Saving Faith, Evangelical Witness

Saving and Secular Faith: An Invitation to Systematic Theology

By B.A. Gerrish (Fortress, 153 pp.)

The Pilgrim Road: Sermons on Christian Life

By B.A. Gerrish; edited by Mary T. Stimming. (Westminster John Knox, 213 pp.)

As I read these two books by Brian Gerrish, I had three reactions in turn: first, I marveled at what a wonderful scholar and theologian he is; second, I realized how much I disagree with him on several points; third, I was surprised at how little those disagreements seem to matter when reading his wonderful sermons.

Gerrish has moved from the University of Chicago, where he held the Nuveen Professorship (whose previous occupants had been Paul Tillich and Paul Ricoeur) to Union Seminary in Richmond, where he is Distinguished Service Professor of Theology His many publications on Reformation and 19th-century theology (above all, on Calvin and Schleiermacher) are models of rich scholarship, elegant prose and reflection on the history of theology with an eye to how it matters for church life today.

In Saving and Secular Faith Gerrish turns his focus from history to constructive theology. He offers an introduction to the task of theology centered on the concept of faith, considering that concept in dialogue with psychologists, historians of religion and sociologists, as well as with the history of theology Faith, he says, is obviously "one of the keywords in the language of the Christian community" But, starting with the Bible itself, it has two meanings: assent or belief, and trust. Emphases can vary -- more on assent in Aquinas and more on trust in Luther, for instance -- but Gerrish admits that he has come to see fewer and fewer differences between Protestant and Catholic perspectives. He calls this trusting assent at the core of Christian life "saving faith."

One of the book’s central claims is that this "saving faith" is but one species of a genus "faith" to be found in other religions and indeed in all human activities. Gerrish rather awkwardly (as he admits) lumps Muslim, Buddhist and nonreligious faith into the category of "secular faith." Scientists, for instance, have faith "that observations made on Monday yield data our research can use on Tuesday and a discovery made in Cambridge will hold good in Göttingen or Chicago."

Indeed, everybody holds certain principles of "elemental faith": for example, that the world has some kind of order to it, and that we have some kind of moral responsibility Elemental faith and other forms of secular faith provide "points of contact" for Christians trying to explain saving faith. The content of our faith is different from yours, we can say to skeptics -- but don’t pretend that we have faith and you don’t, or that having faith is in principle a bad idea.

Christian theologians explore their faith within a particular community and tradition, though "keeping faith with tradition. . . is not at all being bound by the letter of the law; it is more a matter of the company you keep -- or the books you reach for first -- when you want to do your best thinking." But contemporary Christian theologians also operate in a particular historical context, and that makes for some differences. At one point Gerrish summarizes saving faith as the "construal of the story of Jesus, and therefore of our own story, as the work of a parentlike God who means us well, and in whom we accordingly place our trust."

Today such faith faces at least two new sorts of problems related to "the uniqueness of Christ and the historical reliability of the Gospels," Gerrish argues. We find ourselves in conversation with adherents of other religions, and the question whether Christ is the only way to God inevitably arises. We also encounter the works of historians who reach a wide range of conclusions about Jesus, including skepticism. Does saving faith have to wait until they agree on an answer?

According to Gerrish, "To say that the Christian receives saving faith through the New Testament image of Jesus need not imply that faith cannot be had in any other way, or that no other religious faiths convey salvation." We trust in what Christ has done for us, and we can enter openly into dialogue with non-Christians about what has transformed their lives. As Gerrish puts it in one of the sermons collected in The Pilgrim Road, "The Creator must love variety, since the world is so full of it. We are summoned to be loyal to the best we know and to bear faithful witness to it. We are not required to deny that the eternal goodness we believe in may reach out to others in other ways.

Knowing what our encounter with the New Testament picture of Christ has done in our own lives, we can be agnostic about the degree to which that image corresponds to historical reality. Gerrish quotes the blind man from John 9: he does not know just who this Jesus is, he tells his suspicious questioners, but "one thing I do know, that though I was blind, now I see." Gerrish comments, "That, to him, was the one thing certain. And it is not so very different for ourselves." The evangelist who, when asked if Jesus is alive, replied, "I know he is: I spoke with him this morning," offered, Gerrish says, "a wiser response than any attempt to prove the tomb was empty, though we might do better to reverse the order of the response." (I spoke with him this morning because I know that he is alive, not the other way round.)

I‘m not as sure as Gerrish is that everyone necessarily believes that the world is ordered and that we have moral responsibilities. Whether I read post-modern intellectuals or try to understand my students’ favorite pop music, I run into people who seem to doubt that the world makes any sense at all. Unlike some contemporary theologians, I’m not inclined to celebrate this development. Like Gerrish, I would rather argue with Deists than with deconstructionists.

Still, here we are, and it seems to me arbitrary to accept the challenges of religious pluralism and historical skepticism about Jesus while ignoring postmodern nihilism. If we find atheists who believe the world has a kind of moral order, we do indeed have a great starting point for conversation with them. Or if we find atheists fascinated by the gospel picture of Jesus, we could start there. But I don’t think we can stipulate that any of these starting points is the one every conversation partner has to accept.

In response to people who tried to figure out by careful introspection if they were saved, Calvin once remarked that "we shall not find assurance of our election in ourselves" but only in "Christ . . . the mirror wherein we must, and without self-deception may, contemplate our own election." Even at our best, we are pretty ambiguous characters, and it is only by God’s grace in Christ that we have hope of salvation. Gerrish would certainly agree. He writes eloquently about grace. However, if saving faith rests on what we observe about God’s work in us to such an extent that we can be indifferent to historical claims about Jesus, do we not risk looking to ourselves rather than to Christ for our assurance?

I would agree that the clarity with which I find myself seeing the world when I look at it through the lens of the Gospels counts more for the Gospels’ "truth" than the available historical evidence does -- though that mysterious power we can only call the work of the Holy Spirit may count most of all. But why I believe is a different question from what I believe. The logic of Christian faith, it seems to me, involves making claims about Jesus, not just about stories about Jesus or how those stories affect our lives. If it turned out, say, that Jesus was really a political revolutionary who wanted to kill as many Romans as possible, then I’d have to give up on Christian faith. However unlikely that eventuality keeping it in mind reminds me both of some core beliefs and of some significant risks involved in being a Christian.

Gerrish, if I understand him right, would even in that extreme case be willing to say, "But look at how the gospel story of the Jesus who taught love has transformed your life and the lives of Christians down the centuries. Isn’t that what really matters?" In this he differs from Schleiermacher (whom he usually so much admires), who made a similar argument from Christian experience but also thought that historical research could establish that Jesus was the person that our experience of faith presupposes him to be.

Despite such disagreements, I wish I could regularly hear Gerrish preach. His former student Mary T. Stimming has performed the great service of collecting 28 of his sermons, arranging them topically and providing helpful notes. Anyone interested in good preaching can learn from these sermons. They are both general models of what it means to be a preacher and the source of lots of excellent material.

Gerrish clearly has a strong sense that the preacher’s job is to interpret the biblical message to the congregation. He knows that a sermon is not a lecture, but he also knows that a preacher is also a teacher. Therefore, in some of these homilies he explains the meaning of the sacraments, and offers help in understanding the relation of science and faith. He tells good stories and can effectively compare diverse things -- for example, the film Lost in Space with Pascal’s work -- to make his point.

At the core of these sermons lies confidence in the order of the universe and in the love of God, known through the grace of Christ: "We are driven by a kind of instinct to get beyond our fragmentary times, and to see them all as parts of one design. . . . The pieces fall into place as a single pattern, with the crucified one at the center," he says. When that happens, "We are no longer anxious, but secure: confident that, come what may, it’s going to be all right." Gerrish’s former University of Chicago colleague, James Gustafson, would be horrified at such an anthropocentric perspective and talk of a personal God who cares about us, but Gerrish is very clear: "The heart of the matter is this: that God is not our adversary, not our accuser, but is on our side." And: "I simply appeal to what every Christian knows in his or her heart: that to be a believer at all is to be vanquished by the grace of Christ."

These sermons offer, if I may use an old-fashioned term, a powerful evangelical witness. In both these books Gerrish offers a theology that highly values church, preaching and the sacraments and has the great Reformation insights about grace at its core. It’s also a theology for which the doctrines of the Trinity and the person of Christ developed in the early church don’t matter very much, leaving for those of us to whom they do matter the challenge of explaining why -- since Gerrish can say so much so well without them -- they are important. Gerrish offers not wishy-washy liberalism or secularism pretending to be Christianity, but a robust affirmation of the Reformation theology of grace. As to exactly how that fits with other things he does or does not say, we haven’t had the last word. This introductory book and these sermons anticipate Gerrish’s systematic theology, soon to be published. There are few books theologians await so eagerly.

After Babel: The Virtues of Liberalism

Book Review:

Ethics After Babel: The Languages of Morals and Their Discontents. By Jeffrey Stout. Beacon, 328 pp., $24.95.

