The Effects on Korea of Un-Ecological Theology

In the following essay the Korean theologian long-Sun Noh provides a telling analysis of injustice and suffering -- human and nonhuman -- in Korea. Writing from the perspective of Minjung theology -- a school of liberation theology specifically centered on the oppressed peoples of Korea -- Noh reports inductively on the sorts of oppression that often arise from, or are validated by, what the Minjung theologians call division theologies. These are theologies that reflect and endorse first world and imperialistic or colonialistic interests. In Korea we see the result of ways of thinking that have failed to be ecological and liberating. Noh’s inductive and socio-historical method lays bare the result of unecological thinking. His concerns, and the concerns of many like him, have played a large part in motivating the thinkers represented in this book, who are working toward a more inclusive vision.

There were two pretty

fish that lived in a small pond

by the path deep in the mountain.

On a certain clear summer day,

the two pretty fish fought each other.

One fish floated on the water,

her flesh decayed.

The water was polluted at the same time.

Now, in that little pond by the path

deep in the mountain.

No life can survive.

-- from Minkee Kim’s "Two Fishes"

Two Fishes: The Division of North and South Korea

This poem is a song that the young, conscientized university students love to sing in Korea. When they sing the song, the small pond refers to the Korean peninsula, and the two fish refer to the divided north and south.) As most of us know, North and South Korea have been divided for over forty-three years. Often, they have fought each other like two fish. Tragically, it is possible that, in the future, the pond as a whole -- the peninsula itself -- will be polluted by conflict in such a way that no life will be possible.

To many young Christians who sing this song, the song has two distinctively theological meanings. First, it means that the Korean peninsula was once beautiful, that it was created by God for God’s glory. The sun, the stars, the heavens, the earth, and that particular part of earth called Korea were designed to praise the Lord. Second, it means that this peninsula may someday become a place that cannot support life. It may become a place in which the integrity of creation of which the World Council of Churches speaks and toward which Christians rightly exercise respect, may become a mere wasteland of disintegration.

What are we to make of this song? What can the song mean for us? Should it mean that the death of the Korean peninsula -- its people and its nonhuman life as well -- is imminent? Should it mean that the biosphere in Korea will be so totally devastated that the waters, the fish, and the human beings there will die? Perhaps it can have an even broader meaning. Perhaps the little pond of death in the song can refer to the planet earth as a whole and to the global biosphere. Perhaps the song is instructive to both Koreans and to the people of the world in pointing toward the destructiveness of a certain kind of unecological theology -- what we in Korea call division theology -- that legitimates an oppression of people, of other animals, and of the earth itself. In what follows I will explain what I mean by division thinking, showing its influence on Korea, the land I know best.

Korea

In the pond by the name of Korea, the people of the north and the people of the south have fought and killed each other for over forty-four years. This conflict has been in fact a proxy war to benefit imperialist superpowers. Both North and South Korea have been the scapegoats for this neo-colonial proxy war, what amounts to a war of imperialist beasts, the dragons of the book of Revelation. Under the structure of this war, females and males of the human species have been and are currently dying, oppressed and exploited, even while they are unaware of the cause of their suffering or the cause of the division of Korea. Korean Christians have advocated and supported faiths, ideologies, and economics that legitimate division and are themselves divisive.

These division theologies (Bundan Shinhak) divide, violate, and destroy the integrity of God’s creation. Korean Christians must confess our responsibility here, for we have sometimes accepted such theologies as our own. At the same time, however, the politico-economic elites within the military-industrial complexes of the super, imperialistic, and hegemonic powers must confess their sin of destroying the pond, the Korean peninsula, of destroying a beautiful and integral part of God’s creation for their own political and economic ends. Let us review some of this history.

Although the Korean peninsula was once a unified community of nature and people, it has consistently been divided by outside forces. The sin of division and separation, breaking the one into two, was first plotted by Toyotomi Hideyosi, the Japanese general, and Weehahhoe, the Chinese general, in 1593, almost four hundred years ago. They proposed the division of Korea as a means of balancing power between the Japanese and Chinese hegemonies. They failed to respect that community which was the Korean people itself, along with the land they loved and the flora and fauna who dwelt among them. Division thinking begins by failing to respect existing communities of this sort.

The effects of such division thinking were exacerbated in the nineteenth century. In 1894 John W. Kimberly, the Minister of Foreign Affairs for Great Britain, the colonial power and chief oppressor of colonized people in the world at that time, again proposed the division of the Korean peninsula in order to make peace between Japan and China. This plan, designed from so-called first-world perspectives, essentially made Koreans scapegoats. It is noteworthy that President Truman and General MacArthur did not divide Japan, the war criminal, in 1945; instead, they divided Korea, the victim of world war and of colonial powers. In dividing Korea these men committed the sin of dividing and destroying a part of the integral order of creation itself. An integral order is deeply ecological in the sense that it involves a people in communion with their land. It is a community in the sense noted above: an ecological community of people living in meaningful degrees of harmony with one another and with the earth.

A few in the West recognized the need to respect such community. Averill Harriman, then the United States ambassador to Moscow, protested against MacArthur’s plan to divide Korea because he knew that Korea had a history as one community with one race, and that no one should divide her. But the structures of MacArthur’s consciousness -- which was built over a long period of his life with guns and swords -- were full of ruling ideologies, which wrongfully justified using the oppressed people as scapegoats for what he supposed to be justice, peace, and order. Though a so-called Christian working for justice, peace, and order in the created world, MacArthur did so from a consciousness informed by the hegemonic ideologies of the first world, ideologies that sought to divide existing communities. Thus Germany was divided after World War II. In Asia, by similar logic of division, Japan ought to have been similarly divided. But instead Korea was divided. This incident is not an accidental one.

The cause of this injustice can be traced back to 1905 when a secret agreement was made between President Taft (United States) and Prime Minister Katsura (Japan).1 The secret agreement was made because Japan wanted Korea as a colony and the United States wanted the Philippines; each agreed to support the other in these respective aims. The Philippines and Korea were the "food" for a coalition of Japanese and American imperialists. From 1910 to 1945 the leaders of the oppressed Korean people who tried to assert the self-reliance and independence of a united Korea were put into prisons, deported, exploited, tortured, politically assassinated, and martyred. The stories of their lives were not permitted to be put into print and were totally suppressed.

The people and their leaders who resisted the division of Korea could not enjoy the life spans given to them by God. Some, like Kim Koo, were killed by guns or stabbed to death by the hands of Cain, by the hands of men who rebelled against the will of God. Some, like Reverend Chun Dukee, were tortured to death. The length of their lives was shortened arbitrarily by the forces of the imperialist superpowers.

The sin of rebelling against God through the violation of the integrity of creation, through the destruction of the beauty and harmony of the Korean peninsula, was ultimately committed by military-industrial elites in collaboration with these superpowers, with Western European and North American colonial powers, and with Japan in Asia. This is a continuing sin based on action that followed the division thinking of the Taft-Katsura mentality.

Division Theology, Imperialism, and the Violation of Life

A kind of quasi-theology arose from the Taft-Katsura model. This quasi-theology is exemplified in the lives of men like the medical missionary Dr. William B. Scranton. Scranton was born in New Haven, Connecticut, graduated from Yale University, and received his M.D. degree from Columbia University in New York City. He was in certain respects a dedicated, loyal, and faithful servant of God, and he spent his life in Korea treating countless numbers of patients. He was one of the founders of the Sangdong Methodist Church, one of the first churches in Seoul City, and was at one time a district superintendent of the Methodist Church in Korea. In 1905 Imperial Japan forced Korea with guns and swords to sign a protectorate treaty and arrested all the diplomatic rights of Korea. This was the first stage of the colonialization of Korea by Japan. The Young Adult Association in the Sangdong Methodist Church began an active but nonviolent protest against Japanese Imperial colonialization. In response, Dr. Scranton, with the power of the district superintendent of the Methodist Church, disbanded the Young Adult Association of the church.

Dr. Scranton also took action against the pastor of the church, warning him not to make any political protests against the Japanese colonialization of Korea. This pastor, Chun Dukee, was very active in organizing the Shin Min Hwoe (New People’s Meeting), which had been working for the self-reliance, independence, and self-development of Korea, working in opposition to threats of colonialization by Japan. Numerous national leaders met with Chun Dukee, using the church as a secret gathering place. Among these were Yi Dongwhee, who later organized the Korean Communist Party, the first Communist Party in Asia; Kin Koo, who was respected as one of the genuine leaders of the Korean people for an undivided Korean peninsula and who was later assassinated by ultra-right-wing terrorists; and Yi Choon, the patriot who killed himself for the peace and independence of Korea.

Scranton’s warning to Chun Dukee and his disbanding of the Young Adult Association indirectly and directly contributed to the processes of enslavement and destruction of life. Scranton’s faith was informed by the Taft-Katsura model; it was centered in the interests of the imperialists. This first-world orientation led him unwittingly to support the destruction of humans and other living beings in Korea. In the language of the World Council of Churches, his actions against the people and the natural communities in the Korean peninsula were actions against the integrity of creation.

The Japanese colonial government, that resulted from the colonization, suppressed Christianity. It prohibited Korean ministers from reading the story of Exodus, the story of another enslaved people which rose up against another imperialist force; and from reading the book of Revelation, the story of passive resistance against the Roman Empire. Indeed, Korean Christians were not allowed to sing "Onward Christian Soldiers" because the Japanese government thought this hymn -- and the biblical stories mentioned -- would conscientize the people to fight against Japanese colonialism. These were the strategies of Japan to suppress the anti-Japanese independence movements among Korean Christians and to distort their faith.

What was the situation of human ecology in Korea under the Japanese colonial government? Young men in the Korean peninsula went to the proxy war and died there for the Japanese version of world peace and justice in Asia. Young women were forcefully "volunteered" to the Women’s Volunteer Corps and then misused as military prostitutes. Each woman was responsible for fifty to one hundred Japanese soldiers per day. They were systematically raped and subsequently died. There is no single memorial statue for the 200 thousand Korean women who died for the cause of the so-called justice and peace of the world.2 It is fair and essential to remember that many Christians supported these historical sins of imperialism, these and other cruelties by which imperialistic colonialism systematically destroyed the created order of nature, men, and women in the Korean peninsula.

Unlike the Israel of prophecy in Ezekiel, chapter 37, a Korea liberated from the Japanese in 1945 was still not a unified land. As noted above, the American general MacArthur divided Korea at this time. He and the United States divided Korea into two without any consent or even prior notice to any single Korean. This action was a clear violation of the rights of the Korean people. It further destroyed the life of the people and forcefully divided the members of countless families. Indeed, my own grandmother has been in North Korea since 1945, and my family has not heard anything of her for forty-three years. Division theologies fail to attend to those communities which are families, and which are among the most beautiful creations of God.

The United States decision to divide Korea clearly destroyed the integrity of many families. The south was placed under the Interim Military Government of the United States. Those who advocated unification were arrested, imprisoned, killed, eliminated from society, and labeled procommunist and leftist. Most of the Christians in the south, informed and guided by division faith, division ideology, and division theology, supported the "south-only election," which assured permanent division of the north from the south.

Division theologies -- by which families are separated, cultural traditions undermined, and natural communities destroyed -- characterized even some of the most astute of Western theologians. For example, John C. Bennett, one of the greatest Christian political ethicists and former professor at Union Theological Seminary, supported the United States foreign policy as a sort of manifestation of the justice, peace, and will of God.3 In actual fact, his support was the affirmation of the separation of families, husbands and wives, and the division of a whole people in the Korean peninsula. His theology was, as far as it concerned the Koreans, an imperialistic division theology. Later, in his book Radical Imperative: From Social Ethics to Theology, Bennett confessed his mistakes, and came to see that his view of American foreign policy in the 1940s and 1950s, a view that took American policies as manifestations and realizations of the kingdom of God, was gravely in error.

Reinhold Niebuhr also made mistakes in understanding Korea. In 1950 he interpreted the Korean War as a war against Russian communist world expansionism. His perspective had been centered on the U.S. and Russia and did not do justice to the Koreans, the scapegoats in this proxy war between the superpowers (see Noh, 1983). In his Intellectual-Autobiography Niebuhr, like Bennett, confessed his misinterpretation and his lack of fair attention to the destiny of Koreans and Vietnamese, scapegoats under the situations of proxy war (Niebuhr). Division ideologies, division faiths, and division theologies of the Koreans were products in many ways of the theologians of the superpowers. Such ideologies would eventually lead to the destruction of both human ecology and the biosphere in the Korean peninsula.

The Human and Nonhuman Consequences

What have been the practical consequences of these persistent efforts to divide Korea? Let us look. They include the sexual exploitation of women and the murder of protesters on Cheju Island; the development of a dependency upon nuclear powers; and an increasing dependence on polluting industry.

Cheju Island: Sexual Exploitation and Death

There is a beautiful island called Cheju in the southernmost part of the Korean peninsula. There are many oranges produced on this island, and it is one of the most popular honeymoon sites. It is also a popular place for international tourists in general and Japanese men in particular. This island is known as an island with an abundance of three things: wind, rocks, and women!

How romantic to see that there are many women in the southernmost island of Korea! However, not many people realize that there is a reason there are many women in that southernmost island with lots of oranges, tourists, and newlyweds. In fact, no one seems to ask the serious human ecological question of why there are so many women proportionally to men. Historical data on this matter has been legally banned from being published in any form for the last forty years. On 1 March, 1947, at a memorial rally on the island for the independence movement of 1919, two people were killed by government forces. Incidents on 3 April, 1948, led to the killing of eighty thousand islanders -- out of a total of 300 thousand who were labeled communist guerillas or pro-communists. Nearly one-third of the population on the island was killed. Almost all the males were eliminated. It will be the research task of engaged theological and biocentric ethics to know how many noncombatant civilians were killed in that massacre. According to the secret documents of the Far East Command, United States, later released to the public, the slogans of the Cheju Islanders were for the establishment of a self-reliant, unified Korean government and denied the division of the Korean peninsula, denying the south-only elections which eventually divided Korea permanently (see Merrill).

In 1988, on this island where almost all males were killed, there are many Geisha houses for non-Korean men only, each of which can entertain three hundred to five hundred Japanese men, men who do not need visas to come to the island for sex tourism. Is this a manifestation of the beautiful order of God’s creation? The descendants of the women of the Japanese Women’s Volunteer Corps who were forced into military prostitution have, in the 1980s, dedicated themselves to the sex tourism of Japanese men. In a twisted way, their work has been praised as patriotic and nation-building because it brings foreign money into the country. In a sermon, the pastor of one of the largest Pentecostal churches on the island called the action of the Geishas patriotic and then declared that these women should give more to the church from their income. Researchers at the International Christian Seminar on Women and Sex Tourism held on 20 April, 1988, at the YMCA. on Cheju Island reported that the Geishas, chatting to one another, said, "We need to have more Japanese tourists, so that we can give more to the church." Is this destruction of the human ecology representative of the integrity of God’s perfectly harmonized order of creation? This destruction involves the oppressed women of the most severely oppressed people in Korea. Such a violation of human ecology must be analyzed with regard to the domination of Korea by foreign powers and the divide-and-conquer strategies that continue to dehumanize the victimized people of the third world. So, too, must the current problems of nuclear weapons dependency. So, too, must the destruction of the ecological biosphere.

Nuclear Dependency

Currently the Korean peninsula is not self-reliant but is rather absolutely dependent on the nuclear war strategies of the superpowers in general and those of the United States in particular. It has been reported by many sources that there are more than enough nuclear bombs in South Korea to destroy the peninsula biologically forever. Reports indicate that there are from 120 to twelve hundred United States nuclear bombs in South Korea, and that there are approximately forty thousand United States ground troops stationed there. Russian nuclear weapons are targeted at South Korean military installations. American ground troops and civilians have efficient evacuation plans ready in case of emergency nuclear war. But there have been no reports on evacuation plans for the forty million Koreans in the south (it is not fair to comment on the case of North Korea without clear evidence).

Recently the Philippines has legislated a law declaring that those who bring nuclear weapons into the territory of the Philippines will be imprisoned for a sentence of at least six years and up to a maximum of thirty, and that all airplanes or ships carrying nuclear bombs will be arrested.4 There have been indications that the United States has explored plans to relocate the United States military from the Philippines to Taiwan. Such a relocation was strongly opposed by Taiwanese women delegates to the recent International Christian Seminar on Women and Sex Tourism, who insisted that it could result in making Taiwan a place of sex tourism for American soldiers. In the face of potential opposition, the United States has also examined the possible relocation of forces in the Philippines to Korea. Is it the case that the divided Korean peninsula will be the United States spare depot for nuclear bombs? Without prior notice to the NATO nations, United States troops are not allowed to use nuclear weapons in Europe. But in the case of the Korean peninsula, United States troops do have the power to start using nuclear weapons without any consent from the people, including the Korean commanders.

As was the case when Korea was divided in 1945, a decision-making structure that totally and intentionally ignores the opinions of any single Korean -- including the current Korean Commander-in-Chief of the military forces in Korea -- is applied now to nuclear-war strategies in Korea. From the time of the Korean War in 1950, an American was until just recently the commander-in-chief of all military forces, including the Korean forces, in South Korea. The decision-making structure still is not only an obstruction of internal justice, but it is a violation of international justice and of the sovereignty of Korea.

Korean life is threatened and the basic biological rights of Koreans are critically violated by the nuclear strategies of the United States. Neither can Russian responsibilities be ignored, since their nuclear weapons are ready to strike any part of the Korean peninsula. In the unfortunate case of nuclear war, Pyungyang City might be bombed by the nuclear warheads. What does this say of the survival of people in Seoul City? If Wonsan City is bombed, could the people of Kangnung City, Sokcho City, or Woolsan City in the south expect to survive? And what of nonhuman life in both the north and the south? What of the biosphere of the peninsula itself? What of even the fish in the Imjeen River or in the seas west and east of Korea? Americans in Korea have efficient evacuation plans, but the Koreans and the other living beings on the peninsula do not have such an escape. The entire peninsula and all its inhabitants are threatened with absolute devastation.

Japan declared an anti-nuclear policy by her constitution. Legally Japan is nuclear-weapon free. The Philippines also does not want to house nuclear weapons. Then why should Korea become the victim of the nuclear weapons of Russia and the United States?

But there are other problems.

Pollutant-Dependent Industry

Not long ago tens of thousands of people mourned the death of a fifteen-year-old boy who died of toxic poisoning as the result of working only six months in a mercury-producing factory. This is but a single example of how a once united land has become the scene of continued exploitation, and the example must be understood set against a recent background of general violence, division, and exploitation of Korean people and Korean land.

In April 1970, following a 1969 Nixon-Sato communique, the Mitsuya plan was proposed and subsequently implemented. The plan’s main points were as follows:

1. A unitary Japan-Republic of Korea (ROK) economic cooperation zone should be created to operate in the 1970s so that the two countries can develop a sort of Asian EEC (common market).

2. Japan will relocate to the South Korean industrial zone its steel, aluminum, oil refining, petrochemical, shipbuilding, electronics, plastics, and other industries that cannot be maintained in Japan because of pollution.

3. In view of the shortage of labor in Japan, Japan will also shift its labor-intensive industries to the ROK.

4. The ROK government will strictly prohibit labor disputes at factories for these Japanese-ROK joint ventures.

5. Flexible domestic measures will be taken within the ROK to facilitate this mode of operation (see Noh 1983).

This plan, one which again commits crimes of the Taft-Katsura type and of division theologies, is clearly exploitative. As with the problem of nuclear weapons, it clearly conjoins exploitation of and threats against the wellbeing of human beings with the exploitation of and threats against all of nature. This plan has been realized in what is now a pollution-dependent Korea through the cooperation of Japan and the United States. Ultra-right-wing theologies in Korea have interpreted the transfer of pollution-dependent industry to the ROK as a blessing, as a manifestation of God’s miraculous assistance toward economic growth. But this transfer of technology and industry from -- and the resulting reality of a dependency on -- the United States and Japan threatens the entire biosphere, the entire Korean peninsula. The mass destruction of human life -- as in the Bhopal incident in India or the Chernobyl nuclear incident in Russia -- could happen at any moment in Korea. The annihilation of human and nonhuman life is increasingly possible.

The economic policies of this plan have resulted in the systematic destruction of the sphere of food production in Korea, which now imports fifty to sixty percent of its total needs, mostly from the United States. Korea is now a country dependent for its food on the United States, although Korea had been self-reliant in terms of food production for thousands of years.

Up until the 1960s, eighty percent of the total population was located in the farming countryside. Now only twenty-seven percent lives in the agricultural sectors of the land. As is happening in so many parts of the world where Western models of development have prevailed, rural communities have been destroyed. Because of increasing food imports, there is no way for farmers to survive without giving up food production and that ecological sphere in which they once worked. Food is a weapon in neo-colonialistic capitalism. The food-dependent state cannot be politically self-reliant. In the Korea of today, Korean bachelor men who remain to live as farmers in the countryside are unable to find brides. Their livelihood is threatened from all sides. Because of imports of beef from the United States, farmers have had to kill their own cows -- and often themselves -- because of debts they have incurred in the current economic situation. Farmers have consistently lost their lands to become mere tenants. These peasants -- so connected as they have been to the earth -- have been the heart of the Korean nation. In 1894, Korea experienced the literal fall of a nation when peasants were killed in the Peasants’ Revolutionary War (see Noh 1987 and Noh 1988).

Toward a Theology of Silver Fish in the Imjeen River

To overcome the current critical situation, a theology of Jubilee must be declared in the land. Korean theologies have directly or indirectly supported the division of Korea, the violation of the integrity of creation, and the division-based psychoses and insecurities that have resulted from this violation and from the manipulation, intervention, and invasion of foreign superpowers. Korean theologies have been division theologies. They have led Korea toward an almost absolute submission to domination by the superpowers, a dehumanizing and degrading submission that has resulted in depressive frustration and neurotic inferiority complexes. As a consequence of this submission, Korean leaders and police have vented their frustrations by torturing their people, violating human rights, and raping subversive women students (as in the case of Deacon Moon Kiidong). These reactions are the symptoms of the collective division psychosis suffered by almost all the Korean people, a psychosis that has developed for over forty-four years. The only medication for such a sickness is the autonomy, self-reliance, and self-determination of the nation in an ecologically responsible way. A process for strengthening the people’s power and reunifying a land that has been systematically victimized by the superpowers calls for a theology of reunification and self-reliance. The Korean situation calls for a theology like the one embodied in the following story of fishes in a divided land, a theology of silver fish.

In January 1987 Park Chongchul, a Seoul National University student, was arrested by the police, who simply wanted to question him about another friend’s whereabouts. After overnight torture with water, and as a result of this torture, Park died. The police cremated his body hurriedly and tried to eliminate the evidence by throwing the ashes into the streams of the Imjeen River, which runs between the divided north and south of Korea. The life of one student, who shouted out for the autonomy, self-reliance, and reunification of a divided land and for the democratization of military dictatorships, was chemically reduced to a few grams of calcium, nitrogen, and so on. After the cremation, these chemical elements -- the ashes -- were thrown into the river. I dreamed that they became the numerous silver-colored fishes in the river. My hope is that these silver fish will live forever, or at least for as long and as far as the Imjeen River flows. They will swim in the demilitarized zone that divides Korea into two.

What we need is a theology of silver fish, a theology that moves beyond division thinking toward respect for the integrity of creation. A theology of silver fish will guide us into that beautiful unity of people in relation to one another and in relation to the earth, but it must do so by overcoming the division ideologies of foolish theologians and the division faiths of misguided Christians. If a theology of silver fishes emerges, one that respects the integrity of the Korean people and their beautiful peninsula, division theologies based on the division psychosis will be transformed into theologies that respect living communities of people and land. Then the memory of Park Chongchul, and the many others like him who have suffered so much, can be redeemed. Then the silver fish of the Imjeen river can themselves enjoy the unpolluting peace of the living Christ.

 

Notes

1. Ki-baik Lee writes, "Roosevelt felt, moreover, that it was necessary to acquiesce in Japanese domination of Korea as a quid pro quo for Japan’s recognition of U.S. hegemony over the Philippines. This deal between the U.S. and Japan is revealed in the secret Taft-Katsura Agreement of July 1905. England, too, in renegotiating the terms of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in August 1905, acknowledged Japan’s right to take appropriate measures for the ‘guidance, control, and protection’ of Korea" (Lee, 309).

2. A monument related to this problem has been built recently in Chiban Prefacture, Japan. See Chung-Ok Yoon (a professor at Ewha University) 1988.

3. John C. Bennett writes: "I recognize in myself a too bland acceptance of national trends in the 1940’s and 1950’s. The fact that there was considerable harmony between my ethical convictions and the policies of the United States Government during the Second World War and during the early years of the cold war contributed to this" (Bennett, 9-10).

4. Chosun Daily News, 27 May 1988.

 

Works Cited

Bennet. John C. The Radical Imperative: From Theology to Social Ethics. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1975.

Lee, Ki-baik. A New History of Korea. Trans. Edward W. Wagner. Seoul: Ilchokak, 1984.

Merrill, John. "Chejudo Rebellion." In The Island That Never Sleeps. Ed. Youngmin Noh. Seoul: Onnuree, 1988.

Neibuhr, Reinhold. "Intellectual Autobiography" in Reinhold Niebuhr: His Religious, Social, and Political Thought. Ed. C. W. Kegley and R. W. Bretall. New York:Macmillan, 1967.

Noh, Jong Son. First World Theology and Third World Critique. New York: Sung Printing Co, 1983. Seoul: Publishing, 1987

_____.Religion and Just Revolution. Voice Publishing, 1987.

_____.Toward a Theology of Reunification: Third World Christian Ethic. Seoul: Hanwoolsa, 1988.

Yoon, Chung-Ok. "Report at the International Christian Conference on Women and Sex Tourism," Chejudo YMCA. 20 April 1988.

Zen and the Self

When one attains enlightenment in Zen Buddhism, at least two things are realized. First, one realizes that the deepest level of one’s life -- what in Zen is called the "true self" -- is always here-and-now. And second, one understands that this true self, even though here-and-now, is always changing. The aim of this essay is to interpret these insights from a process perspective and thereby illuminate certain aspects of the human self. The essay is not about Zen alone, or the self alone, but both. For the true self discovered in enlightenment is the ordinary self or "everyday mind" of each and every human life. (ZDPR 31). Yet, as Zen well attests, this everyday mind has unique qualities which contravene customary ways of thinking about selfhood and reality. In what follows I hope to explain some of these qualities and the everyday mind to which they belong.

I. Definitions and Perspectives

In process philosophy the life of a human being is viewed as a series of experiences extending from birth (and perhaps before) to death (and perhaps after). Each experience in this series is a subjective process of feeling many data and synthesizing them into a complex experiential whole. When the synthesis is complete, the immediacy of the experience perishes, and the experience becomes an object to be remembered consciously or subconsciously by subsequent experiences. As an object remembered, an experience is a superject. As an immediate process of feeling and synthesizing, it is a subject. To say that a human life is a series of experiences, then, is to say that such a life is a series of subjects which become superjects for subsequent subjects.

In this essay the word "person" will refer to a particular series of experiences extending from physical birth to physical death considered as a whole. The word "subject" will refer to any experience in that series, insofar as the experience is a process of feeling and synthesizing data. And the word "self" will refer to that particular subject in the ongoing life-history of a person which is present rather than past or future. Thus a person is a series of subjects, and a person’s self is the subject which at any given moment is here-and-now. When a particular subject that is here-and-now perishes, it loses its status as the self of the person at issue. The subsequent subject takes its place. Thus a person’s self consists of a different subject at each moment, but at any given moment the self is here-and-now.

The self as just defined is the "true self" or "everyday mind" of Zen. When one attains enlightenment in Zen, the reality of this self is uncovered in an intuitive and nondiscursive way, and it is seen that this self is both always here-and-now and always changing. This realization marks the beginning of a new way of experiencing based on the reality of the self. Inasmuch as the self is always here-and-now, one lives fully and creatively in the present. Inasmuch as it is always changing, one realizes the impossibility of clinging to any particular moment of the self’s existence. In a certain sense, the self is a groundless ground. It is a ground because it is the point of departure for all activity in the world, and it is groundless because it is never the same at any two instants. One cannot cling to one’s self; one can only be one’s self at each moment. As Ummon put it: "When walking just walk, when sitting just sit, above all, don’t wobble" (ZDPR 5).

If we are to understand the true self, though, we must recognize that there are two perspectives from which it can be viewed. One is a third-person perspective; the other is a first-person perspective. In Zen the first-person perspective is always preferred. The enlightenment experience itself is an uncovering of what has always been present from a first-person point of view. A dialogue between Zen and process philosophy must therefore involve a recasting of the ideas of process thought in first-person terms.

In order to illustrate the difference between a third-person and a first-person perspective, imagine swimming the length of a pool. If in your mind’s eye you picture a body crossing a pool from one end to the other, then you are assuming a third-person perspective. It is as if you are a spectator on the side of the pool watching a body as it moves from one location to another. If, on the other hand, you imagine yourself inside the body of the swimmer, such that your arms are moving in front of you and water is splashing at your sides, you are assuming a first-person perspective. Both perspectives are of course products of the imagination, but one involves imagining experience from the outside, whereas the other involves imagining it from the inside.

While the first-person perspective is preferable in a dialogue with Zen, the third-person perspective also has its merits. Through it, for example, we can easily picture the referents of the term "self, person," and "subject" as they have been defined. The act of swimming the length of a pool can be taken as a metaphor for human life. The side from which one dives into the pool represents physical birth, the side toward which one swims represents physical death, and each stroke of the arm represents an experience on the journey from birth to death. The person would be the series of strokes considered as a whole. A subject would be any and every particular stroke, regardless of whether it is past, present, or future. The self would be that subject which at any given moment is in a process of occurring. The self would be the first stroke of the arm as it occurs, then the second as it occurs, then the third, and so forth. Thus while a particular subject is stationed in a particular region, the self moves from region to region, traversing the length of the pool, aiming toward death.

Approached from this third-person point of view, the image of a swimmer swimming is helpful in picturing the self in relation to the person and to the subjects constituting the life-history of the person. The self is on the cutting edge of a person’s life, being-toward-death. Yet a third-person approach is problematic because it tempts us to think of our respective selves as something other than who we are. The self appears as a mere image or object in our mind’s eye, an abstraction. In order to counter this limitation of the third-person perspective, it is necessary to imaginatively assume a first-person point of view. We must leave the side of the pool and dive in, and thus become the swimmer swimming. To dive in is to enter the domain of the self in its own element, the element of lived experience. It is also to enter the domain of Zen.

II. The Self as Doing and Undergoing

One’s true self is whatever one is doing or undergoing, as one is doing or undergoing it. As I type words on paper, for example, my self is the typing. As I gaze out the window, my self is the gazing. As I drive home from work, my self is the driving. As I eat dinner, my self is the eating. And as I sleep, my self is the sleeping. Your self at this moment is reading the words on this paper.

In lived experience, the ongoing process of doing and undergoing is a process of experiencing the world from a subjective point of view. One’s subjective experience is not something others can observe, and yet it is constantly occurring as the very essence of one’s process of existence. The word "doing" points to the active side of subjective experience and to the bodily actions that issue from that active side. The word "undergoing" refers to the receptive side of experience, to that side of experience in which the world is experienced as given fact. At this moment, for example, you are experiencing the ink marks on this page as given facts. This aspect of your experience is the receptive side. Yet you are interpreting their meaning and responding to them, which is the active side of your experience. Almost al lived experience involves both an active and a receptive component, an aspect of doing and one of undergoing.

Process philosophy helps us unpack the essence of experiencing still further. Hartshorne and Whitehead suggest that one’s subjective experiencing is a process of synthesizing the data of experience into an aesthetic whole by perceiving them (the receptive side) and responding thereto (the active side). To perceive data is to "feel" them, to take them into account subjectively. From the perspective of lived experience, the data include any objects of any sort that can be experienced in any way. Ink marks, plants, animals, rocks, trees, ideas, future possibilities, remembered events, and bodily sensations are all data in this sense. As I gaze out my window, for example, the data of my experience include people and cars, rocks and trees, the breeze against my face, the ideas I am entertaining, and the sensation of my elbow against the table on which I lean. These data are being synthesized or gathered together into the immediacy of my subjectivity. Moreover, I am responding to them, and this response is part of the process through which they are being synthesized. I am responding to the visual image of the cars and people, for example, by in my attention to the people and allowing the cars to recede into the background of my awareness. The way the cars and people come together in my subjective synthesis thus depends, at least in part, on how I respond to them.

In process thought it is further suggested that my response, stemming as it does from the active side of my experience, is free. This does not mean that it occurs independently of environmental or biographical influence. The fact that I focus on people rather than cars depends in part on social conditioning and my own personal history. Yet my immediate response is free in that it is actualized by me in the very immediacy of my experience. It is not actualized by other people, or by the cars, or by any of the past influences. It arises de novo as my own self-creation. This suggests that, at the ground of my experience, there is a kind of spontaneity or creativity by virtue of which I respond to the world. In actualizing this creativity, I create my own subjective essence at this moment. My self creates itself in responding to the world. Furthermore, in and amidst my self-creativity lies the possibility of responding to the world in multiple ways. Although I did respond to the cars and people by directing my attention to people, I could have directed it to the cars. Self-creativity implies the possibility of novel responses to given situations.

It is just such novelty that one sees in the everyday life of the Zen master, the person who has discovered the creativity of the "true self." The stories of the masters -- where one puts a sandal on his head in response to a question and another shouts "mu" -- are vivid exemplifications of the subjective self-creativity that lies at the ground of their respective selves. Similarly, these masters insist that koans must be answered freely and spontaneously by the student or they will not accept the answers. The masters are not simply encouraging freedom from anxiety. They are encouraging the freedom of novelty. The aim often is to "attain a new and creative Zen personality in order to live freely in this world" (ZCM 162).

But the active side of experience -- the realm of subjective doing -- is not all that is emphasized in Zen. So is the receptive side of experience -- the realm of undergoing. To undergo, however, is not to feel burdened. The world that one experiences as given is not felt as an obligation placed on oneself. Instead it is felt as part of oneself. It is something with which one can empathetically identify, because it is part of who one is. As was explained of one Zen master, "the rocks, the river, everything he could see, all this was his True Self" (ZDPR 29).

In process terms, the world is the objective content of the subjective self. The data of experience -- rocks, trees, animals, people, etc. -- are part of the world, and yet they are part of the self as well. They are aspects of the universe itself as gathered together into the unity of subjective experience. The self, as whatever one is doing or undergoing, is a concrescence of the universe" (PR 51).

