Preface

This collection of essays has ensued from the author’s reflections on the situation of the Church in the conciliar and post-conciliar period. The first essay, "The Changing Church", offers some thoughts on the limits of change within the self-understanding of the Catholic Church. It seeks not merely to warn against a falsely understood "progressism", but, with the same decisiveness, to arouse courage to discover new and bold ways in the Church of God. In view of the ecumenical efforts of the present, the author depicts, in the second essay, by means of the example of "situation ethics", the course which he envisages for a present-day ecumenical dialogue. The opening of the Church to the world calls for a whole series of fundamental debates on the limits of the possibilities of the Church for coping with secular situations of a private and social character. The third essay, ``The Church’s Limits", sketches the author’s thoughts above all on the capacity of the Church to give directions in the public social sphere. The last part of the book attempts a preview of the post-conciliar epoch: which of the teachings of the Constitution on the Church will especially have to touch the heart of the future Christian, if he is to live his faith in the world of tomorrow?

These questions form, in a way, only an accidental selection out of the countless problems posed by the Council documents. They are not a commentary but an elucidation of some of the focal points of the conciliar event, which perhaps did not even find much expression in the official. Some of it is an elaboration of thoughts which just crossed the authors mind and an attempt to draw them generally into consciousness. However, all these reflections seek to help prepare a little the path of the pilgrim Church, so that even in our time it may proclaim and mediate the grace of God.

The original German version of these essays, which are the texts of various lectures given by the author (see note at the end of the book), has appeared in the sixth volume of Schriften zur Theologie (1965). The author and the publishers are grateful to Dr. Oscar Bettschart, Director of Benziger Verlag, Einsiedeln, for permission to publish their English translation in the Quaestiones disputatae series.

Karl Rahner

Munich,

July 1996

Chapter 5: A Wager

I. The Living Christ

From the point of view of radical Christianity, the original heresy was the identification of the Church as the body of Christ. When the Church is known as the body of Christ, and the Church is further conceived as a distinct and particular institution or organism existing within but nevertheless apart from the world, then the body of Christ must inevitably be distinguished from and even opposed to the body of humanity. Only a religious form of Christianity could establish such a chasm between Christ and the world: for it is the backward movement of religious Christianity which retreats from the world, regressing to a primordial deity which it dares to name as the cosmic Logos and the monarchic Christ. We must not be misled by the emergence of Catholic Christianity into thinking that an increasingly universal form of the Church gives witness to a genuinely forward movement of the Church. A forward movement evolving by means of an extension and enlargement of its given or original form cannot evolve to a truly new and comprehensive universality, nor can it embody the kenotic process of the Incarnation. Thus a forward movement in this sense is finally the expression of the will to power, an all too human regression to an inhuman or prehuman state, which necessarily entails a reversal of the true humanity of Jesus. Once the Church had claimed to be the body of Christ, it had already set upon the imperialistic path of conquering the world, of bringing the life and movement of the world into submission to the inhuman authority and power of an infinitely distant Creator and Judge.

But by identifying the Church’s Christ as a reversal of the incarnate Christ, a reversal effected by a backward movement to the now emptied preincarnate epiphanies of God, the radical Christian points the way to the presence of the living Christ in the actuality and fullness of history. It is precisely because the orthodox image of Christ is an image of lordship and power that it is a reversal of a kenotic Christ. The mere fact that the Christ of Christian orthodoxy is an exalted and transcendent Lord is a sufficient sign to the radical Christian that Christianity has reversed the movement of the Incarnation. Simply by clinging to the religious image of transcendent power, the Church has resisted the self-negating movement of Christ and foreclosed the possibility of its own witness to the forward movement of the divine process. Consequently, the radical Christian maintains that it is the Church’s regressive religious belief in God which impels it to betray the present and the kenotic reality of Christ. So long as the Church is grounded in the worship of a sovereign and transcendent Lord, and submits in its life and witness to that infinite distance separating the creature and the Creator, it must continue to reverse the movement of the Spirit who progressively becomes actualized as flesh, thereby silencing the life and speech of the Incarnate Word.

Only by recognizing the antithetical relationship that radical faith posits between the primordial and transcendent reality of God and the kenotic and immediate reality of Christ, can we understand the violent attack which the radical Christian launches upon the Christian God. Even the remembrance of the original glory and majesty of God roots the Christian in the past, inducing him to evade the self-emptying negativity of a fully incarnate divine process, and to flee from the Christ who is actual and real in our present. A faith that names Jesus either as the Son of God or as the prophet of God must be a backward movement to a disincarnate and primordial form of Spirit, a movement annulling the events of the Incarnation and the Crucifixion by resurrecting Jesus either in the form of the exalted Lord or as the proclaimer of an already distant and alien majesty of God: hence an orthodox and priestly Christianity is inevitably grounded in the sacred authority and power of the past. How can the Christian know the living Christ who is immediately present to us, a Christ who is the consequence of the continual forward movement and self-negation of the divine process, if he is bound to a long-distant epiphany of Christ which has been emptied and left behind by the progressive movement of the Word’s becoming flesh? A Christ appearing to our consciousness in his ancient and traditional form cannot be the true and the living Christ, unless we are to deny the real and forward movement of the Incarnation. Above all, a Christ who even now is manifest in the preincarnate form and epiphany of God, and who can be reached only by a total reversal of our history and experience, must be named as the Antichrist, as the dead and alien body of the God who originally died in Christ. Thus it is the radical Christian proclamation of the death of God which liberates the Christian from every alien and lifeless image of Christ.

Radical Christianity poses the real question which must now be addressed to the Christian: is faith speakable or livable in the actuality of our present? Already we have seen that Christianity is the only form of faith which is not grounded in a backward movement of involution and return. Accordingly, authentic Christianity must move forward through history and experience to an eschatological goal. If Christianity refuses the destiny before it, renouncing the actuality of the time and space which it confronts, then inevitably it must regress to a pre-Christian or nonChristian form. Now we must not confuse a Christian and eschatological passage through the actuality of history and experience with a mere submission to the brute reality of the world; such a submission does not affect the world, nor does it embody a self-negation or self-annihilation of the Incarnate Word. We must, rather, understand the forward movement of Christianity to be a truly negative or self-emptying process, a process simultaneously negating both the Word and world which it embodies, and therefore a process transcending and moving beyond the initial expressions of its own movement. Such a process can be actual and real only by occurring in the actuality of experience, it must move through diverse and ever fuller forms of experience to new and progressively more universal goals. A faith reflecting and witnessing to this process obviously cannot retain a static and unchanging form; instead, it must undergo a continual metamorphosis, a progressive metamorphosis embodying the gradual but continual descent of the Word into flesh. Faith must always be able to speak of the Word which is actually present, and to speak to the actuality of the world and experience which it confronts; otherwise, it will relapse into immobility and silence, thereby betraying the very vocation of faith. Perhaps the religious Christian can believe that Christianity need not know the Christ who is immediately present; but a Christianity divorced from the living presence and action of Christ is a Christianity that has abandoned the specifically Christian movement of faith.

Can we truly speak of the Christ who is present to us, of the living Christ who is actually manifest in our world, and who even now is making all things new? We are forewarned that a contemporary Christ will by no means be identical with the Christ of our Christian past, except insofar as he too is a kenotic Christ who is moving ever more comprehensively into the depths of life and experience. By following the way of the radical Christian, we can rejoice in the death of God, and be assured that the historical realization of the death of God is a full unfolding of the forward movement of the Incarnation. Just as the Crucifixion embodies and makes finally real a divine movement from transcendence to immanence, a movement of an originally transcendent God into the actuality of life and experience, so too the dawning of the death of God throughout the totality of experience progressively annuls every human or actual possibility of returning to transcendence. It is precisely because the movement of the Incarnation has now become manifest in every human hand and face, dissolving even the memory of God’s original transcendent life and redemptive power, that there can no longer be either a truly contemporary movement to transcendence or an active and living faith in the transcendent God.

Only by accepting and even willing the death of God in our experience can we be liberated from a transcendent beyond, an alien beyond which has been emptied and darkened by God’s self-annihilation in Christ. To the extent that we attempt to cling to a transcendent realm, a realm that has become ever darker and emptier in the actuality of our experience, we must be closed to the actual presence of the living Christ, and alienated from the contemporary movement of the divine process. Every death of a divine image is a realization of the kenotic movement, an actualization in consciousness and experience of God’s death in Christ; thus a fully incarnate Christ will have dissolved or reversed all sacred images by the very finality of his movement into flesh. We know the finality of the Incarnation by knowing that God is dead; and once we fully live the death of God, we will be liberated from the temptation to return to an epiphany of deity which is present only in the past. Yet to recognize the Christ who has become manifest and real as the result of a total movement from transcendence to immanence, we must be freed from every attachment to transcendence, and detached from all yearning for a primordial innocence. A truly contemporary Christ cannot become present to us until we ourselves have died to every shadow and fragment of his transcendent image.

We must not deceive ourselves by thinking that the faith and worship of the Church must inevitably give witness to a contemporary epiphany of Christ. No doubt, the Incarnate Word is never without witness, but we have little reason to believe that a Christ who has fully and totally entered the world could be known by a Church that refuses either to abandon its transcendent image of Christ or to negate its religious movement of involution and return. If Christ is truly present and real to us in a wholly incarnate epiphany, then the one principle that can direct our search for his presence is the negative principle that he can no longer be clearly or decisively manifest in any of his previous forms or images. All established Christian authority has now been shattered and broken: the Bible may well embody a revelation of the Word but we have long since lost any certain or even clear means of interpreting its meaning as revelation; the Church in its liturgies, creeds, and confessions may well embody an epiphany of Christ, but that epiphany is distant from us, and it cannot speak to our contemporary experience. Even the language that the Christian once employed in speaking of Christ has become archaic and empty, and we could search in vain for a traditional Christian language and symbolism in contemporary art and thinking.

If we are honestly to embark upon a quest for a truly contemporary epiphany of Christ, we must be prepared to accept an ultimate risk, a genuine risk dissolving all certainty and security whatsoever. Let us note, however, that authentic faith always entails a risk of a high order, and this risk must vary in accordance with the time and situation in which it occurs. Already the modern traditional or orthodox Christian has made a wager incorporating such a risk: he has bet that Jesus Christ is the same yesterday, today, and forever, and thus he has bet that finally there is only a single image or epiphany of Jesus, regardless of the time or history in which it appears. The modern dimension of this wager is that our time is so obviously divorced from the time of Jesus, or, at least, our world and history is clearly estranged from the classical world of Christendom, with the consequence that to choose the traditional form of Christ is either to set oneself against the contemporary world or to decide that the actuality of one’s time and situation can have no bearing upon one’s faith in Christ. Never before has this consequence become so clearly manifest, because, as we previously observed, ours is the first form of consciousness and experience that has evolved after the full historical realization of the death of God. This means that any contemporary wager upon the Christ of Christian orthodoxy must be willing to forfeit all the life and movement of a world and actuality that has negated or dissolved the Christian God. We cannot pretend that an ultimate faith in the transcendent Christ of the Church can have no effect upon the actuality of the believer’s life in the world, nor can we imagine that the Church can change its language about Christ in accordance with the actual world which it confronts without in any way decisively effecting its faith in Christ. No, the fact remains that the Christian today who chooses the orthodox image of Christ is making a wager in which he stands to forfeit all the life and energy of a world that is totally alien to the Church’s

Of course, few Christians are consciously or fully aware that they must make such a choice. But true faith is impossible apart from a risk, and the Christian who now chooses the traditional form of Christ is risking not only the loss of the actuality of the present but also the loss of the Christ who may be fully incarnate in that present. Now we must pose a contrary wager. Dare we bet upon a totally incarnate Christ, whose contemporary presence negates his previous epiphanies, with the full realization that we are therein risking both the total loss of Christ as well as the loss of all that life and energy deriving from the presence of a transcendent and eternally given Christ? We must be fully aware that a wager upon a totally incarnate Christ is every bit as much a wager as a wager upon the orthodox image of Christ. Either risks losing both the true reality of Christ and all that life evolving from the presence of Christ. Both are genuine expressions of faith because each enacts a genuine wager, and they are united in repudiating any form of faith that does not demand an ultimate wager. The radical Christian who chooses a fully contemporary Christ not only must be willing to abandon the Christ of our Christian past but he must accept the fact that no clear path lies present to the Christ whom he has chosen, and no final authority exists to direct him upon his quest. Moreover, the Christian who wagers upon a totally incarnate Christ must negate every form and image of transcendence, regardless of what area of consciousness or experience in which it may appear. Thus he must forswear every transcendent ground of judgment, and be banished from every hope in a transcendent life or power. He has chosen a darkness issuing from the death of every image and symbol of transcendence, and he must bet that the darkness of his destiny is the present form and actuality of a totally incarnate body of Christ.

II. Guilt and Resentment

Nietzsche, the greatest modern master of understanding man, has taught us an ironical and intimately human mode of listening, and this listening is often most effective when it listens to what is not said. The modern Christian, at least to judge by the theological spokesmen of the churches, has very nearly ceased speaking about damnation and Hell, and seemingly is no longer capable of even speaking about an ultimate and final form of guilt. Irony besets every action of that strange creature man, and we can only wonder that the ecclesiastical Christian should have ceased to speak about damnation in a century in which guilt and damnation have become an overwhelming motif in so many of the most creative expressions of consciousness and experience. Is ours not a time in which Hell appears to be the arena of human existence? Yet our theologians no longer speak of Hell, and great masses of Christians seem to have lost all fear of damnation. While we need not doubt that most ecclesiastical Christians practice Christianity as a heaven-sent way of returning to innocence, why is it that even the wisest and most worldly of our theologians are mute on the subject of damnation? Why can the theologian not speak of Hell, whereas the artist and the thinker often seem to speak of nothing else? Is it the modern religious Christian’s inability to speak about a God who is actually present in the world which is the ground of his refusal to share a uniquely modern sense of guilt?

Naïve Christians frequently say that damnation and Hell are Old Testament themes which find no place in the "good news" of the New Testament. But the simple truth is that Hell, Satan, and final damnation are almost uniquely New Testament motifs, and these motifs of ultimate terror play a far greater role in the doctrines and liturgies of Christianity than they do in any other religion. Who else but the Christian fears a final and total damnation? Where else but in Christendom do we find records of an experience of total terror? However, in the modern world we find the strange phenomenon of the Christian who is liberated from the fear of damnation, a Christian who apparently is incapable of experiencing terror. Is this the sign of a mature faith which has finally come of age? Or is it but another sign of the truth of Kierkegaard’s judgment that the Christianity of the New Testament no longer exists? Why should the contemporary Christian be innocent of the knowledge of Hell unless the Church has succeeded in establishing itself as a haven from the horror of the modern world? Or is the modern religious Christian so numb with guilt that he can no longer name his condition, and must relapse into a state of immobility and silence about guilt if only as a means of existing in its presence? Is it because the Church can no longer speak about Hell and damnation that we hear so much foolish ecclesiastical chatter about forgiveness? What can an ultimate forgiveness mean if it is impossible to speak about an ultimate guilt? When the Church speaks about guilt, can it be no more than the custodian of the law, ever sanctioning the common fears of society and incorporating in its body whatever is left of the restraints and inhibitions of the society of the past? Is the real function of an all too modern ecclesiastical Christianity to actualize whatever faith and hope is possible for all those masses of men who refuse the darkness and terror of our time?

Nietzsche teaches us that we cannot dissociate the phenomenon of guilt from the phenomenon of pain: it is those who suffer most deeply who are most conscious of guilt, and those who suffer the least who are free of a bad conscience. Of course, suffering in this sense is not to be identified with mere physical pain, but instead is the creation of a full and active consciousness. Nevertheless, a guilty conscience cannot naïvely be judged to be a product of illusion, or of an overly active consciousness, or of simple fear. Guilt is always the consequence of a retreat from life, of a reversal of the life and energy of the body, a reversal having its origin in that repression which is Nietzsche’s name for the real ruler of a fallen history. Nietzsche joins Kierkegaard in identifying existence as guilt. For everything that we know as consciousness and experience is grounded in repression, and to broaden or deepen our consciousness is to recognize the power of repression, a power creating all those dualistic oppositions or antinomies which split human existence asunder, dividing and isolating the shrunken energy of life. Accordingly, guilt is a conscious realization of the broken or fallen condition of humanity, and it is actualized in the individual insofar as he becomes consciously aware of his own bondage to repression. But humanity, as the poets tell us, cannot bear much reality; and we escape the pain of our condition by resentment, a resentment attempting to reverse or even to leap out of the actuality of existence. Resentment arises from an inability or refusal to accept the brute reality of the world; it is a rebellion against life itself, a hatred of the pain, the joy, the fullness of existence. Thus, resentment shrinks existence into the narrowest possible bounds, negating every outlet for the release of energy, and condemning every source of movement and life. The great No-sayers are those who have suffered most profoundly, and they have succeeded in creating patterns of resentment which a weak and broken humanity can accept as the way to the dissolution of consciousness and pain.

Yes, we are guilty; or, our given or actual condition is a condition of guilt; but we harden and freeze our guilty condition by a resentment which forecloses the possibility of the abolition of repression. Resentment is a withdrawal from the possibility of life and movement, a negative reaction to the painfulness of the human condition whereby we submit to guilt and alienation by condemning every possibility of accepting and affirming life. Such a submission to guilt is at bottom a submission to pain, or, rather, an attempt to lower the consciousness of pain by shrinking and confining the energy of life. Ultimately, resentment is directed against the cause of pain; and it arises when we become conscious of our painful condition, and attempt to numb our suffering by negating or evading all occasions for pain. Nietzsche commonly associated resentment with the weak, with those who have been defeated and broken by life, and who then negate every challenge to their own submission and withdrawal. Of course, he also teaches us that resentment can express itself in envy, which is itself the expression of an inability to accept the actuality of a given and particular situation. Always, however, resentment is a flight from life, an evasion of the human condition, an assault upon all life and movement as the way to the dissolution of pain. Resentment progressively lowers the threshold of consciousness, reducing experience to ever narrower spheres, or freezing a given state of consciousness by binding it to a hatred of its immediate ground. Thus, resentment must finally sanction the reality of guilt, passively submitting to the brokenness of the human condition, and ruthlessly refusing every promise of forgiveness and life.

A guilty humanity is inevitably conscious of an opposing other, an imperative appearing whenever we become aware of our confinement by recognizing the repressed state of our own energy. The law, Paul teaches, makes us conscious of sin; but we might reverse Paul’s dictum and also say that sin and guilt make us conscious of the law. As Augustine so wisely teaches, the deepest attraction of sin is the attraction of the forbidden. The temptation to do the forbidden becomes present only when we become conscious of our own state of repression, and then our attraction to the forbidden deepens our bondage to the law, submitting us ever more fully to its distant and inhuman power. Consequently, repression and guilt are inseparable, or, at least, we become conscious of our guilt only to the extent that we become aware of the power of repression within us. Thence our guilt demands that we be punished, and we indulge in orgies of self-hatred if only as a means of appeasing our bad conscience, a bad conscience which is itself the product of a consciousness of repression. A repressed humanity is a guilty humanity, whether it is conscious of its guilt or not, and to the extent that it becomes conscious of its guilt it must submit to the alien authority of the imperative, an authority sealing the finality of guilt, and binding humanity to perpetual repression. Already in the proclamation of Jesus, however, and in the New Testament messages of Paul and John, we discover the Christian promise of the forgiveness of sin, or the release of the sinner from his bondage to law and judgment, a liberation effected by his participation in the body of Christ or the dawning Kingdom of God. Paul insists that the reign of the law extends throughout the body of a fallen humanity, but it is confined to all that human sphere which does not yet exist in faith, for insofar as we exist in faith we are delivered from the bondage of the law. Indeed, it is only by the gift of freedom in Christ that we become aware of the terrible burden of the law, and only by faith in Christ do we receive the power to name the darkness of sin and guilt. It is by faith alone that we become aware of the true meaning and the overwhelming power of guilt and repression: thus we need have little hesitation in assigning Nietzsche to a tradition of a radical Christian understanding of sin, a tradition going back to Paul by way of Dostoevsky, Kierkegaard, Pascal, Luther, and Augustine.

Moreover, it is of vital importance to realize that while existing in a state of alienation and guilt we ourselves must oppose the other, imposing upon all others the obligation under which we live. When Jesus said, "Judge not," he was calling for an end of all moral judgment, a judgment that must inevitably arise from a condition of guilt. Judgment and forgiveness are poles of an opposing continuum, we judge to the extent that we exist in sin, and we become incapable of judgment to the extent that we are forgiven. The Christian is liberated from the alien power of the moral imperative by virtue of his life in Christ, and faith itself calls upon us to acknowledge that we can be aware of a moral demand only insofar as we are estranged from Christ, and thereby closed to the reality of forgiveness. A guilty humanity can exist only by way of judgment and resentment, a judgment sanctioning its own state of alienation, and a resentment opposing every call to forgiveness. In this perspective we can see that resentment is a flight from the presence of Christ, an opposition to his promise of forgiveness. All too naturally a religious Christianity has known the most awesome and terrifying form of the divine Creator and Judge, for a religious reversal of the Incarnation must resurrect the deity in the form of an absolutely majestic and sovereign power, a power that has now lost its ground in the kenotic movement of the divine process. Thus, too, Christendom has known the most terrible guilt in history, and as a religious Christianity has progressively and ever more fully reversed the movement of the Incarnation, the Christian God has increasingly become alien and abstract, until in our own time he has only been present and real in actual experience in a totally alien form, and the whole body of Western humanity has been initiated into a radical and total state of guilt.

Once again we are called upon to make a wager. Dare we bet that the Christian God is dead, that the ultimate ground of guilt and resentment is broken, and that our guilty condition is created by our clinging to the wholly alien power of a now emptied transcendent realm? If we can truly know that God is dead, and can fully actualize the death of God in our own experience, then we can be liberated from the threat of condemnation, and freed from every terror of a transcendent beyond. Even though we may be mute and speechless in confronting the terror of our time, we cannot evade its pervasive presence, and to relapse into immobility and silence is to foreclose the possibility of being freed from its life-negating power.

Yet the "good news" of the death of God can liberate us from our dread of an alien beyond, releasing us from all attachment to an opposing other, and freeing us for a total participation in the actuality of the immediate moment. By wagering that God is dead, we bet that the awesome and alien power of an infinitely distant and wholly other is finally created by our own guilt and resentment, by our refusal of the life and energy about and within us. Of course, every man who negates and opposes life becomes bound to an alien power. But the Christian knows that Christ is the source of energy and life: hence the Christian must identify all No-saying as a refusal and resistance of Christ. When the Christian bets that God is dead, he is betting upon the real and actual presence of the fully incarnate Christ. Thus a Christian wager upon the death of God is a wager upon the presence of the living Christ, a bet that Christ is now at least potentially present in a new and total form. No, we are not guilty, says the Christian who bets that God is dead. His very bet denies the alien authority of the imperative, and refuses all that guilt arising from a submission to repression. He bets that he is even now forgiven, that he has been delivered from all bondage to the law, and that guilt is finally a refusal of the gift of life and freedom in Christ.

Needless to say, such a wager entails a risk, and an ultimate risk at that. For the Christian who bets that God is dead risks both moral chaos and his own damnation. While the religious or the ecclesiastical Christian has increasingly become incapable of speaking about damnation, the radical Christian, who has been willing to confront the totally alien form of God which has been manifest in our time, has known the horror of Satan and Hell, and can all too readily speak the language of guilt and damnation. He knows that either God is dead or that humanity is now enslaved to an infinitely distant, absolutely alien, and wholly other epiphany of God. To refuse a deity who is a sovereign and alien other, or to will the death of the transcendent Lord, is certainly to risk an ultimate wrath and judgment, a judgment which Christianity has long proclaimed to be damnation. Nor can we pretend that it is no longer possible to envision damnation; the modern artist has surpassed even Dante in envisioning the tortures of the damned. So likewise modern man has known a moral chaos, a vacuous nihilism dissolving every ground of moral judgment, which is unequaled in history. The contemporary Christian who bets that God is dead must do so with a full realization that he may very well be embracing a life-destroying nihilism; or, worse yet, he may simply be submitting to the darker currents of our history, passively allowing himself to be the victim of an all too human horror. No honest contemporary seeker can ever lose sight of the very real possibility that the willing of the death of God is the way to madness, dehumanization, and even to the most totalitarian form of society yet realized in history. Who can doubt that a real passage through the death of God must issue in either an abolition of man or in the birth of a new and transfigured humanity?

The Christian, however, cannot escape the fact that he must make a choice. He must either choose the God who is actually manifest and real in the established form of faith, or he must confess the death of God and give himself to a quest for a whole new form of faith. If he follows the latter course, he will sacrifice an established Christian meaning and morality, abandoning all those moral laws which the Christian Church has sanctioned, and perhaps even negating the possibility of an explicitly Christian moral judgment. Certainly he will be forced to renounce every moral imperative with a transcendent ground, and this means that he must forswear the possibility of an absolute moral law, and at best look upon all forms of moral judgment as penultimate ways which must inevitably act as barriers to the full realization of energy and life. Indeed, the Christian who bets that God is dead must recognize that he himself has not yet passed through the death of God at whatever point he clings to moral law and judgment. True, he can look forward to the promise of total forgiveness, but the forgiveness which he chooses can only be realized here and now; it must evaporate and lose all meaning to the extent that it is sought in a distant future or a transcendent beyond. Yet the Christian who wagers upon the death of God can be freed from the alien power of all moral law, just as he can be liberated from the threat of an external moral judgment, and released from the burden of a transcendent source of guilt. Knowing that his sin is forgiven, such a Christian can cast aside the crutches of guilt and resentment. Only then can he rise and walk.

III. Yes-Saying

Not only has the modern Christian apparently been forced to retreat ever more distantly from the fullness of consciousness and experience, but he has been forced to bear the humiliation of discovering in Oriental mysticism a totality of bliss which is not even partially echoed in the shrinking boundaries of an ecclesiastical form of faith. At the very moment when Christian mysticism is either collapsing or receding behind the walls of the monastic cloister, an originally alien form of mysticism is increasingly becoming real to the Western mind, and is casting its spell upon a contemporary and seemingly post-Christian sensibility. We must note, however, that it has been Western scholarship which has unraveled the depths and subtleties of the Oriental mystical vision; or, at least, it has been Western thinkers who have succeeded in translating the exotic language of Eastern mysticism into the contemporary language of Western experience. When we think of such masters of Oriental mysticism as Mircea Eliade, René Guénon, and Hubert Benoit, we are thinking of uniquely contemporary visionaries, masters who have discovered a new way to the sacred through the labyrinth of our profane darkness. But have we not long since learned that the great poetic visionaries of the modern West have employed a non-Christian mystical language and symbolism as a way to the center of a uniquely modern immanence? One has only to think of the names of Blake, Goethe, Hölderlin, Baudelaire, Mallarmé, Rimbaud, Yeats, Rilke, Proust, and Joyce, to realize that non-Christian and even anti-Christian mystical symbols and motifs can supply a primary source of a symbolic language which is here directed to a total vision of the radical profane. Yet it is Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recurrence, a vision also employing but inverting the sacred language of the mystics, which most clearly illuminates the thinking and experience of a history which is becoming totally profane.

Few, if any, thinkers have known the sheer horror of existence which Nietzsche unveiled. Casting aside every fixed source of meaning and value, Nietzsche passed through an interior dissolution of an established form of consciousness and selfhood, and resurrected a chaos of meaninglessness lying deeply buried within the psyche of Western man. His quest was not simply a movement toward madness, for he prophetically foresaw the darkness of the contemporary world, a darkness arising in response to the collapse of the foundations of our history. Once the ground of an inherited form of experience has been uprooted, that experience wilt increasingly become formless, and consciousness with those both the center and the direction which previously made possible its activity and its self-identity. Nietzsche symbolically employed the name of Zarathustra to distinguish two world epochs of history: believing that the Persian Zarathustra created a moral and religious vision which later became the foundation of Western history, Nietzsche created a new Zarathustra whose prophetic proclamation embodies the end of Western history, an end which that history has reached through its own momentum, and an end which will be followed by the advent of a wholly new historical era. All things whatsoever pass into meaninglessness and chaos when they no longer can be known and experienced from the vantage point of a fixed historical or human ground. But it is only by passing through such a chaos that we can reach the new world lying upon our horizon, a world reversing the forms and structures of our inherited consciousness and experience, and a world promising a new life and freedom to that broken and guilty creature, man.

In its initial form, Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recurrence records the chaos of a world that has fallen away from its original center. It reflects a totality of perpetual and meaningless flux; no longer is there a beginning or an end, or, for that matter, a purpose or goal of any kind. For to affirm that all things eternally recur, and recur eternally the same, is to grasp an absolutely chaotic movement or flow, a movement in which identity and difference flow into one another, and nothing at all either preserves its own identity or remains different from anything else. Then the world appears as sheer chaos, and existence itself becomes an unimaginable horror. This vision, however, allows us to peer into the abyss, and thus to perceive the ultimate ground of all No-saying: for guilt and resentment are rooted in the interior reality of chaos and emptiness. Yet the new Zarathustra comes to teach a way to the fullness of life in the midst of chaos, to proclaim a Yes-saying which is the antithetical opposite of No-saying, a Yes-saying embodying a total affirmation of meaninglessness and horror. Yes-saying is, of course, a primary symbol of the higher ways of mysticism, always reflecting a final coincidentia oppositorum, a total union of transiency and eternity, of suffering and joy. But the classical mystical forms of Yes-saying are interior expressions of the metamorphosis of a profane emptiness and nothingness into a sacred totality, a totality of bliss drawing all things into itself, and thereby negating their original and given form. Zarathustra’s Yes-saying dialectically inverts its mystical counterpart, for it embraces and affirms a radically profane nothingness, and does so only by negating the religious quest for a sacred totality.

We shall not understand the Yes-saying of a New Zarathustra unless we realize that it is a total negation of the human and historical world of Christendom, and a negation following from the modern prophet’s proclamation of the death of God. With the death of the Christian God, every transcendent ground is removed from all consciousness and experience, and humanity is hurled into a new and absolute immanence. Our chaos becomes manifest as a uniquely modern chaos when it is ever more comprehensively present in response to the emptying of the transcendent realm, as its darkness fills every pocket of light, and night falls throughout the whole gamut of experience. Now an ultimate choice is thrust upon every man, as he can either turn back in horror at our chaos by engaging in a final No-saying, or he can turn forward and meet our darkness by means of an ultimate Yes-saying, a total affirmation of our actual and immediate existence. Such an acceptance and affirmation is possible only if man will give all of the energy which he once directed to a transcendent beyond to the immediate moment, thus releasing every source of energy so as to effect a total engagement with the actual present before him. Zarathustra, and every authentic modern visionary, points the way to a total affirmation of the world, an affirmation which becomes possible only when the world appears as chaos, and man is liberated from every transcendent root and ground. Here, the disappearance of transcendence actualizes a new immanence, as a total Yes-saying to an immediate and actual present transforms transcendence into immanence, and absolute immanence dawns as the final kenotic metamorphosis of Spirit into flesh.

On every side, scholarly critics and theologians point to Nietzsche’s vision of Eternal Recurrence as the antithetical opposite of the Christian gospel. Without doubt, this radically profane vision is absolutely opposed to the established dogmas and religious practices of Christianity, so much so that it only becomes manifest and real with the collapse of Christendom. Nevertheless, must the contemporary Christian be forced to confess that a totally immanent existence is wholly other than the life of faith? Will he not then also be bound to concede that the Christian can never fully exist in the world and the flesh? The consequence would follow, of course, that the modern Christian must repudiate that total immanence which has so fully dawned in our world, and stand aside from every contemporary negation of transcendence. Let there be no question about this: to judge Zarathustra as the Antichrist, and Eternal Recurrence as a demonic inversion of the Kingdom of God, is to set oneself against the radical secularity of the modern world, and finally to react with No-saying to the uniquely contemporary history of our time. This is precisely the path of the religious or ecclesiastical Christian today, and we might add that this is also the price which now must be paid for choosing the Christian God. On the other hand, if we can find a way to understand and affirm absolute immanence as a contemporary and kenotic realization of the Kingdom of God, an expression in our experience of an original movement of Christ from transcendence to immanence, then we can give ourselves to the darkest and most chaotic moments of our world as contemporary ways to the Christ who even now is becoming all in all. Nothing less is demanded of the Christian who would truly and fully live in our world, and nothing less is promised by the radically kenotic way of Christ.

The religious seer and prophet, whether in East or West, initially appears as one who can name the darkness about him, discovering in its dark emptiness a reversal of the sacred, a reversal banishing the sacred far beyond a present or given state of consciousness. Obviously Nietzsche was such a prophet and seer, and like his ancient compeers, his vision is an expression of a prophetic community, beginning from at least the time of Blake and extended into our own day. The modern prophet, however, names our darkness as a darkness issuing from the death of God. Only the seer or prophet who knows the original and all-encompassing power of God can realize the catastrophic consequences of the death of God. Like the reform prophets of the Old Testament or the Taoist prophets of ancient China, the modern prophet can name even our light as darkness because he has been given a vision which abolishes all that humanity has thus far known as light. Both the ancient and the modern prophet must speak against every previous epiphany of light, calling for an absolute reversal of a fallen history as the way to life, with the hope that the destruction or dissolution of an inherited and given history will bring about the victory of a total epiphany of light. Thus we discover in Second Isaiah, the fullest Old Testament prophetic vision of redemption, a call to look forward to the coming transformation of all things:

Lift up your eyes to the heavens,

and look at the earth beneath;

for the heavens will vanish like smoke,

the earth will wear out like a garment,

and they who dwell in it will die like gnats;

but my salvation will be for ever,

and my deliverance will never be ended.

(Isa. 51:6.)

The triumphant message of Second Isaiah is inseparable from a vision of the coming dissolution of all of reality as man has known it, and it calls for a faith that is wholly directed to this coming event. A disciple of Second Isaiah recorded an oracle of the Lord’s which most clearly witnesses to this radical prophetic call:

For behold, I create new heavens

and a new earth;

and the former things shall not be remembered

or come into mind. (Ch. 65:17.)

May we take these ancient prophetic words as marking the very essence of radical faith? If so, when we greet our chaos with a total Yes-saying, a total engagement with its dark emptiness, then we too can become open to a new and total epiphany of light. It is precisely by a radical movement of turning away from all previous forms of light that we can participate in a new totality of bliss, an absolutely immanent totality embodying in its immediacy all which once appeared and was real in the form of transcendence, and a totality which the Christian must name as the present and living body of Christ. Indeed, can the Christian accept those triumphant words in the third part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, where Zarathustra’s animals speak ecstatically of the redemptive meaning of the symbol of Eternal Recurrence, as a portrait of such a new totality of bliss?

"O Zarathustra," the animals said, "to those who think as we do, all things themselves are dancing: they come and offer their hands and laugh and flee -- and come back. Everything goes, everything comes back; eternally rolls the wheel of being. Everything dies, everything blossoms again; eternally runs the year of being. Everything breaks, everything is joined anew; eternally the same house of being is built. Everything parts, everything greets every other thing again; eternally the ring of being remains faithful to itself. In every Now, being begins; round every Here rolls the sphere There. The center is everywhere. Bent is the path of eternity."

All things will dance when we greet them with affirmation, and then we will be released from the No-saying of guilt and resentment by being freed from all attachment to a distant and transcendent ground. When the path of eternity is bent or curved, then the way down is the way up, and the final or eschatological epiphany of Christ will occur kenotically in the immediate moment: "Being begins in every Now."

The highest expressions of mysticism also envision a center which is everywhere. But the sacred "center" is an interior depth or a transcendent beyond which reveals itself to be all in all as a consequence of an absolute negation or reversal of the profane, whereas Zarathustra’s "center" lies at the very heart of a profane or immanent existence, and it becomes manifest as being everywhere only as the consequence of an absolute negation or reversal of the sacred. The death of God abolishes transcendence, thereby making possible a new and absolute immanence, an immanence freed of every sign of transcendence. Once a new humanity is fully liberated from even the memory of transcendence, it will lose all sense of bondage to the past, and with the loss of that bondage it will be freed from all that No-saying which turns us away from the immediacy of an actual and present "Now." Before singing his drunken midnight song in the fourth part of Thus Spoke Zarathustra, Zarathustra announces that now his world has become perfect; and he asks:

Have you ever said Yes to a single joy? O my friends, then you said Yes too to all woe. All things are entangled, ensnared, enamored; if ever you wanted one thing twice, if ever you said, "You please me, happiness! Abide, moment!" then you wanted all back. All anew, all eternally, all entangled, ensnared, enamored --oh, then you loved the world. Eternal ones, love it eternally and evermore; and to woe too, you say: go, but return! For all joy wants -- eternity.

Such a love of the world is a total affirmation of an actual and immediate present: but in totally affirming the present, we must will that it recur, and that it recur eternally the same. A refusal to will the eternity of the present, the eternity of this actual present before us, can only proceed out of an attachment to transcendence, a bondage to a power lying outside the present, a power withholding us from a total affirmation of the world. Thus Zarathustra concludes his drunken song of joy with a repudiation of every backward movement to eternity, and an affirmation of the new eternity which is here and now:

"Woe implores: Go!

But all joy wants eternity --

Wants deep, wants deep eternity."

Can we join Zarathustra in his hymn of praise to joy? Can we, too, repudiate every reversal of the present, every flight from pain, every backward movement to eternity? But this is to ask the Christian if he dares to open himself to the Christ who is fully present, the Christ who has completed a movement from transcendence to immanence, and who is kenotically present in the fullness and the immediacy of the actual moment before us. If a contemporary epiphany of Christ has abolished all images of transcendence, and emptied the transcendent realm, then we can meet that epiphany only by totally embracing the world. Dare we bet that Christ is fully present in the actuality of the present moment? Then we must bet that God is dead, that a backward movement to eternity is a betrayal of Christ, and that a flight from the pain of existence is a refusal of the passion of Christ. The radical Christian calls us into the center of the world, into the heart of the profane, with the announcement that Christ is present here and he is present nowhere else. Once we confess that Christ is fully present in the moment before us, then we can truly love the world, and can embrace even its pain and darkness as an epiphany of the body of Christ. It is precisely by truly loving the world, by fully existing in the immediacy of the present moment, that we will know that Christ is love, and then we shall know that love is a Yes-saying to the totality of existence.

Christian love is an incarnate love, a self-giving to the fullness of the world, an immersion in the actuality of time and the flesh. Therefore our Yes-saying must give us totally to the moment before us, and if we accept its actuality as the "center" which is everywhere, then we can be delivered from every temptation of regressing to a backward movement which is a reversal and diminution of an actual and immediate present. By turning away from the totality of the present, we engage in a regressive movement dissolving the actuality of the immediate moment, thereby disengaging ourselves from the fullness and the finality of existence. In naming Christ as the full embodiment of love, the Christian confesses that Christ is the fullness of time and the world. Christ is the pure actuality of the total moment, a present and immediate moment drawing all energy forward into itself, and negating every backward movement to eternity. Every nostalgic yearning for innocence, all dependence upon a sovereign other, and every attachment to a transcendent beyond, stand here revealed as flights from the world, as assaults upon life and energy, and as reversals of the full embodiment of love. The Christian who chooses the ancient image of Christ as the Son of God, or who is bound to an epiphany of Christ in a long-distant past, must refuse the Christ who is actually present in our flesh. He wagers upon a purely religious image of Christ even at the price of forfeiting the actuality of our time and history. But the radical Christian wagers upon the Christ who is totally profane. He bets upon the Christ who is the totality of the moment before us, the Christ who draws us into the fullness of life and the world. Finally, radical faith calls us to give ourselves totally to the world, to affirm the fullness and the immediacy of the present moment as the life and the energy of Christ. Thus, ultimately the wager of the radical Christian is simply a wager upon the full and actual presence of the Christ who is a totally incarnate love.

Chapter 4: The Self-Annihilation of God

I. The Death of God

What can it mean to speak of the death of God? Indeed, how is it even possible to speak of the death of God, particularly at a time when the name of God would seem to be unsayable? First, we must recognize that the proclamation of the death of God is a Christian confession of faith. For to know that God is dead is to know the God who died in Jesus Christ, the God who passed through what Blake symbolically named as "Self-Annihilation" or Hegel dialectically conceived as the negation of negation. Only the Christian can truly speak of the death of God, because the Christian alone knows the God who negates himself in his own revelatory and redemptive acts. Just as a purely religious apprehension of deity must know a God who is transcendent and beyond, so likewise a purely rational and nondialectical conception of deity must know a God who is impassive and unmoving, or self-enclosed in his own Being. Neither the religious believer nor the nondialectical thinker can grasp the God whose actuality and movement derives from his own acts of self-negation. Thus it is only the radical, or the profane, or the nonreligious Christian who knows that God has ceased to be active and real in his preincarnate or primordial reality.

Nevertheless, it is essential that the radical Christian make clear what he means by his confession, eliminating so far as possible all that confusion and ambiguity arising from the language of the death of God, and clearly establishing both his Christian claim and his repudiation of all forms of religious Christianity. To confess the death of God is to speak of an actual and real event, not perhaps an event occurring in a single moment of time or history, but notwithstanding this reservation an event that has actually happened both in a cosmic and in a historical sense. There should be no confusion deriving from the mistaken assumption that such a confession refers to an eclipse of God or a withdrawal of God from either history or the creation. Rather, an authentic language speaking about the death of God must inevitably be speaking about the death of God himself. The radical Christian proclaims that God has actually died in Christ, that this death is both a historical and a cosmic event, and, as such, it is a final and irrevocable event, which cannot be reversed by a subsequent religious or cosmic movement. True, a religious reversal of the death of God has indeed occurred in history, is present in the religious expressions of Christianity, and is now receding into the mist of an archaic, if not soon to be forgotten, past. But such a religious reversal cannot annul the event of the death of God; it cannot recover the living God of the old covenant, nor can it reverse or bring to an end the progressive descent of Spirit into flesh. Religious Christians may know a resurrected Lord of the Ascension, just as they may be bound to an almighty and distant Creator and Judge. Yet such a flight from the finality of the Incarnation cannot dissolve the event of the Incarnation itself even if it must finally impel the Christian to seek the presence and the reality of Christ in a world that is totally estranged from Christianity’s established vision of the sacred.

Once again we must attempt to draw a distinction between the original or primal death of God in Christ and the actualization or historical realization of his death throughout the whole gamut of human experience. Remembering the radical Christian affirmation that God has fully and totally become incarnate in Christ, we must note that neither the Incarnation nor the Crucifixion can here be understood as isolated and once-and-for-all events; rather, they must be conceived as primary expressions of a forward-moving and eschatological process of redemption, a process embodying a progressive movement of Spirit into flesh. At no point in this process does the incarnate Word or Spirit assume a final and definitive form, just as God himself can never be wholly or simply identified with any given revelatory event or epiphany, if only because the divine process undergoes a continual metamorphosis, ever moving more deeply and more fully toward an eschatological consummation. While the Oriental mystic knows an incarnational process whereby the sacred totally annihilates or transfigures the profane, a process providing us with our clearest image of the primordial reality of the sacred, it is Christianity alone which witnesses to a concrete and actual descent of the sacred into the profane, a movement wherein the sacred progressively abandons or negates its particular and given expressions, thereby emptying them of their original power and actuality. Radical Christianity knows this divine or incarnational process as a forward-moving Totality. Neither a primordial God nor an original garden of innocence remains immune to this process of descent: here all things whatsoever are drawn into and transfigured by this cosmic or total process of metamorphosis. This movement from "Innocence" to "Experience" is potentially or partially present at every point of time and space, and in every epiphany of the divine process: thus we could even say that God dies in some sense wherever he is present or actual in the world, for God actualizes himself by negating his original or given expressions. Yet we truly know this divine process of negativity only by knowing God’s death in Christ.

Estranged as we are from our Christian heritage, and distant as we most certainly are from the actual faith of the earliest disciples, what can the contemporary Christian know of the original epiphany of God in Christ? Initiated as we are, moreover, into a historical consciousness that has unveiled a whole new world of New Testament thought and imagery, a world that is subject neither to theological systemization nor to translation into modern thought and experience, how can we hope to ascertain the fundamental meaning for us of the original Christian faith? Let us openly confess that there is no possibility of our returning to a primitive Christian faith, and that the Christ who can become contemporary to us is neither the original historical Jesus nor the Lord of the Church’s earliest proclamation. Given our historical situation in the twilight of Christendom, we have long since died to the possibility of a classical or orthodox Christian belief, and must look upon both the New Testament and early Christianity as exotic and alien forms of religion. Nevertheless, and here we continue to have much to learn from the radical Christian, we cannot neglect the possibility that it is precisely our alienation from the religious world of primitive Christianity which can make possible our realization of the fundamental if underlying meaning of the earliest expressions of the Christian faith. For if a religious movement necessarily embodies a backward movement of involution and return, then the very fact that we have died to the religious form of early Christianity can make possible our passage through a reversal of religious Christianity, a reversal that can open to us a new and fuller participation in the forward movement of the Incarnation.

We know that the proclamation of both Jesus and the earliest Palestinian churches revolved about the announcement of the glad tidings or the gospel of the dawning of the Kingdom of God. But thus far neither the theologian nor the Biblical scholar has been able to appropriate the eschatological symbol of the Kingdom of God in such a manner as to make it meaningful to the modern consciousness without thereby sacrificing its original historical meaning. It is scarcely questionable, however, that this symbol originally pointed to the final consummation of a dynamic process of the transcendent’s becoming immanent: of a distant, a majestic, and a sovereign Lord breaking into time and space in such a way as to transfigure and renew all things whatsoever, thereby abolishing the old cosmos of the original creation, and likewise bringing to an end all that law and religion which had thus far been established in history. The very form of Christianity’s original apocalyptic proclamation rests upon an expectation that the actualization of the Kingdom of God will make present not the almighty Creator, Lawgiver, and Judge, but rather a wholly new epiphany of the deity, an epiphany annihilating all that distance separating the creature from the Creator. Despite Paul’s conviction that the victory which Christ won over the powers of sin and darkness had annulled the old Israel and initiated the annihilation of the old creation, to say nothing of his assurance that God will be all in all, both Paul and the early Church were unable fully or decisively to negate the religious forms of the old history, or to surmount their bondage to the transcendent and primordial epiphany of God. Consequently, early Christianity was unable either to negate religion or to absorb and fully assimilate an apocalyptic faith, with the result that it progressively became estranged from its own initial proclamation.

Already we have seen that the modern radical Christian has evolved an apocalyptic and dialectical mode of vision or understanding revolving about an apprehension of the death of God in Christ, and it is just this self-negation or self-annihilation of the primordial reality of God which actualizes the metamorphosis of an all-embracing Totality. Can we not make the judgment that it is precisely this vision of the death of God in Christ that can make possible for us a realization of the deeper meaning of the Christian and eschatological symbol of the dawning of the Kingdom of God? Thereby we could know that the victory of the Kingdom of God in Christ is the fruit of the final movement of God into the world, of Spirit into flesh, and that the Christian meaning of the Kingdom of God is inseparable from an abolition or reversal of all those preincarnate forms or epiphanies of Spirit. By so conceiving the underlying meaning of the original Christian proclamation, we can also see that it is the religious vision of early Christianity which reverses the Christian reality of the Kingdom of God. Inevitably, the orthodox expressions of Christianity abandoned an eschatological ground, and no doubt the radical Christian’s recovery of an apocalyptic faith and vision was in part occasioned by his own estrangement from the dominant and established forms of the Christian tradition. Such a contemporary appropriation of the symbol of the Kingdom of God can also make possible our realization of the gospel, or the "good news," of the death of God: for the death of God does not propel man into an empty darkness, it liberates him from every alien and opposing other, and makes possible his transition into what Blake hailed as "The Great Humanity Divine," or the final coming together of God and man.

Whether or not we choose to so understand the original Christian gospel of the dawning of the Kingdom of God, it is clear that the radical Christian affirms that God has died in Christ, and that the death of God is a final and irrevocable event. All too obviously, however, we cannot discover a clear and decisive witness to the meaning of this event in either the Bible or the orthodox teachings and visions of Christianity. But the radical Christian envisions a gradual and progressive metamorphosis of Spirit into flesh, a divine process continually negating or annihilating itself, as it ever moves forward to an eschatological goal. While the Christian proclaims that this process is triumphant in Christ, or that it is inaugurated in its final form by the events of the Incarnation and the Crucifixion, it does not follow that the process itself ceases to move forward in all that history following the death of Christ. Simply by noting the overwhelming power and the comprehensive expression of the modern Christian experience of the death of God, we can sense the effect of the ever fuller movement of the Word or Spirit into history, a movement whose full meaning only dawns with the collapse of Christendom, and in the wake of the historical realization of the death of God. A contemporary faith that opens itself to the actuality of the death of God in our history as the historical realization of the dawning of the Kingdom of God can know the spiritual emptiness of our time as the consequence in human experience of God’s self-annihilation in Christ, even while recovering in a new and universal form the apocalyptic faith of the primitive Christian. Insofar as the kenotic or negative movement of the divine process is a movement into the actuality of human experience, it can neither be isolated in a given time and place nor be understood as wholly occurring within a given moment. On the contrary, the actualization of the metamorphosis of the Word into flesh is a continual and forward-moving process, a process initially occurring in God’s death in Christ, yes, but a process that is only gradually and progressively realized in history, as God’s original self-negation eventually becomes actualized throughout the total range of human experience.

