevate God the Father (or the underlying divine substance) to a higher ultimacy than the other members of the Trinity, and then treat this element as really God. If the Trinity is not to be understood tritheistically, the generation of the Logos from the Father is God’s self-expression, whereby God’s nature is articulated in ways at least partially accessible to discursive reason.

(2) On the other hand, God is not subject to some uncreated metaphysical structure. There is no ultimate pattern of being, independently discoverable by reason, to which he must conform. Such a thesis was carried to its extreme by Leibniz, who argued that God must choose the best of the compossible worlds. These compossibilities could be ranked quite independently of God’s choosing, and he had only to call the one ranked best into being. In contrast, Whitehead asserts that God both "exemplifies and establishes the categoreal conditions." 1 He is their ultimate source. They receive their value for his valuing, not vice versa.

This is very much in accord with the ancient Hebrew understanding of God’s name: "I am who I am" (Ex. 3:14). Thomas Aquinas took this to mean that God is pure being, being-itself, but that interpretation ignores the role of the reiterated first person singular. This phrase, combining an open-ended imperfect verb (in either the active or causative mood) with a highly indefinite relative pronoun, can be interpreted in a great many different ways. I regard as basic the proclamation of sovereign freedom: "I will be what I will be," fashioned analogously to the words: ‘‘I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy" (Ex. 33:19).

According to this reading it is all too easy to conclude that the original Hebraic understanding claimed God was radically without any nature, radically free to constitute himself anew in any moment. Such an existentialist interpretation violates our first stricture that God stands revealed in the rational structure of the Logos. It also ignores the counterbalancing factor present in the ancient Hebraic view, namely, that this sovereign Lord freely enters into covenants with men, with Noah, with Abraham, and with the whole house of Israel assembled at Sinai. Also, this Lord is faithful to his promises. In this historical and political context, the promises of God provide that sort of ultimate stability later sought in metaphysics.

In a human life this combination of freedom and faithfulness is praiseworthy for the integrity it achieves. Human integrity should be judged by two criteria: (1) the steadfastness of character it expresses, and (2) the values chosen as the basis for that integrity, for they must be sufficiently inclusive in order to serve as a satisfactory guide for the resolution of all particular crises. Such integrity can only be manifested in a temporal series of free decisions because we never confront the totality of those situations comprising our lives all at once. We choose our values hopefully, tentatively, awaiting future developments to see whether we can afford to reaffirm them. A complete restructuring of values, such as the "radical conversion" Sartre envisions, is always possible, for we may well discover that the values we have lived by are inadequate as guides for handling present crises. In that case Sartre’s strictures against inauthenticity are quite pertinent. It will not do to reaffirm the old values mechanically, despite present need. We must then have the courage to tear down and reshape our structure of values. A deeper integrity might thereby arise, since we may find ourselves embodying richer and more inclusive values. Nevertheless a break has occurred. The original integrity has been judged and found wanting. Human integrity cannot thus be an inherent quality, given at the outset, but an achievement only tentatively and gradually achieved. We can never know how well it is achieved until we can review a man’s total life.

The biblical drama is the biography of God, whereby the integrity of his values are gradually made manifest in the vicissitudes of the concrete situations of Israel, Jesus, and the church. These values in all of their complex richness cannot be simply given at the outset; they must be temporally emergent as layer upon layer is added to the account of God’s dealings with man. The concrete character of each situation needs to be explored.

Nevertheless there is a profound difference between divine and human Integrity. In addition, to confront each situation immediately at hand, and to bring it to a definite conclusion, God has the task of ordering all conceivable possibilities. This cosmic ordering cannot be simply temporal, for in that case we face two equally unacceptable alternatives: (1) Suppose God changes his ordering from time to time, according to which possibilities are judged to be better or worse. Then what was better now becomes worse, and vice versa. Given God’s first ordering, no other ordering can be justified. Or, given some later ordering, no earlier one can be justified. With different orderings values would become totally arbitrary, relative not merely to changing circumstance or cultural milieu, or to different individuals, but also to the passing whims of a cosmic ruler. (2) Suppose, to avoid these evils, we conceive God’s first temporal decision to be perfect and complete. It could not be tentative and incomplete, for then it would be subject to the uncertainty that it might prove to be inadequate in some later situation. This would pack all of God’s decision-making back into some first temporal moment, a very problematic notion in itself. Then all God’s decisions from that moment on would merely be mechanical reaffirmations of that original choice.

What is needed is an openness and tentativeness allowing for the ongoing exercise of divine freedom coupled with an underlying integrity which cannot possibly be threatened by whatever happens. This we find in Whitehead’s conception of the primordial envisagement of all pure possibilities. This one, ultimate decision is basically nontemporal, whereby all the possibilities are ordered, and God determines himself to be the sort of God he is. It is thereby God’s act of self-creation. Or, to express it in classical terms, it is the way the Father (=the originating power) generates the Son (=the Logos, the order of all possibility) "before all worlds" (=nontemporally). This basically nontemporal ordering is then temporally emergent in God’s interaction with the world. It is never fully given in any temporal moment.

Thus while the nature of God is ultimately derived from a divine decision, it is not a merely temporal decision. This then qualifies the thrust of that declaration, "I will be what I will be.’’ While God may respond differently to differing circumstances, there is an underlying consistency of character and value that is open to philosophical examination. While process theism welcomes expressions of God’s dynamic activity, I for one am hesitant ever to endorse any change in God’s values not dictated by a change in the objective situation. Yet God is portrayed as not having determined the wickedness of Sodom and Gomorrah prior to his consultation with Abraham (Gen. 18:21), and Moses successfully averts God’s original intention to destroy the Israelites, although Israel’s idolatry with the golden calf remains just what it was before Moses’ intercession (Ex. 32:7 -14).2

The biblical writers have not been particularly sensitive to the demand for an underlying consistency of character among the differing portrayals of God. Various scholars have noticed and emphasized the resulting incompatibilities. John L. McKenzie has written:

We simply do not believe in the Great Warrior who exterminated the Canaanites. Some who shared our faith did. They also professed belief in Jesus Christ the Son of God who said that he who would save his life must lose it, and who implied that a good way to lose it quickly is to love those who hate you and pray for those who persecute you. How does one speak of a god who exhibits both these features? Lam compelled to say simply he does not exist, and that those who professed this monstrous faith worshipped an idol.3

These logical inconsistencies, which so trouble us today because of the implicit way in which we have accepted the perspective of Greek rationality, did not concern the biblical thinkers. Even after we have been admonished to love our enemies and to "be perfect, as your heavenly Father is perfect" (Matt. 5:44, 48), Paul can quote with approval the divine decision: "Jacob I loved, but Esau I hated" (Rom. 9:13, quoting from Mal. 1:2-3). It is a logical contradiction for God to love all men, including his enemies, and yet also hate Esau, but this does not seem to bother Paul at all. For there is an inconsistency only if we introduce the philosopher’s assumption that God has an unchanging nature, such that the way we now experience divine activity must also characterize God’s activity in the past. Paul’s understanding of God, however, was primarily historical. He apprehended God in terms of his present activity, as presently under- stood, but also accepted without challenge the authoritative witness to divine activity in the past. In appealing to this rejection of Esau, Paul was not arguing that the chosenness of Jacob must require the rejection of Esau, let alone trying to justify any hatred for the Edomites. He was simply trying to justify his present understanding of God, involving as it did notions of election and predestination, and for this purpose the authoritative word of the tradition was sufficient. He does not inquire whether the interpretive patterns employed by the historical witness were the same as his own, or even compatible with them. This is a modern preoccupation, growing out of our concern with universality.

It may be precisely this lack of concern for temporal consistency which makes it possible for biblical literature to give us such a rich account of the activity of God. It allows for the accumulation of many different perspectives, each roughly consistent within itself but not necessarily with the others. Had a strict demand for consistency among these various perspectives been present, no new understanding of God could have emerged without a repudiation of the old. Given the conservative nature of religious practice, it is more than likely that the old view would have won out every time, stifling all new creative imagination. The genius of the Hebrew imagination was that it was able to accept and affirm the witness to God’s former acts, even as understood from an older perspective, while at the same time proclaiming what God was about to do as grasped from a newer standpoint. Moreover, it was precisely the acceptance of the old which provided a rich matrix for present creative imagination to reach new levels of insight. This combination of the old and the new was experienced as a living reality, for God, having graciously acted on behalf of Israel, was now prepared to do a new thing.

The danger of a premature demand for consistency may be seen in the Greek experience. Here heightened moral sensitivity was not handled historically, but became part of philosophy’s general criticism of its inherited myth. The notion that it is most appropriate for the divine to be unchanging enters the philosophical tradition very early. If Aristotle’s report carries over the words of Anaximander (and not merely some later inference), Anaximander, himself already so conceived his basic principle, the apeiron (the indefinite): "And this, they say, is the divine. For it is immortal and indestructible, as Anaximander and most of the natural philosophers maintain."4 At any rate, Xenophanes emphatically claims that God:

. . .ever abides

In the selfsame place without moving; nor is it fitting For him to move hither and thither, changing his place.5

The result of this conception of the divine was devastating. With one blow the Olympian gods were consigned to oblivion. How could there be strife or any sort of interaction among the gods if only the unchanging could really be perfect? Xenophanes seems to have had a fierce belief in his one divine being, but it seems to have been too vague to capture the imagination of his compatriots. They were only too aware of the incisiveness of his critique against the Homeric deities, and in fact the Greeks gradually lost faith in these gods during the ensuing century. Greek philosophy sought to conceive some underlying divinity which Zeus, Hermes, Aphrodite, and the rest all participated in, but in the process lost the personality of God, and with it all popular allegiance. Faced with the many gods of antiquity, the biblical tradition took an approach that was wiser.- It did not initially insist upon their nonexistence. The injunction was clear and practical: "Thou shalt have no other gods before me." This is primarily a vow of fidelity, with no necessary theoretical implications. If in marriage a man and woman take each other, forswearing all others, this by no means implies they are the only ones in existence. Yet the eventual outcome of the biblical experience, initially elevating one God above all competing powers, was the discovery that these gods were no gods at all. Thus monotheism can grow out of an earlier henotheism, with apparently little awareness of the diverse theological views of the differing historical layers.

In the course of many centuries the biblical record has left us with an impressive compendium of historical testimony to God’s dealings with Israel, expressed in terms of a wide variety of diverse and often conflicting perspectives, which so perplexed the Greek mind as it tried to come to terms with the foundations of Christian theology. No wonder it so often sought refuge in allegory! Many biblical theologians are suspicious of the use the church has made of philosophy in understanding this heritage, yet even they accept the demand for philosophical consistency. And it is precisely this demand which shatters the thought-world of the biblical writers themselves. For now it becomes no longer possible to incorporate other perspectives within one’s own simply because they authoritatively witness to God’s past actions. We must now show how the total range of testimony can be accommodated, more or less, within a single, consistent perspective. This requirement brings us to philosophy, for it is the one discipline best suited for the construction of such all-embracing concepts.

History has served the cause of God well. In no other culture or span of time has man’s understanding of God’s ways progressed so much as in ancient Israel. At the time of the Judges, Yahweh was conceived as simply one of the various tribal deities, along with Molech of Moab and Chemosh of Ammon (see Judg. 11:24), yet barely six centuries later Second Isaiah can proclaim with monotheistic fervor the glories of the Lord as creator of the world and redeemer of Israel. Nothing in the history of Christian doctrine since the New Testament, certainly not since Nicaea, can rival this for growth in increased sensitivity. In the light of this it is very tempting to want to continue to exploit the paradigm of historical interpretation for our understanding of God today. Unfortunately it is a paradigm that has outlived its usefulness, for at least two reasons:

(1) The book of Job now stands in its way as a massive roadblock. The righteous are not always rewarded, nor the wicked punished. This observation was already causing concern to the thoughtful during the last years of Judah’s monarchy. According to the historian of Kings, Manasseh was one of the worst kings to sit on the throne of Judah, and Josiah one of the very best. Yet Manasseh has a long and peaceful reign of some fifty-five years, and Josiah is cut down in battle before he was yet forty, despite Huldah’s word from the Lord that he would die in peace (2 Kings 22:20; cf. 23:29). Jeremiah and Habakkuk questioned the justice of God, as did many of those exiled in Babylon. Why should they be required to pay for the sins of their forefathers, particularly in the light of the emerging realization that each man should be answerable for his own sins? (Jer. 31:27-30; Ezek. 18:1-4). The author of the book of Job faced this question squarely,6 and resolved it as best he could dramatically, but no resolution is really possible, given the presuppositions of the time.

It is a commonplace to observe that Job undercuts the easy assumptions of the wisdom school or of the Deuteronomic historian. It is not equally realized that it undercuts the basis for the whole prophetic interpretation of history. Amos and Hosea could threaten doom upon Israel in the confidence that this was God’s just punishment for its sin. If in fact there is no correlation between conduct and consequence, the nerve of this sort of interpretation of history is severed.

We seek to understand God as purely persuasive. But what if this persuasion proves ineffective, because the people are recalcitrant? The king can compel obedience by punishing the rebellious, and this same model was transferred to God. But, as we have seen, any such coercive measures depend upon creaturely agencies partially beyond God’s control. The gap between the ‘‘ought’’ and the "is’’ applies equally well to any theory of rewards and punishments. Measures which, if directly controlled by God, should be interpreted as instances of God’s wrath may not have been so intended. Thus it is possible that Huldah’s prophecy concerning Josiah properly reflected the aims of God, in this case frustrated by Pharaoh Necho and the king’s own miscalculation as to the probable consequences of that confrontation between Egypt and Israel.