The immanence of the objective world in the self can be understood through an example. Imagine talking to a friend. She stands in front of you and thus is external to your body. Yet she is within your experience. Through your visual field, your auditory field, and your field of concern, she is part of you. Your self is thus a field of awareness or a field of feeling which includes seeing, hearing, and caring, plus numerous other modes of experience. It is not, as Descartes would have it, a soul locked within your body and isolated from the world. It is a field of feeling in which other beings are simultaneously apprehended and gathered together into a single whole. It is in this sense that the self is a concrescence of the universe.

The insight that the self is a field of feeling or a field of awareness has occurred, not only in Zen or in process thought, but also in twentieth century phenomenology. In Being and Time, for example, the Heideggerian Dasein emerges as a field of concern rather than as an isolated ego. It is noteworthy that Whitehead also uses the word concern to capture the essence of the experiential field (AI 176, 180). Heidegger and Whitehead both see that subjective experience has wrongly been envisioned in past philosophy in terms of models derived from objects of sense-experience. The objects of sense-experience, and in particular those of visual experience, are often passive and bounded in particular regions of space to the exclusion of other regions. One’s experiential field or consciousness, on the other hand, is neither passive nor bounded in one region to the exclusion of others. As will be seen subsequently, the self is centered in the body, but not bounded by it. As a field of feeling or concern, the self is in the body, yet beyond it.

In Zen and in process thought, however, the intimacy of the self and world is stressed even more than it is in the phenomenological tradition. While Heidegger’s expression "being-in-the-world" suggests an integral relation between self and world, other aspects of his thought suggest a dichotomy. In particular one does not sense a continuity between Dasein and the world of nonhuman life. In Zen and process thought, by contrast, there is a radical continuity between the self and the natural world, and in two respects. First, the natural world is in the self as its objective content. Trees and rocks are just as much a part of the human self as are other human beings. Second, an ontological continuity is stressed between the human self and nonhuman life. In Buddhist terms, all beings are expressions of the Buddha-nature. In process terms, all beings are expressions of subjective self-creativity. Not only is it the case that the universe is part of the self, it is also the case that the beings in the universe are similar to the self in their ultimate make-up. In each of these ways, a continuity between the self and the world is affirmed.

Because in Zen and in process thought the universe is the objective content of the self, it is inappropriate to speak of a boundary between the self and the world. In this way both Zen and process thought transcend the infamous subject-object dichotomy. The transcendence does not involve collapsing the objective world into a figment of the subjective imagination or collapsing subjectivity into a piece of the objective world. Nor does it involve a lapse into pure monism where all particularities, subjective or objective, disappear (ZDPR 15). Instead it involves an assertion (in process thought) and an existential realization (in Zen) that one’s self is at every moment a unification, directly or indirectly, of the universe. The universe itself concresces in and through whatever one is doing or undergoing.

III. The Self as Always Here-and-Now

As a field of subjectivity in which the world is gathered together, the self is always here-and-now.

From a third-person perspective, the word "here" has no particular referent. It can apply to any particular location in one context or another. From a first-person perspective, however, the word "here" refers to wherever one is standing, sitting, or lying down: that is, to the location of one’s body. This does not mean that there is an absolute frame of reference through which to specify the body’s location. Instead it means that one’s body is the frame of reference through which other locations are specified. As Whitehead put it: "A traveler, who has lost his way, should not ask, Where am I? What he really wants to know is, Where are the other places? He has got his own body, but he has lost them" (PR 170). To say that one’s self is "here," then, is ordinarily to say that it is in one’s body, feeling the world.

Still the word "in" must be interpreted. From a first-person perspective the self is not "in" one’s body in the same manner that a piece of paper is in a trashcan or that a cup is in a cupboard. These examples point to objects that are in receptacles in such fashion that they are isolated from entities outside the receptacles. By contrast, the self; though in the body, is not isolated from beings outside the body. From a first-person perspective the self is "in" the body in the same sense that one’s visual field is in one’s eyes. As I gaze out my window, my visual field is in my eyes in the sense that my eyes are the locus from which I reach out visually to include the world. Analogously, my self is in my body in the sense that, ordinarily, my body is the locus from which my field of feeling extends outward to include the world. My visual field is simply one aspect of this overall field of feeling. My self; as a field of feeling, is in my body and beyond it.

While most lived experience is in the body in the sense just described, a speculative possibility needs to be mentioned for the sake of further clarification of the meaning of the term "here." The possibility is that a self might exist without a body -- for example, in some kind of life-after-death. If this were to happen, what would be the meaning of the term "here"? It would be, I think, that the self would feel its environment (whatever that environment would be and whatever modes of feeling are at work) from some region of what Whitehead called the extensive continuum. Ultimately, then, the word "here" points to a region of this continuum from which the self feels its world. In ordinary human experience this region is coextensive with the body or with some aspect of the body. If a self could exist without a body, however, it would still be "here" from its own perspective.

The self never experiences its regional perspective as an object among objects. This is because the self occupies the region, proceeding out from it to form a field of awareness in which the world is contained. As I gaze out my window, for example, I gaze from a particular regional perspective. But this region is not an object among the objects I perceive. It is not this tree, or that rock, or even the totality of visual data. It is the region from which I perceive that totality, a region that my self immediately occupies. I become aware of this region, though, in being aware of the data. Their presence "there" discloses my presence "here." This corresponds to the general principle, made popular in the tradition of nineteenth century German idealism, that self-consciousness occurs in and through other-consciousness. But it is important to remember that the "others" of whom I am aware in self-consciousness are themselves the objective content of my self. Though the trees and rocks are "there" outside my body, they are "here" within my experience. As Whitehead put it: "The world within experience is identical with the world beyond experience. The occasion of experience is within the world and the world is within the occasion" (AI 228).

At this point, however, the words "world" and "universe" have been used primarily with reference to the world of spatial perception. It is also the case that the data of temporal awareness are within experience. In remembering the past either consciously or subconsciously, the past is "here" within experience even though its immediacy has perished. And in anticipating possibilities the future is "here" within experience, even though it does not yet exist as actuality. Memory and anticipation are aspects of that field of feeling which is the self; and through these modes of perception the past and future are immanent within the self.

The immanence of the past and future in the self does not mean that the past and future are interchangeable. Though some interpreters of Zen might speak of the reversibility of time, I believe that in Zen, as in ordinary life, time is unidirectional. In enlightenment one does not see that the past and future are interchangeable, but rather that they are symmetrically present within one’s field of experience. In Zen time goes one way, though at each point along the way the past and future are symmetrically present in experience through memory and anticipation.

The fact that the world of time and space is "here" in experience also means that it is "now" in experience. The word "here" tells us where the self is from its own point of view; the word "now" tells us when it is. The way in which the "now" is understood, however, is crucial. It can be understood either from a third-person perspective or a first-person perspective.

From a third -person perspective the "now" has often been pictured as a particularized moment in a series of moments. On one side of this moment stand past moments, and on the other side stand unactualized future moments. From a first-person perspective, however, this picture of particularized now-moments is descriptively inadequate. The now of lived experience is not an object that is felt, but rather the subject that is feeling. It is the process of experiencing the world, not the world experienced. As a process of experiencing, the now is ongoing and ever-present. It is not as if one cannot grasp it. Rather it is the case that one cannot escape it. Wherever one goes, whatever one is doing, one’s field of feeling is now.

To say that the self is always here-and-now, then, is to say that it is a process of experiencing which proceeds from a particular region. The word "here" refers to the region, and the word "now" refers to the process of experiencing. The word "always" means that there are no exceptions. Wherever one is, whatever one is experiencing, one is invariably here-and-now.

IV. The Self as Always Changing

Yet, even as one is invariably here-and-now, one is also always changing. This is the other aspect of what is realized about the self in Zen enlightenment. This fact of perpetual change is what is meant by impermanence in traditional Buddhism. In Zen this traditional doctrine applies even to the true self. The true self does not transcend time, but rather lives time from the inside.

From a third-person perspective it is easy to picture the manner in which the true self is constantly changing. Recall the image of a swimmer swimming the length of a pool. The "person" is represented by the series of strokes from one end of the pool to the other. Each "subject" is represented by a particular stroke. And the "self’ is represented by that particular stroke which, in the ongoing life-history of the person, is immediately occurring. While each subject is in a sense stationary by virtue of the fact that it occupies a particular region of the pool, the self traverses the length of the pool as one subject and then another, moving from region to region. Thus the self is different at every moment and yet invariably here-and-now.

From a first-person perspective, however, the self’s change does not lie in the fact that it moves from region to region. Its change is not necessarily that of bodily position. For example, one may stay in the same region of space for a given period of time, and yet be feeling and thinking different things at each moment. The impermanence of the self lies in the subjective process of experiencing (the "now") whether there is or is not a change in bodily location (the "here"). Even in meditation this subjective change is occurring, though not in the form of rapidly shifting thoughts and conscious feelings. Rather it is occurring in bodily feelings, the feeling of breathing, for example. Meditational experiences involve timelessness only in the sense that ordinary temporal transitions, discernible through shifting thoughts and momentary feelings, are transcended. Deeper temporal transitions, in particular those involved with bodily experience, continue.

In ordinary experience, there are four ways in which the transitions of the self are disclosed. In the first place, they are disclosed through sense-perception. As objects in one’s visual field move through space, for example, one’s feeling of them changes. This is because feelings of visual and other sensory objects ordinarily involve a sense of where they are spatially, and their locations are in constant flux. A second way in which the transitions of the self are disclosed is through the memory of past subjective experiences. In such memory one recognizes a difference between then and now, and one thus sees that a transition in the nature of the self has occurred. A third way is through anticipation. Whereas memory discloses transitions that have taken place, anticipation discloses transitions that may take place in the future. I anticipate the completion of a paragraph, for example, and thus discover the possibility of new content to my self in the future.

Yet there is a fourth way in which the transitions of the self are disclosed, a way that is more perspicuous than sense-perception, memory, or anticipation. This is through the activity of making decisions. At a conscious or subconscious level, suggests Whitehead, we are always deciding how to think, feel, or act in response to the data of our experience. Examples from consciousness are manifold. When I see a book on a table, I respond either by deciding to take further note of it because it seems interesting or by deciding to dismiss it from my immediate attention. When I hear the telephone ring, I respond by deciding either to answer it or let it ring. When I think of a word to use in conversation, I respond by deciding either to use it or not. In the latter example the reality of subconscious decision comes into purview, for much speech involves making subconscious decisions either to use or not to use certain words. The point is that at all times -- either on a conscious or subconscious level -- the self is experiencing and deciding upon possibilities for thought, feeling, and action. This is the truth so well articulated in the literature of existentialism: namely that we are condemned to freedom; we cannot choose not to choose.

The activity of choosing or making decisions that is occurring in one’s life is the reality of self-creativity mentioned in the first section of this paper. At every moment the self is creating itself by making a decision as to how to respond to the data of its experience. It is this self-creativity that is uncovered so vividly in the Zen enlightenment experience and that is then highlighted in the Zen way of experiencing. In Zen it is realized not that one may or may not decide to respond to the world, but rather that of necessity one responds to the world. For the deepest aspect of one’s life -- the true self -- is identical with this response.

Inasmuch as the self is always in the process of deciding, it is always coming-into-being. In this sense one is always on the way toward the actualization of some possibility for thought, feeling, or action. It is also the case, however, that the self is always passing-out-of-being. From a first-person perspective this passing out of being is not experienced as the passing of a fleeting now-moment. Instead it is experienced as the activity of creating a personal past, the immediacy of which can never be retrieved. To respond to the data of experience is to create a personal fact which becomes part of the past, never to be relived. Thus the self is perpetually perishing, to use Whitehead’s phrase, even as it is perpetually creating itself. It is simultaneously a process of dying and living at each moment.

The fact that the self is always living and dying gives it a peculiar ontological status. In traditional Buddhist terminology, it neither is nor is not. In Whiteheadian terminology, it becomes, but "never really is" (PR 82). One way to capture this ontological status is to speak of the self as a "process," both in Whitehead’s sense of concrescence (coming-into-being) and transition (the perishing of immediacy). The self, then, is not a being in the sense of being a static fact, nor is it mere nothingness. It is pure subjective becoming, pure process, that is perpetually perishing in the midst of its becoming. The key to Zen Buddhism lies not in escaping this process, but rather in living it fully. Ultimately, of course, one has no choice except to live the process fully, for the process is one’s own life. What happens in Zen enlightenment, however, is that this perpetual process of living and dying -- the everyday mind -- becomes the lived point of departure for all activity in the world. The enlightened Buddhist discovers that she need not cling to the past or the future, because she is always here-and-now. And she discovers that she cannot cling to her life; she can only live it fully, because she is constantly changing.

 

References

ZCM -- Zenkei Shibayama. Zen Comments on the Mumonkan. New York: Harper and Row, 1975.

ZDPR -- Anne Bancroft. Zen: Direct Pointing to Reality. New York: Thames and Hudson, 1979.

Land Ethics, Animal Rights, and Process Theology

Traditionally many Christian theologies have recognized that humans are called by God to care for the world. Theologies of ecology emphasize that such care rightly includes among its subjects animals, plants, and the land. Philip Joranson and Ken Butigan, the editors of Cry of the Environment: Rebuilding the Christian Creation Tradition, a multi-authored theological study of the environmental crisis, speak of such inclusive care as "creation consciousness" (CE). For them the phrase intentionally suggests that all earthly creatures are parts of God’s creation, that all are recipients of God’s care, and hence that all merit our own appreciation and moral regard. I begin this essay by sharing the assumption of Joranson and Butigan, namely that creation consciousness is a needed attitude on the part of Christians if, in relation to the abuse of nature, Christians are to be part of the solution rather than part of the problem.1

As the twenty-eight authors of Cry of the Environment show, there are numerous resources from which Christians can draw as they seek to embody creation consciousness. They can turn to underemphasized traditions within the Judeo-Christian heritage, both biblical and post biblical, highlighting the motif of stewardship; they can turn to contemporary developments in any and science; and they can turn to feminism and to other world religions. The value of Cry of the Environment is that it contains individual essays which, taken collectively, employ all of these resources. One weakness of the book, however, is that it fails to take advantage of an additional resource that can be very important to the task of encouraging creation consciousness. It fails to include resources from philosophy, or, more particularly, from that contemporary movement in philosophy called "environmental philosophy," which, as articulated in a journal such as Environmental Ethics, has a growing number of advocates in Western Europe, the United States, and Australia.2

The task of this essay is to indicate resources in contemporary environmental philosophy that can contribute to a Christian embodiment of creation consciousness. My aims are (a) to review the major movements that have emerged recently in environmental philosophy, (b) to suggest some of the implications of these movements for creation consciousness, and (c) to show how process theology provides a perspective for integrating the truths of these movements, thereby encouraging creation consciousness.

The paper is divided into five sections. In the first I deal with the land ethics tradition as initiated by Aldo Leopold; and in the second with the animal rights movement as exemplified by Peter Singer. I show how these two movements are, at face value, conflicting: the first emphasizing the rights of ecosystems, the second those of individual organisms. In the third I discuss the philosophy of Whitehead and its environmental ethic as developed by Birch and Cobb as a potential resource for resolving this conflict. Using Whitehead’s philosophy, I argue that the truths of the land ethics tradition and the animal rights movement can be jointly affirmed. In the fourth section I discuss Heidegger and the Deep Ecology movements as additional resources for Christian creation consciousness. And in the fifth section I discuss process theology (influenced as it currently is not only by Whitehead but also by biblical and liberation perspectives) as a contemporary Christian tradition in which aspects of each of these diverse philosophical resources -- land ethics and animal rights, Heidegger and Deep Ecology -- can be synthesized.

I. Land Ethics

Chief among the forerunners of environmental ethics is Aldo Leopold (1887-1948), forest and game manager for the U.S. Forest Service and later professor of game management at the University of Wisconsin. In his well-known A Sand County Almanac, Leopold argued that ethics should move beyond anthropocentrism toward a land ethic. He was among the first to coin the phrase "land ethic," and to this day his understanding of the phrase’s content serves as a resource for environmental philosophers.3

Leopold believed that ethical codes and aptitudes can and should evolve. What in one generation may seem unworthy of moral consideration can in the next generation seem worthy, and rightly so. Consider, for example, our attitude toward Greek ethics as the latter are illustrated in the Odyssey. "When god-like Odysseus returned from the wars of Troy." Leopold reminds us, "he hanged all on one rope a dozen slave girls." For Odysseus the hanging "involved no question of propriety." After all, the girls were suspected of misbehavior, and something had to be done to prevent further occurrences. But such behavior on Odysseus’ part should not lead us to think that ancient Greece was without concepts of right and wrong. "Witness the fidelity of his wife through the long years before at last his black-prowed galleys clove the wine-dark seas for home." From Odysseus’ perspective as from that of any aristocratic Greek, relationships with slaves were not matters involving ethics. "The girls were property," and "the disposal of property was then, as now, a matter of expedience, not right and wrong" (SCA 201).

In modern times many readers of this essay would judge Odysseus’ actions to be reprehensible. We realize that those who have been called "slaves" are human beings with integrity of their own, and that they have rights of their own, including the right not to be enslaved. We know, of course, that this realization is still not universally shared, and that more subtle forms of enslavement still exist even in societies, including our own, where blatant slavery is condemned. Nonetheless, our own disdain for Odysseus’ actions illustrates what Leopold would call an evolution in ethics, at least in principle. Our care, or at least our understanding of the appropriate scope and implications of care, has become more inclusive than it was in ancient Greece. According to Leopold, ethical progress occurs when beings once regarded in merely utilitarian terms -- that is, as property -- come to be regarded as appropriate subjects of moral regard, and codes of conduct follow. As Leopold puts it in discussing the transition from Greek society to our own: "During the three thousand years which have since elapsed, ethical criteria have been extended to many fields of conduct, with corresponding shrinkages in those judged by expediency only" (SCA 201).

Leopold’s argument in proposing a land ethic is that it is time to expand even further our horizons of ethical regard. Our circle of concern must extend beyond the human sphere to the biosphere, cognizant of the fact that we are part of a "biotic community." The problem, Leopold writes, is that "there is as yet no ethic dealing with man’s relation to land and to animals and plants which grow upon it. Land, like Odysseus’ slave-girls, is still property. The land relation is still strictly economic, entailing privileges but not obligations" (SCA 201). Leopold’s aim is to remedy this situation.

His proposed "land ethic" is decidedly communitarian or systemic in emphasis. As we extend our horizons of concern, Leopold suggests, our actions can be guided by the following principle:

A thing is right when it tends to preserve the integrity, stability, and beauty of the biotic community. It is wrong when it tends otherwise. (SCA 224-225)

As is observed by J. Baird Callicott, a contemporary environmental philosopher and defender of Leopold, what is noteworthy about this principle "is that the good of the biotic community is the ultimate measure of the moral value, the rightness or wrongness, of actions" (AL 318).

Leopold’s emphasis on community has concrete implications for action. His principle suggests, for example, that it might be acceptable to hunt and kill white tail deer in order to protect a local ecosystem from the disintegrating effects of excessive population growth. And yet the principle also implies that it would be obligatory to protect individual members of an endangered species from extermination, since they are part of the integrity, stability, and beauty of a biotic community. In Callicott’s words: "In every case the effect upon ecological systems is the decisive factor in the determination of the ethical quality of actions" (AL 321; my emphasis).4

With Leopold’s interest in expanding ethical horizons beyond the human arena, of course, the ecologically oriented Christian will be naturally sympathetic. Indeed creation consciousness involves precisely such expansion. And yet two questions naturally emerge from an encounter with Leopold. The first concerns value in nature. In what sense, after all, is the land valuable apart from its usefulness to human ends? The second concerns the status of the individual nonhuman organism. Given the emphasis on ecosystems or biotic communities that is so central to the land ethic, what is the moral status of the individual organism? Let us deal with the first question at this point and then turn in the next section to the second.

An environmental philosopher who has thought much about the issue of value in nature is Holmes Rolston, III (PGW). Rolston laments that many influenced by the mechanistic worldview of industrial civilizations think of nonhuman nature as something devoid of value until assigned importance by human beings. The common but problematic assumption is that humans are the only creatures within creation with inherent value: "loci of value lost in a worthless environment" (AVN 151). Yet Rolston does not counter this denial of nature’s value, as might some Christians, by proposing that nature has worth because assigned it by God. Rather he suggests that nature has value in itself, God or no God. He proposes that if we analyze our own experience of nature carefully, we will see that in many instances we experience nature, not merely as a recipient of value assignments, but as a "carrier of values" (VN 113). If we are phenomenologically honest, we realize that nature carries values which supersede our own invention.

Rolston realizes that nature does not disclose its values to us apart from our subjective interpretations of it. With Kant and most philosophers since Kant, Rolston argues that our experience of nature is inevitably interpretive. Yet Rolston does suggest that, amid our interpretations, there is a receptive component. We do not simply create the nonhuman realities -- plants, animals, and inorganic materials -- that we interpret; rather we experience these realities as given to us for interpretation, and in their givenness values are disclosed. Some of these values are aesthetic: "the mist that floats about an alpine cliff, spitting out lacy snowflakes, tiny exquisite crystals" (VN 120). Some have to do with the unity and diversity of life and material forms: the macroscopic web of diverse life-forms that is matched by the unity revealed by the electron microscope or the X-ray spectrometer. And some pertain to the value living beings have in and for themselves: like that of the "tarantula at the Grand Canyon in 1896" whom the American naturalist and conservationist John Muir refused to kill (VN 121). If we attend to and reflect upon our own experience and knowledge of nature, we see that "values are actualized in human relationships with nature, sometimes by (human) constructive activity depending on a natural support, sometimes by a sensitive, if an interpretive, appreciation of the characteristics of natural objects" (VN 121).

Rolston is representative of most environmental ethicists in encouraging us to recognize the inherent worth of nature. Yet he, like Leopold and his advocates, warns against understanding it in atomistic or excessively individualistic terms. When people argue for the "intrinsic value" of a natural entity -- that is, the value a natural entity might have for what it is in itself -- Rolston is troubled. From his perspective "the ‘for what it is in itself’ fact of intrinsic value becomes problematic in a holistic web." It is "too internal and elementary; it forgets relatedness and externality." It neglects the fact that everything is good "in a role, in a whole" (AVN 146). Rolston’s point is that individual mountains, plants, and animals do indeed have value apart from their usefulness to humans, but not in isolation from their environments. Their own intrinsic value is that of being organic parts of biotic communities, and ultimately, of nature as a whole.

As to why nature as a whole has value, Rolston does not say. Certainly his silence on the matter suggests that, in the last analysis, the appeal is to intuition. But perhaps it is important to note that another environmental philosopher, Mary Ann Warren, believes silence of this sort betrays an as yet unanswered question among environmental philosophers. Asking what sorts of value nonhuman creatures might have, Warren writes: "The environmentalists’ answer is that they are valuable as organic parts of the natural whole." This is indeed Rolston’s perspective. "But," she says, "this answer is incomplete, in that it does not explain why we ought to value the natural world as a whole, except insofar as it serves our own interests to do so." To the question of why we ought to value the web of life in the first place "no clear and persuasive answer to this more basic question has yet been given" (RNW 128).

On this matter a momentary aside is in order. For a Christian drawn toward creation consciousness, the answer to "this more basic question" will undoubtedly involve God. The Christian will affirm that at any given moment the natural world as a whole is gathered into the experience of a single ongoing Life, a divine Self, who feels the whole, "declaring it good," or at least potentially so, both in its particulars and in its complex unity. Some, those in a Calvinist tradition, for example, may emphasize that God assigns the world its value, and hence that the God’s declaration of the world’s goodness is itself an imposition of worth. Others, process theologians for example, may say that God does not assign the world its value, as if the world would not have value otherwise, but rather that God recognizes the world’s value, and invites us, who are part of this world, to do the same. For process thinkers the world is God’s creation, not in the sense that it emerged ex nihilo from God, but rather that, from out of a beginningless past, it was lured toward its own forms of order and intrinsic value by God. Both theological perspectives will emphasize God as having a point of view from which the value of the world is recognized and affirmed.

In any case Rolston, as I have said, is silent concerning God. What is important for our purposes is to recognize that he is in the tradition of Leopold, emphasizing systems rather than individuals in his treatment of nature’s value. And it is in this Leopoldian vein that he opens the door, perhaps unwittingly, to the second question mentioned above: What, if anything, is the ethical status of individual nonhuman organisms, as they exist in and for themselves?

II Animal Rights

Some proponents of the land ethic -- Callicott, for example -- are suspicious of ethical preoccupations with individual nonhuman creatures. They see it as symptomatic of a Western individualistic bias. Callicott does not deny that individual creatures can have a place as individuals in the sphere of ethical regard. But he says that when we are concerned with them, it is not their well-being as individuals that should be our concern. Rather it is the well-being of the biotic community of which they are a part and to which they contribute. Taking Leopold’s land ethic as paradigmatic for environmental ethics as such, Callicott insists that "environmental ethics locates ultimate value in the ‘biotic community’ and assigns differential moral value to the constitutive individuals relative to that standard" (AL 337).

Here we cannot settle the question of what rightly or wrongly belongs within the purview of environmental ethics understood as a sub-discipline within philosophy. But we can highlight those traditions in philosophy that point toward a postanthropocentric ethic, and in this context it is important to recognize that there exists a tradition that is interested in the interests of individual creatures, in particular animals under human dominion Though not all its advocates prefer the language of "rights" in proposing that we recognize our obligations to animals, many do. For that reason we can call it the "animal rights" movement, or, alternatively, the "animal liberation" movement, borrowing a phrase from Peter Singer (ALNE)] 5

If Aldo Leopold is the mentor of the land ethic tradition, so Albert Schweitzer could be that of the animal rights movement. Perhaps one reason Schweitzer has not played this role is that, in point of fact, the rights of animals have been defended by minority traditions in philosophy at least since the eighteenth century.6 Nevertheless, in advancing his reverence-for-life ethic In the early part of our century, Schweitzer well anticipates the concerns of contemporary animal rights advocates. Schweitzer writes:

When abuse of animals is widespread, when the bellowing of thirsty animals in cattle cars is heard and ignored, when cruelty still prevails in many slaughterhouses, when animals are clumsily and painfully butchered in our kitchens, when brutish people inflict unimaginable torments upon animals and when some animals are exposed to the cruel games of children, all of us share in the guilt.7

Schweitzer’s interest in eliminating the unnecessary suffering of individual animals is at the heart of the animal rights movement.

Singer is among the movement’s most articulate spokespersons. His well-known Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals (New York: Avon, 1975) deals specifically with the suffering inflicted on individual animals in scientific experimentation, agribusiness, and industry. The examples he gives -- ranging from pain experiments on rhesus monkeys and dogs, through the inhumane conditions in which pigs and cattle are reared for food consumption, the blinding of rabbits in the testing of cosmetics -- are staggering both in terms of the pains suffered by the animals and in terms of the numbers of animals affected.8 He argues that there is no reason in principle why the suffering of our fellow creatures should matter less than our own. The fact that some animals cannot reason or talk in language we understand should be as irrelevant to us as is the fact that some humans in relation to whom we have ethical obligations -- severely retarded children, for example -- can neither reason nor talk. Quoting Jeremy Bentham, the late eighteenth-century utilitarian philosopher, Singer writes: "the question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but Can they suffer?" (PML ch. 18, sec. I).

Singer’s answer, of course, is yes. Not only do animals act as if they experience pain, he says, biology shows that the higher animals -- our fellow mammals, for example -- are equipped with neurophysiological mechanisms for pain similar to our own. Because animals can suffer, we have ethical obligations not to inflict upon them more pain, relative to their capacities for sentience, than we would inflict on creatures of our own kind, relative to our capacities. We are obliged, not necessarily to treat all creatures equally, but rather to give all sentient creatures equal moral consideration (ALNE 3). To neglect such consideration is to fall into a bias that is just as unacceptable in its own way, and analogously destructive in its consequences, as racism or sexism. Singer calls it speciesism.

In helping us to move beyond speciesism, Singer proposes several forms of action. In addition to ending unnecessary experimentation in science and the unnecessary infliction of pain on animals in industry and agribusiness, we should end many other practices that society currently sanctions. For example, we should stop "hunting for sport or furs; farming minks, foxes and other animals for their fur; capturing wild animals (often after shooting their mothers) and imprisoning them in small cages for humans to stare at; tormenting animals to make them learn tricks for circuses, and tormenting them to make them entertain the folks at rodeos; slaughtering whales with explosive harpoons; and generally ignoring the interests of wild animals as we extend our empire of concrete and pollution over the surface of the globe" (ALNE 23). "We should write to our political representatives urging them to pass legislation that obstructs these activities; make our friends aware of the issues; educate our children to be concerned about the welfare of all sentient beings; and protest publicly on behalf of nonhuman animals" (ALNE 163).

Finally, Singer argues, we should become vegetarians. "Whatever the theoretical possibilities of rearing animals without suffering may be, the fact is that the meat available from butchers and supermarkets comes from animals who did suffer while being reared" (ALNE 165). The people who profit by exploiting large numbers of animals on factory farms "do not need our approval. They need our money" (ALNE 166). It is only by our boycotting meat that animals can cease to suffer under the conditions of contemporary factory farming.

Not all advocates of animal rights endorse all the solutions Singer proposes. For example, process theologians, who are among the few within the contemporary theological community to be concerned with animal liberation, and to whom I will turn shortly, accept the eating of meat under certain conditions. But one way or another all advocates of animal rights, process thinkers included, lament the fact that so many domesticated animals can and do suffer unnecessarily at the hands of humans. Believing that the infliction of such suffering is immoral, their hope is that in the future such suffering will cease, either because humans have been morally persuaded or legislatively coerced.

III. WHITEHEAD

From what has been said so far, it should be clear that land ethicists and animal rightists differ. Whereas land ethicists are systems-oriented, animal rightists are individual-oriented; whereas land ethicists are concerned with the stability, integrity, and beauty of ecosystems, animal rightists are concerned with suffering; whereas land ethicists are concerned with the fate of flora, rivers, and mountains, animal rightists emphasize fellow fauna. Must the creation-conscious Christian choose between these two traditions?

A better approach, I believe, is one suggested by John B. Cobb, Jr. and L. Charles Birch in The Liberation of Life: From Cell to Community (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). Recognizing that the concerns of animal rightists pertain for the most part to animals subjected to human captivity, Birch and Cobb demonstrate that these concerns can be combined with those of the land ethicist into a single environmental ethic. From the animal rightist, so Birch and Cobb suggest, we rightly learn to be sensitive to the sufferings of individual animals under human dominion, affirming and insisting that they not be subjected to unnecessary suffering. And with the land ethicists we rightly learn to be sensitive to ecological wholes, including as these wholes do, plants and inorganic realities of value in their own right. Once the inherent value of nonhuman realities is recognized, we can learn to be attentive both to individual creatures and to the biotic wholes of which they, and we ourselves, are a part.

Both authors -- Birch as a biologist and Cobb as a theologian -- are influenced by the philosophy of Whitehead. Their conclusions follow from a Whiteheadian worldview which they describe in their work as "ecological" and which Bernard Loomer describes in Cry of the Environment as "process/relational." This use of Whitehead is illustrative of the fact that an environmental ethic, like a Christian faith perspective, will inevitably rely on a vision of reality of one sort or another, thus acknowledged or not. As Christians, Birch and Cobb believe that in many respects the Whiteheadian vision of reality is more compatible with biblical points of view than are other visions, Platonic for example, on which Christian in the past have relied. But they also believe that it is more ecological, which confirms the fact, attested by Bernard Anderson in Cry of the Environment, that biblical perspectives, too, often have a strong ecological dimension. As Ian Barbour notes in the foreword to Cry of the Environment, "a recurrent note" of the volume is "the potential of process theology for expression both of biblical and ecological understanding" (CE ix).

Let us consider for the moment the nature of the Whiteheadian vision and its implied ethic. What is valuable about Whitehead’s philosophy is that it is both Schweitzerian and Leopoldian. With its emphasis on nature as a vast web of interdependence that is alive through and through, it affirms with Schweitzer that individual creatures, human included, have intrinsic value. Yet it also recognizes, with Leopold, that creatures never exist in isolation; they always exist in and through relations to others and to the biotic whole. Indeed Eugene Hargrove, the editor of Environmental Ethics, points out strong parallels between Leopold and Whitehead, although Leopold seems to have arrived at his perspective independently of any reading of Whitehead.

Most interesting of all is the similarity of some of Whitehead’s comments and those of environmentalist Aldo Leopold. There are long passages in the last chapter of Science and the Modern World, for instance, which could easily have served as the source of some of Leopold’s ideas, and which suggest that Leopold’s notion of community could be derived from Whitehead’s theory of organism without much difficulty. In one place especially Whitehead speaks of ‘associations of different species which mutually cooperate,’ and he refers to the forest environment as ‘the triumph of the organization of mutually dependent species.’ A few lines further on he adds that ‘every organism requires an environment of friends, partly to shield it from violent changes, and partly to supply it with its wants.’ (HFA 239)

It is a small step, Hargrove tells us, "from Whitehead’s ‘environment of friends’ to Leopold’s ‘biotic community"’ (HFA 239).

From Whitehead’ s vision of reality as informing and informed by insights from biology, Birch and Cobb develop a distinctively "process" environmental ethic. "The general ethical principle," they say, "is that we should respect every entity for its intrinsic value as well as for its instrumental value to others, including ourselves" (LL 152). One feature of this ethic is that it proposes a criterion for action when the sacrifice of life is required. Birch and Cobb propose that, when decisions must be made between the taking of various forms of life, say that between a cancer cell and a woman in whom that cell resides, such decisions can be made on the basis of degrees of intrinsic value. Along with Teilhard they believe that evolution displays a gradual trend toward more complex forms of organization, that with these more complex forms there emerge living beings with greater capacities for sentience or awareness, and that with these greater capacities there are greater degrees of intrinsic value.

To be sentient is to be able consciously or unconsciously to take into account, and thus enjoy, environmental influence. All living beings, including cancer cells, do this to one degree or another; hence all living beings have intrinsic value. But some, the more complexly organized, enjoy amid their sentience greater harmony or intensity -- greater "richness of experience" to use Birch and Cobb’s phrase -- than others. By virtue of this richness, they have greater intrinsic value. If a life must be taken, and if instrumental considerations are equalized, it is best to take the life of the being with the lesser capacity for sentience, and hence the lesser degree of intrinsic value. Thus, in choosing between a cancer cell in a woman and the woman herself, the cancer cell can be sacrificed.

But the general emphasis of a Whiteheadian environmental ethic is on life rather than death. A Whiteheadian environmental ethic is, as Birch and Cobb put it, an "ethic of life" that intends to be responsive to the God who is "Life" itself (LL chs. 5 and 6). All things considered, it is always best to allow life to flourish in its diverse expressions, respectful of the fact that each living being has intrinsic as well as instrumental value. Just as God is appreciative and affirming of life, human and nonhuman, so an "ethic of life" is appreciative and affirming.