The book is divided into three parts: the first argues that there is no universal human language for making or defending ethical judgments; the second explores the implications of that thesis for religious ethics; and the third defends a liberalism suitably chastened in the face of the arguments of the first part.

Stout begins by attacking the claim, classically stated by Kant and taken for granted in much recent philosophical ethics, that there is one way of defining what’s right and what’s wrong that any rational person ought to accept. Every ethical argument, Stout maintains, draws on the vocabulary of a particular tradition. "You can’t somehow leap out of culture and history altogether and gaze directly into the moral law. . . any more than you can gaze directly into the mind of God." That view does not, he cautions, imply radical moral relativism. We do not make ethical judgments simply concerning those who share our own values. We believe, for instance, that "knowingly and willingly torturing innocents is wrong, impermissible, unjust. It always has been . . . . That is the moral truth of the matter, whether we recognize it or not -- a truth I deem more certain than any explanation I could give of it or any argument I could make on its behalf." My arguments against torture may draw on the particular legacy of the Bible, Locke and Kant, and every argument necessarily draws on some particular legacy. If some people do not stand in a tradition that condemns torture, I may find it hard to explain to them why applying a lighted cigarette to a prisoner is wrong -- but I still don’t think it is morally acceptable for them to do so.

Stout uses a scientific analogy. Imagine trying to explain to a Stone Age tribesman or an ancient Hebrew that helium atoms have two neutrons. They simply wouldn’t understand what you were talking about, and they couldn’t understand unless they learned the language of modern physics -- unless they in a sense became modern physicists. We do not simply believe, however, that helium atoms only have two neutrons for us or in our culture. We really think our claim is true -- though, just as with claims about the evils of torture, we can explain and defend our claim only in the language of a particular tradition.

What are the implications of these conclusions for religious ethics? For far too long, Stout says, "almost all analytic philosophers saw ethics as the logical study of the language of morals." They just weren’t interested in "distinct moral languages or communities of belief." Indeed, if you appealed to the Bible or the Gita or your cultural traditions to justify a moral claim, they dismissed you as regressive and authoritarian. But if all ethical arguments grow out of traditions, if secular, Western modernity is just one tradition among others, then certain kinds of religious ethics start to look more intriguing. Stout urges everyone to pay more attention to "religious thinkers . . . more apt to be philosophically interesting precisely because they are not trying to sound like philosophers."

Stout thinks too many recent Christian theologians have spent too much time emphasizing what they have in common with their secular neighbors and how well they follow the rules of modern academic discourse. "Secular intellectuals," he says, "don’t need to be told, by theologians, that Genesis is mythical, that nobody knows much about the historical Jesus, that it’s morally imperative to side with the oppressed, or that birth control is morally permissible . . . academic theologians have increasingly given the impression of saying nothing atheists don’t already know." Theological ethicists ought to pursue their own vocation, do their own thing, speak in their own distinctive voice.

Stout cites James Gustafson as one admirable model of such a theological ethicist. "For Gustafson, to be human is to be situated in nature, history, culture, and society -- to have a particular location." Gustafson seeks dialogues with contemporary science and social thought, but he makes it clear that he speaks as a Reformed Christian, and that his viewpoint, and therefore his conclusions, will not necessarily be persuasive to all rational persons.

Yet Stout has reservations even about Gustafson (reservations that others share). As a secular philosopher, Stout finds himself consistently in agreement with the way Gustafson sees things. Such agreement is pleasing, but also troubling. Gustafson talks about God. He wants to stand in the Christian tradition. Yet, given all he shares with Stout and others, he seems unable to articulate why that talk of God and that tradition are so important to him. "Is not Gustafson’s theology distinguishable from a more humane and recognizably secular vision only at the points where he is also most elusive, where we have the most difficulty figuring out what he is saying and why he is saying it, where we have the most trouble discerning what the difference comes to and why he wants to maintain it?"

By the end of part two, Stout has sounded themes familiar from a number of widely discussed recent books and drawn some conclusions for religious ethics. In Habits of the Heart, Robert Bellah and his co-authors lamented the individualism of contemporary American society, the lack of a shared system of values. In After Virtue and Whose Justice? Which Rationality? Alasdair Maclntyre has decried the attempt to do ethics by philosophical abstraction and insisted that only by standing in a particular tradition can a culture acquire and maintain a shared sense of the virtues. Readers of The Christian Century will be familiar with Stanley Hauerwas and William Willimon’s call for Christians to take as their primary task the establishment of a distinctive Christian community that speaks a language the world does not share.

Stout goes on, however, to clarify his disagreements with these critics of contemporary liberalism. Drawing in part on Richard Rorty’s recent philosophy, he concedes that the liberal tradition often erred in trying to provide itself with a universal philosophical foundation. But if one gives up the futile effort to find foundations, contend Stout and Rorty, the values of liberalism start to look pretty good.

Back in the religious wars of the 16th century, people were murdering each other in the attempt to impose a shared set of moral values. Modern liberalism arose in part when people said, in effect, "It seems we can’t agree about the nature of God or the, fully good life. Can we find enough agreement so that we can avoid killing each other and even pursue some goals we can all agree are worthwhile?" Up to a point, we have managed to succeed.

True, on some issues -- from abortion to nuclear war -- we find it impossible to agree. And even when we reach the same conclusions, we often do so from very different premises. Still, we shouldn’t forget how much we agree about: "We all agree that nuclear destruction would be bad, that Charles Manson shouldn’t be held up as a model to the young, and that torturing innocents for the fun of it would be abhorrent. Most of us agree that extending legal protection to peaceful fellow citizens who disagree with us religiously is better than starting the religious wars up again." We tend to take such agreements for granted, until we consider Lebanon, or Tehran, or Belfast, where a liberal consensus does not prevail.

Critics of contemporary liberalism like MacIntyre, Stout says, seem to suffer from "terminal wistfulness." They regret contemporary pluralism and lack of common values, but they aren’t really willing either to try to reimpose medieval society, Inquisition and all, or to pull out and join the Amish. These critics "rarely give us any clear sense of what to do about our misgivings aside from yearning pensively for conditions we are either unwilling or unable to bring about."

Let us not entertain fantasies of withdrawal from modern society, Stout urges. Let us keep talking, try to learn from each other, and recognize that no ethical tradition represents the final answer or the universal standard, but that the language of contemporary liberal values may remain, for us, the best starting point for living together peaceably enough to keep that conversation going.

No one defends such a viewpoint better than Stout. This book manifests not only his characteristic clarity but also a generosity that puts other writers in the best possible light before he begins to criticize them. (He may even sometimes be too generous -- he rightly regrets some of the "pithy little formulae" Rorty uses to shock his readers, for instance, but I think he understates their importance for Rorty’s position.) As a Christian theologian, I am in general agreement with Stout’s analysis. Still, the book leaves me in a quandary. George Orwell once remarked that one of the problems with his prep school was that it tried to teach a boy to be at once a Christian and a social success -- which is of course impossible. I worry that Stout puts Christian theologians in a similar double bind.

If we follow Hauerwas (or George Lindbeck or John Howard Yoder) and try to teach the Christian community to speak in its own distinctive language, Stout will tell us that we do not sufficiently appreciate the virtues of modern liberalism, that we long for a communitarian ideal that we would abhor if it ever actually arrived. But if we follow Gustafson (or David Tracy or Wolfhart Pannenberg) into the general intellectual conversation of our culture, Stout may ask if we have anything distinctively Christian to say.

He wants us to speak self-consciously out of the Christian tradition in serious conversation with secular intellectuals who are, he admits, not much interested in Christianity. That doesn’t sound easy. Well, fair enough. Doing theology these days isn’t easy. Stout offers no quick solutions. But no one does a better job of defining some of the problems.

Being Postliberal: A Response to James Gustafson

The Editors have asked me -- as, I assume, some sort of certified postliberal -- to respond to James Gustafson's questions. For several reasons, I was probably a fool to agree.

First, in a lifetime of work, Gustafson has maintained the highest standards of clarity. Addressing big questions in a short space, I will almost certainly fail to meet his criteria for "clarification." Second, when George Lindbeck christened a nascent theological movement "postliberal," he didn't copyright the term. It gets used by all sorts of people I don't recognize as members of the tribe (including, at some points, Anthony Robinson and Martin Copenhaver in their recent CHRISTIAN CENTURY articles), and even among those who seem to me properly so labeled there are many disagreements. So I will inevitably generalize inappropriately. Third, in responding to Gustafson's letter in public, I'm of necessity writing to two audiences -- to readers of the CENTURY and to Gustafson himself. I risk either insulting Gustafson by telling him things he already knows or getting two technical for many other readers; I'll probably do a little of both.

That said, the traditional role of fools is to rush in.

More seriously,Gustafson's questions seem so important that someone should have a try at answering them. If I myself fail to c1arify, perhaps I will draw a response from Gustafson (or protests from fellow postliberals that I have misrepresented them) that will achieve some clarification. At least it's worth a try.