Once again we have detected a Christian religious reversal of God’s act in Christ: for a faith that isolates the sacred events of Christ’s passion from the profane actuality of human experience must inevitably enclose Christ within a distant and alien form and refuse his presence in the immediacy of our existence. Every Christian attempt to create an unbridgeable chasm between sacred history and human history gives witness to a refusal of the Incarnation and a betrayal of the forward-moving process of salvation. We can discover a reversal of the kenotic movement of the Word in the very insistence of the religious Christian that faith has for once and for all been given, that it is fully and finally present in the Scriptures, the liturgies, the creeds, and the dogmas of the past, and can in no sense undergo a development or transformation that moves beyond its original expression to new and more universal forms. All such religious claims not only attempt to solidify and freeze the life and movement of the divine process, but they foreclose the possibility of the enlargement and evolution of faith, and ruthlessly set the believer against the presence of Christ in an increasingly profane history, thereby alienating the Christian from the actuality of his own time. The radical Christian calls upon his hearer to open himself to the fullness of our history, not with the illusory belief that our history is identical with the history that Jesus lived, but rather with the conviction that the death of God which has dawned so fully in our history is a movement into the total body of humanity of God’s original death in Christ. Once we grasp the radical Christian truth that a radically profane history is the inevitable consummation of an actual movement of the sacred into the profane, then we can be liberated from every preincarnate form of Spirit, and accept our destiny as an occasion for the realization in the immediacy of experience of the self-emptying or self-annihilation of the transcendent and primordial God in the passion and death of Christ.

From this perspective it would even be possible to understand Christendom’s religious reversal of the movement of Spirit into flesh as a necessary consequence of the Incarnation, preparing the way for a more comprehensive historical realization of the death of God by its progressive banishment of the dead body of God to an ever more transcendent and inaccessible realm. If we conceive of the Word or Spirit as moving more and more fully into the body of the profane in response to the self-negation of God in Christ, then we can understand how the Christian God gradually becomes more alien and beyond, receding into a lifeless and oppressive form, until it finally appears as an empty and vacuous nothingness. The God who is progressively manifest in human experience as an empty and alien other is the inevitable consequence of the Spirit who descends ever more deeply into flesh. Not only does the distant and alien God witness to the historical actualization of the Word in the flesh, but his epiphany as a vacuous and empty formlessness dissolves the possibility of a living and actual faith in God, thus impelling the Christian to seek a new epiphany of Christ in the world. Let the contemporary Christian rejoice that Christianity has evolved the most alien, the most distant, and the most oppressive deity in history: it is precisely the self-alienation of God from his original redemptive form that has liberated humanity from the transcendent realm, and made possible the total descent of the Word into the fullness of human experience. The God who died in Christ is the God who thereby gradually ceases to be present in a living form, emptying himself of his original life and power, and thereafter receding into an alien and lifeless nothingness.

The death of God in Christ is an inevitable consequence of the movement of God into the world, of Spirit into flesh, and the actualization of the death of God in the totality of experience is a decisive sign of the continuing and forward movement of the divine process, as it continues to negate its particular and given expressions, by moving ever more fully into the depths of the profane. A faith that knows this process as a self-negating and kenotic movement, as both embodied and symbolically enacted in the passion of Christ, knows that it becomes manifest in the suffering and the darkness of a naked human experience, an experience banished from the garden of innocence, and emptied of the sustaining power of a transcendent ground or source. So far from regarding the vacuous and rootless existence of modern man as the product of an abandonment of faith, the radical Christian recognizes the spiritual emptiness of our time as the historical actualization of the self-annihilation of God, and despite the horror and anguish embedded in such a condition of humanity, the radical Christian can greet even this darkness as a yet more comprehensive embodiment and fulfillment of the original passion of Christ. Hence a radical faith claims our contemporary condition as an unfolding of the body of Christ, an extension into the fullness of history of the self-emptying of God. No evasion of an autonomous human condition is possible for the Christian who confesses his participation in a Word that has negated its primordial and transcendent ground: the Christian who lives in a fully incarnate Christ is forbidden either to cling to an original innocence or to yearn nostalgically for a preincarnate Spirit. Indeed, it is precisely the Christian’s life in the kenotic Word which impels him to accept and affirm a world in which God is dead as the realization in history of God’s self-annihilation in Christ.

Once the Christian has been liberated from all attachment to a celestial and transcendent Lord, and has died in Christ to the primordial reality of God, then he can say triumphantly: God is dead! Only the Christian can speak the liberating word of the death of God because only the Christian has died in Christ to the transcendent realm of the sacred and can realize in his own participation in the forward-moving body of Christ the victory of the self-negation of Spirit. Just as the primitive Christian could call upon his hearer to rejoice in the Crucifixion because it effected the advent of the Kingdom of God, the contemporary Christian can announce the glad tidings of the death of God, and speak with joy of the final consummation of the self-annihilation of God. True, every man today who is open to experience knows that God is absent, but only the Christian knows that God is dead, that the death of God is a final and irrevocable event, and that God’s death has actualized in our history a new and liberated humanity. How does the Christian know that God is dead? because the Christian lives in the fully incarnate body of Christ, he acknowledges the totality of our experience as the consummation of the kenotic passion of the Word, and by giving himself to the Christ who is present to us he is liberated from the alien power of an emptied and darkened transcendence. Rather than being mute and numb in response to the advent of a world in which the original name of God is no longer sayable, the Christian can live and speak by pronouncing the word of God’s death, by joyously announcing the "good news" of the death of God, and by greeting the naked reality of our experience as the triumphant realization of the self-negation of God. What can the Christian fear of the power of darkness when he can name our darkness as the fulfillment of the self-emptying of God in Christ?

II. Atonement

When the Incarnation and the Crucifixion are understood as dual expressions of a common process, a kenotic or negative process whereby God negates his primordial and transcendent epiphany thereby undergoing a metamorphosis into a new and immanent form, then the incarnate manifestation of Word or Spirit can also be understood as an eschatological consummation of the self-negation of God, an extension of the atoning process of the self-annihilation of God throughout the totality of experience. Such an apocalyptic and dialectical understanding of the atonement, however, demands a new conception of atonement or reconciliation: a conception revealing not simply that God is the author and the agent of atonement but is himself the subject of reconciliation as well. We have seen that radical faith knows the transcendent epiphany of Spirit as an alien and repressive form of God, and Hegel would teach us that it is only in the modern world or in an absolute form of faith that consciousness can know that transcendent Spirit is abstract and lifeless, for only by means of a realization of the death of God in human experience can faith be liberated from the authority and the power of the primordial God. Once God has died in Christ to his transcendent epiphany, that epiphany must inevitably recede into an abstract and alien form, eventually becoming the full embodiment of every alien other, and thence appearing to consciousness as the ultimate source of all repression. Already we have seen that faith can name this movement as the metamorphosis of God into Satan, as God empties himself of his original power and glory and progressively becomes manifest as an alien but oppressive nothingness. We must understand this whole movement as an atoning process, a forward-moving process wherein a vacuous and nameless power of evil becomes increasingly manifest as the dead body of God or Satan; but it is precisely this epiphany of God as Satan which numbs the power of evil, and unveils every alien and oppressive other as a backward-moving regression into the now lifeless and hence ultimately powerless emptiness of the primordial sacrality of God.

The negation occurring in the Crucifixion therefore is not a simple negation, not a mere annulment or annihilation of a previously existent Being, but rather the negation of a negation, the reversal and transformation of the fallen or transcendent epiphany of Spirit. Yes, God dies in the Crucifixion: therein he fulfills the movement of the Incarnation by totally emptying himself of his primordial sacrality. But his death is a self-negation or self-annihilation: consequently, by freely willing the dissolution of His transcendent "Selfhood," the Godhead reverses the life and movement of the transcendent realm, transforming transcendence into immanence, thereby abolishing the ground of every alien other. If we conceive the Crucifixion as the original enactment and embodiment of the self-reversal of all transcendent life and power, then we can understand the atonement as a universal process, a process present wherever there is life and energy, wherever alienation and repression are abolished by the self-negation of their ultimate source. However, the abolition of alienation and repression must remain illusory if it is not the expression of the self-negation or self-annihilation of God. Alienation and repression must forever rule in history if it is impossible to abolish their ground; so long as the ultimate ground of a fallen history remains wholly isolated and absolutely autonomous, there can be no hope in the resurrection of energy and life. Yet the God who died in Christ has freely annulled the final ground of repression: by annihilating his original epiphany, he has shattered all abstract and alien forms of Spirit, finally bringing an end to the life and movement of a transcendent or wholly other beyond, thereby obliterating the ground of all No-saying, and dissolving every sanction for a regressive movement to immobility and silence.

While it is true that the event of the Crucifixion, or the movement of the universal process of atonement, reveals the self-estrangement of God, a polarity manifesting itself in the yawning chasm between the Father and the Son, a consistent and radical form of faith must never fall into a nondialectical dualism by wholly isolating the alien God and the incarnate Word. Recognizing that the Crucifixion is an act of atonement, an act reversing the primordial sacrality of God, we must not imagine that it is consumed in the emptying of the transcendent sacred, but rather conceive its consummation as the final extension of an emptied and negated sacrality throughout the totality of experience. Not until a self-negated sacrality has entered into the fullness of experience will it fulfill the movement of the atonement. Just as the Crucifixion cannot truly be known as the mere negation of transcendence, it is necessary to understand the atonement as a negative process of reversing every alien other, a process of negating all negations. It, too, is a kenotic process, for it is the embodiment in history and experience of the divine process, and it effects a self-negation or self-annihilation of every power confining life and energy. Even the most awesome and oppressive manifestations of an alien otherness are finally subject to a dialectical reversal, a reversal that has already occurred in the self-annihilation of God, but only with the extension of this reversal into every alien sphere will the actualization of the atonement be consummated. Satan must become totally and comprehensively present in his apocalyptic form as the lifeless residue of the self-negation of God before the atonement will have become wholly actualized in history; and then, the radical apocalyptic seer assures us, Satan must undergo a final metamorphosis into an eschatological epiphany of Christ.

No doubt the total vision promised by an apocalyptic form of faith is not yet present upon our historical horizon; for, immersed as we are in a fully profane consciousness, we would seem to have lost the very possibility of apocalyptic vision. Not until our time did the meaning and the reality of the radical profane become embedded in human consciousness, because ours is the first form of consciousness to have evolved after the historical actualization of the death of God. Nevertheless, the modern artist, by inverting or reversing our mythical traditions, has disclosed a totally immanent mode of existence banished even from the memory of transcendence, and created a comprehensive vision of a new and total nothingness which Blake named as Ulro, or Hell. In 1822, Blake etched The Ghost of Abel, "A Revelation in the Visions of Jehovah Seen by William Blake," and the poem on this single plate was destined to be the last prophetic poetry that Blake was to give to the world. After the death of Abel, his ghost appears, demanding vengeance, then sinks into his grave, from which Satan arises, demanding of Jehovah the sacrifice of men, and foreseeing that: "Thou shalt Thyself be Sacrificed to Me, thy God, on Calvary." But Jehovah thunders and replies:

"Such is My Will that Thou Thyself go to Eternal

Death

In Self-Annihilation, even till Satan, Self-subdu’d,

Put off Satan

Into the Bottomless Abyss, whose torment arises

for ever & ever."

Compressed as these lines are, they contain the dual theme that God must be sacrificed to Satan on Calvary, and that Satan must be self-annihilated and forever perish as Satan. Once again Blake is envisioning a revolutionary transformation of Christianity. Believing that every repression of energy is a repetition of Calvary, Blake finally came to see that the very horror of the sacrifice which Satan demands in all his multiple forms is ultimately a redemptive horror, a darkness which must become light. This is because the movement of the energy of passion is kenotic or sacrificial, both in origin and in goal: therefore an energy becoming actualized or incarnate in the flesh must be self-subdued in self-annihilation. Can this mean that, apocalyptically and dialectically envisioned, Satan is the Christian name of the atoning power and presence of Christ?

In his commentary on Jerusalem, Joseph Wicksteed notes -- but unfortunately he fails to develop or explicate this insight -- that Blake’s Christ is the redeemer of the Creator. Christ is the redeemer because he is the full actualization of kenotic energy; but the Creator, or the wholly alien and transcendent epiphany of Spirit, is the redeemed because an absolutely transcendent and sovereign God is finally the source of all that repressed energy which is transmuted in self-sacrifice. Thus the Creator is the spectrous "Shadow" of a fallen and inverted energy, and his shadow disappears in the kenotic passion of self-sacrifice and self-annihilation. "I am not a God afar off," declares the Savior in Jerusalem, but in the Lamb’s presence the distant God is self-annihilated and forever perishes as Satan: "Thou shalt Thyself be Sacrificed to Me, thy God, on Calvary." So long as Christianity knows the Crucifixion as a vicarious sacrifice for a totally guilty humanity, as the innocent sacrifice of the eternal Son of God to a just but merciful Father, it can never celebrate the definitive victory of the Crucifixion; for such a redeemed humanity remains in bondage to the transcendent Judge, and must continue to be submissive to his distant and alien authority, ever pleading for mercy when it falls away from his absolute command. If the Crucifixion does not express and embody a decisive self-transformation of God, then at most it can only give a guilty humanity a temporary respite from the sovereign power of the transcendent Creator, while at worst it can seal a fallen humanity in its abject state of powerlessness and self-abasement, totally repressing every tendency to movement and life. The radical Christian, who is in quest of a total redemption, must repudiate every religious promise resting upon a perpetuation of man’s fallen state, and recognize in the orthodox image of the crucified Christ an image of the victory of that Satan who would bind man to a broken and shrunken condition. Not until the Christian recognizes the Crucifixion as enacting and embodying the self-negation of the sovereign and transcendent Creator can he celebrate an atonement which is the source of the abolition of all confinement and repression.

Hegel, in those difficult, often cryptic, but nevertheless profoundly rewarding pages in the final sections of The Phenomenology of Spirit, where he discusses Christianity as the "absolute religion," gives witness to the advent of an absolute form of Christianity which both negates all previous religion and promises a reconciliation of all those antinomies which have plagued human consciousness throughout its history. While Blake struggled with great difficulty to create a consistent dialectical vision of the atonement as a universal process, Hegel’s philosophical method leads to an understanding of the ground of such a vision, and for that very reason the philosopher’s ideas can illuminate the dark if deeper vision of the poet. Hegel is all too Blakean in understanding the Crucifixion as the sacrifice of the abstract and alien God. Indeed, Hegel attempts to demonstrate that the Crucifixion can only fully appear and be real in consciousness when God is known as being alienated from himself, existing in a dichotomous form as Father and Son or sovereign Creator and eternal Word. To maintain his existence as the transcendent Creator, God must continually cancel or negate the world; but to move toward his universal epiphany as the Incarnate Word, he must negate his sovereign transcendence. Consequently, God is here known as existing in opposition to himself. The dissolution of this opposition takes place only when each form of the Godhead, by virtue of its inherent independence, dissolves itself in itself: "Therefore that element which has for its essence, not independent self-existence but simple being, is what empties and abandons itself, gives itself unto death, and so reconciles Absolute Being with its own self." Spirit now becomes manifest in its ultimate form, yet it comes to its own fulfillment in the sphere of the immediate and sensuous present, as the dissolution of the alienated forms of the Godhead reconciles that Godhead with the actuality of immediate existence.

Through the events that faith knows as the Incarnation and the Crucifixion, God empties himself of his sovereignty and transcendence, and not only does this kenotic sacrifice effect the dissolution of the opposition between Father and Son in the new epiphany of God as universal Spirit, but so likewise vanishes the opposition between God and the world. As the full meaning of this sacrifice or self-negation dawns in consciousness, the factuality and historicity of Jesus’ particular "self-existence" is negated as that existence now becomes universal self-consciousness: "The death of the mediator is death not merely of his natural aspect, of his particular self-existence: what dies is not merely the outer casement, which, being stripped of essential being, is eo ipso dead, but also the abstraction of the divine Being." Therefore spiritual Christianity, as Hegel conceives it, understands the atoning death of Christ as the manifestation of the transition of Spirit from its alienated epiphany as transcendent Being to its final epiphany as incarnate Spirit, or what Hegel termed "total self-consciousness." This transition is effected by the death of the abstract and alien God in the kenotic process of Incarnation and Crucifixion; but a religious form of faith can only grasp this process as a series of events that are autonomous and external to human consciousness. Only when the death of God appears in all its bitterness in the "unhappy Consciousness," and consciousness thence comes to know the dissolution of the Wholly Other, can a spiritual form of dialectical understanding arise that will know the death of God as the triumphant epiphany of Spirit. For so long as consciousness remains bound to religion, it must exist in an alienated form, closed to the inner reality of Spirit by its very belief in an alien Other. This traditional form of faith is the product of a divided consciousness: it can only know redemption as a reconciliation with an Other lying beyond itself, and must experience the actuality of the present as a world merely awaiting its transfiguration. Yet Christianity has now at least implicitly evolved to an absolute form wherein it can realize the final epiphany of Spirit as immediately present and actualized for us.

All too obviously, however, our world is not bathed in an epiphany of light. Indeed, the contemporary Christian is confronted with a world of total darkness, a darkness dissolving or negating everything that Christianity once knew as faith. If a new and total Antichrist has appeared upon our horizon, and is destined to become yet more fully incarnate in the world, then we must learn from the apocalyptic and radical Christian to greet his epiphany not only with horror but also with the joy of faith. The fact that artists and seers have succeeded in naming our darkness, in speaking in the presence of the most awesome nothingness yet actualized in history, is a decisive sign of new life and affirmation, a life that can speak and move even in the presence of a life-negating Totality. Like the ancient apocalyptic seer, the modern artist has unveiled a world of darkness, but whereas earlier seers could know a darkness penetrated by a new æon of light, the contemporary artist has seen light itself as darkness, and embodied in his work an all-embracing vacuity dissolving every previous form of life and light. Nevertheless, the Christian can name an empty and life-negating Totality as the body of the Antichrist. The Christian, moreover, who knows the Christ who is the embodiment of the self-negation of God, can know the Satan or the Antichrist who is present to us as the actualization or the historical realization of the death of God. Insofar as an eschatological epiphany of Christ can occur only in conjunction with a realization in total experience of the kenotic process of self-negation, we should expect that epiphany to occur in the heart of darkness, for only the universal triumph of the Antichrist can provide an arena for the total manifestation of Christ. Thus the Christian must finally rejoice in the advent of a total darkness, because the Christian knows the reign of the Antichrist as the darkness before the dawn, a darkness that must ultimately pass away by being transfigured into light.

The radical Christian repudiates the Christian dogma of the resurrection of Christ and his ascension into a celestial and transcendent realm because radical faith revolves about a participation in the Christ who is fully and totally present to us. Speaking in the traditional symbolic language of Christianity, we could say that radical faith transposes the traditional vision of the resurrection into a contemporary vision of the descent into Hell: the crucified Christ does not ascend to a heavenly realm but rather descends ever more fully into darkness and flesh. By this means we can see that the continuing descent of the Word into flesh clearly parallels the historical actualization of the death of God and God’s final appearance in our history in a totally alien and lifeless form. Finally, the dead body of God cannot be dissociated from the Christ who has descended into Hell. We must not imagine that a movement of Word or Spirit into flesh is liberating and redemptive in a simple and nondialectical sense: a metamorphosis of Word into flesh must reverse the original redemptive potency of Spirit and extend that reversal throughout the whole range of experience. As the original form of Spirit progressively recedes into a faceless immobility, that blank and numbing silence becomes manifest throughout experience, abolishing every transcendent ground of hope and stilling every nostalgic aspiration for a garden of innocence. Once the transcendent realm has lost every sign of its original redemptive power, then it must become manifest as a negative or demonic transcendence, before its passage into total formlessness. It is not without significance that the modern artist has given himself so fully to envisioning evil and nothingness, or has been so deeply bound to visions of Satan, of chaos, and of emptiness; for the artist cannot escape the reality of his time by fleeing to an earlier moment of history. A new epiphany of Antichrist is drawing everything into itself, as its ever dawning totality transfigures all experience, unveiling the emptiness of Hell in every human hand and face.

Yet if the Christian can but name our Hell as Antichrist, then we shall know that its power has been broken and it can pose no ultimate threat to us. When all evil and nothingness pass into the faceless epiphany of a total Antichrist, then the ultimate ground of chaos will be dissolved, every inherent sanction for all alien and compelling demands will be removed, and every opposing other will stand revealed in a lifeless and vacuous form. The reign of the Antichrist is the consummation of all oppressive power because it embodies every alien other in its pure and intrinsic otherness, dissolving once and for all the deceptive mask of evil, and actualizing an underlying and hidden chaos in the fullness of a now naked experience. It is precisely because an epiphany of Antichrist abolishes the transcendent source of evil and nothingness by embodying a primordial chaos in the actuality of history that it is a redemptive epiphany, an epiphany unveiling the full reality of alienation and repression, thereby preparing the way for their ultimate reversal. Therefore the Christian is finally called to accept the Antichrist, or the totality of the dead body of God, as a final kenotic manifestation of Christ. Distant as we ourselves may actually be from such an apocalyptic vision, a vision that is already clearly present in Blake, we must nevertheless be prepared to open ourselves to the anguish and terror of experience as an expression of the atoning process of redemption, a process that even now is unveiling a yet fuller form of horror by dissolving the sacred and transcendent masks of experience, and actualizing experience in a totally immanent form. Perhaps we cannot yet name such an experience as the atoning body of Christ; but we can know it as the dead and alien body of God, and consequently we cannot dissociate the alien body of the Antichrist from the Christ who is the embodiment of the self-negation of God.

III. The Forgiveness of Sin

Protestant dialectical theologians from Luther to Barth have insisted that we only truly know our fallen and sinful condition as a consequence of the gift of grace, that only a realization of redemption or of the forgiveness of sin makes possible an understanding of the reality of sin. Nevertheless, Christian theology has almost entirely reached its conception of sin either from the postulation of a natural and universal moral law or from the situation of a broken and guilty humanity confronting an absolutely sovereign Creator and Judge. When theology draws its conception of sin either from a normative understanding of law or an analysis of the state of the sinner, it isolates sin from grace, and thus forecloses the possibility of understanding the forgiveness or the annulment of sin. Perhaps the Old Testament words most clearly preparing the way for the Christian proclamation of the forgiveness of sin are contained in a postexilic prophecy recorded in The Book of Jeremiah, a joyous prophecy embodying the initial promise of a new covenant:

Behold, the days are coming, says the Lord, when I will make a new covenant with the house of Israel and the house of Judah, not like the covenant which I made with their fathers when I took them by the hand to bring them out of the land of Egypt, my covenant which they broke, though I was their husband, says the Lord. But this is the covenant which I will make with the house of Israel after those days, says the Lord: I will put my law within them, and I will write it upon their hearts; and I will be their God, and they shall be my people. And no longer shall each man teach his neighbor and each his brother, saying, "Know the Lord," for they shall all know me, from the least of them to the greatest, says the Lord; for I will forgive their iniquity, and I will remember their sin no more. (Jer. 31:31-34.)

It is the final phrase of this prophecy which supplies a crucial key to the radical Christian vision: "I will remember their sin no more." Remarkably enough, these words have no clear analogue in the New Testament, but the radical Christian joins the greatest reformers of the Christian faith in discovering that the forgiveness of sin culminates in an abolition of the memory of sin.

If we know anything at all about the ministry of Jesus, we know that no action of his ministry brought greater offense to his hearer than his forgiveness of sin; and no theme of his sayings or parables overshadows the proclamation of forgiveness, although we must recognize that originally this forgiveness was inseparable from the eschatological situation of the dawning of the Kingdom of God. We can sense something of the early Christian understanding of the eschatological meaning of the new covenant by noting the words of Paul, who, while speaking of the old covenant as a law of death and condemnation, rejoices that the glory of the new covenant so surpasses the glory of the old that the old covenant now has no glory at all:

Since we have such a hope, we are very bold, not like Moses, who put a veil over his face so that the Israelites might not see the end of the fading splendor. But their minds were hardened; for to this day, when they read the old covenant, that same veil remains unlifted, because only through Christ is it taken away. Yes, to this day whenever Moses is read a veil lies over their minds; but when a man turns to the Lord the veil is removed. Now the Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom. And we all, with unveiled face, beholding the glory of the Lord, are being changed into his likeness from one degree of glory to another; for this comes from the Lord who is the Spirit. (II Cor. 3 :12-18.)

A radical Christian would interpret these words as meaning that the glory of the God of the old covenant is abolished, for apart from an abolition of the God of judgment, there remains no possibility of transforming humanity into the likeness or image of the glory of Christ. Accordingly, radical or spiritual Christians believe that the demands of the God of law and judgment are annulled in the grace of the God who died on Calvary. Yet this grace cannot be realized or fulfilled until it culminates in the cessation of the very memory of sin: indeed, Kierkegaard underwent his second conversion or "metamorphosis" only when he finally came to realize that God had forgotten his sin, and then wrote The Sickness Unto Death, whose dialectical thesis is that sin is the opposite not of virtue but of faith.

When faith understands itself as existing in opposition to the state of sin, it must give itself both to a negation of law and guilt and to a continual process of abolishing the consciousness of sin: "Come, O thou Lamb of God, and take away the remembrance of Sin" (Jerusalem 50:24). Seen in this perspective, guilt is the product of self-alienation: and not simply an alienation from an individual and private selfhood, but rather a cosmic state of alienation from a universal energy and life.

In Great Eternity every particular Form gives

forth or Emanates

Its own peculiar Light, & the Form is the Divine

Vision

And the Light is his Garment. This is Jerusalem

in every Man,

A Tent & Tabernacle of Mutual Forgiveness, Male

& Female Clothings.

And Jerusalem is called Liberty among the Chil-

dren of Albion.

Although Jerusalem is present in every "Man" as a tabernacle of mutual forgiveness, that tabernacle has been shattered by the Fall, as fallen man is sealed in the isolation of his individual selfhood:

But AIbion fell down, a Rocky fragment from

Eternity hurl’d

By his own Spectre, who is the Reasoning Power

in every Man,

Into his own Chaos, which is the Memory between

Man & Man.

(Jerusalem 54: 1-8.)

To name chaos as the memory separating man from man is to recognize that sin is a state of solitude, with the consequence that the forgiveness of sin is a cosmic process of "Self-Annihilation." Furthermore, the forgiveness of sin is a universal and apocalyptic process of redemption: all those spaces separating a fallen humanity from its isolated parts must be annulled by a forward-moving process drawing the apocalyptic futurity of Jerusalem into the present moment, thereby making possible the final triumph of "The Great Humanity Divine."

Blake’s most luminous vision of "Self-Annihilation" is contained in the second book of Milton, where Milton or a reborn Christianity undergoes regeneration by transforming Satan into "The Great Humanity Divine." This vision of the mature Blake is accompanied by a new conception of the relation between human individuals and their changing states:

Distinguish therefore States from Individuals in

those States.

States Change, but Individual Identities never

change nor cease.

You cannot go to Eternal Death in that which can

never Die.

(Milton 32:22-24.)

While individual identities never die, all that which they become in history and experience must pass through an eternal death, and it is precisely this passage through death which effects a cosmic and total regeneration. Milton, the human state called "Eternal Annihilation," has, in his own state of self-negation, the power to annihilate that Satan who appears within the deadly "Selfhood." But following the "Laws of Eternity," he annihilates himself for Satan’s good: "Such are the Laws of Eternity, that each shall mutually/Annihilate himself for others’ good, as I for thee" (38:35). Repudiating the fear and dread inspired in men by Satan and his churches -- an Angst deriving from an abject and selfish terror of death (38:38) -- Milton’s purpose is to teach men to despise death and to move forward:

"In fearless majesty annihilating Self, laughing to

scorn

Thy Laws & terrors, shaking down thy Synagogues

as webs.

I come to discover before Heav’n & Hell the Self

righteousness

In all its Hypocritic turpitude, opening to every

eye

These wonders of Satan’s holiness, shewing to the

Earth

The Idol Virtues of the Natural Heart, & Satan’s

Seat

Explore in all its Selfish Natural Virtue…"

(Milton 38:41-47.)

We must not fail to observe, however, that here God is revealed in his satanic form only in response to a humanity that has passed through "Self-Annihilation" and abolished even the memory of sin. It is only when man has been delivered from the threat of condemnation, a threat always present wherever humanity exists in a state of isolated selfhood, that a truly forgiven humanity can be liberated from Satan’s power.

When self-righteousness and natural virtue are unveiled as Satan’s holiness, we are once again confronting a transcendence and inversion of the Western moral and theological tradition, an inversion revealing that the natural virtue and power of an individual selfhood is the inevitable expression of the self-alienation of a fallen and isolated humanity. Moreover, so long as self-righteousness is judged to be a moral state deriving from an isolated and autonomous individual, there lies no way to a comprehension of its ultimate ground and its universal consequences. The regenerate Milton moves through a self-annihilation actualizing the death of God in immediate experience. Thereby the living power of the transcendent and omnipotent Judge is transposed in human experience into the dead body of Satan, as Milton’s passage through the death of selfhood unveils the ground of an isolated selfhood as that chasm separating the creature from the Creator, thus making possible the reversal or dissolution of natural virtue and self-righteousness in the immediate and present actualization of the self-annihilation of God. Once God has ceased to exist in human experience as the omnipotent and numinous Lord, there perishes with him every moral imperative addressed to man from a beyond, and humanity ceases to be imprisoned by an obedience to an external will or authority. In The Everlasting Gospel, Blake presents a simple but powerful evocation of this antinomian theme, as can be seen in these lines recounting Jesus’ reaction to the woman taken in adultery (who is blasphemously identified with Mary, the mother of Jesus):

What was the sound of Jesus’ breath?

He laid His hand on Moses’ Law:

The Ancient Heavens, in Silent Awe

Writ with Curses from Pole to Pole,

All away began to roll:

The Earth trembling & Naked lay

In secret bed of Mortal Clay,

On Sinai felt the hand divine

Putting back the bloody shrine,

And she heard the breath of God

As she heard by Eden’s flood:

"Good & Evil are no more!

Sinai’s trumpets, cease to roar!

Cease, finger of God, to write!

The Heavens are not clean in thy Sight.

Thou art Good, & thou Alone;

Nor may the sinner cast one stone.

To be Good only, is to be

A God or else a Pharisee."

(2e, 10-28.)

Good and evil cease to be when man is delivered from selfhood, when his solitary and autonomous ego is abolished, and he ceases to be aware of a distance separating himself from others. That very distance is solidified by the demands of a distant Lord, and apart from a fallen confinement in an isolated selfhood there could be no awareness of the God who is the Wholly Other.

If a universal and fallen condition of selfhood isolates man from man and man from God, then sin is equivalent to this cosmic state of isolation, and the forgiveness of sin must be a cosmic and historical process that negates this estrangement by annihilating the solitude that is its source. On the 96th plate of Jerusalem, there is an illustration of the Creator and Jerusalem drawing together in an ecstatic embrace. The Creator is on the left and is moving downward toward Jerusalem in his final manifestation as Satan, while Jerusalem, or the apocalyptic epiphany of Christ, appears as a naked female form moving upward toward Satan. Satan ("The Ancient of Days") looks to the right and exposes his right foot from beneath his covering veil, both of which symbolize a spiritual ascent; whereas, Jerusalem, who unlike her divine counterpart is facing us, rises on her left foot and looks to her right and our left, as she ascends by descending, by reversing the divine movement ("the way up is the way down"). We may surmise that this illustration is a vision of the universal process of atonement if only because Satan and Jerusalem are engaged in a mutual negation of all that selfhood isolating each from the other: Satan reverses his transcendent selfhood so as to become "flesh" (i.e., sarx, in the Pauline sense of existence outside of or apart from Spirit), and Jerusalem completes her reverse movement of ascent by descending into Hell. The text on this plate is saturated with apocalyptic imagery; it opens with a vision of the sun and moon leading forward the "Vision of Heaven & Earth," which is immediately followed by an apocalyptic epiphany of Jesus as the Son of Man: "And the Divine Appearance was the likeness & similitude of Los." However, the traditional apocalyptic symbol of the Son of Man is a symbol of a heavenly and divine Being; and his epiphany -- which marks the advent of the final Eschaton --occurs in the heavens, where he appears with legions of angels. Blake dialectically inverts this ancient symbol so as to transpose it into the kenotic Christ: hence Jesus appears in the likeness of Los or the temporal form of the "Human Imagination."

We must not dissociate the lines of the text from their accompanying illustration, for the apocalyptic epiphany of Jesus occurs when Satan and Jerusalem engage in a mutual embrace. This ecstatic union of Satan and Jerusalem is in process of fulfillment even as Albion (Blake’s symbolic figure representing a universal but fallen humanity) experiences the final epiphany of Jesus. The Satan of the illustration has his back turned toward us, and in the lines directly facing his awesome buttocks, Albion laments his cruel and deceitful "Selfhood," recognizing that the God of Sinai has ensnared him in a deadly sleep of six thousand years: "I know it is my Self, O my Divine Creator & Redeemer." These words are addressed to Jesus, and we must not fail to notice that the transcendent Creator and Judge can be identified as the ultimate ground of selfhood only at the moment when an immanent and totally human Jesus can be named as the divine Creator and Redeemer! Nothing less is occurring here than an apocalyptic coincidentia oppositorum, and while such a radical dialectical inversion has never previously occurred in the apocalyptic tradition, when it occurs in this initial form it is accompanied by a vision of a total process of redemption that is effected by a divine passage through death. Thus Jesus responds to Albion’s terror of his own selfhood with these words: "Fear not Albion: unless I die thou canst not live;/But if I die I shall arise again & thou with me...."

So Jesus spoke: the Covering Cherub coming on

in darkness

Overshadow’d them, & Jesus said: "Thus do Men

in Eternity

One for another to put off, by forgiveness, every

sin."

The Satan whose darkness engulfs both Jerusalem and Jesus and Albion is the Satan who finally undergoes a total reversal by dying in Jesus’ death:

Jesus said: "Wouldest thou love one who never

died

For thee, or ever die for one who had not died for

thee?

And if God dieth not for Man & giveth not him-

self

Eternally for Man, Man could not exist; for Man

is Love

As God is Love: every kindness to another is a

little Death

In the Divine Image, nor can Man exist but by

Brotherhood."

While Satan’s embrace of Jerusalem can only be consummated in death, that death is a final realization in experience of the self-annihilation of God, thereby effecting the forgiveness of sin by the reversal of all solitary selfhood. The "Divine Image" dies in Jesus and Jerusalem so as to abolish the transcendent source of guilt and judgment and bring about an apocalyptic and total union of God and man, a union abolishing both transcendence and selfhood, and actualizing a new "Totality of` Love." Consequently, the forgiveness of sin is an atoning process embodying the progressive realization in experience of the self-annihilation of God, and it must culminate in an apocalyptic epiphany of "The Great Humanity Divine."

Chapter 2: Idols and the Word

1. God Speaks

God speaks.(I affirm the contradiction between word and image in the Bible, contrary to the present-day tendency to meld them into one. This is done, for example, by showing that the word includes the image [Jean-Luc Blaquart], that the word contains visions as well, etc. In X. Durand’s approach, "The body of Jacob became word.... The word of the unknown adversary is embodied.... The text makes the body a setting for the word,’’ etc. Having witnessed a time when scholars spiritualized the biblical text, we now see an insistence on materializing it at all costs. There is absolutely no way to justify statements like those above. They can be made only by slipping them into the argument, using a sequence of expressions whose very accumulation makes them seem correct.

The invariable tendency throughout the Bible is to place seeing and hearing in opposition to each other, as well as the Image or Idol and the Word. What is at stake here is not a single text, but the entire meaning of the whole revelation: the opposition between YHWH and "the" figurative representations of the gods, and the very definition of the God of Israel. A pseudo-interpretation of some texts cannot overrule the overall biblical teaching.

See the excellent little article by Alphonse Maillot, "L’Oreille et la liberté," Conscience et Liberté [Berne], no. 3 [1979]). Jesus is the word:"The Word was with God, and the Word was God" (Jn. 1:1). From beginning to end, the Bible deals only with the word. Non-Christians, in their usual simplistic manner, lost no time in ridiculing this concept, calling it nothing but a gross anthropomorphism. They laughingly asked what mouth God speaks with; if he has a mouth, he must be only an overgrown animal.

It goes without saying that when we read that God speaks, it does not mean at all that he pronounces words and that he has a vocabulary and follows syntactical rules. This comparison is used of course to help us understand the action and person of God. Only a very obtuse and rankly materialistic person could fail to understand what the Bible says so clearly. He would have to refuse to accept this language for what it is: metaphorical, an analogy, not an anthropomorphism.

Neither will it do to reduce the expression "God speaks" to a simple "manner of speaking" which does not matter much. Let us not say that it shows a lack of analysis or the influence of Babylonian or other groups’ thinking, that theologians and philosophers have understood the nature of God much better, so that we should drop the idea of a "Word" with reference to God. All these ideas are only expressions of rationalistic objections.

If "God speaks" were just an expression, it would not remain constant throughout nine or ten centuries. There would be many other expressions, images, and comparisons. But there is only one. The issue is not to know whether someday we will be able to listen and hear divine words, but why the chosen people and then the prophets, apostles, and Jesus used this particular analogy. What does it mean and what does it imply to say God speaks? What are we taught by this statement and by the continually repeated description that shows us a speaking God? (We can ignore studies like Blaquart’s on the Word of God that claim to be scientific but confine themselves to imposing a classifying framework on biblical texts. This framework has no scientific value outside the circle of those who have previously approved of classification as a way of explaining. See "Parole de Dieu et prophètes," in Jean-Luc Blaquart et al., L’Ancien Testament, approches et lectures: Des procédures de travail à la théologie, Institut Catholique de Paris [Paris: Beauchesne, 1977]. In this way the Word as revelation is excluded, and Blaquart concludes that the Word is divine because of the integrity of its message!)

Finally, let’s dismiss another, more serious objection: in Hebrew, dabar certainly means "word," but it also means "action." Saying that God speaks does not necessarily allude to language or human speech. It may simply mean that he acts. Here we must answer in two ways:(See also the remarkable study by Paul Beauchamp, who demonstrates extremely well that even when charged with power, the word is still the word: Création et séparation: Etude exégétique du chapitre premier de la Genèse (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970).

According to Gerhard Kittel, we must distinguish two series of passages: those that refer to creation by action and those that refer to creation by the word. The latter would be subsequent to the former. Gerhard von Rad initially adopted this view, favoring two sources. The version where the word is involved was added later in this view. However, such a division becomes impossible (for example, na’aseh [niphal participle of ‘as’ah], "be done, be made, manufactured, prepared," is attributed to the "word" version, and bara’, "create," to the "action,, version), so that after some discussion by P. Humbert, W. H. Schmidt, etc, it is concluded that the "tradition" Of silent and undiscernible action was finally incorporated into and given form by the predominant word. This sort of research, in my opinion, enlightens us not at all, since the word in itself also constitutes an action.) first, we find not only the expressions "God speaks" and "Word of God" being used, but also the "words" of God are given to us. In this case, the formulation of God’s language is alluded to; thus there is coherence in this set of expressions, so that we cannot dismiss the word "speak." We cannot translate it, for example, as "God acted: let there be light." We must of course have "God said, ‘Let there be light"’ (Gen. 1:3). The complexity of dabar shows us that God’s word is the equivalent of action; it is power and it acts; his word does not fail to have effect. The word is the divine working par excellence.

Our great difficulty in this connection is that God expresses himself, acts, and is found only in his Word. We would like it if he could logically be found elsewhere -- if we could make him conform to our opinions, and of course see him. We prefer concepts like spirit or energy, "God is dead so as to make room for humanity," the God who lives only in the poor person, God as image, as a kind, elderly gentleman, great judge, magnificent creator, etc. The Bible absolutely excludes all these approaches. We continually bump into the limitation which irritates us: we must understand the meaning of the Bible’s great affirmation that God is manifested only in his Word. We can never grasp God elsewhere or otherwise.

The Bible vigorously opposes mystics of all descriptions, including Christians, who ascend to heaven and contemplate God by means of ascetic practices. God can never be directly grasped or contemplated face to face (Moses is the only one who is said to have done so). The only channel of revelation is the Word. And if it is a word, then it is intelligible and addressed to us; it contains meaning as well as power. This Word that created the elements and the world is the same one which, when addressed to humanity, tells us something about God and ourselves. When the Word does this it is no less creative, since it creates the heart and ear of the one it addresses, so he can hear and receive the word. Left to himself, that person would be unable to grasp the word; or rather he would find in it only a reason for condemnation and terror. This is true because of the identity between what we can understand of God’s action, God himself, and his Word.

The unknowable God chooses this way to make himself known. It is not by accident that he uses the highest human faculty, entering this way, and only this way, into the circle of human intelligence. This Word spoken to us and for us thus testifies to the fact that God is no stranger; he is truly with us. This assurance was already included in the affirmation of the creative word. The God who speaks through the Word ("God says . . . ") is neither far off nor abstract. Rather, he is the creator by means of something that is primarily a means of relationship. The Word is the essential relationship. The God who creates through the Word is not outside his creation, but with it, and especially with Adam, who is made precisely in order to hear this very word and create this relationship with God. Having received the Word himself, Adam can respond to God in dialogue.

The relationship between God and Adam is not a silent, abstract, inactive contemplation, however glowing and spiritual that might be. On the contrary, it is dialogue and word. It is language, and nothing else. It is not a question of symbolic interpretation as in Faust. But since we are dealing with God’s language, it is of course special, so Karl Barth could say that this word was both act and mystery. This word is not only creative power, but power to command. It is a decision of God’s. It is first of all a decision, which is then inserted into history. This word is the peculiarity of the God who uses his divine freedom. Barth has demonstrated this wonderfully.

Here is the fundamental difference between the Word of God and the human word: God’s Word is not just a sound which flies away and disappears, a meaning grasped one instant by the listener’s mind only to fall into oblivion afterward. Rather, God’s Word leaves a sure, irrefutable trace of its passage, just as at the beginning of creation, when God said "Let there be light" (Gen. 1:3). The Word resounded and light came into existence as a permanent witness of the Word spoken in the past.

God’s Word is not just a part of language, it is a person. When we say God speaks, we imply that God is a person. "The Word of God is not something that can be described, but neither is it a concept one can define. It is neither an objective content nor an idea. It is not an object; it is the only object, in the sense that it is the only subject -- God the subject" (Barth). The Word of God is the very person of God incarnate. There is no contradiction in the fact that the word is spoken by God and also incarnate in Jesus, since this word is what reveals God, and God has effectively revealed himself only in the Incarnation of his Son. The incarnate Word is in reality the Word fully given to humankind, so that an individual can finally be truly enlightened about God’s decision concerning him, and about love and justice.

The personality of the Word of God cannot contradict its literalness and intellectuality. The word spoken in ancient times by the prophets becomes fully the Word of God because it refers to the incarnate Word. And the word newly spoken by witnesses becomes in turn this Word when and because it refers to Jesus Christ.

Since all of Christianity depends on the incarnate Word, the Word made flesh, we must say that there is no Christian faith outside the Word; our description of the God who speaks points to what is specific and particular in Christian revelation. This leads us to give an astonishing and unique importance to the Word. If we devalue the Word even a little, we are rejecting all of Christianity and the Incarnation. Demanding that Christianity be acted rather than spoken, as the current formula has it, is thus not a way of taking Christianity more seriously. It is dilettantism.

Just as the Word is the way God reveals himself, it also reveals a person to himself. "If anyone is a hearer of the word . . . he is like a man who observes his natural face in a mirror" (Jas. 1:23). We discover our truth in this Word, which questions us on God’s behalf. In the mirror we see an image of ourselves, of our natural face: we see our reality. The parallel is striking when we understand that the Word instructs each one about himself, it teaches him not just everyday reality, but his own truth -- the most hidden, since it is hidden in God, and the most decisive, since one’s being depends on it. One learns the truth of his being, which only God knows in its ultimate objectivity, and which only God loves in its unique particularity. In the Word God speaks about someone; the person sees himself in his abject need and his utter vanity. But because of God’s Word to him, he now sees the new countenance that is given to him: the countenance of life.

This work of the Word in a person is also taught in the Bible through the importance given to the Name. The word or syllable that indicates a person is the person himself. Let not anyone speak to us in this connection of primitive ideas. A person’s name is not so much a magic way of getting hold of him as it is the profound meaning of his being. To name someone or something is to show one’s superiority over him or it. Adam is confirmed as the head of creation when God brings all the animals to him so that he can give each one a name (Gen. 2:19). In his sovereign power and perfect initiative Adam reveals himself to be free before God (God brings all the animals to him to see how he will name them).

A poet is lying when he throws off language: "I said ‘Apple’ to the apple, and it answered me ‘Liar.’ And ‘Vulture’ to the vulture, who did not respond." Human sovereignty is due more to our language than to our techniques and instruments of war. One can claim or believe himself to be free because of language. Naming something means asserting oneself as subject and designating the other as object. It is the greatest spiritual and personal venture.

Thus we understand why refusing the name given by God and making a name for himself was the very sign of revolt for humanity. This was the undertaking at Babel (Gen. 11): people ceased to accept God’s giving them a name, ceased being face to face with God, and thus having a spiritual purpose. Instead, they decided to name themselves; that is, to assume all mastery and direction in their own lives, including their spiritual destiny. Being master of the words about oneself is in reality claiming to be one’s own subject and completely autonomous.

Throughout the Bible, a person’s name always tells of his spiritual reality. This accounts for Jacob’s destiny as much as for the mystery of the act in which God reveals his name to Moses --YHWH: the one who is (Ex. 3:14). He causes to be, He is He. This Word’s meaning is unfathomable, yet through it God reveals himself to humanity. The pattern applies to the new name to be received at the end of time by the one who has conquered, the one who will be written in the book of life. These names are only words, but it is not possible that the word be any one taken at random, or that its meaning fluctuate with the wind. We cannot create an arbitrary language for ourselves that would not matter, so that we could after all replace the Word with a drawing and someone’s name with a picture or a registration number.

* * * * * *

God creates through his Word; creation is an act of separation. The word is creator in that it names things, thus specifying them by differentiating them. The Genesis passage that establishes creation on the basis of separation contains the germ of the most modern ideas about language: it tells us that difference both establishes the word and proceeds from it. The word bestows being on each reality, attributing truth to it; it gives dynamism to reality and prescribes a fixed trajectory for it. In this way the word disentangles confusion and nonbeing.

Individual being comes from the word, because it is distinguished from the whole and given meaning by the word. Everything is given birth by the word. Things are designated because they are lacking. Only desire speaks. Satisfaction is silence.

God creates through his Word. This simple word, which has become a commonplace, first indicates to us that for God creation involves absolutely no effort at all. This is no "difficult" birth. It is not a huge struggle against chaos; it is not laborious work, arduous modeling, or a sculpture that requires supreme effort, as is the case in so many other cosmogonies. No: God speaks. (Beauchamp shows the degree to which language is consistent with the very idea of creation: "The word is nearer to the notion of otherness inherent in the concept of creation: one thinks alone, but one speaks to a person. The word connotes destination, passage, or even breach and certainly decision.... The word chooses and sets in order.... Everything is given birth by the word; the word is the course of creation: things are designated only because they are lacking. Satisfaction is silent whereas desire speaks.... But in order to speak, one must identify a thing as what it is, both for me and for others, in the past and the future. The word creates a permanent status for things in a way that the hand’s gesture cannot ensure. Ascribing creation to the word is therefore stretching beyond the depiction of an initial moment of production which would establish a state of things, following which there would be transformations. But this ‘beyond’ is not a matter of thought: God ... could have created by thought.... But [in Genesis] we find nothing like the concept of a double in some mental space, followed by a transposition into another space: that is, into our space.") It is the simplest thing possible, and the least constrained: "God speaks and things come to be."

This leads us immediately to God’s absolutely infinite greatness and power. Astronomers probe pulsars and quasars, speaking of billions of light-years, billions of degrees centigrade, billions of megawatts, and unimaginable explosions of energy. All this, encompassed in reality within the "God says," gives us an idea of the distance between the creator and us. These astronomic numbers represent merely the effect of a word, from God’s point of view. The word creates with supreme ease, so that in this sense word and action can truly be considered identical.

The creative Word also situates God with respect to time. I was going to say "in time.", Creation through the Word involves entering into temporality. We established above the indissoluble link between word and time.(The relationship between word and time from the biblical point of view has been rigorously demonstrated in Beauchamp’s commentary on Genesis 1, Création et séparation. Creation through the Word is successive. Biblically space is neither first nor essential. All objects are created separately in succession. Living beings, situated by God, are directed by a function which is of the order of succession: the perpetuation of life. "The plurality of species thus crisscrosses the pages of the future."