Birch and Cobb propose that to live out such an ethic one must act personally and politically to promote two complementary ideals: ecological sustainability in our relations to the rest of nature, and social justice among humans. Sustainability involves living within the limits of the planet’s carrying capacity in terms of population and resource usage, reducing pollution, and allowing other living beings to flourish and enjoy existence. As we seek to live sustainably, our fellow creatures are appropriately understood as valuable ends in their own right and as contributors, along with us, to God’s own enjoyment. They, like we, are part of God’s body. Justice involves the promotion of economic equity, political participation, and personal liberties among and between humans. If the interest in sustainability is enriched by creation literature in the Bible, so justice is enriched by prophetic literature. The challenge of our time, so Birch and Cobb suggest, is to find ways of living, both personally and as communities, that are both just and sustainable. The Liberation of Life offers concrete proposals for just and sustainable public policies in the areas of agriculture, economics, and transportation.

IV. Heidegger and Deep Ecology

I will return to process theology in the next and final section of this essay. At this stage, however, it is important to note that in addition to the literature of land ethics, animal rights, and Whiteheadian philosophy, there are numerous other resources within philosophy from which Christians interested in creation consciousness can learn. For one, there are excellent works at the interface of environmental ethics and public policy, such as K. S. Schrader-Frechette’s Nuclear Power and Public Policy (Boston: D. Reidel, 1980), and her Environmental Ethics (Pacific Grove, CA: Boxwood Press, 1981). Furthermore, there are other visions of reality from which to learn: visions that, like Whitehead’s perspective, can serve as philosophical underpinnings for a responsible environmental ethic.

In searching for these underpinnings, philosophers turn to a host of sources from which Christians, too, can draw. Some turn to the East, particularly to Taoism; some to Native American perspectives and other primal traditions; some to emerging feminist visions; still others to neglected themes or traditions within the Western heritage, ranging from materials in Pythagorean philosophy to neglected themes in Plato to Leibniz or Spinoza; and still others to twentieth-century philosophers such as Heidegger or to philosophical movements such as the Deep Ecology movement.9 As one would expect in an age characterized by a split between religion and philosophy, few environmental philosophers turn to sources in the Bible or Christian theology for help, though some -- Robin Attfield, for example -- argue that Christian history has been wrongly maligned by environmental philosophers, and that it can serve as a better resource than some might expect (WTEE 201-230). 10 In any case, Christians interested in creation consciousness can learn from these other sources.

Consider, for example, Heidegger. Of course, existentialist theologians like Tillich and biblical scholars like Bultmann have already drawn upon Heidegger’s early writings, particularly Being and Time, in developing doctrines of God and human existence. But it is the later writings -- written in a more meditative style and with greater attunement to nature -- that philosophers of ecology such as Michael Zimmerman, George Cave, and Bruce Foltz find helpful (THE 99-131).11 For in his later philosophy Heidegger moved beyond a preoccupation with Being as instantiated in human existence to an interest in Being as disclosed throughout nature and beyond. For Heidegger, Being is the ultimate reality, though not itself a thing or substance which can be grasped with certainty by the mind or relied upon as a metaphysical ground. It is not identical with God, rather it is that underlying and yet all-encompassing Happening -- itself not a being at all -- of which even God would be an expression. As Heidegger journeyed more and more deeply into his intuition of Being, it became ever more clear to him that a central problem in Western culture is the forgetfulness of Being, and that this forgetfulness is symptomized by the will-to-power: that impulse to dominate and subjugate the world in light of human projects. He became critical of that humanism which attempts to measure all things in terms of human design, and which can never ‘let beings be’ in their own right. It is this Heidegger, who recognized the human obligation to let things be, whom ecological philosophers find important.

A central emphasis of Heidegger’ s later thought is dwelling. To dwell is to live in and amid the whole of the world, seeking to preserve and care for the beings within it. For him, authentic human existence lies in dwelling in harmonious relation to entities as they gather into unity four modes of Being: the earth, the sky, the gods, and fellow mortals. (Whether or not Heidegger’s gods represent the general sphere of the holy, and might thus be different faces of a single divine reality, is a question left open.) Consider, for example, an ordinary jug filled with wine. As Zimmerman explains, "a jug draws together earth, which provides water for the grapes in wine, sky, which provides the sunshine for the ripening fruit, gods, to whom we offer a libation for the gift of wine and life, and mortals, who enjoy the liquid refreshment and who are somehow aware of the mystery of thing and world" (THE 112). To dwell authentically in relation to the jug, or to any being for that matter, is to be sensitive to the way it assembles the Fourfold. It is to see a being as a shining of Being in the latter’s four expressions. In Zimmerman’s words, "the crucial point here is that the world is not constituted by a transcendental subject but instead is a luminous realm drawn together by the things that shine forth within" (THE 113).12

Another resource within philosophy from which Christians can learn is not itself a thinker or historical tradition but rather a movement. It is called the "deep ecology" movement, and it has itself been influenced by many of the sources identified above (see DEM). The phrase "deep ecology" comes from one of the founders of the movement, the Norwegian philosopher Arne Naess (SD). His distinction is between "shallow" and "deep" environmentalism. According to Naess, along with other members of the movement such as American philosophers Bill Devall and George Sessions, a "shallow" environmentalism adopts a managerial perspective toward nature, assuming that nonhuman nature must be conserved or preserved for the sake of future human use. It is rooted in that humanistic ethos which assumes that humans are apart from, and more important than, the rest of nature, and that nature should be protected and conserved only for human ends. By contrast "deep" environmentalism -- that is, deep ecology -- adopts a cooperative perspective, believing that human beings are inseparable from that web of life of which they are a part, and that other members of the web are equally as valuable as humans. A deep ecologist seeks to live cooperatively with nature, not simply because such living is in human interests, but because he or she allows nature itself to serve as the paradigm for human self-understanding.

Deep ecologists are, or at least they conceive themselves to be, the most radical of environmental philosophers. They differ from those environmental philosophers who see environmental ethics as a subdiscipline of traditional philosophy. They believe that environmental ethics, rightly understood, points to an alternative discipline and an alternative way of thinking in its own right: one that recognizes without equivocation the radical interconnectedness, and the equal value, of all beings. The metaphysical underpinnings of this new perspective have been compared by Devall to the philosophy of Spinoza. As with Spinoza, nature is identified with the ultimate, and a human being appropriately understands himself or herself as but one of many equally important and interrelated expressions of God: a "temporary and dependent mode of the whole of God/Nature" (SD 310).

V. Creation Consciousness and the Prophetic God

How can Christians interested in creation consciousness respond to Heidegger and the Deep Ecology movement? There are things to learn from each.

In the case of Heidegger, Christians can be open to the intuition of Being. In part such openness can be facilitated by a recovery of certain mystical traditions in their own past, such as those discussed by Matthew Fox in Chapter Four of Cry of the Environment (CCS). Yet whereas the mystical traditions identify Being Itself with God, Christians can also take seriously Heidegger’s claim that Being is not God, and that the realm of the holy, symbolized by Heidegger’s term "the gods," is but one manifestation of Being. Here process theology can be helpful, for John Cobb and others show that what Heidegger means by Being is generally analogous to what Buddhists mean by Emptiness, or Whitehead by Creativity. Indeed Being is not God, but rather that of which God and the world are expressions. Being is the ultimate reality, not itself a sentient agent, of which all actualities, God included, are actualizations; and God is the ultimate actuality, indeed a sentient agent who loves and cares for the world, who is the primordial embodiment of Being. In the words of Cobb: "The direction is to accept without hesitation or embarrassment the distinction between ultimate reality and God, and to recognize that the God of the Bible . . . is a manifestation of ultimate reality -- not the name of that reality" (Quoted in BPM 120). Heidegger’s philosophy well shows us how an intuition of Being, alongside faith in God, can contribute to ecological consciousness and promote that "dwelling" which lives in harmony with the earth.

In the case of the deep ecologists, Christians can recognize that in many instances a Christian environmental ethic -- often called stewardship -- has been shallow rather than deep. Christians have sometimes equated stewardship with the prudent management of natural resources for human consumption. Furthermore, when we have thought of stewardship in relation to future generations, we have often thought only of future human generations, forgetting that an appropriate ethical stance must be directed toward the well-being of future nonhuman generations as well. Deep ecologists remind us that stewardship, too, must be deep. We rightly preserve wilderness areas, not simply so that future humans can enjoy them, but so that future species with value in their own right can dwell in them. From deep ecology we learn both to affirm our kinship with fellow creatures and to allow evolutionary history -- past, present, and future -- to serve as a frame of reference through which we understand ourselves.

Yet clearly, at least in some respects, both Heidegger and Deep Ecology contravene ideas important to the biblically influenced Christian, and this in two ways. First, in biblical Christianity at least some distinction between a God and the world has been affirmed, and God has been understood as having personal characteristics such as feeling, thought, and will. By contrast, deep ecologists disparage such a distinction and its attendant personalistic imagery, and in Heidegger intimations of a loving God remain quite undeveloped. Second, in biblically influenced Christianity it has usually been affirmed that humans are of distinctive value in the scheme of creation, and indeed that they are made in God’s image. Heidegger sometimes leans in this direction as well, but deep ecologists deny such a distinction.

Are these two traditional affirmations, which we ultimately derive from the prophetic biblical heritage, worth retaining? Among other reasons, I suggest that they are worth retaining in the interests of justice. The ideas (1) that there is a personal and loving God, and (2) that as made in God’s image we have distinctive responsibilities to God, serve as resources for challenging injustice. Having learned from the prophetic traditions of Moses, Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Jesus, Christians rightly recognize the resourcefulness of biblical perspectives. Only a God who in some way transcends the world, who has special care for the downtrodden, who calls humans (if among the oppressors) to practice justice, and who calls humans (if among the oppressed) to demand their rights -- only this God can or will say no to oppression and invite others to do as well. If this God were too immanent, too identified with either the powers of nature or the socio-political status quo, or too impersonal, there would be no divine judgement, no divine care, and hence no hope for the disenfranchised and downtrodden. After all, the powers of nature care little for particular victims of racism, repression, or rape. For such victims, the cost of giving up God’s call for justice in the interests of proclaiming ecological holism is too great.

The question, then, is this: As Christians "rebuild the Christian creation tradition," to quote the subtitle of Cry of the Environment, can they learn from philosophy and the Bible? Can they develop theologies of ecology that affirm the intrinsic value of all life, as do the deep ecologists and most others within environmental philosophy, and that also affirm the care of a compassionate God for the poor and oppressed, as do prophetic biblical traditions? As Birch and Cobb would put it, can Christians develop ways of thinking about God and the world that encourage ecological sustainability and social justice?

Hopefully there are many ways of doing this, several of which are indicated in Cry of the Environment. Christianity today is in need of many theologies of ecology, not just one.

Still, among the most promising to date is process theology. During the latter decades of the twentieth century process theology has itself been in process, and it has become more than Whiteheadian theology. While retaining an ecological point of view characteristic of Whitehead, it has also become -- with the help of process thinkers such as Marjorie Suchocki, John Cobb, Delwin Brown, Catherine Keller, and Sheila Davaney -- a political theology, deeply resonating with feminist points of view and liberation perspectives. Indeed, in its own way it has become a prophetic biblical theology (see PT).

Consider, for example, the way in which process thinkers image God. While they believe that the world is God’s body, such that what happens in the world happens in and to God, they also believe that God, as the psyche of the universe, is more than the world. God is not simply the totality of worldly events; God is a living subject, with consciousness in God’s own right, who feels these events and responds to them. In this sense God is personal: a sentient Thou rather than an insentient It. Moreover, there are things that happen in the world that are not willed by this Thou, just as there are things that happen in our own bodies that are not willed by our psyches. Social injustices are among these occurrences, as are instances of ecological unsustainability. In relation to these occurrences God transcends the world and feels that divine disharmony in relation to unjustice -- or perhaps better, that divine pain -- so central to prophetic traditions.

In response to injustice and unsustainability, God provides possibilities for creative transformation and inclusive love. And indeed, as theologian Charles McCoy emphasizes in discussing the biblical idea of covenant, God is always faithful (CCE 355-375). Like a Buddhist bodhisattva, God never gives up. When all seems hopeless, God provides possibilities for hope; when all seems unjust, possibilities for justice; and when all is unsustainable, possibilities for sustainability. We may or may not respond to these possibilities, and the possibilities may or may not be what we would have hoped for all things considered, because their content is relative to what is possible for the situation at hand. But we can trust that they are always available. Creation consciousness is itself a possibility offered by God.

The point here is that in its conception of God, process theology is indebted, not only to the ecological dimensions of Whitehead’s philosophy, but also to the traditions of Moses. Jeremiah, Isaiah, and Jesus. It is shaped by the covenant traditions. This is no accident. McCoy suggests that Whitehead, too, may have been shaped by biblical ways of thinking: "Indeed, it is highly probable that the process philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries emerged from contexts influenced by the covenantal or federal tradition and thus are in part intellectual progeny of covenantal theology and ethics" (CCE 360).

But what of the second idea mentioned above, that humans are made in God’s image? Here, too, a process theology of ecology assents in its own way. Along with biblical ways of thinking it affirms a special significance of humankind within the context of creation, recognizing, as Conrad Bonifazi puts it in the context of explicating Teilhard de Chardin, that "in human beings evolution has revealed its profoundest energy and significance" (TNE 311). It does indeed seem evident that, at least in evolution as it is seen in life on earth, homo sapiens have evolved capacities for sentience unparalleled by other creatures.

Yet a process theology of ecology is quick to point out that this energy and significance -- this greater degree of intrinsic value -- is no warrant for arrogance. Rather it is warrant for tenderness and responsibility. There is intrinsic value, or richness of experience, in every living creature, human or nonhuman. Human life is not the only end toward which evolution has been called by God. Nonhuman life, too, embodies ends called by God, distinctive ends not necessarily shared by human beings. Nevertheless, with our unique opportunities for inclusive love, we mirror the Supreme Sentience. We are made in God’s image, and we can mirror that image. To do so is to feel the world as God feels it, to revere life as God reveres it. It is to be as richly related to the world, in our way and given our limitations, as is God to the world.

References

AL -- J. Baird Callicott. "Animal Liberation: A Triangular Affair." Environmental Ethics 2:4 (Winter 1980).

ALNE -- Peter Singer. Animal Liberation: A New Ethics for our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon, 1975.

AVN -- Holmes Rolston, III. "Are Values in Nature Subjective or Objective?" Environmental Ethics 4:1 (Spring 1982).

BPM -- Huston Smith. Beyond the Post-Modern Mind. New York: Crossroad, 1982.

CCE -- Charles McCoy. "Covenant, Creation, and Ethics: A Federal Vision for Humanity and the Environment."

CCS -- Mathew Fox. "Creation-Centered Spirituality from Hildegard of Bingen to Julian of Norwich: 300 Years of an Ecological Spirituality in the West." CE 85-106.

CE -- Philip N. Joranson and Ken Butigan. Cry of the Environment. Rebuilding the Christian Creation Tradition. Santa Fe, NM: Bear and Company, 1984.

DEM -- Bill Devall. "The Deep Ecology Movement." Natural Resources Journal 20 (1980): 298-322.

HFA -- Eugene C. Hargrove. "The Historical Foundation of American Environmental Attitudes." Environmental Ethics 1:3 (Fall 1979).

LL -- Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr. The Liberation of Life. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981.

PGW -- Holmes Rolston, Ill. Philosophy Gone Wild: Essays in Environmental Ethics. Buffalo: Prometheus Books, 1986.

PML -- Jeremy Bentham. The Principles of Morals and Legislation. (1789).

PT -- John B. Cobb, Jr. Process Theology as Political Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984.

RNW -- Mary Ann Warren. "Rights of the Nonhuman World." Environmental Philosophy. Ed. Robert Elliot and Arran Gare. University Park: The State University of Pennsylvania Press, 1983.

SCA -- Aldo Leopold. A Sand Country Almanac. New York: Oxford University Press, 1949.

SD -- Arne Naess. "The Shallow and the Deep, Long-Range Ecology Movement." Inquiry 16 (1973).

THE -- Michael F. Zimmerman. "Toward a Heideggerian Ethos for Radical Environmentalism." Environmental Ethics 5:2 (Summer 1983), 99-131.

TNE -- Conrad Bonifazi. "Teilhard and the Natural Environment: Pierre Teilhard de Chardin’s Contribution to the Christian Understanding of the World, and to Human Relationships within the Natural Environment." CE 311-320.

VN -- Holmes Rolston, III. "Values in Nature." Environmental Ethics 3:2 (Summer 1981).

WTEE -- Robin Attfield. "Western Tradition and Environmental Ethics." Environmental Philosophy. Ed. Robert Elliot and Arran Gare. University Park: The State University of Pennsylvania Press. 1983: 201-230.

 

Notes:

1For an excellent survey of the ambiguous record of Christian thinking vis-a-vis the need for creation consciousness, see Paul Santmire, The Travail of Nature: The Ambiguous Ecological Promise of Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1985).

2Environmental Ethics: An Interdisciplinary Journal Dedicated to the Philosophical Aspects of Environmental Problems is a quarterly publication of Environmental Philosophy, Inc. and the University of Georgia.

3 Even among those who do not agree with Leopold concerning the inadequacies of traditional Western ethics, as in the case of John Passmore, the first modern philosopher to write a systematic treatise in environmental philosophy, Leopold’s arguments serve as a standard requiring response. See John Passmore, Man’s Responsibility for Nature (London: Duckworth, 1974). For another critic of Leopold whose own understanding differs from the one presented here, see Scott Lehmann, "Do Wildernesses Have Rights?" Environmental Ethics 3:2 (Summer 1981): 129-146.

4In RNW, Mary Ann Warren points importantly to other thinkers who advocate a system or holistic approach. Her references include William T. Blackstone, "Ethics and Ecology" in Philosophy and Environmental Crisis,16-42; Thomas Auxter, ‘The Right Not To Be Eaten," in Inquiry 22:1-2 (Spring 1979): 221-230; Robert Cahn, Footprints on the Planets The Search for an Environmental Ethics (New York: Universe Books, 1978); Albert A. Fritsch, Environmental Ethics 2:1 (Spring 1980): 17-37; Eugene P. Odum, "Environmental Ethics and the Attitude Revolution," in Philosophy and the Environmental Crisis. 10-15.

5 See also Animal Rights and Human Obligations, ed. Tom Regan and Peter Singer (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1976). in choosing the phrase "animal liberation" as paradigmatic of the animal rights movement, I am following Callicott, AL.

6William Blackstone argues for Schweitzer’s role as mentor in the animal liberation movement in "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," in Matters of Life and Death: New Introductory Essays in Moral Philosophy, ed. Tom Regan (New York: Random House, 1980). For historical precedents in the West to the contemporary concern with individual animals, see selections from Jeremy Bentham, John Stuart Mill, and Henry Salt in Animal Rights and Human Obligations.

7Taken from Albert Schweitzer, The Teaching of Reverence for Life, trans. Richard and Clara Winston (New York: Holt and Rinehart, 1965). 9. Quotation taken from Blackstone. "The Search for an Environmental Ethic," 306.

8 Though Singer is particularly concerned with the infliction of suffering upon animals rather than the killing of them, it is important to note that in the United States alone 200 million animals, including dogs, cats, apes, horses, rabbits, and rats are killed in research each year. David Lamb, Review of Ethics and Animals (Clifton, NJ: Humana Press. 1983) in Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 373.

9See, for example, Po-keung Ip, "Taoism and the Foundations of Environmental Ethics, "Environmental Ethics 5:4(1983): 335-343; Russell Goodman, "Taoism and Ecology," Environmental Ethics 2:1(1980): 73-80; 1. Baird Callicott, "Traditional American Indian and Western European Attitudes Toward Nature: An Overview," Environmental Ethics 4:4 (1982): 293-318; J. Donald Hughes, "The Environmental Ethics of the Pythagoreans," Environmental Ethics 2:3 (1980): 195-213; Walter H. O’Briant, "Leibniz’s Contribution to Environmental Philosophy" Environmental Ethics 2:3(1980): 215-220; George Sessions. "Spinosa and Jeffers on Man in Nature," Inquiry’ 20 (1977); ‘Feminism and Ecology," a special issue of Heresies: A Feminist Journal of Art and Politics 4:1 (1981).

10 See also Robin Attfield, "Christian Attitudes to Nature ," Journal of the History of Ideas 44 (1983).

11 See also George P. Cave, "Animals, Heidegger, and the Right to Life," Environmental Ethics 4:3 (1982): 249-254; and Bruce V. Foltz, "On Heidegger and the interpretation of Environmental Crisis," Environmental Ethics 6 (1984): 323-338,

12 There is an additional emphasis on the later Heidegger which Foltz recommends for appropriation, and which may well pose an important alternative to the Whiteheadian approach. Heidegger was interested not in developing a new metaphysical perspective, but rather in overcoming metaphysics so as to "let beings be." For him, Being was not a concept arrived at the conclusion of a metaphysical syllogism; rather it was something directly intuited once metaphysics had been left behind. He, and those such as Foltz who are influenced by him, see "metaphysics" itself as an expression of the will-to-power: the impulse to dominate and subjugate the world, if not physically, then at least with the mind. A fruitful interchange within environmental philosophy will be that between environmental ethicists who, like Whiteheadians, propose a metaphysical philosophy of ecology and those, like Heideggerians, who propose the dissolution of all metaphysics.

Latin America and the Need for a Life-Liberating Theology

In the latter decades of the twentieth century, the phrase liberation theology often has been used synonymously with Latin American liberation theology. This reflects the Immense influence that Latin American theologians have had on the global Christian community. Can Latin American theologies, too, be part of the emerging consensus that life in its totality, and not human life alone, deserves liberation? Indeed they can, at least from the point of view of Ingemar Hedström. Hedström, living in Latin America for many years and deeply influenced by liberation perspectives, has published several works at the interface of liberation theology and ecology. His proposal is that Latin American liberation perspectives can and must be committed to the integrity of creation if they are to meet the needs of the human poor. Hedström’s essay, abridged by the editors of this book and translated by Kathlyn Smith, combines sections from two of his books: We Are Part of a Great Balance: The Ecological Crisis in Central America [3d ed., published in San Jose, Costa Rica, by Editorial DEI, 1988] and Will the Swallows Return? The Reintegration of Creation from a Latin American Perspective [Editorial DEI, 1988].

All the great civilizations of the world began with the felling of the first tree . . . the majority of them disappeared with the felling of the last

Combe and Gewald

During the 1970s, when I visited the capital of El Salvador on several occasions, I was able to observe the thousands of swallows that would fill the power lines every evening across from the National Theater in Morazan Plaza. Like endless strings of white pearls they covered the entire electrical layout of the plaza, as well as the small ledges on the theater building. The same phenomenon was observed for many years in the city of Escuintla, located to the southwest of Guatemala’s capital city.

This Custom of gathering together to sleep and rest at night (roosting in English) is practiced by a few animals, including white herons, mammals, and some species of butterflies. It is believed that, given the high number of captures by predators, the chances of individual survival are greater.

My native companions informed me that these swallows of San Salvador had been practicing the custom of roosting together in Morazan Plaza for many, many years. Some citizens had written beautiful poems in homage to the swallows, while others argued that they soiled the streets and tried to get rid of them -- with gunshots, buckets of water, or fireworks. In spite of this, the swallows continued arriving every evening to cover the cables and spend a peaceful night in the plaza.

Ten years later, upon returning to San Salvador, I could not see a single swallow in Morazan Plaza. What had happened to them? Why did they not appear as usual in the evenings? I asked several of my friends in the capital, but no one could give me a definite reason. Among other things, they told me that owls had come to the plaza in search of prey, and that the swallows had fled in a panic. This reason, like the others they had offered, did not seem to me a very satisfactory explanation.

I have been thinking about the apparent disappearance of the swallows in San Salvador as well as in Escuintla. For me, they have become a very concrete symbol of what is happening in Latin America; I am referring to the environmental deterioration of the continent and in particular of El Salvador. When the swallows could find nothing to eat in the Vicinity of the capital, what choice did they have but to move on or die? We wonder: Will the swallows return, or are they, are we ourselves, headed toward premature death and irreversible destruction?

The disappearance of swallows in El Salvador is by no means an isolated incident. It is part of a much larger pattern of abuse and exploitation, of the earth and of people, which has occurred in South and Central America, and which is itself part of an age-old historical pattern of ecological destruction. It is worth our while to review this age-old pattern and then to look at its exemplification in South and Central America.

THE PATTERN OF DESTRUCTION

The Landscape of Greece: A Decayed Skeleton

Let us recall that centuries ago in ancient Greece more than half the country was covered by green forests. Today it is estimated that only one-twentieth of this country is wooded, apparently, scarcely two percent of the old layer of humus (fertile organic remains of dead plants and animals) has been conserved in Greece (Edberg, 150).

The famous Greek philosopher Plato (438-347 BCE.) founded the Greek Academy. Following extensive travels throughout his country he lamented the fact that the delicate, fertile part of the Greek soil had been washed away through rains and the lack of vegetation in the country (Edberg, 149-50). Of the landscape nothing remained but a decayed skeleton. The temple ruins on the hills of Attica to the north of Athens, the capital, today are silent, along with the natural world that surrounds them. A great many species, among them many birds, have now abandoned this dry, semi-sterile environment in order to survive.

The Roman Empire

Centuries later on the Italic peninsula this same drama was being repeated. During the Roman Empire the flatlands were already suffering from excessive cultivation. The Roman peasants were obliged to go higher and higher into the Apennine Mountains for arable land. The fertile soil lost its humus layer, which was washed by the rains into the rivers and then deposited forever in the Mediterranean Sea. Once there, it fouled the water and killed the aquatic fauna.

So the Roman Empire was soon forced to seek new lands on the other side of the Mediterranean Sea -- in Northern Africa, in what is now Algeria and Tunisia. The Romans thus acquired in their African colonies provisions and olives enough to continue living "on bread, wine, and pleasure" in the city of Rome.

The Romans also exploited the lands on the island of Sicily in the same way as in Northern Africa. Let us remember the legendary city of Carthage, which lies close to the capital (Tunis) -- how it had to be literally "destroyed to please the Romans." Carthage had to feed not only itself and the neighboring villages -- whose populations are calculated to have been about three times the present population -- but the Roman population as well, including a very large migration of people who were then looking for new opportunities in Rome.

Northern Africa

With the exploitation of natural resources that was practiced throughout this epoch, the natural environments of Italy, Sicily, and Northern Africa had to pay a very high price to be able to satisfy the excesses of the Empire. Furthermore, what the Romans did not manage to destroy during this period was finished off by domestic animals, mainly goats or kids. These animals not only eat the green parts of the plants, but consume the roots of the vegetation as well. The region in which Hannibal of Carthage captured elephants for his army -- the mountains of Northern Africa where today these beautiful animals are no longer found -- became a semi-desert, along with southern Italy and Sicily. Today history informs us that the vegetation of this landscape died with the Roman Empire itself.

The Clearing of European Forests

At this point I should add that not only the environment of the great Southern European empires was sadly damaged. In the tenth century, when the original European forests began to be converted to farmland and pasturage, ninety percent of the entire continent was covered by trees; today only twenty percent of these trees remain (Myers 1979, 121).

Often the despoliation occurred with amazing rapidity. In the eighteenth century, when the Swedish naturalist Carolus Linnaeus (1707-78) returned in his later years to an island of the Gothenburg (Sweden) archipelago, he was surprised at the absence of trees, which had been there when he was a young man. The cliffs facing the sea were practically bare because the trees had become raw material for the construction of ships and of wooden barrels for preserving the famous Nordic herring.

Disappearance of North American Virgin Forests

About the tenth century, when the ancient Scandinavians, the Vikings, were frequenting North America, the humid portion of the east, as far as the mid-east of what is now the United States of North America, was covered by a dense forest of 1.6 million square kilometers. Today less than five percent of this forest is still virgin (see Myers 1979, 121).

Spain

If we move forward in the course of European history, we find that at the time when Spanish kings were trying to build their own empire, trees were cut down in Spain, also, to produce lumber for shipbuilding, and great expanses of forest were converted to pastureland. But all of the wealth that Spain had managed to amass during the sixteenth century was lost in the Spanish trade crisis of the following century. Spain’s environment was greatly affected, and today on the Iberian Peninsula we find a severely eroded landscape, virtually dead rivers, and bare mountains.

The Naked Coasts of the Mediterranean

I have been able personally to observe several of these areas and their present appearance as resulting from overexploitation in Southern Europe: felling of trees and excessive pasturing in Greece, Turkey, Italy, and southern Spain, as well as in North Africa -- Morocco, Algeria, and Tunisia. All of these large areas are now dry and eroded because of the poor land management mentioned above.

A New Land to Exploit: America

Long ago the Spanish and the Portuguese settled in Central and South America. It may be supposed that Central America at the time of the conquistadors’ arrival presented an area covered almost completely by forests. On his fourth voyage, when Christopher Columbus reached the coast of what is now Costa Rica, the admiral found an enormous wealth of forest in the area:

Before Spanish colonization, the natives cultivated the soil using rudimentary, subsistence-level methods; therefore, the exploited geographic areas were very limited. Forests predominated; plant cover was maintained on cultivated ground, thereby renewing its organic material and nutrients, or natural fertility; the climate contributed efficiently to agricultural yield, and the rivers and underground springs were plentiful and of excellent quality; the fauna was abundant (Espinoza, 168).

In South America, in what is now Peru, the subjects of the Incan Empire had developed terrace cultivation, by which they obtained better harvests and also avoided soil erosion.

In Mexico the high plateau populations used water-rationing methods for centuries in their farming, which made possible the flourishing of an area that today is totally dry and eroded due to lack of measures to prevent a permanent water shortage in the region.

The Fall of the Mayas

Another illustrative case, though not an altogether clear one, is the collapse of Mayan civilization about one thousand years ago. Of the proposed theories regarding its fall, the role of agricultural productivity in the lowlands has been discussed in the majority of the studies done on the subject (see Fonseca Zamora). It is believed that the Mayas upset the balance between humans and nature, although the fall of their civilization probably corresponded to "a network of interaction in which any difficulty could have had repercussions on the whole" (Fonseca Zamora, 505).

The Mayas attained a high degree of efficiency in mathematics, writing, and astronomy, but probably not in the rational management of soil and forest. Roughly by the year 250 BCE., the clearing of forests and the over-cultivation of Mayan agricultural lands had caused a great deal of soil erosion (see Deevey, et al.). One proof of their mistaken farming methods may lie in a discovery made on Mexico’s Yucatan Peninsula, where after a meter’s excavation into the light-brown fertile soil, a stratus of black was unexpectedly found: this probably means that this civilization practiced burning off vegetation in order to expand their arable lands (see the studies in Dagens Nyheter.(Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, 30 April 1979. "Skogsvard död för Maya"1 Repeated burnings promote destruction of soil productivity in any part of the world.

The Aboriginal Population of Central America

Certain parts of Central America were densely populated during the pre-Columbian period, reaching their peak density by 1520, when the Europeans arrived. The most important nuclei of aboriginal population were in Guatemala, El Salvador, and certain parts of Honduras (Fournier, 50), while Nicaragua, Costa Rica, and Panama were a sparsely populated region.2 The aboriginal population then decreased eighty to ninety percent over the following twenty-five to fifty years (Corrales Rodriguez, 114-15).

Imported Agricultural Systems

The Spaniards who came to Central America saw as backward and primitive the native system of soil cultivation, which was migratory or itinerant agriculture, involving prolonged rotation (Hall, 122-23). They therefore replaced the indigenous tradition with agricultural systems imported, literally, from Spain and with models of land use which were well-suited to the Mediterranean regions but completely alien to the tropics.3 When the Spaniards settled in Costa Rica, all lands, including those of the aborigines, became the property of the Spanish Crown. True to Spanish tradition, the pastures and cleared fields, which had no place in’the aboriginal ecosystem, were initially designated as public lands, but in practice many of them were gradually absorbed as private property (Hall, 123). Espinoza summarizes the situation well:

The Spaniards invaded the region by pillaging nature; they appropriated vast tracts of land, monopolizing the best soil, introduced livestock, and enslaved the natives for clearing forests, creating pastureland, and tending livestock, thus establishing land-cattle fiefs. With oxen they implemented animal traction, or cultivation of the soil with ploughs, thus intensifying erosive agricultural practices and the soil compaction caused by livestock’s trampling of the ground (Espinoza, 168).

Today, the depletion of minerals, forests, and other natural resources in Central America is considerable, just as is soil depletion in the areas of greatest development. Changes in the possession and overdevelopment of land have affected the people in the past and continue to do so today. The Spaniards and their descendants, in less than four centuries, changed great stretches of countryside into an unbalanced, half-naked environment. We continue this destruction in the present through practices at the heart of our economies. By way of illustration, consider the pattern of destruction in light of its relation to the meat-eating habits of North Americans.

The "Hamburgerization" of the Forests of Central America

Forest management, agriculture, and extensive cattle-ranching are the principal activities upon which Central America’s economy rests.4 Of these, cattle-ranching has developed the most during recent decades. For this reason the majority of Central American countries could be called "hamburger republics," though the cattlemen of the region do not themselves perceive it in this way. They see their activity as fair and profitable enterprise. Cattle-ranching still represents a fairly secure flow of income into Central America.

Now, what the cattlemen refuse to acknowledge is that meat production in Central America is intimately linked to destruction of the forests. This is due primarily to the fact that cattle-ranching in this region is a process of colonization based upon extensive exploitation of large amounts of land, including forests. Consider the following statistics concerning individual countries in Central America.

Costa Rica

In Costa Rica, between 1960 and 1980, pasturage and cattle increased by about seventy-five percent, while the rain forests decreased by about forty percent during this same period, being converted to pasturelands (Myers 1981, 6). The hatos (cattle pastures) account for one-half of the landed property in Costa Rica and one-third of the country’s total area.

In 1972 Tosi had already summed up very precisely the consequences of irrational utilization of Costa Rica’s virgin lands, to the detriment of the natural balance. His account is worth extensive quoting.

When it left the Central Valley, agricultural colonization became Cattle-based and extensive, occupying great areas of land in order to sustain a dispersed population. The invaded regions were, in general, warmer . . . much rainier, and characterized by a topography that was often rugged and uneven. . . . The land was ill-suited for continual cultivation. New fields cultivated on top of the debris of a recently cleared forest . . . did not last more than two or three years. Given these limitations, colonization was characterized by a frontier that advanced rapidly upon virgin forests with tree-cutting . . . , burning, and temporary cultivation, and by a large area in its wake where abandoned farmland, instead of being allowed to turn into natural secondary forests thus renewing its fertility and guarding against erosion, was converted into cattle ranches. Whenever there was a dry season of sufficient length for the annual burnings, the brushlands were made into natural pasturelands. Since cattle require a wide expanse of this barren land in order to be profitable, the colonists indiscriminately cleared forests in every kind of climate, topography, and soil. Even watersheds important to the lowland water supply were completely shorn of their protective forests.