A basic definition: "postliberalism" is the school of theology shaped by Hans Frei, George Lindbeck and some of their friends and students -- also called "the Yale school,' or "narrative theology." All these labels seem for various reasons awkward, but Lindbeck himself has used "postliberal," so it's hard for him or his students to object to it. James Gustafson, however, has some hard questions to raise about "postliberal theology."

la) What sort of liberalism is postliberalism "post"? To start with, it is "post" a philosophical or theological liberalism, not a political one. Politically, postliberals seem all over the map, but many share a theological history.

When I was in graduate school in the early 1970s, Schubert Ogden, Gordon Kaufman and David Tracy (as then represented by Blessed Rage for Order) seemed to be roughly at the center of "mainline" academic theology in the U.S. At most major graduate schools, few students read Barth. Bultmannians dominated New Testament scholarship, with their focus on interpreting individual sayings and stories and with little interest in literary approaches to scripture. The dominant view seemed to be that theologians should join Bultmannian exegesis with some sort of metaphysics, process or otherwise. Ogden would be the classic case, and his was a powerful voice.

In contrast, Hans Frei argued, first, that we ought to stop reading the Bible with primary attention to the historical context of individual passages and attend more to the shape of the biblical narratives, and, second, that we could read the biblical narratives best if, as much as possible, we started with those narratives rather than beginning with a cultural or philosophical framework into which we tried to make their meanings fit. Of course, we inevitably bring all sorts of ad hoc assumptions to our reading, but, as we read, we should keep questioning them and resist trying to form them into a system (since, once systematized, they would likely be harder to challenge). Frei also got a lot of us excited about reading Barth.

I must here acknowledge a puzzle. As Gustafson implies, the standard story of contemporary North American theology is that, long before the early '70s, "neo-orthodoxy," and above all the influence of Barth, had beaten back "liberalism." I still more or less teach that story to my students. Yet some version of "neoliberalism" -- or "liberal revisionism" -- seemed clearly dominant in university-related divinity schools by the time I came along. It owed a lot to Ogden's reading of Bultmann and a reading of Tillich as primarily in conversation with Hartshorne and Eliade, but it tended to dismiss Barth out of hand. Its relation to "neo-orthodoxy" (itself a problematic term) and earlier liberalism is thus hard to define, but it was this "neoliberalism" that I think some theologians of my generation thought we were rejecting by becoming "postliberals."

Robinson and Copenhaver imply that the "neo-orthodox" revolution never really reached the churches where they grew up, and it didn't reach mine either. I'd welcome some empirical study of how far it did reach.

1b) Do postliberals claim that God chose to reveal God-self in a unique and exclusive way in a single historical event, Jesus Christ? Yes.

1c) Do postliberals think there are no ways to grade the better or worse, if not the truth or falsity, of historically relative claims? If I may hawk my own wares, in Unapologetic Theology (Westminster John Knox, 1989) I argued at length that "true" doesn't mean just "true for me" or "true for us," but simply means "true" -- everywhere and always. We may be wrong, but that's what we assert when we claim that a belief is true. But the ways of arguing for the truth of a large-scale theory may be complicated and historically conditioned. To use an example from Jeffrey Stout, if I say, "Slavery is wrong," I mean that it is wrong everywhere and always. But in trying to persuade someone else of that claim I would have to appeal to assumptions drawn from particular historical traditions -- different arguments, therefore, for different conversation partners.

In any conversation, we start wherever we happen to agree, and see where we can get, without postponing the conversation until we can find a starting point on which everyone would agree (suspecting that there probably isn't such a point). A good many philosophers of science would make similar claims concerning arguments for large-scale scientific theories, and I think something similar is what Hans Frei and William Werpehowski mean by "ad hoc apologetics."

2) What are postliberal attitudes toward religions other than Christianity? I would here follow the lead of my friend J. A. DiNoia (The Diversity of Religions: A Christian Perspective, Catholic University of America Press, 1992). DiNoia rejects Rahner's model of good Buddhists or Muslims being "anonymous Christians" because, he says, it too easily assumes that Buddhists or Muslims are trying to do the same thing Christians are, but are less successful at it. At the same time, DiNoia would agree with Gustafson, against Troeltsch, that we cannot make a case for Christianity by claiming that it is, humanly, a "better religion." Rather, he invites us to think about a "providential diversity of religions."

Jesus Christ reveals and anticipates the culmination of Cod's will for creation, and in that sense Christianity is uniquely right about what is most important in the ultimate purpose of things. But other religions bring their own insights to understanding that purpose and how we might contribute to it, and it may well be that Cod's will is best served by some adherents of other religions pursuing their own traditions to their depths. Gandhi, to take one dramatic example, may have given the world (and even Christianity) more by remaining a Hindu than he would have contributed as a Christian convert. And, we can hope and trust, God does not discard or abandon those who have served Cod's will.

3a) Can we really expect to absorb the world of our daily lives into the biblical world? I wouldn't want to be silly about this. A good worldview leaves many particulars underdetermined. Neither "the modern scientific worldview" nor Marxism nor postliberal Christianity has much to tell us about which baseball team to root for, or whether to prefer Brahms or the blues, or about many other aspects of our lives. Visions of the world that try to dictate every detail quickly collapse of their own weight. But if the biblical world absorbs our world, then we will try a) not to hold views incompatible with what we take to be its central claims, and b) regularly to consider whether its categories might be unexpectedly helpful in understanding any aspects of our lives.

An example: A church-supported social worker I know was regularly invited out from the inner city to suburban congregations to describe his work and his concerns. For some time, he gave "political" speeches about the injustices of American society. His audiences either rejected him angrily or smiled condescendingly and said, "Well, that's what you liberals believe, of course, but we're Republicans out here."

Then he started asking if he could lead people in Bible study over several weeks. Beginning with texts they shared (admittedly, he usually picked Amos or the Sermon on the Mount), he and his audiences learned from each other in ways that challenged the assumptions of both sides. In a modest way, wasn't the biblical world absorbing the world of their daily lives?

My own experience in fights among Presbyterians is that one of our problems is that, lacking biblical or theological literacy, we have only the language and categories of contemporary politics to discuss most issues before us. And that language only serves to confirm how much we disagree. To take another example: If I go to my pastor, I don't want just psychological counseling -- I can find someone better trained in that elsewhere. And if my pastor has only the language of contemporary psychology with which to help me think about my life, then he or she has no alternative to the better-trained psychologist down the street to offer. In short, Christians don't seem, in a variety of contexts, to function well as Christians if they let various contemporary languages take over the discourse of their communities.

I don't know how much the biblical world can "absorb," but I want to find out. I think that we mainline Protestants, at least, would be well served if we tried its absorptive powers more often and more extensively.

3b) Do postliberals believe in a personal God who engages in particular interventions into events from hurricanes to headaches in order to answer prayers?

This gets a bit more complicated. Postliberals don't picture a God who occasionally intervenes in the world but normally lets it run its own course. Rather (like Aquinas, Calvin, Edwards and others), we think that Cod is continually the sustaining cause of the whole world. Calvin put metaphysical principle into the language of myth: "If God should but withdraw His hand a little, all things would immediately perish and dissolve into nothing" (Commentary on Genesis 2:2). One might even think, as Maurice Wiles has proposed, of "the gradual emergence of our world as a single divine act. In other words it is a purposeful occurrence, whose disparate features are held together by a unity of intention" (God's Action in the World, SCM, 1986). So the question isn't, "Does Cod sometimes intervene in the world?" since Cod is always acting in world. (See Kathryn Tanner, God and Creation in Christian Theology, Blackwell, 1988.)

Gustafson raises a particular question about God's intervention. What do we mean when we say things like "Sam was sick, and I prayed for him, and he recovered." Or "Sam was sick, and I prayed for him, and he died, but I hope that he found peace in dying and that dying was for him part of the will of the Cod who understands all things." As Austin Farrer insisted, in such cases we have no understanding of the "causal joint" between my prayers and what happened to Sam. But if Cod is gracious, then perhaps the God who has no need of my prayers so made the world that there would be some relation of a sort unknown to me between my praying and what happened to Sam -- not so that Sam should be grateful to me for praying, but so that I should be grateful to God for giving meaning to my prayers.

4) If postliberals aren't liberals, aren't you really just orthodox evangelical Christians? For several generations much of evangelical theology, particularly in the U.S., has been locked into a kind of philosophical positivism. From tracts about the historical evidence for the resurrection or against Darwinism to the more sophisticated apologetics of, say, Christianity Today (though there are recent moves there in new directions), evangelicals have talked about "arguments" and "facts" in a way that owes more to particular strands of modern empiricism than to the Christian tradition.

In an exchange with the evangelical theologian Carl Henry, who was pressing him to say whether he believed the empty tomb was a "fact" or not, Hans Frei once remarked

If I am asked to use the language of factuality, then I would say, yes, in those terms, I have to speak of an empty tomb. In those terms I have to speak of a literal resurrection. But I think those terms are not privileged, theory-neutral, transcultural, an ingredient in the structure of the human mind and of reality always and everywhere for me, as I think they are for Dr. Henry. Now that may mean, you see, that I am looking for a way that doesn't exist between evangelicalism on the one hand and liberalism on the other. If that's the case, well, so be it. But it may also be that I am looking for a way that looks for a relation between Christian theology and philosophy that disagrees with a view of certainty and knowledge which liberals and evangelicals hold in common (Theology and Narrative).