"The parallelism between the time of discourse and the time in a week illustrates this intimate relationship of word and time. God does not make everything all at once because not everything can be said all at once. But after the entire creation has been repeated for Adam, God’s word ends. And the finishing point is simply the recognition and celebration of the finishing.") This is exactly what the use of the term "word" suggests in this context: the God who speaks is a God related to time, who is located in humanity’s temporality, and who does not try to be atemporal or eternal in the bad sense of the word. After all, when Genesis tells us that the first thing created was light, doesn’t that indicate clearly that time is created, since light and time are inseparable?

"God spoke, and there was light" involves the same truth: time comes first, and God places himself in this time. As a result, all the later revelations that show us God intervening in History, God accompanying humanity and Israel in its adventure -- all these are already included in the declaration "God speaks." Here we have the specificity, originality, and the unique character of this God. He is not a deity within time who is subject to the ups and downs of time (like the Greek and Roman gods): he originates time. He is not a god who intervenes in the course of history in an incoherent manner, depending on his moods (like the gods of the Iliad and the Odyssey). On the contrary, he accompanies the coherent history made by humanity. On the other hand, neither is he an abstract, philosophical, metaphysical, unfeeling, immortal, eternal God, as human reflection conceives him. He is a God who enters history through his inseparable relationship with his creation.

This relationship is created by his Word. He is a God of History, and this discovery about God is Judaism’s monumental invention, which has been completely adopted by Christianity. This is the origin of all historical thinking and of History. No one else has thought in this way.(Contrary to what Delouse and Guattari say in Anti-Oedipus. They have not understood this issue at all.) God, the World, Time, and History are connected through the Word.

Since he is God in relationship to Time, this excludes the possibility of his being a god of a space or locality. He is not a god of springs, of a mountain, or of a place (once he was called "God of the mountains," but this expression was used by an enemy of Israel who did not understand this God!). He is not the god of a given country. Jonah was sadly deluded when he fled far from the Holy Land, saying: "This god will not pursue me at the other end of the world." Contrary to all the gods of all peoples, this God, who speaks and is characterized by his Word, is not a local god. (Contrary to a period in the historical school when scholars tried to see the God of Israel as God of Sinai [as a place], or as a god connected to Jerusalem’ after which he became little by little more universal, until the birth of the idea of universalism. This is false because it considers only a spatial dimension of revelation). This is because he cannot be situated in a place, since his only "place" is the Word.(The place of God: the expression "Heavens of Heavens" [for example, 1 Kings 8:27, King James] does not indicate a given place -- certainly not the "Heaven", of the astronauts! This is a purely verbal expression, used to identify Elsewhere, the Inaccessible, the Beyond [or the Very Deep], rather than a place.) God as creator through the Word signifies that God inaugurates history with humanity. Humanity will not be without God.

God who speaks is also God the savior. This can also be expressed another way: the God who speaks to humanity is "God with humanity," Immanuel, and then God in a human being. We must not stretch this too far, and say in a metaphysical leap that God in a human being means "in every human being," implying that human beings are divine, and all that follows from that premise. In this idea the center has been displaced from God to humanity, and this goes explicitly contrary to Scripture. Only one person is called Immanuel; God became incarnate in just one. We must not leap to the generalization, even if every person is saved by this Incarnation and even if this Incarnation is in a sense a model.

A word is still what is incarnate. The Word was made flesh. Nothing else. What does this mean? As we have seen, the word is the manifestation of the most secret part of a person; it is also a proclamation. To say that the Word was incarnate means that God has manifested himself, and that a proclamation has been given. It amounts to the inalienable assurance that God is henceforth forever with us, on our side, by our side. Since judgment has taken place, it is the proclamation that Satan is excluded.

"The Word was made flesh" also means that since the Word of God was incarnate, what is visible is forever excluded. The invisible God came as word. He cannot be recognized by sight. Nothing about Jesus indicates divinity in a visual way. We will return to this matter.

During his ministry Jesus only speaks. He establishes and organizes nothing. He shows nothing. "The miracles?" you ask. They are signs, as the Greek word indicates: signs of the word. Miracles are always accomplished through the word. They are always situated in a verbal context, and come as a consequence of words. "Your sins are forgiven" (Mk. 2:5). Here the word is decisive. And then: "Which is easier, to say to the paralytic, ‘Your sins are forgiven,’ or to say ‘Rise . . . and walk’?" (Mk. 2:5). And to show that the Son of man has the power to forgive sins, he says, "Paralytic, rise and walk" (Mk. 2:11, JE). Thus the miracle is much less than the Word.

Jesus only spoke; he wrote nothing. He wrote only once, we are told: the mysterious text he wrote on the sand in front of the accusers of the woman taken in adultery. And I think (but this is one of a hundred possibilities!) that this shows the inferiority of the written word as compared with speech. He wrote a useless, obscure, incommunicable text that was soon obliterated. But he spoke the sovereign word: "Let him who is without sin . . . " (Jn. 8:7). The word liberated the woman. It convinced the accusers and pardoned the sins. The written word remained sterile and ineffectual.

Jesus bears in himself the Word of God, so that he can say "I am the truth" (Jn. 14:6; "I am the life" means "I incarnate the creative word"; "I am the way" means that the word is a guide). "God speaks" means that the question of truth has been raised -- the question of truth and therefore, as we have said, of falsehood. The "anti-God" is named the Liar. The question of truth has been raised, and therefore the question of hypocrisy for those who alter the nature of this word. In the last analysis this is the only essential accusation against those who falsify and utilize this word. I am the truth; I am myself the totality of the Word which denotes, expresses, relates, and contains the ultimate truth, of which every human word is a reflection, stammering, and repetition.

The God who speaks is at the same time the God who reveals himself, since, as we have said, the use of this term designates a relationship in which the speaker reveals who he is. The word as revelation is the Holy Spirit, who manifests himself for the first time at Pentecost in the diversity of words, in the multiplicity of languages reduced to a single understanding. Again speaking is involved. And from this starting point there is an incessant coming and going, from the revelation by means of the word to the word concerning the revelation, from the word as inspiration to the word freely spoken as expression of this inspiration.

The idea of the Word throws a decisive light on the famous theopneustia debate. Inspiration (not a vague spirit, a spirituality, an impulse) comes through a Word expressly spoken and understood as coming from God. But as we have seen, like all language, this word is by no means dictated or recorded on a tape recorder (the tape recorder would correspond to our brain in this analogy). This word has several dimensions: its lights and shadows, its ambiguities and connotations, its different depths. It is thus heard, understood, interpreted, and retranslated by the careful listener, who will in turn speak by making use of the freedom of the word. For the word is free.

Thus the witness will speak with his own word to testfy to this word which was addressed to him. The God who reveals himself by his Word accepts entering into this game and its symbolisms, into this flexibility of human relationships, exactly as he accepts the limitations of the human condition in the Incarnation. He has given us an image, apparently visual, of the revealer, the Holy Spirit, who is represented as a dove: "He saw the heavens opened, and the Spirit descending . . . Like a dove’, (Mk. 1:10). He sees a void: an opening, a break, or a fault. "Like" is a comparison used to express something with no possible form. It is really a verbal image rather than a visual one. No dove appeared in the heavens. There was no vision of a dove, for the word "dove," since the story of the flood, is the consecrated and chosen word, simply because in Hebrew it means "messenger" as well. "Dove" means "bearer of a message." In this text there is complete identity between the dove and the proclamation of the message: "This is my beloved Son, with whom I am well pleased" (Mt. 3:17). We do not have something seen on the one hand and a word on the other. Rather, a word is borne, which implies a bearer of the word in verbal form. This bearer is traditionally a dove.

This revealer always expresses God’s glory to us. All we can "see" is his Shekinah glory, which is by nature invisible. God conceals himself in it at the same time that he reveals himself by it. It is not visual, since this glory "cannot be compared with any other," and cannot be described by its shape or colors. Nothing visual can show us the glory of the Lord! Only the Holy Spirit!

* * * * * *

The teaching involved in the statement that God speaks is not complete at this point. The word obligates us to follow it down three paths which lead to an understanding of who God is. The word is an expression of freedom. It presupposes freedom and invites the listener as well to assert his freedom by speaking. God is the liberator.(Among the countless works on Christian freedom, I refer the reader to Martin Luther’s, and to the following modern studies: Roland de Pury, Le Libérateur [Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1957]; Jacques Ellul, The Ethics of Freedom, trans. and ed. Geoffrey W. Bromiley [Grand Rapids: William B. Eerdmans, 1976].) We must constantly remember that the God of Israel manifests himself historically for the first time in the Exodus as the one who liberates human beings from the slavery established by other human beings. God chooses his people from among slaves, in order to liberate them. The prophets continually return to this fundamental concept: this God, the only true God, frees people from all alienation.

The same spirit is at work in the New Testament. Paul’s whole theology is a theology of freedom: "For freedom Christ has set us free" (Gal. 5:1). James answers (and he certainly does not have Paul’s theology!): "You will be judged by the law of liberty" (2:12, JE). Freedom is the basic theme which ties everything else in the Bible together, from beginning to end. Freedom explains everything else in the Bible and gives meaning to the whole adventure of election, grace, and redemption, as the Bible describes it. It is certain that with the revelation at Horeb and the accomplishment of Jesus Christ, freedom entered the world.

Freedom has not been lived or proclaimed anywhere else. We must repeat this with conviction in our time, since it is fashionable to accuse Christianity of being a source of slavery and a means of spreading it throughout the world. Psychoanalysts, sociologists, ethnologists, and philosophers continually repeat this anti-Christian bromide, either from ignorance and in good faith or else with full knowledge and therefore in bad faith. They seize certain cases of oppression in given periods of Church history, a certain moralism and moral prohibitions dating from given periods and places, certain sermons (also localized) concerning sin or hell, and they make of these the sum total of Christianity. They do not even think about the fact that their being scandalized by alienation, oppression, and repression does not spring from the French revolution in 1789 and the eighteenth-century philosophers, nor from Greek thought (which is completely foreign to freedom, in spite of what has been said on the subject!), nor from Marx or Sigmund Freud. Their sense of scandal is a result of the Judeo-Christian roots of our civilization. The peoples of the Third World would never have thought of revolting against their destiny if the idea of, and the hope and the will for, freedom had not been spread by the West.

Everything comes from this first interchange: God speaks. Thus he manifests his freedom, just as a human speaker does. He invites his listener to the freedom involved in answering. God speaks; this statement contains the profound, central, supreme conviction that God is the liberator: that he never stops liberating, just as his Word never stops.

At the same time, the Word implies that this God is a God of love. We have already seen that the Word determines a relationship. God is not only creator; he is creator through the word, which means that he is never far from, never foreign to, his creation. God speaking means he is in relationship. But at the same time, this is a positive rather than a negative relationship. A relationship of love is established rather than a relationship of rejection or condemnation (in spite of what we have so often heard!) or commandment. Nevertheless, there certainly are words of condemnation. But they are much more sparse than is usually appreciated, and they are addressed much more often to the powers of alienation, error, hallucination, religion, falsehood, and accusation than they are to people. Money is damned rather than the rich person; more precisely, the rich person is condemned because of his money and not in himself. Political power is damned rather than the person who exercises it; more precisely, the person is also condemned because of his power over others, but not in himself.(For a detailed study of this important point, see Jacques Ellul, Apocalypse: The Book of Revelation, trans. George W. Schreiner [New York: Seabury, 1977]).

People are judged; that is, stripped of these powers of evil, but not damned. Thus the words of condemnation when correctly understood are words of liberation for everyone. They are words of hope which certify the love of God.

We are prevented from understanding these words of condemnation for what they are by two different things; our thirst for vengeance and our guilt feelings. We are not pleased that God loves everyone, that his Word is for all, without limit, and that he is gracious to all. On the one hand, sectarians jealously want to be the only ones saved from the ocean of the damned; on the other, nonChristians are spontaneously scandalized by the idea that Adolf Hitler or Joseph Stalin and their cohorts and devoted followers should also be saved. But there is no real difference between these two reactions. We want people to be damned because there are people we hate and we demand vengeance. It is terribly difficult to accept grace that has no limit because God’s love can know no place that is off-limits. Since God creates through his Word, it creates everyone.

Our second obstacle to understanding God’s Word also has its roots within us: the feeling of guilt. Here again we are up against the trite notion that guilt feelings come from Christianity. It is true that the Church has concentrated too much on prohibitions, has declared (sexual) taboos, and has sometimes, in preaching on sin, internalized guilt feelings. But let no one say that humanity was free from guilt; sacrifice, found in all religions, is propitiatory or else is a sacrifice for redemption or forgiveness. In any case, the sacrifice is substitutionary and proceeds from a deep sense of guilt.(Unfortunately, we must constantly remind people that prohibitions and taboos do not come from Christianity, and that as far as situations that create guilt are concerned, you can find nothing better than the tangles of prohibitions among so-called primitive peoples. Just look at the analyses of kinship in Claude Levi-Strauss’s work! We must also remember constantly that the idea of sin should not lead to guilt feelings, simply because biblically, and in truly Christian thought, sin is known and recognized for what it is only after the recognition, proclamation, and experience of forgiveness. Because I have been pardoned, I realize how much of a sinner I was. Sin is shown to be sin through grace, and not otherwise, just as the abruptly freed slave realizes, as he sees his chains, how great his misery was. Sin is never known alone and in itself. Sin is never proclaimed. But it is true that the Church has often betrayed the Bible in this area). This very generalized guilt feeling keeps us from understanding this Word of God with simplicity, and leads us to approve condemnations for ourselves that go through us and above us, affecting those behind us. This situation causes us to act and prevents us from understanding these words of condemnation as words of liberation. God speaks; biblically, this means that he is Love.

We still have to deal with the word of commandment, however! Surely we cannot deny that in the Bible there are words of Law, received like a heavy burden, these complex and numerous prohibitions the terrible Decalogue. "I am crushed under your law." First of all we should reflect on the fact that we never find the idea that the law crushes in the Bible. This is a modern idea. Biblically we always find amazement that God, the Creator, chooses to give us orientation in life (Ps. 119), and that God, the Wholly Other, wishes to let us know what justice is, when we are looking for it so eagerly. God is worshipped for this law or commandment, and Israel was able to preserve perfectly this source of amazement, joy, and radiance, as it considered the law not as a constraint but as a liberating word. This is the first way of looking at the problem.

The second is that the law is not so much in the imperative as in the future: "Thou shalt not kill" means that situated within God’s love, in constant dialogue with this God, you will at last find it possible not to kill. Outside this dialogue and this word, you are, like everybody, obligated to kill. Murder and series of murders, linked to one another, are the common lot. Beginning the moment the Word of God reechoes in your life, you are able to avoid killing. The fatality of murder disappears like the other fatalities. Thus the commandment is not a hard, negative constraint, but the promise of a new life filled with freedom and joy.

The third way of looking at this problem (I could of course never exhaust in these pages all that the law signifies!) is that the law’s commandments are the precise limits between life and death. Within these limits, you live fully and you are alive in all possible ways. But transgression brings with it the certainty of death --not death as a punishment willed by God and decided by him, but death as a natural destiny. If you slaughter, you will be slaughtered.

Whichever point of view one adopts, we see that the belief that the law and God’s commandment are based on rank imposition by an all-powerful Master on a terrorized slave is based on a misinterpretation. This is how the situation looks from the outside. Unfortunately, it is sometimes the view of those who have in effect been subjected to Christianity by coercion. And the mystery of iniquity in the Church is that such things have happened. Such things could happen precisely when the Church ceased to be related to the Word; it ceased being a Church that speaks; preferring to become a Church that acts, shows, and dominates (these three things being equivalent!). The law is never coercion for the person who believes in his heart and confesses with his mouth, the one who has encountered grace, lived this experience, and is living in freedom.

Whom should we believe? The person who knows this Word of, God in his life and exalts it with wonder, or the one who has not experienced this liberation, who has perhaps been crushed or coerced by a family or ecclesiastical structure, and who considers this law abominable because he has known nothing but the slavery imposed by other people?

This law is in no way comparable to our codes, which are written and fixed. As commandment, it has been the object of innumerable glosses and commentaries. It is an ever living word, always new and always newly addressed to its listener. It is not the objective declaration of an anonymous legislator. The law is a renewed word for each individual, and not a fixed inscription on the facade of a monument.

Not enough thinking has been done about the breaking of the tables of the Law. The story is well known: on descending from Sinai, in the presence of the incredible pretension of the Israelites to make themselves a god (which they could control since they had made it) to replace the mysterious Liberator, out of anger and despair, Moses breaks and destroys the miraculous talisman he was bringing: the stone tables on which God himself had written. He acted in anger, we say. It was an act of judgment against a people who were not worthy to receive such an extraordinary gift. But in my opinion, there is a hidden meaning: here the law is written. It has ceased being a word. It is about to become a talisman: a magic rock, an oracle. It will of necessity be identified with the Salians’ shield or any other statue. The law is dead -- graven, engraved, buried in this stone.

This gift of God’s Writing in material form suits the human desire to have an image of God. God knows our need to see, which is why he sends Moses down the mountain with these visible witnesses of his will (Fernand Ryser, Le Veau d’or [Geneva: Labor et Fides, 1954]) (which oppose and at the same time respond to the demand of the people, who want to see, and therefore make themselves a golden calf). For this reason the text emphasizes the fact that God himself made the stone tables to counter the vision of the bull. No direct vision of God is involved here. But his work is seen, and this vision leads one to a vision of the word. Everything is inevitably brought back to the word. This is the only concession YHWH can make to sight!

But the story goes even further: Moses breaks the stone tables. They were in themselves the image of God, the image of the Word of God. And now Moses destroys this image. Fernand Ryser says: "This nineteenth verse [Ex. 32:19] shows us then what must happen to the image of God when it enters into contact with the world: it must be broken and perish in order not to be fatal for humanity. When God comes into the world in his Son, there are only two possibilities: either the world will die, or God will die in his Son." This destruction of the divine image enables Moses to destroy the false divine image. This is the basis of iconoclastic inclination for both Jew and Christian.

Finally, the destruction of this single visible, material represen- tation of God ought to remind us continually that the Bible in its materiality is not the Word of God made visible through reading. God did not become Jeremiah’s secretary and write for him (Jer. 1:9). And he has not made his Word visible. Between the written word and speech there is the same distance we have discovered on the human plane. The phenomenon is exactly the same. The Bible is not a sort of visible representation of God.

Therefore it was absolutely necessary that the tables be broken. In reality, as he brings the tables of stone down from the mountain, Moses suddenly grasps the identity of this work of sculpture with the golden calf that the people have built. God’s Word must remain a fleeting spoken Word, inscribed only in the human heart. It must not be a prestigious stone, a frozen word which will be adored, replacing the ear attentive to the word. If the people adored their golden calf, which they had made, how much more would they have adored the absolute Stone which God’s hands had held and on which God’s finger had written!

The breaking of the tables of the Law takes place so that the commandment can remain a living word, addressed to each individual without existing objectively anywhere. The commandment remains a word, with all the unstable, direct, interpreted, and strictly personal qualities that the word involves. When people later begin to write the Law and even later the Gospels, that is their affair! But we must be clearly conscious that it is a human act. Only very rarely is it said to certain prophets: "You will write." And the proclamation "You shall write [this law] and wear it on your forehead, on your arm," etc., seems to me deliberately symbolic, and should not have produced texts actually placed in little bags, etc.

* * * * * *

"God speaks. We must answer him." God creates human beings as speaking beings. Perhaps this is one of the meanings of the image of God: one who responds and is responsible; a counterpart who will dialogue, who is both at a certain distance and has the ability to communicate. The human being is the only one, out of the entire creation, who is capable of language. Like God who speaks or God who is said to speak, humanity has this capacity which comes from its creator. Speech constitutes human specificity, just as it constitutes the specificity of God as compared with all other gods. God summons a person through the word, and induces him to speak in dialogue. If God is freedom, there is someone there to live out freedom. If God is love, there is someone to respond to love through the word. The human word exists only because it is a product of the Word of God: I would not speak if you had not previously called me. "Even before a word is on my tongue, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether" (Ps. 139:4).

We do not declare that God speaks because of the model of human speech. Rather, it is because word and creation share a common nature that the speaking creator gives language to humanity, as his counterpart. All the natural, objective characteristics we observe in human speech (which we have noted in Chapter I) are such because they are the characteristics of the Word as expression of God the creator.(Here we return to Beauchamp’s magnificent study, from which I must quote an especially illuminating and powerful passage: "God did not so much create the things I am talking about as he spoke them . . . before speaking to me about them, so that the human word might be declared a response to his. God made humanity the depository of the relationship of difference instituted by the word: men and women will establish in the world the law of their own word, and the text [of Genesis] shows how in this sense they are born of God. Why then should we insist on speaking of the human mission of ‘completing, through our work the work finished on the sixth day, as if God had created nature in such a way as to leave to humanity the margin, the risk, and the honor of this artifice? God and humanity are called to encounter each other in the artifice of the word. By having God speak first, Genesis conceives of all human language as a response. A human being understands through his existence that he is in God’s image. And it is through his own speech that he declares that God has spoken. Giving the first word to God is the same as saying that the truth of human speech, on which all existence depends, cannot have any other depository than God himself. Every human experience of language grasps it as repetition: no one would speak if those who gave him birth did not speak to him first."

The following passage also speaks of the relationship of human language to God’s: "A human being speaks of the world which he cannot clasp to himself. Thus he transforms it into a network of relationships and movements: into a world.... The word connotes destination, passage, or even breach, and certainly decision. All language, even if it does not contain a commandment, as is the case in this passage, is volitional. It chooses and sets in order.... [Creation is the] conflict of energy and resistance, a struggle of life against death, from which the word takes its impetus.... Having created things through words, God finally speaks to a human being.... "

Beauchamp quotes the well-known Psalm 139 ("Even before a word is on my tongue, O Lord, thou knowest it altogether.... For thou didst form my inward parts, thou didst knit me together in my mother’s womb," vv. 4 and 13), emphasizing the close relationship between the genesis of humanity in its corporeal being and of its language. This certainty that human language is a creation and a continuation of the Word of God is also found in a hymn at Qumtan. In Genesis 1 we do not see directly the creation of human language by God, but "we see something like the circulation of an underground river, before its appearance as a spring above ground. The words pronounced by God (at the moment of creation-separation) are the true genesis of human speech, the genesis of humanity.... The theme of the father-child relationship of humankind and God is interpreted here as transmission of the word which ‘commands."’) For human speech possesses eminent dignity. It is more decisive than action and reveals more. But most of all, human speech is invested with unlimited importance because God chose the word as his means. The fact that revelation was accomplished through the word attaches meaning and value to human language. God could have chosen any other means for his action and revelation, but he chose this particular one. Therefore human language possesses a dignity it would not otherwise have had.

Because God speaks, when a person speaks a mysterious power is attached to what he says. Every human word is called on, more or less clearly, to express the Word of God, and there is a misuse of power, an abuse of words when this is not the case. Henceforth human language has an eternal reference from which it cannot escape without destroying itself or without stripping itself of all meaning. The value of the human word depends on the Word of God, from which it receives its decisive and ultimate character. This quality is expressed in its critical value and in ethical decision. This is a result of human speech’s relationship with the Word of God: of God’s taking up this human word, so that there is continuity (as well as discontinuity) between them, and of human speech’s finality in relationship with the Word of God. For God’s Word, according to the author of the letter to the Hebrews (4:12), is "sharper than any two-edged sword, piercing to the division of soul and spirit, of joints and marrow, and discerning the thoughts and intentions of the heart." Thus the Word of God is the critical power par excellence, which of course only God can exercise; only he knows what its result will be.

The Word of God distinguishes and separates, and because it criticizes, it judges. This is because of its nature. Human language draws its function from this efficacy and power of the Word of God, except that human language does not have the same degree of efficacy and power: it can convey falsehood as well as truth.

The Word of God, since it criticizes, is also the expression of God’s commandment. His Word directs; it is a commanding power and thus it determines what is ethical. Human language finds its role at this point. There is an enormous difference, however: the human word cannot determine what is ethical. But based on the commandment of the Word of God, the human word enables an individual to choose and to make his personal decision, faced with the demands placed on him. This is accomplished by means of a difficult process of differentiation and in the context of the intolerable weight of his commitment.

But when Adam speaks for the first time, he does not answer God; he names animals. We need not linger over this frequently explained passage. An important remark, often forgotten, needs to be made, however: when it says that Adam names the animals, the passage underlines the gratuitousness and ease of language. Adam does not see names already prepared, registered in advance. There is no natural science of words. An animal passing before Adam does not have a name already established -- given by God, for example. Instead, Adam names; that is, he chooses the word that suits him to designate a given animal, and then all other things.

Biblically, there is no common nature shared by language and the name of a thing. It is after all rather important to emphasize that in a seventh-century text, predating all reflection on language, wherever that reflection may have occurred, we find this clear statement: the fact of human speech comes from God; but language is made up by the human race, which decides for itself -- arbitrarily -- the words, the rules, and the syntax. Human beings choose arbitrarily with respect to the thing designated, but not arbitrarily with respect to meanings and structures. I need not enter into a discussion of these latter issues.

The other theme is more frequently treated: the commandment and preeminence or domination. A name assigns a place and a spiritual value. By naming the animals Adam shows his power over them and puts them in their place within the order of Creation. Again in this situation, Adam takes initiative: there is no predetermined order which Adam would limit himself to recording as he names the animals. He establishes his own order, before the Fall: a "taxonomy" which is a free, invented expression of the supremacy God has given him. God leaves Adam free to make this choice ("to see what he would call them," says the passage, so that "whatever the man called every living creature, that was its name," Gen. 2:19).

But in this created world, in unity and unbroken communion with God, Adam does not give a name to his wife. It is only after the Fall, in the midst of the disorder of powers, that he names his wife also: "Eve, because ..." (Gen. 3:20). This is a reflection of the disorder of powers; for God’s power is a restrained power. He does not occupy all the space. The God who speaks also lets his creature speak. God does not speak continually, covering over all noises and all expression.

Each thing has its place with God in its nonassigned specificity. Even when God’s Word indicates a requirement, it leaves the other person his complete freedom of decision, choice, and expression. Thus no power is excessive. Every power has its limits in this Creation. This concept is also expressed in the image "God speaks." He only speaks. And his listener can take him seriously or not, can listen or not, can answer or not, as in the case of any word. Saying that God speaks is the equivalent of situating him at the level of everyday talkers. "God speaks" also foretells the coming of Jesus, who is an ordinary person and yet God. So within this order of power, human beings are also invested with a power; first of all, the power to speak.("We may be surprised that Creation should be closed and finished and that at the same time the act of creating should be crowned with the transmission of a transforming word. But the limit and the impetus do not contradict each other. Whatever the human trajectory may be, it can only have meaning in terms of its finitude. Humanity can escape from everything except from the fact of having been, which is necessary if it is to be able to speak and plan, on both an individual and a collective basis. It is not by accident that, in, the priestly document, the Creation narrative represents the past par excellence, at the same time as it formulates and establishes the human project. Language follows the laws of before and after; it progresses and makes a path for itself toward a goal, since indefinite discourse would be discourse without meaning" (Beauchamp).

God’s declaration in the first creation narrative (which is later than the second one), situating Adam as lord of creation, corresponds precisely to Adam’s naming of the animals in the second narrative. The first narrative says: "Subdue the earth; have dominion over all animals" (Gen. 1:28, JE). What a lot of nonsense has been written about this passage in recent decades. Scholars have frantically tried to find here the basis for technique and all the modern technological ventures. They have tried to make this text justify what humanity does, gloriously evoking a demurrage. But these writers forget the parallelism between the two narratives, and they particularly forget that God does not give the human race an incoherent, unlimited, totalitarian power. The passage does not say that we can use the world however we like. In particular, since we are the image of God, we must direct the earth, as God directs Creation. We must have dominion over the animals as God has dominion over the worlds. "As" means "imitating," "in the same manner," "with the same respect," "with the same restraint from doing all that could be done." It does not signify an unleashed, torrential, Dionysian power, a superpower, covering everything, making use of everything without order or restraint, devastating and depleting the earth.

Quite specifically, since God creates and governs through his Word, and the human being is the image of God, called by God to subdue (govern) and have dominion (command), he can only do it by the same means; that is, the word. Humanity must fulfill its royal function in the midst of the animals through the word, and not through the violence of implements. There is no allusion -- absolutely none -- to technique or technology in this passage; the only power is that of the word.

The word resolves the apparently insolvable contradiction in which humanity is placed in a world created perfect and therefore complete, and yet is given the power to act and transform. The word is the transforming power in a finished world where the human word is a liberating force.(On this theme, see Jacques Ellul, Technique and Theology, soon to be published.) You find that I force the text, or limit it? I beg to differ! A simple comparison of this passage (Gen. 1:28-29) with its exact parallel in the Noachian covenant (Gen. 9:1-7) shows I am right. Between the two passages, we have the Fall (human autonomy), the establishment of the disorder of powers, and the invention of technique, expressly attributed to Cain (Gen. 4:17-22). The new world emerges from the deluge. At this point a new covenant is formulated between God and the human race. It is almost the same as the original covenant. Almost. There are two slight differences: from now on human beings may kill animals for food. This was not said at creation. And next, the matter of terror: "The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth . . . into your hand they are delivered" (Gen. 9:2). It is no longer a question of word but of hands; there is no more ordering and commanding through the word, but by the power of material constraint, including killing.

Technique finds its legitimacy at this point and not in the first covenant, in which the word was the only power. Why did God not simply erase this tragic period of history and begin again at the beginning? Why does he record what humanity created to its misfortune and the misfortune of the world? Precisely because this God continues to direct and command through his Word alone; because he never constrains in an absolute manner, and because he takes into account everything humankind does, including evil. He never does anything but speak.(The evidence for these statements is found in Jacques Ellul, The Meaning of the City, trans. Dennis Pardee (Grand Rapids. William B. Eerdmans, 1970). But the powerful word, refused by a humanity that thought it could do so much better with its machines, has remained what distinguishes humanity and makes it human. This word is the gift of God par excellence; it is human mystery, endlessly leading to truth.

* * * * * *

We have tried to show that biblically everything leads back to the word: God and humankind, and their relationships, their powers, the unique expression of truth, of creation, and of the order of the world. The word is everything in this revelation. Nothing is left to sight, which is nevertheless essential.

As a transition to the study of sight in the Bible, I would like to refer here to the remarkable study by Paul Ricoeur that expresses this contradiction in philosophical terms: proclamation as opposed to manifestation.(Paul Ricoeur, "Manifestation et proclamation," in Le Sacré, ed. Enrico Castelli (Paris: Aubier, 1974). Proclamation, which implies interpretation, is an act of speech, with a historicity of transmission and hermeneutical activ- ity. Manifestation is a showing of the sacred; the sacred is manifested in the Greek mysteries, but always with power. Power and efficacy are related to this visual manifestation: "the numinous element is not language to begin with. Power signifies something besides the word.... Power does not go through the articulation of meaning; it is efficacious." This antithesis is decisive: the word, relating to meaning, produces proclamation. Manifestation addresses itself to the visual sense and relates to efficacy. "The sacred opens a space for manifestation that should be called imaginal" rather than Logos. The sacred is manifested in signs to look at and also in meaningful behavior, essentially rites. The rite combines the visual with the efficacious, in order to act powerfully.

Finally, the manifestation of the sacred is expressed in a symbolism of Nature which is also related to the visual, by figures. The Greek mysteries are carried out through symbols of a natural sort (earth, fire, water, stars, etc.). Ricocur shows very subtly how the (visual) rite is both associated with and contradictory to the (spoken) myth, and how the natural mystery is both associated with and contradictory to a symbolism of language. But he says this symbolism is "adherent,, rather than being a true act of language (a true act of language being, for example, the metaphor, which is a free invention of speech).

The symbol of the sacred in language is related to the configurations (and therefore to the visible images) of the cosmos. This adherence to symbolism implies that symbolism in language is valid only when it is borne by the sacred values of the elements themselves. It is a silent spectacle which is imposed on language rather than an effort of language and interpretation. These are the characteristics of the Greek mysteries. It is possible to speak of their phenomenology and to describe them, but not to identify a possible hermeneutic for them, since hermeneutics is restricted to proclamation.

Ricoeur reminds us that the entire theology of Israel is organized around discourse, narratives, instructions (Torah), and prophecy -- never on the basis of the numinous. Biblical myths are all polemical myths countering nature religions. In Israel "a theology of the Name of God opposes the mystery of idols." "Listening to the word has taken the place of looking at signs." Although rites certainly subsist in Israel, "the ritualization of life is no longer based on the correlation between myth and rite," but on a fundamentally historical vision of reality. And the result is a theology of history, as opposed to a theology of nature. Ricoeur summarizes admirably: "This difference is based entirely on the logic of meaning that I try to oppose to the logic of relationships in the sacred universe."

We have seen that paradox is the very key of language, and Ricoeur expresses this perfectly as it relates to the conflict between meaning and the sacred, between manifestation and proclamation. The symbol (in the visual world) belongs to a set of circular cosmic relationships. The "expressions at the extreme limits" show a paradoxical universe: the universe of the parables, the "proverbs," and eschatological language. It is a shattered universe, like the word itself, which brings about the breaking up of ordinary speech and refers to (or announces) what is not a visual image: the Kingdom of God. Thus speech is necessarily iconoclastic. But Ricoeur finally reminds us that it is not possible to maintain iconoclastic discourse in all its strictness, any more than sight can be eliminated, leaving us with only speech! We are in this world, not in another, and consequently we cannot avoid having images nor change the fact that images have a vital importance in our spirituality.

There are inevitably "symbolic resurgences of the sacred" throughout the history of Israel and of the Church. The sacred, the visual, and the cosmic are necessary if language is to be possible: "without the support and help of the vital and cosmic sacred, language itself becomes abstract and cerebral. Only by its incarnation in repeatedly reinterpreted ancient symbolism, by which the word is continually reduced to essentials, can the word speak to the heart as well as to the intelligence and the will -- in short, to the whole person."

Ricoeur reminds us that there is a continual alternation in the Church between iconoclastic proclamation and symbolic manifestation, in the dialectic of preaching and the sacrament. In preaching, the kerygmatic element prevails; in the sacrament, visual symbolism takes over. But there is also a continual temptation to find all the truth in image and symbolism, thus excluding the word, which is less concrete, less evident, more austere and demanding. In all periods of Church history we find a renewed triumph of the image in statues, stained-glass windows, monuments, crucifixes, and relics. Although we cannot separate sight and language, only the Incarnation of Jesus shows us the correct equilibrium or synthesis, as we wait in hope for the fullness of the Kingdom.

2. Visions and Idols

In spite of what we have said, the Bible often speaks of sight, in terms of theophanies, visions, idols, icons, and false gods. In reality, the biblical revelation is radically opposed to everything visual. Don’t let the reader react immediately by speaking of visions, which we will consider. The only possible relationship with God is based on the word, and nothing else. This is because the biblical God speaks, and does nothing else. The word includes with it all the connotations we have mentioned above: love, freedom, and making the other person conscious of his opportunity to become a subject also. In the sphere of truth, everything is related to the word, nothing to sight.

With regard to vision, we must remember the impossibility of seeing God, maintained throughout Scripture. Yahweh says to Moses: "You cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live" (Ex. 33:20). As Jacques Guillet emphasizes,(Jacques Guillet, La Gloire du Sinaï (Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1956) it is as if "God had a face and hands, but just when you think you could touch him, an infinite distance appears." And earlier in Exodus, "Moses hid his face, for he was afraid to look at God" (3:6). All those who witness God have the same experience: Elijah at Mount Horeb, Isaiah, and the parents of Samson.

We must choose. Shall we consider all the passages where someone is said to "see God" as equal in weight to the above passages? Must we have a "flat," nonhierarchical-interpretation? I believe that in reality, concerning the impossibility of seeing God, there is a kind of constant. The other passages should be interpreted in the light of this constant. We must try to understand the meaning of each specific vision, noting what may be added in each case, and considering whether it is really said that God is seen. The passages that involve seeing God must be interpreted in the light of both the curse on images and the impossibility of seeing him.

Sight is of course not condemned in itself!(Sometimes, according to Antoine Vergote, in Dette et désir (Paris: Seuil, 1978), vision and word are united or merged by mystics. "Heating is seeing,,, says John of the Cross. An essential idea is underscored indirectly by Vergote: "The mystics believe that . . . by sight and by hearing, words are given to them which are not simply produced by human beings." Vergote shows that John of the Cross is therefore suspicious of words which could come only from human beings: "Many people talk to themselves as if somebody were really there,’, he says. But because these words come "from elsewhere," "they have the consistency of a vision.") It has its legitimate place in the sphere of reality and usefulness, as a means of gaining power over objects. It is infinitely precious, but only in its domain. As soon as sight tries to enter into the spiritual realm, or claims to have access to the order of truth, it is radically condemned. It is out of the question to try to grasp God through sight (which is the equivalent of reducing truth to reality), to claim that what one sees can be God (in this case one converts reality into truth), or to make a representation of something in the spiritual realm (which is the same as consecrating a religion, since religions always belong to the visual realm). This raises the issue of the conflict between the spiritual and the religious realms. The whole visual sphere begins to be suspect, biblically, through association, so to speak, when these things are done --but not before.

Vision is a means or instrument -- the basic element of power in action, of domination, utilization, and constraint. When the Assyrian kings wanted to eliminate their enemies’ power, they blinded them. After the Assyrians, many others did the same. There is no ambiguity in the power commanded by sight, just as there is no ambiguity in reality as perceived by sight. For this reason the triple desire -- to reduce God to reality, to convert reality into God, and to transform the love relationship into a religion -- is explicitly condemned, and sight along with it.

But there are two completely different issues here, both placed under the heading of sight: vision and theophany on the one hand, and idols and false gods on the other. In the first tendency, one asks whether it is possible to see God, the biblical God, Yahweh, the God of revelation who also reveals himself. In the second, individuals make gods for themselves, erect idols everywhere, and adore them: idols and icons. In this second case we are actually dealing with images: objects that can be seen and that always involve a visible representation.

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We are not, of course, going to examine in detail what is still called biblical theophany; that is, a visible, material appearance of the biblical God.(I reserve the word theophany, as is customary, for the visible appearance of God, and not in the larger sense used by Beauchamp, who speaks of a visible or spoken theophany. This usage amounts to confusing theophany with revelation.) My general thesis is that nowhere do we have true theophany, genuinely comparable to the theophanies found in all religions (at least all those that have one or several gods). The term theophany, from the history of religions, has been applied to the Bible as a result of a superficial textual analysis, a determination to find comparable and identical elements, and simplification. A few simple explanations that are in exact conformity with the texts will suffice to dispense with this hasty patchwork.

Let us begin with an introductory remark. "Seeing the glory of God" is an expression which really indicates that God is concealed and invisible. Paul Beauchamp reminds us of two basic truths in this connection: the first is that the biblical God is usually accompanied by a dark cloud. There is a screen between him and everyone else (especially in the passages in Job: 22:14; 38:9; 36:30; 37:21). When God reveals himself, "he sweeps the heavens with his breath [ruah]" Job: 37:21, JE).(Just this once, I disagree with Maillot’s explanation of Job’s "vision" of God. Maillot believes Job’s experience is narrated as a vision because it is a "pagan" text which relates to the pagan religious context. The result of the vision is not faith but the crushing of Job, who is reduced to silence. I prefer to see in Job’s experience an eschatological vision. This seems to me to be confirmed by the marvelous "reestablishment" of everything in the last chapter.) Obscurity precedes him, and his revelation of himself consists of his breath-spirit separating the cloud, but not so he can be seen!

Beauchamp’s second explanation is that a remarkable piece of work is accomplished in Genesis 1: "the originality of this ‘theophany’ lies in concealing God instead of revealing him. This mutilated theophany, which is almost an active theokrypty [God’s hiding of himself], retains only the breath-spirit (ruah) and the word. The other aspects disappear: shadows and light, the usual direct manifestation of God. And beyond this, the ruah is only present in order to suggest mystery: that God is something other than his word. Before creating there is a plan, which is not so much thought as already active and orienting itself, but we can know nothing about it.... Thus we have a narrative in which we do not see the principal agent; but this absence is given positive value." Within this framework, and in relation to this revelation, we must consider all the narratives concerning a "vision" of God.

Furthermore, working from this basis, we must proceed to establish several distinctions. In reality many things are covered by the word "theophany": dreams, signs, visions, etc. When dreams are at issue, we absolutely cannot speak of theophany. When we are dealing with a visible sign, the text is nearly always careful to speak of just a sign. Sometimes it reduces the matter even further, to a signal: God causes a flickering to appear, so that something is noticed. I find it unacceptable to consider the burning bush at Horeb to be a theophany: Moses sees nothing but the bush. The flame attracts Moses’ attention, and the fact that the bush is not consumed intrigues him; that is all. Deuteronomy 4:15-19 clarifies this point: "Since you saw no form on the day that the Lord spoke to you at Horeb out of the midst of the fire, beware lest you act corruptly by making a graven image for yourselves.... And beware lest you lift up your eyes to heaven, and when you see the sun and the moon . . . you be drawn away and worship them and serve them, things which the Lord your God has allotted to all the peoples under the whole heaven." Therefore everything one sees are just things, created by this God who is not a thing and not visible. What matters is not the burning bush, but the word which is spoken.

The same is true of Jacob’s "theophany" at the ford of Jabbok: he sees a man, nothing else, and later, tradition speaks of an angel (Gen. 32:22-32; just as in the case of Abraham’s "theophany" under the oaks of Mamre [Gen. 18], or Manoah’s vision Judg. 13]). Jacob did not see God in the form of a man, nor did Abraham see him in the three men by the oaks of Mamre. As for the theophany at Sinai, we must note that everything is surrounded by clouds and smoke. The people are forbidden to lift their eyes to look (Ex. 19:21). In the Exodus story, it is never said that Moses sees God, but only that God speaks to Moses. And in the famous "face to face" passage (Ex. 33:11), what Moses sees is never mentioned -- only that God spoke face to face, as with a friend. Finally, in the desert, what Israel sees before it is a pillar of smoke.

The essential thing is the significance of the fact that there is no real theophany in the Bible. The only possible image of God is a human being. But a human being is not God; and the visual representation of a human being cannot be taken for God -- only the living person is this image. Therefore in this matter the visual sphere has no importance whatever. Visible things are thus signs, as, for example, the burning bush; but these signs (just as in the case of miracles) have no meaning by themselves. It is remarkable to notice that the sign must always be explained. What matters is the word that gives meaning to what is seen. When Moses turns off from the path at Horeb, the fire is only a summons; it is not the image of God. The decisive issue is not to have seen something, but to hear a word which is utterly clear, distinct, and explicit, and contains a revelation, a promise, and a mission altogether. This is a denial of all possibility of knowledge through sight, which places sight and language in contradiction with each other.

We must distinguish visions from these theophanies. The theophanies are explosive and perceptible to the senses. They are expressed in an exterior object that can be verified and that is part of the world in which we live. Visions are completely different. They can be interior matters or "the heavens opening" (as in Mt. 3:16). They refer to images and are seen, but they deal with realities utterly different from the ones which make up the world perceived by our senses.

When we deal with visions, we are in the presence of another dimension of sight: one that does not refer to reality.(We must add to this the significant remark of Vergote (Dette et désir). He emphasizes that contrary to what people usually think, the great mystics absolutely do not confuse mystical experience with visions. Teresa of Avila explicitly states that she has never had tangible visions of the outside world, but only visions of the imagination. Furthermore, she is convinced theologically that Christ never again manifested himself on the earth after the Ascension. For John of the Cross, tangible visions, "even on the assumption that some of them come from God," are in any case "obstacles to faith." "Therefore it is best for the soul to consider them with eyes closed, without examining where they come from." Imaginary perception is obviously another matter entirely; but these are images that the mystic forms for himself after a long spiritual process. On the contrary, the danger is that visions will attract the person’s entire attention, and in reality lead him away from God! As Vergote remarks quite accurately "The religious content of mystical visions is not different from the content of faith; figurative representations are derived from natural perceptions., As far as revelation is concerned, visions add absolutely nothing. "Therefore the mystic does not place his confidence in the visions in themselves. Sometimes mystics suspect that a vision is deceiving them instead of manifesting something. Certain visible forms can conceal a diabolical content.’’) Therefore we must consider what vision means in the Bible. First it seems to me that we must remove from consideration all the passages that use the word vision, but contain nothing other than a word spoken by God -- where nothing "seen" or visible to the eye is indicated. Genesis 15:1 is an example: "The word of the Lord came to Abram in a vision." The same is true of the "vision,, of young Samuel. Nothing like vision is described for us, and we can question whether the word used in these cases has anything at all to do with sight and image. This is all the more true since the Hebrew word used in these passages comes from the root meaning "to prophesy." This sort of language comes up frequently, and means simply "revelation." Consequently we can set these texts aside as we try to define "vision." The same is true of the passages in which "vision" means "dream." In this case we do not have real sight, but an illusion or an image created by the human brain. Night visions therefore do not relate to the problem of image and Word.

Having said this, we are left with several types of visions. First, we have the prophets’ visions: in each context we must consider that what is seen is "like a human form." This relates directly to the question of "image." But the prophet’s role is not to tell about his visions; it is to convey the Word of God.

The only nonapocalyptic passage in which God is seen (since the text in Ezekiel is clearly apocalyptic) is Isaiah 6. Unquestionably in this case we are in the presence of a vision of God: "In the year that King Uzziah died I saw the Lord sitting upon a throne, high and lifted up; and his train filled the temple. Above him stood the seraphim; each had six wings . . . " (Isa. 6:1-2). We need to make three remarks about this passage: first, the vision takes place in the Temple. The empty Temple! The vision is related to the invisible presence in the holy of holies. Consequently we can speak of a cultic vision here. Second, it is again a vision of God in human form (seated on a throne). It is not so much God who is seen as it is the image of a man (as in the book of Revelation). Yet Isaiah recognizes this vision immediately as God. Finally, Isaiah says nothing about what he has seen; he gives no description. He practices absolute restraint; this vision provides no knowledge about God. It is not a revelation. Nothing "results" from what he has seen, except for a terrible feeling of unworthiness and impurity. And again, the important and decisive thing is what this Lord will say (vv. 8ff.). The vision is only a sort of shock for Isaiah, so that he will respond positively to the question: "Whom shall I send, and who will go for us?" In other words, this is certainly a vision of God, but it does not adduce anything specific. Sight is immediately absorbed and incorporated into the Word, which becomes decisive.

Furthermore, the vision itself refers immediately to the Word. Isaiah accuses himself: "I am lost; for I am a man of unclean lips" (Isa. 6:5, JE). That is, he is a person who does not speak the Word of God but is occupied with human words. The Word is the criterion of the possibility or impossibility of remaining in God’s presence. When the seraph purifies his lips, he can become a person who speaks the Word.

We should also mention Exodus 24:10, where some scholars believe we should translate that Moses, Aaron, etc., saw the Elohim of Israel (replacing the usual translation: feared). But the exegete also makes it immediately clear that even if the God of Israel is seen in this passage, only the pedestal of his throne is involved. The language is completely inadequate for describing the sight of divine reality. Daniel Dore quotes Peter Lengsfeld’s excellent comment: "If someday a human expression were found to be directly and absolutely identical to the divine reality, such an expression would be the insurpassable and definitive manifestation of God as we expect to know him in heaven. Then the Logos of human language would not only communicate revelation, but would be the revelation itself."(Daniel Doré,"Un repas d’alliance," in Jean-Luc Blanquart et al., L’Ancien Testament, appreaches et lectures.)

Furthermore, we must note that this passage in Exodus speaks of Elohim, whereas God was earlier declared to be Yahweh. Doesn’t this mean precisely that we can see the setting or an objectification, but that God "in himself" remains utterly invisible? We are therefore twice removed from being able to see God. God shows what we can bear to see of him; and even of that, we can say or convey nothing. In this way vision or theophany is utterly sterilized. If there is a vision, in any case it is utterly impossible to depict it in any way whatever. This utter uncertainty agrees with Paul’s: "I know a man in Christ who fourteen years ago was caught up to the third heaven -- whether in the body or out of the body I do not know, God knows" (2 Cor. 12:2). Here as always the relationship with God takes place "in the body and out of the body," but we cannot tell which, because the relationship oversteps the bounds of sight.

We must also take into account the vision of God as A. Galy formulates it in connection with Genesis 22, in a fine study (in Jean-Luc Blaquart et al., L’Ancien Testament). Abraham’s faith is expressed in his certainty that God sees or will be able to see. And God says, when he sees that Abraham is ready for the sacrifice: "Now I know...." Abraham hears the Word of God, and affirms: "God sees" (therefore, he knows). The mountain is the tangible setting, not so much of the sacrifice as of the vision. The text can be translated in two ways: "On the mount the Lord shows" (instead of "is seen"), or "sees." But in all this the only affirmation concerns God: his reality and truth, rather than the vision a person could have of God, in spite of the later statement: "On the mount the Lord is seen" (Gen. 22:14). "The Lord sees and echoes Abraham, who affirms: the Lord is seen." But these words are included in the narrative as something occurring after God has come and acted. It is not exactly the Lord himself who is seen, but the result of his action; and one must back up from the action seen to the Lord to know that it was he.