We know the process well. It is not just persisting, but is getting worse at present, spreading over the slopes and upper river basins of the country’s mountain ranges. . . . It has gained new momentum, impelled not by the poor colonist searching for land with which to support his family, but rather by the commercial cattleman seeking short-term profits in the new and expanding international beef market.

Popularly regarded as progress, this colonizing process has reached a point where it does not lead to authentic development in the country, but leads instead to its impoverishment and to the eventual biological and economic death of the land. In most cases, primary forests arc cleared along rivers and streams. This destruction of elements vital to the ecology and renewal of the land -- elimination of entire communities, their flora and fauna, their roots and seeds, their organic soils. . . . When there are no vestigial forests close by, natural repopulation of secondary forests and wildlife becomes impossible. Worse yet, much of this land is unsuitable for use as pastureland and, when used for such purposes, is gradually ruined for any future use, including forestation (Tosi).

Nicaragua

Beginning in the sixties, cattle-ranching in Nicaragua was enormously revitalized (see Slutsky, 100). Meat exports came to constitute the country’s third largest export product, surpassed only by cotton and coffee.

Cattle-ranching in Nicaragua has been conducted traditionally in the form of land-leasing and sharecropping, which the great landowners have given to the campesino (Slutsky, 100). The sharecropper would clear and farm the land and leave it planted with grass before moving on in search of more land; the campesino’s function from the sixties on, then, basically has been that of "increasing the value of land that will later be occupied by the big cattlemen" (Slutsky, 100).

Panama

Or consider Panama. In 1950 Panama had about 570,000 head of cattle and approximately 550,000 hectares of pasturage; by 1970 the number of cattle had risen to 1.2 million head and the pasturage to 1.1 million hectares (Heckadon Moreno 1984b, 18).

Regarding Panama, S. Heckadon Moreno says:

The tropical-forest zones are being incorporated into the national economy, at a high ecological and social cost, due to the rapid expansion of extensive cattle-ranching. . . . This colonization is characterized by rapid destruction of the tropical forest, substituted first by cultivation of cleared lands and later by pastures which are burned annually. When the forests disappear and the soil loses its fertility, social organization is altered. Class structure changes, and traditional, mutual-assistance institutions are weakened. . . . These transformations contribute to the cycle which continually displaces the campesinos from old to new frontiers of colonization (Heckadon Moreno[a], 133).

Food for Export and Not for Central Americans

The increase in meat production in Central America did not come about in order to satisfy internal consumption . . . but rather for the purpose of exportation.5

Why the exportation of meat, and not rice and beans or other popular foods so badly needed by the hungry populace? Why cattle-raising, so extensive in its use of the most limited resource in all of Central America, the soil, and so unintensive in its use of labor while thousands are looking for work? Just as in the other operational categories of the World Bank, its interest in promoting cattle-ranching in Central America does not seem to correspond to a desire to confront the conditions and structures produced by man and by poverty. Instead, an answer must be sought as we examine the role of Central American cattle-ranching in the world meat market, and especially capitalism’s interest in its development (Keene, 202).

In some countries of Central America, as is the case in Costa Rica, Guatemala, and Honduras, one can see that meat production went from being insufficient in satisfying internal consumption needs to a position of importance among export products, following coffee, sugar, and bananas.

For example, studies conducted by the Nutrition Institute of Central America established that for the average conditions of Costa Rica an average of ninety grams of meat should be eaten daily. According to findings of the country’s National Production Council, in 1983 the daily consumption per person was twenty-three grams.6 Per capita consumption of meat for Costa Ricans declined after that, in spite of the fact that consumption was already at an unacceptable level for supporting basic protein nutrition. According to some sources, such as Myers, even though meat production in Costa Rica tripled during the period 1960-70 internal consumption fell to a point where each person ate "less meat than a domestic cat receives annually in the United States" (Myers 1981, 6).

The increase in meat production is designated almost entirely for export; more than thirty percent is sent to the United States (see Parsons). The meat produced in Central America is usually frozen and flown to Miami, where it enters the processed-foods production chain (see Andersson).

It could be contended that the eating habits of North Americans and their country’s politics are determinants in the promotion of cattle-ranching in Central America. According to Andersson, some United States government programs stimulate ranching activity in Central America. The U.S. State Department’s Agency for International Development, for example, has carried Out various assistance programs for profitability in that industry.

The "Hamburgerization" of Central America

On the other hand, after 1955, when the first "hamburgers to go" restaurant opened in Chicago, there was a veritable revolution in the eating habits of North Americans (Hubler, 1). In 1960 there were already more than 200 McDonald’s restaurants in the United States alone, with a consumption of meat that was truly immense. The problem at that time was how to obtain so many tons of meat at a low price. The best alternative turned out to be the meat produced in Central America, on the basis of the extensive grazing and natural pastures of the region. Inexpensive meat would mean inexpensive hamburgers. So, beginning in 1960 a "bonanza era" of cattle-ranching came to be. Few people had any idea of the high cost that would be paid in the Central American forests.

In summary, we would point out that from 1960 to 1980 beef production in Central America increased 160 percent; of the 400,000 square kilometers of rain forest that existed in 1960 in Central America less than one-half remained by 1980 (Myers 1981). We find ourselves faced, then, with a "hamburgerization" of Central America.

The Need for a Life-Liberating Theology

In light of this ravaging of people and land in Central America, we realize that the preferential option for the poor, characteristic of Latin American liberation theologies, must be articulated as a preferential option for life. To exercise this option is to defend and promote the fundamental right to life of all creatures on earth. The right to life in all its fullness involves partaking of the material base of creation, that is, of the material goods that permit life. All people, and not the powerful alone, must be availed of such goods; all people, not the powerful alone, must do so in a way that preserves rather than despoils the earth and other forms of life. In order to exercise this right in a just and sustainable way, we must rediscover our primal roots in the earth, and creatures of the earth.

This rediscovery will not be easy. Many modern people are detaching themselves, consciously or unconsciously, from their primal roots, from the origins of their existence: the earth and its natural resources, self-renewing sources of food, raw materials, energy, and so on. They are doing so because they are obsessed with profit and an eagerness to dominate nature. Indeed, this obsession has become an ideology.

The basic characteristic of this ideology seems to be unlimited growth, constant expansion. In the case of capitalism we have a pattern of consumption and waste that attacks humanity itself. This ideology is the basis for a mode of production, especially in the affluent countries, whose thirst for profit and for irrational expansion has not only promoted the pauperization of the majority of the planet’s human population but has also led to the plundering and pollution of nature. Thus has life been endangered not only for the poor, but for all sectors of the human population and for many of the creatures with which we share the earth.

It would seem that we have only two options. On the one hand, there is the traditional, persistent, and negative interpretation of anthropocentrism. According to it, human beings are in the front rank, trying to control the natural environment for his own benefit.

On the other hand, we have a new and more attractive valuation of nature. We might call it ecocentrism (see Sale). According to this interpretation human beings are but one among many species, and not much more. We have no right to continue our present behavior, as if we were the only species on earth and, moreover, as if the present generation were the last. Rather we must recognize ourselves as of the same order as other animals, in no way more valuable.

I believe we ought not limit ourselves to either of these concepts. Rather, we must somehow discover and combine the positive elements contained in each. That is, we must establish a new concept based on a balance between these two ideas, thereby achieving an interpretation of the harmonious relationship that is aspired to between human being and the rest of nature.

What we need is a greater understanding of the environmental limits which most certainly exist regarding human intervention into nature. The acceptance of these environmental limits may not guarantee us an equitable distribution of society’s wealth, but -- and this is the crucial point -- the idea of balance and environmental limits offers the prospect of a more just society. This is because respect for these limits is essential to any social body that aspires to a qualitatively better life for all. Traditional industrial society, as we know, has not really presented us with this possibility.

In other words, we must develop a new ethic and, to be frank, a new logic with relation to nature, based on the conviction that, as Father Gustavo Gutiérrez of Peru says, "life and not death has the last word." We rightly insist that God opposes death because God is the Creator and the giver of life.

Thus, as Christians in Latin America we choose life over death by combating the deterioration of the natural environment and the pollution of soil, air, water, and other elements. Always keeping in mind the environmental limits, we put ourselves on the side of life rather than death, among other reasons, so that all of us will have the chance to satisfy the basic necessities: work, food, home, health, education. Such must be our new, life-liberating ethic.

By way of conclusion, then, let us recall the plight of the swallows mentioned in the introduction, noting that if we are not careful, their plight may become our own.

The swallows that once occupied the power lines in the Morazan Plaza of El Salvador’s capital are migratory birds. They, along with 150 other species of birds (which is equivalent to two-thirds of the birds in North America’s forests), move each year from North America toward Central America and the Caribbean, going as far as South America, in order to spend the North American cold season in warmer latitudes.7

Central America lies on the route of many species of migratory birds. The isthmus is shaped more or less like a funnel, which channels the birds that migrate along diverse paths and come together in the narrow isthmus. Every time that the swallows and other birds fly south, they find their habitat more and more deteriorated. As a result, one to four percent of migratory birds disappear each year (Myers 1986). In other words, the individuals of each species of migratory bird are slowly diminishing in number. It is calculated that within some fifteen years, more than half of the migratory birds will have disappeared. If this is happening with wild animals, we may easily guess who is to follow.

Notes

1. Dagens Nyheter, Stockholm, 30 April 1979. "Skogsvard död för Maya" ("Poor Forest Management Causes the Ruin of the Mayas"). These studies were carded out on the Yucatan Peninsula in the 1970s by the agronomist Gerald Olson, Cornell University, United States.

2. When the conquistadors arrived there were, in Costa Rica at least, no more than 27,000 natives, according to Bishop Thiel. Seventy years later, given the abuse to which they were subjected, they had decreased to about 17,000, which dwindled to 9,000 by 1801. In other words, in three hundred years the aboriginal population in Costa Rica was reduced by almost two-thirds. Today only one percent of the country’s total population is aboriginal, the lowest percentage in Central America (see Cevo Guzman, et al., 224).

3. Pre-Columbian aboriginal communities required access to a large area of forest, and they would reduce the land’s yield after one or two harvests; they would abandon the farmed lands so that the forest would grow back and would clear another strip for cultivation. In this way the forest protected the soil, the plants, and the wild animals which, together with fish and shellfish, provided the aborigines with valuable sources of energy and nutrients (Hall, 122-124).

4. In the mid-seventies El Salvador had sixty-five percent, Costa Rica fifty- four percent, Honduras and Nicaragua thirty-five percent, and Guatemala thirty-two percent of their land area in agricultural use (see Soria 1976).

5. For a more in-depth study on the World Bank’s cattle politics in Central America, see Keene.

6. See Libertad, Costa Rica. "Desnutrici6n y consumo de came en Costa Rica," 23029 November 1984.

7. In the opinion of Bill Marleau, forest ranger with the Adirondack Reserve, New York State, United States, the abuse of pesticides is the main cause of the recent disappearance of swallows and other animals from this famous reserve. He relates: "I remember how it used to be, when millions of swallows perched on the power lines here. Every year around the 26th of August, they would assemble in large flocks and then migrate south. Last year, however, for the first time in twenty years, we didn’t have even one to build its nest. For four years now, not a single pair has been able to feed its young due to lack of insects in the area. . . . The two kinds of swallows common here had always raised two broods per year. Last year, when as usual I was counting the number of swallows assembled to migrate south, I could only see about fifteen; no more. As I said earlier, there used to be thousands. The same thing is being seen with other species of birds, and with mammals and insects, within our reserve" (Landin, 146-47).

 

Works Cited:

Andersson, W.T. "A más ganado, menos carne para el pueblo." Noticias Aliades, no. 2 (24 January 1985): 3-4.

Cevo Guzman, et al. Costa Rica: nuestra comunidad nacional estudios sociales sétimo año. San Jose, Costa Rica: Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1984.

Combe, J., and N. J. Gewald eds., Guía de campo de los ensayos forestales del CATIE en Turrialba, Costa Rica. Costa Rica: Centro Agronómico Tropical de Investigaciones y Enseñanza, 1979.

Corrales Rodríguez, D. Impacto ecológico sobre los recursos naturales renovables de Centro América. Managua, Nicaragua: Instituto Nicaragüense de Recursos Naturales y del Ambiente, 1983.

Deevey, E. S., et al. "Mayan Urbanism: Impact on Tropical Karst Environment." Science (19 October 1979).

Edberg, R. Spillran av ett moln (The Remains of a Cloud). Stockholm, Sweden: Litteratur-främjendet, 1966.

Espinoza, E. "Recursos naturales de aprovechamiento agropecuario." Actas of the Segundo Seminario Nacional de Recursos Naturales y del Ainbiente. Managua, Nicaragua: Instituto Nicaragilense de Recursos Naturales y del Ambiente, 1981.

Fonseca Zamora, O.M. 1979. "El colapso maya." In Anuario de Estudios Centroamericanos. Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad de Costa Rica, 1979, pp. 489-505.

Foumier, O. Ecología y desarrollo en Costa Rica. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Universidad Estatal a Distancia, 1981.

Hall, C. Costa Rica: Una interpretación geográfica con perspectiva histórica. San José, Costa Rica: Editorial Costa Rica, 1984.

Heckadon Moreno, S. (a) "Dinámica social de la ‘cultura del potrero’ de Panama el caso de Tonosí" Colonización y destrucción de bosques en Panamá. Ed. S.Heckadon Moreno and A. McKay. Panama: Asociación Panameña de Anthropolgía, 1984.

______ (b) "La colonización campesina de bosques tropicales en Panamá" Colonización y destrucción de bosques en Panamá. Ed. S. Heckadon Moreno, and A. McKay. Panama: Asociación Panameña de Anthropología, 1984.

Hubler, D. "El rey de la hamburguesa en Estados Unidos." La Prensa Libre, Costa Rica (6 March 1985).

Keene, B. "Incursiones del Banco Mundial en Centroaámerica." El Banco Mundial: un caso de "progresis,no conservador." Ed. H. Assman. San José, Costa Rica: Departmento Ecuménico de Investigaciones (DEI), 1981.

Landin, B. Om träd kunde grata (If Trees Could Cry). Stockholm: Prisma, 1986. Myers, Norman. The Sinking Ark. Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1979.

"The Hamburger Connection: How Central America’s Forests Become North America’s Hamburgers." Ambio 10, no. 1 (1981): 3-8.

_____"Economics and Ecology in the International Arena: The Phenomenon of Linked Linkages." Ambio (Sweden) 15 (1986):296-300.

Parsons, J. J. "Forest to Pasture: Development or Destruction? Revista de Biología Tropical 24, suppl. 1 (1976): 121-38.

Sale, K. "The Forest for the Trees: Can Today’s Environmentalists Tell the Difference?" Mother Jones 11, no. 8 (1986):25-33, 58.

Slutsky, D. "El avance de la frontera agrícola con especial referencia a Ia cost Atlántica de Nicaragua." Actas del segundo Seminarfo Nacional de Recursos Naturales y delAmbiente. Managua, Nicaragua: Instituto Nicaragüense de Recursos Naturales y del Ainbiente, 1981.

Soria, V. J. "Los sistemas de agricultura en el Istmo Centroamericano." Revista de Biología Tropical 24, suppl. 1 (1976): 57-68.

Tosi, J. A. Los recursos forestales de Costa Rica. San José, Costa Rica: I Congreso Nacional sobre la Conservacioón de los Recursos Naturales Renvoables, 1972.

A Sacramental Approach to Environmental Issues

For many Christians, participation in the sacraments is a more immediate and more fundamental way of discovering the presence of God than is the reading of abstract theological treatises. Through them, as John Habgood explains, "material reality is shown to be capable of bearing the image of the divine." In this essay Habgood carries this suggestion much further, showing how a sacramental approach to nature can give us a deep-seated respect for the earth and other living beings, and how it can, at the same time, guide us in developing technologies that help -- rather than frustrate -- the fulfillment of divine purpose. For those for whom sacramentalism is at the very heart of Christian faith, this essay offers an indispensable resource for seeing the relation between worship and environmentally responsible action.

Orthodox theology makes much of the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm. In the words of Kallistos Ware:

The human person is not only microcosm, the universe in miniature, but also microtheos, God in miniature. Each of us is not simply imago mundi, image of the world, but also image Dei, image of God. Each is a created reflection of the uncreated Deity, a finite expression of God’s infinite self-expression. That is why Gregory of Nazianus states . . . that man is "a second cosmos, a great universe within a little one" (Peacocke, 203).

Such a claim may sound absurdly anthropocentric. Who are we, mere specks in a vast universe, the accidental products of a process that far exceeds us and, even in earthly terms, only one among a myriad of life forms, who are we to dignify ourselves with such a central role in the ordering of things? Yet the inescapable truth remains that all our knowledge of the cosmos is our knowledge, filtered through the medium of our own minds and expressed in terms ultimately derived from our own thoughts and experience. The alternative may be even more arrogant. The quest for completely objective knowledge and the supposition that we can somehow give an account of the universe from some independent nonhuman standpoint fly in the face of the facts. Our perspective is, and always remains, human. To say this is not to deny that we can achieve in some fields of knowledge a high degree of objectivity. Nor is it to deny that the totality of things is much greater and more mysterious than our minds can grasp. There is a proper sense in which knowledge, like prayer, ends in silence. But insofar as our knowledge admits its human limitations, the claim that microcosm and macrocosm are related, and may reflect one another, is not absurd.

The theological basis of the claim rests, as Kallistos Ware makes clear, on the belief that humanity is created in the image of God. If this is true of humanity then it must in some sense extend to the whole cosmos because Christ, the perfect image of God, is also in St. Paul’s thought the agent and fulfillment of creation.

These are high and abstract thoughts, which may seem very distant from the main concerns of this book. I state them without argument as a prologue to some thoughts about sacramental theology, because sacramental theology itself may seem an absurdly narrow route along which to tackle practical questions about the environment. But if small things can reflect large ones, it may not be such a bad route after all. An eleventh-century Chinese administrator is said to have complained about Buddhists: "When they try to understand what is lofty without studying what is lowly, how can they have a proper understanding of what is lofty?"

I have no wish to make exclusive claims for sacramental theology. For some Christians the sacraments form only a small part of their religious experience. For others, among whom I include myself, they lie at the heart of Worship. They hold together in a unique manner the inner relationship with God and the Outer relationship with material reality, reaching out to embrace a universe whose meaning is finally disclosed in Jesus Christ. In the sacraments microcosm and macrocosm meet.

Sacramental theology centers on the perception that items of material reality -- water, bread, and wine -- can be given a new meaning and status by being brought within the saving action of God in Christ. This is both a revelation and a transformation. The true potential of bread, for instance, Is revealed by its transformation into a means of communication with God. This is beautifully summed up in the ancient offertory prayer:

Blessed be God through whom we have this bread to offer, which earth has given and human hands have made. It will become for us the bread of heaven.

The prayer is a subtle balance between recognizing God’s gift, acknowledging our human role in developing and using it rightly, and accepting its potential as a conveyer of God’s own reality. Bread, at once the most basic and ancient of foods, is also the human product that perhaps more than anything else, made possible the civilized world. This fundamental support of life, says the prayer, will reveal a new level of meaning, made possible and actual by God’s own involvement in material reality through Christ.

Behind the prayer lies a theology of the incarnation and, more immediately, the discourse on the bread of life in the sixth chapter of St. John’s Gospel. Whether the author of the Gospel meant this to be his substitute for an account of the Last Supper need not concern us here. The point is that it is impossible to read it now without seeing the bread as the body of Jesus given for the life of the world in a eucharistic context. But it is significant that it is not confined to a eucharistic context. The bread given by Jesus is not just contrasted with ordinary bread, profoundly important though that is, but with the manna eaten for forty years by the Israelites in the wilderness. In other words even miraculous food, food that had saved a nation from starvation, food that lay at root of its self-understanding as a people saved by God, even this was not to be compared with the bread now promised. The "bread from heaven" is no incidental feature of life with Jesus. Its meaning spreads out to embrace the totality of relationship with him. "I am the living bread which came down from heaven. If a man cats of this bread, he will live for ever" (Jn. 6: 51). And it points beyond Jesus himself. "I am" in the sentence "I am the bread of life" picks up and echoes the most profound and mysterious title of God, "I am that I am (Ex. 3:14).

Some of those who have no doubts about the value of the sacraments in their proper liturgical context find themselves uneasy when sacramental theology appears to "take off" in an apparently illegitimate fashion and to claim sacramental significance in everything. The process of widening sacramental horizons has already begun in John 6, which is why I have used it as the basis for my exposition. It fits well with a theology of worship and of the church which interprets them as expressing on a small scale and in an explicit way truths, often hidden, about what God is doing in the whole human drama. To think like this is not to ecclesiasticize everything. In fact, precisely the reverse. Church and sacraments are the making visible of what is already there but might otherwise remain unrecognized.

The essential point is that material reality is shown to be capable of bearing the image of the divine. It rests on the staggering claim that this is what happened in Jesus and what constitutes the truth in the doctrines of the incarnation and of salvation. Thus what happens to water, bread, and wine when they are used as vehicles of God’s grace is no isolated miracle. All matter shares this potential, and specific sacramental actions, which themselves belong within a specific historical, theological, and liturgical context, are the God-given means by which this truth is safeguarded and made known.

They are not the exclusive means, however. Thomas Traherne in Centuries of Meditations, saw the same truth as part of a childlike vision of the world before the distortions and separations of adult consciousness take over:

You never enjoy the world aright, till the sea itself floweth in your veins, till you are clothed with the heavens, and crowned with the stars: and perceive yourself to be the sole heir of the whole world, and more than so, because men are in it who are everyone sole heirs as well as you. Till you can sing and rejoice and delight in God, as misers do in gold, and kings in scepters, you never enjoy the world (Traherne, 29).

At a much lower level of awareness there can be a sense of the goodness. or meaningfulness, or value of the world, which forms part of many people’s basic religious awareness, even if it is only glimpsed in fleeting moments. What such experiences tend to lack, though, is the complex interplay between what God has given and what human beings must do, and the illumination that comes from setting individual experience within a developed and subtle religious tradition.

I contend, therefore, that the sacraments themselves remain one of our best clues as to how we should treat the world aright, and in what follows I sketch out in a preliminary fashion how this might help the environmental debate.

The Recognition Of Potential

What might it mean to live in practice as if anything or everything might become a vehicle of divine grace?

Perhaps it is easier to start by imagining the opposite, a universe in which anything or everything is ripe for exploitation. The essence of such a regime is that human needs and desires are sovereign, and the stuff of the world can be bent to human purposes with no respect paid to what it is in itself or what it might become within the purposes of God. In the sacramental vision the world is seen as created by God, owned by God, and ultimately finding its fulfillment in God.

Paradoxically the practical consequences of these two visions may not always be very different. Rubbish, for instance, may be seen as a resource by the sacramentalist who is concerned not to dismiss anything as mere waste, as well as by the commercially minded entrepreneur who sees that there is money to be made from it. Deep motivation may be one thing, but seeing a problem as an opportunity is not confined to those who share a particular philosophy of life.

Equally, there may be very different motives for wishing to preserve, say, a forest or an animal species. Long-term prudential considerations can provide reasons for holding back even within a general philosophy of exploitation. An attempt to recognize and respect divine potential might take various forms. It might include, for instance, respect for the evolutionary process as the means whereby in practice most of the potential within the living matter of the universe has so far been released. To let a forest be, or to protect a species, is to acknowledge that they still have within them a greater potential for life, growth, and development, and that their being may therefore form part of the larger purposes of God in using evolution as a means of creation.

Alternatively there might be a more direct respect due to them for what they can reveal of God in being themselves. This is a difficult idea to carry through into practical programs. To let everything be, to respect its right to be itself, and to allow it to develop in its own way, would, if carried to extremes, make human life impossible and negate our own creativeness. Forests also have the potential to become fuel or furniture or agricultural land, and some of the greatest human achievements have resulted from seeing a potential in things that was decidedly not a consequence of letting them be.

Human beings have interfered decisively and irreversibly in many kinds of animal breeding, often bringing out latent potentials that have been hugely to our benefit. We now stand on the threshold of wielding far greater genetic powers, with incalculable consequences for the future. This need not be mere exploitation, though with such powers available the dividing line between drawing out potential and arrogantly trying to play God may be a narrow one.

The key religious insight would seem to be that, whether things are let be or whether they are developed by human ingenuity for human purposes, they belong to God and not to ourselves. There is a respect due to them, an awareness of human limitations, a fine balance to be struck between penitence for what we have done to God’s world in the past and hopeful creativeness for the future.

Sacramentally such an attitude would seem appropriate toward inanimate things, at least toward things of a certain complexity, as well as toward living creatures. A flowing stream, a clear sea teeming with life, a mountain landscape, surely deserve respect and care despite the large subjective element that enters into our appreciation of them. They can be treated in specific ways that still further reveal their potential. The great eighteenth-century creator of English landscapes, Capability Brown, earned his nick-name for his skill, not in imposing his will on a recalcitrant nature, but in drawing out its aesthetic capabilities. A sculptor carving a particular stone or lump of wood may describe this work in similar ways; the finished object is somehow seen as being already there in the natural formation of the raw material, waiting only to be revealed. An engineer may see a valley as waiting to be dammed, a chasm as waiting to be bridged, an ugly and unhealthy swamp as potentially a place of beauty and usefulness. Such actions can in their own way become secular sacraments, an enhancement, a liberation of what is already there, a transformation that does not violate a thing’s essential nature.

I fully admit that such a way of speaking creates acute difficulties for those who are more used to seeing the universe as a torrent of change. "Essential natures" do not have much place in evolution. Clearly, by itself the recognition of potential is not enough. But sacramentalism is also about God’s work complementing and giving substance to ours in a world still in process of creation.

The Need for Cooperation

The offertory prayer speaks of bread "which earth had given and human hands have made." Cooperation with natural processes, working with the grain of nature rather than against it, is now part of the conventional wisdom among conservationalists. Can the sacramental context add anything significant to this already familiar idea?

The eucharist is a complex act of giving and receiving in which the worshipers as well as God are both givers and receivers. At its highest it is a mutual exchange of love. But all this is set within the context of what God has already done. Despite the mutuality, therefore, the key word is response. In the exchange of love "we love because he first loved us" (I Jn. 4:19). Sacramental action is thus essentially a matter of cooperation rather than co-creation. As human beings we share a role with God in drawing out the divine potential of the world, but only because God has already himself taken the decisive steps.

The theme of cooperation receives further emphasis in the communion, which forms the climax of the whole. There can be no true giving and receiving with God unless others form a part of it. As those who are themselves loved by God, worshipers caught up in this action are commanded and enabled to love their fellow human beings. And this communion with others spreads still further to embrace "angels and archangels and all the company of heaven." The microcosm of love and mutuality in response to the love of God experienced by those engaged in sacramental worship ultimately has to include the macrocosm.

But how far should this mutuality spread? Should it for instance include battery hens? There is an evolutionary case for including battery hens in some kind of relationship with human beings as very distant cousins, and this common membership of the community of life constitutes some kind of moral claim, albeit not a very strong one. If the sense of community goes further than this, if it is possible to hold that at a very rudimentary level there can and should be a cooperative relationship between human beings and hens, the moral claim is strengthened. If, to put the point more strongly, God gives hens a being of their own and values them prior to their usefulness as a cheap source of food, then the hen’s point of view as a partner in this larger communion begins to assume some importance.

Admittedly it is not easy to know what a hen’s point of view is, but in the case of battery hens there would seem to be a fairly simple test. In a battery the human element in the relationship with hens so dominates the conditions of life that the possibility of co-operation virtually disappears altogether. The hen is reduced as far as possible to machine-like operation.

Animal husbandry at its best has always contained an element of cooperation.

Even when the relationship ends in death it can be marked by respect for the life taken. The rituals surrounding animal sacrifice in cultures where sacrifice was the almost inevitable preliminary to eating meat witness to the seriousness of taking life, unpleasant though some of the rituals were. Here again the theme of communion with the life sacrificed can perhaps help modern Westernized consciousness develop a different feel for the products of industrialized scientific agriculture. Organic farming, for instance, may not fulfill the quasi-scientific claims for it, but may have moral and spiritual benefits for societies that see the need to develop a more sensitive relationship with the natural world.

The limits of cooperation become all too evident, however, when there is a mosquito in the bedroom. Letting things be themselves, discerning their point of view, looking for the divine potentiality in what is lowly, cannot become a recipe for the passive acceptance of whatever befalls us. Our human place in God’s purposes is to cooperate with him in the process of creative change. Sacramental thinking points to a world which has to be redeemed before it can truly reveal the face of God. There is an inescapable element of struggle, discrimination, suffering, and tragedy in the process, and any theological approach to ecological issues that belittles or ignores these is hopelessly unrealistic. Hence, my third and final heading.

Transformation by Redemption

The sacraments are sacraments of Christ’s death and resurrection. Suffering and the transformation of suffering belong to their very essence. This is plain from the New Testament account of their origins.

Sacramental theology has no excuse, therefore, for underrating the extent to which the divine potential of the world is denied, frustrated, distorted, defaced, and ignored. Nor need it shrink from accepting that the very means of creation through evolution entails conflict and suffering. Sacramental awareness is not at all the same as sentimentality. The perceptions of divine glory in a world capable of bearing God’s image have to be matched by the belief that God bears the weight and suffering of his own creation on the cross.

All this is basic Christianity. To interpret the cross in the light of the sacraments can help to strengthen the bridge between the redemption of human sin and suffering and the redemption of the rest of creation. St. Paul’s language about creation "groaning and travailing" (Rom 8:22) and "waiting for the redemption of the sons of God" (Rom 8:23) is another way of expressing the same link.

To put it in sacramental terms has an advantage in that it can suggest a means by which the link is actually operative. The sacraments entail human cooperation with divine initiative, a cooperation which is essentially priestly. This is so whether we think in terms of the priesthood of all believers or the representative priesthood of individuals within the body of the church. The point is that there is a human role whereby, under the grace of God and in the midst of an ambivalent and partially evil world, ordinary things can be offered, consecrated, broken, and transformed as a means of anticipating heaven on earth. The priestly role of all human beings toward the world of nature entails a similar offering through prayer and through the recognition that all belongs to God already, a similar transformation by the release of new potential and by the discovery that even in the world of nature there can be glimpses of heaven on earth.

Implicit in this priestly role is the dual character of human life as belonging to the world of nature yet transcending it. The priest is a mediator, and our common human priesthood as cooperators with God in his creation entails coming to terms both with our createdness and with our God-relatedness. There are other ways of expressing this within Christian theology. The description of human beings as both "beasts and angels" is perhaps the most famous. But the link between sacramental theology and priesthood makes the idea of mediation particularly apposite.

As ourselves part of the process that has to be offered and transformed there is no room for arrogance or for the exploitative mentality which assumes that the created world is ours. But as those who also stand on the godward side of the process, and who dare to describe ourselves as "made in the image of God," we also have a responsibility not simply to accept the world as it is but see and pursue its possibilities for revealing more fully the glory of God. All our environmental thinking has to take place between these two poles. And the value of a sacramental approach to it lies in the richness and diversity of images, rooted in common Christian experience, such a theology can provide.

 

Works Cited

Peacocke, A., and G. Gillett. Persons and Personality. Oxford: Blackwell, 1987.

Traherne, Thomas. Centuries of Meditations. I. New York: Harper and Row, 1960.

New Testament Foundations for Understanding the Creation

Christians interested in ecological theologies have much to gain from an encounter with other religions. Sometimes this encounter, as exemplified in McDaniel’s essay later in this work, will result in an appropriation of insights of other perspectives. Yet sometimes it will result instead in a sympathetic yet critical rejection of non-Christian perspectives through which Christian views are themselves elucidated. Paulos Gregorios’ essay illustrates the latter approach in its relevance to the development of a Christian theology of nature. Emerging out of an encounter with Hinduism, we find in this Indian Orthodox writer’s essay a biblical and Christian understanding of the created order. By framing three ecological principles for the environmental movement, he shows the resourcefulness of an Orthodox point of view for ecological concerns. This essay first appeared in Tending the Garden, Essays on the Gospel and the Earth (ed. Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, Grand Rapids, MI: William B. Eerdmans, 1987, pp. 83-92) and is used with permission. Translations of scripture are by Gregorios himself.

Recently I was present at a special function at our presidential palace. Zail Singh, the president of India, bestowed a privately endowed honor on one of our most creative friends of nature: Sunderlal Bahuguna. Bahuguna is well known and written about, both in India and abroad. He initiated the Chipko movement, which has been an important factor in awakening Indians to the environmental question, particularly the importance of conserving the forest trees in the Himalayan region.

The mindless and tragic decimation of the Himalayan forests was the result of the government’s thoughtless felling of trees in that region. It resulted in heavy soil erosion, desertification, and climate change. After trying many ways of stopping the government, Bahuguna finally launched the "Embrace [chipko] the Trees" movement. He trained the village people to go and embrace a tree as the government workers came to cut it down. The people understood Bahuguna’s goal and took on the concerns of the movement with enthusiasm. The highest government officials had to make major decisions to reduce the cutting of trees, decisions that would have been politically impossible without the Chipko movement.

Bahuguna is a simple Gandhian. At this function in his honor he said publicly that he was ill at ease on the green lawns of the presidential palace; he wanted to be back among the forest trees and the mountain people. He accepted the award bestowed on him very reluctantly, but expressed happiness that in the process the movement was being recognized.

In his acceptance speech Bahuguna presented three principles for the environmental movement which have stayed in my mind:

1. Nature is to be worshiped, not exploited.

2. One who takes less from nature and society should receive greater respect than one who takes more.

3. There is a world inside a person that is richer and more worthy of cultivation than the outside world.

Bahuguna is a Hindu; I am a Christian. As such I must reflect on these principles further rather than accept them at face value. And it is in this context that I seek, trusting in the grace of God and in the power of the Holy Spirit, to examine three passages from the New Testament in order to frame my own principles for the environmental movement. In what follows I will offer my own translation of each of these passages and then discuss the three basic ecological principles I extrapolate from them.

I

For I regard the troubles that befall us in this present time as trivial when compared

with the magnificent goodness of God that is to be manifested in us. For the created order awaits, with eager longing, with neck outstretched, the full manifestation of the children of God. The futility or emptiness to which the created order is now subject is not something intrinsic to it. The Creator made the creation contingent, in his ordering, upon hope; for the Creation itself has something to look forward to -- namely, to be freed from its present enslavement to disintegration. The creation itself is to share in the freedom, in the glorious and undying goodness, of the children of God. For we know how the whole creation up till now has been groaning together in agony, in a common pain. And not just the nonhuman created order -- even we ourselves, as Christians, who have received the advance gift of the Holy Spirit, are now groaning within ourselves, for we are also waiting -- waiting for the transformation of our bodies and for the full experiencing of our adoption as God’s children. For it is by that waiting with hope that we are being saved today. We do not hope for something which we already see. Once one sees something, there is no point in continuing to hope to see it. What we hope for is what we have not yet seen; we await its manifestation with patient endurance (Rom 8:18-25).