Too many evangelicals are not modern enough in some respects (continuing to fight rearguard battles against Darwin, for instance) because they are too modern in other respects (accepting definitions of truth, argument and evidence characteristic of one sort of modern empiricism). Postliberals, to oversimplify, would want to do it the other way round.

Whose side am I on? Well, that depends. Sometimes, talking with liberal Southern Baptists disgusted by the direction their denomination has taken and open to new ideas, I see exciting possibilities of joining with them in what Frei called a "generous orthodoxy." On other occasions, I get invited to the wrong evangelical meeting and find that the issue is still refuting the theory of evolution or, even worse, I find that I have wandered by mistake into what seems to be the ecclesial wing of the Republican right. Then I am sure that I have far more in common with a "generous liberalism" like Jim Gustafson's. I hope that such uncertainties do not seem "unstraightforward" or worse to someone I have admired so much for so long.

Helping Theology Matter: A Challenge for the Mainline



Several years ago in the midst of one of its well-publicized battles about sex, the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) proclaimed, "Theology matters." At first glance, this was a slogan to warm the heart of a theologian. But then I started to wonder why our denomination even had to say such a thing. After all, theology means thinking about our faith, and for Christians our faith ought to lie at the core of our lives. So why wouldn't theology matter?

Yet anyone looking at pastors' lives, seminaries' curricula or denominations' priorities these days recognizes full well why it needed to be said that theology matters. "Theology" is a word that scares off most Christians today, and changing that state of affairs seems low on nearly every list of priorities. We've too often defined theology as something done by experts, and once we assume that theology isn't a part of the lives of ordinary people, then the work of those experts doesn't seem very important. If most of us don't need to reflect about our faith, how necessary can such reflection be?

Thanks to a grant from the Lilly Endowment, I recently had the chance to spend six months talking to all sorts of people about how theology might better connect with Christian laypeople. I'm particularly grateful to Westminster John Knox Press and the CHRISTIAN CENTURY for offering me homes away from home for parts of that time. I had a hunch, based on my own work with local congregations, that in the "mainline" Protestant world that I know best, lots of laypeople really do want to think seriously about their faith, and somehow they aren't getting enough help in doing that well.

I found good news and bad news. The good news is that I was right about the potential interest among laypeople. Even if they react negatively to the word "theology," they're in fact hungry for it. A year and a half ago, Fifth Avenue Presbyterian Church in New York began a program of adult education, offering classes on topics as demanding and varied as "The Nature of God the Father" and "Renaissance and Reformation: The Formation of the Protestant Tradition." They now have an enrollment of 1,500, and the adult education program is the single most effective way of attracting new members to the church. Courses in theology and Bible consistently draw the greatest interest.

Christ Church Cathedral in Houston began a Lay Academy of Theology a year ago, attracting students from churches across the city. The academy had 150 students its first semester, 250 in its current semester and anticipates continued growth. Rabbi Leonard Schoolman, the executive director of the academy (this really is an ecumenical program!), is convinced that this isn't an aberration and that similar success is possible in any reasonably large American city.

Less direct evidence points to even larger numbers. Over half a million people have completed Abingdon Press's Disciple Bible study program in the past ten years. Participants sign up for a 30-week program of weekly discussions, and busy people who thought they couldn't spare the time are soon canceling all sorts of other engagements because "they can't miss their group Bible study." In response to many requests, Abingdon is developing a similar program on the doctrines of the church. Secular magazines, including Time, Newsweek, U. S. News & World Report and the Atlantic Monthly, regularly run cover stories on religion, in part because they find that those covers sell more magazines. People want to think about religious issues.

In churches or out, theological reflection isn't for everyone. Most contemporary Americans aren't regular readers of books-about anything. So churches need to find ways of connecting with those who don't read. But those who like to read and reflect are often potential leaders in congregations, and even a small minority can make a program feel like a success. After all, a few hundred people aren't a lot in a city the size of Houston, but the enthusiasm that the education program generates makes Christ Church Cathedral an exciting place.

Moreover, done right, education efforts get wide publicity. In an environment where so many of the "unchurched" have an image of Christianity derived exclusively from childhood Sunday school and from television evangelists, the announcement of substantive discussions-with hard questions welcome-provides an alternative image of Christian faith. It can keep Christianity alive as a real option in the minds of religious "seekers."

What do successful programs like this have in common? They're carefully planned and presented with enthusiasm. It almost seems that the more ambitious the better. For a large church, at least, the impressive-sounding name, the catalog of courses, the registration fees and the substantive topics all help. People look for signals that this is a serious enterprise. To be sure, the word "theology" does carry heavy negative connotations. It implies something very complicated, something that gives you set answers rather than inviting you to open-ended conversation. But if you say, "We're here with lots of questions, wanting to learn about religious traditions, wanting to think about the meaning of faith for our lives, and we hope you'll join us," it turns out you can draw a crowd.

So what’s bad news? Most institutions aren't doing much to serve the needs and desires of laypeople who are hungry (consciously or not) for theology. The problem begins with academic theologians, whose education prepares them to write for a guild of fellow experts and whose careers can often be harmed by more popular writing. One university divinity school dean told me that he himself values the writing his faculty does for laypeople in the church, but tenure decisions are made by a universitywide committee, and chemists, economists and other scholars will dismiss more popular writing as "obviously not scholarship." Wise mentors advise young scholars that there is the sort of writing "you don't put on your vita." Even denominational seminaries often buy into criteria of "excellence" that serve the universities-which means faculty members need to publish more distinguished specialized scholarship.

Surely, though, by a certain point in your career, you've made it, and you can

write what you please? Well, maybe. But it's not easy, in mid-career, to switch to a kind of writing you haven't been practicing. Moreover, while you can persuade yourself that a monograph or scholarly article represents a contribution to scholarship even if hardly anyone reads it, something written for a wide audience that doesn't sell is neither scholarly nor popular-it's just a failure. Perhaps above all, it's often hard to find the outlets that really connect to the audience you want to reach.

This magazine, for instance, has 33,000 subscribers, 80 percent of whom are ordained. So that's fewer than 7,000 lay subscribers (subtract library subscriptions, and it's fewer than that) for the most successful journal of mainline Protestantism. (Some other circulation numbers for purposes of comparison: the New York Review of Books, 125,000; the Nation, 85,000; Commonweal, 18,000; Theology Today, 16,000; Interpretation, 9,000; Journal of Religion, 2,200.)

Could such a subscription list be expanded? Well, perhaps, but at considerable risk. A modest ad for new subscribers in Newsweek would shoot the advertising budget for the year. Even the New Yorker is now losing money, thanks in part to offering too many cut-rate subscriptions to new readers. The CENTURY pretty much breaks even, whereas I've been told every secular general audience magazine of opinion except the New York Review of Books is losing money. So better not tamper with modest success. A magazine for laypeople wouldn’t have to "dumb down" its ideas (lots of laypeople are smarter than lots of clergy), but it would have to change-to explain more terms, to address different topics. A magazine can lose its old audience in the process of trying (maybe unsuccessfully) to get a new one.

Religious book publishers face different but analogous dilemmas. It's important to grasp the remarkable difference in scale between the religious publishers of mainline Protestantism and the big-name secular publishers. A denominational press can feel good about sales of 6,000 to 10,000 over the lifetime of a book; HarperSanFrancisco does not want to publish a book unless it is likely to sell at least 15,000 in the first year.

Thus big publishers need an author with a very famous name or a pretty dramatic gimmick. Religious publishers work hard at developing books for laypeople, and they sometimes have breakthrough successes, but they face the same marketing problems as the CHRISTIAN CENTURY-a limited budget makes it impossible to run ads in major "secular" magazines or to do a really big direct mail campaign. Sales representatives visit bookstores; ads appear in this magazine and others like it: catalogs go out to academics and pastors. But it's hard to do more than that. You can buy mailing lists of faculty members in religion or of clergy, but there isn't a list of names and addresses of "thoughtful laypeople interested in reading accessible theology." Mailing an ad out to something more like the population at-large produces too small a return to justify anything like the expense.

Denominations might offer some help for both readers and writers, but most of them don't. Institutionally, "main- line" Protestant denominations have generally bought into our culture of technical expertise. One longtime denominational executive remarked to me that when he came to his church's headquarters many years ago, almost everyone there had at least a seminary degree. There were formal and informal discussions of books and theology. Gradually, though, it came to seem that you shouldn't have a former pastor running a multimillion-dollar pension fund or a complex educational program, and so the denomination started hiring experts in such fields. Now this executive is one of the few people around his office with theological training. For instance, in the Curriculum Publishing Area of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.), which produces adult education material for the denomination, only five of 42 employees currently have even seminary training.