Prophets are in no way authenticated by their visions. In fact, usually when a prophet has a vision it is not an ecstatic vision of God, but rather a completely different reality. Amos 7 and 8 are classic examples: the vision of the basket of summer fruit, the plumb line, etc. But Jeremiah’s and Zechariah’s visions are also typical: the prophet has an utterly common experience. What he sees is commonplace, but its explanation is not. Only the word of explanation is revelation -- nothing else. What is seen belongs to the order of reality, of created things, and never goes beyond that order. It is impossible to contain the creator within the order of visible things. Most certainly the word is also something created. But there is a kind of distance established between what is said and what is observed, so that there is play between the two. And within this play something else is introduced.

The prophets even have a strange tendency to be suspicious of visions. In any case, a vision cannot contradict the word. On rare occasions it accompanies the word as a guarantee, occasionally as a framework. But there is even a tendency to criticize visions and to make the opposition between word and vision the line of demarcation between true and false prophets. On the one side we have the prophets of the word, who announce the very power of God, with no ambiguity or ambivalence, and with hard objectivity. On the other, we have the visionaries whose prophecy is unreliable, ambiguous, abstruse, and requires deciphering.

We must consider how many texts involve a vision which is primarily a false prophecy in which the false prophet argues that his vision proves he is right. A vision is both argument and falsehood. The vision is inspired by a fraudulent power which tries to pass for God and seduces people away from the revelation through the Word. The prophets often insist on the falseness of visions as opposed to the certainty of the Word of God. Thus we can say that the antithesis between sight and word is confirmed. In this connection we are told of "visions of a person’s heart": what a person invents on his own, as if it were a truth from God.

Finally, the prophets also say "I saw . . . " when they refer to an understanding they have just had of reality. In this case we no longer have an abstract celestial "vision," but the sight of the real world as perceived by the senses, through which the meaning of the world becomes clear. This meaning is truth. The object of sight in the Bible is clearly the Word of God. Such an object is known only by the Word of God, as Wilhelm Vischer clearly shows. The potter’s finger seen by Jeremiah becomes the finger of God. The almond branch which blooms is the haste with which the Word will be fulfilled; the cauldron whose mouth faces north is the image of God’s judgment.

The prophet perceives the meaning of these material objects he sees. "Normal vision is designation. The prophetic vision is the giving of a sense. Out of the nomenclature according to human seeing . . . all of a sudden values arise."(André Neher, The Prophetic Existence, trans. William Wolf (South Brunswick and New York: A. S. Barnes and Co.; London: Thomas Yoseloff Ltd, 1969), p. 333.) The prophet’s vision is an understanding of the meaning of things and the world. Thus we might suppose that this vision has value in itself -- a quality of truth similar to that of the Word. In reality, this is not so, for if vision has this power to signify, it is only to the degree that there is meaning for the prophet in what is perceived, because this meaning was created by a Word. It is because the vision expresses an active, living, powerful Word. It is a rich manifestation of a creative word (Claude Tresmontant); reality means nothing without this word backing it up. The prophet grasps the meaning and the sign only because he is a prophet of the Word, and he expresses this meaning only through words. Thus reality as seen by the prophet is surrounded from beginning to end by the word, which gives it value. The prophets’ "I saw" in no way contradicts the unique truth of the Word.

In the New Testament three groups of passages evidently involve sight and vision. First, those where Jesus is concerned, in which the verb "see" is used intentionally. Next, the passages of apocalyptic character. Finally, the passages in the Acts of the Apostles.

The first group of passages is found mainly in the Gospel of John. In contrast with the initial statement, "No one has ever seen God" (Jn. 1:18), this entire Gospel emphasizes the importance of the vision that the apostles and their contemporaries had of Jesus. "You have seen me and yet do not believe" (Jn. 6:36); "every one who sees the Son and believes in him [has] eternal life" (Jn. 6:40). The word "see" in these contexts has a precise meaning: "he who sees me sees him who sent me" (Jn. 12:45); "[He] who has seen me has seen the Father" (Jn. 14:9). This implies complete unity between Father and Son. Furthermore, the Son is the image of the Father -- the only image. There is no other vision of God apart from Jesus Christ; there is no other representation apart from the Son. It is impossible for a person to see God apart from the incarnation of Jesus. Again the mystics’ claims are denied. There are a few related passages in the synoptic Gospels and the Epistles of John.

Considering what we have said so far, what is the meaning of this importance given to seeing Jesus Christ? It reveals something about the Incarnation. The Word entered into the world of the senses. Furthermore, as we have already outlined, the Word is related to truth, whereas images are related to reality. The Incarnation is the only moment in world history when truth joins reality, when it completely penetrates reality and therefore changes it at its root. The Incarnation is the point where reality ceases being a diversion from truth and where truth ceases being the fatal judgment on reality. At this moment the Word can be seen. Sight can be believed (because in the Incarnation, but there only, sight is related to truth). The image, which normally does not have the force of truth, becomes true when the image is Jesus Christ, who is the image of the living God. For this reason John emphasizes sight -- because here reality is penetrated by truth.

But this is temporary; it is limited to the period of the Incarnation. Once the incarnate life of Jesus is over, the two orders become separate again. "A little while, and you will see me no more" (Jn. 16:16). At that point, we fall back into our frailty, back into the human condition, where reality is not truth. For this reason the Gospel of John ends with the story of Thomas, who needs to see in order to believe. When the incarnate life of Jesus is over, it is no longer possible to do so: "Blessed are those who have not seen and yet believe" (Jn. 20:29). We return to the need for believing a person’s words -- only the word of those who have seen, who have been able to certify that truth penetrated reality, that it subsists, and that the word alone is again the expression of the truth. From now on sight will relate only to reality.

After the incarnate life of Jesus, as before it, faith and sight are in contradiction. And faith is born of the Word: "You believe, not because you saw miracles, but because you ate your fill of the bread [of heaven]" (Jn. 6:26, JE). Once again the miracle is a sign without meaning in itself. Its truth resides only in the word that accompanies it and in the experience of life that it gives. Sight always pulls us away from the relationship of faith, because it draws us toward a reality we want to grasp, and because it necessarily directs us toward evidence. Seeing something implies the possibility of proof. This is exactly what Thomas asks for and what Jesus answers. Thomas had proof: things that are visible, tangible, and experienced are closely related. But wherever you have proof, or a demand for proof, the relationship is different from the relationship that faith brings. In the faith relationship, one believes without need for demonstration and without seeing anything, because faith establishes a relationship of confidence in the person who speaks. The word has significance only if I have confidence in the person speaking to me. The truth of the word depends neither on its objective content nor on its logical coherence, but on the person who speaks it.

In this case I cannot follow the same reasoning process I used for sight. In order to be understood, the Word presupposes faith, but this faith is a result of the Word that is addressed to me. "Faith comes by hearing," says Paul (Rom. 10:17, JE). It comes by hearing exclusively, and absolutely never from what one sees. Evidence and what we see appear to pull us away from a relationship of confidence and faithfulness. There is utter contradiction between this relationship with God that can only be based on faith and a relationship that would be based on sight. Sight is utterly excluded from the faith relationship. The New Testament thus confirms the Old on the issue of covetousness. The First Epistle of John speaks expressly of the "lust of the eyes’, (2:16), and the most significant passage of all is the famous text in Philippians (2: 5-8) that shows Jesus’ anticovetousness. But we must return to the Incarnation itself: can we interpret it as the coming together of the Spirit of God and the world, the erasure of the breach, as reintegration in unity, and therefore the reconciliation of reality with truth and thus of image and word? Although the prohibition concerning making images and attaching truth to them is understandable under the old covenant, it would fall away with the Incarnation. This is true because Jesus is the image of God and he could be seen. He is the only possible way of seeing God, and at the same time he is the true image of humanity.

I must say that I am always dumbfounded when the real effect of the Incarnation is stated thus, in absolute terms. Is it possible that the modern world’s atrocity and the atrocity of world history are not sufficient to convince people that the Incarnation is in reality not universal and cannot be universalized? It is now an established fact that no Christian politics, economics, society, or philosophy are possible. Can it be that this fact is not sufficient to make it clear that the argument based on the Incarnation is only a sophisticated effort to justify and legitimize our modern ventures through Christianity?

Of course the Incarnation is the coming in human flesh of the absolute God and the truth of his love. But that happened once, in a given time and place. It is as fleeting an event as the Transfiguration. The Jews are right when they say that if he had truly been the Messiah, the Son of God incarnate, things would have changed in some concrete way. They are right, in contrast to the theologians who wish to use the Incarnation to justify our current actions, and to proclaim that all of humanity has already reached some sort of divine condition.

The Incarnation is the sure promise, the pledge, the first fruits and the premise of what God will accomplish. It is the source of truth, freedom, and hope. It is all this, but it is not something already universally accomplished. It is something accomplished once and for all (in the sense that neither God nor anyone else will render it void), but as an accomplishment it is only the beginning of a wider achievement: Christ the firstborn from among the dead. But the resurrection has not yet taken place. This theology of the Incarnation as a magical mutation of human beings seems to me indefensible. It is a theology of the "already accomplished" that fails to take into account the "not yet," and the fact that we live under the Promise. So far we have only the "earnest" of this Promise.

As far as I am concerned, in spite of the criticisms of some modern theologians, we must continue to emphasize the dialectic of the "already and not yet" of the Kingdom of Heaven and the Kingdom of God. There is an "already": Christ has already come; God is on humanity’s side; death has been vanquished once, and therefore once for all; evil has been vanquished once, and therefore once for all, and we can live in the certainty of love and hope. But nothing has yet been universally consummated. We have not yet been resurrected, we are not yet holy and blessed, and reconciliation is not visible, even though it is a reality as far as God is concerned. As a person outside the faith, an individual is neither assured of his salvation nor permeated by truth. He is not liberated or righteous in his undertakings.

In other words, there is no magic wand, for that is exactly what is involved in the triumphalist theology that I oppose. It says that "from now on everything is changed: God is now humanity’s partner, and whatever human beings undertake (even outside the faith, even if they are utterly unconscious of God’s love and will), they now do the works of God." Thus the Incarnation is taken for a magic wand. Everything has changed, whether or not a person knows, wishes, or believes it. And everything has changed concretely, in reality.

I believe this view is fundamentally antibiblical, since nothing has changed except for faith. Nothing has changed ontologically, but everything has changed at the level of meaning, of the sign, and of evolution. Nothing of humanity’s evil and misfortune has changed, except in hope and in truth. But this truth is hidden.

This theological position also depends on a substantialist attitude (things must be changed in substance, just as the eucharistic host changes substance). But humanity is antisubstantialist and antiontological. There is no change in human nature, which in no way became divine through the Incarnation. Jesus is one person and not humanity. The mutation produced is the entry of truth and love into the world which had always excluded them. But this entry is as unobtrusive as the word of truth. The Kingdom of Heaven is present in our midst and is at work. It is also within us: "The kingdom is in the midst of you and within you" (Lk. 17:21, JE). But it is not in everyone.

Let us quickly recall that this is not the same as discriminating between sinners and the saved; Christians acquire no superiority through knowing and recognizing the God of truth. On the contrary, they have a responsibility and a function: the Kingdom of Heaven is a power secretly at work within the world, to change it. This is accomplished not through a metaphysical mutation but through a slow work of mysterious and invisible insertion. It is not an obvious process. Being a Christian means taking part in this work which does not change "the essence of things" but causes a new dimension of love and hope to penetrate everywhere, because of and in the true Lord. This work takes place within visible and concrete reality, but it is not located there. And it is not yet the Kingdom of God which will come in power "at the end of time," when everything will be radically changed by the fulfillment of what is promised.

He will come "in the clouds" as the glorious Christ, and every- one will be obliged to recognize him. In the meantime, we are not yet at this stage. Christ is glorified and invisible in the heaven of heavens. And we remain on the earth, unchanged: human folly and tragedy remain what they have always been -- but with the gnawing of love, the leaven concealed in the dough (but it has not yet risen), the seed hidden in the ground (but it has not sprung up), and the salt put in the soup (but it has not dissolved). So sight has not joined the Word. Sight does not have a new status, and nothing can justify the Christian imagery and the idols of all sorts that we continually erect. The Incarnation has not introduced sight into the order of truth. Only the word belongs there!

Certainly we cannot dodge the question of Jesus’ being the image of God -- the only possible image. But we must be most cautious in this connection. The Gospels show us clearly that Jesus’ divinity was not obvious. It was in no way visible. According to the passage in Isaiah: "Nothing about him attracted attention -- neither beauty nor bearing" (Isa. 53:2, JE). Continual ambiguity surrounds Jesus; although he may declare himself to be the Messiah or even the Son of God, most of the time he uses the title "Son of man." He never declares that he is God himself. He is not a visible and recognizable God in his observable reality. He is not a Tibetan-style God incarnate. It was absolutely impossible to say when one saw Jesus: there is God. John the Baptist discerned this by a miracle and the voice he heard, but not by seeing him as a man.

Following the Gospel writers, Origen understood perfectly this "invisibility" of the truth of Jesus: "Not all those who observed Christ’s actions immediately understood their meaning. In the last days the Word came into the world born of Mary and clothed in flesh. But the eyes that saw him as a person saw one thing; their spirit understood something different. Everyone could observe his fleshly form, but very few -- only the elect -- received the grace to recognize his divinity", (Commentary on Matthew).

John’s Gospel continually emphasizes the misunderstandings about Jesus. He is the image of God, because a theological reinterpretation of the Word has been effected, but he is never rendered visible and distinguishable as God in our reality. And when Jesus has ascended to the Father, when he has "found" his divinity again after the resurrection, the disciples no longer recognize him: neither the disciples on the road to Emmaus nor those on the shore of the Lake of Tiberias. They no longer see him as the man Jesus. This is why Paul places little value on knowing Jesus "according to the flesh"; the flesh adds nothing. Again (just as when God reveals himself to Moses), Paul can say of him afterward: "He was God present in our midst; Jesus was the eternal Christ," "the glory of Christ who is the image of God," or "as the firstborn of creation, all things were created in him," etc. He is "the image of the invisible God." But these things are said precisely when he is no longer seen!

We still have no visible image of God, and in this realm sight continues to be useless! Seeing a photograph of Jesus would not prove anything more and would add nothing to his words.(This also means that, since Jesus is not recognizable as God by sight, it is certainly praiseworthy to make drawings, paintings, and sculptures showing what we imagine him to have been like. But this activity can be oriented in two directions. If it involves symbolic representations, then this is perfectly acceptable and consistent with revelation. Twelfth-century sculpture does not claim to represent the real Jesus as he was; rather it tries to show in a purely symbolic manner an incarnation of the glory of the invisible God. On the contrary, as soon as someone tries to show the "humanity,’ of Jesus, in a kind of photography, as in the religious art called saint-sulpicerie and in nineteenth-century painting, then the situation becomes both ridiculous and idolatrous. This is precisely what is forbidden.

This impossibility of representing Jesus prevents me from believing in the supposed shroud of Jesus. In no way does it aid God’s revelation. All it does is feed our curiosity. It does not allow us to understand the Word of God or to receive Truth. It contradicts directly Jesus’ "You will see me no more."’ It tends to perpetuate an image of Jesus in our midst, whereas the only presence promised to us is that of the Holy Spirit. As for the value of the "miracle," we have seen abundant evidence for the fact that miracles have no value in themselves. Their value comes only from the Word which accompanies them. And in this case we have only the silence of the tomb). And I believe that in our present situation, such a picture would, on the contrary, unleash a reaction of unbelief.

For this reason the pretension of certain contemporary theological tendencies that want to eliminate God in favor of Jesus of Nazareth (since he is all we can know and believe about God).seems to me to be closely connected with this preoccupation with reintroducing the visible. They say that no one has ever seen God, but people could see Jesus, since he was a historical personality.

The desire to return to what is visible amounts to a new introduction of religion, in another guise, which takes the place of the faith called forth by the Word. In other words, the image of Jesus confirms our certainty that we are in the presence of a breach (perhaps related to the breach of holiness) between religions of sight and vision on the one hand, and a proclamation of the Word on the other. The religions of sight are related to a representable reality and they consider evidence to consist of demonstrations. The proclamation of the Word addresses itself to hearing, which leads to a different knowledge, understanding, and obedience. The two approaches are mutually exclusive.

In the same way, if humanity was created as the image of God, and if the only perfect image is Jesus Christ, this means that the living God cannot tolerate sterile material images. He requires living images; this is the basis of the Incarnation. "The imperceptible God desires images that are not fleeting, but neither does he want fixed, determined images" (Alphonse Maillot).

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Following these thoughts on the Incarnation, we will very quickly consider the other aspects of visualization in the New Testament. In Chapter VII we will study the Gospel of John and the vision of the book of Revelation, both of which involve us in eschatology. They both attest that access to truth in visible form is related to the New Creation, the accomplished reconciliation between God and humanity, and the reintegration of humanity in its fullness.

This being the case, we can go straight to the early Christians’ visions as they are recorded for us in the book of Acts. Let’s eliminate Stephen’s vision, since it is apocalyptic in nature, and Saul’s, since he encounters the reality of the living Jesus, as the disciples saw him in the Transfiguration.

Let’s consider the genuine visions. They all have something in common: they are instrumental visions. The vision of Ananias, who is told to welcome Saul of Tarsus; the vision of Cornelius, who is told to send for Peter; Peter’s vision, in which he is told to eat the unclean animals; Paul’s vision of a Macedonian who asks him to come to Macedonia; Paul’s vision when he is told to evangelize Corinth, etc. This common denominator enables us to understand that all the visions in Acts have a special meaning: it is always a matter of engaging someone in an action, giving a concrete command, or causing something to be done.

All of this is in the domain of reality and practical matters. The visions in Acts belong to the order of reality which needs to be encountered or changed. The purpose is pragmatic, and as a result these visions are adequate instruments for the end in view, but they contain nothing from the domain of truth or of spiritual revelation. Thus the visions mentioned in Scripture all coincide with what we have said about the Word’s exclusiveness in relation to truth. Finally, it must be noted that such examples of vision are infrequent in the Bible. The Bible consists entirely of the Word, whereas visions are sporadic events.

Having made these cursory remarks concerning theophanies and biblical visions, we can say, with certain exceptions, that truly the biblical God does not offer anything to sight. There is no showing or demonstration of God. A certain historical movement once tended to visualize the biblical revelation, in order to restore sight to its former position, and searched on the intellectual level for proofs of the existence of God.

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Obviously visions have nothing in common with the "false gods" of which the Bible speaks -- nothing in common except for sight. False gods are always gods one can see (and touch), and that very quality demonstrates their falsity and their nonexistence as gods. Isaiah’s irony is well known: "You can take it and put it on a pedestal, but you can also throw it on the ground.... What is this god, except a piece of wood, since you can see it as it is?" From the viewpoint of our subtle ethnologists and historians of religions, Isaiah undoubtedly commits a grave error -- the same error committed by Christians who ridicule statues of gods. These pagan religions are much more refined than that. The pagan "never" identified the deity with the statue. He had an abstract, superior conception of an inaccessible and indefinable divine power. I know all that. But after all, what if Isaiah (who lived in the midst of that world and belonged to it, which is not true of us) was right after all? Sacrifices and oblations were indeed offered to the statue. Prayers were indeed addressed to it. Of course, wherever representation exists, there is necessarily something that is represented.

But if the statue is so important, it must represent something utterly transient and hazy (this is the impression I get when I read the complicated explanations of certain scholars; I always wonder if ethnologists’ presentations are not really poetry when they base their propositions on dubious notions grasped on the run). Belief needs to be fixed on something a bit more solid than this hazy concept.

Another possible explanation for the importance of the statue is that the representation coincides with what is represented. In this case everything Isaiah says is confirmed: such a god is nothing more than a table or a coat rack and has a certain verifiable and comfortable usefulness (isn’t this really the role of deities?). Otherwise the statue will be punished: it will be turned facing the wall, etc. Surely this will impress the god!

Idols are indispensable for mankind. We need to see things represented and make the powers enter our domain of reality. It is a sort of kidnapping. False gods (they are false, but they exist!) are powers of all sorts that human beings discern in the world. The Bible clearly distinguishes these from the idol, which is the visualization of these powers and mysterious forces. People give names to these powers and forces. But that is not sufficient. They must be transferred to reality in order for us to be reassured. For we are reassured only by reality. Things that can be seen and grasped are certain and at our disposition. It is fundamentally unacceptable for us to be at the disposition of these gods ourselves, and unable to have power over them. Prayer or offering cannot satisfy, since they provide no sure domination. If, on the contrary, a person makes his own image and can certify that it is truly the deity, he is no longer afraid. Idols quiet our fears.

Images are truly filled with spiritual meaning and power; they are integrated into the sacred world, but belong to reality, to this human world. They are not in an impossible relationship over which I am not the master. Even if the idol is not itself the deity it is nevertheless the same. It has an identity and is not just a pointer. It participates in the god’s existence, and is the means by which I lay hold on the deity and bring him down to my level.

Ryser shows clearly the relationship between sight and idolatry in his excellent study on the golden calf. In this narrative, Moses has disappeared. The issue is to "present to the people not just a fleeting word, related to the person speaking it, but something visible and accessible to everyone. It will be something one can be sure of and hold on to just as much as God, but more easily." Thus in this first step we have objectification and generalization: the visible object is permanent (unlike the word), and is at our disposition. The object allows anyone to see it, whereas the word is not for just anyone; it is addressed to someone in particular.

Based on this conclusion, three essential remarks from Ryser’s book must be considered. First, something visible is substituted for what is heard. Ryser sees clearly the subtle truth of the matter of the golden rings: the calf will be made with the gold from the "rings that adorn the ears"; that is, which honor the organ that allows us to hear the word! "Aaron dishonors the ear; it no longer counts; now just the eye matters. Hearing the Word of God no longer matters; now seeing and looking at an image are central. Sight replaces faith. The concept that arises from a person’s heart or mind is transformed into a work fashioned by human hands and takes the place of the invisible revelation that comes from above."

The second remark is that the deity represented, the visible Baal, is a god of power, possession, and domination (and fertility). What is visible is related to power. This means that humanity’s desire to have a visible deity that is near and actually known leads to the making of terrible, merciless, and tyrannical gods.

The third remark comes from Aaron’s proclamation as he unveils the bull: "This is your god, O Israel, which brought you up out of the land of Egypt" (Ex. 32:4, JE). This is of crucial importance: what we have here is not a switch from one god to another, but a visible image which does not remain an image! It has now become God himself. The image brought Israel out of Egypt.

God and the idol are the same thing, the same reality; and the idol wins. This process contradicts the explanations that say "of course, statues and depictions are not God . . . everyone knows that." No! The confusion always takes place. What is visible always takes in everything else. But only God takes in everything. Only he can see the truth. The passage in Exodus says: "I have seen," says God (32:9). This "I have seen" is obviously in opposition to the "sight" which the people demand. God sees both the reality and the truth. He sees the true meaning of what the people have done.

Anything may become an idol. The Bible shows us that the brazen serpent, the Temple at Jerusalem, and sacrifices can become idols when sight restricts them to a single role or a limited function. Symbols are groups of fragments of a shattered truth. Symbols become idols when the elasticity between truth and its symbols is frozen into a stereotype that humanity can finally possess.

In this connection I concur with Jean-Paul Gabus in his excellent analysis of idols: "The idol remains in a sense a symbol, since it is a concept overloaded with meaning.... But the idol crystallizes attention on a single element of the symbol’s meaning: the serpent as healer, the Temple as a place of safety, sacrifice as a means of attracting divine favors. In practice the idol destroys the pluralism of symbolic meaning. It inhibits the circulation of meaning that normally takes place between several levels of meaning. The idol conceals the symbol.(Jean-Paul Gabus, Critique du discours théologique (Paris: Delachaux, 1977)

Thus there is a conflict, according to the Bible, not only with "false gods" (which do not concern us here), but also with all visible depiction of spiritual matters. The Bible attacks the security humanity draws from statues. Still we must, obviously, distinguish between the two kinds of divine statues or visualizations humanity can make for itself: the kind involving strange gods such as calves or bulls, for example, and the sort which concerns the God of Israel himself. However, the same condemnation, the same error, and the same impossibility are involved in both cases. People confuse truth with reality, and reduce what can belong only to the order of the word (where of necessity they are responsible) to the order of sight (where they reign as masters). Whether an image is called an idol or an icon changes absolutely nothing!

The paradox of idols is this: idols do not exist. In an apparently ambiguous passage, Paul speaks to us very strangely: "We know that ‘an idol has no real existence.’... For although there may be so-called gods in heaven or on earth -- as indeed there are many ‘gods’ and many ‘lords’ -- yet for us there is one God, the Father . . and one Lord, Jesus Christ" (1 Cor. 8:4-6). This passage has several levels of meaning: that of the spiritual dispute is always pointed out -- there is only one God and Lord; all the rest are false gods.

But we are attracted to this passage at another level: on the one hand there are gods and lords. They really exist. They are part of the powers that claim to be all-powerful or salvific, etc., and that attract people’s love and religious belief. They exist. And they pass themselves off as gods. But idols do not exist. That is to say that the visible portrayal of these powers, which is perceived by the senses, has no value, no consistency, and no existence. I could suggest a comparison: money certainly exists, but a banknote does not "exist." It is never anything but a piece of paper, and is not even a real sign anymore. And here is the paradox: since idols try to introduce a spiritual force into reality by bringing it into the sphere of the visible and the concrete, idols themselves do not exist. They exist neither as something visible and concrete (since in this sense they are really nothing) nor as something spiritual and "true-or-false" (since they cannot reach this level). They have no kind of existence precisely because they have tried to obtain indisputable existence beyond the uncertainty of the word.

The idol does not exist, but it alienates the person who makes it! Maillot shows admirably that in Deuteronomy "there is a coming together of the ‘sight’ one can have of other gods (their portrayal) and of religious alienation; making a god, drawing or sculpting a god means immediately bowing down to it and becoming a slave. The eye becomes not just the organ of laziness, but also of religious alienation.... Seeing is not only being assured of something’s presence; it is also possession.... But the Bible shows that this immediately signifies being possessed."

All images are harshly condemned. The Bible speaks of "graven images," but no other sort was known at that time. Painting was almost nonexistent. "The graven images . . . you shall burn with fire", (Deut. 7:25); "Cursed be the man who makes a graven or molten image" (Deut. 27:15); "Every goldsmith is put to shame by his idols" (Jer. 10:14); "All worshipers of images are put to shame" (Ps. 97:7). Of course, some will say that the image is not condemned in itself, but that idolatry is the problem: the image one adores, or the image made to inspire worship. Naturally. But we are still left with the strange opposition between word and image.

The God of the word cannot tolerate the gods of image. Why? The elementary, obvious answer is that these passages come from a society of images, where gods were thus portrayed, and that Israel’s monotheism could not tolerate it.(It is true that there was evolution in Israel with regard to images. Israel was probably also acquainted with images at the beginning: the brazen serpent, used under Moses’ high authority, and perhaps taken by David from the Jebusites and placed in the sanctuary; the golden calf, undoubtedly an image quite acceptable to the people at a late stage, in imitation of the Canaanite bull. Perhaps there was even an image of Yahweh in the Temple. All this is possible, and as a result it gives us a rather late date for the respect given to images. The essential matter is that, given the general context of the surrounding religions, and given the general popular tendency, there was a total reversal. This reversal makes something magical of the brazen serpent and a destroyed idol of the golden calf, affirming that the eternal God is the enemy of images, at least as early as Amos and Hosea.

This reversal comes about gradually as the people deepen their knowledge of the truth of the Word, and as they learn of the radical opposition between word and image. The essential matter is the point at which the people of God arrive in their recognition of the truth, as they follow the Word of God alone.) The most spiritual religion could not accept this gross materialism. This is apparently correct (except for the fact that religions with images are not all that materialistic), but it is certainly insufficient.

A passage of Paul’s clarifies the problem somewhat: people "exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles" (Rom. 1:23). What is the serious error? That glory has been changed into image. Glory is what shows God for what he is as God. This glory is invisible and can only be grasped approximately by the word. This glory is the reflection of God himself and can never be transformed into a thing. God’s glory is a manifestation of the truth. It is the presence of a person.

The seriousness of making images lies not only in the fact of idolatry. The image relates not to God but to visible things (obviously it cannot exist otherwise!); it refers to reality. Thus there is an exchange of truth for reality, of the person for the object. It is therefore much more than a sort of competition between gods, between a true god and false ones: it is a fundamental, radical change. God really is not God any longer when he is represented. What people look at has nothing to do with truth. For this reason Paul says: "They have exchanged.... " The image is a change -- in itself and not only in terms of the feelings that it produces or that produced it.

Thus the Bible attacks not only adoration but also the image itself. This is because with the image we change not only from one religion to another but from one order to another. We leave the order of truth and move into that of reality. The prophets understand this when they show the absurdity of people who adore the creature instead of the creator. Thus the image is condemned as a denial of God himself.

This does not mean, of course, that every image, sculpture, or painting works this way! It is true only of images in the religious sphere. But just as every word draws its seriousness from the fact that God adopted speech, so every image draws its character from the place the Bible assigns to images. I repeat that of course not all images are idolatrous and demonic. But they are in effect opposed to the word, belong to another order, and are intrinsically contradictory and not complementary to the word. The contradiction situated at the level of adoration has repercussions at all levels. Images are incapable of expressing anything at all about God. In daily life as well, the word remains the expression God chooses. Images are in a completely different domain -- the domain that is not God and can never become God, on any grounds.

Let us return to the warning from Sinai: "You shall not make yourself a graven image . . . you shall not bow down to them" (Ex. 20:4-5). The usual error is to refer this command only to the worship of "false gods." But this matter is already dealt with in the previous command. Here the adoration of false gods is not at issue so much as the confusion that amounts to claiming to represent by an image what one is going to worship. Not only the idol is concerned.(Goux, in Les Iconoclastes, needs of course to find a psychoanalytical basis for the biblical prohibition against representing God and adoring images. He reasons thus: making images of gods involves making a material image (he of course avoids the problem of the visible, which is the explicit problem in the Bible). Given that materia comes from mater (an unfounded etymology!), this means making an image of the Mother. This can only mean adoring in a sensual way the mother figure. Therefore, "the prohibition against making images of the divinity is a radical form -- the Judaistic form -- of the prohibition against incest. And Moses’ terrific anger against the idolaters signifies that he threatens them with castration -- the punishment for loving one’s mother." QED! It is obvious that anything at all can be substantiated using such "reasoning."

Furthermore, this conclusion leads Goux in an amazing way to an astonishing conclusion: the golden calf is a cow. It does not matter that all the biblical texts speak of the calf in the masculine; that the Bible tells us clearly that a bull is called a "calf" in order to ridicule it, or that we know concretely that such worship was related to the masculine fertility cult and to the bulls of Canaan or Babylon. Everything the Bible says is erased by the great discovery of the prohibition against incest. The calf must therefore be a cow! And all these prohibitions must be concerned with the worship of feminine deities, who are never explicitly mentioned, with exception of Istar, who comes up much later!) Before there is any idol, the will to portray exists. And since it is a matter of representing something as an image, visible things are necessarily involved: things that are in the sky, on the earth, and in the sea.(Here we must refer to the very new and profound interpretation of the commandment against graven images as related by Fernando Belo in "Universalité et contextualité," in Parole et Société (Paris), no. 1 (1978). He believes that this passage involves two complementary orientations not to have images that resemble . . ., and the bowing down, which implies a gathering before (these images). The gathering is a closed one, excluding general participation, and it takes place around a scene of images "displaying the effects of resemblance in those who are thus assembled together because they have the same relationship of similarity with the images of the scene.", Thus we have the image of an imaginary closed scene, with a mirror-type action so that the people cease being active in their lives (or in their relationship with God) and become passive and prostrate. The people become like this image and at the same time they become like each other, through identification with their object of worship. They cease being individualized and become united by images (Belo says that we are individualized by social practices; I would say rather it is by God’s challenge to each person and one’s insertion into this universe of the word).

This image can also become an imaginary image based on a mythological narrative with closed and mirrored language (which goes back and forth from one mirror to another). This provides an image of the god related to past events and ancestors and allows for a repetitive liturgy involving images. Thus the image produces a self-mirroring enclosure. This is what the commandment shatters, since it comes from the historical and nonmythological God, and since he starts people off on an adventure rather than enclosing them. Revelation gives no image of Yahweh; God is not enclosed anywhere, not even in the Temple. He produces in people a drive toward life and action, as they become participants in "God’s story," and are sent out for an open-ended adventure rather than caught up in a repetitive liturgy. This is indeed the ultimate problem of the fixed, frozen, contemplated image.) Thus what is invisible is transferred to the domain of visible things. And this is exactly what Paul means when he opposes visible (transitory) things with invisible (Rom. 1:23; 2 Cor. 4). The God of Israel denies any possible expression of himself in visual form.

True, of course, other religions in the area also had a concept of a power or "deity" beyond all visible representation (certainly in Egypt, but probably also in Mesopotamia). However, no god was excluded, and the visible portrayals were considered in effect to be gods. The visual element was basic -- so basic that the nonvisualized deity was limited to an utterly hazy, uncertain, and unidentifiable existence. The visual element here is what enables people to become certain in their belief and to specify its content.

The God of Israel, however, is exclusive. He cannot tolerate a possible confusion of himself with other gods, but in particular he cannot tolerate people’s attempting any visualization of him whatever. The holy of holies is empty. It can contain a representation of things which suggest the glory of this God in a parabolic fashion, but nothing else. The glory itself is there, but it is invisible. God continually proclaims that he cannot be portrayed in any manner. And the condemnation of the golden calf, or of Jeroboam’s calves, is not aimed at the adoration of foreign deities, the gods of the surrounding peoples, the idols that imitate other people’s idols. The condemnation centers on the claim that the one who has revealed himself to Israel as invisible has been portrayed in a visible manner. Only secondarily could the form of a bull, which was indeed adopted in imitation of other religions, mean that they were adoring another god. The essential matter, which has not often been seen by historians, is that by claiming to represent the true God, in whom Israel believed, by pretending to visualize him, they signified by that very act that they had changed gods. Their god was no longer the Lord of Israel. This is exactly what Paul says when he recalls the sin of having changed the glory of God into an image.

God is fundamentally, essentially invisible. Over and over again it is proclaimed and stated that no one can see God and live. This is said even to Moses in Exodus 33:20 (we will return to this idea). When Moses asks God to let him see his glory, the basic answer is: "I will make all my goodness pass before you, and will proclaim before you my name ‘the Lord’; and I will be gracious to whom I will be gracious, and will show mercy on whom I will show mercy, but . . . you cannot see my face; for man shall not see me and live" (Ex. 33:19-20). What follows is the famous passage in which God says to Moses that he will hide him while he passes by, and that Moses will be able to see God from behind, but no one can see his face. This means that one can see God’s trace after he has passed: God’s work and God’s action after the fact. But one can never see God at work, nor God’s presence.

This passage rigorously opposes seeing and hearing. We find the same idea at the birth of Samson the judge, when his father states: "We shall surely die, for we have seen God" (Judg. 13:22). I am especially interested here in the fact that sight and hearing are treated differently. This God cannot be seen, but he can be heard. If we were dealing with a "spiritualization," it would be difficult to explain why it would deal only with visible portrayal. Later Israel formulates a prohibition which seems to specify in an astonishing manner the God of the earliest period. Rather than theological progress, this signifies an acceptance of the first revelation.

The prohibition against portraying God leads to a unique situation among all the peoples of antiquity: the "empty Temple." This is precisely "the site which systematically relegates all other religions to subjective fetishism" (Goux). The empty Temple amounts to a prohibition against attributing to tangible and visible matter what belongs only to the creator of heaven and earth, and who therefore does not belong to the earthly order. This prohibition thus attests the radical otherness of God. This is the exact meaning of the well-known passages in Psalms 115 and 135; Jeremiah 10:3-4; Isaiah 40:18-19; 46:6-7; etc. Idols, made by human beings, belong to the earth’s domain; they belong to "this side" (which is why people prefer them). They partake of visible reality, but this very fact demonstrates that they are not gods: there is nothing behind or beyond them; they are confined things, with no truth and no future.

The empty Temple, which is Israel’s specificity, and which corresponds precisely to the temptation of the golden calf, is the critical locus of all visualization. This signifies radically that this God is truly the incomparable Wholly Other, who cannot be directly approached except through the Word that this God speaks when he chooses. The empty Temple is a critical place, just as the Word is critical and the empty Tomb is absolutely critical of all our representations of the Resurrection.

Faced with this absolute prohibition against all representation, the attitude required of the Jew, but also of the Christian, is an iconoclastic attitude. We must shatter images and destroy the statues before which people bow down. They bow down as masters who have enclosed truth within their reality, and who prevent the emergence of the Wholly Other because they have circumscribed a sacred space. Breaking the image obliges people to discover themselves faced again with the gaping void that challenges them. In the midst of fear, scandal, anger, or stupor, they are obliged to see their god fallen down, and so must raise a question and listen to a word.

But even though iconoclasm in the material sphere was the characteristic act of Christian intransigence at the beginning of the Church’s history, at the time of the monks of the Egyptian desert in the fourth century, and in the Reformation, it no longer seems to concern us much. In reality, however, this is the spiritual question of our age, since it is the age of extreme visualization; but the issue no longer necessarily concerns statues! The conflict surrounding the representation of God in stone or painting no longer concerns us, because for our contemporaries, these works of art no longer represent anything. Since they are "just art," we have no reaction to them. On the contrary, iconoclasm is always essential to the degree that other gods and other representations are manifested. We no longer have to struggle against Dagon or Ishtar or Melkart, but against thrones, powers, and dominions. These are called Money, State, and Technique -- the new spiritual trinity that manifests itself in quite visible idols, belonging exclusively to the visible sphere. The process (of transforming material things into deities), however, is exactly the same.

In our era, iconoclasm attacks the spiritual trinity of Money, State, and Technique. The visual sphere has won overwhelmingly, but it passes itself off for something spiritual. Only the means used (to make visible things appear to be spiritual) are different. Formerly one discerned a spiritual truth that was materialized in order to grasp it through sight. Today reality triumphs, has swept everything away, and monopolizes all our energy and projects. The image is everywhere, but now we bestow dignity, authenticity, and spiritual truth on it. We enclose within the image everything that belongs to the order of truth. The word is thus localized, and becomes space and mediocre reality. First of all, then, iconoclasm is directed at all visible signs of invisible powers. Today, much more than formerly, when we attack visible signs, all divine and demonic power is at stake, since its essence lies in these visible signs.

But there is another iconoclasm: the one that attacks portrayals of God made by Christians, even apart from statues and paintings. We also visualize in our minds, in our concepts. Only with much difficulty can we escape from spatialization (and Bishop John A. T. Robinson was right when he said that it was ridiculous to talk about the God who is "up there" somewhere above us. But Robinson seemed not to realize, oddly enough, that he also spoke of God in spatial terms when he said God was "deep down" in the depths). Only with much difficulty can we escape from our ultimate desire to bring everything back to sight, even when it is a matter of internalized sight. We need an image of God in order for our thinking to grab hold of something.

So God the Father becomes God with a white beard. The God of justice becomes the stern God on his throne. The unportrayable deity becomes the Triangle surrounded by rays of light. The God who knows all things becomes a huge eye. And we have already seen that images of Jesus, unless they are symbolic, are no more legitimate than images of God. They have no value either as representations of Jesus or as an attempt to make God show through this pious and pitiful imagery.

We must fight all these false images. They are necessarily false, because they are all situated in space and related to sight. The process is always the same. And when Gabriel Vahanian proclaims that God is dead, he refers to all these images. He attacks them by considering iconoclasm as the first act of the Christian life: the first and continuous act, the breaking down of images through the Word.

* * * * * *

We must constantly return, however, to the Fall. Obviously, although the word is given absolute preeminence in Creation, sight is by no means excluded. In God a close association exists between sight and word, but this poses no contradiction. A constant movement is established from truth to reality and from reality to truth. At first even Adam is given the eminent role of being the meeting point between created reality and space, where sight dominates, on the one hand, and the creator, on the other. The true creator is this one who addresses Adam through the word. This produces a situation characterized by unity of being (that is, unity of reality and truth); unity of the creator with his creation (but this is through the mediation of humanity); noncontradiction and fullness: "and when they had everything, they desired nothing."

The association in God of sight and word is emphasized by the very text of Genesis: at each stage of creation, God speaks; God sees; God names. He says "let there be light"; he sees "that the light was good"; he "called the light day" (Gen. 1:3-5). There is perfect continuity, and each act reflects his authenticity of being.

The explosion takes place at the moment of separation, when rupture occurs between God and humanity -- and even before that. We can foresee the Fall as soon as sight is considered independently of the word; and this sight refers to the truth, appropriately enough! In Genesis 3 we read that "the woman saw that the tree was good for food, and that it was a delight to the eyes, and that the tree was to be desired to make one wise" (Gen. 3:6). This is the first time sight is a separate issue. This sight refers to the tree of the knowledge of good and evil;(It is the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, and not, as some have insisted on saying, the tree simply of "knowledge"! As I have shown, this knowledge is the power to decide on one’s own what is good and what is evil. [See Jacques Ellul, To Will and To Do, trans. C. Edward Hopkin (Philadelphia: Pilgrim Press, 1969).--Trans.]) that is to say, the tree of discernment of the truth. She sees; she no longer hears a word to know what is good, bad, or true. She sees --reality. She sees the reality of this tree. What she sees has no relationship with the word -- neither with the serpent’s word nor later with her own word, and finally not with Adam’s word when he speaks to God.

"Evidently," she sees. Evidence becomes the sign of certainty and conviction. It is compared with fleeting words which are preserved only by the memory: words of God, who is not visible, and words which are difficult to interpret. They contain all the laxity of freedom. These words permit no solid certainty: it is so easy to manipulate words.

"Did God really say?" is the only real argument. After all, am I so sure of what I heard? "Really" -- that is, related to this reality. In place of all this vagueness, this open-endedness, and this memory whose uncertainty is pointed out to me, here I have the visual, indisputable evidence. It leaves no room for discussion.

I see. What I see is evident and certain. It gives evidence against the Word. This is the real "temptation," and the process by which we question truth. Rather than remaining in a fluid relationship based on listening, word, memory, choice, and response, the woman sees a possible way to take possession and to dominate at the level of this reality that she recognizes as the only stable one. She hears the true Word placed in doubt. These two facts are closely related, and based on them the opposition to images is made explicit, as the irreconcilable contradiction of image and word is ascertained (but this conclusion is a later theological construction!).

Evidence is absolute evil. We must accept nothing based on evidence, contrary to Descartes’s recommendation. The evidence of reality is quite useful for action, but can in no way help us to understand the meaning of our lives. As soon as we allow ourselves to be invaded by this obsession with evidence, the discretion of the word vanishes. We become insensitive to language, which, even if it is the Word of God, loses its meaning. Thus we no longer pay any attention to it.

The utterly remarkable construction of the text of Genesis tells us that immediately after Eve’s discovety of evidence for the tree’s excellence, "their eyes opened" (Gen. 3:7, JE). They had been closed up until then! How many philosophers and theologians have fallen into a trap here. They say, "You see how unkind this God is. Adam and Eve were blind. He kept them blind. The Fall, disobedience (a fine use of freedom), transgression, and insolence toward this God, the doubting of his word and the refusal of his command -- all this was necessary, so that their eyes could finally be opened. They are no longer foolish: they have become both clairvoyant and intelligent."

It is considered a blessed disobedience, a blessed "Fall," that gives birth to History and Science. Finally! "How stupid the Jewish theologians were who wrote this narrative and did not even understand what an explosive concept they included in their own representation of God. Their God is either wicked or absurd. And these theologians are certainly childish!" The historians, exegetes, hermeneutics experts, and philosophers who talk this way never realize that they themselves could be the stupid and absurd ones!

"Their eyes were opened." But it had already been said earlier that they saw light. Their eyes were opened with respect to what? Their nudity. That is the great first discovery. And that is all. All their new sight allows them to discover and learn is this nudity. And this discovery leads them to make clothing for themselves. But this has been explained as a moral matter: they are ashamed of being this way. What we have here is moral conscience and the discovery of "modesty," or the myth of the origin of clothing. But this is only a small part of the meaning of this sentence, which is much more profound.

Biblically, nudity is essentially the sign of fragility and weakness. We often find the expression "I am poor and naked" ("naked" not as an expression of this poverty, but in the sense of "weak"). And clothing is the sign of and search for protection. This is the essence of this marvelous discovery, thanks to their opened eyes: humanity is weak and without protection or defense.

Furthermore, Adam’s first reaction when he hears the voice of God (in the following verse) is fear. Thus the eyes being opened in no way constitutes a point of departure for the luminous ascent of humanity. In no way does it open the possibility for humanity to understand, to assert itself, and to begin history. Instead, this even amounts to the discovery of the terrible reality that humanity without God is nothing. Without him we are without protection, without strength, and we are fragile as a breath. Sight reveals our effective reality to us.

Thus we can certainly say that this event will be the point of departure for "science and technique," since these are essentially means for escaping from this weakness and acquiring protection and power. We can certainly say that this will be the point of departure for history, since it is composed of all humanity’s efforts to subsist and persist. But there is nothing grandiose and sublime in this.

On the contrary, we have here the beginning of the frightful adventure of humanity’s trouble, of its misery and weakness. This is what is inaugurated by this sight which suddenly discovers reality outside truth -- reality fending for itself, on its own, sight beyond light, which up until this moment had transfigured it.

This light was thought of as a light coming from God; that is, the Light of God. Human beings as limited creatures were fragile and weak, but placed in God’s love; this reality was seen within the context of eternal and perfect love. It was seen by God’s own sight. It was therefore a happy reality, and weakness was just one more joy, another perfection: that of the little child who buries himself in his father’s shoulder. He is glad to be weak, since his father is so strong. But now their eyes are opened. They see raw reality, with realism and accuracy: reality outside God’s love and therefore unpleasant, dangerous, and broken. This is the fruit of evidence. Their eyes are opened to this single and exclusive reality.

Contrary to this evidence of reality as seen, God continues to act toward human beings only through the word; that is, through proposal and discretion. God is never evident. This is another way of saying that he can never be seen. He erects and transmits signs, he calls and challenges. He speaks, and humanity must receive these signs in the adventure of listening and of the word. He speaks and his signs are never constraining; they are never as gripping as reality.

God is a God of signs, and, as we have seen, what are called theophanies on the one hand, and miracles on the other, are never anything but signs for the purpose of attracting our attention. The signs are meant to move us to lend our ear to God’s voice, which is never shattering or terrifying, because it is the voice of love. "I stand at the door and knock" (Rev. 3:20). He never breaks down doors; he is never a battering ram that breaks down obstacles. The battering ram is Baal, who is visible. God sends us only signs to receive -- imperceptible indications that must be disentangled from the trumpet blasts of reality; they are words mingled with all the other words broadcast around us.

Here again we have two clear and distinct universes: the universe of evidence, seen reality, humanity’s universe; and that other one, of discretion and the word, of signs -- God’s universe. The human race of course has claimed to complete its universe through truth. Not existing truth, but manufactured truth; not the truth of love, but of power, which permits us to get a hold on dangerous and humiliating reality. So men and women monopolized language and made up signs on their own.

Human beings function on the basis of signs. "Thy foes . . . set up their own signs for signs" (Ps. 74:4). This passage is a very strong and up-to-date description of autonomous human effort. Thus we have no longer God’s signs received by humanity, but agreed-on human signs addressed to human beings.

Of what are they signs? Here resides the great difficulty for linguistics and semiotics! The debate on this issue is continuous. Having destroyed the possibility of something signified and having retained only the notion of structures, scholars now realize that the signifier no longer has any value. We must liberate ourselves from the "dictatorship of the signifier," and therefore of structures, and counterbalance the signifier by giving all the weight to the utter uncertainty of "flow."

As a result, the status of signs set up by humankind is utterly uncertain, gratuitous, and vain. The sign no longer plays any definitive role whatever, and it refers only to itself. In this immense confusion, the signs addressed to us by God suffer, just as the Word of God is a victim of the confusion of languages. Was this confusion of languages at Babel God’s vengeance? Here we have another simplistic explanation. I have discussed an initial element of the explanation of this confusion as it related to the construction of the City.(See Jacques Ellul, The Meaning of the City.) Here is a second element: the word related to truth; the word as communication with God -- the unobtrusive word which is able to express what is deepest and most adored.