First Principle: Human redemption can be understood only as an integral part of the redemption of the whole creation.

For a long time now we have been conditioned to understand the redemption in Christ primarily -- and too often exclusively -- in terms of personal salvation. A basic requirement for a healthy Christian approach to the human environment seems to be a shift of gears in this regard.

What is a "person" whose salvation Christ effects? A person exists only in relation -- in relation to other human persons (his or her father and mother, to begin with) and to nonhuman realities (light, air, water, food, and so on). It is not possible for a person to come to be or to grow without relation to other persons and things. The earth and the sun as well as other people are essential parts of our existence. Without them we cannot exist. Both the Pauline and the Johannine witnesses in the New Testament strongly affirm this redemption of the whole creation -- cosmic redemption, if you like, of the participation of all creation in the liberation of humanity from the bondage of sin and death. This strongly contradicts the Gnostic-Hellenic-Hindu notion that is most characteristically expressed by Plotinus, the so-called founder of Neoplatonism in the third century:

No, if body is the cause of Evil, then there is no escape; the cause of Evil is Matter (Enneads 1:8:8).

Thus, it is quite correct to say at once that Matter is without Quality (in itself) and that it is evil; it is evil not in the sense of having Quality, but precisely, in not having it (Enneads 1:8:10).

In this tradition the body is the source of bondage and evil. Unfortunately this tradition is also very strong among Christians, who -- like Hellenists, Hindus, and Neoplatonists -- believe that the soul alone is to be saved and that the body and other material objects, whether living or non-living, do not participate in or benefit from the redemption in Christ. This Gnostic influence in Christianity is what has pervaded our understanding of the Old and the New Testaments. Why do we magnify the prophetic and underplay the priestly? We prefer the prophetic because it fits better with our Gnostic temperament, which despises the material and the corporate, the sacrificial and the ritual, and prefers to focus on the individual soul and the prophetic word. I will come back to this point later, but here we only need affirm what St. Paul and St. John so strongly affirm, contrary to the Gnostic-Hellenic-Hindu tradition, and in the true spirit of the Hebrew Scriptures: that the whole creation -- not just a few human souls -- has been redeemed and reconciled in Christ.

Human beings have existed and do exist only as integral parts of a system that includes sources of sustenance -- meat, grains, and vegetables -- as well as sun and earth, light and water, air and fire. To make a false distinction between nature and history, to limit the presence and action of God to history, to deny God’s action in nature -- these cannot be regarded as Christian.

Nature, in the way in which we use it, is not a biblical notion. Nature (physis in Greek) in the sense of nonhuman self-existent reality does not occur in the Old or the New Testament; it is a concept alien to the biblical world. Insofar as the word nature refers to something as it exists by itself, it is contrary to the Johannine affirmation that not a thing came into being without Christ the Logos. If the Hebrew Scriptures use the word nature, it is only in the Book of Maccabees, and there it puts the word in the mouth of a Greek (Antiochus) rather than of a Hebrew.

In fact, there is no Hebrew word for nature. Hebrew uses "creating" (bara) as a verb, but it seldom uses beriah, a feminine noun, to refer to the whole creation. It does not make an entity out of creation, though it recognizes the act that produces and sustains the creation. The Hebrew Scriptures may make all the trees of the wood rejoice (Ps 96:12) and ask the trees and animals to praise the Lord (Ps 148), but they do not speak about nature or the creation as an entity representing the whole created order. The New Testament also does not speak of nature as the ensemble of created entities. If it uses the word nature (in expressions like physis, physikos, kata physin), it is to distinguish between natural and unnatural or natural and artificial (see Rom 1:26, 27; 2:27; 11:21, 24), or to speak about what is spontaneous or connatural. It can speak of our being partakers of the divine nature (in 2 Pt 1:4, theias koinonoi physeos literally means "sharers in the nature of the Godhead"), but not of any nature existing independently of God.

Neither is the noun history a common biblical notion. Certainly the Bible does not know a God who acts in "history" but does not act in "nature"; it does not distinguish nature from history, as we do. A historia is a carefully researched narrative of a series of events, not a realm of exclusively human or divine action unrelated to nature. The noun historia does not occur in the Hebrew or Greek Scriptures. The verb historeo occurs once (in Gal 1:18), but it is used to mean "visit."

We have seriously distorted the biblical perspective on redemption by introducing alien categories like nature and history into it, and by understanding redemption only in terms of souls and persons. In reacting against the exclusive emphasis on personal salvation, liberalism and neo-orthodoxy fell into the trap of false categories, claiming that God acts in history but not in nature, and that history rather than nature is the realm of God’s revelation. These emphases can be traced to a Gnostic bias that detests nature and sacrament as material, but can see history and word as somehow nonmaterial and (therefore?) spiritual.

A new understanding of the redemption in Jesus Christ will then have to take into account at least the following: (a) personal and corporate salvation; (b) spiritual reality and material reality in the creation and in the incarnation; (c) the created order as the object and field of the redeeming order; and (d) the human person as integrally related to the whole cosmos. When we keep these relationships in mind, we will have a picture of our own faith that will facilitate a more respectful approach not to nature but to the created order as a whole. The continuity between the order of creation and the order of redemption, rather than their distinction and difference, should be the focus of our interest. Humanity is redeemed with the created order, not from it.

II

He, Christ, the Beloved Son, is the manifest presence (icon) of the unmanifest God. He

is the Elder Brother of all things created, for it was by him and in him that all things were created, whether here on earth in the sensible world or in the world beyond the horizon of your senses which we call heaven, even institutions like royal thrones, seats of lords and rulers -- all forms of authority. All things were created through him, by him, in him. But he himself is before all things; in him they consist and subsist; he is the head of the body, the Church. He is the New Beginning, the First-born from the dead; thus he becomes in all respects pre-eminent. For it was (God’s) good pleasure that in Christ all fullness should dwell; it is through him and in him that all things are to be reconciled and reharmonized. For he has removed the contradiction and made peace by his own blood. So all things in the visible earth and in the invisible heaven should dwell together in him. That includes you, who were once alienated, enemies in your own minds to God’s purposes, immersed in evil actions; but now you are bodily reconciled in his fleshly body which has tasted death. Christ intends to present you -- holy, spotless, and blameless -- in God’s presence, if you remain firm in the faith, rooted and grounded in him, unswerving from the hope of the good news you have heard, the good news declared not only to men and women on earth, but to all created beings under heaven. It is this gospel that I, Paul, have also been called to serve (Col 1:15-23).

Second Principle: Christ himself should be seen in his three principal relationships: (1) to members incorporated into his body; (2) to the human race; and (3) to the other-than-human orders of created existence In a many-planed universe. Each of these is related to the other.

A Christology based on this principle will not conceive of a Christ as somehow other than the created order. Today much of Christology sees Christ as being separate from the world, from culture, and so forth; we try to affirm the lordship of Christ over world and culture by conceiving even the incarnate Christ as somehow totally distinct from the created order. We then think of him as Lord of the world, Lord of the church, and so on. In the more individualistic versions of Christology-soteriology, some make him sole mediato between the person and God. This perception involves three realities: God, Christ, and the individual. God is there, the individual is here, and Christ stands in between. And the world and the church are fourth and fifth realities.

This kind of disjunctive thinking has to give way to an integral and participative way of understanding Christ. Jesus Christ is not an abstract or "purely spiritual" entity. He is incarnate. He took a material body, becoming part of the created order while remaining unchanged as one of the three persons in the Trinity who is Creator. He is one of us. He is fully consubstantial with us.

As Christians we are united with him in an especially intimate way. By baptism and by faith he has incorporated us as members of his body. By participation in his body and blood, we grow to be integral parts of him. Once he had a human body like ours. In fact, he still does -- though it has already been transformed and resurrected and is therefore no longer subject to the ordinary laws of our physics, which govern only mortal bodies and material objects. But he has chosen to have a larger body, partly in heaven (that is, beyond the horizon of our senses) and partly on earth. We belong to that body as a whole, but particularly to the earthly part of it. Christ is always with us, the members of his body, particularly as he continues to fulfill his ministry as high priest of creation and as prophet and servant to the world.

Christ incarnate is a human being, consubstantial with all other human beings. He did not become simply an individual human person or a Christian. He became humankind -- male and female. He assumed the whole of human nature, and now there is no humanity other than the one which Christ took on -- our humanity, in which all human beings participate, whether or not they believe in Christ, whether or not they recognize the nature of their humanity. This aspect of the Redeemer’s relationship to the whole of humanity, independent of human faith, is seldom fully recognized by Christians and its implications worked out. No humans are alien to Christ. whether they be Hindu, Muslim, Communist, or Buddhist. They share in Christ’s humanity in ways that we have to spell out elsewhere. They are not members of the body of Christ, but they are not unrelated to Christ.

Christ the Incarnate One assumed flesh -- organic, human flesh; he was nurtured by air and water, vegetables and meat, like the rest of us. He took matter into himself, so matter is not alien to him now. His body is a material body -- transformed, of course, but transformed matter. Thus he shares his being with the whole created order: animals and birds, snakes and worms, flowers and seeds. All parts of creation are now reconciled to Christ. And the created order is to be set free and to share in the glorious freedom of the children of God. Sun and moon, planets and stars, pulsars and black holes -- as well as the planet earth -- are to participate in that final consumption of the redemption.

The risen Christ is thus active, by the Spirit, in all three realms: in the church, in the whole of humanity, and in the cosmos. Each of these relationships is fundamentally different, but all are real and meaningful to Christ, the Incarnate One.

Our theology’s weakness has been its failure to recognize the wider scope of the redemption beyond the "individualized soul" or the person. Liberalism still spiritualizes the incarnate Christ by confining his actions to so-called history, as if that were a realm in which nature and the material elements of creation were not present. We must move beyond personal salvation to declare and teach the three basic dimensions of the redemption.

III

At the source-spring of all, the Logos is and was. The Logos is God vis-à-vis, and the

Logos is God. It is this Logos that in the beginning was face to face with God. It is through the Logos that all existing things have come to exist. Without him not a single thing could have come into being. In him was also life. Life is light in human beings. The light shines in the midst of the darkness, and the darkness has not comprehended or overcome the light (John 1:1-5).

Third Principle: Christ and the Holy Spirit are related to the whole created order in three ways: by creating it. by redeeming it, and by finally fulfilling it in the last great consummation.

There is no need to elaborate these points. The act of creation is a corporate act of the three persons of the Trinity. God’s relation to plants and trees, to air and water did not begin with the redemption in the incarnate Christ. Not a single thing exists that did not come into being without Christ and the Holy Spirit, including the primeval water over which the Spirit was hovering at the time of creation (Gn 1:2). Neither art nor literature, neither mountain nor river, neither flower nor field came into existence without Christ and the Holy Spirit. They exist now because they are sustained by God. The creative energy of God is the true being of all that is; matter is that spirit or energy in physical form. Therefore, we should regard our human environment as the energy of God in a form that is accessible to our senses.

We have already discussed the relationship of the human environment, of the whole cosmos, to the redemption. It is a redeemed cosmos that we meet in our environment, and as such it is worthy of respect.

It is the final apokatastasis, the fulfillment at the end, that still needs to be stressed. The consummation, which Paul calls anakephalaiosis, means adding up everything (Eph 1:10) -- that is, the consummation of the whole created order in Christ. Take the three numbers 5, 7, and 14. When one adds them up, one gets 26. At first it may not be obvious that the three smaller numbers are contained in the larger number, but they are there; they are not lost. Analogous to this is the process in the final apokatastasis, about which Peter preached in Solomon’s Portico in Jerusalem. There he talked about "Christ Jesus, whom the unseen realm must keep until the times of the final restitution of all things, about which God spoke through the mouths of his holy ones the prophets from ages ago" (Acts 3:21; my translation).

The Christian understanding of the status of the world, of all life and of inorganic matter, is determined by these three factors:

Q. How did they come to be, and how are they sustained?

A. By creation.

Q. How does the incarnation of Jesus Christ affect them?

A. They share in the destined freedom of the children of God.

Q. What is their final destiny?

A. To be incorporated, through transformation, in the new order that fully emerges only at the end, in the final recapitulation.

The whole created order comes from God the Holy Trinity, is redeemed by the incarnate Christ, and will be brought to fulfillment after transformation by the same Christ and by the Holy Spirit, the perfecter of all.

REFUTING BAHUGUNA

Now that we have explored these three basic Christian principles, we are in a position to look again at Sunderlal Bahuguna’s three principles. As for his first principle, Christians cannot say that nature is to be worshiped and not exploited. Christians would say that the created order (not nature) is to be respected as the order that has given birth to us, sustains us, and will still be the framework for our existence when the whole process of creation-redemption has been consummated. We respect the created order both because it comes from God and is sustained by him, and because it is the matrix of our origin, growth, and fulfillment as human beings. But we do not worship the creation; worship is reserved for the Creator. We have to tend the creation, use it for our own sustenance and flourishing, but we also have to respect it in itself as a manifestation of God’s creative energy and cooperate with God in bringing out the full splendor of the created order as reflecting the glory of the Creator. Bahuguna’s second principle -- that one who takes less from nature is to be more honored than one who takes more -- is also dubious from a Christian perspective. Simplicity of life is a high value, but enforced poverty is not. And the poor are to be respected not because they take less from nature but because they are friends of God and the victims of injustice. Christians can choose from two lifestyles: the simple life à la John the Baptist, who lived on locusts and wild honey in the desert, and the fuller life of our Lord, who prayed all night and worked all day, but who ate and drank with others. Neither of these lifestyles would, however, justify the mindless affluence of our consumer society. To impose austerity on a society may be unwise, but it is even more unwise to impose affluence on a nation through hidden per. suasion and to make some people more affluent than others. In taking what is given by nature, we should be careful to give back to nature what it needs to maintain its own integrity and to supply the needs of the future.

Bahuguna’s third principle -- that the individual’s inner life is more worthy of development than the outside world -- is also wrongheaded. Christians need not despise or reject the outer world in order to develop the inner world. And we should not think of the inner world as an individual realm. Rather, we should think of it as the unseen, the heavenly, that which lies beyond our senses. It is a different perception, one that Paul talks about when he says, "If then you have co-risen with Christ, seek the higher things, where Christ now is enthroned at the right hand of God. Meditate on and will the heavenly realities, not the earthly ones" (Col. 3:1-2; my translation). We should not speak of the inner world but of the final fulfillment that is already present in the realm beyond our senses, and that now moves our world as its norm and goal. Even when we are thinking about the environment or socio-economic and political life -- ta ano phroneite, we should focus our minds and wills on the higher realities (not the inner), which must be manifested in the earthly realities -- now partially, but in the end, fully.

Covenant and Creation

For Wesley Granberg-Michaelson, director of the sub-unit on Church and Society of the World Council of Churches, God’s covenant as depicted in the Bible consists of promises not only to humans but to all of creation as well. In thematizing the concept of covenant and showing its relevance to the crises now faced by life on earth, Granberg-Michaelson uncovers an oft-neglected resource within the Christian tradition. The perspectives and material in this essay originally were developed by the author as part of a consultation by the World Alliance of Reformed Churches exploring the meaning of covenant for justice, peace, and integrity of creation, and as preparation for their World Assembly.

Relating covenant to justice and peace is a task already initially embraced both theologically and in the practice of the churches today. The same, however, cannot be said about the integrity of creation. For the most part, our churches have been inattentive to the growing threats facing the life of the creation. And our theological and biblical understandings often have minimized and ignored the significance of God’s creation when expressing the meaning of Christian faith.

Our challenge, then, is to relate the insights of the Christian tradition to the crisis that today threatens the essential integrity of the creation. In so doing we can discover neglected yet empowering dimensions of God’s covenant. Moreover, we can call upon the members of our church communities to respond through covenanting for the very survival and renewal of the gift given in God’s creation.

God’s Covenant Embraces the Creation

This is the biblical truth that forms the foundation for upholding the integrity of creation and provides the basis for the church’s response to the perils threatening the life of the world.

God’s action as Creator did not consist simply of God making the world. Rather, as Creator, Redeemer, and Sustainer, God chose the creation. Through grace alone, God identified the world as the beloved creation. "For God so loved the world. ."

Within most Christian thought and particularly in Reformed theology, covenant has been understood as God’s promises to humanity. Biblical scholars have revealed the nature of covenant agreements in the world of the Hebrew Scriptures. This background has led to insights concerning the various ways in which covenant was understood by the people of Israel. In some cases covenant promises between God and a people were seen as conditional, and dependent upon appropriate responses. Another tradition came to stress the abiding and unconditional character of God’s covenant. Yet, most all such reflection has assumed that the scope of covenant is only God and humanity.

That limited perspective has contributed to the church’s inattention to the crisis facing the world’s environment. The assumption that God’s promises extend simply to humanity has left little roam for regarding the creation as central to the message of Christian faith. This has allowed an anthropocentric bias to dominate our interpretation of the biblical message. Further, attitudes that sanction the ruthless domination of nature have been theologically tolerated and even strengthened from the view that God’s promises and covenant have no practical relevance for the earth.

Our fresh and hopeful discovery, however, is that the biblical message resounds with declarations of the creation as God’s loved possession and gift. The promises of God, and the work of redemption in Jesus Christ, encompass the whole created order. Moreover, the creation is a partner in covenant with God. In fact, the covenant tradition biblically is linked to the creation from the earliest prehistory to the future promises of a new creation.

Christian faith today faces the critical task of renewing its theological tradition through recovering the central place of creation in the biblical message. The community of believers is confronted with the clear calling to participate in the heart of the struggle throughout the world to uphold the integrity of creation. The realities that jeopardize life on this planet make clear that our response is imperative if our hope in God’s promises is genuine.

A Fundamental Breakdown at the Heart of the Ecological Crisis

At the heart of the global ecological crisis lies a fundamental breakdown in the modern world view of Western culture. Since the Enlightenment and the scientific revolution, Western culture came to assume that humanity had both the right and duty to dominate nature. Objective, scientific knowledge became an absolute value. And the purpose of such knowledge was to exercise power over the creation. The view of life became secularized;we came to understand the world apart from any reference to God. The creation became "nature" -- raw materials that existed only to be given value through exploitation.

The pragmatic benefits of these developments for civilization are remarkable in many ways. Humanity has been afforded protection against many ancient threats to life. However, this mindset now is presenting humanity with more curses than blessings. Technology has become a social drug. We are addicted to technological solutions to any problem. Power seems the same as truth. Thus we split the atom because we could do it. Instead of solving problems, that action gave humanity the godlike power of life and death over created order.

Modern humanity has become too confident in its own power and has trusted far too deeply in its dominance over the creation. It has constructed a world view that places human power and glory at the center of the universe. We have become like gods, masters over creation’s destiny, and ready to demand any sacrifice for our enjoyment -- even the destruction of the environment upon which all life depends.

This same mindset also results in the domination of women by men. A hierarchy of values justifies not only the exploitation of nature but identifies female characteristics with nature; both are regarded as weaker, and become subject to male mastery and oppression. The same mistaken biblical interpretation that justifies the rule of men over women also blesses man’s unbridled exploitation of creation. Moreover, this stance of mastery over nature has justified the oppression by white people of others who, like women, have been treated as "lower" and associated with nature as objects for exploitation.

Therefore, if the Christian tradition is to play some part in upholding the integrity of the creation in our own time, we must recognize the depth of our challenge. Rather than simply acknowledging immediate environmental problems that need remedy, our task is confronting the basic modern mindset that spawns and rationalizes environmental ruin. This requires nothing short of the power of the gospel.

The message of new life in Jesus Christ overturns the values and cultural assumptions that lie at the foundation of modern ecological ruin. We are called to conversion; such conversion frees us from the ways of thought and life that are hastening the earth’s destruction and calls us through the Spirit to live in ways that protect and nourish the gift of God’s creation. The power of the gospel beckons us to confront the economic, cultural, and technological assumptions that are destroying life on earth and offer a vision for upholding the creation.

Early Reformed Theologians and the Universal Scope of the Covenant

Bullinger maintained that God’s covenant did not originate with Abraham but was renewed. Covenant began with Adam and Noah. Zwingli also argued that the covenant was one whole, reaching to the entire human race, and then to the people of Israel through Abraham. Karl Barth underscored the broad scope of the covenant as understood by such early Reformers, and pointing ultimately to the intended destiny of all humanity.

In Calvin, the kingdom of God is portrayed as the special end and goal of the creation. Thus, creation and redemption become united. In this truth. we can understand how humanity’s destiny is fully linked with the destiny of creation itself.

The promises of the covenant, then, find their foundation in God’s steadfast relationships to the creation. Indeed, the first explicit biblical reference to God’s covenant comes in the story of Noah, and establishes the creation, not only humanity, as a partner m the covenant with God. When the creation, with all of its life, is reestablished as Noah and all the animals come forth from the ark, God’s covenant is announced. And it is a covenant with "every living creature," a covenant God describes as "between me and the earth" (Gn 9:13). To underscore the promise, the integrity of the earth’s cycles, "seedtime and harvest, cold and heat, summer and winter, day and night" is also assured (Gn 8:22); as the Lord promises, "I will never again curse the ground" (Gn 8:21). Five times in the ninth chapter the scope of this covenant is repeated, extending to "all living things on earth of every kind." And the rainbow is described by the words of God as the sign "of the covenant between myself and the earth."

In other expressions of God’s covenant promises in the Hebrew Scriptures, the place of creation remains prominent. The Abrahamic covenant (described in Genesis 15 and 17), for example, involves the land, given as God’s gift to his descendants. Indeed, in the later giving of the law, the Sabbatical and Jubilee laws rest on the proper treatment of the land, to allow the just sharing of its fruits. The Mosaic covenant at Sinai, often regarded more as a covenant conditional on the actions of the people of Israel, also encompasses God’s relationship to all the creation. In Exodus 19, before the ten commandments are given, the Lord reminds Moses that "all the earth is mine" (v.5). In the account of the same events in Deuteronomy 10, when Moses sets forth God’s requirements to "fear the Lord your God, to walk in all his ways, to love him, to serve the Lord your God with all your heart and with all your soul, and to keep the commandments" (w.12-13) he then immediately declares, "Behold, to the Lord your God belong heaven and the heaven of heavens, the earth with all that is in it" (v.14).

Following the Noahic and Abrahamic covenants, the tradition of the unconditional covenant also found expression in the promises to the throne of David. Seen initially as God’s guarantee to rule through the Jerusalem kings in the line of David, this covenant finds affirmation in God’s reign over all creation. The justice and righteousness at the foundation of David’s throne rest upon God’s intention to bring shalom, and right relationships, in all the creation. The "Royal Psalms" refer continuously to God’s power to rule and accomplish divine intentions in all the world. Rightly understood, kings were to serve as the servants upholding and preserving such dominion in the creation, because it all belongs to God.

This underscores the links between covenant and shalom. Covenant implies a rightly ordered relationship, whether between people, with God, or with the creation. In the biblical view these relationships become inseparable. Shalom is the vision of the harmony, fulfillment, and fellowship among God, humanity, and the creation; its result is justice, peace, and the integrity of creation. In the understanding of covenant we discover God’s pledge of faithfulness, intention, and grace to bring about shalom in all that is created.

Establishing such right relationships, and a legitimate order, is initiated through God’s identification with the weak, poor, and oppressed. This theme resounds through the pattern of biblical covenants, revealing a movement of solidarity with what is broken, outcast, and rejected. And this pattern extends to the creation. For in the midst of its brokenness and suffering, resulting from "nature" being exploited, we discover that God’s solidarity extends to the creation itself, longing for its liberation and wholeness.

Covenant, then, portrays God’s predisposition toward humanity and all creation. Simply because of the grace of God, all that God has created becomes loved, chosen, and destined for glory.

God’s intention for the creation, underscored by covenant, provides the basis of hope for creation’s destiny. For the people of Israel, such hope became refined and purified through the experience of exile and desolation, which shattered their self-aggrandizing dreams. In this time the vision of the prophets returned again to covenant and creation.

In the later part of Isaiah the prophet sets forth the vision of God’s work of renewal and salvation. And that vision finds roots in the faithfulness of God’s covenant promises. God’s work as creator and ruler over all the earth is sounded with fresh power to the people. And the redemptive work of God results in a cosmic renewal and transformation. God’s righteousness upholds and brings new life to the whole of creation.

Thus, biblical faith comes to place its hope for the fulfillment, healing, and renewal of creation in the covenant promises, which look to God’s redemptive activity. We hear the power and expanse of this hope in Hosea’s words:

And I will make for you a covenant on that day with the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the creeping things of the ground; and I will abolish the bow, the sword, and war from the land; and I will make you lie down in safety. And I will betroth you to me for ever; I will betroth you to me in righteousness and in justice, in steadfast love, and in mercy. I will betroth you to me in faithfulness; and you shall know the Lord.

And in that day, says the Lord, I will answer the heavens and they shall answer the earth; and the earth shall answer the grain, the wine, and the oil, and they shall answer Jezreel; and I will sow him for myself in the land. And I will have pity on Not pitied, and I will say to Not my people, "you are my people"; and he shall say, "Thou art my God" (Hos. 2:18-23).

God’s Covenant Promises Find their Full Expression in Jesus Christ

The depth of God’s grace -- the faithful, long-suffering, sacrificial love of God -- is fully embodied in God’s Son. And in the saving and redeeming work of Christ all creation finds its promise of fulfillment and glory.

Christ announced and inaugurated the kingdom of God. This kingdom consists of the full reign of God in the world, a reign that restores right relationship among God, humanity, and the creation. Shalom finds its expression. A new order, divinely initiated, breaks into history. And in this all, the initial promises of covenant with creation and humanity become manifest in the life of the kingdom of God.

Thus, the New Testament builds on this foundation, which integrates creation into the work of God’s redemption. God’s role as creator and sustainer is ascribed to Jesus Christ in understanding the incarnation. John says of Christ, "All things were made through him, and without him was not anything made that was made" (1:3). Colossians repeats this description with this worshipful declaration: "In him all things were created, in heaven and on earth . . . all things were created through him and for him. He is before all things, and in him all things hold together" (1:16-17).

When the work of God’s redemption in Jesus Christ is discussed by New Testament writers, the reconciliation achieved through the life, death, and resurrection of Christ extends to the creation. The Colossians passage, for example, continues by declaring, "For in him all the fullness of God was pleased to dwell, and through him to reconcile to himself all things" (1:19-20). This is the same "all things" that were created through Christ. Several other New Testament passages underscore how Christ’s defeat of all the rebellious powers results in the restoration of God’s purpose and intended order in all the creation.

God’s saving activity once expressed legalistically through the commandments and laws from Sinai now is embodied through the one commandment of love demonstrated in the life of Jesus. And the foundational scope of the covenant, embracing the whole of creation, is taken up in Christ, the source and reconciler of all things, who initiates the new creation. This is celebrated in the eucharist, the feast which acknowledges our belonging to this new covenant relationship as the body of Christ and opens all life to the promise of new creation.

Response to God’s Covenant Actions

The initiative of God’s covenant actions always asks for response. Faced with the crisis confronting the life of creation itself, the church today is compelled to offer to the world a decisive commitment for preserving the integrity of creation as a witness to the promise of God’s love. In covenant, the solidarity of God with the created world is declared as an everlasting promise. What is chosen as God’s own must now be embraced in solidarity by God’s people.

The church’s response to creation is rooted, above all, in gratitude. Even in the midst of the calamitous destruction inflicted on the created order by human sin, we still can receive God’s creation as the gift of grace. This grace sustains all life, momentarily, through air, water, land, and energy. It opens humanity to the possibility of fellowship with God and to the potential of justice and peace in relationship to others. From God’s covenant with creation we discover and receive all life as gift. And our response is one of joyous gratitude and praise to God’s glory.

Such gratitude compels resistance. As the church, our response to God’s covenant with creation must certainly place us in stalwart resistance to all that breaks the integrity of creation, all that treats the earth as an object for our possession rather than God’s gift, and all that subjugates the creation to destruction and ruin rather than saving the creation through fellowship with it. Such resistance brings the power of the gospel to convert the most fundamental attitudes and values in modern culture, which has assumed that the creation can be severed from its belonging to the Creator, and which has placed its highest goal as the industrial and technological exploitation of the earth rather than its preservation.

In Romans we read that all creation longs for liberation from the bondage imposed on it by human sin. And in this longing the creation looks to "the full manifestation of the children of God" (Rom. 8:19). For the creation and the children of God are to share together in the kingdom of glory. This is the divine intention of God’s covenant action through history.

The church is called to participate in the liberation of creation through entering into fellowship with it in response to God’s grace. And here, the struggles for the integrity of creation and for justice and peace all become indivisible parts of one whole.

The creation hungers for its transformation and freedom promised by God. In its suffering, the creation is waiting for the church -- waiting for the people of God to embrace, protect, and renew the world as God’s well-loved gift. Creation exists to give God glory and honor. Its possession by God is the ground of its final destiny and sustains the church’s response in covenant for a renewed creation.

Threats to Survival

By the end of this century the greatest threats to the survival of life on earth may well arise from the destruction of the God-given environment. What can guide the church in its response to this momentous crisis? How can the church witness to God’s covenant promises intended for the creation?

First, the church must identify concrete issues threatening the integrity of creation, which must be addressed, and cannot be ignored, for the sake of enabling the ongoing gift of life. The following are examples, interrelated to one another.

The Greenhouse Effect

A dramatic rise in the temperature of the earth over the next few decades, which scientists now say could occur, would result in global catastrophe second only to nuclear war. The church must join with other groups to urge governments of industrialized countries to reduce the burning of fossil fuels by at least fifty percent in the next twenty-five years. Alternative, renewable energy resources throughout the world must be encouraged as essential to global stability. Sustainable agriculture less dependent on chemical fertilizers -- another cause of the greenhouse effect -- must be aggressively promoted. In short, the churches’ mission to the world must now include the saving of the world’s climate and atmosphere.

Deforestation

The devastation of tropical forests throughout the world poses critical threats to peoples within the third and fourth worlds, increasing erosion of irreplaceable soil, creating greater water shortages, and contributing to drought and desertification. Further, deforestation is the chief cause of species extinction, as well as adding to the greenhouse effect. Curbing such deforestation, and planting trees, can be a vital form of the church’s witness for preserving creation’s integrity.

Acid Rain

The contamination of atmosphere, particularly from the burning of fossil fuels, has already destroyed forests and lakes, as well as human lungs, in many regions of the northern hemisphere. Crossing political and ideological barriers as it is carried in the atmosphere, acid rain is spreading through many parts of the globe. The church can encourage international cooperation as well as changes in energy policies, which are required for preserving air that gives life rather than death.

Population Expansion

The issue of global population cannot be considered in isolation from questions of lifestyle and consumption of resources, cultural realities, and prospects for economic justice. But neither can the population issue be ignored by the church. Even with reductions in the maldistribution of global resources, the unprecedented expansion of population over the next few decades will stretch the carrying capacity of the earth to its breaking point. Population growth must become an ethical and theological issue addressed by our churches.

Unlimited Economic Growth

Industrialized societies continue to believe that they can grow economically without any limits. The so-called developing societies often aspire to these same goals. Yet, scientific analysis, as well as practical common sense, make clear that the limits to the earth’s resources impose constraints on the level of economic development. The church must encourage the search in modern societies for new understandings of economic life that are rooted in ecological realities. Biblical wisdom underscores the inescapable harmony between human economic welfare and the integrity of the created order. Our world today stands in critical need of such a prophetic and saving message.

Yet, before our churches consider the nature of our witness within society concerning the integrity of creation, we must examine the shape of our own lives as believing communities. The initial steps we must take in response to God’s covenant with the creation are those that would bring our own corporate lives more faithfully under the Lordship of Christ’s reconciling presence, upholding all the creation.

Some concrete measures can be suggested. Our churches own large amounts of land, for church buildings, camps, and schools as well as for investment purposes. How well do we demonstrate the gift of God’s creation on lands that are in our control? What form of witness do we make through the ways in which we tend, nurture, and cherish those portions of land entrusted to us?

Similarly, our buildings, including their architectural design and their use of energy, are expressions of our witness. Certainly there are vast differences of geography and wealth among the member churches in the ecumenical family. Yet we all share the responsibility of relating our material Structures to our spiritual beliefs. In a time when the actual survival of many people will depend on radical shifts in the world’s patterns of energy consumption, churches can be salt and leaven within their societies through the ways we conserve and use energy resources.

Beyond any doubt preserving the integrity of creation will require dramatic changes in the lifestyles particularly of those living in the North and the West. And the changes in personal patterns of consumption by Christians need the support of the gathered church community. Responding to God’s covenant with creation will deepen our understanding of being called into the covenant community, living in love, interdependence, and sharing with our sisters and brothers in Christ’s body.

For any of these responses to take root in the lives of our member churches, a strong emphasis must be given to the biblical and theological teaching we offer at all levels concerning God’s creation and humanity’s relationship to the environment. Though these themes resound in the Bible, we have ignored and neglected them. Heresies have often taken their place. We deny the goodness of the material world and suppose that spiritual realities can be separated from worldly existence. We assume that biological life suffers under God’s curse rather than God’s blessing, and we fail to see how ongoing decay and death in the natural world bring forth new life. We don’t believe that God’s redemptive action in Jesus Christ reaches out to the whole creation or that new life in Christ can restore a healing relationship to the earth. In all these ways and more our churches stand in need of God’s word and truth.

God’s covenant with the creation offers the world the true hope for the preservation of its life and invites the response of God’s people. Preserving the integrity of creation must become for our churches in the years ahead a central part of our witness and life in our societies.

Ecofeminism, Reverence for Life, and Feminist Theological Ethics

Feminist theologies are among the most promising of contemporary theological options. As these theologies often make clear, the ways of thinking that have led to a destruction of the earth and an exploitation of animals are often the very ways of thinking that have led to an exploitation of women. To overcome male-centeredness is also to overcome human-centeredness.

Speaking as a feminist, Lois K. Daly reviews the argument that male-centeredness and human-centeredness have gone hand-in-hand and then proposes a new ecofeminist alternative to both, drawing on the perspective of Albert Schweitzer. She suggests that Schweitzer’s theme of reverence for life provides a helpful antidote to the dualisms that have dominated patriarchal culture in the West and that have contributed to the subjugation of nature and women to men. Inherent in Daly’s appropriation of Schweitzer is the advocacy of an ethical absolute: that we affirm and treat compassionately and nonviolently all life. Such an imperative takes life-centered ethical and theological thinking to its utmost possibilities.