Such changes in hiring practices, common to a number of denominations, change the character of the conversation among decision-makers. Those who raise theological issues report that they are often perceived as inappropriately "showing off by colleagues without theological education. In such an environment, theology gets marginalized, and the chance of a major initiative focusing on theology nearly disappears. The relatively small denominational programs explicitly charged with attending to theological issues tend to devote their limited resources primarily to working with pastors, with the hope that that's the most cost-effective way to reach laypeople. But neither the amount of money available nor the level of commitment from the denominations as a whole encourages bold initiatives to reach laypeople directly.

As I was interviewing people from the mainline Protestant world about these issues, many of them urged me to "talk to the evangelicals; they're the ones who know how to do this." But the most thoughtful evangelicals with whom I met did not feel nearly so optimistic. To be sure, the numbers look encouraging; compared with the CHRISTIAN CENTURY's 33,000 circulation, Christianity Today has about 180,000 (and Today's Christian Woman, published by the same company, 300,000). But it's not a comparable magazine. Christianity Today is careful about the demands, whether ideological or intellectual, that it makes on its readers. It markets itself to a wide evangelical consensus that holds together only by not bringing up controversial issues. It's not an audience that wants to be stretched or challenged very much, and the magazine respects its readers' wishes. (No doubt that's one reason it has so many of them.) Its new offshoot publication, Books and Culture, does aim to stretch its readers intellectually, but its circulation remains at 16,000, and it's unclear that it could survive without its current subsidy.

Evangelical success in selling books has rested principally on "CBA stores," whose owners belong to the Christian Booksellers Association. These chains and locally owned stores, found all over the country, are usually run by people who think of their work as a real vocation. They offer outlets unmatched by anything in "mainline" Protestantism. But in terms of my concerns, they're changing for the worse in two respects. First, they are growing ideologically narrower and more conservative. Owners of such stores dread the angry customer who returns with a book and says, "I thought I could trust what I buy here, but this challenges the inerrancy of scripture." Safer not to stock such a volume.

Second, stores that once had substantial collections of serious evangelical theology now carry mostly celebrity biographies and very simple books about Christian life. Books issued by a publisher with as solid a sense of evangelical mission as Intervarsity Press are marginalized as "too academic." Such caution doesn't come only from the evangelical world: editors from one well-known "secular" publisher told a successful evangelical author who wanted to challenge her readers a bit and move toward the mainstream that they wouldn't publish the new book if she did that they didn't want to threaten her evangelical audience.

It's frustrating. In theological circles, one can sense an exciting rapprochement between "progressive evangelicals" and moderate adherents of the "mainline." But out closer to the ground, the evangelical world too often remains a place where issues of biblical literalism and opposition to evolution are nonnegotiable. Moreover, much of this world seems to be losing the kind of intellectual rigor which, whatever narrowness it may sometimes have had, used to be one of its virtues. It is a symptom of what Mark Noll has called "the scandal of the evangelical mind" that our country's most developed system for selling Christian books doesn't want to sell intellectually serious books.

So what's to be done? Suppose there is an audience of thoughtful laypeople who could be persuaded to get interested in theology. Suppose our churches could be more interesting, more faithful to their calling, and more attractive to thoughtful "seekers" if some of their members were invigorated by such study. How could it happen? I think there's no one answer. All sorts of individuals and institutions will need to play a part. Here are some suggestions.

Whatever else, we need writers. Occasional geniuses from outside academic and ecclesial establishments like Kathleen Norris may write the best books of all, but we'll never have many of them. Pastors and journalists can help. But advanced academic work does have a point to it; there are great riches in the Christian tradition, and it's often only the trained theologian who will see the dangers to which an argument might lead or remember the beautiful passage from one of Augustine's sermons that best illumines a point. So those of us who have that kind of training need to start taking some of the risks entailed in writing for a wider audience. The occasional bad review or loss of a chance at a more prestigious job, even falling on one's professional face, is a small price to pay in service to one's vocation in the life of the church.

Book and magazine publishers need to take some risks too. if the right kind of book gets written, a publisher should try a more aggressive marketing campaign. Maybe we need a new magazine; maybe some old ones need to reimagine their audience. Either way, they too will need to think of new ways to market the product. I do not speak casually of "risks." The world of religious publishing is a world without much money, and one failed initiative can spell disaster.

I asked one religious publisher, "What would you do if you suddenly had a lot more money?" and he instantly replied, "I'd like to take a couple of our mid-line books- good books we think could reach a big audience but without a really big-name author-and market the hell out of them. If we could prove that a really big campaign can pay for itself in increased sales for a book like that, we could do it more often. But just now, we can't risk spending that much money."

Similarly, the editor of a thoughtful religious journal said, "I think we have the talent and imagination to produce writing as lively and excellent as the New Yorker. But when writers are producing articles for free or for $100, they can't fly off somewhere to do research or spend a month polishing the piece."

So it becomes a vicious circle: writing or marketing that isn't quite first-rate doesn't generate enough revenue to pay for really topflight writing or marketing, and so it goes. It does involve risk to spend money in hopes of breaking out of that circle when it might not work, and foundations and other institutions ought to think about cushioning those risks.

We also need readers, and much of the energy in encouraging them needs to come from local congregations. Partly, that's just because no one else is going to do it. But local congregations also have rich opportunities. Ken Arnold, editor of Cross Currents, recently conducted an informal survey of some successful pastors. One of the things they had in common, he found, was that they all sought to shape their members' reading by their own reading. They mentioned books and articles in their sermons; they made copies of articles and sent them to people; they talked about what they'd been reading. They also read things that people passed on to them; they learned from what members of their congregations were reading. One pastor made a standing offer to read anything anyone put in the offering plate. Various members of her congregation, she reported, systematically clipped things from the Wall Streetjournal, Science and the New England Jounal of Medicine that they thought their pastor would find helpful. It must be like having a congregation of Martin Martys!

Congregations want to make contact with the seekers, the unchurched but religiously interested. At least in urban settings, many of the brightest among them have found a surrogate community center at the large local chain bookstore-Barnes and Noble, Borders or whatever. Making contacts there may be as important a form of outreach as joining the Rotary Club used to be. Such bookstores are generally hungry for events. They'll stock books that sell. If a pastor says, "Here's a book I'm going to be mentioning often in the next few weeks; I'd like to be able to tell people you'll have copies available," they will stock copies. If a minister or priest says, "I see you have this new book on Christian-Jewish relations; the local rabbi and I thought we might lead a discussion of it some evening here at the bookstore," they'll make the arrangements and do the publicity.

Pastors who can undertake such work need the kind of seminary education that will prepare them for it-for their role as what Presbyterians used to call "teaching elders." That means at least two things. First, pastors need the encouragement to think of those three years of seminary as the beginning of their theological education. So often, what students seem to learn from their theology or exegesis course is that this sort of thing is too hard to do without the teacher's help-so they give up trying to do it after graduation. But those few semesters are a pretty thin basis for a lifetime of ministry. Maybe the emphasis needs to be less on content and more or learning how to learn, though that might work only if denominations built expectations for continued study into the way they think about the careers of their pastors.

Second, seminary courses in theology or Bible or religion and literature need to include discussions of appropriate books and teaching techniques to present relevant parts of the material to laypeople. My hunch would be that a course in how to teach theology to your congregation might even be the best kind of introductory theology course.

Let me not, as writers typically do, get obsessed with the printed word. Each generation reads less and watches more-whether the TV screen or the computer screen. When bored, I've always looked for something to read, but I've found that when bright undergraduates are bored these days they look for a computer. I can't yet figure out how to make good use of the Internet (though I suspect that someone who took on the calling of typing in enthusiastic reviews of good Christian books on the amazon.com Web site might make a remarkable impact), but I'm sure videos ought to play an important part in the kind of education I've been trying to describe. A big church can bring in experts to lead classes; smaller churches have fewer resources and very busy pastors. But given a 20-minute video featuring an engaging expert and a list of questions to follow it up, most pastors or laypeople can lead a lively discussion with minimal preparation.

One person who produces such resources told me that her denomination literally couldn't put out enough 20-minute videos with accompanying study guides to meet the market. The founder of the Teaching Company, starting with a camera in his basement, has made a fortune selling video lectures on everything from Greek philosophy to British literature. Surely there's a modest market for a series or two on the Reformation or the Old Testament. Individual seminaries often have many such tapes, but they rarely market them widely.

In this and other matters, I'm talking about spending money. An average video, for instance, costs about $1,000 a minute to produce. Institutions with limited resources and competing demands will be reluctant to spend big money on projects that may fail, and this audience of potentially interested folk may be a figment of my imagination. But we have to try something. So many of our churches have become boring and depressing places. So many of the brightest children of our church members are going to Buddhist retreats or reading about Celestine prophecies or God knows what. They aren't seeing churches as places where they might go to think seriously about their religious questions.