According to the law of the prophet, if the word spoken in the name of the Lord does not come to pass, then the prophet has spoken falsely (Deut. 18:22). But that law presupposes that God directly controls man’s destiny, to insure that his threats or promises would be carried Out. Yet, even at the time, Israel understood prophecy as the open-ended proclamation of divine intent, modifiable in terms of its response. This is the point of the story of Jonah, and Jeremiah had a lively sense of its truth (see, e.g., Jer. 26:3, or 18:1-11). The non-fulfillment of Micah’s prophecy against the temple was understood in Jeremiah’s time as the result of Hezekiah’s repentance (Jer. 26:16-19). Perhaps we should evaluate the truth or falsity of prophecy in terms of whether it correctly reflects God’s intentions in that particular situation, not how it was in fact carried out. In that case Jeremiah’s prediction of a bad end for Jehoiakim (Jer. 22:19; 36:30-31), while it was apparently never fulfilled, nevertheless remains authentic prophetic declaration. As I read them, both Isaiah and Micah fully expected the destruction of Jerusalem and Judah at the hands of Sennacherib,7 and by their lights this is what ought to have happened. This may be truer prophecy than the later legendary accretions in which Isaiah predicts the Lord’s miraculous deliverance of the city of Jerusalem from the Assyrian siege (Isa. 36-37), even though that reinterpretation of the prophet’s role may have saved the book of Isaiah for the canon.

Most of the prophetic writings we now have are clustered around three major crises in Israel’s history: (1) the fall of Samaria in 722 BC., (2) the invasion by Sennacherib in 701 BC., and (3) the fall of Jerusalem in 586 BC. In the case of the first and third instances, these events could be truly interpreted as the execution of God’s wrath. Thus the prophetic declaration of divine intent based on what ought to be the case could coincide with fulfilled prediction. If in hindsight Israel collected only those prophecies which could be understood as properly fulfilled prediction, in accordance with the Deuteronomic law of the prophet, there is no way of determining how many other "true" prophets there may have been, ‘‘true’’ in the sense that they accurately proclaimed the character of God’s intent.

(2) The prophetic interpretation of history was plausible when only Israel and its Lord were the protagonists, and the other nations were simply onlookers or instrumentalities of God’s will. When the horizon is widened to embrace all the nations, God’s will has to be reconceived from their standpoint as well. In the Exodus traditions the Israelites could enjoy a good fight with Egypt, since this conflict was regarded as simply the means whereby God redeemed them out of the house of bondage. But what is God’s purpose vis-à-vis the Egyptians? The status of God’s instrumentalities becomes even more enigmatic, because it is only the arrogance, greed, and aggressiveness of the Assyrians and the Babylonians which make them unconscious tools for God’s punishment. Habakkuk protests: "Why dost thou look on faithless men, and art silent when the wicked swallows up the man more righteous then he?" (1:13). Jeremiah can only proclaim God’s judgment against all the nations at the hands of Babylon, and then Babylon is to be judged in turn (25:8-14).

Thus in the end, the apocalyptic writers who use the horizon of universal history have recourse to angelic instrumentalities of God’s will. Angels can directly and unambiguously accomplish the divine purpose, for in theory they lack the creaturely freedom that so distorts the course of history. Yet, in doing so, the presupposition underlying divine persuasion is destroyed.

If Whitehead is right that "God’s purpose in the creative advance is the evocation of intensities"8 for each creature or group as it arises, and that history must be conceived "as the theatre of diverse groups of idealists respectively urging ideals incompatible for conjoint realization," 9 then perhaps we should see God as encouraging each to pursue the good it envisages, despite the conflict this may entail. (To be sure, compromise and the harmonization of interests may well be among the goods the parties are also enjoined to pursue.) The complexity and diversity of interests and values represented in universal history, coupled with the radical uncertainty about any connection between performance and deserts, make it impossible today to discern God’s providential hand in it with the confidence of Israel’s prophets.

The prophetic corpus of the Old Testament oversimplifies history in two directions. It sees a direct correlation between conduct and consequence, and it concentrates its attention narrowly on Israel. It cannot do justice to the complexities of universal history. Yet this was a most important oversimplification, for it made possible for the Jews to accept their fate as the just punishment of God, and to accept the Torah as the book by which they would live. Without that credibility of the prophetic oversimplification, the exiled Jews might have lost their identity as the people of God. Israel might have vanished before the Christ of Israel could appear.

If for no other reason, the universality of the Christian proclamation of salvation for all requires that the particularity of historical categories be replaced by the universality of philosophical concepts. But it is important that there be no premature abandonment of history’s nurturing role, as the fate of Greek religious sensibility indicates. Had the question of a monarchy in Israel been addressed in the absolutistic terms of political philosophy, the result could very well have been disastrous. On the one hand, if the Israelite monarchy were seen as essential, then the whole foundation of Israel would have collapsed when Jerusalem was taken by Nebuchadnezzar. On the other hand, if the monarchy were understood as inimical to true theism, Israel at the time of Samuel and Saul might have succumbed to the Philistines. Without a royal theology, it is difficult to • Imagine how the anticipation of a future king could have arisen. Jesus’ own role, at least in the eyes of his disciples and the later church, would have had less justification without this rich matrix of messianic expectation.

History provides the proper way into theology, but philosophy is the critic of the consistency of its perspectives. Theology today must be articulated by means of philosophical concepts, and these should be evaluated according to purely philosophical criteria of consistency, coherence, adequacy, and applicability. Yet if these concepts are to be adequate and applicable to all experience, this experience must also include the experience of biblical man. While philosophy may judge the consistency of his interpretive standpoints, it cannot gainsay his witness to the contingencies of divine action.

Process theism is the natural ally of biblical history, for process is history abstractly conceived. Process theism can provide the contemporary conceptuality by which we can appropriate this ancient literature, while the biblical tradition can provide those concrete particularities whereby our lives are given final meaning.



NOTES

1. PR, p. 522.

2. For an incisive analysis of this last incident, see George W. Coats, ‘‘The King’s Loyal Opposition: Obedience and Authority in Exodus 32-34," pp. 91-109 in Canon and Authority. Essays in Old Testament and Theology, ed. George W. Coats and Burke O. Long (Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977).

3. John L. McKenzie, "Biblical Anthropomorphism and the Humaneness of God," p. 182 in Religion and the Humanizing of Man, ed. James M. Robinson (Waterloo Ontario: Council on the Study of Religion, 1972).

4. Aristotle, Physics iii. 4, about 203b12. See Werner Jaeger’s discussion of this passage in The Theology of he Early Greek Philosophers (New York: Oxford University Press, 1947), p. 25.

5. Xenophanes B26, in Herman Diels, DieFragmente der Vorsokratiker, ed. Walther Kranz, 5th ed. (Berlin: Weidmann, 1934-35).

6. I take Job 3-42:6 to be an exilic composition inserted in a traditional folktale which now frames the encounter of Job with his three friends and with God.

7. For Isaiah, Isa. 29:1-4 is the key passage. I take verses 5-8 to be a later reinterpretation by another hand, based upon the ambiguity of the preposition in v. 3, which can be interpreted either as "against" or as "upon."

S. PR, p. 161.

9. Al, p. 356-57.

Chapter 8: The Sources of Christian Hope

Pierre Teilhard de Chardin has been perhaps the most eloquent apostle of Christian hope in recent years, discerning in the evolutionary process an increasing convergence and complexification that will finally result in the Omega point, the consummation and terminus of history foreshadowed in Jesus as the Christ. Yet how can we be certain that this final convergence will yield the full personalization of man instead of his collectivization or destruction? Does God guarantee a final victory? Can we have the confidence that God will finally bring about the triumph of good, no matter how badly we fail him? If so, its coming is inevitable, and we need not strive to bring it about. Then the risks of this world lose their seriousness, for there is no ultimate risk. If the good triumphs no matter what, the sufferings that God allows us to endure on the way lose their meaning because he could have accomplished his purposes without them.

But what if, on the other hand, there is no final triumph of good, and we simply face the bleak prospect of more of the same? It is all too easy to dismiss Teilhard as a facile optimist, without penetrating to the root of his desperate vision. Teilhard was deeply sensitive to the growing hopelessness of modern man. Without the assurance of tomorrow, can we go on living? Hope releases the energies of man, and the lure of a better future is the only reason for any striving. Individual, particular, proximate hopes, however, must be situated within an horizon of ultimate hope. For all the hopes and strivings of man are unmasked as utter vanity if the final end of the universe is simply a wasting away into nothingness.

The logic of the situation seems inexorable: without hope, we are lost and still in our sins. This hope requires an ultimate horizon which must be both real and good, for otherwise our hope is based on an illusion. But an inevitable triumph of good undercuts the seriousness and risk of the human task, and gives the lie to its manifold sufferings.

Here metaphysics fails us. Any metaphysical necessity that might be adduced to give us confidence in our future would be too heavy-handed. We would simply be reduced to passive spectators before its inexorability. As Paul wrote, "Hope that is seen is not hope. For who hopes for what he sees?" (Rom. 8:24). That which we "see’’ by metaphysical insight should be included under this ban. Hope means trust in a future which is to be acted out in our deeds and efforts. Metaphysics may enable us to see whether this trust is reasonable, but it cannot be its basis.

Hence in this chapter we must leave metaphysical certainties and venture forth tentatively, sketching possible alternatives about which no final decisions can be made, exploring the bases of hope, first for ourselves, as grounded in the possible survival after death, and/or in the ongoing life of God, and then our hope for the future of the world.

In Whitehead’s philosophy the soul is a series of momentary events or actual occasions supported by the body (particularly the brain) and coordinating its activities. It is not an enduring substance and does not necessarily survive the death of the body, as most have interpreted Plato to teach. On the other hand, Whitehead’s metaphysics does not preclude such survival. "It is entirely neutral on the question of immortality, or on the existence of purely spiritual beings other than God." 1

Subsequent process theologians have been deeply divided on this point. Charles Hartshorne2 in The Logic of Perfection and Schubert Ogden3 in "The Meaning of Christian Hope" have forcefully argued against any subjective immortality, holding that as objectively experienced by God our lives are wholly preserved and cherished forever. Without denying this objective immortality, David Griffin has examined the possibility of subjective survival more positively,4 and John Cobb has speculated about the possible interpenetration of such souls in the hereafter in ways that overcome their possible self-centeredness.5 Marjorie Suchocki has also explored ways in which we may live on in God which are quite different from these conceptions of the immortality of the soul.6

I find disembodied survival questionable, simply because the soul is so dependent upon the body. The body is its means for sensing and perceiving. All of its action is expressed through the body it coordinates. Quite probably all of its memory, and other subconscious activities, are provided for the soul by subordinate living occasions within the brain. Bereft of all these capacities, the soul might still be able to exist, but in such an impoverished state that it hardly seems worthwhile.

The situation might be quite different if the ongoing life of God were to provide the support for these continuing occasions of the soul which it had been accustomed to receive from the body. Whitehead briefly speculated on this possibility:

How far this soul finds a support for its existence beyond the body is: -- another question. The everlasting nature of God, which in a sense is non-temporal and in another sense is temporal, may establish with the soul a peculiarly intense relationship of mutual immanence. Thus in some important sense the existence of the soul may be freed from its complete dependence upon the bodily organization.7

In that case God might mediate to the soul the memory of past experiences from his own experiences of those events, and possibly even his perception of present events. God could also mediate the free actions of such souls to one another, taking care to harmonize any potential conflicts by means of conceptual supplementation, thus overcoming any evil consequent upon the free actions of many actualities acting in concert. On earth these free actions are communicated directly to supervening occasions, creating the risk of conflict and evil. But this freedom may well be possible within the perfect harmony of heaven, if God can neutralize the potential outcomes before they are able to produce any conflict.8

But is such subjective immortality needed? There seem to be three factors which impel man to look for life beyond the grave: (1) the preservation of values achieved, (2) the redemption from evil and suffering, (3) and the non-acceptance of the extinction of the self. Let us consider each of these factors in turn.

The first is the most insistent. What is the point of it all if it all ends in nothing? Our achievements may live on in the memories of others, but this is a very fragmentary and transient immortality. Eventually they too shall perish, as well as all traces of our existence. It is only a matter of time. If we survive death, then what we have experienced and achieved will survive with us. But to what extent? Rilke suggests that such earthly experiences and achievements would be remembered like the discarded playthings of our childhood, if at all. If, however, God perfectly remembers all that has happened, or better, is still experiencing in his ongoing, everlasting present whatever is past to us, the values we now cherish will be better preserved in the divine experience than they would be in any subjective immortality we might enjoy. Our own personal immortality is not needed, if all our achieved values are objectively immortal as cherished within the divine everlasting experience.

The second reason, concerning redemption from evil, really has two aspects. On the one hand, we may ask whether the guilty can be received by God; on the other, whether there can be any recompense for the suffering of the innocent.

Some interpret the saying that God’s experience "is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved"9 as meaning that God only preserves that which is good, discarding the evil as incapable of such preservation. That interpretation ignores the very next sentence: ‘It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage."10 It also ignores the teaching of the apostle Paul, that we sinners are justified by grace, that we are accepted despite our unacceptability. If only the good that we do is received into God’s experience, then most of what we are would be forever lost. God experiences all that we are and do, even though much of that causes conflict, evil, and suffering, not only to others but also to God.

This is all possible within the divine experience because God has all the inexhaustible resources of conceptual possibility to heal the wounds inflicted by actuality. Here we may gain a dim impression of Whitehead’s point by recourse to works of the imagination. Art and poetry can transform the dull, ugly, irritating commonplaces of life into vibrant, meaningful realities by inserting them within fresh and unexpected contexts. The dramatic insight of a Sophocles can suffuse the grossly evil deeds of Oedipus the king with high tragedy by skillfully weaving these actions with choric commentary into an artful whole. These deeds would be horribly shocking to witness in actuality, yet in the drama this evil is transformed into tragic beauty. Likewise, the disciplined imagination of speculative reason can surmount the interminable conflicts between man and nature, mind and body, freedom and determinism, religion and science, by assigning each its rightful place within a larger systematic framework. The larger pattern, introduced conceptually, can bring harmony to discord by interrelating potentially disruptive elements in constructive ways. Since God’s conceptual feelings as derived from his primordial nature are infinite, he has all the necessary resources to supplement his physical feelings perfectly, thereby achieving a maximum of intensity and harmony from every situation.