Feminist theological ethics claims to be informed by an analysis of the interlocking dualisms of patriarchal Western culture. These include the dualisms of male/female, mind/body, and human/nature. In fact, as feminists argue, none of these dualisms will be overcome or transformed until the connections between and among them are named and understood. This means that we cannot rest with examining the consequences of subjugating body to mind or female to male. We must also look at the ways in which the distinction between what is human and what is nonhuman authorizes the widespread destruction of individual animals, their habitats, and the earth itself. And, in doing theological ethics, we must also explore what this means for understanding the relationship between human beings and the divine. In other words, feminist theological ethics must ask about the implications of a transformed human/nonhuman relationship for understanding the human/divine relationship.

This essay will describe the connections between feminist concern about the status of women and the status of nonhuman nature, point to a theological ethic that reconsiders the relationship between human beings and other living beings, and explore the theological and ethical implications of those two steps. Reverence for life, as articulated by Albert Schweitzer, will serve as a primary resource in this project. Though decidedly not feminist in any self-conscious way, Schweitzer’s position does provide resources for reconceptualizing the relationship between human beings and the nonhuman, or "natural," world and for examining the theological implications of such a reconceptualization. This theological task, the task of conceptualizing the relationship between human beings and God in light of a different way of thinking about human life in relation to the nonhuman world, is critical for feminist theological ethics.

Ecofeminism

Ecofeminists, or ecological feminists, are those feminists who analyze the interconnections between the status of women and the status of non-human nature. At the heart of this analysis are four central claims: (1) the oppression of women and the oppression of nature are interconnected; (2) these connections must be uncovered in order to understand both the oppression of women and the oppression of nature; (3) feminist analysis must include ecological insights; and (4) a feminist perspective must be a part of any proposed ecological solutions (Warren, 4). A closer look at each of these claims will illuminate the concerns of ecofeminism.

The Oppression of Women and the Oppression of Nature Are Interconnected.

One way to talk about the connections between women and nature is to describe the parallel ways they have been treated in Western patriarchal society. First, the traditional role of both women and nature has been instrumental (Plumwood, 120). Women’s role has been to serve the needs and desires of men. Traditionally, women were not considered to have a life except in relation to a man, whether father, brother, husband, or son. Likewise, nonhuman nature has provided the resources to meet human needs for food, shelter, and recreation. Nature had no purpose except to provide for human wants. In both cases the instrumental role led to instrumental value. Women were valued to the extent that they fulfilled their role. Nature was valued in relation to human interests either in the present or the future. Women and nature had little or no meaning independent of men.

A second parallel in the treatment of women and nature lies in the way the dominant thought has attempted "to impose sharp separation on a natural continuum" in order to maximize difference (Plumwood, 120). In other words, men are identified as strong and rational while women are seen as weak and emotional. In this division of traits those men who are sensitive and those women who are intellectually or athletically inclined are marginalized. They are overlooked in the typical (stereotypical) description of men as opposed to women. The same holds true for distinctions between what is human and what is not. The human being is conscious, the nonhuman plant or animal is not; the human is able to plan for the future, to understand a present predicament, the nonhuman simply reacts to a situation out of instinct. These distinctions are drawn sharply in order to protect the privilege and place of those thought to be more important.

These parallels are instructive but they do not explain why they developed. Two theologians were among the feminists who first articulated the link between women and nature in patriarchal culture. They were Rosemary Ruether, in New Woman, New Earth (1975), and Elizabeth Dodson Gray, in Green Paradise Lost (1979). Both of them focused on the dualisms that characterize patriarchy, in particular the dualisms of mind/body and nature/culture. In her work Ruether traces the historical development of these dualisms in Western culture. She points to the way in which Greek thought, namely dualistic thought, was imported into ancient Hebraic culture. The triumph of this dualism came in the development of a transcendent or hierarchical dualism in which men

master nature, not by basing themselves on it and exalting it as an independent divine power, but by subordinating it and linking their essential selves with a transcendent principle beyond nature which is pictured as intellectual and male. This image of transcendent, male spiritual deity is a projection of the ego or consciousness of ruling-class males, who envision a reality, beyond the physical processes that gave them birth, as the true source of their being. Men locate their true origins and natures in this transcendent sphere, which thereby also gives them power over the lower sphere of "female" nature (Ruether 1975, 13-14).

In this way, transcendent dualism incorporates and reinforces the dualisms of mind/body and nature/culture as well as male/female. In addition these distinctions are read into other social relations, including class and race. As a result, ruling-class males lump together those whom Ruether calls the "body people": women, slaves, and barbarians (Ruether 1975, 14; see also Plumwood, 121-22).

While agreeing with the reasons for the development of transcendent dualism, Dodson Gray’s response to it differs from Ruether’s. Ruether’s tack is to reject transcendental dualism outright; Dodson Gray appears to embrace the dualism but to reevaluate the pairs. In other words, she maintains the distinction but insists that being more closely tied to nature does not detract from women’s worth. Instead, for Dodson Gray, it enhances it. As others have pointed out, Dodson Gray "come[s] dangerously close to implicitly accepting the polarities which are part of the dualism, and to trying to fix up the result by a reversal of the valuation which would have men joining women in immanence and identifying the authentic self as the body" (Plumwood, 125).

A similar division of opinion can also be traced in other feminist writings. It is the difference between the nature feminists and the social feminists (Griscom 1981, 5). The nature feminists are those who celebrate women’s biological difference and claim some measure of superiority as a result of it. The social feminists are those who recognize the interstructuring of race, class, and sex, but who tend to avoid discussing nature exploitation precisely because it invites attention to biological difference. Both kinds of feminists have positive points to express, but another sort of feminism, one that transcends these, is needed in order to understand the connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature.

These Connections Must Be Uncovered in Order To Understand Both the Oppression of Women and the Oppression of Nature.

Feminist analysis of the transcendent dualism identified by Ruether shows that there are three basic assumptions that govern the way the dualism’s elements are treated (see Ruether 1975, 1983). These assumptions lie behind the parallels between the oppression of women and nature described above. First, the elements in the dualism are perceived as higher and lower relative to each other. The higher is deemed more worthy or valuable than the lower. Second, the lower element is understood to serve the higher. In fact, the value of the lower is derived in instrumental fashion. Third, the two elements are described as polar opposites. That is, "the traits taken to be virtuous and defining for one side are those which maximize distance from the other side" (Plumwood, 132). In other words, men are "not women" and women are "not men." The same holds true in traditional conceptions of human and nonhuman nature. These three assumptions lead to a logic of domination that repeatedly identifies differences and controls them in such a way as to protect the "higher" element in the dualism. In this way, from the point of view of the "higher," difference automatically implies inferiority.

In patriarchal culture these three assumptions are at work in a "nest of assumptions" that also includes (1) the identification of women with the physical and nature. (2) the identification of men with the intellectual, and (3) the dualistic assumption of the inferiority of the physical and the superiority of the mental (Plumwood, 133). Once this nest of assumptions is unpacked the differences between the social feminists and nature feminists and the deficiency of each become more clear. On the one hand, the social feminists simply reject the identification of women with nature and the physical and insist that women have the same talents and characteristics as men. These feminists focus on the interaction of sexism, racism, and classism (Griscom, 6). On the other hand, the nature feminists embrace the identification of women with nature but deny that nature or the physical is inferior. But neither of these responses represents a sufficient challenge to the dualistic assumptions themselves since both leave part unquestioned. Social feminists do not ask about the assumed inferiority of nature, and nature feminists do not ask about the assumed identification of women with nature. In this way, both "remain within the framework in which the problem has arisen, and . . . leave its central structures intact" (Plumwood, 133).

A thoroughgoing ecofeminism must challenge each of the dualisms of patriarchal culture (see King, 12-16). The issue is not whether women are closer to nature, since that question arises only in the context of the nature/ culture dualism in the first place. Rather, the task is to overcome the nature/ culture dualism itself. The task can be accomplished first by admitting that "gender identity is neither fully natural nor fully cultural," and that neither is inherently oppressive or liberating (King, 13). Second, ecofeminists need to learn what both the social feminists and nature feminists already know. From social feminists we learn that "while it is possible to discuss women and nature without reference to class and race, such discussion risks remaining white and elite" (Griscom, 6). And nature feminists remind us that there is no human/nonhuman dichotomy and that our bodies are worth celebrating (Griscom, 8).

Feminist Analysis Must Include Ecological Insights.

One result of the way the oppression of women and the oppression of nature are linked in these dualisms is that feminist thought and practice must incorporate ecological insights. To do otherwise would not sufficiently challenge the structures of patriarchal domination. The most direct way to illustrate this is to discuss the repercussions of the feminist assertion of women’s full humanity in light of the interlocking dualisms described above. The fact that male/female, human/nature, and mind/body dualism are all closely linked together means that feminism cannot rest with proclaiming women s full humanity. To do this without also raising the question of the human/nature relationship would be simply to buy into the male-defined human being. In other words, if women and men are now to be reconceptualized non-dualistically, the choices available are either to buy into the male definition of the human (as the social feminists tend to do) or to engage in a reconceptualization of humanity as well. But, as soon as we begin to redefine humanity, the question of the human/nature dualism arises (Plumwood, 134-35). This is also the case when we ask about the status of race or class. Thus, any thorough challenge to the male/female dichotomy must also take on the other dualisms that structure Western patriarchy.

At this point it becomes clear that ecofeminism is not just another branch of feminism. Rather, ecofeminists are taking the feminist critique of dualism another step. What ecofeminism aims for transcends the differences between social and nature feminists. What is needed is an integrative and transformative feminism that moves beyond the current debate among these competing feminisms. Such a feminism would: (1) unmask the interconnections between all systems of oppression; (2) acknowledge the diversity of women’s experiences and the experiences of other oppressed groups; (3) reject the logic of domination and the patriarchal conceptual framework in order to prevent concerns for ecology from degenerating into white middle-class anxiety; (4) rethink what it is to be human, that is, to see ourselves as "both co-members of ecological community and yet different from other members of it"; (5) recast traditional ethics to underscore the importance of values such as care, reciprocity, and diversity; and (6) challenge the patriarchal bias in technology research and analysis and the use of science for the destruction of the earth (Warren, 18-20).

A Feminist Perspective Must Be Part of Any Proposed Ecological Solutions.

Just as feminism must challenge all of patriarchy’s dualisms, including the human/nature dichotomy, ecological solutions and environmental ethics must include a feminist perspective:

Otherwise, the ecological movement will fail to make the conceptual connections between the oppression of women and the oppression of nature (and to link these to other systems of oppression), and will risk utilizing strategies and implementing solutions which contribute to the continued subordination of women [and others] (Warren, 8).

In particular, two issues in the ecological movement and environmental ethics need to be addressed in the context of ecofeminism: the status of hierarchy and dualism, and the place of feeling.

As already indicated, ecofeminism works at overcoming dualism and hierarchy. Much of current environmental ethics, however, attempts to establish hierarchies of value for ranking different parts of nature (Kheel, 137). It does this by debating whether particular "rights" ought to be extended to certain classes of animals (Singer). This is another way of assigning rights to some and excluding them from others and of judging the value of one part as more or less than that of another. These judgments, then, operate within the same framework of dualistic assumptions. As a result, this debate merely moves the dualism, as it were; it does not abandon it. Human/nonhuman may no longer be the operative dualism; instead, sentient/nonsentient or some other replaces it.

Another way in which environmental ethics has perpetuated traditional dualist thought lies in its dependence on reason and its exclusion of feeling or emotion in dealing with nature. The dualism of reason/emotion is another dualism under attack by feminists. In this case environmental ethics has sought to determine by reason alone what beings have value and in what ranking and what rules ought to govern human interactions with nature (Kheel, 141). This procedure is flawed according to ecofeminists since "the attempt to formulate universal, rational rules of conduct ignores the constantly changing nature of reality. It also neglects the emotional-instinctive or spontaneous component in each particular situation, for in the end, emotion cannot be contained by boundaries and rules" (Kheel, 141).

Ethics must find a way to include feeling, but including feeling does not mean excluding reason. Again, the task is to overcome the exclusive dualism.

Ecofeminism, then, involves a thoroughgoing analysis of the dualisms that structure patriarchal culture. In particular ecofeminists analyze the link between the oppression of women and of nature by focusing on the hierarchies established by mind/body, nature/culture, male/female, and human/nonhuman dualisms. The goal is to reconceptualize these relationships in nonhierarchical, nonpatriarchal ways. In this way, ecofeminists envision a new way of seeing the world and strive toward a new way of living in the world as co-members of the ecological community.

What ecofeminism lacks, however, is an analysis of what Ruether and Dodson Gray agreed was hierarchical or transcendent dualism, the dualism that they think undergirds the others. Ecofeminists, largely philosophers and social scientists, have not attended to the specifically theological dimensions of patriarchy. Meanwhile, feminist theologians and ethicists have focused primarily on the interrelationship of sexism, racism, and classism without sufficiently articulating or naming the interconnections between these forms of oppression and the oppression of nature. Yet the analysis of these critically important social justice questions would be strengthened when it is understood that the same dualistic assumptions are operative in each of these forms of oppression.

Furthermore, feminist theology needs to explore the relationship between human beings and God in light of those dualistic assumptions and the impact of the new way of seeing human beings that results from linking the oppression of nature with other forms of oppression. When reconceptualizing the male/female dualism entails reconceptualizing the human/nature relation because male/female is embedded in human/nature, as ecofeminists argue, then the human/divine relationship also needs reworking, since male/female is also embedded in human/divine. In other words, if feminist theology is serious in attempting to transform patriarchal dualisms, it must go further than reworking the dualistic imagery used to refer to God; it must discover how the images themselves support a dualistic relationship between human beings and God with the same assumptions as the traditional male/female and human/nonhuman dualisms.

Two contemporary theologians, Isabel Carter Heyward (1982) and Sallie McFague (1987). have begun this task. They contrast their respective conceptions of God with the traditional idea of a God "set apart from human experience... by the nature of ‘His’ impassivity" (Heyward, 7), or the idea of a "monarchical" God (McFague, 63-69). In other words, both challenge the dualistic assumptions that typically characterize the relationship between human beings and God. They argue that human beings are not simply subordinate to God but are co-workers with God, and consequently, that human beings are not simply instrumentally related to God and that God and human beings are not polar opposites. For Heyward, God is the "power in relation" (Heyward, 2), while for McFague, God is more appropriately conceived using the models of mother, lover, and friend within the context of the image of the world as God’s body (McFague, xi).

What I am suggesting is a position that goes further than these authors even while it shares certain characteristics with them. The main difference lies in the extent to which Heyward and McFague have really reworked their conception of the relationship between human beings and the nonhuman world. In Heyward’s case it is clear that she wants to include the creation in the relationships effected by God as the power in relation; however, this desire appears to be qualified. For example, Heyward writes:

In relation to God, as in any relation, God is affected by humanity and creation, just as we are affected by God. With us, by us, through us, God lives, God becomes, God changes, God speaks, God acts, God suffers and God dies in the world. . . . The constancy of God is the activity of God in the world wherever, whenever, and for whatever reason, humanity acts to create, liberate, and bless humanity (Heyward, 9).

Creation, including the nonhuman elements, may be included in what affects God, but what happens to it in the talk about God’s activity in the world? Is it only God’s activity when the activity benefits humanity? Even more absent is any discussion of the kind of behavior toward the nonhuman world required of human beings in order to "incarnate God."

McFague goes further than Heyward when she discusses the necessity of adopting an "evolutionary, ecological perspective" due to our interconnections and interdependence with aspects of the world (McFague, 7-8) and when she includes in her descriptions of the models of mother, lover, and friend an explanation of the ethic which follows from the model. These are, respectively, the ethics of justice, healing, and companionship (pp. 116-24, 146-56, 174-80). What is missing in these ethics is a frank discussion of the hard decisions that confront us as soon as we begin to see "ourselves as gardeners, caretakers, mothers and fathers, stewards, trustees, lovers, priests, co-creators, and friends" of the world (p. 13). In other words, how far does McFague’s transformation of the dualistic relationship between human beings and the nonhuman world go?

Finally, neither Heyward nor McFague does what ecofeminists claim must be done, namely, to articulate the links between forms of oppression, especially the oppression of women and of nature. Heyward’s and McFague’s concentration on the transformation of the human/divine relationship away from dualist assumptions is extremely helpful, but it needs to be joined with concrete descriptions of and efforts to transform the other dualisms that structure Western patriarchy. In other words, Heyward and McFague appear to reconceptualize the divine/human dualism without sufficiently exploring the consequences for other powerful dualisms, including but not limited to male/female and human/nonhuman.

Reverence for Life

Albert Schweitzer’s notion of reverence for life provides some clues for feminist theological and ethical efforts to reexamine the relationship between human beings and the nonhuman world and between human beings and God despite the fact that he offers no analysis of oppression. Instead, what Schweitzer does is begin with a description of human beings that links us both with nonhuman nature and with God in a way that does not appear to presuppose those dualistic assumptions of subordination, instrumentality, and polarity. For this reason, his position is highly instructive.

Schweitzer begins with a description of the self as "life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live." This, he says, is the "the most immediate and comprehensive fact of consciousness" (Schweitzer 1949/ 1981, 309). As will-to-live, the self is volitional, free, driven to perfect itself, and living in relation to others who will to live. More important, however, is the fact that Schweitzer refuses to describe the self simply as "life," for "life continues to be a mystery too great to understand" (Schweitzer 1936/ 1962. 182-183). He knows only that life is good since the self continues to will to live.

Ethics, for Schweitzer, emerges with thinking about the experience of the will-to-live. There are two kinds of knowing for Schweitzer: intuitive and scientific. The intuitive is an inward reflection on the contents of the will-to-live. By living out these ideas, the self finds meaning and purpose in its actions (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 282). Scientific knowing, the second kind of knowing, is knowledge of the world. Science describes "the phenomena in which life in its innumerable forms appears and passes"; it may sometimes "discover life where we did not previously expect it." Hence, scientific knowledge "compels our attention to the mystery of the will-to-live which we see stirring everywhere" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 308). Together, the two kinds of knowing allow the self to describe what science finds by using an analogy with itself as will-to-live. In this way the self knows and, for Schweitzer, feels that "the will-to-live is everywhere present, even as in me" (Schweitzer 1936/1962, 185). The self, therefore, becomes aware of its inward relation to the wills-to-live present in the world.

Schweitzer gives one important qualification to both kinds of knowing: neither one can explain what life is. "We cannot understand what happens in the universe. . . . It creates while it destroys and destroys while it creates, and therefore it remains to us a riddle" (Schweitzer 1934, 1520). As a result human beings have no grounds for placing themselves at the center of a moral universe or at the apex of moral order in the universe. "We are entirely ignorant of what significance we have for the earth. How much less then may we presume to try to attribute to the infinite universe a meaning which has us for its object, or which can be explained in terms of our existence!" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 273).

Because no purposiveness or prioritizing of phenomena is evident in the events of the world, no hierarchy of meaning and value can be constructed from the evidence of intuitive or scientific thought. As Schweitzer points out, "we like to imagine that Man is nature’s goal; but facts do not support that belief" (Schweitzer 1936/1962, 181).

The inability to find meaning in the world and the recognition of the interrelationship of all wills-to-live lead to what Schweitzer calls an ethical mysticism. This mysticism is a mysticism of the will. The volition found in the will-to-live becomes an activist ethic. As Schweitzer explains:

Ethics alone can put me in true relationship with the universe by my serving it, cooperating with it; not by trying to understand it. . . . Only by serving every kind of life do I enter the service of that Creative Will whence all life emanates. I do not understand it; but I do know (and it is sufficient to live by) that by serving life, I serve the Creative Will. This is the mystical significance of ethics (Schweitzer 1936/1962, 189).

Union with the Creative Will, or infinite will-to-live, Schweitzer’s philosophical name for God, is achieved through active service and devotion to all that lives. Hence as an ethical mysticism, Schweitzer’s is directed toward those particular manifestations of the infinite will-to-live that come within the reach of the individual.

Schweitzer’s mysticism, then, provides him a way to combine the drive for self-perfection, which is contained in the will-to-live, and devotion to others. Self-perfection in the context of this mysticism becomes a drive to attain union with that which the human will-to-live manifests, namely, the infinite will-to-live (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 301-2). In human beings, as Schweitzer points Out, "the craving for perfection is given in such a way that we aim at raising to their highest material and spiritual value both ourselves and every existing thing which is open to our influence" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 282). That is, I make a reality of my own dedication to the infinite only by devoting myself to its manifestations. "Whenever my life devotes itself in any way to life, my finite will-to-live experiences union with the infinite will in which all life is one" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 313). Self-perfection, or self-fulfillment, is therefore, reciprocally related to devotion to others.

In addition, Schweitzer’s mysticism provides another way into his refusal to place human beings at the center of the moral universe. The self as will-to-live is not the source of its own value. Instead, the will-to-live given in the self has value as a result of its relationship to the infinite. The source or origin of value is the universal will-to-live or infinite being. As Schweitzer points out, through the will-to-live

my existence joins in pursuing the aims of the mysterious universal will of which I am a manifestation. . . . With consciousness and with volition I devote myself to Being. I become of service to the ideas which it thinks out in me; I become imaginative force like that which works mysteriously in nature, and thus I give my existence a meaning from within outwards (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 305).

Meaning comes not simply from my own estimation but also from the fact that my will-to-live is a manifestation of the universal will-to-live. At the same time, all other wills-to-live are also manifestations of that same universal. Hence their value and my value have the same source. The fact that the self cannot discern the meaning of any of these lives from the world as it is experienced means that it cannot determine that any one manifestation of the will-to-live is more important or more valuable than any other manifestation. The mystical and mysterious relatedness of every will-to-live in the universal will-to-live prohibits assigning gradations of value to individual manifestations of the will-to-live, whether in humans or viruses. The will-to-live establishes value but not distinctions in it. Therefore, Schweitzer insists, all attempts to bring ethics and epistemology together must be renounced (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 289).

The ethic that follows from thinking about the will-to-live is the ethic of reverence for life. The self lives in the midst of other wills-to-live. Hence Schweitzer says, "If I am a thinking being, I must regard other life than my own with equal reverence" (Schweitzer 1936/1962, 185). Actions in accord with my will-to-live, such as upbuilding, deepening, and enhancing the optimism, value, and affirmation given in the will-to-live, are required in relation to other manifestations of the will-to-live (Kraus, 47). "Ethics consist . . . in my experiencing the compulsion to show to all will-to-live the same reverence as I do to my own" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 309). In the language of Schweitzer’s mysticism, "reverence for life means to be in the grasp of the infinite, inexplicable, forward-urging Will in which all Being is grounded" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 283).

According to Schweitzer, the ethic of reverence for life cannot foster, condone, or excuse injuring or killing of any sort. Three reasons support this judgment. First, reverence for life is what Schweitzer calls an absolute ethic. That is, its claim is absolute because it arises from the inner necessity of the will-to-live to be true to itself. Second, reverence for life is a universal ethic. The inner compulsion to show reverence to life extends to all that can in any way be considered as life.

The absolute ethics of the will-to-live must reverence every form of life, seeking so far as possible to refrain from destroying any life, regardless of its particular type. It says of no instance of life, "this has no value." It cannot make any such exceptions, for it is built upon reverence for life as such (Schweitzer 1960, 187.88).

Neither species nor sentience presents a barrier that qualifies this universality.

The third reason why the ethic of reverence for life does not justify killing or injury is its refusal to allow human beings to locate themselves at the center of a moral universe, its inability to base any ranking of value on information about the world that comes from external sources. There is no moral hierarchy that says that decisions to destroy infectious bacteria in human beings or other animals are the right decisions. There is no sure way to judge any being, human or not, as less worthy and therefore insignificant enough to allow it to be killed.

The ethics of reverence for life makes no distinction between higher and lower, more precious and less precious lives. It has good reasons for this omission. For what are we doing, when we establish hard and fast gradations in value between living organisms, but judging them in relation to ourselves, by whether they seem to stand closer to us or farther from us. This is a wholly subjective standard. How can we know what importance other living organisms have in themselves and in terms of the universe? (Schweitzer 1965, 47).

Universality, absoluteness, and the absence of any clear objective moral order "out there" prevent Schweitzer’s reverence for life from condoning any form of killing or harming of life. His ethic will not compromise; it points to limitless responsibility.

These reasons clearly do not mean that choices to kill are not made. Schweitzer knows that human beings as well as other forms of life depend for life on killing and that, in many situations, decisions to save one means death to another (Schweitzer 1965, 22-23). This is all part of what he calls the "dilemma" of the will-to-live (Schweitzer 1949/1953, 181).

According to Schweitzer we must recognize that "the universe provides us with the dreary spectacle of manifestations of the will to live continually opposed to each other. One life preserves itself by fighting and destroying other lives" (Schweitzer 1965, 24-25). Conflict in the world prevents Schweitzer from being able to find a basis for ethics in the patterns and purposes seen in the world. Hence, he turns inward to the will-to-live. It is precisely Schweitzer’s realistic description of the world in terms of conflict that drives him to the ethic of reverence for life. The only sure meaning and purpose for activity comes, for Schweitzer, in the certainty of the volition of the will-to-live found and experienced in the self.

Because of its absolute and universal character, then, the ethic of reverence for life cannot provide any specific guidelines for making life-and-death decisions even though it knows these decisions must be made. The fact that reason and the will-to-live can find no objective moral ordering means that there are no objective moral standards by which to judge. Reverence for life

knows that the mystery of life is always too profound for us, and that its value is beyond our capacity to estimate. We happen to believe that man’s life is more important than any other form of which we know. But we cannot prove any such comparison of value from what we know of the world’s development. True, in practice we are forced to choose. At times we have to decide arbitrarily which forms of life, and even which particular individuals, we shall save, and which we shall destroy (Schweitzer 1936/1962, 188).

The decision, for Schweitzer, is always subjective, arbitrary:

In ethical conflicts man can arrive only at subjective decisions. No one can decide for him at what point, on each occasion, lies the extreme limit of possibility for his persistence in the preservation and furtherance of life. He alone has to judge this issue, by letting himself be guided by a feeling of the highest possible responsibility towards other life (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 317-318).

No one else knows the limits of one’s ability to aid and protect another. The ethic of reverence of life means limitless personal responsibility. In decisions to harm or destroy one "bears the responsibility for the life which is sacrificed" (Schweitzer 1949/1953, 181).

Schweitzer’s restriction of ethics to activity that does no harm reveals the extent to which reverence for life is not an unbreakable rule or law.

In the conflict between the maintenance of my own existence and the destruction of, or injury to, that of another, I can never unite the ethical and the necessary to form a relative ethical; I must choose between ethical and necessary, and, if I choose the latter, must take it upon myself to incur guilt by an act of injury to life (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 324).

The necessity of killing or harming does not challenge the authority or validity of reverence for life. As absolute and universal, reverence for life continues its demands even in the face of overwhelming odds, namely, the fact that the will-to-live is divided against itself. It may be, for example, that it is better to kill a suffering animal than to watch it slowly die (see Schweitzer 1960, 83-84). The tension between the ethical and necessary is maintained by facing the reality of conflict. "We are living in truth, when we experience these conflicts more profoundly. The good conscience is an invention of the devil" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 318).

A pressing issue facing individuals who must kill is the intensity of guilt incurred in actions that kill or harm and the possibilities there are to alleviate that guilt. For Schweitzer the principal way to do this is to increase service to others: "Some atonement for that guilt can be found by the man who pledges himself to neglect no opportunity to succor creatures in distress. . . . When we help an insect out of a difficulty, we are only trying to compensate for man’s ever-renewed sins against other creatures" (Schweitzer 1965, 23, 49).

His answer, then, is renewed determination to reverence all forms of life. Again, the reality of destruction does not compromise the demand. Part of the reason for this is the mystical nature of reverence for life. "The more we act in accordance with the principle of reverence for life, the more we are gripped by the desire to preserve and benefit life" (Schweitzer 1965, 31). "Reverence for life means to be in the grasp of the infinite, inexplicable, forward-urging Will in which all Being is grounded" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 283).

According to Schweitzer, the ethic of reverence for life has a profoundly religious character (1949/1953, 182). This is most clearly seen in his mysticism. Reverence for life is a way of relating to the "multiform manifestations of the will-to-live," which comprise the world. Only through action in devotion to others do I come in contact with the infinite will-to-live, God. Religion is not, for Schweitzer, a matter of accepting creeds or knowing the history of dogma. Instead, it is the ethic of reverence for life (Schweitzer 1934, 1521).

In a letter to Oskar Kraus, one of Schweitzer’s early critics, Schweitzer explains his use of language with respect to philosophy and religion.

Hitherto it has been my principle never to express in my philosophy more than I have experienced as a result of absolutely logical reflection. That is why I never speak in philosophy of "God" but only of the "universal will-to-live." But if I speak the traditional language of religion, I use the word "God" in its historical definiteness and indefiniteness, just as I speak in ethics of "Love" in place of "Reverence for Life" (Kraus 1944, 42).

Schweitzer’s philosophy is at the same time his theology. The universal will-to-live manifest in the world and in my will-to-live is Schweitzer’s way of speaking philosophically about God. And reverence for life is the ethic of love, the ethic of Jesus. In fact for Schweitzer, "Christianity, as the most profound religion, is to me at the same time the most profound philosophy" (Schweitzer 1939, 90).

Schweitzer defines Christianity as an "ethical theism" (Schweitzer 1939, 80-81). But Christianity’s theism, Schweitzer argues, is ambiguous: "It presupposes a God who is an ethical Personality, and who is, therefore, so to speak, outside the world . . . [and] it must hold fast the belief that God is the sum total of the forces working in the world -- that all that is, is in God" (Schweitzer 1939, 81).

This ambiguity is not resolved in Christian faith. As Schweitzer puts it: "In the world He is impersonal Force, within me He reveals Himself as Personality. . . . They are one; but how they are one, I do not understand" (Schweitzer 1939, 83). Theism and pantheism remain unreconciled. This ambiguity in the conception of God is not something that concerns Schweitzer. Attention to intellectual conceptions of God is, for Schweitzer, an abstraction. Concern about the particular relation of theism to pantheism leads one away from active devotion to the individual manifestations of the will-to-live in the world. Christianity, according to Schweitzer, is more a way of acting in the world than a way of knowing, and this way of acting is not dependent on a full or complete understanding of how the world works or of God’s intrinsic nature. Piety, according to Schweitzer, "depends not on man being able to subscribe to a historically traditional conception of God, but on his being seized by the spirit and walking in it" (cited in Langfeldt, 52-53). Ultimately, "theism does not stand in opposition to pantheism, but rises out of it as the ethically definite of the indefinite" (cited in Langfeldt, 51).

For Schweitzer, Christians are called to surrender themselves to the ethical will of God. This surrender corresponds exactly with how Schweitzer develops the contents of the will-to-live: Service to other forms of life is also service to God. Christianity, therefore, appeals not only to the historical revelation but also to "that inward one which corresponds with, and continually confirms the historical revelation" (Schweitzer 1939, 83). Experience of the will-to-live corresponds with and confirms, then, the teachings of the historical Jesus. For Schweitzer, this means the teachings of the kingdom, especially as they are found in the Sermon on the Mount. These are Jesus’ teachings concerning love. In response to them the will-to-live as devotion to others becomes the will-to-love. Devotion to others construed as will-to-love is at the heart of Christianity, according to Schweitzer, in the same way that devotion to others is a necessary part of self-perfection in a philosophical construal. For both philosophy and theology, it is service to others as individuals that brings about union with the ultimate.

Christianity, according to Schweitzer, provides no more account of the world, its meaning and purpose, than reason. The inward revelation of God as universal will-to-love and the self as one of its manifestations does not reveal anything which makes life less mysterious or tells of the final destiny of human beings.

When Christianity becomes conscious of its innermost nature, it realizes that it is godliness rising out of inward constraint. The highest knowledge is to know that we are surrounded by mystery. Neither knowledge nor hope for the future can be the pivot of our life or determine its direction. It is intended to be solely determined by our allowing ourselves to be gripped by the ethical God, who reveals Himself in us, and by our yielding our will to His (Schweitzer 1939, 78).

Moreover, Christianity

assigns man a place in this world and commands him to live in it and to work in it in the spirit of the ethical God. Further, Christianity gives him the assurance that thereby God’s purpose for the world and for man is being fulfilled; it cannot, however, explain how. For what significance have the ethical character and the ethical activity of the religious individual in the infinite happenings of the universe? What do they accomplish? We must admit that the only answer we have to this question is, that thereby the will of God is fulfilled (Schweitzer 1939, 73-74).

Christian teachings do not give human beings a privileged place in relation to other manifestations of the will-to-live. What Christianity does is confirm what we already experience through our own will-to-live in its relations to others.

Toward an Ecofeminist Theological Ethic

Although I want to argue that Schweitzer’s position provides clues for feminist theological ethics, it is important to point out two places where his thought is seriously lacking. First, Schweitzer has little sense of the sociality of the self. Instead, his will-to-live is the radical individual, who, despite being related to other wills-to-live in an ethical mysticism, does not really live socially or communally. The human will-to-live works, according to Schweitzer, to better the situation of other wills-to-live as individuals. Furthermore, he focuses his attention so exclusively on the individual and the individual’s actions that the ways in which lives are shaped and affected by social structures are ignored. Significantly, justice is not a high priority for Schweitzer (Schweitzer 1939, 18-19). For feminists, particularly those who are schooled in the social feminist analysis of the structures of oppression, this is a serious failure. Schweitzer writes as if most suffering takes place as a result of individuals acting on other individuals. Feminist analysis insists, in contrast, that social structures and cultural expectations affect not only the conditions under which people live but also severely restrict the choices they perceive themselves to have.

The second problem is a consequence of the first: Schweitzer does no social analysis. For Schweitzer, human beings are ahistorical individuals, who learn to reverence life through self-reflection. There is no attention to social structures which limit or enhance those individuals. As a result, Schweitzer does not address institutionalized oppression in any way. For example, his position is a good example of the way in which man, as male, is taken as normative for both male and female without any hint that male experience is not normative for females. He makes no effort to rethink the meaning of the human (or man, as he would say) that experiences itself as will-to-live and that is one manifestation among others of the infinite will-to-live. In other words, although Schweitzer reworks the human/nonhuman dichotomy by using the will-to-live terminology, he fails to take seriously the destructiveness of the male/female dualism embedded in the traditional conceptions of human/nonhuman relationships. And, despite his home in Africa and his attention to individual patients, there is no analysis of two other destructive dualisms embedded in a traditional description of human beings: racism and classism.

Nevertheless, Schweitzer’s position clearly involves a reevaluation of the relationship between human beings and nonhuman forms of life along the lines suggested by ecofeminists. That is, despite the absence of any analysis of oppression, Schweitzer does attack the dualistic structure of Western patriarchy. The relationship between human beings and nonhuman forms of life is not characterized by subordination, instrumentality, or polarity. Schweitzer has no basis for judging that nonhuman lives simply serve human interests or that they have no value apart from their service to human lives. He refuses to construct a moral hierarchy with human beings at the top. And, his use of "will-to-live" as the description of all that lives means that the polarity assumption has also been discarded. Human and nonhuman cannot be polar opposites since both are manifestations of the same will-to-live.