 

 

 

 

 

Why Creeds Matter

Book Review:

Creeds and Confessions of Faith In the Christian Tradition. Edited by Jaroslav Pelikan and Valerie Hotchkiss. Yale University Press. 4 vols., 3,796 pp. and CD ROM. $995.00

Credo. By Jaroslav Pelikan. Yale University Press, 609 pp. First of the 4 vol. set, also sold separately at $37.50.

 

Just a few months before his 80th birthday, Jaroslav Pelikan has published yet another major project -- editing, in collaboration with Valerie Hotchkiss, a collection of the creeds and confessions of the Christian tradition from its beginnings up through the Lutheran-Roman Catholic 1999 joint declaration on the doctrine of justification. This is a monumental and marvelous work of scholarship, the worthy successor to Philip Schaff’s Creeds of Christendom, published 125 years ago.

Given the price. I can’t honestly urge every reader to rush out and buy a set, but get a library near you to buy it and spend some time reading and looking through it. Hope for a paperback edition. The books are physically beautiful, and the introductions, bibliographies and indexes are models of their kind. The creeds lead from the first fragments confessing the faith of early Christians through the ecumenical councils, the doctrinal debates of both East and West in the Middle Ages, the vast multiplicity of Reformation confessions and catechisms, down to contemporary statements from new denominations, the Third World and ecumenical discussions.

Some texts are here translated into English for the first time. The accompanying CD ROM provides all the non-English texts in their original languages. (Techies might dream of a CD ROM that included translations and a search capacity, but the fine indexes will help in tracking down almost anything a reader needs.) The set of books comes with endorsements on the back cover from nearly everybody but God, who, I suppose, stopped endorsing new books some time ago.

Scholars will consult these volumes to answer all sorts of particular questions; interested readers should find just thumbing through them endlessly fascinating. To pick some random examples: In the 12th century, Peter Abelard, after a life of tragedy and tribulation, concludes his account of his own faith by saying, "The storm may rage but I am unshaken, though the winds may blow they leave me unmoved, for the rock of my foundation stands firm." The Masai Creed, written about 1960 (the introduction here oddly puts the Masai in Nigeria, on the wrong side of Africa), summarizes Christology like this: "We believe that God made good his promise by sending his Son, Jesus Christ, a man in the flesh, a Jew by tribe, born poor in a little village, who left his home and was always on safari, doing good, curing people by the power of God, teaching about God and man, showing that the meaning of religion is love," The Alliance of Confessing Evangelicals, meeting in 1998, declares: "The loss of God’s centrality in the life of today’s church is common and lamentable. It is this loss that allows us to transform worship into entertainment, gospel preaching into marketing, believing into technique, being good into feeling good about ourselves, and faithfulness into being successful." In every case, there is an unexpected phrase to inspire or set a reader thinking.

No collection of Christian creeds and confessions can be complete. As Pelikan points out, the confessional texts from just the one German province of Franconia in the decade between 1520 and 1530 add up to more than 500 pages. Other books, therefore, include documents not to be found here. For instance, Lukas Vischer’s 1982 Reformed Witness Today has a wider selection of recent Reformed confessions from around the world than appears here. J. Gordon Melton’s 1988 Encyclopedia of American Religions: Religious Creeds remains the best resource for finding out the beliefs of some American denominations you’ve never heard of. But for the whole sweep of the world over 2,000 years, Pelikan and Hotchkiss have produced what will be the standard work for decades to come.

Pelikan’s introductory first volume, Credo, comes as part of the set but can be purchased separately. It may be significant that Schaff took only eight pages to comment on the general topic of creeds and confessions before moving on to introductions of particular texts, while Pelikan takes 500 pages. As late as the 1870s when Schaff was writing, creeds were obviously important. Denominational identity mattered, and it was the beliefs set out in their confessional statements that centrally defined most denominations. Presbyterians believed in predestination; Methodists didn’t. Catholics and Lutherans differed on the meaning of justification and the Eucharist. And so on. They brought their children up to know why those other folk were wrong.

At least in North America, times have radically changed. To the people on the left (to use admittedly problematic categories), doing good and being "sincere" often appear more important than believing correctly, and even the thought of condemning anyone for heresy seems embarrassing. As Pelikan observes, many in this age feel "that even if the time for faith as such may not have passed, the time for teaching Christian faith as authoritative dogma probably has, and the time for confessing it in a nonnative creedal formulary certainly has." On the right, many of those who think themselves most concerned about maintaining every jot and tittle of Christian orthodoxy see little reason to look beyond the Bible itself for instruction. The whole history of creeds and confessions is veiled by evangelical amnesia. And in the broad middle, people are more apt to choose their congregation because of its congenial music or strong youth program than because of the particular set of beliefs it confesses. Even scholars of Christian history often conclude that political and social conflicts really have been more important than doctrinal debates.

Pelikan’s Credo thus becomes a defense not only of the volumes it introduces -- why bother to gather all these creeds and confessions in a time when they seem not to matter much anymore? -- but also of his whole remarkable career, dedicated as it has been to the study of what Christians down the centuries have believed, taught and confessed. He writes, as always, with magisterial command of all possible sources in all known languages and a gift for the occasional elegant epigram derived in part, I suspect, from a lifetime of reading Edward Gibbon for fun.

Confessions arise, he argues, from exegesis, prayer, polemics and politics. Those who read the Bible seriously (as opposed to those content to memorize a dozen or so all-purpose proof texts) will find themselves puzzling over how to reconcile James and Paul on the relation between works and faith, John 10:30 ("I and the Father are one") and John 14:28 ("the Father is greater than I") and a host of other apparently conflicting passages. Figure out how to put such pieces together in a coherent whole, and you are doing theology; suggest the answer you figured out to your fellow Christians, and you are proposing doctrine; write down what you and they agree on, and you have produced a confession. Similarly, in private prayer and public liturgy, Christians turn to God and need to figure out how they should properly address God. Thus reflection on prayer, like exegesis, leads toward doctrine.

So do polemics and politics. "Wherever there is a creed," Alfred North Whitehead once remarked, "there is a heretic round the corner or in his grave." Pelikan doesn’t quite agree -- he cites the Apostles’ Creed, for instance, as having emerged from baptismal confessions without a primary focus on any particular heresy -- but he does readily concede that polemics against heresies are an important reason for the emergence of confessional statements. Finally he admits, politics also plays its role. He quotes the title of a book by the Dutch scholar H. M. Kuitert: Everything Is Politics but Politics Is Not Everything. No creed or confession has been written without political influences at work, but Pelikan maintains that the meaning or importance of any significant creed cannot be reduced purely to its political implications.

It is now fashionable to argue that creeds should be less important than deeds and piety, and that formal confessions impose the will of the elite on ordinary folk. In response to the first claim, Pelikan quotes Lionel Trilling: "It is probably true that when the dogmatic principle in religion is slighted, religion goes along for a while on generalized emotion and ethical intention – ‘morality touched by emotion,’ " but it "then loses the force of its impulse and even the essence of Its being." Even If I have a warm personal relationship with Jesus, I also need an account of what’s so special about Jesus to understand why my relationship with him is so important. If I think about dedicating my life to following him, I need an idea about why he’s worth following. Without such accounts and ideas, Christian feeling and Christian behavior start to fade to generalized warm fuzziness and social conventions.

As to the claim that creeds impose the will of the elite, Pelikan points out cases -- most notably the opposition to Arianism in the century or so after the Council of Nicaea -- in which, in John Henry Newman’s words, "The Catholic people, in the length and breadth of Christendom, were the obstinate champions of Catholic truth, and the bishops were not." Sometimes the masses fight for their creeds against the elite. Moreover, as Christianity has spread around the world, it is often a new confession that expresses the faith of Third World peoples in their own distinctive languages in contrast to the languages and categories of their colonizers.

It is easy to be cynical about confessions when confessing carries no danger. The term "confessor," it is worth remembering, originally referred to those in the early church who had been arrested and tortured for their faith, though not (like martyrs) actually killed. We may now treat the confession of faith so casually because it comes so easily. We perhaps have become too comfortable in various ways to take confessions seriously enough.

Belief in resurrection, historians tell us, emerged in ancient Judaism only when disaster followed disaster and Jews could no longer feel confident that their memory and legacy would be preserved in the life of their own descendents in particular and the Jewish people in general. Then and now, those who lead rich and rewarding lives in this world may be able to reconcile themselves to agnosticism about life after death. Similarly, those who feel relatively satisfied with themselves may not feel the need of an objective atonement. Comforting metaphors suffice.

Those who are suffering starvation and oppression or know themselves to be sinners, on the other hand, want truth, not just metaphors. Do the injustices of this world constitute the last word on how things are? Do sinners really have hope of redemption? Is there some meaning to this apparently chaotic universe? Is Christian faith Incompatible with the views of Hitler and his minions, and are the differences worth dying for? Creeds and confessions offer answers to such questions: Here, people say, is what we believe to be the truth about things that matter ultimately.