Here at Babel humanity continues along the road it began when its eyes were opened to reality and the apprehension and comprehension of this reality outside of God. The word and language play their role at Babel -- to say what? "Come, let us make bricks, and burn them thoroughly.... Come, let us build ourselves a city" (Gen. 11 :34). Here the word enters into reality and becomes the means of action and of reality. I do not mean, of course, to say anything so foolish as that language was not used for everyday things in the real world. It is quite legitimate to say "let’s make bricks," or "please pass the bread." Language is not restricted to metaphysics or liturgy! But I mean that in a myth the elements have meaning (and are not allegorical!). Therefore, since there is such heavy emphasis here on this use of language, this fact is filled with meaning. It tells us that this word, which comes from the Word of God and is designed for speaking with God; this word, which is related to truth and expresses the profoundest things, becomes a means of action at Babel.

Here language is inserted into reality and is used to communicate things and information about reality -- that is to say, something else entirely. And because the word has lost its basic truth, its essential root, since it no longer possesses its content, its weight and harmony, it explodes. Because human words are no longer in harmony with the Word of God, languages become separate and then diversity in accordance with their subordination to different realities. Since the word is made commonplace and instrumental, it no longer has any function except to make action possible. On the one hand it loses the unity of its origin, and on the other it acquires the diversity related to actions. Once inserted into reality, the word changed to the point where it became incomprehensible language.

Thus sight played an enormous role in the Fall and caused all of humanity and language to swing to its side. Under these circumstances, it is understandable that the Bible so often relates sight to sin. Sight is seen as a source of sin, and the eye becomes the link between reality and the flesh. The eye is seen as the focusing lens of the body (but only of the body). The Bible speaks of the lust of the eye and of the eye as the source and means of coveting. Now we know that covetousness is the crux of the whole affair, since sin always depends on it. "You shall not covet" (Ex. 20:17) is the last of the commandments because it summarizes everything -- all the other sins. Humanity searches for other gods because it covets power; it makes idols for itself because it covets religion. Murder, adultery, and theft are always expressions of covetousness. Covetousness is equivalent to the spirit of power or domination. It is not just a simple moral question, but utterly basic.

The Bible closely and explicitly links covetousness to sight. This connection is derived, of course, from the passage in Genesis we have been examining. Eve coveted equality with God. She coveted the knowledge of good and evil. She coveted autonomy of decision. And all this resulted from her looking at the fruit. This covetousness based on evidence is the same covetousness we have seen at Babel. She looked, and the fruit seemed worth coveting to her.

We have the exact antithesis of this attitude in the famous passage in Philippians that describes the decision of the Son to strip himself of divinity, to enter into the human condition, and to make himself a poor servant, and finally to accept death -- the death of the cross. The starting point of this process is: "He did not look at equality with God as a thing to be grasped " (Phil. 2:6, JE). That is, at the outset of every work of God or Jesus there is this denial of the covetousness that comes from sight. Here and only here can covetousness be vanquished, as a new beginning is made; and this is related to sight: he did not "look. ." (even though the meaning is figurative). The Son did not look at this reality -- neither at the power he held nor at the wretched condition he was assuming.

He was the Word. On earth he lived by the word. He lived in strict conformity with the Father, who does not look on appearances. But we always live in covetousness, which is related to evidence. Who can fail to understand this today? All human covetousness is related to the evidence of the excellence of what our society offers us: money, machines, knowledge. The evidence is clear. Therefore we must desire these things, and the current exaltation of "desire" results from this covetousness, which is unleashed by sight. Sight takes its place in the circle formed by sin, as origin and continual impetus to sin, because it is at the basis of the rupture with God as it roots itself in reality alone.

This is not to say, of course, that the word is not also an agent, means, etc., of evil! It is a fundamental aspect of evil, because it is the instrument of falsehood. But we must be careful: here the word is turned aside from its goal and (as we said in connection with Babel) is enclosed within reality; that is, it is the word subordinate to sight and an instrument of the covetousness of reality.

Let us also be clear that we must not make a realitry of this analysis of the myth. I am not saying that the word is good and that sight is evil! Nor that the word is pure and sight impure! To say that amounts to reentering the universe of realism -- the universe of this reality where sight is autonomous! I simply insist that the word belongs to the order of truth and sight to the order of reality. When the two were separated and their unity had disappeared, humanity, submitted to reality alone, entered into separation from truth. This rupture with God is called sin. Reality is thus submitted without limit to unfettered covetousness.

3. The Theology of the Icon

Everything we have just said utterly contradicts the theology of icons as we find it in Greek Orthodox thought. We will follow Paul Evdokimov(Paul Evdokimov, L’Art de l’icône: Théologie de la beauté [Paris: Desclée de Brouwer, 1970]. At the outset it is significant and basic to note that for the author, beauty relates only to the icon. He constructs his theology of beauty, in general, only on the basis of objects that are seen -- painted objects. Everything related to music, poetry, the beauty of language and rhetoric, of taste and odors, is forgotten. Only one of the senses is given special status sight, which grants a person access to the contemplation of the invisible.) in order to review this theology briefly. The icon of course is not worshipped for itself; in itself it has no value. It is not a work of art, and much emphasis is laid on the difference between the theology of the Orthodox icon and the less rigorous viewpoint of medieval Catholic theology. The object is not venerated; Beauty is, by means of the resemblance mysteriously conveyed by the icon. It irradiates "the ineffable reflections of divine Beauty." The image is clearly superior to the word: "the image shows what the word says."

Quite strangely the icon is ascribed to the Holy Spirit, who was supposed to lead us into all truth. The Holy Spirit embodies this truth. "The icon is a symbolical-hypostatic representation which invites us to transcend the symbol and to communicate with the hypostasis in order to participate in the indescribable. It is a path one must take in order to go beyond it. This is done not by eliminating it, but by discovering its transcendent dimension." The icon is an "image which leads us to something else," a prop in a mystical and transcendent quest.

The word is not sufficient. The icon is a symbol, but must be surpassed; though nothing in itself, it is indispensable in mystical contemplation. As a kind of sacrament that makes transcendent communion possible, in itself it is transcendent. The icon alone enables a person to participate in the indescribable.

The icon is thus light on the one hand (seen as the symbolic reflection of the original light), yet on the other hand it is opposed to anything that is "portrait." Icons are not portraits of the Virgin or of Jesus (thus no icon of a living person is ever possible). Icons are related only to the hypostasis: the heavenly body, the "person." The icon grasps the absolute resemblance: it takes on the very celestial figure of the hypostasis in its transfigured body -- this is the icon in itself.

All this is closely linked to a theology of the Incarnation understood as "sanctification of matter and transfiguration of the flesh." The Incarnation enables us to see both spiritual bodies and nature as transformed by Christ. In other words, the Incarnation of Jesus has transformed the entire human species and all of nature; it is a completely finished work, and this transformed nature enables us to contemplate the divine through "indirect thought." Human beings are (already) deified.

This symbolic knowledge needs a material vehicle. But, starting from the symbol, by means of contemplation and true imagination with its evocative power, such knowledge grasps the figurative presence as an epiphany of the transcendent. This presence is symbolized, but very real. The icon guides our gaze toward the Highest -- toward the Most High, toward the only necessity.

The icon is neither a sign nor a picture, but rather the symbol of a presence and the dazzling locus of the mystery in the form of an image. "The Word . . . offers itself to contemplation, as visual theology, in the form of the icon. It is [in itself.] one of the sacraments.... The icon shows us by its colors, and makes present: for us what the gospel tells us through the word" (obviously, the importance of considering all this work as the expression of the Holy Spirit comes from this belief). The icon (in itself!) participates in the Wholly Other, by means of its resemblance, which becomes a process of effulgence.

The icon is also a kind of theophany. Since it has no volume, it excludes all possible materialization. It is purely spiritual: it is exclusively spiritual although visual. "It conveys an energetic presence that is neither localized nor enclosed, but radiates from around its point of condensation." The icon accomplishes what the letter to the Hebrews says about contemplating invisible things (but should this contemplation be visual and depend on our physical eyes?).

The icon of Christ, of course, is certainly not Christ. It is only an image, not the prototype. But it bears witness to a well-defined presence, and permits prayerful communion (which is not eucharistic communion, because it permits spiritual communion with the Person of Christ). "The presence of the icon is a circle whose center is found in the icon, but whose circumference is nowhere.(We must remember that this is the definition Barth gives of the Church in its relation to Jesus Christ. This shows how idolatrous the icon is!) As a material point in the world, the icon opens a breach through which the Transcendent bursts" (no less!). Thanks to this relationship, the earthbound human being becomes homo caelestis. The hypostasis of Christ actually appears in icons. Coming back to the Incarnation, Evdokimov concludes: "A hypostasis in two natures signifies an image in two modes: visible and invisible. The divine is invisible, but it is reflected by the visible human object. The icon of Christ is possible, true and real, because his image in the human mode is identical to the invisible image in the divine mode."

Fundamentally the theology of icons involves first a switch from signs to symbols, because the icon is essentially symbolic. Then, the icon is inserted into an entire liturgy. It implies a theology of the concrete presence of the spiritual realm, and of divine light, which can be symbolically retranscribed and which is the image of glory itself.

We have said enough to show the degree to which this theology is diametrically opposed to everything that seems to me to be of key importance in biblical thinking. Furthermore we must note carefully that in the important work we have referred to, this theology is based on quotations from the Greek Church Fathers and councils -- but there is almost no biblical foundation. For example, in this three-hundred-page book, the biblical foundation amounts to only two pages and seven quotations!

Because of my Orthodox friends I am sorry to say so, but this theology of the icon seems to me to correspond exactly to what we are prohibited biblically from doing: it is idolatrous. It rests on a certain conception of the Incarnation that utterly fails to take into account its unfulfilled aspect: the waiting and the hope. "Having reestablished the sullied image in its former dignity, the Word unites it with divine Beauty." Everything is already accomplished.

Furthermore, this theology rests on a conception of the image of God in the Creation that makes of it a concrete resemblance: "the image of God" is the materiality of visible humanity. This concept tries to place humanity permanently on Tabor, the mount of Transfiguration (the expression is used repeatedly: the icon transmits the light from Tabor). That corresponds exactly to the error of the disciples who accompanied Jesus and who wanted to set up tents in order to remain permanently in the Transfiguration.

We must not try to find humanity’s deification in God’s humanization, as if God became human so that humanity might become God. Humanity goes from being a microcosm to being a micro-theos in this case. This is applied very concretely: to material, corporeal, visual humanity. The human being in himself, as we see him, is the face of God. One wonders then why the Gospels find it necessary to say of Jesus: "Behold the man." He is the only, the unique case of a human being as the image of God. But he is God’s image precisely in the visible image of the condemned, scourged individual.

Here we come back, of course, to the need of visualizing in a material way what may be an imaginary, purely spiritual vision.(See note 23 above, on mental images.) In the icon such a vision becomes an object, whether we like it or not, to be seen in the flesh. This cannot be avoided. And we should, after all, ask about the humble believers’ practice. Obviously, the theological principles we have summarized above are utterly foreign to these people. So are mystical experience and the hypostatic exaltation of which the icon is supposed to be the center or the vehicle. What alternative is left open to them, then? Whereas Catholic theology remained very reserved and careful, often negative, toward images (Thomas Aquinas is an example!), a whole idolatrous tendency toward statues developed on the popular level in Catholic societies. How can we help believing, then, that the Orthodox believer considers the icon to be a god, a magic object, a reservoir of miracles, etc.? The icon becomes in itself the presence of God, of the Virgin Mary, or of Jesus. Everything is ascribed to the image: worship and prayer. And the well-known deviation toward superstition, which is a corruption of the faith, proceeds exclusively from visualizing what we are supposed to worship, pray to, and believe in without seeing anything.

One more matter before we leave the controversy over iconoclasm in Orthodox belief. The iconoclasts, whose beliefs were judged in the seventh council, refused to admit the symbolic character of the icon. Consequently they did not believe in "a mysterious presence of the Model in the image." "They could not seem to understand that besides the visible representation of a visible reality (the portrait), there is a completely different art in which the image presents what is visible of the invisible." In reality, this was not a problem of "understanding,,; the iconoclasts simply did not believe this doctrine! They were accused of being docetics, of having a purely realistic view of art, since they refused to ascribe a sacred character to the icon. They denied that a representation of Christ or the Virgin Mary could be anything other than a representation. They denied that even symbolically the icon could have any sacramental value at all.

But the argument against the iconoclasts is utterly fallacious: it is denied that one can have an idolatrous attitude toward an icon, since an idol is the expression of something that does not exist -- a fiction, a semblance, a nothing. Treating an icon as an idol, worshipping it as a natural object, amounts to destroying it. And the seventh council states: "The more the believer looks at the icon, the more he remembers the one it represents.... Woe to the person who would worship images." This argument is false because in many of the religions condemned in the Bible, the idol was a visible representation of an invisible religious reality, to which it referred. Idols are usually symbolical. Furthermore, this argument is also false because it melds the first two commandments into just one. The second commandment is quite rigorous: no representation (even symbolical!) of what is (also) in the heavens. . . ! The iconoclasts were right. But they were defeated.

As for the argument that the iconoclasts were docetics who denied the reality of the Incarnation, this rests on a cosmic conception of a realized Incarnation. This concept eliminates both the period of promise and history itself, since Jesus as crucified is considered already to be fully the glorious Christ. This "heresy" is the exact counterpart of the real docetic heresy (of which the iconoclasts were falsely accused), but it is no better!

4. The Word of the Witness

God speaks. Myth is born from this word, but rarely is it heard directly and never conveyed just as it is received, because human beings cannot speak God’s words. Myth is the analogy that enables us to grasp the meaning of what God has said. As discourse constructed to paraphrase the revelation, it is a metaphor that should lead the listener beyond what he has heard. Myth is born of the revealed Word of God, but because it is figurative, it has no visible image. As the highest expression of the word, it reaches the edge and very limit of the inexpressible, the ineffable, and the unspeakable, as does the divine tetragrammaton.

Myth is the living word that soon will become a text. I only receive and know the text. And this text falls short of the myth just as the myth itself falls short of the word. Margins surround the myth as it relates to God’s revelation. Our effusions, prayers, and our direct relationship are written in these margins. Margins also encompass the text as it relates to myth. In these margins are written our thoughts, quests, and questions. Correspondence is not exact, so that we will not be directly conditioned or reduced to the status of robots -- saved but mechanized!

At each step I have the possibility of choice, freedom, and initiative. When I read the text, I reinsert meaning into it; I make it a word again. In a sense, the text avoids being too perfect, too absolute, too obviously identical with the very indescribable Word of God. This way I myself may speak as I make the text speak, just as God speaks (but without taking up all the available space) and then lets Adam speak.

The text that encloses the truth of the Word of God is never so exact that it only bears repeating. This text invites me to retell the myth, to recreate it. And the recreated myth calls me to listen to the ultimate, absolute Word. The Word obliges me to speak. This indivisible process implies that the text should never be fixed, reduced to structures, enclosed within itself, or understood as if it were an exact and precise mathematical formula. No valid semiotic diagram exists that can exhaust the text that is a metaphor for the Word of God. Such a text must be spoken rather than dissected.

According to the Bible, God’s revelation is conveyed by the human word -- by the word and nothing else. Action, miracles, and works only accompany and authenticate the word as demonstrations and accessories. Without the word they are nothing. Only the word can convey the Word of God, the sole means God used to reveal himself to us.

The importance of the human word becomes evident when we consider that a person speaking is God’s witness. In and by means of this word, God speaks about himself. Just as human flesh was necessary for the Incarnation, so the Word of God is conveyed by the vehicle of the human word. The witness is the person who speaks this word in such a way that God, in sovereign judgment, declares it "True, worthy of attention, really faithful" (Barth). In this situation language is still central. But we must not forget that biblically, God’s witness is the martyr (Greek martyros), who pays the price of this word he has spoken with his blood and life. This means that again in the Bible, word and authenticity are connected. The word commits unto death the one who has spoken it. This is an important lesson: not because of his action is the witness a martyr, but because of his word!

The nature of an action is not to signify, for it can always "signify, any number of things and suggest various interpretations.’ But precisely language can never be without meaning. This is not to say it cannot occasionally occur without meaning. Sometimes people even intentionally make it that way. But the true role of language is to clarify: to formulate clearly and to eliminate ambiguity. A person’s sound and fury? The gravity of the warning lies precisely in the fact that the word is the means God chooses to express himself. In this way and only in this way can we understand the extreme importance of deforming the word, of misusing it, of falsehood! Only in this way can we understand why our "yes" must be completely and only "yes," our "no" completely and only "no." "Anything more than this comes from Satan." That covers a lot of ground: everything that tends to make the word ambiguous, that would devaluate, corrupt, or deform it.

Thus the witness to the Word of God -- the one who testifies that God is the Word and speaks -- is in the full sense a witness, while at the same time he restores to the human word its fullness. We have observed that all human language draws its nature and value from the fact that it both comes from the Word of God and is chosen by God to manifest himself. But this relationship is secret and incomprehensible, beyond the bounds of reason and analysis. This relationship becomes luminous and unquestionable only when the word is spoken by a witness -- that is, by one who explicitly makes the connection between the divine and the human word. He must have the courage, audacity, enthusiasm, and presumption to declare, despite his deep humility: "What I say expresses the Word of God. My word projects the Word of God." This is inconceivable and must surely be paranoia. Yet only thus can all human language gather strength and find a new beginning. Such statements require the courage to look ridiculous ("Who am 1. . . ?"); it is crazy to think that I could express the truth of the Most High God, knowing what I know about myself. Isn’t this a potential source of pride? No, because in fact I am overwhelmed, broken, and crushed by the truth of this word I must speak. Kierkegaard lived this experience in its entirety, as did Martin Luther and Augustine. The witness cannot affirm great truths lightly.

Precisely for this reason preaching is the most frightful adventure. I have no right to make a mistake that makes God a liar. But who can guarantee that I won’t make a mistake? I walk on the razor’s edge. On the other hand, if my preaching is nothing but a pious, oratorical, Sunday-morning exercise, then better to keep silent. If through my words I do not proclaim the Word of God, what I say has no meaning but is the most absurd and odious of speeches. If, however, I try to proclaim God’s word, I am utterly called into question by my very pretension. If I make God a liar I risk being the absolute Liar. And what if I err, substituting my ideas and opinions for God’s Revelation -- if I proclaim my word as the Word of God, in order to give it weight and sparkle, in order to beguile my listeners? Then my word, unratified by God and disavowed by the Holy Spirit, becomes the cause for my condemnation.

Not just any word can cause my condemnation -- only the word related to the truth of God revealed in Jesus Christ. Only in this context can I be the Liar. This is the absolute risk of the Witness, the only serious risk a person can run. But only on this condition can he return to language its original authenticity.

At the same time, this person who speaks is a true witness: one who introduces something new and unexpected into a given situation, (See Jacques Ellul, "Herméneutique du témoignage," in Le Témoin, ed. Enrico Castelli[Milan, 1975]) thus bringing about a rupture and reversal of the situation. In a trial, the witness furnishes the key fact that changes the certitudes or view of the reality held before his appearance. But the witness to the Word of God produces the greatest change, innovation, and rupture that can be imagined. He testifies to the Wholly Other, the Invisible, the imperceptible dimension we call Eternity, Absolute, Ultimate, or some other name. These words mean nothing, since we cannot imagine or understand what they designate. But we use them as our only means of referring to the "different" one whose word has taught us that we are his beloved children. The witness introduces this Wholly Other into our visible, concrete, measurable, and analyzable reality. The Wholly Other takes this reality upon himself, limits it, measures it, and gives it another dimension.

No work or action can bear witness like this, but only the word, referring to the Word. Only the human word brought by one who commits himself totally to it. The Holy Spirit is necessary, but so is the witness, without whom nothing will happen. This presence of the Wholly Other is one of the most basic necessities of our society and our time, because of the many totalitarianisms, the closing up of human relations, and the terrible coldness that characterize our technological, state-controlled world.

Since totalitarian society turns everything to its own ends, the only possible challenge to it is the proclamation of a radical Wholly Other and the intervention of the Wholly Other through this proclamation. The Wholly Other -- since he is incommensurable and cannot be assimilated or utilized -- can produce an opening, a breaking up of the iceberg. He can allow some unfilled space and provide elasticity and play within the mechanisms.

Such a result, however, cannot arise from any internal force intrinsic to the system, because immediately it would be reintegrated into the system. Such space for freedom can only be brought about through a word, since only the word is free. But it must be a living word and not a leaden word. And the word can remain living only as the echo, response, and question to the other Word. This Word by nature is essence and truth, independence and genesis, as well as self-producing, self-directing, and autonomous. The word continually must be begun again by the only one who creates through the Word. And the word must be continually taken up again by the Witness. Thus it must be closely connected with the person who pronounced it as his own direct and immediate expression. If such a person is absent, nothing is left.

The Word once spoken belongs to the past. But this past has no reality, so the word cannot return. Silent waves spirit it away into space. It is not language any longer. Language is heard and believed hic et nunc, but once spoken, it no longer exists. What remains then is what we have learned or believed through the word: our agreement (or refusal) with the other person. The word itself has disappeared, for the word is related to life, and is a part of life that can never be crystallized or preserved unaltered. Thus never can the word -- neither the Word of God nor the human word -- simply become an object.

Thus we return again to the word’s fundamental opposition to the image. The image is an object and never anything else. Never is it living, even when it is animated; never is it the experience of a person. When God chose the Word, he adopted the means of Revelation that forbids any human familiarity or possession. God’s Word can never be transformed into an object nor be at our disposition. Either God is present, in which case the Word is God’s Word; or God is absent, and there is nothing. By necessity, this word is either present and direct, or else it does not exist. And when written, when in a sense it can become an object, we know well what Christ says about it: the letter is dead.

Chapter 1: Seeing and Hearing: Prolegomena

Forget about origins and history. Let’s deal with our simplest, most direct experiences. I look out in front of me, and perceive the sea lit up out to the horizon. I look around me: to my left and right, I see the limitless straight line of the beach, and behind it, the dunes -- all in space. With my gaze I make the space my own. The objects are clear and plain. I see the wind bend over to the ground the reeds that keep the dunes in place.

I record these images one by one, and their juxtaposition shows me the real world in which I live, the world around me. I am at the center of this universe by means of my gaze, which sweeps across this space and lets me know everything in it. By combining these images of reality, I grasp it as a whole, and become a part of it as a result of my looking. I am the point of departure from which the universe and space are ordered: my vision situates me and every other component, placing each where it belongs. As I look I discover order. My looking is in itself what constitutes this order, by means of its sequence, which provides me with a progressive discovery of everything around me.

The very fact that I express myself in this way shows how inevitably my sight makes me the center of the world.(This is true in all societies, although it is denied by the extremely peculiar and dogmatic notion which considers perspective to be a Renaissance invention that expresses the bourgeois universe: separation between values and facts, between subject and object. Of course, these dichotomies are seen as results of the class struggle. Although this idea is partly correct, it has become an extremely trite commonplace because it has been expressed so dogmatically. See for example Jean-Joseph Goux, Les Iconoclasees (Paris: Seuil, 1978). It lets me know what is to the left and right of me, what is near and what is far away. All of reality unfolds itself to me little by little. Without sight, I would be suddenly deprived of the very possibility of grasping reality and of situating myself in space.

My sight constructs a universe for me. It reveals to me a directly perceivable reality composed of colorful, simple, harmonious images. But it also furnishes me with more subtle materials. I learn to read my brother’s or my enemy’s face. Transmitted images are superimposed on one another, and as a result, I now know that a given image belongs within a particular context of reality. It conjures up another image; I anticipate what I am going to see, but what is coming will in any case be located in space and will constitute part of reality -- deeper and hidden, in a sense, but still reality.

By looking I learn the signs in the sky that indicate what the weather will be. But in itself, my gaze shows me only heavily laden clouds coming from the northwest, with ambiguous round shapes rising high in a gray sky. I deduce a rainstorm, but my sight has shown me only a group of images.

Vision also furnishes me with information. I need to know what action to take and where to place myself; my sight enables me to know the reality in which my action will take place, and whether my action is possible. Sight gives me information concerning the world around me. It permits me to accumulate pieces of information, each of which is an image, in space, of reality. How could I possibly take part in this reality without such an unfailing source of information? Such information is precise and pinpointed, and deals only with reality. Nothing else, no other dimension, is ever involved. A different activity allows me to understand and associate, to see beyond, in the distance, the thing I cannot physically see.

Vision works exactly like a camera, which provides me with dozens or hundreds of snapshots that are connected only if my mind relates them. And because of this information, I can take part and involve myself in this reality by means other than sight. Sight has made me the center of the world because it situates me at the point from which I see everything, and causes me to see things relative to this point. My vision makes a circular sweep of space, working from this point: my point of view.

But now I am tempted, as the center of the world, to act on this spectacle and transform this setting. What was missing in my vision was someone to act, and I am available. Sight moves to action at the same time that it serves as the means of action. Again, without it, how could I act, since I wouldn’t even know what my hand was touching or what was within my reach? Sight previously showed me reality as a thing present to my consciousness; now it urges me to be a presence myself, in relation to this reality. I will use all the information that sight has conveyed to me, as I change this universe of images by creating new ones. I am a subject, not separated from what I look at. Rather, what I see becomes part of me, as my action involves me in what I see.

Images both permit and condition my action; they are always imperative. I lean out the window and look searchingly into the emptiness. Images of distance and depth thrust themselves on my consciousness. I know I mustn’t lean out any further. The image defines and marks the boundaries of my action. The image does not induce my action, but establishes its conditions and possibilities.

Without visual images my action is definitely blind, incoherent, and uncertain. Sight conveys certainties and pieces of information to me, as we have said. Such information is reliable. I perceive a gray ocean and an overcast skyline. This is unquestionable. The reality around me is a certainty in which I can be confident. It is neither incoherent nor deformed.

I know, of course, that this is also something learned; there are no data coming directly from the senses, and the shapes and colors and distances I apprehend are perceptible to me because I learned them. My culture has furnished me with the very images I see. But however important this may be (and we must not push this idea too far!), it is still true that I see. I see images which are reliable. In order to change the shape of this reality, I must intervene or change my viewpoint, by putting on glasses or distorting it as I draw it. But in this case, I see my drawing rather than the reality of the universe.

What a dreadful uneasiness takes hold of us when reality becomes uncertain because it is submerged in fog. Then sight fails to furnish me with reliable, clear, guaranteed images, and I cannot act because I no longer have unquestionable sources of information -- visual images. Fear of the dark is a consequence of the same uncertainty. The world loses its midpoint. It is off center because I cannot see it anymore. The center could be anywhere, but it is no longer located where I am. It could be anywhere, or nowhere. I am not situated anymore. Things are no longer situated in relation to me. Dimension and colors have disappeared. I remain immobilized and wait, incapable of intervention and unable to change the situation. I am suddenly paralyzed without images.

Sight offers me the whole realm of reality, space, and concrete objects, thus allowing me to act.(But we will see later on that this relationship between sight and action is profoundly changed when sight is based on projected images.) Without space, no action is possible. Without a known, constructed, coherent space, no action is possible. But on the other hand, action is called forth and induced by the very existence of this reality, in which everything beckons to me. My outstretched hand is also an image of this reality; how can I avoid extending it toward this fruit ready to be picked?

The visual image of the fruit ready for picking is not ambiguous. The image furnishes me reliably with precisely what I need to know in order to act. It is neither deceptive nor hypocritical, and does not mislead me. In order for my sight to mislead me concerning reality, there must be some unusual phenomenon, like a mirage. The image is not ambiguous. This peach I am looking at is red and weighs heavily on the bending branch. This is absolutely certain. But the image is insignificant. It has no meaning in itself and must be interpreted. In the case of a fruit ripe for picking, the visual image gives me indisputable information, but if I stop there, nothing will happen -- my action will not be set in motion. I see clearly that the peach is beautifully red. I see clearly that it is round and heavy. But so what? The image does not provide me with any meaning for this reality which it so faithfully conveys to me. It must therefore be interpreted. In order to move from the vision of the fruit to "I should pick it" or "It can be picked," there must be an interpretation: an attribution of meaning to these real images of reality. Another dimension must be added to sight: interpretation will come through speech.

Thus the image contains within itself a deep contradiction. It is not ambiguous: it is coherent, reliable, and inclusive; but it is insignificant. It can have innumerable meanings, depending on culture, learning, or the intervention of some other dimension. For this reason I must learn to see, before looking at the image. After seeing it, I must learn to interpret it. The image is clear, but this clarity does not imply certainty or comprehension. My certainty is limited to this directly perceived reality that my sight reveals to me. Nothing beyond that. Next I must decide what I am going to do about it. Nevertheless, what I perceive in this limited manner is the reality in which I must live.

The image furnished by sight is neither dream nor vision. Certainly visions are not the same thing as sight. On the contrary, I compare them with what I see. I recount what I see; it is as if I were seeing, but I see nothing. These visual images owe nothing to sight. Instead, they are the product of nerves excited in a different manner. I call them "vision," but only by extension -- by projecting onto this phenomenon the guaranteed reliability of my good, solid sight, in which I can have confidence. I call these images "vision" because they are connected with the other images I am accustomed to. I would be tempted to say in this case that the order is reversed. The visual image exists, and then I attribute a meaning to it; but the vision appears only as the illustration of a previously established meaning.

No matter how insignificant it may be, the visual image is always rigorous, imperative, and irreversible. I saw what I saw. I cannot change this image. I cannot change the reality which is conveyed to me in this way, except through my action. There is no ambiguity at this point. Nor is there reversibility. As irreversible, an image indicates the orientation for my action. This involves a kind of "meaning," but it is like a circular drive with only two possible directions: one prohibited and the other obligatory! By virtue of the image I am situated in this reality which is neither polyvalent nor polynuclear. It is ordered in such a way that it is irreversible and invariable. It is an order of permanence; each image could be, and is in fact, eternal.

This reality is directly perceived, directly present, and permanent. Duration has no effect on this image which is conveyed to me by my sight. It is always an instantaneous matter. No duration is included in an image. As we have said, there is a sequence of instantaneous images which are connected and which can be coordinated or not: instantaneous "takes" of a single image that are superimposed on each other.

My sight is not really continuous, even when I fix my gaze on the same broom plant. I do not see it change. I see it; then an instant later I see it again, and the image is imperceptibly different. The same thing applies to different instantaneous images in space. My view covers only a limited field. I change my angle of vision and join together the instantaneous views of the different fields which I have recorded. This way the visual image, the images I have grasped and accumulated, produces a world made up of small dots, as in a pointillist painting.

The visual world is pointillist. Images are points which take on value only when reassembled, so that they acquire an identity as part of a total picture. If I had only one "view" of my universe, I would be a participant in a totality which would be both terribly coherent and yet at the same time composed of fragments without any necessary relationship. The totality would be like a cloud of irrational dots which can form only the framework of an action, a change in the relationships between the points. But the cloud of dots cannot be used for understanding anything, because this pointillism of images is space but not duration.

The image is present. It is only a presence. It bears witness to something "already there": the object I see was there before I opened my eyes. The image exists in the present and conveys to me only a present. For this reason it seems permanent to me, as a thing with duration because of the passage of time. The image conveys to me objects that do not change -- truly unchanging objects.

The visual image constitutes the object -- ob-jactus: that which is thrown before me. The word "before" implies in itself this visualization, which makes something an object. But I exist in this world of seen objects that are objects because they are seen. I belong, inseparably, to this observed setting. I am continually involved in it. I am continually refashioned within myself by what I see, and I cannot take my distance from it. I have a point of view, a location from which I see things, but it is situated within what I see and inseparable from it. Wherever I place myself, however I shift my position, I remain in the field of vision, I remain in the middle of what I see. I can never take my distance, act as if I were not present, or even begin to think independently of what I see.

At night, when I cannot see, a certain distance is established. This explains why the day’s events become so painful at night: the distance between me and the world around me allows for reflection and meditation. A flood of images overwhelms me, beckons me, and carries me along: an image I have seen follows immediately after the one I have just dismissed from my mind. I can never stop this movement of reality in space. I can never consider a given image like a diamond or a painting from which I can take my distance in order to be "myself," instead of being overwhelmed by the images composed of dots.

The image prevents me from taking my distance. And if I cannot establish a certain distance, I can neither judge nor criticize. Of course, I also feel pleasure or displeasure in what I see. I can find it beautiful or ugly. But this is not a critical process. No judgment is involved. Furthermore, what possible criticism or judgment can we make with respect to space and reality? In spite of the frailty we have all observed in a person’s testimony about what he has seen, everyone has the same certainty about anything he has seen. He has seen reality. And this leads to the widely held opinion: seeing the same images results in an identical viewpoint! When we describe in this manner the characteristics of the visual image as pointillistic, permanent, and irreversible, and as eliminating distance and criticism, we are only pointing out the characteristics of the reality which we perceive in this manner.

* * * * * *

It happens, however, that we have started down a more perilous path than we thought. Sight guarantees my possession of the world and makes it into a "universe-for-me." Seeing gives me the possibility of action. The apprehension which sight gives me of reality commits me to action. I see objects and am tempted to place my hand on them. Isn’t an object made to be used once it has been seen? Sight is the basis of my mastery. (Reality is what is seen, counted, and quantified, and is located in space. But reality is at the same time what is definite (Axel Hägerström). This corresponds clearly to the visual universe. The indefinite is the domain of the word. Thus visual reality is clearly noncontradictory. You can say that a piece of paper is both red and blue. But you cannot see it as both red and blue at the same time. It is either one or the other. The famous principle of noncontradiction is based on visual experience of the world, just as the principle of identity is. Declaring that two opinions cannot both be true, when one denies what the other affirms, has to do with vision, which involves instantaneousness. But language involves duration. Consequently what is visual cannot be dialectical. Knowledge based on sight is of necessity linear and logical. Only thought based on language can be dialectical, taking into account contradictory aspects of reality, which are possible because they are located in time. This is basic for understanding the opposition between the two methods of thought we will be discussing in Chapter Vl. But this distinction also teaches us that language grants us access to knowledge of a plurality of aspects in a reality that sight cannot grasp. In other words, truth includes reality and permits a deeper knowledge of reality. But this knowledge is not based on evidence or immediacy.) Deprived of vision, I find myself in the paralysis of darkness where nothing seems right.

In connection with mastery I am led to a technical process. Sight alone is not sufficient to accomplish it, but without sight no technique is possible. Sight is not sufficient, but at this point Spengler may well be right. A human being’s sight commits him to technique. The visual image points out the totality of my possible life in a world where I am both master and subject. All techniques are based on visualization and involve visualization. If a phenomenon cannot be transformed into something visual, it cannot be the object of a technique.

The correlation is even more marked with respect to efficiency. Sight is the organ of efficiency. Conversely, making use of images is efficient. Images sell things in advertising. Images ensure a pedagogical efficiency unknown before our time, and science now depends on visual representation. We will return to this matter. The correlation between "visual" and "technique" is one of the first facts to note. The visual image potentially contains within itself all the traits and characteristics of what later becomes the experience, experimentation, and organization of technique.

At this point we are on the threshold of a new dimension in sight. Up until now we have remained on the most elementary level of direct apprehension as the response of sight when brought to bear on things in nature, in the human environment, or in the cultural sphere. But now we are beginning to see that sight is a great deal more than this. We have already alluded to its larger role. What is seen is constructed. We have said that an image depends on the individual’s cultural background. We must go farther on this point. Sight refers to and proceeds from a specific notion of humanity, from a previously established image, an eidolon, which we already have in mind. Sight places us in the most direct and natural relationship possible with the environment, but at the same time it involves the artifice of a given element. This artificial element, as we have seen, causes a direct division between subject and object. Then it transforms nature into something outside the human environment and changes the human observer into someone outside his own milieu.

Sight leads us simultaneously along the paths of separation and division, of intervention and efficiency, and of artificiality. It has been said, quite accurately, that the urban milieu is a visual world where sight finds its satisfaction. The city allows humanity to see its mirror image in the sense of contemplating itself as it contemplates the product of its own work.

* * * * * *

Sight involves a relationship with reality as established in space. It is an artificial construction. Medusa’s head transfixes whoever gazes at her. Whoever looks at the scenes on the shields of the Iliad is terror stricken. Sight introduces us to an unbearable shock. Reality when seen inspires horror. Terror is always visual. Horror stories play only on our visual sense and suggest representation.

In contrast, the spoken word can involve us in mystery or drama. It places us in situations of conflict and makes us conscious of tragedy. But it is never on its own terrifying or stupefying. We are dazed by sight -- by an image or a vision. The word takes us to the edge of terror only when descriptive and painting extremely precise images. Edgar Allan Poe’s short stories are an example.

All the descriptions we have heard of Nazi death camps move us to revulsion and to a judgment that may be based more on strong feelings than anything else. The image of bulldozers pushing along mounds of skeletal corpses, which shortly before had been living beings, faces teetering from the machine’s pushing -- this image drawn from Night and Fog (A film by Alain Resnais (1956). -- trans.) moves us to abject horror. It terrifies us, because we see. Such terror results from the horror of reality.

Reality apprehended by sight is always unbearable, even when that reality is beauty. We have a horror of reality, perhaps because we depend on it so. Language, even when it is realistic, allows us to escape from this terrible reality. Sight locks us up with it and obliges us to look at it. There is no way out -- except by controlling and mastering the reality. I think that through technical process I can claim to be master of what I see. But this process in turn breeds stupefaction and misgivings when we see its results. All at once technique does not belong to us any more. We see it in these reflected images that both excite and terrify us. It is a vision of apocalypse.

2. Hearing

I hear noises. The wind is blowing through these pine trees. In the distance the sea roars. I can judge its force and its condition. The pine cones crackle. I hear their bursting. Their sound reminds me how hot it is. The sequence of sounds sometimes forms a symphony. Noises come to me. I do not turn my ears toward a certain spot where I suspect there might be something to hear. I direct my gaze, turning it spontaneously toward a certain face, toward a landscape which awaits me. I am the subject. I act and decide what I want to see.

Sounds come to me, and I receive them when they are produced. They form a sequence of impressions that carves up time. A baby’s cry drowns out everything else. Instead of a symphony, now I hear an outburst. The noise assails and haunts me. I cannot close anything, as I would my eyes, to shut it out.

Images fall into a pattern with respect to each other, but sounds do not. Instead, sounds contradict each other and cancel each other out. I am listening to a Mozart concerto, and suddenly near me someone speaks. Or a visitor knocks at my door. Or someone starts noisily putting away dishes and silverware. Sounds produce incoherence. The noises I hear form no panorama of the world.

Apparently a dog’s panorama of the world is basically olfactory. Using various odors, dogs create a coherent whole. For us as human beings, on the contrary, an odor is only an incidental sign. Our coherent and unbroken panorama of the world is visual (it is an unbroken panorama even though it is pointillistic, just as the impressionist painters saw it!). It is not auditory. The sequence of noises I perceive does not constitute a universe. They cannot be compared with the sequence of images resulting from the movement of my eyes.

Noise overwhelms me with uncertainty, because of the very fact of its sequence. Where is it coming from? What does it herald? I cannot avoid asking these temporal questions. A sound is never clear and plain by itself. It always brings questions with it. What is going to happen? It may be that this uncertainty is really a cultural matter, if we have learned to decode shapes and colors accurately but not sounds. But whatever its origin, this uncertainty is part of us.

I am much more concerned with the temporal origin of sound. Sight is spatial. Sound’s domain is temporal, and it inserts us within a duration rather than an expanse. Sound generates an immediate, unconscious interrogation: What now? What sound will come next? Naturally, sight also can, on second or third thought, give rise to the question: What is beyond? I see the horizon; what is beyond it? But anyone can see the difference between the two. The question "What lies beyond?" is secondary and indirect; it is based on thought. The question about the sound I hear -- What next? -- is immediate and primary, arising in the same instant I perceive the sound. What will the next sound be? And this brings us to the highest order of sounds.

Alone among all other sounds there is one that is particularly important for us: the spoken word. It ushers us into another dimension: relationship with other living beings, with persons. The Word is the particularly human sound which differentiates us from everything else. In this connection a fundamental difference between seeing and hearing is immediately apparent. In seeing, the living being is one form among many. A human being has a special shape and color, but he is included with all the rest as part of the landscape: a discrete, moving speck. When I hear speech, however, the human being becomes qualitatively different from everything else.

Right at the beginning of this issue, we find ourselves in the presence of a gripping question. We have just seen that our auditory sense is probably less culturally sharpened than the visual, since auditory education is less complete, complex, and distinctive. This is true for all cultures, including musical families and "primitive," societies that are much more skilled in interpreting the noises of the forest or of the savanna. In all societies, the auditory sense does not permit us to construct a universe. And yet language, which is related to it, is the most culturally elaborated, the richest, the most "universalizing," and the most significant aspect of a culture, as well as the sign of human specificity.

This contradiction gives us a profound insight into the complex nature of speech and hearing. Speech always depends on hearing. It engulfs us in temporality, because of the unfolding of discourse, if for no other reason. A sentence has a certain rhythm, and I must wait for the end of it to know what is being said to me. Some languages accentuate even more strongly this suspense over meaning during the development of the sentence. When German places the verb at the end of the sentence, I must listen to the entire sentence before I can understand it, and that occurs in a temporal sequence.

Sight, however, can give me an image not limited by time because it is instantaneous and inclusive. I need not wait in order to grasp the meaning of what I see. But I must always wait in order to grasp the exact meaning of the sentence which has just begun. I am suspended between two points in time. The beginning of the sentence has already been pronounced, and has already faded away; the end has not yet been spoken, but it is coming, and it will give meaning to what was said at the beginning. Let’s not deal yet with writing, and certainly not with tape recording; these involve a forcing of speech into space, in which it ceases to be speech. We will return to this matter, but for now let’s limit ourselves to spoken language.

The spoken word, even if it involves an essential proclamation or the thought of a genius, falls into the void, passes, and disappears, if it is not heard and recovered by someone. The ocean over there, even if no one contemplates it, remains what it is and what it was. I see it, and it produces a flurry of emotions in me. I leave. I go away, but it does not. The spoken sentence has sunk into nothingness; time has gone by, and there are no "frozen words" which can make themselves heard again later.(An allusion to François Rabelais’s Quart Livre (1548), in which words spoken long ago were "frozen" and could be heard later by those traveling to the spot where they had been spoken. -- Trans.) Time does not return, and speech has no permanence.

When I hear a sentence, I am in the present with it. I have grabbed hold of and memorized its beginning, which is now past, and it plunges me into the past with it. I am also listening carefully for the end of the sentence; I am waiting for the direct object which will clarify the meaning of the whole sentence. I am straining toward this future implied by speech.

For the word to exist, then, we must have several elements present at the same time: duration, two people (the speaker and the listener, who are living in the same moment of time), and concentration on the fact that the past is abolished. Thus speech is basically presence. It is something alive and is never an object. It cannot be thrown before me and remain there. Once spoken, the word ceases to exist, unless I have recovered it. Before it is spoken, the word places me in an expectant situation, in a future I await eagerly. The word does not exist on its own. It continues to exist only in its effect on the one who spoke it and on the one who recovered it. The word is never an object you can turn this way and that, grasp, and preserve for tomorrow or some distant day when you may have time to deal with it.

The word exists now. It is something immediate and can never be manipulated. Either it exists or it doesn’t. It makes me what I am, establishes the speaking me and the listening me, so that my role is determined by the word itself rather than by its content. For the word to become an object, someone must transform it into writing. But then it is no longer speech. Yet even in that form, it requires time. My glance must scan the line, then the page, moving downward, and this movement of the eyes takes time. The image I see changes: an overall glance is not enough. There is no possible instantaneous approach to the written page; seeing takes time when it is applied to the word.The word remains sovereign even when transformed into writing and visualized.

* * * * * * *

The word is, of necessity, spoken to someone. If no one is present, it is spoken to oneself or to God. It presupposes an ear; the Great Ear, if necessary. It calls for a response. Every word, even a swearword, an insult, an exclamation, or a soliloquy, begins a dialogue. The monologue is a dialogue in the future or the past, or else it is a dialogue incorporated into a monologue. Here again, time is involved. Dialogue develops according to a variable timetable, but dialogue cannot exist unless those engaging in it are inserted into time.

Language is a call, an exchange. I avoid using the threadbare term "communication." It is not true that language exists only to communicate information. This concept is superficial and holds little interest for us. Obviously, language is also communication. It communicates information also. But if we spoke only to convey information our relationships would be greatly impoverished. To verify this you have only to listen to the "information" given on television, in spite of the speakers’ talent and the surprising and varied way things are presented.

Language is uncertain, communicating information but also a whole universe that is fluid, without content or framework, unpretentious, and filled with the rich complexity of things left unexpressed in a relationship. What is not said also plays a role in language. More accurately, what is said sometimes hides what could be said, and on the other hand sometimes it reveals what is not said. Language never belongs to the order of evident things. It is a continuous movement between hiding and revealing. It makes of the play in human relationships something even more fine and complex than it would be without language. Language exists only for, in, and by virtue of this relationship. Dialogue involves the astonishing discovery of the other person who is like me, and the person like me who is different. We need both similarity and difference at the same time. I speak the same language that you do; we use the same code. But what I have to say is different from what you have to say. Without this difference there would be neither language nor dialogue.

Do we have something to say? In spite of the condemnation of this concept by linguists and modern artists, I insist that I speak because I have something to say. If this pressure were absent, I would not speak. Speech is not born of nothing. It does not itself give birth to the signified that it points to. In spite of the extravagant modern ideas we will examine later, it is still true that when I speak to another person, it is because I have a desire to convey to him something I have that he does not have -- or that I think he does not have. And based on this situation, I find the words and phrases that correspond to what I indeed have to say. There is something that precedes speech.

Speech does not take its pattern directly from what there is "to say"; it creates in addition a sphere of unexpectedness, a wonderful flowering which adorns, enriches, and ennobles what I have to say, instead of expressing it directly, flatly, and exactly. I have an idea in mind -- or a fact, an outline. I begin to write, and if I reread what I have written a few days later, I am amazed by what I have written. It tallies, to be sure, with what I had to say, up to a point, but it overflows this, and I realize that I have written a different text. What I have written conjures up ideas, images, and shapes which I did not expect, which I have forgotten.

Dialogue involves a certain distance. We must be separated as well as different. I do not speak to a person identical to me. I must have something to say which the other lacks, but he must also be different from me. Yet similarity is required as well. When Adam sees Eve he bursts into speech. He speaks because of her and for her. She was flesh of his flesh, bone of his bone; and yet different: a dissimilar similar person.

Speech fills the infinite gap that separates us. But the difference is never removed. Discourse begins again and again because the distance between us remains. I find I must repeatedly begin speaking again to restate what I have said. The result is an inevitable, yet rich and blessed, redundancy. The word is resumed and repeated because it is never fully explicit or an exact translation of what I have to say. It is never precisely received, never precisely understood. Language is Word. The Word contains fuzziness, a halo that is richer and less precise than information.

Even the simplest word -- bread, for instance -- involves all sorts of connotations. In a mysterious way, it calls up many images which form a dazzling rainbow, a multitude of echoes. When the word bread is pronounced, I cannot help but think of the millions of people who have none. I cannot avoid the image of a certain baker friend of mine, and of the time during the Nazi occupation when bread was so scarce and of such poor quality. The communion service comes to me: the breaking of bread at the Last Supper and the image of Jesus, both present and unknown.

I pass quickly to the moral lessons I learned as a child: that it is a crime to throw away a piece of bread, since it is a sacred substance. And from there, of course, I arrive at the enormous, incredible amount of wastefulness in our society. We waste many things besides bread, but it remains the negative symbol of our squandering ways. Memories come back to me: the warm, crusty bread of my childhood. The promised bread of life that will satisfy all hunger. And not living by bread alone. What ever happened to this Word of the Father which is proclaimed without being understood?

Not all of these memories are conjured up every time I hear the word, and they do not all come at once, but it is a rarity when none of them follows the oft-repeated request: "pass me the bread."

Language deals with connotations and overtones. It takes its place in the center of an infinitely delicate spider’s web, whose central structure is fine, rigorous, and dense. As you move away from the center, the web becomes larger and distended, until it reaches incoherence, at its edge, where it sends off threads in every direction. Some of these threads go a great distance, until they arrive at the invisible spots where the web is anchored. This complex web is a marvel which is never the same, not for me at different points in time nor for another person.

The spoken Word puts the web in motion so that waves sweep through it and cause lights to flicker. The waves induce vibrations that are different for the other person and for me. The word is uncertain. Discourse is ambiguous and often ambivalent. Some foolishly try to reduce language to something like algebra, in which each word would have a mathematically precise meaning, and only one meaning. Each word would be put in a straitjacket, having only one meaning, so that we would know with scientific precision what we were saying. And the receiver of our message would always know exactly what we meant.