Furthermore, Schweitzer’s use of will-to-live to describe not only all living beings but also the divine suggests a transformation in the divine/ human relationship away from the transcendent dualism feminist theologians criticize. Human beings and God are not conceived as polar opposites or as over against each other. God is not, according to Schweitzer, an external "other," external to the world or to human beings. As Schweitzer explains, "I carry out the will of the universal will-to-live which reveals itself in me. I live my life in God, in the mysterious divine personality which I do not know as such in the world, but only experience as mysterious Will within myself" (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 79). This idea of living life in God sounds very much like Isabel Carter Heyward’s notion that human beings "incarnate God" as they work to bring about justice in the world (Heyward, 159).

It may be argued, however, that Schweitzer retains at least one dualism even while he transforms others. In particular, Schweitzer is open to challenge concerning his apparently exclusive attention to all that lives. Using "will-to-live" as the primary category suggests that nonliving, nonhuman nature, such as rocks, air, and water, is excluded from the ethic of reverence for life. Feminists, in contrast, are increasingly calling for ways to include the so-called nonliving as morally significant (see Warren and Kheel). For the most part Schweitzer’s will-to-live refers to plant and animal life, although, in at least one place, he does include the crystal as a form of will-to-live (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 282). In addition, he uses the language of "Being" in several places as well (Schweitzer 1949/1981, 304-6). These suggest some attention to nonliving nature. A more fruitful way to look at this issue is to recall Schweitzer’s openness to science and scientific knowledge. As science through its investigations increasingly blurs the distinction between living and nonliving, will-to-live will become a less accurate way to describe what Schweitzer is trying to express.

One way for Schweitzer to include the nonliving as relevant is to emphasize the relatedness of wills-to-live, or the fact that "I am life which wills to live, in the midst of life which wills to live" (emphasis added). This relatedness, or interrelatedness in the context of Schweitzer’s mysticism, in addition to his insistence that we do not know what life is (which means that we have no grounds for limiting it) moves Schweitzer in the direction of including the nonliving in moral discussions. Further, the possibility of seeing rocks and water as morally relevant tests Schweitzer’s insistence that the reason something has value is not its analogical proximity to human life but its relationship to the divine as somehow a manifestation of the universal will-to-live.

The weight of evidence concerning the retention of hierarchical dualism in Schweitzer’s thought suggests that he is more interested in transforming such dualisms. In addition to his use of "will-to-live" in the context of the human/nonhuman dualism, there are at least two other patriarchal dualisms that Schweitzer refuses to maintain. First, like feminists, Schweitzer does not divorce reason from intuition or affectivity. The two kinds of knowing for Schweitzer work in concert with each other to describe the self’s relations with others in the world and to allow the self to feel those relations. Moreover, one of the most important elements in Schweitzer’s ethic is compassion, and reverence itself is not a rational category. In these ways Schweitzer’s ethic embraces the feelings and affectivity of the agent. In like manner feminists insist that the whole person be involved in judging and acting (Harrison, 3-21). As Marti Kheel points Out, "We cannot even begin to talk about the issue of ethics unless we admit that we care (or feel something)" (Kheel, 144).

Second, Schweitzer’s position works to transform the dualism of mind and body. Schweitzer’s description of human beings as participants in the dilemma of the will-to-live, or its self-division, is done in such a way that he does not disparage the body. In other words, if Schweitzer was a firm supporter of a mind/body dualism, the fact that the body lives at the expense of other wills-to-live provides an occasion to deny bodily needs in favor of the "superior" mind. Schweitzer does not do this. Instead, it is the self as a whole as will-to-live that lives at the expense of others. And it is the self as a whole that must work to overcome the dilemma. Clearly feminist ethicists also attack the mind/body dualism.

In addition to overcoming these dualisms, Schweitzer’s articulation of the ethic of reverence for life shares certain key features with feminist theological ethics. First, he depends on experience for his description of the interrelatedness and interdependence of all of life. For Schweitzer, the experience of the individual will-to-live in the midst of other wills-to-live presupposes a network of relation and interrelation. In Schweitzer’s ethical mysticism, each being is a manifestation of the universal will-to-live and as such is related to every other being. More important, this experience of the self as will-to-live provides the only basis for understanding the self and others, including God. Feminists likewise depend on women’s experience of themselves in relationship to others for their description of the world. For both, then, experience is crucial.

Second, both Schweitzer and feminists refuse to systematize ethics. Neither proposes absolute principles, which must be obeyed no matter what the situation or consequences; nor do they propose a telos or utilitarian goal. In both cases there is attention to the situation and an attempt to respond to the situation as it presents itself. For Schweitzer, ethics cannot be systematized because reverence for life, including love and compassion, must attend to the situation in which it finds itself. For example, in one situation compassion may mean saving a bird at the expense of the worms and bugs it will eat. In another circumstance, however, it may mean allowing the bird to remain where it has fallen in order to protect some other life, whether the worms and bugs, an injured cow, or the starving child I am trying to assist. In either case reverence for life cannot be removed or abstracted from the situation. Schweitzer’s vision of ethics, then, sounds very much like the ethics of care that many feminists describe (see Warren and Gilligan).

Third, both feminist theological ethics and Schweitzer’s ethic are activist ethics. Feminists are not simply interested in theory; rather we are interested in transforming oppressive social structures and living in nonpatriarchal ways. That entails concrete activity. Similarly, Schweitzer’s reverence for life is far more than a way to reflect on the relationship between self and world. Reverence for life seeks to aid those in need and to transform the conditions of the will-to-live in the world. It does not accept present circumstances, especially the dilemma of the will-to-live as eternally or supernaturally given. The world as populated by manifold manifestations of the universal will-to-live is not static.

Fourth, Schweitzer’s ethic is life-affirming. This includes not only his optimism about the possibilities for constructive action but also his attention to this world. Schweitzer’s ethic does not support any form of nihilistic rejection of this world or any sort of religious otherworldliness. Individuals, for Schweitzer, come into contact with the divine not by withdrawing from others but by actively serving them in this world. This ethical mysticism lies at the heart of Schweitzer’s position. It supports the sort of world-affirming and life-affirming ethic insisted upon by feminists such as Beverly Harrison, Isabel Carter Heyward, and Sallie McFague.

To conclude: Ecofeminist concerns and Schweitzer’s reverence for life provide both challenges and resources for feminist theological ethics Eco-feminists help us to see the connections between forms of oppression maintained by patriarchy at the level of dualistic assumptions. At the same time they challenge us not to lose sight of those connections when we move to the specifically theological dualism of human/divine. Schweitzer’s ethic of reverence for life provides an example of an ethic that takes very seriously a non-dualistic description of the relationships between human beings and the world and between human beings and God. He challenges us to add to this the analysis of the dualistic structures that characterize human social relationships.

In short, what feminist theological ethics must recognize is that three fundamental relationships must be addressed simultaneously. These three relationships -- between human beings and the nonhuman world, between human beings and God, and among human beings -- are all defined dualistically by Western patriarchy. What we must see is that the way in which human beings are described in one of these relationships affects all the others. What we must remember is that no one or two of these relationships will be transformed without the transformation of all three.

 

Works Cited

Gilligan, Carol. In a Different Voice. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1982.

Gray, Elizabeth Dodson. Green Paradise Lost. Wellesley, MA: Roundtable Press, 1979.

Griscom, Joan L. "On Healing the Nature/History Split in Feminist Thought." Heresies: A Feminist Journal of Art and Politics 4, no. 1 (1981): 4-9.

Harrison, Beverly. Making the Connections. Ed. Carol S. Robb. Boston: Beacon Press, 1985.

Heyward, Isabel Carter. The Redemption of God: A Theology of Mutual Relation. Washington, D.C.: University Press of America, 1982.

Kheel, Marti. "The Liberation of Nature: A Circular Affair," Environmental Ethics 7 (Summer 1985):135-49.

King, Ynestra. "Feminism and the Revolt of Nature." Heresies: A Feminist Journal of Art and Politics 4, no. 1 (1981): 12-16.

Kraus, Oskar. Albert Schweitzer: His Work and His Philosophy. Trans. I. G. McCalman. London: Adam and Charles Black, 1944.

Langfeldt, Gabriel Albert Schweitzer: A Study of His Philosophy of Life. Trans. Maurice Michael. London: George Allen and Unwin, 1960.

McFague, Sallie. Models of God: Theology for an Ecological, Nuclear Age. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987.

Plumwood, Val. "Ecofeminism: An Overview and Discussion of Positions and Arguments," Australasian Journal of Philosophy 64, Suppl. (June 1986):120-138.

Ruether, Rosemary Radford. New Woman, New Earth. New York: Seabury Press, 1975.

______Sexism and God-Talk: Toward a Feminist Theology. Boston: Beacon Press, 1983.

Schweitzer, Albert. "Religion and Modern Civilization." The Christian Century 51 (28 November 1934):1519-21.

______"The Ethics of Reverence for Life," Christendom 1 (Winter 1936): 225-39. Reprinted in Henry Clark, The Ethical Mysticism of Albert Schweitzer: A Study of the Sources and Significance of Schweitzer’s "Philosophy of Civilization". Boston: Beacon Press, 1962, pp. 180-94.

______Christianity and the Religions of the World. Trans. Johanna Powers. New York: Henry Holt, 1939.

______Out of My Life and Thought: An Autobiography. Trans. C.T. Campion. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1949. Reprint ed. New York: New American Library, 1953.

______The Philosophy of Civilization. Trans. C. T. Campion. New York: Macmillan, 1949. Reprint ed. Tallahassee, FL: University Presses of Florida, 1981.

______Indian Thought and Its Development. Trans. Mrs. Charles I. B. Russell. Boston: Beacon Press, 1960.

______The Teaching of Reverence for Life. Trans. Richard and Clara Winston. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965.

Singer, Peter. Animal Liberation; A New Ethics for Our Treatment of Animals. New York: Avon Books, 1975.

Warren, Karen. "Feminism and Ecology: Making Connections," Environmental Ethics 9 (Spring 1987):3-20.

The Spirituality of the Earth

For Thomas Berry and for those who follow him, the earth, in a very real sense, is our mother. We are born from this mother, from Gaia; we are extensions of the earth and the cosmos of which it is a part. This means that our conceptualizing and our spirituality also extend from the spiritual dimension of the cosmos and the earth. As Berry makes clear, Christians have often failed to acknowledge the spirituality and numinous presence of the earth. But we are also experiencing a turn in our awareness, developing new consciousness in dialogue with the sciences, with other faiths, with ourselves as men and women, and with the earth itself.

The subject with which we are concerned is the spirituality of the earth. By this I do not mean a spirituality that is directed toward an appreciation of the earth. I speak of the earth as subject, not as object. I am concerned with the maternal principle out of which we were born and whence we derive all that we are and all that we have. In our totality we are born of the earth. We are earthlings. The earth is our origin, our nourishment, our support, our guide. Our spirituality itself is earth-derived. If there is no spirituality in the earth, then there is no spirituality in ourselves. The human and the earth are totally implicated each in the other.

Not to recognize the spirituality of the earth is to indicate a radical lack of spiritual perception in ourselves. We see this lack of spiritual insight in the earlier attitude of Euro-Americans in their inability to perceive the spiritual qualities of the indigenous American peoples and their mysticism of the land. The attack on these spiritual qualities by Christians constitutes one of the most barbaric moments in Christian history. This barbarism turned upon the tribal peoples was loosed also upon the American earth with a destructive impact beyond calculation.

The fragility of the earth has not yet impressed itself upon us. The crassness of our relation to the earth cannot but indicate a radical absence of spirituality in ourselves, not the lack of a spiritual dimension of the earth. The opaqueness is in our understanding of the earth, not in the earth’s structure which expresses an abiding numinous presence. The earth process has been generally ignored by the religious-spiritual currents of the West. Our alienation goes so deep that it is beyond our conscious mode of awareness. While there are tributes to the earth in the scriptures and in Christian liturgy, there is a tendency to see the earth as a seductive reality, which brought about alienation from God in the agricultural peoples of the Near East. Earth worship was the ultimate idolatry, the cause of the Fall, and thereby the cause of sacrificial redemption by divine personality. Thus, too, the Christian sense of being crucified to the world and living only for the savior. This personal savior orientation has led to an interpersonal devotionalism that quite easily dispenses with earth except as a convenient support for life.

We can produce Christian spiritualities that function in a certain isolated context without regard for the larger society. But such redemptive spiritualities are not liable to be effective in our present world. They speak a rhetoric that is not available for our world, or, if it is available, widens rather than lessens the tragic inner division between the world of affairs and the world of divine communion. They do not offer a way of interpreting the inner life of the society itself in a rhetoric available to the society. They do not establish an understanding of that authentic experience in contemporary life oriented toward communion with creation processes. Indeed, they do not recognize that the context of any authentic spirituality lies in the creation myth that governs the total life orientation.

Creation in traditional Christian teaching is generally presented as part of the discussion concerning "God in himself and in relation to his creation." But creation in this metaphysical, biblical, medieval, theological context is not terribly helpful in understanding the creation process as set forth in the scientific manuals or the textbooks of the earth sciences as they are studied by children in elementary or high school, or later in college.

These classroom studies initiate the child into a world that has more continuity with later adult life in its functional aspect than does the catechetical story of creation taken from biblical sources. This schoolroom presentation of the world in which the child lives and finds a place in the world is all-important for the future spirituality of the child. The school fulfills in our times the role of the ancient initiation rituals, which introduced our children to the society and to their human and sacred role in this society. The tragedy is that the sacred or spiritual aspect of this process is now absent. It is doubtful if separate catechetical instructions with their heavy emphasis on redemptive processes can ever supply what is missing.

It may be that the later alienation of young adults from the redemptive tradition is, in some degree, due to this inability to communicate to the child a spirituality grounded more deeply in creation dynamics in accord with the modem way of experiencing the galactic emergence of the universe, the shaping of the earth, the appearance of life and of human consciousness, and the historical sequence in human development.

In this sequence the child might learn that the earth has its intrinsic spiritual quality from the beginning, for this aspect of the creation story is what has been missing. This is what needs to be established if we are to have a functional spirituality. Just how to give the child an integral world -- that is the issue. It is also the spiritual issue of the modern religious personality. Among our most immediate tasks is to establish this new sense of the earth and of the human as a function of the earth.

We need to understand that the earth acts in all that acts upon the earth. The earth is acting in us whenever we act. In and through the earth spiritual energy is present. This spiritual energy emerges in the total complex of earth functions. Each form of life is integrated with every other life form. Even beyond the earth, by force of gravitation, every particle of the physical world attracts and is attracted to every other particle. This attraction holds the differentiated universe together and enables it to be a universe of individual realities. The universe is not a vast smudge of matter, some jelly-like substance extended indefinitely in space. Nor is the universe a collection of unrelated particles. The universe is, rather, a vast multiplicity of individual realities with both qualitative and quantitative differences all in spiritual-physical communion with each other. The individuals of similar form are bound together in their unity of form. The species are related to one another by derivation: the later, more complex life forms are derived from earlier, more simple life forms.

The first shaping of the universe was into those great galactic systems of fiery energy that constitute the starry heavens. In these celestial furnaces the elements are shaped. Eventually, after some ten billion years, the solar system and the earth and its living forms constituted a unique planet in the entire complex of the universe. Here on earth life, both plant and animal life, was born in the primordial seas some three billion years ago. Plants came out upon the land some six hundred million years ago, after the planet earth had shaped itself through a great series of transformations forming the continents, the mountains, the valleys, the rivers and streams. The atmosphere was long in developing. The animals came ashore a brief interval later. As these life forms established themselves over some hundreds of millions of years, the luxuriant foliage formed layer after layer of organic matter, which was then buried in the crust of the earth to become fossil formations with enormous amounts of stored energy. One hundred million years ago flowers appeared and the full beauty of earth began to manifest itself. Some sixty million years ago the birds were in the air. Mammals walked through the forest. Some of the mammals -- the whales, porpoises, and dolphins -- went back into the sea.

Finally, some two million years ago, the ascending forms of life culminated in the awakening human consciousness. Wandering food gatherers and hunters until some eight thousand years ago, we then settled into village life. This life led us through the neolithic period to the classical civilization which has flourished so brilliantly for the past five thousand years.

Then, some four hundred years ago, a new stage of scientific development took place which in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, brought about human technological dominance of the earth out of which we had emerged. This stage can be interpreted as the earth awakening to consciousness of itself in its human mode of being. The story of this awakening consciousness is the most dramatic aspect of the earth story.

The spiritual attitude that then caused or permitted humans to attack the earth with such savagery has never been adequately explained. That it was done by a Christian-derived society, and even with the belief that this was the truly human and Christian task, makes explanation especially harsh for our society.

Possibly it was the millennial drive toward a total transformation of the earth condition that led us, resentful that the perfect world was not yet achieved by divine means, to set about the violent subjugation of the earth by our own powers in the hope that in this way the higher life would be attained, our afflictions healed.

While this is the positive goal sought it must be added that the negative, even fearful, attitude toward the earth resulting from the general hardships of life led to the radical disturbance of the entire process. The increasing intensity shown in exploiting the earth was also the result of the ever-rising and unsatiated expectation of Western peoples. Even further, the natural tensions with the earth were increased by the Darwinian principle of natural selection, indicating that the primary attitude of each individual and each species is for its own survival at the expense of the others. Out of this strife, supposedly, the glorious achievements of earth take place. Darwin had only minimal awareness of the cooperation and mutual dependence of each form of life on the other forms of life. This is amazing since he himself discovered the great web of life. Still, he had no real appreciation of the principle of intercommunion.

Much more needs to be said on the conditions that permitted such a mutually destructive situation to arise between ourselves and the earth, but we must pass on to give some indication of the new attitude that needs to be adopted toward the earth. This involves a new spiritual and even mystical communion with the earth, a true aesthetic of the earth, a sensitivity to earth needs, a valid economy of the earth. We need a way of designating the earth-human world in its continuity and identity rather than in its discontinuity and difference. In spirituality, especially, we need to recognize the numinous qualities of the earth. We might begin with some awareness of what it is to be human, of the role of consciousness on the earth, and of the place of the human species in the universe.

While the scholastic definition of the human as a rational animal gives us some idea of ourselves among the biological species, it gives us a rather inadequate sense of the role we play in the total earth process. The Chinese have a better definition of the human as the hsin of heaven and earth. This word hsin is written as a pictograph of the human heart. It should be translated by a single word or phrase with both a feeling and an understanding aspect. It could be thus translated by saying that the human is the "understanding heart of heaven and earth." Even more briefly, the phrase has been translated by Julia Ch’ing in the statement that the human is "the heart of the universe." It could, finally, be translated by saying that we are "the consciousness of the world," or "the psyche of the universe." Here we have a remarkable feeling for the absolute dimensions of the human, the total integration of reality in the human, the total integration of the human within the reality of things.

We need a spirituality that emerges out of a reality deeper than ourselves, even deeper than life, a spirituality that is as deep as the earth process itself, a spirituality born out of the solar system and even out of the heavens beyond the solar system. There in the stars is where the primordial elements take shape in both their physical and psychic aspects. Out of these elements the solar system and the earth took shape, and out of the earth, ourselves.

There is a certain triviality in any spiritual discipline that does not experience itself as supported by the spiritual as well as the physical dynamics of the entire cosmic-earth process. A spirituality is a mode of being in which not only the divine and the human commune with each other, but we discover ourselves in the universe and the universe discovers itself in us. The Sioux Indian Crazy Horse called upon these depths of his being when he invoked the cosmic forces to support himself in battle. He painted the lightning upon his cheek, placed a rock behind his ear, an eagle feather in his hair, and the head of a hawk upon his head. Assumption of the cosmic insignia is also evident in the Sun Dance Ceremony. In this dance the symbols of the sun and moon and stars are cut out of rawhide and worn by the dancers. The world of living moving things is indicated by the form of the buffalo cut from rawhide, and by eagle feathers. The plant world is represented by the cottonwood tree set up in the center of the ceremonial circle. The supreme spirit itself is represented by the circular form of the dance area.

So the spiritual personality should feel constantly in communion with those numinous cosmic forces out of which we were born. Furthermore, the cosmic-earth order needs to be supplemented by the entire historical order of human development such as was depicted on the shield of Achilles by Homer and on the shield of Aeneas by Virgil. Virgil spends several long pages enumerating the past and future historical events wrought on the shield of Aeneas by Vulcan at the command of Venus, the heavenly mother of Aeneas. All these cosmic and historical forces are presently available to us in a new mode of appreciation. The historical and the cosmic can be seen as a single process. This vision of earth-human development provides the sustaining dynamic of the contemporary world.

That there is an organizing force within the earth process with both physical and psychic dimensions needs to be acknowledged in language and in imagery. It needs to be named and spoken of in its integral form. It has a unified functioning similar to the more particular organisms with which we are acquainted. When we speak of earth we are speaking of a numinous maternal principle in and through which the total complex of earth phenomena takes its shape.

In antiquity this mode of being of the earth was indicated by personification. "Earth" itself designates a deity in Hesiod and in the Homeric hymns. This personification is expressed as Cybele in the Eastern Mediterranean and as Demeter in the Greek world. Biblical revelation represents a basic antagonism between the transcendent deity, Jahweh, and the fertility religions of the surrounding societies. There is a basic effort here to keep the asymmetry in the relationship between the divine and the created. In the doctrine of the Madonna in later Christian history there are many passages indicating that Mary was to be thought of as the Earth in which the True Vine is planted and which had been made fruitful by the Holy Spirit. Probably it belongs to the dialectics of history that direct human association with unique historical individuals, the savior and his mother, had to develop before any adequate feeling for the mystique of the earth could take place. Perhaps, too, full development of redemption processes was needed before this new mode of human-earth communion could find expression in our times.

However this may be, a shift in attention is now taking place. Several things are happening. The most notable single event is that modern science is giving us a new and more comprehensive account of our own birth out of the earth. This story of the birth of the human was never known so well as now. After the discovery of the geological stages of earth transformation and the discovery of the sequence of life in ancient fossil remains by Louis le Clerc, James Hutton, and Charles Lyell, came the discovery of the emergence of all forms of life from primordial life forms by Charles Darwin, presented in his Origin of Species in 1859. While Darwin saw the human appearing only out of the physical earth, Teilhard de Chardin saw the human emerging out of both the physical and the psychic dimensions of the earth. Thus the whole burden of modern earth studies is to narrate the story of the birth of the human from our Mother the Earth.

Once this story is told, it immediately becomes obvious how significant the title Mother Earth is, how intimate a relationship exists, how absolute our gratitude must be, how delicate our concern. Our long motherless period is coming to a close. Hopefully, too, the long period of our mistreatment of earth is being terminated. If it is not terminated, if we fail to perceive not only our earth origin but also our continuing dependence on our earth-mother, then our failure will be due in no small measure to the ephemeral spiritualities that have governed our own thoughts, attitudes, and actions.

In this mother-child relationship, however, a new and fundamental shift in dependence has now taken place. Until recently the child was taken care of by the mother. Now, however, the mother must be extensively cared for by the child. The child has grown to adult status. The mother-child relationship needs to undergo a renewal similar to that in the ordinary process of maturing. In this process both child and mother experience a period of alienation. Then follows a reconciliation period when mother and child relate to each other with a new type of intimacy, a new depth of appreciation, and a new mode of interdependence. Such is the historical period in which we are now living. Development of this new mode of earth-human communion can only take place within a profound spiritual context. Thus the need for a spirituality that will encompass this process. As a second observation concerning our newly awakening sense of the Earth, we could say that a new phase in the history of the madonna figure of Western civilization has begun. Association of the Virgin Mother with the Earth may now be a condition of Mary returning to her traditional role in Western civilization. Her presence may also be a condition for overcoming our estrangement from the earth. In the Western world the earth known only in itself as universal mother is not sufficient. It must be identified with an historical person in and through whom earth functions in its ultimate reaches. Phrases referring to Mary as the Earth are found throughout Western religious literature. Whether this is anything more than a simple rhetorical device needs a thorough inquiry at the present time. But whether or not this relationship is given in any extensive manner in prior Christian literature, it is a subject of utmost importance for our entire civilizational venture. Few, if any, other civilizations were so deeply grounded in a feminine mystique as the medieval period of Western Christendom. A vital contact with this earlier phase of Western civilization is hardly possible without some deep appreciation of its feminine component. Thus we cannot fail to unite in some manner these two realities: Earth and Mary. In Western Christian tradition earth needs embodiment in an historical person, and such an historical person needs an earth identity to fulfill adequately her role as divine mother.

A third observation is that emergence of the new age of human culture will necessarily be an age dominated by the symbol woman. This, too, depends on the identification of woman with the earth and its creativity. Woman and Earth are inseparable. The fate of one is the fate of the other. This association is given in such a variety of cultural developments throughout the world in differing historical periods that it is hardly possible to disassociate the two. Earth consciousness, woman consciousness; these two go together. Both play a stupendous role in the spirituality of humans as well as in the structure of civilizations. Our alienation from the earth, from ourselves, and from a truly creative man-woman relationship in an overly masculine mode of being, demands a reciprocal historical period in which not only a balance will be achieved but even, perhaps, a period of feminine emphasis.

A fourth observation I would make is to note our new capacity for subjectivity, for subjective communion with the manifold presences that constitute the universe. In this we are recovering the more primitive genius of humankind. For in our earlier years we experienced both the intimacy and the distance of our relation with the earth and with the entire natural world. Above all we lived in a spirit world, a world that could be addressed in a reciprocal mood of affectionate concern. This is what gave rise to sympathetic magic as well as to the great rituals, the majestic poetry, and the awesome architecture of past ages. Nothing on earth was a mere "thing." Every being had its own divine, numinous subjectivity, its self, its center, its unique identity. Every being was a presence to every other being. Among the more massive civilizations, China gave clearest expression to this intimacy of beings with each other in its splendid concept of Jen, a word that requires translation according to context by a long list of terms in English, terms such as love, goodness, human-heartedness, and affection. All beings are held together in Jen, as in St. Paul all things are held together in Christ. But perhaps an even better analogy is to say that while for Newton, the universal law of gravitation whereby each particle of matter attracts and is attracted to every other particle of matter in the universe indicates a mere physical force of attraction, the universal law of attraction for the Chinese is a form of feeling identity.

For this reason there is, in China, the universal law of compassion. This law is especially observable in humankind, for every human has a heart that cannot bear to witness the suffering of others. When the objection was made to Wang Yang-ming in the fifteenth century that this compassion is evident only in human relations, Master Wang replied by noting that even the frightened cry of the bird, the crushing of a plant, the shattering of a tile, or the senseless breaking of a stone immediately and spontaneously causes pain in the human heart. This would not be, he tells us, unless there exists a bond of intimacy and even identity between ourselves and these other beings.

Recovery of this capacity for subjective communion with the earth is a consequence and a cause of a newly emerging spirituality. Subjective communion with the earth, identification with the cosmic-earth-human process, provides the context in which we now make our spiritual journey. This Journey is no longer the journey of Dante through the heavenly spheres. It is no longer simply the journey of the Christian community through history to the heavenly Jerusalem. It is the journey of primordial matter through its marvelous sequence of transformations -- in the stars, in the earth, in living beings, in human consciousness -- toward an ever more complete spiritual-physical intercommunion of the parts with each other, with the whole, and with that numinous presence that has been manifested throughout this entire cosmic-earth-human process.

Biblical Views of Nature

Ecological theologies that are shaped by biblical materials require a thorough analysis of the various views of nature held by biblical writers. This essay offers that analysis. It was written more than a decade ago, when theologians in different parts of the world were first realizing the depths of the crisis inflicted upon earth by human exploitation. It appeared in the World Council of Churches’ publication Anticipation [No. 25, January 1979, 40-46].

Ten years later the essay is even more timely. Acknowledging the diversity of biblical perspectives on nature, Bishop Baker shows how the Bible combines concerns for creation with concerns for the transformation and redemption of the world, and how both sets of concerns have profound implications for an understanding of nature. However contemporary ecological theologians appropriate or repent of the various views of nature in the Christian scriptures, an analysis such as this is indispensable for ecologically sensitive vision.

One or two remarks by way of preamble may be helpful in preventing misunderstandings. This paper is descriptive and interpretative; it is an attempt to convey my understanding of the views of nature found in the biblical writers. It is not intended to draw normative conclusions for our own attitude to nature or our treatment of it. It is, therefore, primarily a religio-historical essay, not one in "biblical theology." The most I have allowed myself by way of contemporary application is to comment at various points on which of our current attitudes and policies seem compatible with the biblical view under consideration, and which do not. Secondly, I have called the paper "Biblical Views of Nature" because I do not believe there is any one view held by the whole range of biblical writers. Any single view which incorporated all their various insights, assuming such a synthesis could be made, would be a theological construct of our day, not something properly called biblical. This is not to say, of course, that there are not themes and beliefs which the biblical writers share in their approach to nature, but the differences are as important as the common assumptions. Again, however, I have allowed myself to draw attention to some of these common (or majority) assumptions, since these can be helpful in any attempt to compare biblical views with those from other sources.

The writers of the Hebrew Scriptures, unlike ourselves, did not have an immense stock of universal or semi-abstract terms. While this limited them in some directions -- philosophy and metaphysics, for example -- it also saved them from a certain woolliness of thought to which we are peculiarly liable. Thus, the lack of a word corresponding to our term was in some respects a handicap: but it also safeguarded them against lumping together things that have no obvious business together and against being taken in by such phrases as "communing with nature," or "nature, red in tooth and claw." What they saw when they looked around them was not some undifferentiated global category but particular things -- mountains, seas, rivers, crawling animals, oak trees, birds, the sun and moon, and so on. Their nearest approach to an all-embracing word for their environment was ‘erets, the earth. The title Friends of the Earth they might have understood; nature-lover would have required some explanation.

How far are humans involved in nature, and how far have they distanced themselves from it? The basic elements of this question can be found scattered in the Hebrew Scriptures. Humanity is part of the panorama of nature. Psalm 104 places humanity with great artistry in the context of all the other teeming life of the earth. If the human is the final figure to be painted in, and therefore in some sense special or climactic, this is very much understated (v. 23). In the same way, in the older creation story (I) in Genesis 2:4b-25, both man and the animals are formed out of the soil. Here, in a strange fashion, the original fusion of supposed fact and faith-image, after an interim period of being dismissed by the religious mind as purely symbolic and crudely so, becomes in our day once again the vivid symbol for a faith-interpretation of literal fact. Genesis does not go as far as the following quotation, but the germ of the idea is there:

My body was originally formed from an ovum and a sperm in my mother’s body, and this ovum and sperm were formed of matter which came into the bloodstream of my father and mother from the world outside. I am formed of the matter of the universe and am linked through it to the remotest stars in time and space. My body has passed through all the stages of evolution through which matter has passed over millions of years. I have been present when matter was first formed into atoms and molecules, when the living cell appeared. I have passed through every stage from protoplasm to fish and animal and man. If I could know myself, I would know matter and life, animal and man, since all are contained within me (Griffiths, 35).

Nevertheless, even this older creation story is concerned predominantly to stress the distinctness of man from the rest of creation. Birds and beasts may share a material origin with man, and even a divine artificer, but they are not adequate companions and partners for him (v. 20). Only another human being, formed out of his own living substance, can be that (vv. 21-23). It is this unique kinship, so the story claims, which explains the all-surpassing force of the bond between man and woman (v. 24). The superiority of man to the animals is further emphasized by the incident of man’s naming of all the living creatures. This act has two important implications. First, to give a name to some other being is to claim and exercise sovereignty over it. So a parent names his newborn child, an overlord his vassal (2 Kgs 24:17). True, man gives a name to his wife at her first creation (Gn 2:23), implying the male hegemony characteristic of the biblical world, and reasserts his authority over her, in accordance with God’s judicial verdict after their joint offense, by giving her a new name (3:20). But the first of these two names, the generic woman (‘issa), emphasizes that woman is the only creature who belongs in the same category as man (’is).

Second, there is the strong conviction of the whole ancient world that a true name expresses the nature and controls the destiny of its owner (cf. Gn 35:16-18, for example). By giving animals the truly appropriate name for each (Gn 2:19), Adam proves that he has insight into their true nature. This at once puts him on a different plane from them. He is a creature nearer to God than they, for he shares some at least of the insight which enabled God to create them in the first place. So the giving of names to the animals by man is a sign of actual superiority and legitimate authority over them on his part -- not the absolute superiority and authority that belong to God alone, but real nevertheless, even if relative. By this act of sovereignty Adam proves that none of these other creatures is a "helper fit for him" (vv. 18, 20); and paradoxically the act of naming by which he claims authority over his wife is also a recognition of her essential equality with him. That this is the correct reading of the story is confirmed by the divine sentence passed on Adam and Eve for their offense in eating of the fruit of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil. Because man has rebelled against his proper overlord, God, his own subjects are to rebel against him. The tillage of the earth was once within his strength and its fruits were all beneficial (2:15); now it is to yield less, and that only to unremitting labor, and some of its produce will be worthless for human consumption (3:17-19). Similarly, the woman who upset the order of things by persuading her husband to disobedience loses the relationship of a free subordinate partner and becomes his servant, driven by a compulsive attachment (3:16). In all this, too, it is possible to discern the traits of kingship in the portrait of man, expressed not only through the naming ritual but also in the ancient cultic symbolism of the tending and watering of the tree of life, a sacral duty of the king.

In the later creation narrative (P) in Genesis 1:1-2:4a, man’s supremacy is spelt out categorically, though here, be it noted, the sub-plot of male superiority to the female is eliminated. This is not to be taken as implying equality of the sexes in the writer’s mind, merely that in the context of the relation of man to nature, all human beings share in the distinctive superiority of their species in the created order. In this story man’s supremacy is given technical theological expression, peculiar to this writer and his school. Man is "in (God’s) image" and "after (his) likeness" (Gn 1:26-27). The exact meaning of this phrase has been endlessly debated. There may be influence from the Egyptian formula, according to which the pharaoh is the "image of Amun-Re," in which case there are viceregal overtones, made explicit in v. 28. But the Hebrew and Egyptian phrases are not truly parallel. Much more certain is the implication that man is the nearest visible pointer to what God looks like (cf. Ez 1:26). The interesting question is: How far is this similarity thought to go below the surface into the realm of understanding and character? To some degree it must do, since it is improbable that any writer would make God give even a shadow of his own unique likeness to a Creature that had nothing in common with him; and this common-sense conclusion is confirmed by the fact that God entrusts to man dominion over his new and wonderful earth and its other inhabitants.