We may object that imagination is not enough. Certainly it is not enough in our experience. Our limited imaginations are easily over-whelmed by the insistent persistence of determinate actuality. But such actuality is itself limited. Could it not in turn be overcome and transformed by an infinite, inexhaustible, divine imagination?

This is a redemption that God experiences, but do we experience it? We could, if there were an objective immortality of the consequent nature.11 Then it would be true that ‘‘the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience." 12 But God’s everlasting concrescence would have to be completed for it to pass back Into our world, and it is never complete. Whitehead never attempted to resolve this problem, and it is not clear that it could ever be solved.13

In the closing chapter of Adventures of Ideas, Whitehead discusses the final ideal requisite for the perfection of life, "Peace." It involves the tragic beauty that God creatively experiences in redeeming the world from evil, but it is not the direct experience of this redemption. Peace "is primarily a trust in the efficacy of Beauty." 14 We trust, without directly experiencing, this Beauty as that which ultimately makes it all worthwhile.

But is this enough? Coupled with the refusal to accept the extinction of the self is our frequent craving for the direct experience of compensation for any Innocent suffering we have endured; if not now, at least in some life to come. But is this not a sign of that "restless egotism" that Peace is designed to overcome?15

It might be thought a just precept that each one should suffer for his own sins. This runs counter to the whole of Christian experience, however, rooted in the image of the suffering servant of the Lord depicted in Isaiah 53 as suffering on behalf of the sins of others. It runs counter to the meaning of Jesus’ death as disclosing to us the depths of God’s solidarity with the world, that he suffers the pain and destruction caused by the evil we inflict. Even though God is able to transform this suffering into joy by Imaginatively suffusing its evil with tragic beauty, the fact remains that his initial experience of the world involves all the pain and loss that the conflict of its many actualities produces. God cannot ignore this conflict by blunting his perceptions, and he is acutely aware of the clash between what actually is and what might or ought to have been.

It might just be barely possible to insist upon this precept that each should suffer for the evil he inflicts, if the self endured to experience the result of its own actions and decisions. But within a Whiteheadian cosmology built upon momentary occasions, this is not possible. No occasion ever experiences the outcome of its own actions. What it experiences is bequeathed to it by others, for good or ill, and the results of its decision affect subsequent occasions, never itself. What we as momentary selves experience can never be that which we have done.

The quest for subjective immortality may simply be a disguised affirmation of the substantial, enduring self of traditional thought. Whitehead’s meditation upon Peace combats this tendency. It is the quest for a Harmony of Harmonies that can utterly transcend the limits of any self. "It results in a wider sweep of conscious interest. It enlarges the field of attention. Thus Peace is self-control at its widest -- at the width where the ‘self’ has been lost, and interest has been transferred to coordinations wider than personality." 16 If every self is thoroughly bound up with the past world it experiences, and the coming world it affects, so that it is constantly drawn out of itself to the other, this widening of concern beyond the self is most salutary. It cannot dwell exclusively on the intrinsic value it achieves for itself without introducing an arbitrary narrowness. Only by transferring its concern to "coordinations wider than personality" can the self affirm the values it is inextricably bound up with. Experience at its widest, its fullest, its deepest, its most adequate, is God’s. It is that to which our concern should be directed, not to some future state of our own selfhood.

This line of reasoning is put forth tentatively, for on these questions there can be no final dogmatism. Yet it should be emphasized that this argument does not merely seek to reconcile us with the secularity of contemporary experience which wishes to renounce all other-worldly concerns as distracting wishful thinking. It is governed by a religious concern asking whether subjective immortality is ultimately desirable in the eyes of God. If the prolongation of the self beyond the life of the body is ultimately restrictive, then we should lose it in order to find our lives merged within the life of God. Perhaps in this transfer of concern from our own life to God’s we may discover this final Peace.

Prescinding now from questions of immortality and the life of God, what hope can we reasonably have for the overcoming of evil in this finite, temporal world of everyday experience?

The first thing that must be said is that this future is most risky and uncertain. Classical theism, for all the difficulties it might have with present evil, can be serene in the confidence that someday God will wipe out all evil. After all, he is all-powerful, and needs only to assume full control of the world to make it conform to his will. Process theism, by relinquishing the claim that God could completely control the world in order to overcome the problem of present evil, cannot have this traditional assurance about the future. We are faced with an ineluctable dilemma: Either God has the power to overcome evil unilaterally, and he should have already, or he does not, and we have no guarantee that he will ever be able to. Process theism has chosen to embrace the second horn of this dilemma. God cannot guarantee that evil will be overcome simply because he is not the sole agent determining the outcome of the world. It is a joint enterprise involving a vast multiplicity of actualities responding to his cosmic purposes. Since all these actualities are free to respond as they will, it is conceivable that most may all elect to frustrate the divine aim. The world could possibly generate into near chaos. There can be no metaphysical guarantee against such a catastrophe.

On the other hand, there is a strong pragmatic ground for hoping in God, and that lies in the evolutionary advance of the world during the observable past (that is to say, during the past eighteen billion years or so). Up until now God seems to be able to elicit ever richer forms of complexity from the world, and there is all the reason to expect that he will be able to continue to do this in the future.

This hope, however, need not be especially comforting to the human race. Many, if not most, species have become extinct in the course of this evolutionary advance, and there is good reason to anticipate that this may be our fate as well. Then we would be defeated, though not God. The human experiment would have failed, but God could continue on his quest for more intensive forms of existence, if not on this planet, then elsewhere in the universe. Earlier in the history of mankind this danger of extinction was not so evident, but it threatens our generation on every side, particularly in terms of nuclear annihilation or ecological suicide.

In the face of these dangers, can we have any confidence in the power of God to sustain the human enterprise? Here I think we can find renewed meaning in the death and resurrection of Jesus as a profound symbol of hope. If our analysis of Jesus’ death is correct, this event signified a defeat for God by the forces of evil, so much so that God was not able to comfort Jesus in the hour of his deepest need on the cross. That experience of despair wrung from Jesus’ lips the cry, "My God, my God, why have you forsaken me?" The forces of evil conspired to defeat God, but he was able to triumph over evil in the end by raising up Jesus as the Christ. This resurrection of Christ can be the basis of our hope in God for a human future. The forces of evil could conceivably overwhelm God. Against that there is no metaphysical guarantee. But against such attacks God has hitherto emerged victorious, and what he has already done he can do again. Because we remember Christ’s resurrection we can reasonably put our trust and hope in God for our future.

Note that this hope based on the resurrection is quite different from the traditional hope in subjective immortality. Many, following Paul, have argued that if Christ be raised from the dead, we shall be also. The cogency of that argument depends wholly upon the first-century expectation of the general resurrection of the dead in terms of which Paul and the early Christians interpreted their experience of the risen Christ. That expectation also had to interpret Christ’s singular resurrection as a preliminary manifestation of the general resurrection very shortly to follow. This keenly anticipated event never took place. Hence we have used a very different framework of interpretation, that of evolutionary emergence, in order to interpret Paul’s experience of the risen Christ.

This interpretation of the risen Christ does not rest upon any concept of a disembodied soul. It is precisely because the risen Christ has a body constituted by his disciples that he can live and act. Our interpretation is entirely neutral on the question whether there can be any subjective immortality for us, since the resurrection of Jesus as Christ with his church was such a singular event, and did not necessarily require subjective immortality as generally understood. It is most unfortunate that the question of personal immortality became so inextricably bound up with the question of the resurrection of Christ, because as immortality has become questionable in our age, so has Christ’s resurrection. But the two issues stand on very different logical grounds. Whether there be subjective immortality or not is peripheral to the Christian faith. Insofar as resurrection is understood in terms of immortality, it is perhaps an optional belief for the Christian faith. But the resurrection of Christ as the emergence of the church is hardly optional. It is the heart of the New Testament proclamation and the basis for our life in Christ. It may well be also the grounds for our hope in the future of mankind.



NOTES:

1. RM, pp. 110-11

2. Charles Hartshorne, "Time, Death, and Everlasting Life," The Logic of Perfection (LaSalle, Ill.: Open Court, 1962), pp. 245-62.

3. Schubert Ogden, ‘The Meaning of Christian Hope," Union Seminary Quarterly Review 30 (1975), 153-64.

4. David Griffin, ‘‘The Possibility of Subjective Immortality in Whitehead’s Philosophy," The Mode,-,, School,~an 53/1 (November 1975), 39-57.

5. John Cobb, "What Is the Future? A Process Perspective," in Hope and the Future of Man, ed. Ewert H. Cousins (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1972), pp. 1-14.

6. Marjorie Suchocki, "The Question of Immortality," Journal of Religion 57/3 (July 1977), 288-306. See also our joint essay on ‘‘A Whiteheadian Reflection on Subjective Immortality" in Process Studies 7/1 (Spring 1977), 1-13, showing that the way God experiences through me (by means of the subjective form of my satisfaction) may be the same as my experiencing in God.

7. Al, p. 267.

8. The technical details of this proposal need to be worked out in terms of Whitehead’s principles. This may prove to be impossible, for they seem to require a direct objectification of God’s temporal experience which, unlike his nontemporal experience and the experience of actual occasions, never reaches the completion required for objectification.

9. PR, p. 525.

10. Ibid., italics added

11. Cf. Ibid., p.47.

12. Ibid., p. 532.

13. See A. H. Johnson’s report, ‘‘Whitehead as Teacher and Philosopher," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 29 (1968-69), 373.

14. Al, p. 367.

15. ibid.

16. Ibid., p. 368.

Chapter 7: A Process Trinitarianism

Trinitarian reflection has fallen on evil days. At one point in the history of the Christian faith it formed the cutting edge of theological speculation, responding to the need to clarify the relationship between its two central symbols, "Christ" and "God." Then under the threat of heresy and schism this reflection crystallized into dogma, becoming no longer the object and goal of reflection, but a bit of permanent cultural baggage whose continued presence had to be explained and rationalized. In recent times many have sought to justify trinitarian formulations by employing them for the articulation of God’s simultaneous transcendence of, and immanence in, the world. Increasingly, however, the artificiality of these attempts is being called into question, for it is by no means evident that this problem demands a triunity of principles for its resolution. Thus Cyril C. Richardson has criticized the classical formulations of the Trinity as imposing an arbitrary "threeness" upon our theological thinking, and proposes instead a basic twofold distinction between God as Absolute and God as Related.1 This is for Richardson a basic paradox, an apparent self-contradiction, for if we try to bring these aspects into relationship, we compromise God’s absoluteness.2 Charles Hartshorne accepts this same twofold distinction, but he removes the contradictory element by understanding it in terms of the abstract and concrete dimensions of God’s nature and experience.3

Classical theism sees only a single problem here, the question of God’s transcendence and immanence, for which a twofold solution is quite adequate. From the perspective of Whitehead’s theism, however, there is a double problem, the other aspect consisting in the world’s transcendence of, and immanence within, God. Only a trinitarian conception of God seems able to meet this problem. Trinitarian speculation may have spoken more wisely than it knew by providing the basic coordinates for a problem which did not even arise within the horizon of classical theism. Like conic sections, which had to wait nearly two thousand years for their first important application in Kepler’s description of the elliptical orbits of the planets, perhaps the trinitarian conceptuality, at least with regard to the problem of transcendence and immanence, first comes into its own in our situation. If God’s relation to the world necessarily entails a fundamental triunity, this triunity may provide the conceptual means for coordinating our contemporary understanding of the key biblical symbols.

Some conclusions about the Trinity and the workings of God have already emerged from earlier chapters. We have seen that God works by divine persuasion by providing those lures toward which we can aspire. Jesus proclaimed this reigning of God as the power of the future operative in the present. Insofar as we respond to actualize these aims, to that extent the good is achieved in creative advance. To that extent God is effective in our lives.

Divine persuasion is not limited, however, solely to human beings. It extends to the entire created order, and constitutes the means whereby God directs the evolutionary process, both here and on distant planets. It addresses both subhuman creatures and extraterrestrial intelligent species, each after its own kind.

Here we need a series of distinctions: The Logos is the totality of the divine aims, both large and small, relevant and irrelevant. Those aims capable of addressing an entire species by infusing in them a novel order bringing about the emergence of a more advanced species constitute that part of the Logos which we call the creative Word. That creative Word which is specifically addressed to humankind is the Christ. Christians find this creative Word most fully actualized in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus as they participate in that body whose living mind they discern to be the risen Christ.

Too often these distinctions have been ignored with the result that the preexistent subjectivity of Jesus is identified with the second member of the Trinity. Surely this is the assumption of the Fourth Gospel (cf. John 17:1-5). But, as we have seen, there cannot be distinct subjectivities within the Godhead. On Whitehead’s principles, whatever has actual unity enjoys its own subjectivity, and vice versa. Thus a divine person enjoying his own subjectivity would be a separate actuality, thus leading to tritheism. Moreover, substance in the sense of a divine substratum in which three persons inhere is just that sort of vacuous actuality devoid of its own subjectivity that Whitehead rejects. For these reasons we cannot accept the traditional Latin interpretation of the time-honored formula, "one substance in three persons," and insist on a stricter reading more in accordance with the Greek fathers, "one actuality having three distinct aspects." Originally persona did not mean "person" in our sense but the mask through which an actor spoke, indicating the specific role he was performing. The three "personae" come from the three roles God plays. These roles are not arbitrary, however, but are rooted in the very being of God. In the language of Duns Scotus, these natures are formally distinct. They are not really distinct, for this would imply the possibility of separate existence, nor are they merely logically distinct.