What might be the short-term future for confessions in American mainline Protestantism? Let me speculate just a bit. Most of the really nasty ecclesial debates in the U.S. these days -- on the role of women, homosexuality, evolution and so on -- center explicitly or implicitly on how we interpret the Bible. Could we be helped in settling such debates by confessional statements? My own guess is that simply addressing the controversial issues of the moment will not be of much use. We need to dig deeper. Perhaps even across denominational lines, those of us on the center left need to articulate how the Bible still functions for us as a religious authority indeed as the word of God. Those on the center right need to explain the interpretive rules which seem to lead them to different conclusions on some issues (divorce, the role of women in the church) than on others (homosexuality, salvation for non-Christians). Whether or not such statements would ever have confessional status, Pelikan’s collection of texts reminds us how helpful the clear statement of a position can be in the life of the church. Whether Christians find a compromise or force a choice, they are at least talking clearly about the real issues.

These volumes contain Interesting resources for such a project. The Second Vatican Council’s Dogmatic Constitution on Divine Revelation, Dei verbum, reminds Catholics of the need to attend to the literary genres of scripture, since truth is presented and expressed differently in historical, prophetic or poetic texts, or in other styles of speech. The interpreter has to look for that meaning which a biblical writer intended and expressed in his particular circumstances, and in his historical and cultural context, by means of such literary genres as were in use at his time, To understand correctly what a biblical writer intended to assert, due attention is needed both to the customary and characteristic ways of feeling, speaking and storytelling which were current in his time, and to the social conventions of the period.

The Confession of 1967, part of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)’s Book of Confessions, argues,

The Scriptures, given under the guidance of the Holy Spirit, are nevertheless the words of men, conditioned by the language, thought forms, and literary fashions of the places and times at which they were written. They reflect views of life, history, and the cosmos which were then current. The church, therefore, has an obligation to approach the Scriptures with literary and historical understanding. As God has spoken his word in diverse cultural situations, the church is confident that he will continue to speak through the Scriptures in a changing world and in every form of human culture.

In our current debates, we may need to move a step or two toward greater specificity. What do such claims mean for how scripture functions authoritatively in our faith and life?

As both the documents here collected and Pelikan’s introduction to them remind us, creeds and confessions can function either to establish a consensus or to make clear lines of disagreement. In many mainline Protestant denominations, if the next generation does not find a way of establishing consensus, it may be necessary to draw dividing lines. Either way, we may well be thinking a great deal in the coming decades about the form and function of creeds and confessions of faith. No resource will be more valuable to that thinking, and to much other thinking important to the life of the church, than these volumes. By presenting a collection worldwide and 20 centuries long in scope, they also remind us of the often parochial character of our own debates and the church’s enduring ability to continue confessing faithfully through crises much greater than our own.

Spread Too Thin

Book Review:

Theological Literacy for the Twenty-First Century

Edited by Rodney L. Petersen with Nancy M. Rourke. Eerdmans, 445 pp.



Reading this long book on theological literacy has left me mightily discouraged. The discouragement does not come from the book itself, which is excellent. Rodney L. Petersen, its editor, is executive director of the Boston Theological Institute (the consortium of Orthodox, Roman Catholic and Protestant theological schools, seminaries and university divinity schools in the Boston area). Its authors, a variety of theological educators, mostly from the Boston area, reflect on what a seminary graduate going into ministry in the 21st century ought to know. They offer a great many exciting ideas, but thinking about how to put those ideas into practice engendered in me something close to despair. What follows, then, is not a review of the 22 rich and diverse essays (by Catholics, Orthodox, mainline and evangelical Protestants) gathered in this volume, but some reflections they occasioned in this mainline Protestant on problems facing theological education today

First and foremost, there’s just the sheer quantity of things those seminary graduates ought to know. Since they will work in a religiously pluralistic society, it’s not enough to know how their denomination differs from others on the Eucharist. They need to understand how we Christians differ from Buddhists on just about everything. The standard version of church history, focused on Western Europe and the United States, doesn’t seem appropriate for a world in which soon two-thirds of Christians will live in the Southern Hemisphere. Even in our own society, there are black, Hispanic, feminist, womanist, mujerista, gay, neo-evangelical and many other voices. Where can one stop in listing the theological perspectives calling for our attention? And preaching and pastoring in contemporary society surely requires knowing something about the natural sciences, economics and world politics, to say nothing of the range of ways of understanding human beings and how to help them, from Freud to pharmacology.

I wish I were being ironic. Various chapters in this book, as well as other reading and my own experience in churches, persuade me that all these kinds of knowledge and more really would be helpful for contemporary ministers. Back in the distant days of my youth, in the 1960s and ‘70s, some radical theologians proposed a way of making room for new material. We were to stop reading all those "deadwhite males," and that would free up a lot of time to read more contemporary, diverse, "relevant" material. Even radical critics today, however, generally recognize the value of knowing the "canon" even as we expand it. Henry Louis Gates Jr. talks about a vision of life big enough to include "Bach and James Brown. Sushi and fried catfish." So, in a theological context, we might say, "Barth and Cone, Aquinas and McFague." Unless I missed it, no author in this volume proposed dropping anything from the curriculum.

On a recent Friday I had lunch at a seminary -- academically probably better than most -- and found the place virtually empty. Its academic week, I discovered, now runs from Tuesday morning to Thursday afternoon. Its administrators find that schedule the only way to accommodate students who live in different cities, have families and jobs or already serve as pastors. The day after that Friday lunch, I happened to have dinner with a former student now enrolled in medical school. He left early because he had to go back to studying that night. After all, there is a lot a future doctor needs to learn.

No doubt the implied comparison is in some ways unfair. The seminary students are doing academic work back home over their long weekends. The workload in medical education is arguably pathologically demanding. And seminaries are often to be admired for the creative ways in which they are making theological education possible for students with diverse and complicated personal and economic situations.

Still, as I visit seminary campuses and talk to my friends who teach at them, I’m struck by how often and how much, except at a few top institutions, the educational process gets stretched and bent these days. "We can’t assign library research," a typical faculty member reports, "because our students are in class pretty much the whole time they’re on campus, and they don’t have access to a theological library when they go home." Students who haven’t been in a classroom for 20 years, and who were studying engineering or business back in their classroom days, are often the norm rather than the exception.

They bring with them all sorts of interesting experience, but it often doesn’t include the experience of reading the kinds of academic books that are the staple of theological education. The Association of Theological Schools’ accreditation allows member schools to admit up to 10 percent of their students without a college degree, and many schools do so. Classes get taught in one long block of time per week, even in subjects in which that approach clearly doesn’t make pedagogical sense.

It’s easy to dismiss the occasional faculty member who whines, "My students aren’t good enough." The teachers I take seriously are those who admire their students’ struggle against inadequate preparation and their juggling of bizarrely complex schedules, but then sadly admit, "We do the best we can, and many of them bring such commitment to the work and such fascinating life experiences. But every year it seems we have to find books that are a little easier and cut back on the assignments if they’re going to survive.

Unfortunately, some instructors do not have that kind of sensitivity to the realities of their students’ lives. They keep making assignments that are over their students heads and then, sometimes under administrative pressure, grumble and hand out passing grades to people who never really understood what was going on. Their students go off into ministry without ever having read theology with pleasure and understanding, or done exegesis well. So reading theology or doing careful exegesis aren’t things they ever try again.

But most seminary faculty members do a tremendous job in difficult circumstances. They teach full loads of classes, juggle a range of administrative duties, try to keep active in the local church, and generally get stretched thinner and thinner, I’m amazed at how they balance family responsibilities with teaching intensive courses around the country, and scholarship with the demands of multiple degree programs in small institutions.

One could drop many of a seminary’s programs. One could raise admissions requirements. One could require that students live on campus and attend full-time. One could set higher standards and start flunking people. Whether these might or might not be good ideas, they will not be significantly put into practice. Most seminaries simply can’t afford to try them. Seminaries need the tuition income to survive.

Of course, I have been painting with too broad a brush, and therefore have produced too bleak a picture. At some university divinity schools and a few independent institutions the quality of resources and students is much higher (though there one often can worry about how few of their students are headed toward ministry). Even at not very good seminaries, some students are excellent by any standard. And some students who struggle with much of their academic work will make wonderful pastors. Under almost any circumstances, on the right day and sometimes even for a whole semester, a teacher, a group of students and a text or a topic can click, and the magic of education happens. Good teachers get it to happen more often than anyone has a right to expect.

Nevertheless, given many seminary students’ abilities, academic preparation and current schedules, it seems to me a very tough job to give them even a minimal version of a "traditional" seminary education. A book of essays that keeps proposing things to add without ever mentioning things to subtract and that doesn’t acknowledge that all this might add up to a problem does not seem in very close touch with reality. Of course, reality is different in Boston. Many of these authors come from elite institutions with greater resources and abler students.

Unfortunately, the problem gets even worse. One of the advantages of volumes offering ecumenical conversations about theological education is that they remind Protestants of the Catholic category of "formation." Preparation for ministry is not just a matter of learning things. Effective pastors who do not "burn out" have generally developed a prayer life, moral virtues and spiritual practices that sustain and nurture them.