The major difference between this creation story and the older one, so far as our present subject is concerned, is that in Genesis 1 the theme of a common material origin for man and animals is suppressed altogether. The writer seems to have held a view, instanced elsewhere in the ancient world, that the earth and the sea themselves "brought forth" their various inhabitants (vv. 20-21, 2425), but he has combined this with safeguards against any divinization of earth or sea by insisting simultaneously that in fact God himself "created" (v. 21) and "made" (v. 25) the creatures these primordial entities generated. The resultant picture is that all animal life was produced either by the earth or the sea as a result of God’s creative edict and operation. There is a very careful gradation upward from the production of plant life (vv. 11-12), where God issues the creative fiat, "Let the earth put forth vegetation, . . ." but is not said to have "made" or "created" what is put forth. The writer seems to be saying that animal life, whether on land or in the sea, is more marvelous than mere plant life, and, although issuing from the womb of the earth and from the waters, required a special operation of God to bring it about. Then in the case of man we take yet another step upward. Here the divine edict and activity are everything; no intermediate creative source is named. Man is presented as created by God directly, and the question whether he too came from the earth is at least passed over in silence. It is possible that Psalm 139:15 draws on a myth that man was "earth-born." If such a view was current, then the writer of Genesis 1 has deliberately snubbed it. As for the fact that God is said both to "create" (v. 27) and to "make" (v. 26) man, there do not to the present writer seem to be solid grounds for finding here two distinct theological concepts. As is well-known, the verb ‘bara’, "create," is found in the Hebrew Scriptures only with God as subject. The significance of this is hard to assess. The word is used only by the Priestly Writer, Deuteronomy, Jeremiah, Second and Third Isaiah, Amos, Psalms, Malachi, and Koheleth. With the exception of Koheleth, who is late and therefore drawing on an already established usage, all these sources are strongly priestly in character (the Amos instance comes in a formal hymnic doxology which may or may not be the prophet’s own work). Since the Hebrew Scriptures are, to all intents and purposes, the only Hebrew literature of their period that we possess, it is precarious to argue from evidence that bara’ was an exclusively theological terminus technicus with no secular use. Etymologically it has been linked with an ancient South Arabian verb meaning "to build," and with a verb in the dialect of Socotra meaning "to bear, bring forth." The absence of more standard ANE parallels suggests that it might have been a fairly esoteric word, entering Hebrew through a specialized channel of some antiquity. (There may just be some significance in the fact that Levi, the priestly gentilic, is also, in one view, related to a South Arabian word for a cultic official.) On balance, the most likely view seems to be that bara’ simply means "to build" or "construct," but that it came into the Hebrew as part of the sacral vocabulary of priestly circles and may already at its importation have had by convention an exclusive link with the deity. What we are not justified in doing on the basis of known usage is to read into bara’ anywhere in the Hebrew Scriptures later metaphysical understandings of the idea of creation, such as creatio ex nihilo, which is not the sense of Genesis 1:1f. and is indeed not found in Jewish religious writing until 2 Maccabees 7:28, where there is undoubted Hellenistic influence. In the end, therefore, there is no reason to see any substantial difference of meaning between "create" and "make" in Genesis 1. The collocation of the two words at the end of the Priestly creation story (Gn 2:3) is a sonorous full close for the stylistic effect. Nevertheless, with regard to our main point it seems clear that by stressing the direct divine activity involved in the making of man, and by omitting any reference to physical stuff out of which man is formed, this writer is intentionally minimizing that which is common to man and the rest of the animal world. The only common bond is the theological one: both are the works of God and created to fulfill the particular purposes he has in mind for them.

It is clear, however, that humanity’s purpose and role is a unique one. Man in Genesis 1 occupies much the same high place in the scheme of things as he does in Psalm 8: "Yet thou hast made him little less than God, and dost crown him with glory and honour. Thou hast given him dominion over the works of thy hands; thou hast put all things under his feet, all sheep and oxen, and also the beasts of the field, the birds of the air, and the fish of the sea, whatever passes along the paths of the sea" (vv. 5-8). To our ears such words sound very like the most blatant human imperialism toward the rest of nature, as does the divine commission to man in Genesis 1:28; and in modern times they may have fostered such an attitude and been used as a divine "exploiters’ charter" to justify it. But what in their biblical context did they originally imply?

One connection of this type of language is with the institution of kingship. Under the influence of Mesopotamian models, even quite petty kings in the ANE seem to have used cosmic iconography to express their status and authority. Solomon’s throne, with six steps and a curved back (1 Kgs 10:18- 20). symbolized universal dominion; and the embroidery on the collar of the later high priests, which was probably zodiacal and signified the whole cosmos, was almost certainly taken over from royal robes of earlier times (cf. Wis 18:24a). "Kingship came down from heaven," the ANE believed, and part of the mystique of kingship was that every king was God’s viceregent on earth. One of a king’s most important duties was to ensure fertility and prosperity by his obedience to the gods and by his observance of the yearly rituals. We can trace thinking of this kind at many points in the Hebrew Scriptures; for example, in the famine sent on Israel for the wickedness of Ahab (1 Kgs 17:1); or conversely, in a text like Psalm 72, where unimaginable abundance is to be a mark of the reign of the ideal ruler. The conditions pictured in this psalm -- for example, the king’s worldwide sovereignty (v. 8) -- certainly never obtained in any actual reign; but the psalm is nonetheless not just a dream of an indefinite future. Verse 1 refers to an actual king; it is a prayer, perhaps used at the coronation, that the vision painted in the psalm may come true in this king’s reign. Primarily, therefore, the "man" and "son of man" of Psalm 8 is also the king, whose sacred office endows him with the resources of divine power not just over his human subjects but over all other creatures within his domain; and it is only his sins which cause this power to be withheld. Later this correlation between righteousness and prosperity was to be democratized, and the magical element confined to the direct action of God; in the final versions of Deuteronomy, for example, the responsibility for righteousness is laid on all Israelites equally, and abundance is God’s reward for this. But there is also another line of development, which continues to use the figure of the individual ruler. As hopes set on actual rulers are falsified, so longing grows more intense for a ruler who will measure up to God’s standards. Under such a king all the anomalies of man and nature will be ironed out, and harmony and abundance will reign. The most famous instance of this hope in Hebrew Scriptures is Isaiah 11:1-9.

By a common feature of human mythical thinking, however, paradise in the end time is thought of as the recreation of a primeval paradise at the dawn of creation, the lost "golden age." Thus we find a small but significant detail common to both Genesis 1 and the eschatological vision of Isaiah 11: the vegetarianism of the creation. Animals eat grass and man eats grains and fruits (cf. Gn 1:29-30 and Is 11:6-7). It is not possible to decide for certain whether the prophetic vision of the end time is consciously drawing upon paradisal traditions of the Urzeit, or whether a passage like Genesis 1 owes something to the prophetic imagery. Both no doubt derive along their respective routes from a long, complex, and interwoven traditional history. (Awareness of a link between the eschatological fulfillment and the primal paradise story shows in the words of Isaiah 65:25, "and the snake [shall eat] dust," a reapplication of Isaiah 11:6f.) What we can say is that the basic assumptions of the Israelite view of history work out in two very different shapings of the whole historical sequence in the priestly and prophetic perspectives. Both are acutely aware of human sin and the disruption it has imported into the whole created order. The prophet, however, is interested primarily in the resolution of this discord in the new age God is going to inaugurate, the world in which righteousness is going to be achieved and peace and well-being reign. The priest sees God’s goal as something much more immediately manageable; namely a world where life is regulated by the God-given law, and any margin of failure is covered by cultic atonement. Consequently, though recognizing the imperfections of the present, he does not look for any radical reformation of it. The time -- which must be a reality at some point -- when God’s ideals are fully realized is in the primal past. Then all things were "good, very good" (Gn 1:31). The future which the prophetic vision desiderates, and the past, which the priestly theodicy presupposes, are, therefore, inevitably very close to one another in character; both speak of a way the world ought to be, but is not. And both link this ideal condition with the right exercise of kingship, either that of the perfect Israelite ruler or of the human species in its cosmic vocation. But the "dominion" promised to man in Genesis 1 or Psalm 8, and the government expected of the ideal Davidic ruler in Isaiah 11, are poles apart from the kind of right to egotistical exploitation that the words superficially suggest to our ears. They are in essence a perfect obedience to the will of God, which respects the divine order in nature and is rewarded by nature’s recognition of man as the greatest of God’s creatures and its provision of a sufficiency of food for all flesh (cf. Ps 145:15f.). If this vision has anything to say to our present situation, it is certainly not to ratify the extermination of species or the ruthless greed that exhausts precious natural resources for short-term profit. On the other hand, it would be overly simple to claim the Hebrew Scriptures in support of our modern study of animal life or the work of environmental conservation, since it is clear that neither priest not prophet thought the order of nature as we now see it to reflect God’s intentions, either original or ultimate, for it.

We referred just now to the general Israelite assumption that human sin was the factor that had disrupted the cosmic order. The Torah expresses in a number of ways the idea that man declined drastically from the standards of the golden age. The story of Cain and Abel (Gn 4) is one; the decline in the normal length of human life, another (cf. Gn 5 with 10:10-26 and 47:9). (This later feature is another link with the late prophetic vision of restoration in Isaiah 65:17-25, already mentioned, where some improvement in longevity to a norm of 100 years is promised: v. 20.) Another mark of decline of more direct relevance to our present subject, is the change in the divine laws of life after the flood. The new start for the human race, embodied in Noah and his family, is marked by a divine covenant, modeled ultimately on the treaties imposed unilaterally in some ANE empires by suzerains on their vassals, consisting of promises by the overlord and obligations laid upon his subjects. The promise is that never again will God destroy all living things by a flood (Gn 9:8-17; the older version of the story has the same promise, though not in covenant form: 8:21-22). It is interesting and important that this covenant is made not just with man but with all living creatures (five times repeated: 9:10, 12, 15, 16, 17) and indeed with the earth itself (9:13). The new laws of life (9:1-7) replace the ordinances established at the creation and modify them in significant respects. No longer is man’s food to be fruit and grains only: "Every moving thing that lives shall be food for you; and as I gave you green plants, I give you everything" (9:3). (This license is qualified for Israel later, when they are granted the higher insight, denied to the nations, of the distinction between "clean" and "unclean" animals. Christianity’s rejection of this distinction is thus of great symbolic importance for her universal mission.) The flood and the subsequent new start for the world are thus used as an opportunity to switch from the theoretic "golden age" to the conditions actually obtaining; and one of the saddest features of this change is the degradation of relations between humans and animals from their first created beauty. The language of Genesis 9:1-2, when compared with the phrasing of 1 :28f., betrays at once the poignancy of the writer’s feelings: "The fear of you and the dread of you shall be upon every beast of the earth, and upon every bird of the air, upon everything that creeps on the ground and all the fish of the sea; into your hand they are delivered." The language is that normally used of a conqueror slaughtering a routed army or sacking a fallen city. Man has become the enemy of all living things.

The Hebrew Scriptures, then, do nothing to justify the charge that they bless an exploitative, humanly self-centered attitude to nature. They recognize man’s preying on nature as a fact, but characterize that fact as a mark of man’s decline from the first perfect intentions of God for him or as a defect to be eradicated in God’s perfect future. This is in tune with another notable feature of the Hebrew Scriptures, namely that they are permeated with what we can only call an affectionate and admiring approach to nature. We have already noted the supreme example of this in Psalm 104, but instances are to be found in other psalms that are not, as is that one, modeled on already existing foreign poetry (cf. Pss 19:1-6; 65:10-13; 84:3; 136; 148). The same attitude is particularly evident in the wisdom literature, with its many similes from observation of animals, weather, plant life, and so on. We also find a kindred spirit in some of the prophets, where the faithful obedience of nonhuman creatures to the divine will is contrasted with the faithfulness and perversity of men: "Even the stork in the heavens knows her times; and the turtledove, swallow, and crane keep the time of their coming; but my people know not the ordinance of the Lord" (Jer 8:7). This admiration of nature finds its climax in the book of Job, where the wonders of the natural order are used for a didactic purpose unique to the Bible, and possibly in all ancient literature: to make the point that humanity’s whole attitude to the created order is wrong, because it is totally egoistic, totally anthropocentric. If humans were to stop even for a moment to consider the universe as it actually is, they would see that by far the greater part of it has no relevance to them at all. If God created Behemoth and Leviathan, it assuredly was not for humanity’s benefit (chaps. 40-41); it must have been for some purpose opaque to humans, who can think only in terms of themselves and their situation. Such creatures glorify God in their existence according to rules far beyond our ken; God made them and delights in them for their own sake, not for some ulterior usefulness to us as human beings. The same point is made in a rather different way by drawing Job’s attention to the seemingly idiotic behavior of certain animals such as the ostrich (39:13-18) or to the apparent pointlessness of certain phenomena, such as the brief spring rains, which cause a short-lived carpet of tiny flowers to appear in the desert (38:26-27). Why have flowers where there is no one to admire them? Man did not arrange any of these; if it had been left to him, he never would have done! But God did arrange them. We are left to draw our own conclusions either that God is daft, or perhaps that we with our purely human-conditioned "wisdom" take far too narrow and short-sighted a view to reach any genuine understanding of reality. This is not to say that a sound and sensible way of dealing with nature is not a part of the wisdom appropriate to humans, and as such itself a gift of God (cf. Isa 28:23-29). Not only is this accepted; it is in fact one particular application of a more general principle developed in the Hebrew Scriptures, which is of some importance for our subject. This is the principle that by observing the way in which nature functions we can arrive at moral guidance for human life. In the Hebrew Scriptures this is not taken beyond the most obvious instances; for example, the world is made in such a way that the lazy are likely to starve, and therefore it is wrong to be lazy. But significantly, such conduct is held to be wrong not just in a pragmatic sense but also in a theological one. For, as with everything else in the Hebrew Scriptures, such thinking has an extra dimension, the omni-relevant fact of God. Since it was the wisdom of God that made the world, God must have had some purpose in every detail of its ordering and must therefore have intended laziness to be dangerous. Hence diligent and sensible work can be said to be something God both commands and commends, and sloth something God condemns. There are, then, in the Hebrew Scriptures elements to justify a pragmatic, science-based ethic, at least in some such general terms as these: What by observation we discover really to work best, both for man and for other creatures, is something that loyalty to God requires us to put into practice. Even the point about what is best for other creatures, which may seem very modern, is not without foundation in Hebrew Scriptures in such passages as the law against taking the hen-bird as well as the eggs from the nest (Deut 22:6), or this saying from Proverbs: "A righteous man has regard for the life of his beast" (12:10), where, be it noted, the quality that makes a man considerate of his working animals is not prudence or good business sense but "righteousness," a point all the more significant when we remember that in the Hebrew Scriptures one of the marks of righteousness is not mere evenhandedness but active favor to the weak and deprived.

One reason why the attitude in the Hebrew Scriptures to nature is more sympathetic and comprehensible to us than that of some other ancient people is that for a good many of the writers of the Hebrew Scriptures, though not all, nature had been, to use a modern term, substantially demythologized. An example may clarify the point. In the Ugaritic texts of the mid-second millennium occurs the following passage: "If thou smite Lotan, the serpent slant, Destroy the serpent tortuous, Shalyat of the seven heads

" The name Lotan is the Canaanite equivalent of one that appears many centuries later in the Hebrew Scriptures, and to which we have already referred, namely Leviathan, who is also a sea-monster. In the Hebrew Scriptures, Leviathan plays a number of roles. In Psalm 74 he is, as in Ugarit, many-headed, and also an enemy of God. (By the process known as historicization his destruction is linked with the Israelites’ crossing of the Red Sea at their Exodus from Egypt. A similar association of the killing of the sea-monster with the Exodus occurs in Isaiah 51:9-10, but here the monster’s name is Rahab, a mocking name in the Isaiah tradition for Egypt, cf. Is 30:7.) In Isaiah 27:1 we have mention of "Leviathan the fleeing serpent, Leviathan the twisting serpent," another very close parallel to the Ugaritic text, but here the monster symbolizes cosmic evil, to be overthrown by God at the eschaton. In striking contrast to both these uses of the Leviathan figure, however, are Psalm 104 and Job 41. In Psalm 104 Leviathan is a pet with whom God enjoys playing in his leisure moments (v. 26); in Job he is the greatest of all God’s creatures, "king over all the sons of pride," and is cited simply to crush the anthropocentric conceit of Job. If we try to date these passages, we find no steady theological trend. A majority vote of scholarly opinion would probably give this sequence: Psalm 104 -- Psalm 74 -- Isaiah 51 -- Job 41 -- Isaiah 27. In other words, running side by side we have the sea as something evil and something good, and the monster as a supernatural evil being, a symbol of anti-God forces, and a magnificent testimony to God’s wisdom and power.

The theological background to this ongoing activity of demythologizing that developed in certain quarters in Israel may be analyzed very crudely and briefly as follows. The basic premise of Israel’s faith is that her God is stronger than anything or anyone, and for this to be so, she found, it was necessary for God to be radically distanced from natural phenomena. Other nations in the ANE had advanced, it is true, well beyond the stage of a simple-minded identification of gods with natural forces or objects. But they were trapped in the morass of polytheism; one of the reasons for this was that the traditional associations of various deities with particular phenomena -- the sun, the moon, the stars, storms, vegetation, the sea, and so on -- meant that the obvious multiplicity of nature kept getting in the way of their struggles to apprehend the unity of the divine. By a kind of inspired bigotry the Jews, however, succeeded where all others failed. By holding fast to the thesis that God was supreme, in the teeth of all those disasters such as exile and persecution, which seemed to prove the contrary, they found themselves forced to treat everything -- nature, humanity, and history -- as subordinate to God, indeed as God’s instruments, even when the uses to which God put them proved morally inscrutable. This has two very important consequences for the attitude of the Hebrew Scriptures to nature. First, nature is progressively depersonalized and demythologized: "Who makest the winds thy messengers, fire and flame thy ministers" (Ps 104:4). It is no longer the manifestation of supernatural beings but now for the first time actually merits the name nature, though, as we have said, the Hebrew language did not have that concept at its disposal. The climax of this process in the Hebrew Scriptures is the book of Ecclesiastes (Koheleth), which our own outlook on the world finds remarkably sympathetic. Second, following on from this, humans lose their numinous dread of nature. Nature can still frighten them, but only by virtue of being stronger than they in a natural way, from which they may need God to rescue them, but which they recognize as being in principle a strength they can understand and in many cases do something about.

We may summarize the main points emerging from the utterances of the Hebrew Scriptures about nature as follows:

(a) For the writers of the Hebrew Scriptures, the determining factors in thinking about nature, as about every other subject, are the all-controlling rights and power of God. "The earth is the Lord’s and the fullness thereof (Ps 24:1); this can be carried so far even as to have practical consequences for human social organization, as in the principles underlying the law of Jubilee, that no human being can ever own land outright but must be regarded as a tenant installed by God (Lv 25:1-34).

(b) Under this overall sovereignty of God, humankind does have a position of control over nature, which is approved by God and which is meant to be exercised in a spirit of respect and responsibility. Skills and technology of all kinds may be admirable, but the tyrannical or greedy use of human power over nature is a failure deriving from human sin, not from God’s intention in creation.

(c) Humanity’s proper control over nature is made possible because the realization that God is One and Supreme, and therefore transcendent, effectively desupernaturalizes the world, ridding it of superhuman personal power, whether divine or demonic, and placing humans in a position to use their powers rationally in dealing with nature.

(d) Nevertheless, nature is not to be evaluated simply in terms of human needs and interests; to think that it is, is simply a mark of folly. God created the greater part of the world for its own sake -- a point that comes home even more strongly to us, with our knowledge of the infinite universe -- and wisdom consists fundamentally in recognizing this and the limitations it imposes upon us. Technology may explore and exploit nature, but it will never discover the way to wisdom (Job 28). The truly wise person never imagines that he or she knows fully what God was about in creation.

(e) Since God, however, has a moral and rational character, humans must in the end submit to things as they are, as a genuine revelation, so far as they can grasp it, of ultimate goodness and wisdom. Hence the careful and comprehensive observation of nature will yield indications for human behavior, which were part of God’s intention in creating in the first place and which therefore have the status of moral imperatives for humans. We must ultimately be guided by respect for the intricate character and needs of the natural order.

(f) If we are so guided, then we may hope even to improve the condition of nature, which does not as yet embody God’s character as human beings have come to know this through their communion with him. Nature is not perfect; there is a work of salvation to be done in it, as well as in humanity, as part of God’s eschatological purpose, and this salvation is part of human responsibility for nature.

In contrast with the Hebrew Scriptures, the New Testament has relatively little to say about nature. The reasons for this are some fortuitous, some sociological, but some are inherent in the nature of the primitive Christian community and its world view. The fortuitous reasons arise purely from the scale and character of the New Testament material. To start with, the volume of the New Testament is only thirty percent of that of the Old. The bulk of its contents falls within a period of forty years, and the outside limits of its dating bracket only a century, compared with the nine centuries between the earliest and latest passages of the Hebrew Scriptures. The New Testament is the work of a relatively small community with highly selective interests, whereas the Old is the product of a whole nation’s wider issues and situations. Hence it is no surprise to find in the Hebrew Scriptures far greater diversity of literature than in the Christian Scriptures. There is nothing in the New Testament, for example, to parallel the large collections of "observations on life and the world-order," which we call the wisdom literature of the Hebrew Scriptures, or its extensive range of liturgical poetry, or the detailed corpus of its laws on what we would regard as secular matters. The very types of material, therefore, in which an attitude to nature might be most likely to be reflected are precisely those missing from the New Testament.

Sociologically, it is hard to escape the impression that most of the New Testament writers are urbanized, compared with the predominantly agricultural orientation of the mind of the Hebrew Scriptures. The gospel material, especially in the teaching of Jesus, with its use of images from nature and husbandry, is nearest to rural society and to the world of the Hebrew Scriptures; James is thought by some scholars to be addressed to the Palestinian church. But otherwise there is little sign in the writers of any attention to nature; their audiences, where known, are almost exclusively urban. While it is true that this would not have been as strong a distinction in the Roman world as it is in our own megalopolitan culture, nevertheless it is probably fair to say that nature was not one of the things in the center of the mental focus of the early Christians; this is partly related to their sociological classification.

There were, however, other reasons, inherent in the earliest church and its gospel that conspired to minimize concern with the question of human attitudes to nature. The first was the approach of primitive Christianity to scripture. For Christians of the first century, the Hebrew Scriptures were the Bible, the only inspired word of God. It might be thought that this would have awakened some interest at least in all the various subjects with which the Hebrew Scriptures deals, but one overriding factor prevented this. The first Christians were interested in the Hebrew Scriptures primarily as a vast source book of predictions, some clear, some enigmatic, of the coming of Christ, his nature, life, death, resurrection, redeeming work, and heavenly glory, and of the mission and destiny of the church. The literal sense of any passage was, in most cases, of much less importance than its prophetic meaning, which had to be disentangled by allegorical or typological exegesis. Nor were they interested on the whole in the total range of an argument or the total message of a book. These are characteristically modern ways of using scripture. For them, every verse, sentence, or phrase could be taken, out of context if need be, and its reference to Christ extracted by what seems to us at times over-ingenious exposition, but which, given the thought-forms of the day, simply sprang naturally from their exuberant and untiring obsession with the gospel. Given this situation, it can be seen that many of those elements in Judaism that we have been considering were effectively blanked off from early Christian consciousness.

Second, there is the fact that the Christian message was initially a gospel of personal salvation. It impinged on ordinary life only at the points of religious belief and personal morality. The criticism of much present-day Christian preaching as being too much concerned with these two things instead of having something to say on corporate or global issues must, if it is to be both honest and helpful, face the fact that in the foundation (and still authoritative) documents of the church precisely these were the overwhelming dominant concerns. Christianity was from the start a religion of individual faith and morals, its corporate consciousness related not to membership of humankind but to membership of the elect community drawn out from the human race by its response to the gospel. The question whether anything which is specifically Christian, yet of wider import, can develop from this basic character is, of course, a general concern of the church today. But it was not ever thus. The members of the church at Corinth received much instruction from St. Paul, but none of it was directed at the matters we are considering. Indeed, when St. Paul does happen to mention a relevant text from the Hebrew Scriptures -- "You shall not muzzle an ox when it treads out the grain" (Deut 25:4) -- he does so simply to apply it by a kind of allegorical interpretation to the economic support of those who preach the gospel. No doubt St. Paul was not anti-oxen, but he is quite clear that God would not waste valuable inspired wordage on such a subject: "Is it for oxen that God is concerned? Does he not speak entirely for our sake?" (1 Cor 9:9-10).

The third and perhaps most important of all reasons is, of course, that the earliest Christians felt themselves to be those "upon whom the end of the ages has come" (1 Cor 10:11). The "form of this world" was passing away, the new age was about to dawn; and it was a serious question what would happen to the bodies of those who had not yet died when the last day came, and so could hardly be resurrected (1 Cor 15:51). Since, therefore, the created order did not have long to run, there was no incentive to develop a constructive long-term attitude to nature as it was. It is to their successors of the second generation that we have to look for most of the modest amount the New Testament church has to say on this issue.

Turning now to this positive side, we note first that the underlying tonality, so to speak, of the New Testament is the same as that of the Old; namely, the created order is God’s work and as such is good. In the gospels God’s providential care extends to the most insignificant of animals, and the beauty of flowers springing up in the fields of Galilee is greater than that of Solomon in all his glory (Mt 5:6 = Lk 12:24; Mt 10:29 = Lk 14:6; Mt 6:28f.). There is no food that is unclean; impurity is a moral quality (Lk 7:19). In his parables Jesus assumes care and concern for animals, even if only in illustration of his main point (Lk 13:15; 15:4; Mt 12:11 = Lk 14:5). In St. Paul the wonders of the creation are sufficient in themselves to lead the open and rational mind to God (Rom 1:20). He accepts, despite his rigorous Jewish upbringing, the insight of Jesus that nothing is in itself unclean (Rom 14:14; cf. Acts 10:9-16, 28; 11:5-10); in discussing the question of meat offered to idols, while respecting the tender consciences of the more scrupulous brethren, he makes it clear that for himself, with his robust Jewish monotheism reinforced by the revelation of God in Christ (1 Cor 8:4-6), there can be no problem, for "the earth is the Lord’s and everything in it" (1 Cor 10:26-28). This fundamentally affirmative and confident attitude to the creation is reinforced by the doctrine of creatio ex nihilo (Heb 11:3), which, as we noted, was not available to the writers of the Hebrew Scriptures, emerging as it does in the intertestamental period. In the Acts of the Apostles we find the classic position again clearly stated: "The living God made heaven and earth and sea and everything in them. In past ages he allowed all nations to go their own way; and yet he has not left you without some clue to his nature, in the kindness he shows; he sends you rain from heaven and crops in their seasons, and gives you food and good cheer in plenty" (14:15-17). In the same work there are signs of a very positive theology of the natural order developing with the assimilation of the Middle Platonist thought of Hellenistic Judaism: God the Unknowable, who created the world and everything in it, is not far from each one of us, for in him we live and move, in him we exist, indeed, "We are his offspring" (17:23-24, 27-28).

Nevertheless, even though the basic tonality, to pursue our metaphor, is that of the major key, it is shadowed from time to time by more somber material in the minor. This is a reflection of the pessimism and anxiety afflicting the Mediterranean world around the turn of the era. In Judaism it found expression in that apocalyptic despair that in certain circles regarded the whole of the present created order as beyond redemption and looked for a cataclysmic irruption of God to establish a new order from which evil would be banished. The wide dissemination in the Near and Middle East at this time of dualistic faiths, the staple of that religious phenomenon loosely labeled Gnosticism, was another manifestation of the same malaise; while in Hellenism many suffered from a "sense of helplessness in the hands of fate" which made them "wonder whether it is possible to be at home in the world at all." Because the world had become "a hostile, alien place," they turned to astral cults. "The lower world was not centered in itself, but was under the control of the stars. . . . Hence, in the last resort all activity here is trivial and meaningless, and if it seems to be independent, that is mere illusion" (Bultmann, chap. 2).

These contemporary trends are reflected in the New Testament, partly in vigorous reaction against such beliefs, not by denying the reality to which they referred, but by claiming that in the gospel men were delivered from helpless subjection to that reality. Thus, in such passages as Galatians 4:3, Colossians 2:8,15, and Ephesians 6:12, Christians are exhorted to enter into the freedom Christ has won for them, and to fight against the domination of the hypercosmic powers. Again, in Romans 8:9-22, Paul seems to echo the Stoic views of the aging of the world, as well as the Jewish apocalyptic conception of its subjugation by evil powers responsible for human sin and the disruption of nature. But he puts all this in a new theological perspective. The passage presents notorious difficulties of translation, but certain convictions of Paul stand out. If God was ultimately responsible for the universe’s state of frustration, nevertheless this was always imposed within a context of hope: "The universe is itself to be freed from the shackles of mortality, and enter upon the liberty and splendor of the children of God." In other words, the kind of transfigured, eternal existence promised to humanity in the resurrection of Jesus is to have its counterpart in the transformation of the cosmos. The groans of the universe, then, are not the expression of hopeless anguish; they correspond to the cries of a mother in childbirth, they are the pangs of bringing forth a new order. It is true that the general diagnosis of the cosmic situation is not very different from that made by many other sects and schools of thought at the time. The Pauline tradition does not say, "This is rubbish! All this talk of deep-seated corruption and bondage to Fate throughout the created order is nonsense." On the contrary it is taken very seriously; all that Christianity claims is that it has a better answer to the crisis. But that answer is not a program for redeeming the world of nature as well as the human soul, so that they can then live in harmony to create the kingdom of God on earth as it is, but a spiritual liberation of those men and women who believe in Jesus as the prerequisite of a total remaking of the cosmos by God’s Spirit and in God’s own time. The book of Revelation, with its vision of a new heaven and a new earth (21:1), is the logical culmination of this approach.

As time went on a more optimistic note became discernible, chiefly in opposition to the false asceticism characteristic of the dualistic sects. Thus 1 Timothy 4:3-4 commends the right use of God’s gifts in the order of creation. And there was one theological concept in particular in the later New Testament writings that offered a theoretical foundation for a more affirmative attitude to nature. This was the idea of the cosmic Christ. In various forms the conception was developed that the pre-existent divine Christ was himself the divine agent in creation, and that the existence of all things was upheld by him. We find this in such diverse writings as Hebrews (1-3) and Colossians (1:16f.), but the best-known instance is the prologue to the gospel of John (1:1-4). The implications of this idea for a theology of nature are not, of course, worked out in the New Testament itself, but, obscure as the thought-forms undoubtedly are to us, there does shine through them a conviction that the whole universe, could we but see it, is in its essential nature in harmony not merely with some unknown divine power but specifically with God as revealed in Jesus, and that therefore there must be some modus vivendi between humans and nature which, even if not yet attained, is in keeping with all that is best in both.

In seeking for any kind of theology of humanity and nature, the Christian cannot but be grateful that his or her Bible does not consist merely of the New Testament. Even the final point, that of the cosmic Christ, would be virtually unusable were it not built on the world-affirming monotheism of the Hebrew Scriptures. But in conclusion can we see in the Bible as a whole insights that are not present in either Testament by itself? What cannot be ignored is the unresolved tension between the theological view that puts all the weight on God’s wisdom in creation and the excellence of the cosmos thus created, on the one hand, and the theology which thinks eschatologically and looks to God primarily to redeem the cosmic order, on the other. The cosmic Christ concept can be used with either emphasis. Teilhard de Chardin employed a version of it eschatologically: in Christ is revealed "le Dieu d’en-avant," the telos appropriate to an evolving creation, which in humanity has at last attained the self-determining freedom of reflective beings. What the Old and New Testaments together seem to say is that on their understanding of God the character of the primordial and the eschatological must be the same; there must always have been in God from the beginning that which is needed for him to be Savior in the end. Creation and redemption are two expressions of the same Ultimate Being, its power and wisdom and love, even though the "mystery" of this Being was for long ages hidden and has been definitively revealed only in Christ and in the developing understanding of existence of which he is the source. The diptych of the creation story in Genesis 1 and the Isaianic vision of a new and perfected cosmos finds a counterpart in the New Testament terminology applied to Christ: he is "the first and the last" (Rv 1:17); he exists "before everything"; in him "everything was created," and "all things are held together in him" (Col 1:16f.). But at the same time, "the whole universe has been created for him," and "through him God chose to reconcile the whole universe to himself" (Col 1:16, 20). He "is its origin," but also destined "to be in all things alone supreme" (Col 1:18); he is the one who "himself receives the entire fullness of God" (Eph 1:23), but who also descended to our world and ascended again" so that he might fill the universe" (Eph 4:10). Underlying this kind of language is without doubt a view of redemptio as redintegratio, the recovery of an original perfection that has been lost; this is the synthesis that seeks to reconcile the incompatibles of the priestly theology, for which Eden is something lost, and the prophetic, for which it is something that has never been found. Our own greater knowledge of the history of the universe puts us firmly on the side of the prophetic. But theologically we may still find the instinct of the New Testament synthesis significant, that in God himself there is a fullness and perfection that is unchanging and outside space and time, and that it is this which makes God the proper telos for a creation in which the mystery of that fullness is unpacked only through the ages of the evolutionary process, which passes through a series of increasingly critical stages and is now precariously poised in a dependence on the rational response of free creatures. Insofar as the crucial factor for the future of nature on this planet at the moment is humankind, the New Testament claim that the reconciliation of the universe is made possible through Christ has distinctive meaning. In Jesus, as portrayed in the Gospels, we see certain basic attitudes, which may seem overly simple but are in fact adequate foundations for an approach to nature. The first is a conviction that the natural order need not be written off as in bondage to evil -- the apocalyptic view -- but contains both clues to the nature of God (Mt 5:45) and conditions within which we can learn to be authentic children of our Father in heaven. The second is his equal conviction that we never shall so learn without a repentance, which among other things learns to trust the existence with which we have been endowed as the gift of one to whom we can say, Abba. These basic attitudes do not assume that nothing can be done to improve nature -- no countryman would ever be so silly anyway -- but they do presuppose a readiness to learn from nature and to be content with the limitations that even at maximum development it still cannot but impose upon us. The tendency of human beings here as in so many other fields is to say not, "What can be done?" but, "What do I want?" and to seek to extort that from nature, whether it is feasible or not. Our responsibility toward nature cannot be fulfilled simply by developing our positive and creative skills; it also involves denying ourselves and taking up the cross daily. All we can do will not be enough of itself to turn earth into paradise, but that after all is something for which we have to wait upon him who is both Alpha and Omega. The new heaven and earth are not of a kind to be evolved on our drawing boards; all we can hope for here are images and foreshadowings of them.

Works Cited

Bultmann, Rudolf. Primitive Christianity: In Its Contemporary Setting. Trans. Reginald Fuller. Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1980.

Griffiths, Bede. Return to the Centre. Springfield, IL: Templegate, 1976.