Christ enjoys his own subjectivity, to be sure, but only in his resurrection, not in some preexistent state. The risen Christ is divine in the sense of being that transparent medium which most intensely communicates God’s aims to the Christian. But in himself the risen Christ is more transhuman than divine. As a possibility, Christ is that aspect of the creative Word addressed to man, and hence part of the Logos. But as actualized in the resurrection of Jesus that possibility becomes a temporally emergent subjectivity separate from God.

In order to address the trinitarian conceptuality directly, then, we need to consider the formal distinction between the Father and the Logos. As the totality of divine possibilities, the Logos may be interpreted as corresponding to the primordial nature of God. As Whitehead conceives it, the primordial nature embraces all eternal objects as the source from whence all initial aims for finite occasions are derived. This primordial nature is also the outcome of a single nontemporal concrescence. As such it corresponds to the Logos as identical with the Son who is "begotten of the Father before all worlds."

According to the Nicene Creed the Son is begotten, not made. This protective formula indicates that the Son is of the same substance as the Father. This does not merely mean that they share a common "material" substratum, as we have seen, but they are aspects of the selfsame actuality. Nevertheless, the second is produced from the first. We have a very close parallel in Whitehead’s general distinction between the two aspects of an actual entity. On the one hand, there is the act of becoming, that process of unification which is the concrescence or growing together of causal influences. On the other hand, there is the being constituted by this becoming, the unity produced by this unification, the concrete satisfaction, or what has been called the "concretum" of this concrescence.4 The concrescence "begets" the concretum in this metaphysical sense that it produces it as a formally distinct aspect of its own actuality.

Moreover, in the divine instance this concrescence is nontemporal, independent of the particular temporal passage of the world. "Before all worlds," as Augustine recognized, symbolically refers to an activity outside of time, whether or not the world had a temporal beginning. Time is part of the world, and there is no time "before" the world in which such begetting could take place. That which is nontemporally "begotten" is itself outside of the time, an atemporal Logos of the many eternal objects.5

Trinitarian thinking has always labored under a difficulty with respect to God as Father: on the one hand, according to the classical formula, God the Father can only constitute one person of the Trinity; on the other, the Father whom Jesus addressed is simply God, particularly God as revealed to Israel. Part of the difficulty stems from the temptation to believe that God in Christ constitutes a second divine subjectivity distinct from the Father’s, both of which must be united in the Trinity to preserve at least the semblance of monotheism. The rest results from the failure to develop a general theory of immanence whereby one actuality could be recognized as being present objectively within the experience of another without thereby destroying its integrity as a distinct individual actuality.6 In contrast to Aristotle’s dictum that one substance (i.e., actuality) cannot be in another, Whitehead’s philosophy is designed to show how this may be so. One actuality, as concretum, can be objectively present in the concrescence of another. The concrescence is the actuality in its transcendent hiddenness; as such it cannot be experienced by another; the concretum is its objective manifestation. The one nontemporal concrescence is God’s innermost subjectivity by which he radically transcends the world. In Plotinus’s terms, it is the unknowable "One" which is the source of the eternal generation. We can only know of it insofar as it is expressed in the primordial nature, for in itself it is God in his hiddenness, in the inexhaustible mystery of his being.

Perhaps, as John Cobb suggests, the mischief is wrought by conceiving of God the Father as a distinct persona in the Godhead. "The actual image was of the Son as God in one mode of his activity and the Spirit as God in another mode, whereas the Father was quite simply God." 7 The metaphysical distinction between that which is hidden in itself and that which is manifest for others is hardly enough to have caused any departure from the strict monotheism of the Old Testament heritage. Israel was acquainted with the manifestations of God as his Spirit, but this did not suggest that God in his inner being constituted one divine person distinct from the Spirit of the Lord. The trinitarian distinctions were called forth by the fact that the Christian community recognized two distinctive manifestations of God in the Logos, in part incarnated by Christ, and the all-pervasive Spirit. In early Christian art this Trinity could be portrayed as a man with two hands. In Whiteheadian terms, we may interpret God in his full unified actuality as a transcendent subjectivity, which is manifest in two natures, one primordial and the other consequent. There is no need to introduce a third distinct nature on a par with these two.8 "God the Father" is simply God, not another member within the Godhead.

This consequent nature of God is his receptive activity whereby he experiences the temporal occasions of the world. Here our interpretation is somewhat tentative, because we must recognize that any simple identification of the Spirit with this consequent nature will only produce confusion. In a very real sense the Spirit and the consequent nature are opposites, since the Spirit makes it possible for God to be immanent in the world (in the guise of ordinary divine aims), while the consequent nature makes it possible for the world to be immanent in God (through God’s ongoing experience of that temporal world). Neverthless, it is by means of our experience of successive divine aims provided by the Spirit that we have any evidence (howbeit indirect) for the existence of God’s consequent nature.

Before explaining this evidence, however, we need to be clear about the activity of the Spirit. Spirit and Logos both concern the provision of initial aims, since that is the only way God is manifest to us. Logos, however, concentrates upon what is so provided, particularly the great structuring principles of the world and of particular species. Spirit describes how these aims are given, and its activities are best seen in the little, ordinary aims we receive from day to day.

The Spirit is the Lord and Giver of Life in providing those novel aims that organisms can actualize in living response to a dynamic environment. We humans are primarily aware of the aims of the Spirit in terms of ethical aspiration, so vividly present in the Hebrew prophets. Creative insight is also "inspired," for genuine discovery is directed toward a novel possibility hitherto unrealized in the world. Finally, it is by means of the Spirit that we can learn to respond consciously to God, since it is through the awareness of values first purposefully entertained by God that we are directed to seek out their divine source.

We cannot directly experience God’s experience of us, but the particular aims he supplies to our ongoing experience form his specific response to our past actions. Most of the time, preoccupied with practical affairs, we hardly notice the aims and values which guide our activities. Occasionally we may become sensitive to these values, but usually as directives for our own existence, as moral intuitions. Only rarely do we experience these values in terms of the dynamic source from which they spring. Such "religious intuitions" are the "somewhat exceptional elements of our conscious experience" that Whitehead seeks to elucidate as evidence for God’s consequent experience of the world.9 Only a living person experiencing a whole series of divine aims, sensitive to the way in which these shift, grow, and develop in response to our changing circumstances can become aware of their source as dynamic and personal, meeting our needs and concerns.10 Jesus, full of the Spirit, knew God personally in this intimate way, until these aims were taken from him in the hour of his deepest need, when he experienced being forsaken by God on the cross.

This awareness of God’s consequent experience is highly indirect, but this is equally true for our experience of any subjectivity other than our own. We can detect no subjectivity in inorganic societies, and little more in living societies such as plants or animal tissues. We only gain confidence in our sense of the presence of other feeling subjects when dealing with the focalized mental activity of the higher animals and human beings. Here all our experiential evidence is indirect, but reliable. We feel the presence of another person in his actions, for we experience those actions as living responses to ourselves and our actions. There can be an exchange of feeling, because I can experience his action as his responsive experience of me. So it is with the Spirit, which can bear witness to God’s responsive experience of his creatures.

Because of their distinct roles in the providing of initial aims, Logos and Spirit thus reflect the two distinct natures of God, the primordial and the consequent. But just as "person" in trinitarian language has caused confusion, so Whitehead’s use of a distinction of reason in referring to these two divine "natures" has led to misunderstanding. Few careful readers have supposed the primordial and consequent natures to be separate divine actualities,11 yet there has been a tendency to consider each nature as having its own distinctive functions, each operating with some degree of independence from the other.12 But this is ultimately not the case. The primordial nature is the source of all those possible ideals which can serve as the initial aims of occasions, while God’s consequent experience of the actual world forms the basis whereby God can specify which aims are relevant for which occasions, thereby serving as "the particular providence for particular occasions."13

This proposal differs from traditional trinitarian formulations in that the third principle indicated by Spirit does not have the primary function of unifying the other two. In part this role is unnecessary. In one sense this unity is provided by the first member, the aboriginal nontemporal act from which all aspects of God are generated. In another sense the unity lies in their mutual coherence; each is merely an aspect requiring the others to constitute the one divine individual actuality. The nontemporal activity must result in some sort of definite, atemporal unity, while the primordial nature must be the outcome of some sort of nontemporal activity. They are implicates of one another, as process and outcome, as act and expression, as dynamics and form. Moreover, God must be capable of experiencing the world if he is to exemplify the metaphysical principles contained in his primordial nature resulting from that nontemporal act. But beyond this, the consequent nature does not have unification as its primary function because it is needed for a different role, called forth by the problematic of transcendence and immanence.

To see why this is so, we must consider the particular meaning that Whitehead assigns to transcendence. It is a generic notion, not a specific notion applicable only to God. "The transcendence of God is not peculiar to him. Every actual entity, in virtue of its novelty, transcends its universe, God included." 14 "Every actual entity, including God, is something individual for its own sake; and thereby transcends the rest of actuality." 15 Each actuality goes beyond the world it inherits, for it is something more than the components from which it is constituted. It is the free creative unification of the many past actualities it experiences, thereby becoming something more than what has already existed, something individual for its own sake. Such transcendence is possible only because of the incessant creative urge transforming every multiplicity as it arises into an actual unity. "The creativity is not an external agency with its own ulterior purposes. All actual entities share with God this characteristic of transcending all other actual entities, including God. The universe is thus a creative advance into novelty."16 As an ongoing activity, creativity is not exhausted in the transcendence of any one actuality: "every actual entity, including God, is a creature transcended by the creativity which it qualifies."17

God, however, transcends and is transcended in ways peculiar to him. A finite actuality or occasion of experience exhausts its creativity (its only power of transcendence) in a momentary act of self-unification, to be superseded by others. God draws all actualities into an inexhaustible unity, since the inner aim informing divine creativity and impelling it forward is infinite, seeking the realization of every possibility, each in its own season. A finite occasion’s transcendence is relative, transcending its past but not its future. God’s transcendent creativity is absolute, transcending every actuality as it arises by incorporating it into his being. On the other hand, finite occasions are absolutely transcended by subsequent actualities, having no other being than that afforded by their objective status in the transcendent creativity. God is only partially transcended by actual occasions, for they can only prehend those aims of God relevant to their particular world, leaving untouched those infinite reservoirs of possibility which are not yet (or no longer) relevant to the creative advance.

Now it may be objected that this notion of transcendence does not do justice to God’s ultimacy. Here we must distinguish between metaphysical ai~d religious meanings for ultimacy. Whitehead had the first in mind when he wrote: ‘‘In all philosophic theory there is an ultimate which is actual in virtue of its accidents.... In the philosophy of organism this ultimate is termed ‘creativity’; and God is its primordial, nontemporal accident."18 God is an accident of creativity because the particular character of the primordial envisagement is not determined by the essential nature of creativity. Creativity only requires that the many become one, but how they become one is the decision of that actuality in process of self-creation. Creativity is metaphysically ultimate as the power of transcendence every actuality instantiates, including God. But this does not make it ultimate in the religious sense of being supremely worthy of worship.

Sheer creativity is utterly formless, essentially indifferent to all its instantiations, whether good or evil. Creativity acquires actuality only through these instantiations, which determine their own value. We should worship only that which is the ultimate source of human good, that one instance of creativity which orders all value. Borrowing Spinoza’s language, this divine creative act is natura naturans, God as creating, which issues forth as natura naturata, God as created, since he creates himself. The infinite ‘‘world’’ that God creates in creating himself is not, as Spinoza supposed, the world of determinate actuality, which is incurably finite, but the infinite wealth of structured possibility which constitutes God’s primordial nature.

Appreciating the ultimacy of creativity in its metaphysical sense, some have suggested a trinity composed of creativity as the divine ground of being, the primordial nature as the divine Logos, and the consequent nature as the unifying Spirit. Such a proposal bears striking resemblances to Tillich’s sketch of the trinitarian principles in terms of power, meaning, and their union.

Human intuition of the divine always has distinguished between the abyss of the divine (the element of power) and the fullness of its content (the element of meaning), between the divine depth and the divine logos. The first principle is the basis of Godhead, that which makes God God. It is the root of his majesty, the unapproachable intensity of his being, the inexhaustible ground of being in which everything has its origin. It is the power of being infinitely resisting nonbeing, giving the power of being to everything that is.19

This is certainly the role of creativity.

Whitehead, however, sees God in his transcendent role as that portion of creativity embodied within the divine creative act, reserving the rest of creativity for finite creative acts. Both thinkers begin with a dynamic, radically indeterminate source of being, called creativity or being-itself, but proceed according to different models of creation: Tillich adopts the traditional dichotomy between an uncreated creator and created creatures, and identifies creativity with this creator, while Whitehead envisages a multiplicity of self-created creatures, all instances of creativity, among whom God is chief. This second approach has two principal advantages: it protects the goodness of God, and insures the freedom of his fellow creatures.

If God were ultimately creativity or being-itself, he would be radically indeterminate, and no theory of symbolic predication can finally overcome this.20 As Tillich recognizes, "Without the second principle the first principle would be chaos, burning fire, but it would not be the creative ground." 21 Only as structured by the Logos can creativity become divine. Apart from the primordial envisagement, divine creativity is indistinguishable from creativity in general, and the tendency toward pantheism in which Brahma replaces Yahweh becomes inevitable. Apart from the envisagement of the forms, creativity is "chaos, burning fire," the divine-demonic power that the prophets of Israel struggled against in declaring Yahweh to be a God of justice. God cannot be sheer creativity, but only that creative act which supremely exemplifies the metaphysical principles.

Granted that creativity must to some extent be structured by the divine Logos, is it exhaustively or solely structured by it? If so, we end up with deterministic Spinozism. If creativity is not exhausted in producing the Logos, there can be creaturely freedom, but by the same token there can be no simple identification of divinity with creativity.