But the blessed uncertainty of language is the source of all its richness. I do not know exactly how much of my message the other person hears, how he interprets it, or what he will retain of it. I know that a kind of electric current is established between us; words penetrate him, and I have the feeling that he either reacts positively or else rejects what I have said. I can interpret his reaction, and then the relationship will rebound, accompanied by a rich halo of overtones. He does not understand, and I see that. So I speak again, weaving another piece of cloth, but this time with a different design. I come up with what I think will reach him and be perceived by him. The uncertainty of meaning and the ambiguity of language inspire creativity. It is a matter of poetics, but not just the esthetics of poetry. There is a poetics of language and of relationships also. We must not limit this poetics to language, which must be constantly rewoven, but remember that the relationship is also involved. Language requires that we recommence this relationship, which is always uncertain. I must disavow it over and over again, through sharp questioning, explanation, and verbal interchange.

Discourse is ambiguous; it is never clear. It arrives from one person’s unconscious aggregate of experiences, desires, skills, and knowledge, only to fall into another person’s, thus producing a different meaning. Because of these continual misunderstandings, new life is breathed into the relationship. We must constantly begin all over again, and as a result the relationship becomes a rich, complex landscape, with unexpected mountain passes and inaccessible peaks. By all means let’s not turn language into something mathematical, nor reduce the rich complexity of human relationships to identical formulas.

Meaning is uncertain; therefore I must constantly fine-tune my language and work at reinterpreting the words I hear. I try to understand what the other person says to me. All language is more or less a riddle to be figured out; it is like interpreting a text that has many possible meanings. In my effort at understanding and interpretation, I establish definitions, and finally, a meaning. The thick haze of discourse produces meaning.

All of intellectual life (and I use the word "all" advisedly), even that of specialists in the most exact sciences, is based on these instabilities, failures to understand, and errors in interpretation, which we must find a way to go beyond and overcome. Mistaking a person’s language keeps me from "taking" the person -- from taking him prisoner.

We are in the presence of an infinitely and unexpectedly rich tool, so that the tiniest phrase unleashes an entire polyphonic gamut of meaning. The ambiguity of language, and even its ambivalence and its contradiction, between the moment it is spoken and the moment it is received produce extremely intense activities. Without such activities, we would be ants or bees, and our drama and tragedy would quickly be dried up and empty. Between the moment of speech and the moment of reception are born symbol, metaphor, and analogy.

Through language I lay hold of two completely different objects. I bring them together, establishing between them a relationship of similarity or even identity. In this manner I come to know this distant, unknown object, through its resemblance. It becomes intelligible to me, because through language I have brought it near this other one that I know well. This is an astonishing process, and logically a foolish one. It is obviously an indefensible operation, yet there it is, utterly successful, utterly enlightening. The uncertainty and the ambiguity of language have permitted it to function. I have access to the unknown through verbal identification, as well as through symbolic language that allows me to express the inexpressible.

As a result of this alchemy, after many efforts, the nugget of pure gold appears: we are in agreement. This is completely unexpected, and always a miracle. Through metaphors and syllogisms, analogies and myths, in the tangles of uncertainties and misunderstandings, agreement crops up. In the middle of so much "noise" (in the sense of interference), word and meaning come to the surface and permit an unclouded agreement, a conformity, in which heart meets heart. The innermost being of one person has reached the innermost of another through the mediation and ambassadorship of this language go-between. Overloaded with meaning, it has now been stripped of all excess and reduced to its essence. Now we can engage in common action without fear of error. Our life together can continue on the basis of a renewed authenticity.

But we must be careful: this happy result is achieved only to the degree that -- exactly to the degree that -- we have experienced all the "interference" of meaning: the rich connotations, the polyphony, and the overtones produced. In the middle of all this, and because of it, a common understanding springs forth and is formulated. It is not exactly what I said (fortunately!). Rather, it is more than that. Nor is it exactly what a tape recorder could have taken down. Instead, it is a symphony of echoes that have reverberated in me. Our agreement commits us to a renewed relationship that will be more profound and genuine. We will be continually reinventing this relationship, just as our speaking must continually recommence.

The word reduced to the value of an algebraic formula with only one possible meaning would be useful for us in carrying out an identical superficial activity. But such language could never create meaning, and would never produce agreement and communication with another person. "Algebraic" language could never produce -- or suggest a story. Bees communicate pieces of information to each other, but do not produce anything like history.

History is produced by the tangle of our misunderstandings and interpretations. Something unexpected is continually cropping up even in the simplest of our relationships. This unexpected element involves us in some action, explanation, or procedure that will constitute the history of our relationship. History is a product of language and the word. This applies not only to something memorized so that we can tell it later. The historian, even if his field is the history of science, is always limited to telling stories -- sometimes his own. This is not only true of the history that is distant from us, which only language can evoke and make new again, since it is told in the present. It is also true of the history we are making, which has yet to be invented: history in process, whether mine or the story of my society or of humanity in general. In every case, language alone sets history in motion, defines it, and makes it possible or necessary. This can be a word from the politician or from the masses.

The word can also obstruct and impede history, when mythical language immerses us in an ahistorical time that is repetitive and continually reduced to myth. Language is either historical or ahistorical, either a discourse on action to be undertaken or of myth to listen to. According to the sort of language used, human history either arises and becomes a significant aspect of humanity’s existence, or else it remains on the level of everyday incoherence.

As in the case of human agreement, history is born and organized, continues, and takes on meaning as a result of the innumerable sounds arising from the Word. Finally the moment comes when understanding takes place, when language is understood after so many setbacks. From the level of being and of the heart, language proceeds to the level of intelligence, and finally it is understood, beyond and because of the repeated misunderstandings which have been progressively eliminated. All this takes place without losing any part of the symphony of meaning.

The instant when language is understood seems like a genuine illumination. It is not the sum of the understood fragments, not the slow and tortuous march of a gradual and complicated unfolding, nor is it the triumphant QED of a solved algebra problem. Instead, this moment of insight is an inspiration which reveals in an instant the meaning of the entire message the other person was trying to give me. Everything is reduced to this sparkling moment which makes order out of the rest of the imbroglio and finds the way out of the maze. In a single instant the entire idea becomes clear: the other person’s argument ceases being mere rhetoric, and his symbols and metaphors are no longer pointless. In a flash that some have compared to a kind of vision, communication between two intelligent beings has taken place.

Have I really "seen" what the other person said? Sudden insight has nothing in common with sight but its instantaneousness. Insight is not a kind of vision, but rather a light. The difference between the two will become clear in a later section. With insight, meaning becomes perfectly transparent. The other person’s words become mine; I receive them in my own mind. I experience utter intellectual delight, but a delight in my whole being as well, when I understand and am understood.

The Word ushers us into time.(I will not deal here with the question of language learning or of whether genetic programming is open to more than one language or oriented toward a single tongue. These matters go beyond my purpose. See the conflict between Noam Chomsky and Jean Piaget, Théories du langage, théories de l’apprentissage, Centre Royaumont pour une Science de l’Homme [Paris: Seuil, 1979]). It makes us live with endless misunderstandings, interpretations, and overtones. Language does not enlighten me concerning the reality around me. I have no need for someone beside me to describe what I can see as well as he can. I have no need for spoken information about the reality I can verify directly. In this situation no ambiguity or distance is involved. Instead, based on my own experience of reality, I could establish the unreliability of the other person’s useless words. This is what happens when someone testifies to what he has seen.

In this reality, language naturally also has its uses. It can command an action. It gives birth to institutions. But reality is not where its specificity lies. We have mentioned myths and symbols, allegories and metaphors, analogies and history, as spheres in which language moves about easily. In these contexts it takes on its full stature and becomes truly the word. In other words, it is true to itself when it refers to Truth instead of Reality.

Of course, I do not presume to deal with Truth here, nor do I intend to define it. When I say that language normally deals with Truth rather than Reality, I only mean that there are two orders of knowledge, two kinds of references we use as human beings. There are references to the concrete, experienced reality around us, and others that come from the spoken universe. The spoken universe is our invention -- something we establish and originate by our words. We derive meaning and understanding from language, and it permits us to go beyond the reality of our lives to enter another universe, which we may call phantasmic, schizophrenic, imaginary, or any other name we choose. I am certain that since the beginning, human beings have felt a pressing need to frame for themselves something different from the verifiable universe, and we have formed it through language. This universe is what we call truth.

Lewis Mumford can dream all he wants to of another world; Cornelius Castoriadis can make up imaginary things; and Roger Caillois can say that myth constitutes our human specificity, our only singularity, but these ideas do not matter much to me. The important thing is that the unique value of language lies in truth. Language is not bound to reality, but to its capacity to create this different universe, which you can call surreal, meta-real, or metaphysical. For the sake of convenience we will call it the order of truth. The word is the creator, founder, and producer of truth.

Note carefully that I am not establishing any hierarchy in this connection, from a mediocre reality with no value, ascending toward a transcendent truth. I merely establish two different orders. Rather than speaking of Truth, at this point I am still dealing just with the order of truth (which is also, to be sure, the order of untruth, error, and falsehood!). Nor am I saying that language has nothing to do with reality. We will examine this relationship later. I am, instead, looking for specificity, and in this case it resides in the fact that nothing besides language can reach or establish the order of truth.

This brings us to the distinctives that characterize only the word: discussion, paradox, and mystery. Language is always unobtrusive, even when it tries to be demonstrative. It includes an unknown aspect in the background that makes it something secret and revealed. Language is unobtrusive in that it never asserts itself on its own. When it uses a loudspeaker and crushes others with its powerful equipment, when the television set speaks, the word is no longer involved, since no dialogue is possible. What we have in these cases is machines that use language as a way of asserting themselves. Their power is magnified, but language is reduced to a useless series of sounds which inspire only reflexes and animal instincts.

Authentic language is of necessity debatable, and therefore unobtrusive, even when a person is speaking from extremely strong conviction. However forceful the arguments may be, however close the reasoning or ardent the speaker, we all know how possible it is to protect ourselves from such outpourings. How often we have come up against a blank wall instead of a face, when the other person did not want to understand! How can we make him understand as long as he persists in that attitude?

In reality, language is an extraordinary occurrence in which each person’s liberty is respected. I can oppose my word to the other person’s. Or I can turn a deaf ear. I remain free as I face someone who tries to define me, encircle me, or convince me. Nothing is more absurd than the argument we hear over and over again these days (we will come back to it later), where someone pompously labels the word and language "terrorist"! I would say that language is the only nonterrorist form of expression! People who use labels so loosely have not experienced the difference between the violence of words and a whip with braided thongs -- or between a human mouth, even if it is shrieking, and the silent muzzle of a revolver.

By its very ambiguity, which is a fundamental and essential part of it, language leaves the listener with a whole margin of freedom. As the speaker, I actually invite my listener to exercise his liberty in two ways. First, every act of speech supposes either assent or rejection. In other words, of necessity I give my listener a choice to make. A situation where there is choice is a situation where there is freedom. But at the same time, I invite him to use the gift of liberty inherent in language, just as I have. He must speak in turn, consciously making use of his freedom. I invite him to start down the difficult road of self-knowledge and self-expression, of choice, self-exposure, and unveiling.

Language always involves the exercise of freedom. It is never mechanical, just as it is not an object! Subtle structural linguistic analyses are of course limited to texts; that is, to finite, fixed words rather than open-ended ones. Such analyses seem to account for everything: codes, units of meaning, morphemes, etc. But they overlook one thing. Once the languages and lexicons, rhetorics, discourses, and narratives have been stripped of their mystery, one thing is left: language itself. It remains because it is history, and such linguistic analysis excludes history. The word remains because it is a call to freedom, and in such analysis structures and systems are closed. Language is an affirmation of my person, since I am the one speaking, and it is born at the same time as the faint belief, aspiration, or conviction of liberty. The two are born together, and language is a sign bearing witness to my freedom and calling the other person to freedom as well.

This is so true that the word is always paradoxical. This is its second characteristic. The paradox, let us remember, is something situated beside or outside the doxa (opinion). The paradox is free of all doxa, but at the same time calls the doxa into question. Roland Barthes is right in showing that "the real instrument of censorship is the endoxa rather than the police." "Just as a language is better defined by what it requires (its obligatory rules) than by what it prohibits (its theoretical rules), in the same way social censorship is present not when one is prevented from speaking, but rather when one is obliged to speak. The deepest subversion (countercensorship) does not consist so much in saying something to shock opinion, morals, the law, or the police, but in inventing paradoxical speech."(Etienne Dagut, Etude sur Baudrillard [Mémoire de l’lnstitut d’Etudes Politiques de Bordeaux, 1978]).

Whereas rules of language can be the doxa, the word is always paradoxical. Enrico Castelli was right again in reminding us that paradox exists, and that there is no need to emphasize it in a heavyhanded manner. The absence of paradox would be the unusual situation, since it is not a profound and subtle invention of the philosopher or intellectual revolutionary, but something that proceeds from common sense.

Common sense defies organized thought. Common sense escapes from any sort of integrating doctrine, and, after half a century of oppression, it springs up strangely unharmed and expresses itself in paradoxes. Common sense is not an inferior stage of thought: it is paradox standing up to structured, logical, organized thought, which follows the rules (of logic, dialectic, etc.). Paradox, always related to the word springing up as something new, prevents thought from closing up and reaching completion. Paradox prevents the system from accounting for everything, and does not allow a structure to mold everything.

The poetic word contains paradox within it. You believe poetic language to be insignificant, a side issue in comparison with political and scientific talk? You are right, but poetry continually brings the uncertainty of ambiguity to our attention, along with double meanings, manifold interpretations, false bottoms, and multiple facets. The word is always paradoxical because it corresponds directly to our ambiguity as persons.

Now we are coming to the last characteristic to keep in mind about the word: it is mystery. The most explicit and the best-explained word still brings me inevitably back to mystery. This mystery has to do with the other person, whom I cannot fathom, and whose word provides me with an echo of his person, but only an echo. I perceive this echo, knowing that there is something more. This is the mystery I feel as I recognize spontaneously that I do not understand well or completely what the other person says. There is a mystery for me in my own lack of comprehension, as I become aware of it. How am I going to react? How can I respond? I sense a whole area of mystery in the fact that I am not very sure I understood correctly. I am not very sure about answering. I am not very sure of what I am saying.

There is always a margin around our conversation. More precisely, conversation is like this printed page, framed on all sides by white margins, without words, but which can be filled in with any word at all. The margins situate a conversation and give it the possibility of rebounding and beginning again. They allow the other person to participate with his marginal comments. I am aware of this possibility, but I do not know what marginal comments are going to appear beside what I say, changing it. Here again we are dealing with the unexpected. And we come up against the mystery of silence.

The mystery is silence as a break in discourse, not silence in the sense of something that discourse fills up! The enigmatic, disturbing, saddening silence of the other person is an inconvenience as I wait. I expect a response, an explanation, or a statement from him. He falls silent, and I no longer know where or how to take my place in relation to him. More precisely, I no longer know how to be as I face him. I find myself faced with a mystery which eludes me when there is a lull in the conversation. I expect words, but this silence constitutes a chasm in the word, which continues unspoken. It is unheard, but it cannot be eliminated. Thus in all sorts of ways the word is related to mystery. It expresses and engulfs us in mystery. There is a reason why mythos and logos go together.

The image, however, is never mysterious. We have seen that it can be terrifying. Mystery does not terrify. It is an existential questioning. The image is nonparadoxical, since it is always in conformity with the doxa (opinion). As we will see, it is especially an influence toward conformity. Thus cultural revolutionaries succumb to a childish illusion when they believe that films or posters can promote revolutionary ideas. Images never reinforce anything but conformity to the dominant doxa. Only the word troubles the waters. Images contain neither blank spaces nor margins. They refer to reality and give a direct account of it, without mystery, since reality has none. Images can include unresolved problems or paralyze me with horror, but they contain no mystery. What paralyzes me is the manifestation of horror. There are no false bottoms, no echoes in the reality I perceive through sight. But truth presents neither problems to resolve nor dreadful hallucinations. It is made up of sympathetic vibrations and vibrations of reason, discreet insights and interruptions, just like the word. Truth assails me and circumvents me with mystery. Everything seems to depend on evidence; reality is evident; sight, naturally, gives me evidence. But the truth is never evident. (It is clear that I am utterly at odds with Marshall McLuhan on this point. When he tries to show that the visual world is continuous and homogeneous, I agree. But when he expounds this by saying that the visual world is a universe of continuity and development, whereas the acoustical world is a universe of simultaneousness, because we hear from all directions at the same time, but do not see everywhere at once, this seems very weak to me. We hear the noises of the area around us, just as we see everywhere within our visual range.

Amazingly, McLuhan considers the visual to be the origin of the linear and the sequential, and therefore of the temporal, whereas he related the acoustical world to what is spatial and global. I have wondered what the source of his error could be, and it seems to stem from the fact that when he speaks of the visual universe, he considers the visual only in terms of alphabetical writing, related, of course, to rationally. But in order to do this, he severs the relationship between Writing and the Word. And when he speaks of the acoustical universe, he considers only music, which can of course be called spatial, global etc., as well as simultaneous. But here he excludes language.

The same thing occurs when he says that the visual universe furnishes us with classifications, whereas the acoustical provides immediate recognition. But it is evident that we recognize a person’s face much more quickly than the sound of his disembodied voice. Immediate recognition is related to sight! In order to arrive at his conclusion, McLuhan must exclude the universe of noises. Whereas sight allows me to distinguish shape and color, which tell me immediately what something is, hearing may allow me to classify the sound or noise but I do not discern immediately what it is.

Thus McLuhan’s definition deals exclusively with the sight of written language and with hearing music. Having said this, I hasten to add that I find myself agreeing with many of his characterizations of both universes: the visual, universe has to do with the quantitative, active sphere, and perceives clearly expressed outlines; the acoustical universe is emotional, intuitive, and qualitative, having to do with abstract perceptions. But how can he miss that these attributes are precisely what contradicts the sequential and therefore temporal characteristic of the one universe, and the spatial characteristic of the other?)

3. Seeing and Hearing

It stands to reason that seeing and hearing are inseparable and complementary. Nothing in human affairs can be done without their joint involvement. I have considered them separately only for the sake of convenience. Their difference is fundamental, however, and it is probably out of their confrontation and opposition that human uniqueness is born. To show how they differ, I have exaggerated their characteristics, distinguished them by isolating them, and thus made their contrast more startling. Their difference is of fundamental importance, but rarely understood.

Now let us try to confront seeing and hearing. Their main antithesis concerns, as we have seen, the distinction between Space and Time, on the one hand, and Reality and Truth on the other. Our civilization’s major temptation (a problem that comes from technique’s preponderant influence) is to confuse reality with truth. We are made to believe that reality is truth: the only truth. At the time of the controversy over universals, the realists believed that only truth is real. We have inverted the terms, believing that everything is limited to reality.

We think that truth is contained within reality and expressed by it. Nothing more. Moreover, there is nothing left beyond reality any more. Nothing is Other; the Wholly Other no longer exists. Everything is reduced to this verifiable reality which is scientifically measurable and pragmatically modifiable. Praxis becomes the measure of all truth. Truth becomes limited to something that falls short of real truth. It is something that can be acted upon.

The Word is related only to Truth. The image is related only to reality. Of course, the word can also refer to reality! It can be perfectly pragmatic, used to command an action or to describe a factual situation. The word enters the world of concrete objects and refers to experiences of reality. It is the means of communication in everyday life, and as a result it fits precisely with all of reality. It conveys information about reality and takes part in the understanding of it. It can even create reality, producing effects that will become part of reality. Thus the word is ambivalent. But its specificity lies in the domain of truth, since this domain is not shared with anything else. On the contrary, the image cannot leave the domain of reality. It is not ambivalent.

At this point I can hear someone tempted to ask: "What is Truth?" I will carefully avoid answering by suggesting some specific content for the word. Such an answer would be challenged immediately, involving us in a long digression which would exceed my capacity. Without attempting this sort of definition, I can show what the object of truth can be, and this will serve to distinguish it clearly from reality. The very questions asked about truth can indicate its nature, replacing the answer that cannot be given.

We can grant, then, that anything concerned with the ultimate destination of a human being belongs to the domain of Truth. "Destination" in this sense is the same as "meaning and direction in life." We can add to this everything that refers to the establishment of a scale of values which allows a person to make significant personal decisions, and everything related to the debate over Justice and Love and their definition.

These considerations allow us to become conscious of what we call truth. There is nothing original in this idea. But when we say that everything related to these considerations belongs to the domain of Truth, we do not mean at all that every answer to these questions has the same value and is therefore true; we are not advocating syncretism. We only mean that none of these matters belongs to the sphere of reality. They can only belong to the domain of reality if truth and reality are decisively merged with each other, in which case the entire group of questions we have mentioned above simply disappears.

By saying these questions belong to the order of Truth, we imply that the answers given will be either truth itself, a reflection of this truth, error, or falsehood. It is important to note that falsehood and error belong to the domain of truth. If there is no truth, neither falsehood nor error exists. They are indissolubly linked, since they belong to the same order.

There is another important matter: the question of Truth is not the same thing as truth. I am not entering into metaphysics here. The question is not truth, because it is not the question that a person asks himself about his own life. This sort of question is just another intellectual game and a way of remaining outside truth. After all, it does not matter if one can answer or not, nor does it matter whether the answer is personal or is objectified as philosophy or revelation. But when a person asks about his own life (consciously or unconsciously), then the real question of truth has been asked. And when anyone claims to have resolved it, he is lying. When he tries to answer this question within the framework of reality alone, he has no answer to offer. The question which his life puts to him in all its aspects and its expressions remains an open question. It is continually being put to him, and this is truth itself.

Therefore, affirming the value of material happiness and the irreplaceable value of happiness as a response to being is simply giving a final answer to the permanently open question of truth. Nothing is resolved or achieved in this manner. Such an answer leaves a person faced with the same uncertainty, immersed in the same adventure as before. A civilization based on happiness becomes a civilization of consumerism, or else the gloomy gray paradise of Sweden. Swedish-type "paradises" finally produce either rebels without a cause (such as the 1953 New Year’s Eve youthful rampage in Stockholm), or strikers who strike for no reason, since they are not revolting against anything Certainly people who have testified to the eminent value of material happiness have not attempted to answer any other question, or even tried to ask this one in the face of men and women thirsting for the unusual.

The opposition between word and image is therefore not the same as the opposition between idealism and materialism. The assertion that praxis is the solution to human problems is words, as long as it remains an assertion. The entire relationship between praxis and truth as established by Karl Marx is words. Praxis, which appears to be an action for the purpose of changing reality, an action that constitutes the only measure and limit of truth, is of necessity initiated and produced by language. And language is also the means of describing and justifying praxis. Thus even in Marx the word is prior to all praxis. The word belongs to the order of the question of truth. An individual can ask the question of truth and attempt to answer it only through language.

The image, on the other hand, belongs to the domain of reality. It can in no way convey anything at all about the order of truth. It never grasps anything but an appearance or outward behavior. It is unable to convey a spiritual experience, a requirement of justice, a testimony to the deepest feelings of a person, or to bear witness to the truth. In all these areas the image will rely on a form.

Images can convey a rite, and thus people have a tendency to confuse religious truth with religious rites. In a world obsessed with images and where statistics are necessary, people feel a need to grasp"religion" by its rites, since it cannot be understood any other way. In this manner people get the impression that they have at least grasped the expressions of faith, whereas they have grasped only some aspects of a reality which of necessity clashes with the truth.

An image can catch a psychological expression on someone’s face: ecstasy, for example. People will believe that they are seeing authentic faith, whereas all they have is a psychological state that can be utterly unrelated to faith. Such a state can be induced by a drug, for example. Faced with such a problem, those who identify reality with truth are so monumentally confused that they deny faith because a psychological state can be artificially induced! An image can show a body’s position, as in a photograph of clasped hands and bowed head, seeming to say that this is prayer. But in reality, no prayer is involved in this image; it could be only a joke. Even when no one is joking, an image is incapable of expressing the seriousness of truth. I remember a photograph of Pope Pius XII in prayer, on the cover of the magazine Paris Match. It was an image that reeked of inauthenticity, utterly lacking in seriousness. It made you wonder how the Pope could have agreed to pose as if he were praying!

An image can properly be used to illustrate the history of the Church for us, but it will never tell us what the Church is. Even by allusion an image cannot enable us to grasp the deep and true life of the Church -- the body of Christ, for example. The image cannot even express the visible Church, except for outward acts and stereotyped forms, which are always false expressions of the visible Church. An image can report miracles, but only recorded miracles -- after they have taken place and grace has departed. The image can never penetrate as far as the holy place where the Word proclaims that an individual has become a new creation. The miracle is an expression of this new creation.

No image is able to convey any truth at all. This explains in part why all "spiritual" films are failures. When we insist on expressing spiritual matters this way through images, something other than truth is always perceived. Even more serious and alarming, truth tends to disappear behind all the lighting and makeup. It tends to vanish when squelched by images. The spectator of such films finds his attention diverted from what the film should be making him feel. The better the quality of the film the more insensitive the spectator becomes to the truth which the reality should be expressing.

Given this exclusive relationship between image and reality, one can easily understand why images have expanded so much in recent times. Our generation is characterized by the exclusive preeminence of reality, both at the factual level and in our preoccupations. We are moved in this direction by the marvels of technique, the prevailing tone of our time, the great concern about economic matters, etc. Our era is further characterized by an absolute identification of reality with truth. Marxism has prevailed absolutely in this matter, and science has finally convinced people that the only possible truth consists in knowing reality, and that the proof of truth is success relative to reality.

Thus in the thinking of modern individuals the image is the means par excellence which communicates reality and truth at the same time. This attitude concerning images can be held only if one confuses reality and truth to begin with, believing that a scientific hypothesis is true when it is confirmed by experiments. Such a hypothesis has nothing to do with truth, and is merely accurate. Of course, this preeminence of reality and this confusion coincide with the universal belief in the "fact," taken to be of ultimate value.

In all this, I am not trying to minimize the importance of the image. I mean only to specify its domain and understand its limits. The image is an admirable tool for understanding reality. In the social or political world, it can even be explosive and terribly efficacious. Land without Bread by Luis Buñuel and Our Daily Bread by King Vidor are admirable films for their ability to convict and to unsettle people’s good conscience. They are genuinely revolutionary. A documentary film of a riot enables us to penetrate the world of anger better than any speech could. But an image is explosive only if the spectator knows what it represents and if it is taken for what it is: a faithful representation of reality.

An image becomes falsehood and illusion as soon as a person tries to see truth in it. At that moment, by means of an amazing reversal, the image loses all its explosive power. For example, a person who finds truth in the films we just mentioned walks away from them with a perfectly good conscience. All techniques of justification stem from the confusion of truth with reality. The spectator of one of these films may believe, for instance, that any movement capable of showing such truth is itself truthful: "Since I adhere to this movement and am sensitive to the scandal portrayed in this film, I possess the truth." So when we believe that an image expresses truth, the image gives us a good conscience and a peaceful spirit. When the image is understood to speak only of reality, however, it is explosive and terrible.

At this point we discover a new problem. images in our society are always the product of a mechanical technique. Technique is truly an intermediary, since the universe of images is established for us by technique. But this is the equivalent of saying that we find ourselves in the presence of an artificial world, made by an outside force with artificial means. Therefore it is important to realize that stark reality is never conveyed to us in this universe of images. Instead we find a more or less arbitrary construction or reconstruction, with the result that we must constantly remind ourselves of the ambiguity behind the apparent objectivity of the image: it expresses a reality, but of necessity it presents us with an artifice. In this sense the image is deceptive: it passes itself off as reality when it is artifice; it pretends to be unilateral truth when it is a reflection of something that cannot be truth.

* * * * * *

When we say that only the word is related to truth, we are not saying that the word is necessarily true. We are stating that only the word can be truth, as, consequently, only the word can be falsehood. An image can be inaccurate with respect to reality, but it is never false because it cannot deceive us about the truth. Images have nothing to do with truth, except for the confusion established in the modern mind between reality and truth. Only the word can be false, since it is destined to express truth and because it occupies the central position.

The word is lying when it gives a lying answer to a question concerning the truth. This has always been an open debate in human history. We will not dwell on this, since it would involve us in a discussion concerning the content of truth, which is not possible in these pages. Let us just note that this permanent debate is always situated at the level of the word, and that it has always been conducted by this means.

But we will dwell on another aspect of this falsehood of the word which is less known and more relevant: the word becomes falsehood when it denies its relationship with truth. This happens when the word claims to be nothing more than an evocation of reality, as if it were an image; when it turns aside from its vocation in order to serve only vested interests, practices, and efficaciousness, whatever their spheres: economic, political, or scientific. Not that the word should refuse to serve in these areas; but it should not enclose itself in them so decisively. Even in its pragmatic uses, the word must always remain a door opening to the Wholly Other, a question concerning ultimate causes, and an indicator of ultimate answers.

The Bible provides us with a remarkable model of this, since it recounts all sorts of concrete and practical stories, factual adventures, politics, and psychologies. Yet in its concrete use of the word, the Bible seizes ultimate mystery from all angles, and in so doing, reveals truth itself. When the word denies its dual use, it becomes of necessity a lie and a counterfeit.

In such a situation, when the word claims to speak only of reality, it is so rapidly outdistanced by the image that the word loses its vitality and its gravity. The image is ever so much more efficacious, and the word is stripped of its authenticity; people stop committing themselves to what it says because it has become merely a practical thing. Under these circumstances, the word no longer deserves to be believed. This is our present situation. The Word is devaluated in our day because it has come to be used only to express reality. Thus no one puts his whole weight behind what he says, and such a word appears useless. Indeed, it is useless, partly because it is a falsehood; it is completely useless because its only true value has been repudiated.

In this state of affairs, people no longer have any means of approaching, discerning, and grasping truth. Thus we can understand the seriousness of the warnings against vain speech, words said "in the air," which are neither yes nor no, committing us neither to anything nor to any person.

Purely doctrinal or doctrinaire language is no more closely related to truth than words said in vain. We are still influenced by this strange movement in which the preeminence of reality has attempted to restrict the word to pure objectivity. The nineteenth century, under the influence of science that dealt with reality, wanted nothing but objective language, separated from the person using it. This transformed the word into something false. If the word of the Gospels is separated from Jesus Christ, the person who says and fulfills it, it is mere vanity. All human speech is intrinsically connected to a person. Not only in theology and from God’s point of view is the word the equivalent of the person. The objective word, left to itself, and in itself, loses all its weight, because of its very inability to be an object. Since someone has tried to separate it from the person who speaks it, it has lost its relationship with truth and has become a lie.

Let us be clear that this is not the same as saying that the word becomes true simply because the person who says it commits himself to it and does what he has said. Even if we can believe only the words people would die for, that still does not guarantee their veracity. It simply means that only these words have something to do with truth. Only these are worthy of entering the great debate, the great human quest. The word detached from the person speaking can never fulfill this minimal condition, because it is a dead word. Who would die for an objective word? Galileo answered the question well: you do not become a martyr in order to insist on the earth’s turning!

Reference to reality situates me in a universe of precision and imprecision, exactitude and inexactitude. I see either a red or a green light. I act in such a way as to find the right answer, the precise solution. The visual is the royal road to discerning what is correct and incorrect, and it gives me direct experience I have no need for reflection; I know immediately what is accurate or correct in my gesture as it relates to the situation I have seen. Hearing involves me with speech, and places me in the universe of truth, and therefore of falsehood or error. The questions are no longer the same. There is never any direct experience of truth, falsehood, or error. Truth and error dazzle equally: since speech is of necessity paradoxical, it presupposes a long effort at discernment, choice, and experimentation. What comes from the word is never obvious. Reality can be obvious, but truth never is.

* * * * * *

In this study we are not attempting to make a radical separation between image and word, reality and truth, but rather to recall the distinction between them and the place of each. It is good for language to accompany images, to add another dimension to them and give them meaning, as long as the image is dearly subordinate to the word. For the image, like reality itself, can never be anything but the raw material for a human decision. In itself the image supplies no fundamental basis for judgment, decision, or commitment. Only the word (since it is at the same time instrument, agent, and locus of confrontation between truth and falsehood) can be also the agent and the locus of differentiation and criticism, thus leading to a judgment.

Criticism is the preferred domain of the word. In its relations with images, the word is called on to criticize the image, not in the sense of accusing it, but in the more basic sense of separation and discernment of true and false. This is one of the noblest functions of the word, and discourse should relate to it.

We realize, of course, how this mission of the word aggravates people in our day. They need prefabricated certainties (stereotypes that are not subject to criticism, images without words). They need monolithic attitudes, behavior guaranteed not to require choices. Criticism seems completely sterile to them because it impedes action. They find it negative because everything is not accepted in advance -- and pessimistic because it does not automatically give its stamp of approval to all of reality.

For this reason the most distinguished use one can make of his language is the most hated one in our day. This is just one more facet of the devaluation of the word. What is at stake here is a conceivable expression of the truth within reality itself, but which must be uprooted by force, in the midst of the pain of affirming that it is falsehood. If language is not useful for this, what else could allow us to accomplish this task without which human beings do not have much significance?

Today, of course, this task seems negligible, compared to the importance of making refrigerators or refining oil. Anyone who tries to interfere with such efforts by means of the word is considered to be nothing but a conjurer. To that extent our contemporaries have lost the sense of their language and their life.

As means and locus of criticism, the word permits judgment -- not the judgment of practical matters and experience, which are the only judgments we are willing to submit to in the modern world, but the laughable judgment that involves ethical values. Only through the use of language can one learn to make ethical decisions. These are a result of the choices we make in critical thinking, as we criticize situations and ourselves.

As a product of criticism, the ethical decision operates in the domain of the word because it is utterly personal. It expresses the person; it can in no way be simply the act of participating in some group activity (if the ethical decision is genuine and not simply a matter of moral conformity). This is absolutely opposed to the guidance which an image can give someone. The image tends, on the contrary, to produce conformity, to make us join a collective tendency.

Indeed, images create certain kinds of human behavior, but these are always in harmony with the societies expressed through the image. This is true even when the image tries to be nonconformist. In such cases there is always a degree of ambiguity confusing what is possible with what is good. The decision an image would lead us to make can never be an all-or-nothing decision. But the word does constrain us in this sense, probably because of its very nature. For when the word is not authentic, it is absolutely nothing. All that remains is air. On the contrary, the image and action, however inaccurate they may be, always remain and give the illusion of reality and effectiveness.

* * * * * *

In these times we know only too well to what extent people’s psychology depends on the language they were taught. Their reactions, their relationships, and their manner of understanding and being, in the cultural sphere, depend on language. Feminists are right in claiming that the very structure of a language places women on an inferior level. Saying man to indicate both masculine and feminine, deriving the feminine grammatical form from the masculine, and a hundred other examples in vocabulary and syntax cause the masculine attitude to predominate. The effect of language in this area is much greater than the games which are said to orient girls toward the kitchen and men toward war! Language determines our psychology as well as our mode of reasoning. My intention here is not to emphasize cultural factors over natural ones, but to show the uniqueness of the mechanism of the spoken and heard word. It determines us as both psychic and knowing beings. It is as if everything on this level depended on verbal expression.

Furthermore, sight and language determine two different kinds of thinking. (Here I limit myself to a brief reference to a theme we will consider more thoroughly later.) Language, which is written, involves a long, careful process. My eyes follow the words one after the other, and thus a sequence of understandings are connected to each other. Thought develops according to the axis of this sequence of words. I receive knowledge progressively as the elements of what I am trying to understand link up in succession. Ideas are gradually laid bare as I follow the sentence. The sentence unfolds within a given time span, so that my knowledge necessarily takes the form of step-by-step reasoning. My knowledge progresses by following the curves of this language, assuming a certain continuity in the sentence and rationality in the relationship between words.

Finally, knowledge always involves consciousness. Language is endowed with rationality; I need to understand what the other person says to me, and I can do so only if there is rationality in the very structure of what he says (rationality by itself is not sufficient for this, but it is necessary). Thus language calls me to a conscious operation that leads me not only to new knowledge but to a broadened and developed consciousness.

The visual world with its signals based on images belongs to another order altogether. The image immediately conveys to us a totality. It gives us in a glance all the information which we could possibly need. It dispenses a reserve of knowledge I need not itemize or coordinate differently than the image itself does: that is, spatially. The transmission takes place instantaneously so long as I am located in the same space as the image. The image conveys to me information belonging to the category of evidence, which convinces me without any prior criticism. It is strange that so often a photograph is considered proof whereas there is hesitation about accepting the testimony of a witness (testimony lacks "credibility"!) or a reasoned demonstration.

Whenever something visible is involved, we are sure of our information. This certainty is direct and does not move gradually from unknown to uncertain and then from uncertain to known. But such certainty is based on absence of awareness. The sort of knowledge produced by an image is by nature unconscious. Only rarely do I remember all the elements of an image or a spectacle, but it has made a strong impression on my entire personality and has produced a change in me that is based in the subconscious. This overall and unconscious perception of a whole "package" of information which does not follow the slow and arduous path of language also explains why we are naturally, through laziness, inclined to watch images rather than to read a long book or listen to a demonstration. Intellectual laziness causes the image to win out over the word automatically, and we observe its victory on every hand.

Finally, the way of thinking changes: images link themselves up to each other in a manner that is neither logical nor reasonable. We proceed by association of images and their successive changes. The aspects of an image that change in this process have to do exclusively with the spectacle in its present moment. They are never a logical sequence. In this respect Marshall McLuhan’s analysis is correct. As he says, it is not the characteristics of electronic signals which have made the difference, but the manner in which images follow each other. When we think by means of images (as in typical comic strip "logic"), each image is a totality, and the sequence progresses by fits and starts.

4. What About the Philosopher?

As far as philosophy is concerned, the first to raise the question of sight and hearing, showing and speaking was apparently Søren Kierkegaard, in his attack on the philosophers who had preceded him.(In this section I limit myself to summarizing a chapter of the remarkable book by Nelly Viallaneix, Kierkegaard et la Parole de Dieu [Paris: Champion, 1977], to which we will refer often!) Kierkegaard mounts an astounding attack on the privileged position of sight in Western philosophy, where the philosopher is a spectator and philosophy is thought of as speculation.

Platonism establishes the philosophical sovereignty of sight and G. Hegel follows it closely. Plato defines the essence of things on the basis of their perception. True knowledge is knowledge of ideas and of form; but idea, eidos, comes from the verb eido, which means to see. René Descartes also places sight in an absolute and privileged position, as the model of intuition. Intueri also means to see. What a constant repetition of error!

Kierkegaard breaks the pattern: "The speculative individual wants to touch everything he sees.... Why doesn’t he respect the distance imposed by Being? Why doesn’t he deal carefully with the difference between himself and the other person, in order to under’ stand who he is? In order to understand, he must give ear: hasten to listen. You must learn to listen." For language and hearing are at the center of being. "Everything leads to the ear. Grammatical rules lead to the ear; so does the message of the law. Jean-Philippe Rameau’s unwritten base line leads to the ear, as does the system of philosophy. The afterlife is also presented as pure and simple music, like a vast harmony. If only the dissonance of my life could soon be resolved into that harmony" (cited by Nelly Viallaneix).

Phenomenology should not only cause things to appear as they are, but make them sound as they are! Classical philosophy does not know how to listen to or hear truth. Kierkegaard listens to Mozart: "The careful listener, when hearing A Little Night Music, will always set the speculative (visual) spectacle over against the silent ‘I know’ -- that silent situation in which we enable ourselves to hear the melody of the world as we listen, and as we wait for God’s call."

The philosopher who refuses to listen also refuses both truth and reality. He lives within one set of categories and thinks with others. He is "like a man who builds an enormous castle, but lives beside it in a hut." These philosophers may not listen to anything, but of course they talk! They do nothing else! But they use words not even "to hide their thoughts, but to hide the fact that they have none." Their verbal inflation has no foundation. This becomes clear when they use language only for constructing systems.

Kierkegaard develops an incessant polemic from his observation that philosophy is based on sight and at the same time ceases speaking. He satirizes philosophy, caught up in mirror tricks of speculation. These tricks lead only to the construction of a system in which one is then enclosed. Only Socrates speaks truly, "for Socrates does not look complacently on the spectacle of Nature, Being, or his own thought. As a man of character, he achieves the ethical ideal in his life, which he risks as he incarnates his demands. And he announces the need for understanding oneself, because to understand truly is to be."

Socrates is docile in relation to the inner voice that guides him. He listens to the secret voice we each hear. That is why he speaks. His irony, which asks the most ungracious questions, calls itself into question. "It abolishes speculation in favor of the word." Therefore, all Socrates’ teaching takes place within the framework of a dialogue, in which two speakers provide each other with the opportunity to find themselves and be born.

Kierkegaard calls this Socratic method of reciprocal (spoken!) interchange "indirect communication." In it the master and his disciple share in the quest for truth. If they wrestle, it is in order to understand each other. In this situation the word is action in life.

Every spoken relationship requires the mutual participation of the one speaking and the one listening, united in the same present moment. The word must be put into practice in life, or else it is interrupted. This is no theory or system or spectacle! This fundamental founding dialogue eliminates false visual knowledge (more precisely the false application of the visual to an object that is not of the visual order -- or even better, the reduction of all knowledge to the visual plane!). It also eliminates the egocentric monologue of the scholar who has understood nothing, and therefore remains unable to draw from within himself any new riches!

This is where Kierkegaard’s dialectic fits in, as Viallaneix shows so well. It is a qualitative dialectic (as contrasted with Hegel’s dialectic, which Kierkegaard calls quantitative), and a dialectic of life rather than a system of concepts. For the word is dialectical in itself and at the same time integrated into the whole of existence. By this I mean that the word is intended to be lived.

We can stop here without considering (Kierkegaardian) repetition, which Viallaneix contrasts with speculative and fine-layered philosophy. We may stop here, since beyond this point Kierkegaard involves us in the dialectically related stages within the steps leading to Christ. These are not successive steps organized in linear progression. On the contrary, each stage adds an irreplaceable element which always takes its place in the present moment of life, like a word that has been heard. Even if the word is forgotten, it leaves its mark on life.

At this point we find ourselves in the presence of a strange and happy contradiction. The reality around us changes and flows constantly. Everything flows: panta rhei. The river I see is never the same. This water I am looking at races away and will never return. At every level, reality is unstable and fleeting. Consider politics or economics: every moment changes their framework. Every moment presents some loss or accident that rules out planning ahead with a view to efficient organization. History does not repeat itself; no two situations will ever be truly comparable.

Time is not alone in making reality unstable. What is the nature of reality? Bernard d’Espagnat’s fine book (Bernard d’Espagnat, A la recherche du Réel: Le Regard d’un physicien (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1981). questions and upsets us. I am aware that this rock I am looking at is essentially a vacuum with atoms whirling around it. But the more physicists progress, the less able we are to grasp reality. In the last analysis, only mathematics can assure us that reality exists. We finally arrive at such refined analysis and a knowledge so subtle that reality becomes a gradually disappearing object that leaves us bedazzled.

Reality is present and yet nothing is there. What I think I grasp is not only transitory and changing, but imperceptible in its "substance" (if one can still use this word in the light of the vacuum and emptiness revealed to us by theoretical physics). We have tools for measuring, but beyond that.... Is everything then an illusion produced by our senses? This old question needs to be brought up again, because it leads us to an astonishing contradiction. I perceive the reality around me (such as this table I am looking at, and on which I am writing) through my sight and sense of touch. That is, I grasp it by means of my most reliable and indisputable senses. We do not need to return to this idea: I cannot doubt what I see. Yet we know for a certainty that what I see is not what I see. But what difference does this make? My sight gives me certainty concerning reality, and I need nothing more.

Here is the other side of the coin: in Measure for Measure, Shakespeare says "Truth is truth to th’end of reck’ning." And Shakespeare is right. Truth remains truth in relation to and in spite of everything. It is firm, stable, hard, and irrefutable. We must not relativize it just because science has changed. We must not say that yesterday’s truth becomes today’s error (and vice versa). We must not become so extremely liberal that we say everything is relative, so that one person can be just as right as the person who says the opposite. If truth is truth even beyond the limits of our grasp and our approximations, it exists. And that settles it. It remains true to itself, of necessity. In observing vanishing reality, Heraclitus says something that does not vanish, and his statement falls within the scope of truth.

Truth is the absolute or eternal. We are not able even to approach its outskirts. We do not construct truth out of bits and pieces added to one another, so as to enable us to remove them and dismantle the construction. By means of language we transmit and understand this truth that is as tightly closed and solid as a dot, reliable as a map, translucent as a crystal, but hard as a diamond. We transmit it and even discern it only through language. Truth is connected to the word and communicated by it. That is, truth is communicated by the most uncertain means, the one most prone to variations and doubt, as we have seen -- by the word, that fragile thing that does not last, evaporating as soon as it has been said. Thus what we are surest of is connected with the most uncertain thing in existence; our most changeable means has to do with what is most certain.

Now here is the amazing thing: this is a godsend for us. How could we live if our senses advised us that the reality in which we live does not really exist in the final analysis, that it is only a tangle of whirlwinds and illusions? How could I walk if my senses showed me nothing but emptiness in front of me? How could I eat if my senses showed me the utter unreality of what I am eating? Not that everything can be reduced to the impressions of my senses. That is not what I mean. My point is that sight and touch, the senses of certainty, give me the guarantee indispensable for living, concerning a milieu that is strange and foreign to me. My certainty is false as far as exact reality is concerned, but this certainty allows me to live.

Physics or mathematics can teach me many things about reality, but they cannot contradict the unimpeachable evidence of my senses. What do I care about the fact that chemistry can give me the exact formula for the wine I am drinking? That has no effect on the great pleasure I derive from it.(Moreover, when chemists claim to be able to reproduce wine, vanilla, orange extract, etc., on the basis of their exact formulas, the result is always horrible -- at least for those with a sense of taste. In order for me to live, my senses must be right in spite of the scientific analysis of reality.(This is part of d’Espagnat’s rigorous analysis.)

The opposite is just as true. What would become of us if we could grasp truth with unvarying precision and express it without the slightest imperfection or without any uncertainty? What would happen if the means were perfectly adequate for expressing truth? Such a situation would be dreadful and completely unlivable. We would be pinned down once and for all in a butterfly museum. We would be there in all our splendor, unable to move any more, because everything would be said, closed up, and finished: perfect.

We have seen the horror that has resulted in the course of our history every time a person or group has claimed to express truth in its entirety, believing their word to be identical with the truth, or that truth could not be "elsewhere" or "other." This attitude has given legitimacy to all dictatorships, oppressions, falsehoods, and massacres. One person’s word against another’s is the only possible fragile pointer to truth, like a compass quivering in its case. And quite apart from human pretension to have a proud, exclusive corner on truth, even if we could seize truth as it is and transmit it without wasting any of it and without confusion, truth would crush us of its own weight and prevent us from living. In order to live, we need truth to be expressed by the most fragile agent, so that the listener remains free. The uneasiness which enables us to keep going involves knowing that we will never be able to grasp truth in its entirety, or be able to bring our adventure to a close by identifying our life with truth.

Some people, including Christians (I think particularly of my Protestant friends), have the profound conviction that truth is "there." They say, for instance, that "the word of God is expressed in the Bible." Even so, I must be prudent enough to say that this word is conveyed through human language: witnesses who pass it on to other witnesses. And when I hear it, I understand it with my words, my verbal images, and I speak it with my language -- and I am not God, fortunately. If this were not so, human life would be closed. By these statements, I do not reduce the value of revealed truth in the slightest; on the contrary, in this way I respect it and recognize its special dimension and the depth and permanence that make it truth. If I claim to grasp and express it in its entirety, then it is no longer truth.

The connection between Word and Truth is of such a nature that nothing can be known of truth apart from language. This truth establishes itself over the duration of generations (Hebrew toledoth), in the ebb and flow of words, through our fellowship and our misunderstandings. This is where this marvelously human life is located. The most reliable thing speaks to the most uncertain world; my most flexible means expresses what is irrefutable.

5. Writing

In finishing these prolegomena, we must say a few words about writing. This situation is completely ambiguous. It is a phenomenon that comes along and shuffles the cards after they have been dealt. We assume that writing is the written word. We invariably associate the two. First we must clearly understand that we associate them because of a long development. André Leroi-Gourhan has done a most praiseworthy job of showing that language was not written at the beginning, and that writing was not "canned" language!(Andre Leroi-Gourhan, Le Geste et la Parole [Paris: Albin Michel, 1965], I: 269-70) "Figurative art is inseparable from language; it is born from the intellectual marriage of phonation and graphic art.... From the beginning, phonation and graphic art have the same goal.... Four thousand years of linear writing have caused us to separate art and writing."

Actually we have misinterpreted picture writing and then ideograms (Leroi-Gourhan speaks of "picto-ideography") because of our familiarity with alphabetical, linear writing. In a stroke of genius, Leroi-Gourhan has discovered that present-day writing is not a normal sequence of picture writing, which would then be considered the "infancy of writing." It is true that alphabetical linearity could have originated in numerating devices, which are of necessity linear, such as notches, knotted cords, etc. Picture writing, however, is another matter, for there are two universes: "Reflective, abstract thought concerning reality, symbols which create a parallel real world, the world of language. This reflective thought is expressed concretely in spoken language, and enables people to express themselves in a way that goes beyond the material present." Therefore two languages exist: that of hearing and that of seeing.