From Whitehead’s perspective, God’s creative act (in terms of its relevant aspects in the initial aim) can be objectively present within the finite occasion’s concrescence, for it is now the creaturely response which must synthesize the divine and mundane causes it receives into a determinate unity. To effect this synthesis the creature must enjoy its own intrinsic creativity distinct from the divine creativity it objectively receives. It is precisely this dissociation of creativity from God which renders finite transcendence possible, for it allows creativity to be conceived pluralistically rather than monistically, as underwriting every act of freedom, both finite and infinite. The creativity which is not God becomes the radical freedom of self-creation over against God.

If, then, there is creative activity which does not stem from God, how can God embrace it? This is the question which calls forth the role of the consequent nature. If effects produce themselves out of their causes, then it becomes more important that we conceive of God as the supreme effect than as the supreme cause. The whole world supplies the contingent, particular causes of which God is the supreme unification in his consequent experience. In creating he knows himself as the infinitude of all pure possibility, but he does not thereby know finite determinate temporal actuality. To that extent he is dependent upon contingent actuality for the content of his knowledge and experience, although the unity and final intelligibility of that divine experience derives from his own powers of unification. God’s knowledge of the world is finite, temporal, and contingent because the world is so, and this knowledge cannot be derived either from God’s nontemporal act or its atemporal outcome in the primordial nature. Another principle is required, and this is consequent nature which has the capacity to receive into itself the objective immanence of the world.

Classical theism in effect sees a single problem: it is as true to say that God transcends the world, as that God is immanent in the world. This problem may be adequately resolved by a twofold distinction, such as that proposed by Richardson and Hartshorne: God as Absolute and God as Related. But, as Whitehead saw, there is a double problem which he expressed in a pair of terse antitheses: "It is as true to say that the World is immanent in God, as that God is immanent in the World. It is as true to say that God transcends the World, as that the World transcends God." 22 Our twofold distinction explains how God transcends and yet is immanent within God.

Classical theism sees no problem in the immanence of the world within God, primarily because it refuses to grant the world any transcendence from God. In terms of the traditional model, the creature derives all of his being and power from God, even his power of opposition and disobedience. Insofar as God knows by creating, the creature is already immanent within God. The creature can only transcend God if it can become something in and for itself independently of God, in the privacy of its own subjective becoming. The world transcends God on its own, but its subsequent immanence within God requires an additional element of receptive dependence within God. For God is dependent upon the independent, transcendent activity of the creature for knowledge and experience of it. The problem of God’s simultaneous transcendence and immanence alone requires only a twofold distinction, but the additional problem of the world’s simultaneous transcendence and immanence calls forth an additional element, making a final threefold distinction necessary.

Thus in the final analysis we must assent to an ultimate triunity of principles defining the divine life: the divine creative act nontemporally generating the primordial nature, from which proceeds the consequent nature as implicated in the Whiteheadian "categoreal conditions" established by the primordial envisagement.

 

NOTES:

1. Cyril C. Richardson, The Doctrine of the Trinity (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1958).

2. Ibid., pp. 8-9.

3. See Charles Hartshorne, ‘‘God as Absolute, Yet Related to All,’’ chapter 2 of The Divine Relativity (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1948).

4. See George L. Kline, "Form, Concrescence, and Concretum," Southern Journal of Philosophy 7/4 (Winter 1969-70), 351-60.

5. Here see my essay on ‘‘The Non-Temporality of Whitehead’s God’’ International Philosophical Quarterly 13/3 (September 1973), 347-76.

6. As we saw in the first chapter, Whitehead argues that the Nicene fathers developed just such a theory of direct immanence, but then failed to generalize it, restricting it to the one instance of God’s immanence in Christ.

7. CPA, pp. 259-60.

8. To be sure, there is also a single, brief mention of "the ‘superjective’ nature of God" (PR, p. 135). Some have supposed this to refer to a third distinct nature, such that the proper Whiteheadian trinity consists of the primordial, consequent, and superjective natures. In context, however, the ‘superjective’ nature of God is formed on strict analogy with the superjective character of other actual entities, and refers to the objective immanence of the primordial nature in the initial aims of actual occasions.

The two natures appear under other guises in Whitehead’s later writings, but no further reference is ever made to any additional superjective nature. Thus in Adventures of Ideas he contrasts the divine "Eros" with "the Adventure in the Universe as One" (pp. 380-81), which in Modes of Thought (New York: Macmillan, 1938) he refers to as "the reservoir of potentiality and the coordination of achievement" (p. 128).

Whitehead announces that "the objective immortality of [God’s] consequent nature" is considered in part V of Process and Reality (p. 47), which appears to have reference to the fourth phase considered at the end of the book (p. 532). The reference is very brief, and seems fraught with difficulties. Only that which is complete, either as a completely definite primordial nature, or as a completely determinate actual occasion, can be objectified. But the consequent nature is never complete, since there are always new occasions for God to prehend. As we shall see, however, Spirit can fulfill the role assigned to this fourth phase of being ‘‘the particular providence for particular occasions" (PR, p. 532). In any case, there is no basis in the text for associating the "superjective’’ nature with the objectification of the consequent nature.

9. PR, p. 521.

10. For this reason Whitehead speaks of ‘‘the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal Creature’’ (PR, p. 533), referring to living persons and not simply to individual actual occasions. See also his comment that ‘‘this account of a living Personality requires completion by reference to its objectification in the consequent nature of God" (PR, p. 164, n. 17.)

11. Yet Oliver Martin has managed to do just that: ‘‘Whitehead’s Naturalism and God," Review of Religion 3 (1939), 149-60.

12. John W. Lansing cites several instances of this tendency, the most striking being: "The actual entity that is needed to order the possibilities is called the primordial nature of God." This statement is excerpted from Victor Lowe, Understanding Whitehead (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1962), p. 101. See Lansing’s article. "The Natures’ of Whitehead’s God," Process Studies 3/3 (Fall 1973), 143-52.

13. PR, p. 532. See note 8 above.

14. Ibid., p. 143.

15. ibid., p. 135.

16. Ibid., pp. 339-40.

17. Ibid., p. 135; cf. pp. 130, 134, 339.

18. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

19. Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol. 1 (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951), pp. 250-51.

20. I defend this claim in "Tillich and Thomas: The Analogy of Being," Journal of Religion 46/2 (April 1966), 229-45.

21. Tillich, Systematic Theology I, p. 251.

22 PR, p. 528.

Chapter 6: Reconciliation through the Cross

God was in Christ as the divine address for man actualized in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. He was also in Christ inasmuch as Jesus’ personal existence revealed the divine perspective upon mankind, for he encountered and experienced our predicament with all the patience, the care, and the longing for our well-being that God bestows upon us. In the last chapter we saw how in Christ’s resurrection we can be raised to newness of life, exchanging our separate, self-justifying individual existences for corporate participation in the body of Christ, whose manifold cells are coordinated and directed by the living purposes of its transhuman psyche, the risen Christ. Now we need to consider how this resurrection was prepared for by the suffering and death of Jesus. It not only made the original event possible, but it continues to make our own incorporation within this body possible by the reconciling work of God effected in Christ.

In the final high-priestly prayer, John records these words for Jesus: "I glorified thee on earth, having accomplished the work which thou gayest me to do; and now, Father, glorify thou me in thine own presence with the glory which I had with thee before the world was made" (John 17:4-5). These words are spoken in anticipation of the cross, when all would be accomplished, and express John’s assumption of a subjective preexistence of Christ, for his exalted state in resurrection is understood as a restoration of his former glory. Our attention is drawn to the twofold act of glorification depicted here: God glorifies Christ in resurrection, while he glorifies God in crucifixion. Exaltation to the right hand of power is certainly glorification. The crucifixion is no less glorification, if it is understood primarily in terms of revelation. The Old Testament spoke of the Shekhinah, the glorious visible manifestation of the invisible God, for no manifestation of God’s presence among us could be less than glorious. The shocking reversal of the gospel, underscored by John, is that God is most decisively glorified to us in this execution of a criminal and blasphemer.

John Courtney Murray has said that while the Old Testament speaks to us of God, only the New Testament reveals this same God to be the God and Father of our Lord Jesus Christ.’ In his teaching and healing ministry Jesus certainly acted out an intimacy with his heavenly Father that startled contemporary Jewish piety, but his deepest revelation of God’s profound empathy for us was reserved for the agony of the cross. This dimension of God’s being, however, though hinted at in tentative probings in the Old Testament literature,2 was indignantly suppressed in classical theism by Greek ideals of perfection, which dictated absolute impassability to God. To safeguard this divine impassability, it even decreed two natures in Christ, one divine and one human, holding that in his crucifixion he suffered as man, but not as God. Our teaching is precisely the opposite: in no event did Jesus more fully demonstrate the love of God than in his passion! In this God was truly glorified.

Classical theism, despite its insistence upon the divinity of Christ, wishes to make the crucifixion into a purely human act. But this would have no saving significance for us. The resurrection is the presupposition of the cross, as Jürgen Moltmann has recently reminded us.3 Without the resurrection, Jesus’ execution is no different from the crucifixion of countless Christian martyrs after him, or the stoning of the prophets before him. He would have died as one of the heroes of the faith, along with the saints and martyrs, inspiring us by his fearless example and profound teaching, but not saving us from our sins and reconciling us to God.. Who can forgive us for our sins, save God alone? If God works through Jesus to reconcile us to himself, this must embrace the suffering this entails. If this is the cross of the Risen One, then the vindication of Jesus as the supreme revelation of God certainly includes the depths of this suffering.

Whitehead’s original conception of God as the principle of limitation in Science and the Modern World, like classical theism, had no room for divine passivity. Subsequently he enlarged this with an appreciation of God’s consequent or receptive nature. With Whitehead we can make a formal distinction between two natures or aspects of God’s actuality: his primordial nature as the locus of all pure possibilities, which God draws upon in order to provide the initial aims for each emerging event, and his consequent nature as the ultimate recipient of all actuality, which is perfectly experienced and treasured within God. Naturally these two aspects of God reciprocally influence each other: God’s provision of initial aims is particularized and made relevant to the world in terms of his consequent experience, and the way God treasures this experience draws heavily upon the infinite resources of his primordial imagination. While a full account of the divine dynamics must perforce dwell on these interactions, we may briefly consider these distinct natures by an abstraction of reason.

We may equally well designate the primordial aspect the nontemporal dimension of God’s being, for it is God conceived of as divorced from time, wholly independent of the world, timelessly envisioning the entire multiplicity of pure possibilities. It is Aristotle’s God "thinking on thinking." Alternatively, it is the God of the Old Testament in his role as creator, lawmaker, and judge. To be sure, Whitehead does not conceive of God as the efficient maker of the universe, fashioning it out of nothing. Rather, his God conforms to the image of the Priestly writers in Genesis 1, who commands the world to be. This realm of pure possibility forms the Word by which God commands and creates. This same realm provides all the pure forms of value, in terms of which each effort of the finite world is evoked, and in terms of which its final achievement is judged. This lure of God entices the creative advance onward, and simultaneously serves as the ideal standard by which its results are measured.

The passive, receptive aspect of God’s being is consequent upon the ongoing activity of the temporal world. It is, we may say, God’s temporal nature. In himself, God is independent of time, but temporal succession is a fundamental reality of the world, the chief means whereby it can support a vast multiplicity of finite, exclusive actualities. Three solutions have been offered as to how a nontemporal God could be related to a temporal world. (1) God and the world are radically distinct, at least from the divine perspective, and so God is ignorant of this dull, sublunary world (Aristotle). (2) God knows the world, but because his knowledge is nontemporal yet penetrates to the reality of things, the temporality of the world is finally merely apparent. This is the upshot of classical theism, and the basic implication of God’s knowledge of future contingents. There seems to be no way a purely nontemporal God can know a temporal world without violating that world’s temporal integrity. (3) God’s eternal nature is supplemented by a temporal nature, itself directly dependent upon the world’s finite actualizations for its concrete content of experience. In himself God knows only pure, unbroken, nontemporal unity, but this knowledge is further enriched by the temporal experience of the world’s plurality. This consequent knowledge is cumulative and temporal, following the contours of the world’s unfolding reality.

The thoroughgoing coherence of Whitehead’s philosophy demands these two natures in God. God is an actuality, even the chief exemplification of the category of actual entities,4 and all actualities have both conceptual and physical prehensions. Without these additional physical prehensions, God would have no experience of the world, whose plurality and finitude require temporality. On the other hand, the experiential evidence for the divine consequent nature is very subtle and tenuous. For this reason Whitehead postpones its introduction as long as possible in his two major metaphysical works. In Process and Reality, the consequent nature is considered only in the last eleven pages,5 while its counterpart, "an Adventure in the Universe as One,’’ is mentioned only on the last two pages of Adventures of Ideas.6 The structure of both works is the same: for the most part Whitehead is content to justify his doctrines by an appeal to average, ordinary experience, although experience is understood more richly than its analysis in classical empiricism would indicate. In this one instance, however, he warns us that "any cogency of argument entirely depends upon elucidation of somewhat exceptional elements in our conscious experience -- those elements which may roughly be classed together as religious and moral intuitions.

These words should not be misunderstood as a traditional appeal to revelation. At least two factors militate against such an interpretation. In the first place, Whitehead takes an evolutionary view of experience, reminding us that our ordinary, waking consciousness was once highly extraordinary among our primate ancestors. Thus it is quite conceivable that in the future the extraordinary deliverances of religious and moral intuitions will appear quite ordinary. Secondly, Whitehead is at all times interested in discerning the generic, invariant structures of experience, not their contingent contents. Insofar as revelation diverges from reason, it does so in terms of such contingent content. Revelation has sought to apprise us of the favored role of Israel or of the divine significance of the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth, contingencies which in the nature of things philosophic generalization knows not of. If revelation has sought to teach us of the mysteries of the Trinity transcending human reason, we must remember that its reflection began in the effort to understand just how God and the person of Jesus are to be related, and must make allowance for the partial or total eclipse of specific revelational content by the overlay of philosophical speculation. Inasmuch as Whitehead always seeks for philosophically generic features, disregarding specific historical particulars, we must suppose that the impress of the consequent nature is a pervasive feature of all experience, yet unnoticed except in all but the most sensitive religious experiences.

The initial aim guiding each act of becoming to fruition is a pervasive feature of all actuality, yet only humankind, to our knowledge, is consciously aware of it. Our perception of the initial aims provided by God is a measure of our moral sensitivity. Frequently, however, these moral norms are taken to be absolute and invariant, regardless of circumstance. No flexibility or sensitivity to changing situations is permitted. This would be the case if the initial aims provided by the primordial nature were not tempered and modulated in any way by God’s consequent experience. In that case, however, moral norms would either be too general to be relevant and useful, or so specific as to be unduly restrictive.

If this were the only side of his character, the primordial nature of a personal God could easily become the impersonal standard of values such as Plato’s Form of the Good. With the consequent nature, however, God is unmistakably personal. We do not directly apprehend his consequent nature, but become aware of its presence by the subtle, dynamic shifts in the divine aims directly accessible to us as God responds to our actions. This is the meaning of a very enigmatic statement that appears on the very last page of Process and Reality: "Throughout the perishing occasions in the life of each temporal Creature, the inward source of distaste or of refreshment, the judge arising out of the very nature of things, redeemer or goddess of mischief, is the transformation of Itself, everlasting in the Being of God."8 This inward source of distaste or of refreshment is the series of initial aims received from God, which both judge our previous achievements, and give us courage to strive anew. If the best be bad, it appears under the guise of the goddess of mischief, providing only the best possibility for that impasse.9 Yet it can also redeem. The individual, momentary occasions of our life, with their particular, limited accomplishments, pass away, yet not before they are caught up and transformed in the divine life, informing and qualifying those initial aims which God then supplies our successive occasions. These new aims are not impervious to our past, but express God’s living response and encouragement to our faltering actions.

In the biblical imperative "You must be born anew" (John 3:3), the same Greek word anothen may also mean: "from above." Both meanings of this rich ambiguity are relevant to our argument. In terms of the perishing occasions of our temporal life, we are being born anew and from above as we receive novel initial aims from God originating our subjectivity from moment to moment. It is possible for us to be blind to this inward source, insisting upon the solid, substantial endurance of our old selfhood, but the experience of reconciliation in nearness to God calls forth the newness of life that this interior dialogue evokes. It is God’s consequent experience of our lives which calls forth his dynamic provision of new aims for our lives, by which we have redemption.

Ancient Israel was never tempted to replace the lawgiver with the law, following Plato’s example. It had a lively sense of God’s personal involvement in the history of his people. To that extent its teachings clearly anticipate what Whitehead designates as the temporal or consequent nature of God. Yet combined with the image of God as the righteous judge, this divine responsiveness quickly issued into the threat of rejection in the face of Israel’s sinfulness. The New Testament proclaims that no matter how evil the sin, God stands ready to receive the sinner and to forgive the sin, He stands ready to receive into his own being all the evil of the world to bring about its transformation, and this experience of evil is the divine suffering epitomized by the crucifixion. This is the most profound manifestation of the presence of the consequent nature in our experience.

Yet the dynamics of divine reconciliation is subtle, and it is all too easy for some commentators to emphasize the consequent character of God’s activity at the expense of his primordial character. This appears to be the case with the most extensive reflection to date upon the work of Christ within a process context, Don S. Browning’s Atonement and Psychotherapy.10 As the title indicates, Browning proposes to understand the atonement in terms of an analogy drawn from Carl Rogers’s theory of psychotherapeutic healing. According to this view, the neurotic person cannot rely spontaneously upon his total experiencing process because some of his feelings are inadmissible to his own awareness.11 He has placed conditions of worth upon himself, conditions by which he can accept his actions, and these same conditions, largely appropriated from his own social matrix, exclude certain elements of his behavior and feeling as unacceptable. The healing process calls for the unconditioned empathic acceptance of the client’s feelings by the therapist. He must feel his client’s feelings fully, yet empathetically rather than sympathetically. If the therapist were to experience these feelings under the same conditions of worth that the client attaches to them, he would become alarmed and attempt to fend off the same feelings the client was trying to avoid.12 He must show the client how to accept the full range of his experiencing, and thereby overcome the inner division within his soul.

Browning makes fully clear to us the sinfulness of our bondage to our conditions of worth, but not the sinfulness of our violation of these standards. In the context of his analysis focusing upon the therapeutic relationship, these conditions of worth are uniformly depreciated as that which the good therapist does without as much as possible. In criticizing Anselm’s concept of sin as a violation of God’s honor, Browning protests that this implies some condition of worth within God. "It would, in effect, place within the Godhead a neurotic element that can never serve as a solid presupposition for the salvation of man."13 God is completely without conditions of worth qualifying his empathic acceptance, and this unconditionedness constitutes the primary sense in which God is law. "This primary sense in which God is love and law must be kept separate from other ways of referring to God’s law. The secondary sense in which God is law refers to the means-end structures of coercion designed to keep the human situation integrated so that his law and love in the primary sense can operate with enhanced effectiveness."14 In neither sense, then, does divine law sanction moral norms. Unconditioned acceptance transcends such norms, while "the means-end structures of coercion" can only refer to the laws of nature whereby human freedom is kept within constructive bounds.15

Perhaps we may distinguish between values functioning as creative goals and values used as conditions of worth. The specific content of these values may be the same, although their use is different. In the first instance, these goals derived from God serve as a focus for creaturely striving; in the second, as a means of exclusion whereby other values are ignored, destroyed, or suppressed. Yet, as Whitehead saw, these two roles are so bound up with one another that some values are inevitably lost. "In the temporal world, it is the empirical fact that process entails loss: the past is present under an abstraction. . . . The nature of evil is that the characters of things are mutually obstructive. Thus the depths of life require a process of selection."16 Every actualization is a finite achievement cutting off all other possibilities for that particular situation and eliminating all elements received from its immediate inheritance which are incompatible with that one outcome decided upon. In human experience, this elimination may take the form of dismissing the unwanted element into the subconscious mind.

In general, if one takes into account all stages of evolutionary development, the elimination inherent in finite actualization takes two basic forms. In simpler organisms the large bulk of incompatible elements are simply never included in the first place, for the organism is incapable of absorbing and responding to them. Thus the behavior of elementary particles and atoms can be explained solely in terms of physical influences because psychological, cultural, or other such influences have no impact upon them. The more complex organisms, on the other hand, are capable of receiving and responding to more influences derived from their immediate situation than they can handle and therefore must eliminate some of these in the very process of achieving a definite result. Thus a molecule’s experience is "unconscious" because it is incapable of raising any of its feelings into consciousness, while the subconscious reaches of our experience have been suppressed in the interests of some definite conscious outcome.

Simpler organisms, including animals, may be largely understood in terms of the Aristotelian concept of entelechy, as spontaneously fulfilling their inherent goals in terms of resources ordinarily commensurate with these goals. In man, however, conscious awareness of goals as moral norms takes precedence, because the freedom consequent upon greatly expanded resources requires more explicit focus. For much of our activity and, experience, these moral norms need to function as conditions of worth excluding much of our potential resources for the sake of definite, stable outcomes. These conditions of worth are not bad in themselves, but they can become the barrier to further self-growth if allowed to become rigid, and the allegiance to old values can make us impervious to the emergence of new values.

Unconditioned empathic acceptance means that God has no intrinsic conditions of worth restricting his own experience and activity, but this does not mean that he has no such conditions for his creatures. Here we must distinguish between the diverse roles of God and his creatures. God is infinitely receptive, receiving from his creatures the measure of finite actuality he acquires. The finite and ultimately arbitrary character of temporal actualization prevents us from ascribing it directly to God’s own activity. His function is to foster and direct the process of actualization carried on by his creatures, and to redress the inevitable loss involved by integrating all of its results into his living experience. In the first role he is the ultimate source of all our values, which serve both as lures for achievement and as conditions of worth by which our achievements may be judged. In the latter role God is the ultimate preserver of all, embracing both our achievements and failures, thereby overcoming the destruction inherent in finite achievement.

The analogy of the therapist adequately describes God’s second, consequent role, but may distort the role of value-commitments both for God and the therapist. We may say that God acts without values in his unconditioned acceptance, but values govern both the initial aims he proposes to his creatures and the way in which what he has fully accepted becomes organized and integrated into his own experience. Likewise the therapist in Browning’s eyes may seek to eliminate all value-conditions from the therapeutic relationship, but this very effort is both motivated and judged by the specific aim of healing the client’s neuroses.

Browning distinguishes between feelings and behavior, arguing that behavior should be controlled by conditions of worth, but not feelings, all of which are acceptable. But our feelings of failure and worthlessness ordinarily relate to our behavior, which would have no focus or direction apart from these value-conditions. What is needed is not an elimination of value-conditions, but their relativization: the possibility of their expansion and growth, and the possibility that failures relative to these values can somehow be redeemed. The therapist in unconditional acceptance conveys that redemption to the client, but the ultimate basis for such acceptance lies in God’s infinite capacity to provide every failure, no matter how severe or destructive, with some value within the total scheme of things.17

A second corrective to Browning’s approach may be found in the other major reflection upon the atonement from a process perspective, that of Daniel Day Williams.18 Williams follows Josiah Royce in placing the meaning of Christ’s death within the context of the entire community. "Royce sought to interpret human existence as the search for loyalty to an adequate cause. Sin is disloyalty to the one really adequate cause, the world of loyal men. . . . In its memory of Jesus the Church has the foundation of its existence in the memory of the deed of Jesus who acted in absolute loyalty to the community in the midst of its disloyalty.19 Royce’s analysis, however, needs to be deepened by an understanding of suffering, which Williams understands not so much in terms of undergoing pain as "being acted upon or being conformed to another in a relationship."20 Such suffering appears to be identical with the empathic acceptance of those negativities of existence which usually cause pain and evil. To Royce’s view Williams adds "the insight that the reconciliation which creates the new community comes by way of suffering. Jesus’ suffering becomes the very word and speech of love finding bodily, historical expression and creating a new possibility of community." 21 This suffering, moreover, discloses God’s own suffering to man. God’s love is absolute in its integrity, invulnerable to any destruction, but this by no means implies any impassibility to suffering, which is at the heart of the most profound love. "If God does not suffer then his love is separated 2 completely from the profoundest human experiences of love, and the suffering of Jesus is unintelligible as the communication of God’s love to man." 22 Through such suffering reconciliation and renewal of love are effected (in ways more fully explored by Browning), bringing into existence a new community, the church, which Williams defines as "the community which lives by participation in the atonement."23

Here we find the clue indicating the intrinsic connection between the atonement and the resurrection, once we recognize that the church is none other than the resurrected body of Christ. Given our understanding of the way God acts in cooperative union with his creatures, we cannot see the resurrection as a unilateral action of God. On the one hand, raising Jesus to himself cannot simply be a purely arbitrary decision on God’s part, but one made in response to the intrinsic quality of Jesus’ life, suffering, and death. He is the one most worthy to be raised, because the living purpose of Jesus concretely embodied God’s own purpose for mankind. Were any other person with a narrower outlook or sympathies raised up as the living source of aims to which we humans would be subordinate, we could find ourselves subject to a demonic totalitarianism destructive of the best possibilities inherent in us as separate individuals. A risen Christ to whom we can subordinate ourselves in good conscience must be one "whom to serve is perfect freedom." Jesus can become that risen Christ only because his living purpose fulfills and does not thwart our highest alms. On the other hand, the resurrection of the body of Christ also involves the transformation of individual men into willing members of that body, and this can only be effected through the atonement.

As Browning has shown, the function of atonement is to overcome those structures of sin which cause us to deny and distort the love of God in our lives. These structures arise from the absolutizing of those value-conditions given to us by God into conditions of acceptability whereby we judge our failures and worthlessness in such a way as to alienate ourselves from God’s love. Moreover, these structures that tend to isolate us as individuals save as they bring us together in terms of the fairly rigid social patterns of "life under the law." Before we can become members of the body of Christ, these structures must be broken down, in order to free us from limiting self-concepts, from the tendency to minimize and downgrade the values we aspire to in a desperate effort to avoid self-judgments of failure which accompany the acceptance of divine values. Given the greatly expanded resources at man’s disposal, coupled with God’s invariant aim at the maximum intensity and enrichment of experience, it is inevitable that the ordinary human achievement will fall short of its originally intended goal. The Christian recognition of original sin appreciates this gap between the initial aim envisioned by God and the final outcome achieved by man in every human event.

Low-level achievement may well be insensitive to this gap either because the original resources are too meager or because there is insufficient awareness of the aims as received from God. But any high-grade achievement depends upon richer resources and upon increasing awareness of these initial aims which in their vibrant intensity may well outrun the achievements they evoke. Therefore, for the very awareness of more intensive aims we must be reassured of our acceptability despite our failures. Reconciliation through atonement places our ultimate acceptability upon a different plane from the judgment of our success or failure in terms of our initial values, thereby enabling us to aspire to those values with greatly reduced risk. Until we are thereby enabled to aspire to the highest values available to us as individual human beings, we cannot be in a position to aspire to those values transcending ourselves which direct the activity of the whole body of Christ. Without atonement, therefore, the resurrection of Christ would not have been possible -- for there would be no individual human beings capable of being transformed into members of that body.

Through participation in the body of Christ we continue to experience this concrete embodiment of divine love, for Christ accepts, cherishes, and affirms us in precisely the same manner in which we accept our own bodies. We have become part of him, and, just as we cannot, he cannot limit his selfhood merely to his mind, excluding the activity of his body. Our acceptability before God is no longer simply dependent upon our individual roles as separate human beings, for we have become part of Christ, and concretely participate in his acceptability before God. Jesus’ suffering and death have inaugurated a process of reconciliation which continues its work of concretely exhibiting to us the love of God in the body of Christ’s resurrection.