Compared to phonetic language, graphic symbolism benefits in a special way from a degree of independence: its content expresses in the three dimensions of space what phonetic language expresses in the single dimension of time. Images enjoy a dimensional freedom that writing lacks. An image can set in motion the verbal process which leads to the telling of a myth, but the image is not attached to the myth. Thus in the case of picture writing we are in the presence of "groups of figures coordinated within a system that is foreign to linear organization and thus foreign to the possibilities of continual speech."

In other words, there is almost complete independence between pictorial expression and vocalized expression, between the role of the hand, which uses tools, and the role of the face, which is the means of creating verbal language. "The hand creates images, which are symbols that do not depend directly on the development of verbal language. In any case, they are not at all parallel." Leroi-Gourhan calls this language "mythographic," because drawing gives rise to mental associations, series of impressions "in a category parallel to verbal myth, and foreign to the rigorous specification of spatiotemporal coordinates."

The images evoked by this language can move in several divergent directions. "The hand has its language in which expression refers to sight. The face has another language, which is linked to hearing. Between the two the halo prevails that gives a special quality to thought that is in the strict sense previous to writing. Gesture interprets language, and language comments on graphics." The image linked with mythological thought integrates itself into a rich and diversified system of symbolic relationships. Leroi-Gourhan thus uses the term mythography to designate this visual language which corresponds perfectly to mytho-logy. The latter designates the recitation of myths composed of many-dimensional and all-inclusive images that occur in succession. Here we discover the relationship between spoken and written language.

Leroi-Gourhan then shows in minute detail how the changes might have taken place: the "linearization of symbols," developing into writing, the intervention of what can be counted, the transformation of picture writing into ideograms, and the appearance of linear graphics (which took the place of multidimensional graphics). He also shows how mythological thought might have developed into rational thought: then, "at the stage of linear graphics, which characterizes writing, the relationship between the two fields evolves again: written language, which paints sounds and is linear in space, becomes completely subordinated to verbal language, which is phonetic and linear in time. Verbal-graphic dualism disappears and mankind has at its disposal a unique linguistic instrument. It is an instrument that expresses and preserves thought, which is itself more and more channeled into reasoning."

We had already arrived at this point of ambiguity and uneasiness in the written word.(Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, in Anti-Oedipus (New York: Viking, 1977), have made use of Leroi-Gourhan’s remarkable explanation for their own ends, to further their arbitrary and burlesque design. They say that civilizations slipped into barbarism because the graphic system lost its independence and its unique dimensions, aligning itself with the voice and becoming subordinate to the voice. After this we are treated to their hallucinations, such as "deterritorialized flow,’ and "instrument of domination." Graphics begin to depend on the voice, but it is a silent voice from the heights or from the beyond. This voice then begins to depend on graphics. By means of subordinating itself to this voice, writing replaces it. Despotism appears at this point: "The voice no longer sings, but dictates and decrees. Graphics no longer dance or animate bodies. Instead, they are written in a fixed manner on tables, stones, and books. The eye begins to read." And all this produces both religious feeling and the despotic state. Juggling with words is always easy.) Earlier we called it the "fixed" word: language that has passed from the order of the auditory to the visual. Henceforth it is a word placed in space, a word by which no one any longer commits himself: a word that no longer involves dialogue. The written word is inscribed in the order of reality, and therefore can be treated as part of reality, using the appropriate methods.

The written word is continually repeated and always identical; this is not possible for the true word. Ask the person speaking with you to repeat the explanation he has just given, and it will be different. But you can reread a page. In this sense, making a record or recording a tape is the same thing as writing: the same passage from temporal to spatial is involved. All these processes go from the unrepeatable to the indefinitely repeatable. They all make dialogue impossible. The word is no longer itself, but has become another world.

The written word is intermediary, which is why the world of writing or recording is so uncertain and ambiguous. However, as we have already said, language retains even in this form some of its fundamental characteristics. It is successive; although inscribed in space, it obliges the reader or listener to accept the law of time because of its successiveness. The sentence is still constructed in the same manner. I must follow it, with my eyes now, from beginning to end, and I grasp its meaning only through this flow of time. The linear aspect of language remains basic. Also, this fixed word is still related to truth, and only to truth. Being written down has not changed its aim, meaning, or intention. It is just diluted, weaker, and no longer backed up by a person’s whole being. No longer does it have a name, even if it does still have meaning. This word can be scoffed at in a way that would be impossible if it had just been spoken.

At this point we can profitably recall Pier Paolo Pasolini’s famous comparison of the oral and written on the one hand and reality and the image on the other. It brings into focus the double transformation characteristic of our era, when technique makes everything into an object. I cannot convey the image I see. When I place it on film, it can be transmitted so that henceforth anyone can see it. But the other person sees an image rather than the reality I had seen in a resplendent moment. There is a difference: the fixed image is not real. The reality grasped by the other person, who has not seen or known the reality I saw, is the film itself, the screen, and the colors and forms of the impression. He does not see the landscape and the face which were transformed into shapes and colors before becoming a landscape and a face. An abstraction takes place through fixation and objectification. I can recompose these abstract spots so that they become a face, but this is not the reality that is noticed at first.

The word is not itself either. Once it is written, it no longer has the sting of truth it had when said by another person -- even when the simplest things were said. No one is involved any longer. The truth is reduced to visual signs, which mean nothing in themselves; and many of the discussions concerning signifier, signified, and sign are based on the written word! The signs have become completely conventional; doesn’t the same thing happen to truth? Truth has become both abstract and objective. It no longer commits anyone to anything. Witnesses do not give their lives for written pages, but rather for words conveyed by people.

The word when written becomes a means of abstract, solemn discussion. A University based on writing is not the same thing as an Academy’s halls. Writing changes hearing into sight, and transforms the understanding of a person, with his words’ halo of mystery and echoes, into the understanding of a text. This approach involves grammatical and logical analysis, decomposition of structures, and understanding of truth through the dull seriousness of exact methods. Deciphering words and phrases leads us to reconstruct a message that has lost its life and immediacy. It becomes the result of a process, of a coming and going from the text to my knowledge and from my knowledge to the text, with an increasingly precise method.

We must not forget that writing also affects language. Images and our practice of reading and writing cause us to conceive of discourse as linear, with only one meaning, and consecutive. Writing is of necessity linear and consecutive, even when we try to sever its univocal quality through a sort of written polyphony. Efforts of this nature, such as Henri Pichette’s Epiphanies(Henri Pichette, Les Epiphanies[mystere profane] (Paris: Gallimard, 1969) or Raymond Queneau’s poems, are just stylistic exercises that cannot outweigh the unrelenting mass of texts that engulf us.

Language is thus reduced by being written down. It ceases being multicentered and flowing, evocative and mythological. In this sense, and therefore quite indirectly, McLuhan is right when he speaks of a return to a world of myth through television -- but not for the reasons he gives. Television, to the degree that it eliminates part of writing, causes writing to lose its rigor, or the implacable quality it gives to the development of thought. All this is lost when the written word is replaced by speech. Spoken language is then able to have multiple meanings again. These include the play on variations of a theme and the myriad directions in which the human spirit can move when listening. But this can happen only if the deluge of televised images has not done away with language altogether. In that case television will not produce any flowering; instead, the result will be the dismal disintegration of the very possibility of thought.

We all know that writing strips language of its certainty and even of its meaning, which then can be restored only after a certain thought process. We show that we sense this when we feel the need to go in the opposite direction and switch from the text to speech. This happens often, especially when we are dealing with the most creative, evocative, and truth-filled texts, such as poetry or religious writings. It is impossible simply to read them. Poetry needs to be spoken. We all know that it acquires impact and meaning only when recited. Then it becomes a living text because it is no longer a text; the speaker takes it up and can read it only to the precise degree that he makes it his own. He must become in turn the creator of language, with the help of the text he has been given.

The same process applies to religious writing. It is filled with life only when it serves as a support and stating point for a word that is spoken, announced, or proclaimed. In this way the word becomes current and living, having left the book’s pages and flown toward the listener. What a tremendous error people commit when they consider the verba volent to be critical and the scripta manent to be something positive. Precisely because written words subsist, and persist, they are nothing but an anonymous trace. Because they fly, spoken words are living and filled with meaning. The expressions above form a useful formula for a judge who needs proof of something that is past and surpassed -- a finished and closed matter. But they are a fatal formula for something living.

The written word is just a mummy whose wrappings must be removed someday -- not to discover a few bones, but to breathe life into it again. Only the word conveys the truth of a religious message. What the written word needs is not to be considered the source of a mere code, law, or formula, or of an indefinitely repeated prayer. It must be taken at its source and given rebirth, not by repetition, but by an inspiration that reopens it. Written language has closed the mind. Like a fist grasping a diamond, it has closed its grammatical and structural trap over a vanishing whisper that it tries to translate through enclosing and containment. But instead, writing snuffs it out, and we must open the straitjacket of writing so that it becomes a freshly spoken word. That way the whisper can be perceived and received again. Then the word can start the listener off anew in his quest for truth

Introduction: Back to Basics

Do not look here for some scholarly study on iconic expression or syntagmatics or metalanguage. I am not pretending to push forward scientific frontiers. Rather, I try to do here the same thing I do in all my books: face, alone, this world I live in, try to understand it, and confront it with another reality I live in, but which is utterly unverifiable. Taking my place at the level of the simplest of daily experiences, I make my way without critical weapons. Not as a scientist, but as an ordinary person, without scientific pretensions, talking about what we all experience, I feel, listen, and look.

Images today are the daily nutrient of our sensory experience, our thought processes, our feelings, and our ideology. When we say ‘’image," the word immediately breaks up into its different meanings: verbal images (why shouldn’t they be considered images as well as the ones I see?); mental images, which can exist only when I am using language to think; and images that feed the imagination or are produced by it, and are therefore inseparable from it.

In this book I will retain the oversimplified distinction between seeing and hearing, between showing and speaking. I am well aware that organized images also constitute a language, and that this distinction is not restricted to speech. Despite all modern advances, however, in this book I will reserve the use of "language" for speech, ignoring the language of gestures, mime, and film. A biased approach? Certainly! At the same time, my desire is to reestablish a measure of clarity in an area filled with confusion, complexity, and misunderstandings.

There is also cinematic language -- I’m well aware! But too often people forget that this sequence of images is not the same thing as the organization of sentences. Defining language by talking about codes, signifiers, the syntagma, semiotics, and semiology does not solve the problem. Always we must come back to simple facts, common sense, and commonplaces as our starting point. Because, whether we know it or not, and whether we like it or not, "everybody grinds his grain and bakes his bread according to everyday truths and constraints."

"But," you say, "why connect hearing and speaking? I hear lots of things besides speech: music, noise, and the crucial noise that interferes with communication. Noise sometimes gives birth to order, and is sometimes silenced for the sake of meaning. Music can be an image or suggest images to us, just as, on the other hand, the word can be written, and writing is something visual: you can read words. No necessary and exclusive relationship exists between hearing and speaking, or between seeing and image." I’m well aware of what you say, and still I stick with my misleading simplification. I continue to relate hearing and speaking, and oppose them to seeing and image, not in an exclusive sense, but fundamentally. I’m aware that fringes exist, that there is no unmistakable cleavage, and that the visual interpenetrates the auditory. But even admitting all this, we must come back to two dissimilar domains: what I hear constitutes a special universe, different from that other universe composed of what I see.

Far from being a superficial proposal, this distinction corresponds to everyone’s experience, in spite of excessive challenges based on scientific foundations. These scientific studies are undoubtedly useful for the purposes of the research scientist, but my aim is different. And the conclusions we come to will compensate for the oversimplification inherent in this fundamental experience.

I refuse, then, to transform the Word into an image or a sequence of images. I refuse to transform Images into a word, or to consider their sequence a language. I do this even though I understand the relationships between word and image, and the scientific reasons for considering them to be identical. But in reality, we are not suggesting an absolute discontinuity between seeing and hearing. I have spoken of two universes based on the distinction between them, but most of the time, at least, they are not separate universes.

In our common experience seeing and hearing are related, and the proper equilibrium between the two produces the equilibrium of the person, so it is dangerous to favor one, in triumphant fashion, to the detriment of the other. Yet this is exactly what is happening today, as we witness the unconditional victory of the visual and images. Furthermore, the above-mentioned ideas concerning (visual) images as constituting a language, the (printed) word as being reduced to visual images, and the word as evoking only images, are hardly innocent and objectively scientific. These assertions are really simply an indication of the triumphant march of the Visual and (visual) Images in our society and thought.

We should not, however, sever the relationship between seeing and hearing. Each person is made up of the confrontation of what he sees and hears, of what he shows and speaks. These are two different senses, each the door to different universes that perpetually encounter and confront each other. These two universes meet at every level of existence.

Nevertheless, I refuse to follow Oswald Spengler, who considers sight to be the decisive sense. He believes that our two eyes in the forefront of the face, with focused binocular vision, constitute human specificity in relation to the animal world, which has one eye on each side of the face. This arrangement produces two separate views of the world, one right and one left. Spengler considers this disposition of the eyes to be the origin of humanity’s conquering power and its upright position, which places the eyes at the top of our bodies.

In a more basic way I side with the entire current of thought that makes spoken language the basis of human specificity, and here again I relate language and word. I accept, of course, that ants have a tactile "language," and that bees have a visual "language," that is to say, a method of designation, communication, and transmission of information. Their "language," is both codified and learned. But however subtle it may be, it has nothing in common with spoken human language. The only way to identify these methods of communication as languages is by presupposing that language can be reduced to factual information. Speech, however, is not essentially transmission of information. It is much more than that. The word has another domain, another sphere of action. The spoken relationship involves receiving messages other than information; it involves emotions that transcend reflexes.

I am not saying that human spoken language is more complex, perfected, or evolved than bees’ language. I say it is not comparable, because its nature is different. In order to compare them, you would have to begin by eliminating from human language everything that goes beyond visual information, everything that is inaccessible to the code. The result would be not just an amputation, which is the traditional reductionist method of all the sciences, but a surgical excision of language’s very heart.

Human spoken language is characterized precisely by these elements we have mentioned: overflowing of limits, going beyond, and destructuring what can be conveyed in tactile or visual language. Its essential aspects are breadth of meaning, ambiguity, and variation in interpretation. A sign in human language does not correspond to a thing. A word calls up echoes, feelings intertwined with thoughts, reasons mingled with irrationality, motives that lead nowhere, and uncoordinated urges. This specificity is what matters, it seems to me, rather than the common denominator. Taking all that can communicate information and calling that human language seems to me biased (in that same way the social sciences, especially, have made us too accustomed to bias!).

"Difference is what matters." Surely we have heard this formula often enough in linguistics and other disciplines. Well then, let’s apply it! Let’s concentrate most of all on the differentiating factors that distinguish human language: the play between the signifier and the signified. "Play" in this sense can be understood in all three of its meanings! It concerns the changeableness and flexibility of the word in its relationship with meaning.

For me, then, human spoken language cannot be reduced to any coherent collection of signs made understandable through use of a code. The logical sequence of visual images and the coherence of spoken language are the starting point of this study. I realize there are other alternatives. But I consider them to be choices (involving presuppositions also) related to other concerns and other methods of research that are not the same as mine. I do not despise or evade them; they are simply different, and belong to a different area of truth.

Preface

For years, Jacques Ellul has warned repeatedly that our modern addiction to images is a kind of terrorist time bomb ominously ticking away in the comfortable hotel of free democratic society. The Humiliation of the Word powerfully and convincingly demonstrates the wholesale abuse of language and this dangerous addiction to images characteristic of modern society. Public officials are "electable" in the United States today only if they project an attractive television image. Reaction to presidential "debates," for example, depends almost entirely on image, not substance, truth, or coherent rational argument.

Similarly, the Church indulges our desire to "feel good" instead of responding to our need to be spiritually challenged and fed through solid exposition of the Scriptures. The electronic Church in particular panders to our appetite for entertainment rather than authentic discipleship and maturity.

Ellul’s response to such incoherent flabbiness is spelled out in this book, and can be summed up in his words: "Anyone wishing to save humanity today must first of all save the word." Like most of Ellul’s themes, his view of the problems of language and image stems from ideas already present in his seminal The Presence of the Kingdom (1948). One of the key problems for modern thinking Christians at that time, in Ellul’s view, was the problem of communication, to which he devoted one of the book’s chapters. There he confronts his reader with the technically determined, choice of facts made available through the mass media, the distortion of language by the media (with which dialogue is impossible), and their tendency to distract and entertain rather than to stimulate reflection. Propaganda has replaced the commonly held ideas made communication between persons possible. Films’ destructive power relates in part to language.

Ellul’s proposed solution to the complex of problems presented in The Presence of the Kingdom is the discovery of a new language. This is the only way understanding can begin to flow again, so that we can communicate the gospel in such a way that it "penetrates."

Except for certain changes of emphasis and the addition of technical and sociological developments since 1948, The Humiliation of the Word can be viewed as the development of Ellul’s early concerns about language in The Presence of the Kingdom. He cannot be accused of having "mellowed with age," however. This volume’s sharp attacks on audiovisual methods, television, souvenir photography, structuralism, and modern art will strike some readers as overdone. But those familiar with the author’s previous works will recognize in his polemic an effort to arouse our image-lulled consciousness and move us to do battle.

In the interim since The Presence of the Kingdom, Ellul has, of course, written often about language before finally dedicating an entire book to the theme. The select subject index in my Jacques Ellul: A Comprehensive Bibliography (Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1984) lists major references to speech or the word in nine of Ellul’s forty books (others could have been added), as well as in ten of his six-hundred-odd articles.

In Prayer and Modern Man (1970), for example, Ellul examines the difficulties we experience in prayer stemming from our present "tragic crisis of language, in which words can no longer attain the level of speech." The failure of language produces a lack of personal relationships and a feeling that words are not only inadequate (Rom. 8:26) but pointless.

In Hope in Time of Abandonment (1972), Ellul devotes a section to the "Death of the Word," in which he examines briefly the phenomenon he calls "the disintegration of language." Propaganda, the meaningless multiplication of words, the disassociation of the word from the person speaking it, and society’s increasing dependence on images -- all contribute to the picture Ellul draws of a world with no solution and no future. These same aspects of the problem of language in our day become major sections of The Humiliation of the Word.

Before writing his books on prayer and hope, Ellul had already published Propaganda (1962), which the present volume complements and updates in several respects. Propaganda was the first of Ellul’s books to isolate one element of The Technological Society (19S4) for in-depth study. Later he devoted several volumes to the impact of Technique on different aspects of modern society. The Humiliation of the Word marks his latest contribution to this series.

In the theological sphere, Ellul deals with the relationship of language and faith in his Living Faith (1980), where he emphasizes the need for confidence in the words of those who witness to salvation history if we are to believe. He also mentions the confidence in Jesus which enables us to believe his words, and the danger of separating the words from the person of Jesus. These themes undergird the fundamental argument of the present volume.

Just a year before The Humiliation of the Word Ellul published his work on art and Technique, L’Empire du non-sens (1981). This art book refers with extraordinary frequency to language, and the present book on language often calls on art to illustrate a point. In fact, the two works overlap considerably, especially in the chapter entitled "Message and Compensation" in L’Empire du non-sens. Ellul’s difficult book on art is best read in conjunction with the present volume, since they often deal with common problems of communication and meaning.

Ellul also previously expressed some of the basic arguments of The Humiliation of the Word in "Notes innocentes sur la ‘question herméneutique"’ (published in L’Evangile hier et anjourd’hui: Mélanges offerts au Professeur Franz J. Leenhardt [Geneva: Labor et Fides,1968]). But now at last he has considered the question of the modern crisis in language at length, and we can follow his thinking in ordered steps rather than in scattered, specialized bits.

Besides the spirited attacks already mentioned, in this book Ellul also criticizes icons and images as idols, along with computers, comic strips, slogans, technical efficiency, the death-of-God theology, and political and liturgical spectacle. Although Ellul himself responds in his last chapter to the potential criticism of this book as sheer negativism, the fundamental positive thrust here should not be overlooked. He has not written an essentially negative book, criticizing the preponderance of images. His basic aim is not to denigrate images but to liberate language as the fundamental weapon in the struggle for human freedom. Only as it relates to language does he deal with the problem of images. Ellul deals positively with language: its essence, its value, and its relationship to freedom. In this sense The Humiliation of the Word is a continuation of the author’s The Ethics of Freedom (1973-1984).

Many of Ellul’s books can be viewed primarily as efforts to attack or even demolish something. But The Humiliation of the Word belongs with Ellul’s more constructive books, most of which are theological. Like many of his more positive studies, the present book devotes a heavy proportion of its space to exploring oppressive factors and forces in the area under investigation, but its main thrust is not negative.

We have heedlessly capitulated to the allure of images, and thus language has been dethroned from its proper preeminence in human affairs. Our preference for images has corrupted and distorted language, which has become sound without sense. In a similar manner, Ellul has shown earlier that we have preferred the wrong sort of revolution (Autopsy of Revolution, Changer de révolution), given ourselves to the wrong sort of prayer (Prayer and Modern Man), allowed the idolatrous city to dominate our affections (The Meaning of the City), and substituted facile belief for vital faith (Living Faith).

In most of these situations something good and necessary has been either corrupted or blown up out of proportion, so that it dominates what it should be subject to. Such lack of proportion involves the dialectic between reality and truth, in the case of images and language. Our attention has focused on the tangible to such an extent that we no longer consider truth to carry any serious weight.

Reality deals with fixed things not open to discussion, things which one can only observe. It forces us to conform. Truth, like the word, is infinitely open-ended and invites reflection, response, relationship, and dialogue. Reality refuses to allow us the distance necessary so that we can be critical of what we are considering. In modern society we tend to accept truth only if it bears on reality -- specifically scientific reality -- which has become our ultimate truth."

In the same vein, we tend to believe words only if they have some visual evidence supporting them. Whatever cannot be expressed through images seems to us to have no genuine importance, or even existence.

Another reason for maintaining that The Humiliation of the Word is not primarily a negative book is Ellul’s repeated effort at synthesis. The dichotomy between word and image and between truth and reality is a temporary effect of the Fall, and contrary to God’s ultimate purpose for humankind. In the Incarnation and the consummation of God’s Kingdom, word and image are reconciled.

In what sense is language "humiliated," according to Ellul? His title alludes to a book written during 1939 and 1940 by the novelist and polemicist Georges Bernanos, but not published until 1949: Les Enfants humiliés (Paris: Gallimard). Bernanos deplores the fact that promises made to those involved in World War I were broken, leading to a second conflagration. In Ellul’s book the problem is not broken promises but rather a broken humanity. He does not attack images in themselves so much as the imperialism of images and our idolatrous prostration before them.

For several years Ellul led public discussions of significant films in his native Bordeaux. Such activity makes it clear that he is not flatly opposed to proper use of images. But images tend to neutralize the effects of the word, which becomes a sort of optional "footnote" to the dominant images. In this sense the word is continually humiliated in our society.

Never have I seen such a strange tragedy as Jean Racine’s Phèdre(1677), performed by a French troupe in 1975 for an American audience. I was astounded at how the words seemed to have lost all value and meaning. The actions dominated utterly, usually having no relationship whatever with the words, which were mouthed quickly, without expression. I was stunned. The play’s meaning was utterly distorted, not to say lost. A professor friend’s response to my distress was: "This is the only way Racine can be presented in our day."

In the book you are holding, Jacques Ellul has enabled me to understand the enigma of Phèdre divorced from its text. In the process, Ellul clarifies many other puzzling tendencies in modern society. Until I read The Humiliation of the Word, for instance, I could not understand why my students in French literature classes had so much to say and ask about the texts they read but never had any verbal response whatever when I showed them a film.

Language is further humiliated by intellectuals, especially certain structuralists, whose attacks on language that communicates meaning and whose preference for the "pure" language of the insane appear to have triggered the writing of this book.

Most of us now think essentially by association of images, Ellul believes, and can no longer construct or follow a rigorous logical demonstration, unless this is supported by charts and diagrams. As schools increase their reliance on images, educational levels decrease, indicating that images are not the panacea we presume them to be.

In theological terms, God’s choice of language as the basis of his contact with humanity signifies that we are free to respond -- or to ignore him if we choose. Reliance on images eliminates the freedom that is essential to us if we are to respond to God.

Some of Ellul’s sociological books include brief but clear statements of his Christian hope (Changer de révolution) or veiled references to the Christian faith as the only conceivable way out of the tunnel his books describe (Autopsy of Revolution, The New Demons). But The Humiliation of the Word is the first book in which Ellul has intertwined major theological sections with his sociological analysis.

It is impossible to say whether this book is predominantly theological or sociological. In Ellul’s latest list of books (at the end of La Subversion du christianisme), The Humiliation of the Word appears in the sociological category, presumably at Ellul’s request. But the work is filled with theological reflection and exegesis of biblical texts (Ex. 32, Isa. 6, John’s Gospel, etc.). In a thematic study, Ellul tries to show that there are no genuine theophanies in the Bible. According to the author, the modern world’s preference for images stems from the fourteenth century, when the Church chose to favor them in preference to the word.

The combination of sociological and theological reflections in this book enables each discipline to hammer away at and refine the other. Thus rejection of words in favor of action on the sociological plane is related to the Hebrew concept (dabar), which combines words and action.

Ellul returns repeatedly to the theme of language as our human distinctive. If we use it thoughtlessly or devaluate it in any way, we also devaluate God, who chose it for his communication with us, and ourselves. We become less human when we opt for images rather than the word. The theological implications of Ellul’s sociological arguments are manifold. Clearly, the Church must not lean toward visual methods or attractions. Over-reliance on lavish liturgy or spectacle (common both to liturgical churches and modern evangelistic campaigns) constitutes a radical distortion of the Christian message.

Ellul could have chosen to write a sociological treatise on language and paired it with a later theological work, as he has previously done (The Meaning of the City explores the theological implications of The Technological Society; The Politics of God and the Politics of Man is the biblical and theological counterpart of The Political Illusion). But in The Humiliation of the Word the author has preferred to integrate sociology and theology into a single whole, for reasons he has not yet explained in print.

I believe it is because of the confrontation of the two disciplines in this work that Costa Rican graduate students have responded to it more thoughtfully than to some of Ellul’s other books. Seeing the sociological realities that motivate the author’s theology helps us grasp his emphases. And understanding how theology can respond to sociological problems enables us to view the future with hope, as Ellul does. As always, however, in Ellul’s thought, this hope is coupled with realism and a spur to thoughtful action.

For twenty years I have worked in the Third World, where the problems Ellul presents in this book have even graver consequences than in North America. Here we are daily bombarded with foreign images that crowd out local, "inferior," images and trample on local culture. Even worse, what you merely see on your television screen is reality here. You can cheer or be indifferent when you see the bullet hit its target, but for us the pain and death are not "pretend." If Christian churches are ever to become a prophetic voice they must give serious attention to the fundamental issues Ellul raises in this book as well as in his previous works on propaganda in technological societies. We realize that "the eyes of the world are upon us," but is anybody really listening?

Joyce Main Hanks

University of Costa Rica

Note: Except where otherwise indicated, the Revised Standard Version is the basis for biblical quotations when accompanied by a concrete reference to book, chapter, and verse. The major exceptions to this are indicated by the letters "JE," which signify my own translation of Ellul’s biblical quotation. He uses various French Bibles and sometimes his own translations and paraphrases. I have made no attempt to distinguish his source.

Publication dates above refer to the first edition of Ellul’s books, usually in French.

Chapter 13: Prayer and Sacrament

The most characteristic religious activity is prayer. If we discover what a man’s prayer is, we know the most important part of his religion. Prayer is religion in operation. In prayer religion is not theory but act. Therefore if we are concerned with outlining an intelligible religion, it is important to understand what prayer is.

Generally speaking, prayer is the process of communication between man and God. More usually it refers only to the communication from man to God. The reverse process, from God to man, is called by such names as inspiration, revelation, or divine guidance. But it is clear that the two processes ought to be considered together. There are many different kinds of prayer. In terms of content, a distinction is often made between prayers of confession, thanksgiving, petition, intercession, and adoration. Prayers may be either informal or liturgical, silent or spoken, corporate or individual. Each type merits its own special analysis and presents its own peculiar problems, yet all these kinds of prayers still possess the generic character of communication of man with God. Our basic task in understanding prayer is therefore to analyze what such communication means.

This brings us back to the problem of the nature of God, which was discussed in Chapter VIII. Communication means the transfer of information from one being to another. The nature of the process depends upon the nature of the beings who communicate and the means of transmission employed. Prayer may therefore be understood only in the light of the nature of God and of the relation of the Deity to man. Now it has been the constant theme of this book that the intelligible basis for dealing with all such problems is to make explicit the fundamental experiences out of which the religious ideas arise. We are invited thus to ask: What does prayer mean in the light of the "fundamentals" of religion described in Part Two ?

We have seen that the meaning of the word "God" can be designated by reference to certain aspects of universal experience. We said that it is appropriate, for example, to use the word in connection with the "shock" of the new or with the recognition of limitless ideal possibilities in every situation. If we have included all of the aspects of experience in which the use of the word "God" is appropriate, we have automatically included those which define prayer, since prayer is one important God-experience. That is to say, the meaning of God and the meaning of prayer are comprehended in the same analysis.

Let us consider, for example, the prayer of confession. A man pours out his admission of guilt, perhaps in a room by himself, where no person can hear him. He speaks as to an unseen Person and believes that he is heard. It makes no difference whether the words are spoken or silent. It does not even matter if the prayer is formulated in words at all. The deeply felt attitude of contrition and repentance is enough. What actually happens in such an act of prayer? In what sense is there any communication involved ? The traditional answer would be that there actually is present a spiritual Being in the room with the pray-er (as well as everywhere else) and that this Being "hears" the words, thoughts, and deepest feelings of the confessor. The trouble with such an answer is that it would be impossible for the believer to convince the skeptic of the existence of any such Being, any more than he could persuade the unbeliever of the existence of a ghost in the house. The simple assertion of the existence of such a Presence is therefore not satisfactory for an intelligible religious view. The problem is solved if an entirely different approach is used --namely, to show that one aspect of the definition of "God" and the understanding of the prayer of confession are simultaneously given in the analysis of the experience of imperfection. It is obvious that confession by itself does not imply prayer. One can admit guilt in a thousand ways without engaging in prayer. Confession becomes prayer when it is made with a consciousness of the limitlessness of the possibilities of goodness against which every human achievement must appear as a relative failure. Confession is prayer when guilt is seen in the light of the consciousness of imperfection. But we have shown that this experience is one of the ways in which God is defined. Therefore the experience of imperfection contains within itself both an aspect of the definition of God and the basis for interpreting the prayer of confession. If "God" is the name applied to that dimension of existence in which its boundless perfectibility is seen, the prayer of confession is man’s response to this recognition, in the face of his own actual performance.

Such a mode of analysis avoids the skeptic’s perplexities. There is no need to cast about for ways in which to exhibit some unseen Presence. For the act of heartfelt repentance in the light of limitless perfectibility is itself the experience in which both the unseen Presence and the process of communicating with that Presence are defined. The trouble with the traditional picture is that it encourages the idea of God on the one hand as a kind of pervasive substance and on the other as a particular Being with whom transfer of thought takes place as with other human beings. Such ideas are crude and confusing pictorial representations which do justice neither to the fundamental religious experiences nor to the realities of the life of prayer.

One of the best ways of clarifying what we mean here is to deal with the question about the objectivity of prayer. It is usually maintained that there are only two possibilities: Either God is an objective Being separate from us, to whom we pray, or else prayer is "purely subjective"-- a talking to oneself. This antithesis -- on the surface so obvious -- in point of fact cannot be defended. It is quite analogous -- for the same reasons -- to the familiar antithesis of the individual and society. Some maintain that society is the sum total of the individuals who constitute it. Others reply that the individual is the product of society. The first makes the individual basic and society derivative, while the second reverses the order of precedence. Actually individual and society are both abstractions from the concrete reality of "community" or persons-in-relationship. There is no such thing as a person apart from his relationships, and there can be no human relationships without persons. So it is with prayer. It is neither a purely objective nor a purely subjective process. Prayer is objective in the sense that it involves the participation of the pray-er in the manifold inter-relations which the world in which he lives imposes. For instance, in the prayer of confession the confessor is directly confronted with the objective and unalterable fact of actual existence and the heights of possibility which it contains. The awareness of imperfection is nothing which he generates, as it were, by an act of will, but is borne in upon him as one of the given structures of his experience of life in the world as it is and as it might be. (The relevance for the prayer of confession of the awareness of dependence upon the given structures of existence, as well as of the awareness of imperfection, is evident from these comments). On the other hand, prayer is also subjective in that it is in the act of prayer that the person most fully becomes a subject or a self. Just as it is only in relationship to other persons that one’s selfhood can be achieved, so it is true that full selfhood requires ever wider and deeper relationships -- for example to the possibilities of what might be, and not only to persons who now are. To return to prayer of confession, the act of recognizing guilt in the light of limitless possibilities is a person-creating act. One becomes a self in a deeper sense through such an act. In this sense prayer is the matrix out of which selfhood grows. This brief discussion should make it clear that prayer is neither purely objective nor purely subjective. It is a process in which the one who prays is constantly related in a profound way to his whole objective world (with both material and mental aspects) and is thereby creatively transformed into a mature person.

This means that in the case of prayer a broader concept of "communication" must be employed than is usually the case. In prayer there is no communication in the ordinary sense between two separate beings -- man and God. Nor is man simply "talking to himself" in prayer, as though a genuine transaction involving the objective world were not taking place. Communication in the usual sense requires the use of objective signs or symbols and a medium through which the transfer of information proceeds. Prayer needs no outward signs and requires no medium. Ordinary communication is a transfer in space and time between creatures with specific space-time locations. Prayer, though it takes place in space and time in creatures who are of space and time, is not a matter of transfer through space in time. Transfer is not involved because the act of prayer takes place solely within human experiences in which the person is confronted immediately (i.e., without mediation) with the reality of his own existence and of his world on the deepest levels of awareness (change, dependence, etc.). There is no need to "project", a prayer to a God who is "out there". Prayer is an inward and intimate act. In all these ways it is not communication in the ordinary sense. It is communication only in the sense that in the act of prayer one does "break through" the bounds of preliminary concern and reach an awareness of the ultimate dimensions of life. This implies the establishment of a new relationship of one’s self with his total world, the creation of a new depth of community, or in fact a form of "communication". This broader sense of the word communication thus really follows from the broader meaning of the word community in not being restricted to the harmonious spatial and temporal interrelation of persons. For example, just as there can be "community" of ideas in a well-integrated philosophy, so communication may be taken (as in the analysis of confessory prayer) to mean the establishment of an appreciation of one’s relatedness to the world as endlessly perfectible.

The analysis of prayer provides the best understanding of what it means to say that God is personal. It is possible to speak meaningfully of communication between animals or between man and animals, but in neither of these cases is there the richness of content as in communication between persons. There is a sense, perhaps, in which even plants or rocks communicate with human beings. But this is not to be compared with what takes place between persons. We commonly describe as "impersonal" those situations in which communication in the full sense does not take place. The difference between personal and impersonal encounters is that the former are relevant to the growth and development of persons on the highest levels of achievement and require the exercise of the distinctively human powers of thought, imagination, and concept formation, while the latter do not. From what we have already said about prayer, it is clear that the prayer-situation is one which is supremely relevant to the fulfillment of the highest human potentiality (e.g., envisaging of ideal possibilities) and which calls for the exercise of the distinctively human capacities (e.g., imagination, reflection, deep feeling). Man’s encounter with his life situation in prayer, as described above, is therefore a supremely personal encounter. It is the personal nature of the prayer response that one makes in the religious dimensions of experience which is the ground for saying that God is personal. As already pointed out in Chapter VIII, to affirm this is not to say that God is a person. In usual speech "a person" is a human being. God is not a human being. Nor is it helpful to regard God as a Being who is personal. The statement "God is personal" is rather a way of speaking of the intensely personal character of the "communication" which takes place in the act of prayer. In fact, nowhere else does the self so truly "come to itself" or "find itself" as in the experiences we have called religious. That is what is meant by the statement "God is personal".

So far we have illustrated our discussion only with the prayer of confession, which was shown to be especially related to the experiences of imperfection and of dependence. Let us now consider briefly some of the other types of prayer. The prayer of thanksgiving is directly involved in the experience of value and of dependence. Thankfulness stems from a vivid sense of the goodness of life combined with an awareness of its given or derived nature. The prayer of thanksgiving is the human response to this combined experience. Does God hear this thankful expression and is he pleased with it? Obviously there is no "hearing" in the ordinary sense, and God’s "pleasure" must be equally metaphorical. "God hears" in the sense that the giving of thanks is not a dead-end process, but is a creative act which "registers" in terms of consequences which confirm or strengthen community. It is this enhancement of community which also constitutes the divine "pleasure".

The case of prayers of petition is more ambiguous. In common thought prayer usually means simply petition -- asking God for things. Of such prayer probably the first thing to say is that it is in large part an unworthy and superstitious practice. It is fundamentally a self-centered act and therefore an enemy of community. Much petitionary prayer is sanctified magic -- an attempt to employ divine powers to serve human purposes. There is no convincing evidence to show that petitionary prayers are "answered", i.e., that imploring the Deity for things that we wish will of itself hasten their coming. For every case of fulfillment (which is long remembered and often spoken of) there are probably dozens of forgotten disappointments.

There is actually nothing religious except in a conventional and formal sense about prayers of petition as just described. However, petitionary prayer may be genuinely religious in character when instead of asking for what he selfishly wants the petitioner earnestly prays for "the will of God" to be done. In such a prayer all the fundamentals of religious experience are involved: passionate yearning (value), awareness of given forms and structures (order), humility in the face of higher possibilities not yet realized (imperfection), faithful recognition of sources of being (dependence), and expectancy of new shapes of things to come (change). In contrast with selfish petition, the religious petitioner is always open to wider possibilities, is tentative in judgment, and is capable of wonder and surprise. Such prayers are indeed answered, in that such receptive attitudes do lead to maximum fulfillment. Religious petition does not need to be general, in the form of seeking "the will of God" or "the kingdom of heaven" or "the truth". Generally it should not be of this form, but should involve requests for specific goods. What makes such prayer religious is the way in which the goods are asked for. The request should be, in effect, a device for seeking community. It is virtually a hypothesis to be tested. It is as though the asker were to say, "Let us see whether the giving of this for which I have a deeply-felt desire may not serve to extend the cause of community." Desire itself, by which (as we have seen) value is indicated, is an invitation to community. The only question is whether the community so established is restrictive of larger community or is conducive to its fuller realization. What makes a desire into a real prayer of petition is the entertainment of that desire chiefly within the consciousness of the tentativeness and inevitable imperfection of the object of desire.

One form of religious petition is the "prayer for guidance". This does not mean that in prayer one has a source of information not available through the normal channels of desire disciplined by intelligence, experience and imaginative insight. It does mean that through religious awareness new material is provided for the direction of conduct by these normal means. Desires are criticized and transmuted by the vision of higher possibilities, wider dependences and inter-relationships are taken into account, expectation of new forms replaces fixation on determined goals. The prayer for guidance is thus the search for direction within the context of the awareness of change, the acknowledgment of the sources of being, the acceptance of the discipline of form, the response to value, and the vision of limitless perfectibility.

Of all the classic forms of prayer, intercession is perhaps the most difficult to interpret affirmatively along the lines of our general analysis. It seems very doubtful, in our present state of knowledge, that much help can be given to others without any direct communication with them, solely by the act of praying for them. Often such intercession is unselfish, and so cannot be criticized as irreligious on that ground. Whatever value there may be in intercession springs from the fact of inter-dependence. It is the pervasive network of inter-relationships spoken of in Chapter IV which is the ground for any efficacy that intercession may have. There is at least a possibility that forms of influence may be exerted by one person on another without any of the modes of mediation now known. Until such possibilities are better understood, intercession literally interpreted will seem to have little meaning. As a symbolic means of enhancing the other forms of prayer through the imaginative consideration of other persons, it will continue to have considerable value.

The prayer of adoration is the highest form of all because in it self-concern is lost in the joyous contemplation of the supremely good. The consciousness of guilt is overshadowed by the freshness and beauty of a new awareness of the boundless goodness constantly poured out into the world. The remembrance of particular past benefits received is lost in the sense of profound gratitude to the source of all being. Requests for particular goods desired become irrelevant in the moment when one feels as though he were drinking from the fountain from which all blessings flow. It is like the lover who adores the beloved and is not concerned with this or that advantage or benefit to be conferred. Adoration is the whole-hearted response to the lure of community. As such it is the fulfillment of all the fundamentals of religious experience.

Of the various forms which prayer assumes -- vocal or silent, public or private, liturgical or free -- little needs to be said here. It should only be observed that some forms there must be. There are particular structures of thought and feeling which constitute prayer as a characteristic mode of activity. There are prayer forms which are appropriate in some situations but not in others. The structure of prayer must be determined in each case in such a way as to maximize the fundamental consciousness of change, dependence, etc., and their implications. Any response within such a basically religious awareness is prayer, whether called by that name or not. Doubtless much that passes for prayer is a routine and meaningless exercise dictated by custom. And much that is not called prayer actually has the reality of prayer, in the way we have described it. On the other hand, the purpose of the classical disciplines of the life of prayer -- such as postures, directing of thoughts, or devotional objects -- is to provide what have proved in actual experience to be the most favorable conditions for real prayer. While these may contain valuable suggestions, it remains as a task for every generation to discover new ways in which to deepen and to enrich the basic experiences which make up the creative life of prayer.

This consideration of the forms of worship leads naturally to the topic of sacred acts and sacred objects. In Christianity the most important of these are the sacraments. Roman Catholics name seven sacraments: baptism, confirmation, the Eucharist, ordination, marriage, penance, and extreme unction. Most Protestants recognize only two: baptism and the Eucharist. The traditional definition of a sacrament is "an outward and visible sign of an inward and spiritual grace". The word "grace" here signifies a gift or an endowment. A sacrament is thus an outward, visible vehicle for the imparting of a spiritual gift.

We can understand the nature of the sacraments by the use of the fundamentals of religious experience. Three of these fundamentals are particularly relevant in this connection. The most important one is order. A sacramental act is a very special and particular kind of act. Not just any act will serve as the stimulator of religious experience. There are only certain forms which will serve as powerful reminders of the divine. For example, in the sacrament of baptism there is apparently a special virtue or power in the symbolic washing of a penitent with water. There is a peculiar quality about water -- perhaps its essential purity and its fundamental place in the economy of all life -- which especially fits it for use as a symbol of the forgiveness of sin. Also for this purpose the act of washing or sprinkling is peculiarly appropriate rather than some other use of the water, such as drinking it. The special form of the sacrament of baptism is therefore especially powerful in representing symbolically the inward sense of the obliteration of guilt. In the sacrament of the Eucharist or the Lord’s Supper there is also a characteristically appropriate form. The inward and spiritual grace to be conferred by it is identification with the risen Christ. For this purpose the appropriate act is the eating of bread and the drinking of wine. The act of eating and drinking implies the closest possible identity -- so that Christ (as represented in the elements) becomes embodied in us in flesh and blood. The wine also stands for enhanced vitality ("spirit") and the bread for the enduring sustenance of life. Furthermore, the form of the sacrament relates the Christian to the historical roots in Judaism in which similar rites in recollection of the deliverance from bondage in Egypt are celebrated. In all these ways the sacramental acts in the Lord’s Supper serve in a unique way to stimulate a sense of the new life in Christ, the conquest of death, and the triumphant fulfillment of the ages-long expectations of God’s people for redemption. The same kind of analysis would apply in the case of other sacraments. For each one it would become apparent that the special form of the symbolic acts and objects has a particular power of generating the type of religious awareness appropriate to it.

The second fundamental which is especially relevant to the understanding of sacrament is the awareness of imperfection. It is of the nature of symbols to point beyond themselves to that which they represent. This means that the symbol is effective when it stimulates a sense of the more perfect, of which it is only a feeble representation. Thus, in baptism there would be no sacrament were the penitent to rest content merely with the purification by water. The act is symbolic because such purification is vividly seen as the very partial reflection of what real purification might be. That is, the limitless possibilities of forgiveness and inner purity are glimpsed in the moment of receiving the partial and imperfect outward purification by water. In a similar way, the Eucharist is sacramental only because the worshipper does not rest content with the mere eating of bread and the drinking of wine. He experiences the vivid awareness of the fragmentary and partial character of the life which these elements impart and in that awareness becomes conscious of the endless possibilities for the fulfillment of life which lie beyond every actual achievement. Thus the awareness of imperfection is also a necessary aspect of the sacramental act. It is this which makes the particular form expressive of a religious dimension rather than merely of its own intrinsic value.

Sacraments also well illustrate a third of the fundamentals -- the consciousness of dependence. The sacrament is the outward sign of an inward grace. Without the recognition of a gift there is no sacrament. The sacramental act is not a way of doing something, but a means by which something is done in the worshipper. In baptism the penitent does not wash himself but is washed outwardly and receives the gift of forgiveness. In the Eucharist the worshipper does not unite himself with Christ, but he receives the gifts of bread and wine by which he expects inner nourishment from the sources of spiritual life upon which he depends.

In Protestant Christianity, although there are generally only two recognized sacraments, "the Word of God" as recorded in the Bible is often regarded as having a sacred character and the reading of the Bible as in effect a sacramental act. The Bible is called a Holy Book and it is usually accorded special veneration. The biblical Word has a sacred character when it succeeds in evoking religious awareness with unique power and clarity. The sacredness of the Bible rests upon the demonstration, through generation after generation within the religious community, that it is able to do this. This is the basis for the uniqueness claimed for the Bible, as pointed out in the previous chapter. Through its visible pages the believer claims he receives the gift of the Holy Spirit opening his inward eyes to the hitherto hidden truth about himself and the perplexing and wonderful world in which he lives. It is this essentially sacramental character of the Scriptures -- the special forms of the words and sentences which give them unique power to point beyond themselves to the sources of being from which untold possibilities spring -- that explains what is meant by the statement that for the believer the Bible is the Word of God.

The essential character of sacrament will be misunderstood unless two points are constantly kept in mind: First, the sacredness of the objects or acts does not lie in themselves. If it did, they would no longer be symbols, the essential nature of which is to point beyond themselves. Sacraments are not fetishes. They are not of themselves filled with sacred power. There is always a danger that sacraments will come to be regarded in this mistaken way. The Roman Catholic view of the sacraments (e.g., the doctrine of transubstantiation, that the consecrated elements in the Eucharist are actually the body and blood of Christ) tends especially to degenerate in this way. The common view of the magical efficacy of baptism is the outstanding example of a degraded view of the sacrament. The other point to be clear about is that sacraments are not merely arbitrary rites agreed upon by social convention, but possessing no inherent symbolic power. This is the opposite error to the magical view just mentioned. It is characteristic of the liberal and rationalistic wing of the Church. Against this view, the special power of sacramental symbols must be affirmed. There is a peculiar fitness of certain forms for the production of religious awareness. These forms may not arbitrarily be created or destroyed. They can only be discovered in the long course of religious development, and while their special power can in some measure be understood it must primarily be accepted as a given fact in the nature of things.

This discussion leads to some concluding remarks about the relation of religious symbols to universal religion. The existence of special religious symbols -- sacraments, rites, holy books, sacred institutions -- is the basic argument by which the particular historic faiths support their universal claim. They argue that, given the nature of things, there are only certain pathways to God and that the forms approved by their special group are the appropriate symbols for representing him and for providing the "means of grace" by which the divine life is mediated to man. In apparent opposition, we have claimed throughout this book that religious awareness is possible in every human experience -- that the fundamentals described in Part Two are universal and central, in the sense that there is no experience to which they are not relevant. There is no necessary opposition between this view and the recognition of the function of religious symbols. It is true that while the fundamentals of religious experience are relevant in every possible situation the nature of things is such that particular kinds of situations may be more conducive than others to the awakening of these fundamental awarenesses. These situations are religiously symbolic. They are the justification for all the special forms, practices, and institutions of organized religion.

Nevertheless, there is a variety of such special forms; no single symbol or set of symbols will suffice to express the ultimate in religious meaning, and any and all of them should serve only to stimulate an awareness of the religious dimension in all experience. The symbols too easily become ends in themselves. As such they are crystallized in the dogmatic finality of an Absolute Church. They are properly only means to an end -- the recognition of the whole world as a "sacramental universe". Particular symbols serve their true purpose only when they lead out beyond themselves, not to the momentary vision of the divine, but to the habitual realization of the religious dimension in every human experience.

Chapter 12: Church, Bible, Prophecy, and Miracle

In the last chapter the major features of the characteristic message of Christianity were described. In this and the next chapter certain related matters, also largely within the context of the Christian tradition, will be considered.

First, there is the question of the Church. Superficially regarded, the Church is merely one of the many social institutions existing within civilization. It represents the association of persons with common religious or social interests and participation in various customary practices characteristic of their particular group. The real problem is: What underlies these organizations and what determines the particular form of their practices ?

One of the essential elements in the historical development of the Christian Church was the Jewish idea of the "Chosen People". The Hebrews, taught by their religious leaders, regarded themselves as in some sense God’s special people. They considered that he had chosen them as the only recipients and custodians of the one final divine law. Sometimes they regarded themselves as selected for special divine favor, through the guarantee of victory over enemies, or social stability or economic prosperity. Sometimes their special position was seen to entail not only privilege but responsibility. In some of the prophets, notably the Second Isaiah, this responsibility was interpreted in terms of a religious mission to all peoples of the earth.

The idea of a Chosen People has usually seemed repugnant to the liberal spirit, particularly in a democratic society where the ideal of equality runs strong. There is nevertheless a deep truth in it which can scarcely be denied. In the case of the Hebrews it is simply a matter of historical record that this people, in some respects alone amongst all of the peoples of the ancient world, possessed religious insights which were destined to endure and to become formative principles of the mighty stream of western civilization. The moral and spiritual contributions of the Assyrians, Babylonians, Persians, Canaanites, or even Egyptians -- at their height so preponderant in power and influence as compared with little Israel -- have been negligible in the long run. In comparison with these other contemporary powers, in the sphere of moral and religious insight, the Hebrews were a special people. All history argues that nations, like individual persons, are in important respects not created equal.

The consciousness of being chosen by God is fundamentally a powerful experience of value. It comes as a result of "being laid hold on" by a dominating ideal whose far-reaching and enduring quality is vividly recognized. All great ideas have this characteristic. They are great precisely because they are immensely persuasive, because they are seen to be applicable to very wide and varying circumstances and peoples, and because they suggest further possibilities lying beyond the more immediately apparent ones (experience of imperfection).

Being chosen also involves a deep consciousness of dependence. The values to which one is dedicated are regarded not as human creations, but as gifts. The Jews never thought of the laws of their society as created by that society or by its leaders for purposes of order and convenience. Moral principles were never regarded by them merely as satisfying rules of behavior. They believed the Law was given to them, and they dramatized this conviction through the biblical narrative about Moses receiving the tablets from the very hand of God on Mount Sinai.

It is for scientific inquiry to answer the question: Why were the Jews the Chosen People ? It is a fact that in the religious sense they were unique, just as in an intellectual sense the Greeks were a Chosen People. The reasons for these facts are many and complex, but in principle there is no barrier to discovering them. Psychological, sociological, anthropological, geographical, and other factors combined in such a way as to generate these remarkable peoples. Certain peoples -- like certain individuals -- are so constituted as to possess in extraordinary degree special gifts for cultural creativity. In like manner, on the simpler level, certain animals or plants are so formed as to exhibit remarkable and unique properties. Just so, on the inorganic level, every element in the periodic scale has its special characteristics, and some, like the radioactive substances, have qualities of far-reaching significance in certain respects. All of these unusual and noteworthy powers are in principle explicable in terms of internal structure, antecedents, and character of inter-actions with other entities.

It follows that there is nothing inherently either unnatural or illiberal about the idea of the Chosen People. Rightly understood, it is the expression in social terms, first, of the fundamental plurality of existence, and second, of the awareness of dominant values, and third, of the sense of dependence which such awareness inspires. This idea becomes destructive when it degenerates into an exclusivistic dogma where the emphasis is not upon one’s own being chosen but upon others’ not being chosen. At this point the idea loses its religious character (in the sense of Part Two). For there is no longer a true experience of dependence, since the special privilege is regarded not as a gift but as an inalienable and exclusive right and possession. The value-experience that underlay the sense of being chosen is itself diminished, as every value which is not shared must be. But most important of all, with an exclusivist dogma the sense of imperfection is gone. Belief in the fixity and finality of the choice (of one’s own group) inevitably shuts out the limitless horizon of the idealizing process which is an integral part of religious experience.

It is clear from what has been said that the idea of "being chosen" is in reality a general religious principle, applicable to individuals as well as to groups, and in an analogous sense has relevance to all levels in the order of nature. To know that one is chosen is to be gratefully conscious of the special gifts with which he has been endowed. So understood, being chosen is not in opposition to community but is its very condition. Community requires the harmonious inter-relation of distinct entities -- all with special gifts and capacities. There is no community with absolute equality. True community involves the enhancing of the life of the whole and of all parts through the mutual recognition and appreciation of those unique contributions which each constituent can make.

The idea of chosen people is otherwise expressed through the so-called doctrine of "election". Election means that human destiny is determined by God rather than by man himself. It may apply either to groups or to individuals. Like the concept of the Chosen People, election has often been regarded as an objectionable idea because it makes the deity seem arbitrary and unjust to many. It is very difficult, however, to avoid the plain evidence of inequality in many ways, and these inequalities must be traced ultimately to whatever are the sources of being upon which life depends. That some are "elected" to fulfillment and some to frustration is, then, to be understood as a consequence of the plurality of being and of the fact of dependence. As pointed out in Chapter IV, this does not deny freedom, which means self-determination, since the self is what it is by virtue of the sources of its being.

The Christian Church is largely an outgrowth of the Jewish idea of the Chosen People. The people of Israel regarded themselves as custodians of the holy oracles of God contained in the Law. The early Christians regarded themselves as the recipients and transmitters of a new holy treasure -- the Gospel of the risen Christ. Just as the Hebrews in their consciousness of historical destiny felt themselves laid hold on by the great principles of the Torah, the Christians were overwhelmed and captured by the consciousness of victory over death and the promise of inexhaustible fountains of life to which they had secured access through identification with Jesus in the resurrection community. Just as the Jews had sometimes felt called to the task of preserving the Law for the salvation of all nations, the early Christians, with tremendous missionary zeal, were inwardly impelled to "proclaim the Gospel to every living creature". Christians regard themselves as a Chosen People in the sense that to them has been entrusted the message of God’s grace to sinful (selfish) man in Jesus, who was shown to be the Christ by his coming alive in the Christian community where, because the fear of death is gone, the rule of love replaces that grasping for security which is the cause of sin.

The Church is therefore the resurrection community. It is not a mere collection of individuals who agree to associate together. Rather, it is an organism brought into being by the unique series of events associated with the life and death of Jesus of Nazareth. The Church is no organization which certain people decided to set up. It is a living whole, brought into being by the overpowering corporate experiences of the early Christians, and continued in being through the successive regeneration of these same experiences of new life from age to age. In Christian language, the Church was created by God when he sent the Holy Spirit upon the disciples, and continues as the Church through the perennial renewal of this gift of the Spirit. Its organic character was referred to by St. Paul in the phrase "the body of Christ". The body has many "members", each differing in function, but each also contributing to the good of the whole. This organic conception is another way of expressing, in the sphere of human relationships, what we have consistently designated by the word "community".

The claim of Christians is therefore validated only in so far as it is really true that they possess a unique and powerful treasure-house (the Gospel) from which new life (the Holy Spirit) is available for the healing, restoring, and recreating of sick, delinquent, and perishing men. To a certain extent this claim can be validated, but there are also serious limitations to which it is subject. We may now add, in the light of the above discussion of the Chosen People, that the Christian claim becomes invalid at the point where it becomes exclusive. The assertion that "outside the Church there is no salvation" must be rejected on religious grounds as well as on the clear evidence of history and of everyday life. That the historic Christian community has made mighty contributions to the life of our society cannot be doubted. (Some of these contributions have been evil.) But that this community is the sole means by which man can be renewed on the deepest levels of his life is hardly a credible position. The traditional reply to this has been to make a distinction between the visible Church (the Church as a social institution) and the invisible Church (the community of those who have been restored to new life by faith in Jesus as Christ, whether they belong to the visible institution or not). Such a distinction has real merit, but it does not answer the question as to whether there may not be other channels of "salvation" (in almost any sense that can be intelligibly specified) than that which stems from the historic events connected with Jesus of Nazareth.

There can be no claim of a Church universal until the principle of exclusion is overcome in favor of an all-embracing principle of community. This would imply the grateful recognition of the powerful sources of moral insight available through the experience of the Jewish people and the revitalizing power resident within the Christian Gospel, but also the rightful and needful contributions of other peoples and historic religions to the fulfillment of the highest potentialities in existence.

Closely related to the Church is the Bible. The Bible is the Holy Book of the religious community. There is a reciprocal relationship between Bible and Church. In the book are recorded the key events, central teaching, and ritual regulations governing the life of the community. Thus the Bible is a product of the Church. On the other hand, the book is in turn the source of the tradition which ensures the continuity of the religious community through the generations. In this sense the Church is a product of the Bible. Historically, the religious community of Israel preceded the production of a collection of sacred writings and the earliest Christian community came before the New Testament writings. In both cases the Scriptures were written expressions of the basic experiences characteristic of the respective religious groups. This does not invalidate the assertion that once the Scriptures were produced (step by step in a long process of literary and social evolution), they were powerful factors in guiding the course of the religious community.

A body of sacred writings gains authority through its demonstrated power of bringing to expression the dominant and enduring attitudes characteristic of the religious group. Out of a vast body of oral or written material, through long testing, a certain few selections are made, generally not by an official body so much as by the decision of the community itself as evidenced by degree of use or disuse, and these become the sacred canon. This observation is important because it emphasizes the fact that the authority of Scripture is generally not (as often maintained by the opponents of traditional religion) arbitrarily imposed but is by common consent out of the long experience of the group. From this we conclude that the familiar idea of the special character and sacred quality of the Scriptures in comparison with other writings is a way of expressing in doctrinal form the well-tested superiority of the holy writings in respect to the religious life of the group. Amongst traditional religious ideas, that of the sacredness of Scripture is one of the most empirical in character.

The sacred writings of all the great religions have the power, in unusual degree, of stimulating the kinds of universal experiences which we described in Part Two. For example, the Old Testament is dominated by the conviction of Israel’s dependence upon God and by specific illustrations from history of the consequences of that dependence. In its pages the reality of change is recognized and the deepest questions of beginnings and endings -- of creation and destruction -- are constantly confronted. It is pervaded by the sense of the order of the creation, with a definite physical, living, and moral structure which set the conditions of man’s life. It is the record of values passionately espoused, and of visions of better things not yet achieved. Similarly with the New Testament, which carries out most of the themes of the Old Testament within the context of a new historical situation introduced by the coming of Jesus. An examination of other sacred writings would show their peculiar fitness for expressing and inspiring the fundamental experiences by which we defined universal religion.

This leads to an interpretation of the doctrine of the divine inspiration of the Scriptures. The obvious meaning of this is that the Scriptures were not human creations, but were specially given by God. The extreme form of the doctrine asserts verbal inspiration, i.e., that the words were themselves given by God (as in Muslim or in some Fundamentalist Jewish or Christian circles). The usual form is that God in all essential features guided the production of the Bible, through human instrumentality. A literal understanding of inspiration, according to which a god delivers messages to special persons, cannot be intelligible in terms of universal experience. It can appeal only to those willing to accept the claim on the authority of others. But the doctrine can be understood rather as a way of symbolizing the peculiar power the Scriptures have of generating religious experience, as described above. "Divine inspiration" means "produced by God", and this means, in terms of our discussion of God in Chapter VIII, "arising from those aspects of the nature of things which are experienced in the five fundamentals of change, dependence, etc." Thus divine inspiration can be intelligibly interpreted to mean that the Scriptures are very particularly transparent to and vehicles of the basic experiences called religious.

According to such an interpretation there is no sharp line which divides sacred writings from all other literature. Many other works have great power of mediating the divine in essentially the same way as the Scriptures. The only claim the Scriptures have must rest upon the long experience of the group whose religious life is nourished by them.

Closely akin to the idea of inspiration is the concept of revelation. This means that the sacred writings, in contrast with other literature, are regarded as disclosures of the divine nature and will. Matters ordinarily hidden from man are made plain through the Scriptures. The revelatory character of sacred writings results essentially from their powerful exemplification of the first two fundamentals of religious experience: In the first place, there is the marked element of surprise, of wonder and amazement at the new and wholly unexpected things that have come to pass (e.g., deliverance of the Hebrews from Egypt or from Babylon, the sense of a living presence among the disciples who had witnessed Jesus’ crucifixion). In this respect something hidden has come to light. In the second place, there is a strong sense of dependence, in the conviction that these surprising things have been done to them and were not of their own will or making. Coupled with these two primary elements in the experience of revelation there is the opening of new and hitherto undisclosed horizons for the fulfillment of life (order, value, and especially the experience of imperfection). Thus revelation combines all the fundamentals of religious experience. Again it must be said, however, that Scripture is not the only source of revelation, in our sense of the word. While the events of the Hebrew and Christian Scriptures certainly have remarkable revelatory power, we cannot deny such power to other events or to other writings. The extent of such power depends upon the particular nature of the writings, of those who use them, and of the situations in which they are produced and read.

Two problems now present themselves. The first is that when certain writings are officially accepted as the sacred canon, they tend to assume a position of finality which resists any further critical testing by corporate experience. They now become the norm for experience rather than a canon judged by experience. When this happens, it may no longer be true that the Scriptures possess intrinsic authority based on contemporary experience. Their authority may then need to be bolstered by extrinsic and arbitrary means. This has taken place with respect to most if not all of the sacred writings of the historic religions. Conditions of life have radically changed since ancient times. It is therefore extremely difficult for the average person so to translate the biblical view into his own idiom that the ancient experiences become relevant to him. For this reason the ancient writings often tend to obscure rather than to illuminate the religious dimensions of experience. To the normal difficulty of penetrating to a more profound level of understanding is added the burden of thinking in terms of both an ancient and a modern world-view. This is not to deny that the sacred writings contain insights of permanent significance. But it is in order to ask whether there is not an imperative in every age for the production of "sacred" literature which will express -- possibly better than the ancient writings -- the deepest religious insights and experiences of civilization. Our analysis of religion and of the meaning of inspiration would suggest an affirmative answer to this question.

The second problem is that of the plurality of sacred books. Each religious group tends to exalt its sacred canon to a leading or to an exclusive position. Obviously everyone cannot make his claim good. Orthodox western religions have accorded a unique status to their particular Bibles. For each of them there is only one holy book, provided by God for the ultimate religious guidance of man. Such exclusive claims are in the same class as claims of exclusive Churches. The two claims generally go together. The only intelligible solution to this problem would seem to be to admit the relative religious value, based on experience, of each group’s scriptures for its own corporate life, but to recognize that no book has final authority. To claim finality is to deny the basic religious principle implied by the experience of imperfection, and (as was shown above in connection with Church exclusiveness) to destroy the other basic elements in religious experience as well.

Among the important components of the sacred writings are the oracles of the prophets. It is often thought that the function of the prophet is to forecast the future. While there is some truth in this, it does not do justice to the real meaning of prophecy in the Old Testament. The true significance of the prophets of Israel was that they were able to discern the deeper meaning of historical events. They were "seers", i.e., those who see deeply into the meanings of events. They were interpreters, who understood what lay beneath the superficial and usually deceptive appearances. Their interpretation was not only a matter of predicting consequences. They were as much concerned with pointing out the meaning of past events and of present situations as with the future.

The Christians, in their zeal to find confirmation for their claim that Jesus was the Messiah, unfortunately obscured the original and really authentic meaning of Old Testament prophecy by seeking to show that the prophets had foretold the coming of Jesus. While there are in the Old Testament prophetic proclamations of a Messianic Age to come, only by the most narrow and literalistic special pleading can the specific foretelling of Jesus be defended.

Prophecy in its true sense is important because it furnishes an excellent illustration of some of the fundamentals of religious experience. The most striking thing about the prophet is his sense of divine commission. He does not regard himself as his own agent but as a spokesman for God, who instructs him to deliver messages to his people. This sense of commission is simply a well-developed consciousness of dependence. It is also a powerful experience of value. The prophet is one who feels that he is grasped or impelled by a demand placed upon him. He has a total commitment, which comes from being wholly and unequivocally caught up by an ideal. It is also as though a key has slipped into place and a door has been unlocked towards future possibilities. The prophet has a keen sense of present imperfection and a vivid apprehension of a better order beyond. Thus he is able to pronounce judgment on the existing order, threatening destruction of every order which resists the pressure of a higher level of community, and holding out the promise of a glorious new age to all who are faithful to this demand.

The prophet is an interpreter because he is able to see the religious dimension in what appear to others as ordinary events. He actually carries out in a particularly complete and faithful way the pursuit of the implications which are present in all experience if profoundly examined. The prophet is in this sense a "religious genius". But this does not mean that he is actually a specially designated agent of God with a relation to him that others cannot have. His genius lies in his ability to discern more clearly what is open to all to see and understand in the universal experience of the race. To be sure, some events are more provocative of religious insight than others, and it is these upon which the prophet chiefly draws. But it remains true that the prophet’s experience is not different in kind from the experience of any other man, and that his greatness and relevance lies not so much in his unique capacities as in the fact that he does represent the universal religious perspective implicit in the experience of every man.

Prophecy is one of the characteristic components of Scripture. Another is accounts of miracles. Miracle stories are also, found outside the sacred canon. In the popular mind the miraculous element is chiefly what makes a religion sacred. To many people religion without miracles would not be religion, and the Scriptures without miracle stories would not be a holy book. The word "miracle" is usually understood to mean any astonishing, extraordinary, inexplicable event which is regarded as signifying the activity of divine agencies.

There are miracles of many kinds. "Nature miracles" are events which appear to contradict the established order of nature, such as the stilling of a storm at sea. Another kind -- healing miracles -- are especially common in the reports. There are miraculous restorations of the dead to life (resurrection stories) which in the case of Jesus is the central Christian miracle. There are communication miracles, in the form of supernatural visions and revelations (usually to prophets or seers). Some miracles are regular in occurrence (e.g., the change of the bread and wine into the body and blood of Christ in the sacrament, according to the Roman Catholic view), while some are unique (as in Christ’s resurrection). Some have a moral purpose (as the parting of the sea for the deliverance of the Israelites), while others have none (the withering of the fig tree cursed by Jesus). Some miracles are worked directly by God, while others are performed by holy men -- prophets, apostles, or saints.

The conditions favorable for belief in miracle reports are several: a strong religious conviction, a vivid imagination, a pre-scientific or non-scientific view of the world, and discontent with the conditions of everyday life as a result of boredom, oppression, or want.

There are several ways in which miracle reports may be interpreted. The orthodox view is that they are direct evidence of supernatural intervention and must be believed without question. A second view is that miracles are due to the operation of natural laws not yet discovered or perhaps of laws now known but not understood by those who reported the miracles. A third view is that miracles are faith-symbols, that they are dramatic representations of the inner meaning of events to those who witnessed them with the eye of faith.

It is actually necessary to deal with each kind of miracle on its own merits. No doubt many of the phenomena of nature, once regarded as miraculous interventions, are now understood as regular parts of the cosmic order. Probably many of the reported miraculous healings did occur. We are only beginning now to understand some of the mechanisms by which emotional and physical factors are inter-related, and therefore to possess a rudimentary explanation of faith healing. Some miracle reports -- especially the most exaggerated ones -- must surely be taken as nothing more than products of the pious imagination. It is also important to remember that most miracle stories come from a pre-scientific age, in which there was no conception of a uniform order of nature. The world was regarded as directly governed by spiritual powers, as a man controls his body. It was therefore taken for granted that "signs and wonders" would occur.

How shall we interpret miracles in the light of our analysis of religious experience? First let it be said that a blind acceptance of such stories simply because they are in the Bible or attested by Church authority has no place in an intelligent religious outlook. In the second place, we cannot and should not, even or especially in our religious outlook, abandon the search for the intelligible structure of the natural order through orderly scientific means. Miracle stories which conflict with well-tested scientific evidence are to be regarded as extremely improbable. Miracles which can be explained by natural means should be analyzed in that way. Miracles which are neither in conflict with scientific evidence nor explicable by known natural laws should be regarded as stimuli for further inquiry. But in the third place we should not be so intent on the orderly structures of nature that we lose sight of the essential religious meaning of miracles. This leads to their interpretation as faith-symbols, as mentioned above. Miracle stories are fundamentally ways of expressing the conviction that the nature of things is not just what it appears to be, but that there are resident in the world hidden depths and heights of possibility, for which from time to time there is at least some evidence. They point to the fact that life is full of surprises and that for those who have eyes to see there is untold treasure of latent richness which may come into being.

This leads us back to the fundamentals of religious experience. The implications of change are especially relevant to the understanding of miracle. In fact, one does not really understand the religious meaning of change until he sees it as miracle. Change is the perennial source of miracle. The supreme wonder is that the wholly new emerges -- apparently from nowhere. The questions raised by the fact of change are expressed in the recognition that a miracle has occurred. In this sense the pre-scientific interpretation of surprising natural phenomena as miracles is really more perceptive than the routine acceptance of every occurrence as part of an invariable law-abiding order of things. What is required in intelligible religion is to preserve an appreciation both for the principle of order and for the acknowledgment of wonder in the presence of the new.

Miracles also need to be understood in the light of dependence. For the miraculous is always regarded as something that happens to one. It is a gift, wholly unexpected and unprepared for, not a human achievement but a contribution from the endlessly rich sources of being. Furthermore, by its novelty miracle impels a recognition of order, not in the sense of a regular occurrence, but as a given structure or condition which is this rather than that. Miracles represent the perception of unexpected orders in existence. Again, miracles always arise in situations of intense value-experience. In fact, the overwhelming surge of new life which comes when one enters -- usually quite unexpectedly -- into a profound value-relationship has all the quality of a miracle. There is truth in such a familiar phrase as "the miracle of love". The surprising gift of a vivifying new human relationship is a miracle. Finally, miracle implies the opening of new horizons. It is not the immediate event in itself which is miraculous. It is the power some occurrences have of raising the curtain upon endless vistas of higher possibilities which makes them miracles, i.e., which makes it possible to appear miraculous. Thus the experience of imperfection also contributes to the understanding of the miraculous.

This analysis leads to the conclusion that miracle, so defined, is the essence of religion. There is no deeply religious experience, according to our interpretation, which is not miraculous. Intelligible religion need not (as some would recommend) deny miracle. Rather it would appear that miracle freed from literalistic and unscientific connotations and re-interpreted in the light of fundamental experience is an essential to significant religion.

Chapter 11: The Christian Message

Thus far our discussion of some of the traditional religious ideas in the light of an analysis of religion in terms of actual human experience has not been concerned exclusively with any one religious or sectarian movement. The fact is, however, that for the most part the doctrines here discussed have stood within the main Jewish and Christian tradition of the west. It is the purpose of this chapter, and largely also that of the next two, to focus attention on the central beliefs of the Christian community. It will also help to show better how the method of analysis applies, through its use in connection with certain central tenets of the dominant historical faith of western civilization.

When we propose to deal with "the Christian message", it is first necessary to state what that message is. But this leads to the difficulty that there is a wide variety of opinions about the nature of that message. What is an essential aspect of Christian teaching to one group of Christians is considered by another group as a minor matter or even as a heresy. Some would say that the Sermon on the Mount is the sum and substance of Christianity. Others would say that the essential Christian message is that Christ died to save sinners or that only by believing in Jesus Christ as personal Savior can one inherit eternal life. The sorely divided condition of Christendom is largely a reflection of the many divergent ideas about what constitutes essential Christianity --about what is fundamental and what is of secondary importance in the Christian message.

In spite of this terrifying diversity of beliefs, it is the present writer’s conviction -- and this is shared by many students of the history of Christian thought -- that there is a fairly clear central core of belief which forms both the original Christian message and the continuing main source of inspiration and doctrine throughout Christian history. This basic Christian message is to be discovered through a careful and critical study of the Christian Bible -- the Old and the New Testaments. It is in the biblical record that the earliest statements of the essential message are to be found. And it is to this record that Christians have continually made reference in re-examining the content of their faith from generation to generation. The next chapter will contain an analysis of the nature and authority of the Bible. Our purpose is here to indicate what this book says about the central message of the Christian faith.

It is impossible to understand Christianity apart from its Jewish background. This is why the Jewish Scriptures or "writings" (the Old Testament) are part of the Christian Bible. The connecting link between Judaism and Christianity is the idea of the Messiah. The word Messiah means "anointed one" and refers to an expected God-appointed agent who would come one day to implement in one way or another the rule of God on earth, ushering in a new age in which the powers of evil would no longer hold sway. The Messiah is the one in whom the Jews centered their hopes for the coming of a new age of righteousness, in which particularly the injustices done to the people of Israel would be punished and loyalty to the one true God appropriately rewarded.

Throughout all Jewish history the coming of the Messiah has remained a hope not yet fulfilled. In the time of Jesus the coming of the anointed one was fervently longed for by many, in the face of the enforced subservience of the Jewish people to the Romans. And even today the unfulfilled and expectant hope for the Messiah is a part of the Jewish faith.

The Christian message may be briefly summarized in the single assertion: "Jesus is the Messiah." The word Christos is the Greek translation of the Hebrew word Messiah. Thus an alternative way of stating the Christian message is to say: "Jesus is the Christ." It will take some explanation to make clear what this means -- to show in what sense Christians believe Jesus to be the Messiah. Indeed, the various forms of Christianity are, in part, different ways of interpreting the meaning of this basic assertion. But the central fact remains that the Christian movement was the expression of this fundamental conviction about Jesus. The major difference between Judaism and Christianity is that in the former the Messiah is still to come, while in the latter he has already come.

The New Testament contains the record of how a belief in Jesus as Messiah arose. As we have already implied, the belief would never have arisen had there not been within Judaism a vivid expectation of the anointed one. But this of itself was of course not enough. The direct cause, within this context, was the whole series of events associated with the career of Jesus of Nazareth. In most respects his life was not unlike that of some of the other great spiritual leaders of Israel. Most of his teaching has parallels in the prophetic or rabbinic literature. He exercised over his followers a remarkable power which often resulted in transformations of character and even in physical healing. He pronounced decisive prophetic judgments on the organized religion of his day, reminiscent of an Amos or a Jeremiah. He interpreted his teaching and actions in terms of the current messianic expectation, and he regarded himself in some sense as the bearer of the messianic commission. It seems unlikely that Jesus’ followers would ever have regarded him as the Christ if he had not made this claim for himself during his brief ministry.

From the biblical record it is clear, however, that the decisive influence in establishing the messianic claim of Jesus was not his life and teaching but the events associated with his death.

It is easy to mark the point at which the Christian message came into being, and that is the moment at which certain of Jesus’ followers claimed to have seen him alive again after his death by crucifixion. It was primarily by virtue of the claim that Jesus had risen from the dead that the Christians established his messiahship. For the early Christians the resurrection of Jesus was the foundation upon which their message rested. Jesus is the Christ, they said, because he has risen from the dead. By historical right, then, the heart of the Christian message is that Jesus of Nazareth, crucified as a criminal, rose from the dead and by that evidence was shown to be God’s anointed one.

From this it follows that the key to the interpretation of the Christian message is the meaning of the resurrection of Jesus. The New Testament itself is by no means unambiguous regarding this meaning, though it is clear that there was unambiguously a belief in the resurrection. Some of the accounts depict post-mortem appearances in a physical body. Some accounts tell of the empty tomb. But a careful study of the earliest accounts, in Paul’s letters, indicates that these physical resurrection stories were probably later than the descriptions of the risen Jesus as an exalted heavenly being. A strong case can be made for the view that the original resurrection appearances were in the nature of visions, and that the physical resuscitation accounts were developed for the purpose of convincing the doubtful, who thought the disciples had only seen a ghost.

In terms of our modern scientific world-view it is difficult to believe that anyone has ever risen bodily from the dead. We must remember, however, that the people of Bible times knew nothing of modern science and that in the Judaism of that day belief in the possibility of resurrection was common; there are several other instances in the Bible where resurrection is claimed. We can therefore understand the way in which the New Testament account of Jesus’ resurrection developed, but we are not likely to be able to accept any belief in a physical resurrection. What meaning, then, can the resurrection of Jesus -- the central Christian message -- have for moderns with an intelligible religious outlook ? The important fact is that the early Christians were convinced that Jesus had been delivered from the bonds of death, and that in a real sense he continued alive with them and for them. It is important to add that they did not regard his aliveness as only a matter of vivid memory, but as a present fact. They did not find his power diminished, but rather multiplied after his death. The meaning of the resurrection therefore has to do with the problem of death. Ordinarily death is the end of things. What was, no longer is. But in connection with Jesus the early Christians experienced a reversal of this customary experience. Instead of death being the end, it turned out to be the beginning.

Actually, if we consider the matter, deaths are often beginnings. Sometimes the existence of some real value is a bar to the achievement of a greater value. Often people or institutions have to die before certain creative developments can take place. But more to the present point, it is by sacrifice -- by the voluntary loss of some good out of devotion to a greater good, that the highest possibilities in human life are realized. Heroes in every area of attainment are those who have given themselves without reservation for a cause they love more than life itself.

In Jesus’ case it was a combination of factors -- such as the fervent longing of oppressed people, their religious preparation and ethical sensitivity, the remarkable personal power of Jesus, and the particular circumstances of his death -- which produced among his followers a mental and emotional situation favorable to the attainment of a remarkable new intensity of life, marked by love, loyalty, courage and joy, all for the sake of the Master, who had sacrificed his life for them and for the larger good he saw through them.

In terms of the fundamentals of religious experience, the resurrection first provides an answer to the problem of change. There was the shock of disappearance (Jesus died), giving rise to the question: Where does that which perishes go? The answer was not a theoretical, but a practical one, and came in the form of a new resurgence of life within the disciples as individuals and within the Christian fellowship. This was the old Jesus appearing in a new form. Where did Jesus go ? He went "to God" (the source of the new and the destiny of the old). The resurrection experience means the realization, through the rising within one of powers related to him who has died, that there is a depth of surprising creative possibility in existence in which we may participate, and that the realization of this possibility is often contingent upon the loss of existing structures. The resurrection experience shows the unity of the depth into which existing actuality sinks and that out of which new possibility arises into actuality.

The resurrection also answers to the experience of dependence. One of the striking things about the New Testament account is the complete reversal of the disciples’ outlook between the day of crucifixion and the day of resurrection. And the impression is strong that this change was not something expected but which "came upon" them, as it were overpowering them. There is no suggestion of any effort to believe something that one hopes is so. The atmosphere is wholly one of wonder and excitement at the remarkable things that have happened to them and of thankfulness for having been granted the gift of the new life they sense within themselves and the Christian community. The resurrection experience was essentially an affair of grace, not of human effortful achievement. It was through it that the early Christians gained a vivid consciousness of the sources from which their life derived.

In the third place, the resurrection experience was one of form. The new life experienced in connection with Jesus had a clear and definite structure. That structure was expressed in terms of obedience to Jesus’ commands, imitation of his life, and the development of forms of organization and patterns of behavior and belief consonant with the emerging life of the new fellowship.

The new life was also of supreme value to the Christians. They were irresistibly drawn not only to the Jesus who had lived among them but even more to the form of dedicated life which had come into being after his death. Furthermore, this value was such as to inspire in them a sense of the limitless possibilities lying beyond their actual attainments. The new life filled them with intense hope for better things, together with an acutual awareness of how far they fell short of the full potentialities inherent in the new community. Everything they did fell under the judgment of the highest good -- Christian love -- which was their version of what we call "community".

Thus the resurrection experience for the early Christians involved an intense exemplification of the five fundamentals of religious experience. We may suppose that this is the primary reason for the centrality of the resurrection in the Christian faith. In the above we have spoken of what the experience of Jesus’ resurrection meant to the early Christians. The same remarks hold good for all those who since that first age have shared in the transforming power which the first believers unquestionably received. The central Christian message is therefore really the proclamation that within the Christian fellowship it is possible to realize the power of new life which was first known by the disciples after Jesus’ death and expressed by them as evidence of his resurrection from the dead and continued living presence among them. Adherence to an organized Christian group does not of itself guarantee the conferring of this new life. All that has been said is that the resurrection of Jesus may be understood in terms of a transforming power within the group of believers, first operating amongst the immediate followers of the crucified Master and then continuing in varying degrees from generation to generation in the Christian fellowships springing from them.

Belief in a dying and rising being is found in many religions. Nowhere else does it have the concrete historical reference found in Christianity. Usually the one who dies and rises is a mythological figure, such as Osiris in the Isis cult. The historical reference probably has the effect of greatly intensifying the power and the vividness of the resurrection belief. Apart from this, the widespread belief in the resurrection of a representative being is a further confirmation of the way in which this belief expressed the universal experiences underlying religion.

The belief in Jesus’ resurrection is not the same as to believe in his immortality. According to the Christian message, Jesus was not immortal. He really died, and then rose again. This is certainly borne out by the disciples’ experience. As far as they were concerned, Jesus was dead, until resurrection day, when (as they believed) God created him anew amongst them. This distinction is important in regard to the doctrine of immortality. One cannot argue from Jesus’ resurrection to the immortality of people in general for two reasons: first, because people in general are not Jesus or even much like him -- and there is strong presumption that Jesus’ nature had everything to do with his resurrection -- and second, because Jesus was not immortal, according to the Christian message. What one can infer from Jesus’ resurrection is that the fountain of life and being is not necessarily frustrated by death, and therefore that we may take courage and hope regarding the deaths of others and of ourselves that we may in like manner be the occasion for some of the creative-death-defeating power which was so magnificently poured out in the case of Jesus. And Christians consider it likely that the best way to ensure that participation is by partaking now of the new life in the Christian community, under the inspiration of the Jesus who founded it and still lives within it.

There is a doctrine closely connected with the resurrection of Jesus which will be briefly mentioned. This is the belief in the ascension of Jesus. According to this teaching Jesus after his resurrection was taken up into heaven. It is clear that this is a logical consequence of the idea of a physical resurrection, for if Jesus returned bodily to life, then some explanation of his ultimate disappearance from earthly residence is required. Careful analysis of the New Testament shows that the ascension story (like the physical resurrection accounts) was relatively late and was not part of the earliest message. Thus it is unlikely even on the grounds of the New Testament itself that the ascension is an integral part of the Christian story. Furthermore, from the modern view it is incredible as a physical phenomenon and belongs to the pre-Copernican cosmology The symbolic meaning of the ascension is that the continuing life of the risen Jesus is a "heavenly" life, i.e., one not dependent upon his physical body, and manifesting itself in the spiritual life of the Christian fellowship.

The essence of the Christian message is that Jesus is the Christ, demonstrated as such by his victory over death in his resurrection. Starting from this basic affirmation a number of other conclusions regarding the nature and function of Jesus in the faith were developed. Probably the most important of these is the assertion that Jesus is divine or that Jesus is God. Orthodox Christians have usually taken this as the basic test of doctrinal soundness. A believing Christian, they say, must affirm the "divinity of Christ", or the "deity of Christ". This is consistent with the attitude of the earliest Christians and must be understood as an expression of their experience of the risen Christ. These people found in that experience the kind of personal renewal, inspiration, and life-direction which they had by their religious training always attributed to God -- the giver of life and the Lord of individuals and nations. Therefore they identified the risen Jesus -- the spirit of life amongst them -- as a manifestation of God himself. From this it was easy to derive such formulas as "Jesus is divine" or "Christ is God".

Another way of putting it is to say that for the first Christians the best in everything they had ever known about religion was fulfilled for them in their encounter with Jesus -- in his life, in his death, and particularly in his new life after death. Thus there was no better representation for them of what God meant to them than Jesus the Christ. The doctrine of the divinity of Christ was nothing more nor nothing less than this. It was a way of expressing a genuine experience of the meaning of Jesus for them. And whenever there has been a re-creation of that original life and experience in Christian history, the meaning of the doctrine has been illuminated afresh. It is not a theoretical or abstract principle. It is an expression of a powerful experience within the Christian circle. It is nothing which can be argued about in such a way as to show it to be true or false in general. It is a symbolic way of talking about attitudes and values of actual persons who have been caught up in devotion to one in relation to whom they have found a new and ultimately satisfying kind of life.

The divinity of Christ so understood is by no means incongruous with his humanity. Indeed, it was precisely through the fact that he lived a fully human life that the powerful experiences which linked him with God in the faith of the Christians were possible.

It is easy to interpret the doctrine of the divinity of Christ in terms of our analysis of religious experience. We showed above that the resurrection experience contained all the elements of the universal experiences of change, dependence, form, value, and imperfection. We have also shown in Chapter VIII how the word "God" may intelligibly be defined by reference to these five fundamentals. If "God" is defined in this fashion, then it would follow that the resurrection experience was (and, whenever it is repeated, is) an experience of God.

The doctrine of the divinity of Christ is only a brief way of affirming this. In our terms, to say that Christ is divine is to say that in the participation in a new life, associated with and resulting from the death of Jesus, the Christian finds an answer to the mystery of change, gratefully receives from the fountain of life upon which he is dependent new access of power, becomes aware of a new form of truth and of life, is grasped by a new enthusiasm (value), and sees as never before the boundless higher possibilities which existence affords (imperfection).

A Christian affirmation closely related to the one just discussed is the Incarnation. The Incarnation means that the earthly Jesus was the embodiment of God in human form. On the face of it, as an abstract proposition, this looks absurd. If one thinks of the universal creative powers (or however he customarily considers God) as becoming concentrated within the limits of a human body, the assertion is pure nonsense. Many times such irrational views have been defended, to the detriment of the cause of intelligible religion. The Incarnation is actually another way of expressing what the significance of Jesus is within the vital Christian community. It is a way of pointing out the rather extraordinary fact that the primary and really convincing evidence which Christians claim to discover for the reality and power of God for them is in their relation to Jesus. It is in him that a center of illumination for all life appears. It is in him that a source of power for the fulfillment of life is provided. Not from any general "sources of being", but from this one particular source. The Incarnation expresses this remarkable focusing of the religious experience in terms of this one person. It is a turning away from religion in general to a special religion, and then finding, incidentally, that the general is freshly illuminated as it never was before. In terms of our analysis, for example, the Christian faith in the Incarnate God would imply that the fullest implications of change, dependence, form, value, and imperfection are apparent when understood in the light of the experience of the resurrected Christ.

Another traditional Christian doctrine is that God is a Trinity -- Father, Son, and Holy Spirit, one God. Again, it is useless to try to analyze this as a general theoretical proposition. It can only be understood as a "symbol of the faith". By the Holy Spirit is meant the life of God in the community of believers. The Spirit was regarded as the source of that tremendous outpouring of enthusiasm, courage, hope, and love which accompanied the rise of the resurrection faith. Experientially there is no difference between what is called the Holy Spirit and what is regarded as the manifestation amongst Christians of the living, risen Christ. Thus the identification of Jesus with God leads also to the identification of the Spirit with God (and with Jesus). The doctrine of the Trinity is simply the statement that, for Christians, Jesus (the Son) and the Spirit to which he gave rise in the Christian community were both none other than the manifestations of that source of spiritual energy which they called "God". It is only to say that God manifests himself in different ways in the general facts of existence (Father), in the particular man Jesus (Son), and in the life of the Christian community (Holy Spirit). In terms of our analysis, this would mean that the five fundamentals could be regarded at the same time as universal experiences (Father), as especially illuminated in the life of Jesus (Son), and as continually re-established in the life of the Church (Holy Spirit).

These considerations lead to the problem of the relation of Jesus to the rest of the human race, that is, to the question of the uniqueness of Jesus. Was Jesus "just another man", though admittedly a great one, or is he in some special way set apart from all the rest of the race? The traditional Christian answer has been to affirm his uniqueness. Usually this affirmation is founded on an abstract and nonexperiential inference from such doctrines as the Trinity and the Incarnation. If Jesus is divine, it is said, he cannot possibly be just another man. To argue in this way leads only to confusion and absurdity. The question about the uniqueness of Jesus can only be answered in terms of experience. To say that Jesus is unique is only to assert that the kind of new life which vital Christians discover they regard as available only through Jesus. They think it is a fact that what they experience in him they have never experienced through any other man. And thus they set him apart as unique.

While it may be true that individual Christians have actually not found the new life they prize other than in relation to Jesus, it is quite something else to assert that there is no other comparable source. It is often this latter which is meant by the uniqueness of Jesus. It is at this point that a perfectly intelligible individual or group experience is arbitrarily extended as a principle to which all possible experience must conform. It may be true that certain persons find only in Jesus the unfolding of the deepest meaning of life -- and we have seen how the experience of the resurrected Jesus makes this possible -- but it does not follow from this that there is no other particular channel through which new life may flow. In fact, the whole history of the race is against it. There are countless particularly creative situations having nothing to do with Christianity historically in which life-fulfillments quite comparable to those of the best of Christians are experienced. In this sense Jesus is not unique. Of course strictly speaking every person is unique; no one is just like anyone else. And in a sense every man has a "divine spark" -- in that he may serve as the occasion for the experience of God. Jesus is different from the rest of mankind only in the degree that the consequences of his life are of special significance in comparison with the rest of the race. That these consequences have been momentous historically and a profound creative power none can deny. But that he stands totally and absolutely beyond and above all other men seems to be an assertion of arbitrary and unwarranted dogmatism which does nothing to enhance the faith of the Christian and much to alienate those who cannot share that faith.

In a number of different connections in the present discussion we have spoken of the new life which constitutes the evidence of the living risen Christ in the community of Christians. It is now important to state more precisely what the nature and source of that new life are. As already suggested, the manifestation of it consisted in such things as heightened courage, confidence, hope, fidelity, enthusiasm, and love. Doubtless nobody ever became perfect, but it does seem clear that Christians at their best have given evidence of truly remarkable achievements, in what have been generally regarded as major virtues -- in such things as the power to endure hardships, to be patient in the face of opposition and disappointment, to forgive others for wrongs inflicted on them, and to show concern for the needs of others. The important fact in this connection is that these achievements are not the result of resolves to be virtuous or of comprehensive programs in self-improvement. They are rather by-products of a transformed personality. What is the nature of the transformation that has taken place? One way of describing it is to say that, to a certain extent at least, the dominion of self-centeredness has been overcome. When we then ask by what means self-centeredness has been destroyed, the answer seems to be related to the death and resurrection of Jesus. How can this be interpreted? It happens, says the Christian, because self-centeredness is caused by the ever-present fear of death: every man sees the life which he desires threatened in all its forms by dissolution, and he strives at all costs and by every means to grasp and hold this insecure treasure. Self-centeredness is the attempt by man to hold fast to that which he knows and fears will pass away. Note that the "death" of which one is afraid does not refer only to the cessation of earthly existence -- to mortality in the usual sense -- but also to the whole parade of smaller deaths -- the endless disappointments, failures, declines, agings -- which render all human life insecure.

The meaning of the resurrection is that the death of Jesus, whose life was certainly worth preserving, was not the end but the beginning of a larger, richer, more powerful, and more widely significant life. By the process of identifying himself with Jesus, the Christian seeks to participate in and appropriate the benefits of the resurrection. Thus he is freed from the fear of death and hence from self-centeredness.

It has been usual to speak of this process of life-transformation by faith in or identification with Jesus as "salvation by faith in Jesus Christ". Salvation here means being rescued from the destructive power of self-concern induced by the sense of personal insecurity. This self-concern is usually called "sin". (In Chapter IX we showed that sin is primarily self-centeredness.) Thus the Christian Gospel or good news is that by faith in Jesus Christ one can be saved from sin. This is not to be understood as a guarantee of perfection, but only as a promise of a new personal orientation in which the self is no longer dominated by the ceaseless but ultimately hopeless struggle to secure his own position in the scheme of things. Nor do we think this is to be interpreted (as is often done) as a particular way of gaining assurance of a favorable position in the life hereafter. It seems like sheer superstition to expect that by affirming belief in Christ one can gain a happy eternity, while those who do not affirm it must suffer everlasting torment in hell. Salvation, according to our interpretation, does not consist primarily in the destiny of the soul after death, but in present participation in the kind of life over which the fear of death has no dominion because it has been shown not to be permanently frustrated by death.

From the standpoint of our interpretation of religion the central Christian experience just described is important because it provides an answer to the question regarding the relative power of community-creating and community-destroying factors in human history, i.e., to the question concerning the outcome of the battle between good and evil. What the Christian message asserts is that the events associated with Jesus precipitated a situation in which a decisive blow was dealt to the community-destroying powers (symbolized in the form of devils or dark spirits) and in which a hitherto unavailable key was provided for opening up the treasure-house of community-creating powers. This can be understood best in relation to the fundamental experience of imperfection. When a person or group is dominated by a sense of impending loss, the resulting fear demands a kind of absolutizing of what already exists, and it dispels any courage for looking to ideals beyond the present imperfect situation. The grasping caused by fear of death therefore results in a constricted and restricted view of things which obscures the heights and depths of possibility inherent in existence. But the measure of these values is community. Hence a sense of profound insecurity results in the frustration of community and the fixation of life on lower levels of achievement. The active awareness of imperfection -- the vital consciousness of the limitless perfectibility in things, which is one of the essentials of religious experience -- thus depends on release from this fear. For this reason the kind of new life which Christians claim through faith in the risen Christ is essential to the actual advancement of community and to the creation of the religious outlook which underlies it.

As a footnote to this discussion it is interesting to observe that a vivid sense of imperfection (including a sense of sin) is a necessary component in religious experience, and that those who are the worst sinners (i.e., who most frustrate community) are the least aware of their sin. Fear of death entails a protective blinding to the fact of imperfection. This points to the fact that for religious fulfillment ("salvation") it is not enough merely to be preached to about sin for that tends to set up defenses against the awareness of imperfection; "grace" is also necessary -- the confidence born of the conviction that the sources of life upon which we are dependent are not extinguished by our death. It is because this conviction has been one of the fruits of the good news about the victorious Jesus that Christians have been so conscious both of the seriousness of sin and of the joyful certainty of freely-given salvation.

What has just been said confirms what was pointed out in Chapter IV and earlier in this chapter about the relation between faith and works. The fruits of the Christian life do not stem from a gigantic effort of the will, but from a transformed personality. The Christian message is not primarily a statement about what man must do but good news about what has been done for man, namely, about his release from the power of sin through identification with the risen Christ, and from this springs the thankful response of a life devoted to good deeds. This is the meaning of the New Testament discussion concerning the relation of the Law (moral requirements) and the Gospel. The Christian answer is that because of sin (self-centeredness) man cannot by nature obey the Law. His only hope is for a transformation of nature which destroys the rule of self-concern by means of the Gospel.

Three critical problems about the Christian message must still be faced. First, we must ask whether the Christian claim regarding the transformations effected by identification with Jesus is actually true. In answer it seems to this writer that there is clear evidence both in past history and in present experience that many persons and groups of people have validated this claim. On the other hand, it seems equally clear that a great many more persons and groups calling themselves by the name of Christ and seeking in every possible way to benefit from faith in him have failed to validate it. It therefore seems on the basis of actual performance that the Christian faith provides an uncertain means of effecting the desired transformations of human nature.

The second problem grows out of the first. May it not be that the particular form of the Christian message, based as it is upon a record of events long ago, recorded in terms largely alien to modern thinking, partly explains the comparative ineffectiveness of the Gospel ? Can modern man consistently, permanently, and whole-heartedly believe that the fulfillment of his life depends upon the events associated with the life of the one man, Jesus of Nazareth?

This leads to the third problem, which was touched on in discussing the uniqueness of Jesus. Is the Christian way of identification with the risen Jesus in the experience of the historic Christian community the only way in which the new life referred to above may be attained? Is it only through Christ that the fear of death and the resulting self-centeredness may be overcome? Is it true that "there is no other name given under heaven by which men may be saved"? The answer seems clearly to be No. It is right to recognize the genuine power and illumination in the Christian message without asserting its exclusiveness of all other messages of salvation. This refers not only to other historic religions, which also produce high fruits of human achievement -- whether or not in as great numbers or with as much efficiency as Christianity we are not concerned to say at this point but to movements and influences not ordinarily called religious. For example, many of the deepest insights of Christianity are implied in some of the current work in psychotherapy. May it not be that a careful scientific attack on the problem of insecurity and fear will enable us more consistently to achieve what has been only sporadically effected by the proclamation of the traditional Christian message?

There are many ways in which to some degree self-centeredness is overcome. In times of national emergency, in warfare, and in the struggle for great causes there are countless illustrations of the sacrifice of personal gain in the interest of the large good. The willingness of devoted parents or of husbands and wives to give up their own immediate comfort or safety in exchange for the privilege of serving those whom they love is further evidence of the larger loyalties that may cause people to abandon concern for personal security. The heroes of culture -- the dedicated scientists, artists, and statesmen of every age -- have also achieved greatness and usefulness in part by the same process.

In summary, it would seem right to regard as truly "saved" anyone who has been given the grace of a high and noble purpose which draws him out of preoccupation with self into a full creative life which serves the development of community. Without underestimating the relevance of the positive Christian message as described above, it is still important to recognize and gratefully to benefit from the other saving influences at work in human life.

An intelligible and a truly universal religion would require this broader basis for faith. The deep insights of historical Christianity -- as well as of other historical religions -- are of great value in understanding the human situation and the resources available in it. But to be of full value for all people in all ages these insights must be understood as illustrations and particular embodiments of general aspects of universal human experience. A durable universal religion cannot be built upon historical particularities and claims of uniqueness and finality. The Christian message must, from this point of view, be regarded as one important source of suggestion and of exemplification for such a religion.