Throughout this discussion we have insisted upon God’s suffering, in apparent contradiction of the common assumption that God dwells in unbroken bliss. This language has been unavoidable, in order to emphasize that God is totally involved in our lives, including the negativities of our experience. His happiness is not purchased by the exclusion of our misery. Nevertheless, there is merit in the ancient concern over the alleged heresy of Patripassianism. That concern is ill expressed in the usual protective doctrine that only part of the Godhead suffered, the Son but not the Father. How are we then to understand John’s word that the Father so loved the world that he was willing to give up the Son (John 3:16)? Is this done at no cost to him? I take the deepest meaning of this concern to lie in the conviction that God is never defeated by evil. He can absorb all evil and overcome it. "He saves the world as it passes into the immediacy of his own life. It is the judgment of a tenderness which loses nothing that can be saved. It is also the judgment of a wisdom which uses what in the temporal world is mere wreckage." 24

Evil lies in the mutual obstruction of things; their conflict and disharmony engender suffering and loss. No matter what the conflict, God possesses infinite conceptual resources in his primordial nature whereby an appropriate pattern can supplement these conflicting elements, thereby transforming them into a harmonious good. In themselves the elements conflict, but not as taken up into the larger texture of meaning.25 This analogy appears distressingly feeble, but only because our human powers of aesthetic creativity are so feeble. We can reconcile conflicts by the addition of clarifying distinctions and imaginative constructs, but only theoretical, not actual conflicts. We can create harmony from discordant sounds by the addition of further sounds, but only in music. We can transform gross evil into tragic beauty, but only on the stage, only in make-believe, when the proper aesthetic distance has been achieved. Our powers of imaginative reconciliation are very restricted indeed. We should not underestimate the powers of an unlimited imagination to over-come the conflicts of finite actualities.

Our redemption is found not only in the assurance that our unacceptability is accepted, but that the evil inherent therein is transformed into lasting value, a good we can dimly appreciate. "For the perfected actuality passes back into the temporal world, and qualifies this world so that each temporal actuality includes it as an immediate fact of relevant experience. For the kingdom of God is with us today. . . .What is done in the world is transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and floods back again into the world."26 In the provision of novel aims for our ongoing activity, in the wellsprings of our renewed selfhood received afresh from above, God discloses the redemptive value whereby he cherishes our past. This sense of transformed meaning is very elusive, and exceedingly hard to describe. We can only refer the reader to the final chapter in Adventures of Ideas, in which Whitehead tries to explain this ultimate "Peace." We cannot hope to improve on his words.

Jesus had this "Peace," this assurance of ultimate victory throughout his life and ministry. It was what sustained his radical obedience, confirmed his quiet sense of authority, and encouraged him to address God as his father. Yet at the very end of his life this "Peace" deserted him: "My God, my God, why hast thou forsaken me?" (Mark 15:34). Jesus did not die a "good" death, with the serene nobility of a Socrates, but in the painful awareness that the intimate presence of God had been withdrawn in the ultimate hour, and he had been abandoned as one rejected. Jürgen Moltmann has recently underscored this forsakenness, challenging us to come to terms with this horrifying prospect. He argues that it can only be described in inner-trinitarian terms: "The abandonment on the cross which separates the Son from the Father is something which takes place within God himself."27 Yet for the Son to be abandoned by the Father, there must be two distinct subjectivities within the Godhead. Many ontologies can permit this, but not Whitehead’s. As we have seen in our discussion of Lionel Thornton’s Christology any distinct subjectivity is necessarily a distinct actuality. Any doctrine suggesting three subjectivities within the Godhead automatically degenerates into tritheism. How, then, can we understand this abandonment, this radical bereavement Jesus felt?

As we have seen, the experience of redemptive love, "Peace," renewing life, is intimately bound up with the provision of initial aims. God is at work in every life providing it with novel aims at every turn, and Jesus was profoundly sensitive to this. Yet these aims, to be relevant, must express real possibilities for the moment; otherwise they could not be actualized under the circumstances. Each occasion of experience is free to actualize itself within the parameters of its causal past, but only within those parameters, since this past provides the content of its actualization. Normally the past allows us some leeway, but it can be coercive, restricting our future within very narrow confines. The initial aim articulates God’s evaluative gift of these real possibilities, but they may be severely constrained. "The initial aim is the best for that impasse." But if the best be bad, Whitehead can speak of the ruthlessness of God.28 In the hour of Jesus’ deepest need, he could not feel the presence of God, because there were no redemptive possibilities that God could provide, no aims which could vouchsafe to him the infinite resourcefulness of the divine life in clothing his actions with resplendent meaning, sending him forth with renewed courage. For Jesus, there was only the cross and death. In his cross the weakness of God is revealed, as he stood by powerless to comfort his beloved. The worst of it was that God intimately experienced Jesus’ awareness that this sustaining grace had suddenly been taken from him. God did not abandon Jesus, but he knew this abandonment, as Jesus knew it, in the depths of his being.

"What is inexorable in God," Whitehead continues, "is valuation as an aim towards ‘order’; and ‘order’ means ‘society’ permissive of actualities with patterned intensity of feeling arising from adjusted contrasts."29 This abstract description is very general, applying equally well to molecules, amoeba, trees, rabbits, man, and that which transcends man in some new transhuman organic society. The ruthlessness of God is Inexorable in evoking new intensities of being. Thus the very act in which Jesus felt abandonment in his death enabled the emergence of the lure for resurrection in the near future. In this transhuman body we need no longer fear abandonment of God in death, for even that can contribute to ongoing life. Jesus underwent the abandonment of God, so necessary for the emergence of the resurrected body, in order that we might be spared this experience.

As we have seen in the last chapter, this risen Christ is a living subjectivity, distinct from the divine subjectivity. In this our proposal has a distinctly Arian flavor: Christ is temporally created, not begotten. On the other hand, we also agree with Athanasius that the Logos, the second member of the Trinity, is nontemporally begotten "before all worlds." We can be both Arian and Athanasian by denying the one point they share in common, namely, the identification of the risen Christ with the preexistent Logos. Here Arius errs philosophically in supposing this preexistent Logos could be created in time and errs religiously in worshiping that which is other than God. The living subjectivity of Christ is temporally emergent, but not "in the beginning," nor even in the birth or baptism of Jesus. Jesus died so that Christ might be born. But Christ is not to be worshiped in himself, but serves only as a mediator, magnifying the availability of God to us. In him the divine aims for our lives can be intensified in a way not possible without him. Yet the very fact that he is our privileged means of access to God, such that only in Christ do we encounter the fullness of God, should not blind us to the createdness and relativity of even the risen Christ. There may be other transhuman societies, in the future or even now, just as there may be other living societies embracing intelligent life on other worlds, or even emergent forms capable of incorporating the fullness of Christ within an unimaginable intensity and richness of being. The possibilities which the divine creative Word holds for the future are inexhaustible, and any restriction of that Word to the risen Christ bespeaks a parochial anthropocentrism we should eschew.

Yet while the Christ is created, temporally emergent in the resurrection, he truly incarnates the Word of God addressed to our situation. His subjectivity is temporally emergent, yet the objective principle that he embodies relative to our need is grounded in the very fabric of the transcendent, primordial God. For the purpose of explicating this inner complexity of the Godhead the ancient doctrine of the Trinity is highly illuminating, as we shall see in the next chapter.

NOTES:

1. John Courtney Murray, The Problem of God (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1964), pp. 25-29.

2. Gen. 6:6; Jer. 31:20; Isa. 63:15. Cf. Kazoh Kitamori, The Theology of the Pain of God (Richmond: John Knox Press, 1965).

3. Jürgen Moltmann, The Crucified God (New York: Harper & Row, 1974), esp. pp. 182 ff.

4. PR, p. 521.

5. Ibid., pp. 523-33.

6. Al, pp. 380-81.

7. PR, p. 521.

8. Ibid., p. 533.

9. Ibid., p. 373.

10. Don S. Browning, Atonement and Psychotherapy (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1966).

11. Ibid., p. 101.

12. Ibid., p. 194.

13. Ibid., p. 230.

14. Ibid., p. 201.

15. Browning bases his study on Hartshorne’s process theism, and it is appropriate to interpret his theory of the divine imposition of the laws of nature in terms of coercion. Cf. Charles Hartshorne, A Natural Theology for Our Time (La Salle, Ill.: Open Court, 1967), pp. 101-2, 120. Yet this need not be the case if, as Whitehead argues, the laws of nature summarize the average response of the creatures to divine persuasion. On this difference between Hartshorne and Whitehead, see Two Process Philosophers, ed. Lewis S. Ford (American Academy of Religion: AAR Studies in Religion 5, 1973), pp. 75-79.

16. PR, p. 517.

17. See also Browning’s argument, Atonement and Psychotherapy, pp. 149-53, that the effectiveness of psychotherapeutic acceptance depends upon a wider context of divine acceptance, which we would argue is in turn justified by God’s capacity to infuse anything with imaginative value.

18. Daniel Day Williams, The Spirit and the Forms of Love (New York: Harper & Row, 1968), pp. 173-91.

19. Ibid., pp. 180-81.

20. Ibid., p. 182.

21. Ibid., p. 184.

22. Ibid., p. 185.

23. Ibid., p. 188.

24. PR, p. 525. These words are easily misunderstood as meaning that there is some residue of unredeemable evil that God cannot overcome. Yet all being, no matter how evil and recalcitrant, can be saved; it is becoming that cannot be preserved, for becoming necessarily ceases ("perishes") in the attainment of being. The indeterminacy of becoming is replaced by the determinateness of being.

25. See my essay on divine persuasion, cited in Chapter 3, note 22.

26. PR, p. 532.

27. Moltmann, The Crucified God, pp. 151-52. See the whole context, pp. 146-53.

28. PR, p. 373.

29. Ibid., pp. 373-74.

Chapter 5: The Resurrection as the Emergence of the Body of Christ

In responding to the New Testament witness to the resurrection, much depends upon the interpretative categories we select to evaluate that testimony. Wolfhart Pannenberg urges us to adopt, in its essential outline, the anticipation of a general resurrection from the dead as the only adequate context within which to judge the evidence. "Only the traditional expectation of the end of history rooted in apocalyptic gave Paul the opportunity of designating the particular event that he experienced, as Jesus’ other disciples had experienced it previously, as an event belonging to the category of resurrection life. There, Paul called the expectation of a resurrection of the dead the presupposition for the recognition of Jesus’ resurrection: ‘If the dead are not raised, then Christ has not been raised’ (1 Cor. 15:16)." 1

Commenting on this same text, Gordon D. Kaufman remarks: "If, now, we bring a different framework of interpretation from Jewish apocalypticism to this critical event in which Christian faith was born -- as we must -- we should not be overly surprised or dismayed when we find it necessary to understand the character of the event somewhat differently from the first Christians." 2 He goes on to argue that the resurrection appearances were essentially hallucinations that the disciples mistakenly interpreted as Jesus come back from the dead, but that God used these hallucinations and this misinterpretation to create his kingdom, his community of love and forgiveness, within human history. I agree with Kaufman that the emergence of this community embodies the reality of the resurrection here on earth, and that the apocalyptic expectation must be discarded. I disagree with him, however, on the one point where he makes common cause with Pannenberg: namely, that apart from the apocalyptic horizon, the disciples’ experiences can only be regarded as subjective hallucinations.

Consider, for the moment, Isaiah’s experience in the temple in the year that King Uzziah died. He reports, "I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple" (Isa. 6:1). Was this an hallucination? On the one hand, there are elements I take to be primarily subjective in Isaiah’s experience -- the bodily figure seated on the throne. On the other hand, I do not doubt Isaiah’s claim that he "saw" the Lord, that is, that he actually encountered the divine reality distinct from himself in a particularly vivid manner. I would not call this experience an hallucination, which I take to be purely subjective in all important respects, having no significant objective referent, but rather a vision, the encounter with a nonperceptual reality made manifest and perceptible by hallucinatory means. Thus a vision stands halfway between an hallucination and veridical experience, and is needed in this case because neither of these alternatives adequately accounts for Isaiah’s experience. To be sure, my judgment is dependent upon the interpretive framework I have adopted, which assumes that God is real independently of the believer and that God cannot be sensuously perceived. If we reject the first assumption, Isaiah’s experience can only be hallucinatory; if, on the other hand, we reject only the second, then his experience might be taken as completely veridical.

We take I Corinthians 15 to be our most reliable testimony to the resurrection appearances, as being the only eyewitness report we have. Was Paul’s experience on the road to Damascus a vision or an hallucination? We rule out the third possibility of veridical experience on the testimony of Luke in Acts, who reports a light from heaven and a voice, which we take to be hallucinatory accompaniments. Paul speaks of a ‘‘spiritual body" later on in that chapter, and it may well be that he took the Christ he encountered to be embodied in a perceptible spiritual body, but if so, it is remarkable that he never attempts to distinguish this spiritual body belonging solely to the resurrected Christ from the body of Christ which is the church. At any rate, we take the risen Christ to be living but not perceptible, and so the means whereby Christ became audible and (perhaps) visible to Paul were essentially hallucinatory. What we need at this point is an interpretive framework permitting us so to specify the possibility of the objective reality of the risen Christ that Paul’s experience may be approached as a vision rather than as an hallucination. Pannenberg claims that this can only be found in the apocalyptic expectation of a general resurrection, but I wish to propose an alternative to accomplish the same purpose.

Before proceeding to this task, however, let us pause to note that if the risen Christ is essentially nonperceptible, we should not expect testimony to certain appearances to be our primary witness to his resurrection. I take this to be the case. The earliest Christians did not believe in the resurrection primarily because they accepted the apostles’ reports, but because they experienced the Spirit of Christ alive and active in their midst. As John Knox argues, "The two facts -- he was known still and he was remembered -- constitute together the miracle of the Resurrection; and neither is more important than the other." 3 This nonperceptual yet real experience of Christ’s directing activity in and through their lives assured the early believers that he was alive. Since they also remembered that he had died, they could only infer that he must have risen from the dead. The resurrection appearances confirmed this conviction, to be sure, but these visions may have been originally understood as grants of apostolic authority to their recipients, as fuller manifestations of the risen Christ bestowed upon the privileged few chosen to be their leaders. Only when the sense of the immediate presence of Christ in their midst faded would these reports be reconceived primarily as testimony to the resurrection. Yet, as with the resurrection appearances, such nonperceptual experiences of the living Christ also depend upon an interpretive framework, one which permits the presence of the living Christ to be a real possibility for the believer. For if this possibility is excluded on a priori grounds, the experience must be interpreted another way: as an unwarranted enthusiasm, as the presence of human love in community, as the activity of God mediated through the community’s memory of Jesus, or what have you.

As a clue to an alternative interpretive framework, I wish to suggest a different way of understanding the "spiritual body," one which Paul may have been groping for but was prevented from reaching by his preconceptions about the general resurrection. Usually this is taken to mean a body which is no longer "corporeal" or material but composed rather of some more ethereal substance. The adjective "spiritual" then signifies the material cause of that body, to use Aristotelian language. In contrast I understand the adjective to refer to that which permeates, vivifies, and directs the body for its own purposes. Here it is important to note that the contrasting term, "physical body" (RSV), is not soma phusikon but soma psuchikon, a "psychical body." This does not mean that ordinary human body is composed of some psychical material, but that this physcal body is animated by a soul or mind or psyche which organizes an directs its activity. The New English Bible translation is to be preferred: "If there is such a thing as an animal body [cf. Vulgate: corpus animale], there is also a spiritual body" (1 Cor. 15:44). Or perhaps we should say, the human body is animate because of the presence of the anima or soul. Thus Paul continues: "It is in this sense that Scripture says, ‘The first man, Adam, became an animate being,’ whereas the last Adam has become a life-giving spirit" (1 Cor. 15:45 NEB). The actions of the spiritual body are animated and directed by that life-giving spirit of the last Adam, that man who stands on the threshold of a new emergent reality, the body of Christ. This body here and now is composed of many human members, of flesh and blood, but it is a spiritual body because it is animated by the spirit of Christ.

This transformed human community forms a living organism, a biological phenomenon which we conceive to be the next stage in the emergent evolution of the world, and the incarnation of the divine Word. As long as we think of this Word as the expression of God’s underlying character or eternal purpose, we overlook its contingent relatedness to the evolving world. It does express God’s creative character and his fundamental purpose in bringing the world into fullness of being, but that is only its abstract essence. The creative Word embodies God’s general power of the future acting on all creatures, but the concrete character of the creative Word must be found in the specific way in which it addresses each species to evolve beyond itself. If by the Christ-event we mean the human actualization of this creative Word, we must bear in mind the contingent aspects of God’s address to man, for this address must be so coordinated with the human situation as to provide the means for a new creation transforming man. God’s purpose in Christ is not merely to manifest his love to all mankind (though it intends that as well), but to establish a new organic unity transcending human fragmentariness. Such action requires a means growing out of our particular conditions and opportunities. That purpose in Christ embodies God’s general aim for all creation in the specific way appropriate to man, and both foci must be considered in any full account.

God has purposes for us in every moment of our existence, some rather trivial, others quite profound. His underlying aim is always the same, for he seeks our welfare both for our sakes and as the condition for his own welfare. This basic aim, however, is expressed in specific purposes appropriate to the particular conditions and opportunities confronting us at particular times. We may respond wholly or partially to these particular purposes by actualizing them in concrete fact; to that extent God’s purposes become incarnate in the world. As we have seen, some argue that the Christ was the incarnation of the Word of God because he fully realized the divine purpose. While this may well be necessary, it is not a sufficient condition to designate the particular character of the Christ. This is not adequate grounds for distinguishing between Jesus and Socrates and Gautama, let alone any number of other wise or saintly or good people, unless one resorts to a dogmatic insistence upon Jesus’ "sinlessness" or "absolute perfection" about which we have no final way of knowing, and which Jesus is reported as denying with respect to himself (Mark 10:18). Not all divine aims are (or could be) christological aims, for it is only under very special circumstances within human life that God could introduce, as relevant to those conditions and opportunities, that aim capable of transforming man beyond himself. We define this christological aim -- God’s purpose in Christ -- to be the creative emergence of a new organic unity incorporating man, and confess that this aim was realized in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus of Nazareth.

Both the granting of this christological aim and its receptive realization required prior preparation. To be relevant and usefully significant, God’s particular purpose must be realizable under the existent conditions. Sometimes these conditions only permit meager results. In other circumstances the concrete realization of God’s preliminary aims may create the conditions for a further intensification of divine aim. We may see in the life of Israel and in the personal life of Jesus just such an intensification, creating the conditions such that God’s culminating aims for man could become relevant for realization. God calls every man, but some like Abraham respond more fully to that call. In the light of the patriarch’s wandering with God in the land of Canaan, Moses could be called to lead the children of Israel into the promised land. Because of Israel’s covenant with God in the wilderness, the prophets could call upon the people to return to that covenant, proclaiming to them the divine intent in their historical situation. Through this process Israel could become a special locus of God’s creative purposes for mankind, purposes it might realize or bequeath to another to realize. God has no fixed, inalterable plan here, but everywhere seeks inexorably to urge creation beyond itself. We may interpret the biblical record as God seeking to further this aim first with all mankind, then with his chosen people Israel, then with the faithful remnant, finally with that individual person willing to embody in his own life the meaning, hopes, and mission God has entrusted to Israel.

In order to see the particular character of the divine aim actualized in the Christ-event, we may speculate a bit upon the evolutionary advance of the world by considering its possible future development. Heretofore, this earth has witnessed the emergence of single-celled living organisms, the growth of multicelled plant organisms, the advent of animals with centralized nervous systems making self-directed activity possible, and the flowering of humanity with its far-flung culture. In this evolutionary process we may discern an unfolding spiral development whereby later phases recapitulate earlier ones on a higher level. Thus animals for the most part have little or no social organization, and in this respect may be likened to single-celled organisms. With the emergence of symbolic communication permitting the transmission of cultural traditions from generation to generation, man has been able to develop a highly complex social life allowing for a high degree of specialization and interdependence among its members. Such human social organization may be compared with the life of plants, whose individual cells may be highly specialized and interdependent. In both cases the focus of life remains on the individual level, for there is no coordinating agency directing the life of the plant or the activities of an ordinary human society as a whole. A tree is a democracy of cells, Whitehead wrote. In both cases individual members may exercise some dominance over others, in particular by altering the patterns guiding further growth and development, but the social coordination stems from basic patterns embodied in the genetic makeup of the plant cells and in the laws and traditions of human culture. Mankind has grown together into ever more involuted social patterns dead -- ending in the unfeeling excesses of bureaucracy, and longs for liberation from this kind of bondage to the law. The law killeth, for these social traditions which made human community possible are increasingly restrictive of human initiative along novel lines, affording maximum freedom only to those content to develop along established patterns.

Some humans romantically yearn for a regression back to social anarchy, which might be likened -- rather fancifully, to be sure -- to the cells of a plant longing for the mobility of single-celled organisms. A more viable option may lie in the emergence of dynamic human societies more nearly analogous to animals possessing minds coordinating the activities of the body. It is not essential to bodies that their individual components be spatially contiguous if we see that the basic relationship involved connects an active coordinating agency with the subordinate instrumentality providing it with expression. The eleventh-century Hindu theologian Ramanuja defined a body as any substance or actuality "which a sentient soul is capable of controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to that soul in an entirely subordinate relation." 4 We adopt this broad definition, which does not entail spatial contiguity. Plant and animal cells must be spatially contiguous in order to permit the interchange of material necessary to sustain life, but mankind has been able to organize commerce and economic interdependence by other means. The transformation of human society, or some part of it, into a living body does not require greater proximity or necessarily more complex organization -- we’re crowded enough as it is. More importantly, it awaits the emergence of a dynamic, responsive agency capable of coordinating the activities of a human society as a whole, within which human individuals might find themselves to be the willing, freely responsive instrumentalities of a higher will. This the early church found in the risen Christ, whom to serve is perfect freedom. Now, Paul exults, life in the Spirit sets us free from the necessity of the law.5

Within the body of Christ the early Christians experienced God’s Spirit, the presence of divine purposing in their lives to which they could respond. They also experienced the Spirit of Christ as a living agency providing aims and directions for their corporate existence. The Spirit of Christ must have had its own distinctive personality, for they recognized that it bore unmistakable continuity with their master Jesus whom they remembered. Paul’s letters show the difficulty they had in relating the Spirit of Christ to the Spirit of God, since the aims they received from Christ were first derived from God. As the directing mind of his body, the risen Christ serves as the channel for the intensification of divine aims. The cells in my index finger are quite limited in terms of what they may achieve on their own, for their individual activity is restricted to processes of growth, oxygen exchange, homeostatic adjustment, and the like. Their individual capacity to serve God’s purposes is rather small. These same cells as part of my hand, however, can serve as instrumentalities accomplishing the aims of my mind, such as the typing of this chapter. Likewise as members of the body of Christ, humans may be achieving aims which far transcend human imagination. God can work through us directly by means of his aims actualized by us individually, but much more powerfully through the mediating agency of Christ.

According to the tradition reported by Paul and the Gospel writers, Peter encountered Jesus as Lord and Christ on the third day after his death. In what form Christ appeared to Peter we do not know; nor is it important, for we regard it as an hallucinatory accompaniment to the actual encounter. Peter experienced the Spirit of Christ, a nonperceptible reality proposing aims for guiding the actions of Peter directly analogous to the nonperceptible reality of the human mind as guiding the actions of the body. Peter encountered a Spirit he knew to be one with the extraordinary life of the Master he had followed, a Spirit to whom he could now fully dedicate himself in the confidence that the aims and directives it mediated served God’s purposes, just as Jesus had served those purposes during his lifetime. Moreover, this Spirit was living, dynamic, responsive to growing circumstance. As others encountered this same reality, they too became the instrumentalities of its will, as they became knit together into that common life we know as the body of Christ. Peter and the others experienced this dynamic presence in their midst as shaping their common activities; they remembered Jesus’ life and death and could interpret this phenomenon in only one way, proclaimed by Peter at Pentecost: This Jesus, whom you crucified, God has raised up and made both Lord and Christ (Acts 2:23-24, 36).

We argue for the bodily resurrection of Christ, but the body of Christ’s resurrection is none other than the body of Christ which is the church, understood as that emergent community of love guided by the dynamic activity of Christ’s Spirit. According to Luke and Paul, Simon Peter was the first person to form that body whose mind is the risen Christ, thereby effecting the bodily resurrection. If the critics are correct in associating Peter’s confession, placed by Mark at Caesarea Philippi, with this resurrection encounter, we may be permitted an additional insight into the appended saying recorded by Matthew (16:17-19). As the first member of the body of Christ, Peter is the rock or foundation for the building up of the church, the cell to which all other cells are attached in the growth of that body.

This resurrection is thus the incarnation of the divine Word addressed to the human situation. The incarnation is not located solely or even primarily in the life of Jesus, although without that life it could not have occurred then. The incarnation was the total event of the emergence of the body of Christ. It required a human life totally open to divine purposing, a life others could completely trust as from God. Yet it also requires the emergence of a new community knit together by the power of God. Initially the continued identity of Jesus was objectively sustained in the memory of his disciples. As these disciples responded to the desires and aims of God as concentrated through this memory by the interpenetration of their concerns for one another in love, the organic life they knit together was able to support the renewed subjectivity of the risen Christ, in the same way a living body can support a living mind.

In Christ we become a new creation; old things have passed away. It began with the human life of Jesus, but culminates in his being "raised up," both as the living Head of the body and as "seated in heavenly place" at the right hand of God, thus becoming a privileged means of interaction and mediation between God and man.

For this process Christology, then, the resurrection of Jesus is hardly an optional belief.6 It is its very heart. It forms the basis of our understanding of what God effected in the Christ-event.

NOTES:

I. Wolfhart Pannenberg, Jesus -- God and Man (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1969), p. 81.

2. Gordon D. Kaufman, Systematic Theology. A Historicist Perspective (New York: Scribner’s, 1968), p. 422, n. 22.

3. John Knox, The Early Church and the Coming Great Church (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1955), pp. 52-53.

4. As quoted by James S. Helfer in "The Body of Brahman According to Ramanuja," Journal of Bible and Religion 32 (1964), 44.

5. Although there are obvious affinities between my reasoning and the thought of Teilhard de Chardin, his discussion of the body of Christ focuses rather upon the individual Christian’s incorporation within Christ as the Omega point toward which all creation moves. Teilhard makes reference to the Pauline texts concerning the body of Christ, but he is primarily intent upon showing how the Christian is related to Christ’s cosmic role as the hope of all creation. See Christopher F. Mooney. Teilhard de Chardin and the Mystery of Christ (New York: Harper & Row, 1966), pp. 83-103, esp. pp. 87-94. Mooney provides a useful summary of Paul’s teaching concerning the body of Christ which comes very close to my interpretation, were it not for the unwarranted introduction of the notion of the "Body-Person of Christ" (pp. 94, 100).

Unlike Teilhard’s, my analysis does not require us to accord mankind some privileged centrality in God’s creative design. The body of Christ need not be the final culmination of the creative process. It is rather the next stage in the evolutionary advance on the planet Earth of overwhelming importance to us humans at this time, but perhaps only one among myriads given God’s creative activity on other worlds. The resurrected Christ is the incarnation of the Word of God, but only of that Word as specifically addressed to the particular situation of mankind.

6. PC, p. 12. Clark Williamson challenges Griffin’s claim in his review, Process Studies 4/3 (Fall 1974), 212-17.