They have been "formed." In one of the essays in this volume, pastoral theologian Carrie Doehring distinguishes between "theological literacy," which knows the vocabulary and the right answers to the questions, and "theological fluency," in which "we ‘inhabit’ our theology as a faith perspective that we use to understand and respond to spiritual and psychological needs. Whereas becoming theologically literate is part of learning how to think critically, becoming theologically fluent involves formation."

Among Protestants the Pietists particularly understood the importance of formation, though it was not a term they used much. Writing in 1675, Philip Jacob Spener used language that may bring a smile to our lips, but his point is analogous to Doehring’s. In seminaries, he said:

It would be especially helpful if the professors would pay attention to the life as well as the studies of the students entrusted to them and would from time to time speak to those who need to be spoken to. The professors should act in such a way toward those students who, although they distinguish themselves in studying, also distinguish themselves in riotous living, tippling, bragging, and boasting of academic and other preeminence. . . . On the other hand, the professors should openly and expressly show those who lead a godly life, even if they are behind the others in their studies, how dear they are to their teachers.

Most of us today would emphasize different virtues and vices, but Spener’s concern for the character of future ministers still seems timely, and the Catholic tradition’s language of "formation" provides many of the most useful categories for discussing it.

Here again, though, the essayists seemed generally insensitive to the realities of most seminaries today. Formation takes time, and time together -- faculty members and students getting to know each other, students forming a community, taking part in corporate worship and having time for reflection. When students arrive from their jobs just in time for class, or spend only a couple of frantic days per week on campus, or when faculty members become circuit riders, turning up at the branch campus every other Wednesday to teach their intensive course before disappearing, formation becomes difficult if not impossible.

It doesn’t follow, alas, that formation happens consistently in campuses with the proper environment for doing it well. Too often faculty members at the most prestigious theological schools owe their primary allegiance to their scholarly guilds. That means going off to get the new book written or to attend a scholarly conference. The best students are competing to get into Ph.D. programs. Formation doesn’t seem a high priority for anyone. Less "competitive" schools might be in a position to do formation best, if they weren’t feeling forced to stretch themselves hither and yon to pick up a few more students in a new degree program or branch campus. In short, in regard to formation as well as curricular content, the authors of these essays have good ideas but seem too often unconnected to the realities of most contemporary seminaries.

Most of the authors in this volume, writing from left of center, focus primarily on the things that ought to be added to seminary education. An exception is Walter C. Kaiser Jr., president of Gordon-Conwell Theological Seminary, one of the book’s few conservative voices. He is probably typical of conservatives in worrying more about what has been discarded. He believes that new theories about how to interpret texts have wrongly led us to think we can get rid of important elements of traditional theological education. Kaiser quotes the patron saint of conservative Presbyterians, J. Gresham Machen, writing in 1912:

Let her [the church] substitute sociology altogether for Hebrew, practical expertness for the proof of her gospel. Let her shorten the preparation of her ministry, let her permit it to be interrupted yet more and more by premature practical activity. By doing so she will win a straggler here and there. But her winnings will be but temporary. The great currents of modern culture will sooner or later engulf her puny eddy. God will save her somehow -- out of the depths. But the labor of the centuries will have been swept away.

Kaiser worries that, too often, this is exactly what has happened. He thinks he can identify the underlying problem. Thanks to theorists as varied as W. K. Wimsatt, Monroe Beardsley, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricoeur, he says, interpreters no longer think that the intent of its author determines the meaning of a text: "The new dogma asserts that when a literary work is finished and delivered to its readers, it becomes autonomous from its author so far as its meaning for others is concerned. . . . This, to my mind, was the most revolutionary concept of the twentieth century."

As a result, he argues, theologians feel themselves free to use the Bible for whatever purpose they wish, from the liberation of women to the church-growth movement, without regard for its supposedly irrecoverable original intent. Learning original languages becomes unnecessary. Theological literacy comes to mean the ability to identify a good contemporary cause, not the ability to understand the Bible in its original context, And that way, he thinks, disaster lies.

I think Kaiser oversimplifies the scholars he criticizes (though maybe not all of their disciples). These postmodern hermeneuts do not replace "original intent" with "anything goes. They try to describe the necessarily complex rules for the appropriate interaction of readers and texts. As the English historian R. C. Collingwood wrote a generation ago, "We shall never know how the flowers smelt in the garden of Epicurus, or how Nietzsche felt the wind in his hair as he walked on the mountains." One level of past experience is indeed irrecoverable.

So we cannot know exactly what Isaiah thought or felt when he wrote of his vision of the six-winged seraphim, or just how "literally" the author of Luke wanted his account of the ascension to be taken. Gadamer talks about a "fusion of horizons" in which both our own questions and perspectives and everything we can learn about the author’s context contribute to a text’s meaning. We need to engage in historical work, he says, so that the text can challenge our assumptions and help us grow; otherwise, we would merely subsume everything we read into the categories of our own experience. But the historical work never gets us exactly back to the mind of the original author.

New hermeneutical methods do not lead to chaos and disaster. But they do add yet another level of complexity to contemporary theological education. Once upon a time seminary students were expected first and foremost simply to know a lot about the content of the Bible. Then came a time when the emphasis fell on knowing the methods and results of the historical-critical method. But now a hundred flowers bloom: historical research, literary methods, feminist criticism, deconstruction, canonical criticism -- each has its contribution to make.

Those contributions can be rich and constructive. Phyllis Trible subtitles her book Texts of Terror, "Literary-Feminist Readings of Biblical Narratives," packing several "new" methodologies into a phrase. Yet when we read her powerful interpretations many of us find that she has shown us something in the texts we had not seen before, but which we will not be able to ignore on future readings and which gives us a better understanding of what we read. The same can happen when all sorts of interpretive methods are used responsibly and sensitively.

The problem, then, isn’t that hermeneutical pluralism leads to chaos but, once again the practical issue of how to teach students everything they really ought to learn. How can a first course in Bible introduce students to methodological diversity and at the same time help the biblically semiliterate begin to know the content of the Bible? How can seminary students learn both to preach from the wealth of useful contemporary insights and as people who know and love the Bible? The tough questions lie not in hermeneutical theory but in pedagogical practice.

So where does all this leave us? I conclude with some theses about theological literacy.

• Christian laypeople in North America today are better educated than at any time and place in history. It is common to be cynical about dumbed-down popular culture, American education comes in for its share of critiques, and biblical and theological illiteracy is a real problem. Still, the percentage of college graduates continues to grow. Many laypeople are doctors, lawyers, teachers, executives -- but even those who repair cars or raise corn use complex computer programs and have to make judgments about the state of the economy. They are not too stupid to understand their pastors. Indeed, for serious conversation, they need smart, educated pastors.

• The future success of mainline Protestantism depends in part on its ability to appeal to the concerns and interests of thoughtful Christians. We will never do praise songs as well as the evangelicals do. The secular world will always provide more fun on Saturday nights than we can offer on Sunday mornings. But for folks who want to think about their faith, the meaning of their lives, or the possibility of hope in the midst of despair, we have wonderful, complicated, endlessly rich news. When it is well presented, they are eager to hear it. Churches that offer quality adult education usually have more people wanting to sign up than they can handle. Bible study programs like "Word" or "Kerygma" draw impressive loyalty. Intellectual substance sells, and it is one of the things we mainline Protestants ought to be good at.

Intellectually rich congregational programs require pastoral leadership and support. Several years ago I interviewed the people in charge of some of the country’s most successful adult education programs in local congregations. When I asked what factors contributed to their success, every single one mentioned, "The senior pastor isn’t intimidated by it." At minimum, pastors need to be confident enough of their own theological education that they don’t run scared at the thought of laypeople learning to ask questions the pastor can’t answer. It is even better if pastors can themselves serve as theological educators.

• The pressure for academic quality in theological education needs to come from the "consumers" -- from denominations and congregations. The economic pressures on most seminaries drive them to make everything as easy as they can in order to attract more students. They are aware that a seminary down the road, or online, stands ready and eager to offer something easier and cheaper. The demand for higher standards needs to come from denominations and through the hiring practices of local congregations.

• Denominations and the congregations from which ministerial candidates come need to offer better financial help. Given the low level of ministerial salaries, seminarians (unlike medical students and law students) simply dare not go badly into debt. If we want them to have time for serious study and formation, we will have to make sure they are not holding down three jobs to pay for their education. Indeed, encouraging and supporting candidates for ministry needs to be one of the priorities of Christian congregations. (One way to encourage candidates for ministry, by the way, is to make the congregation’s own pastor’s job seem rewarding and honored.)

• Three years isn’t enough. Given the level of preparation of many students and the range of things good pastors need to know, three years of seminary is not adequate for theological education. Alternatives as varied as "residencies" in which students learn more of the practical side in a year or two of "on-the-job training," or structured ongoing education during the first several years of ministry, or even four years of seminary are worth exploring. Above all, theological students need to be "formed" to be lifelong learners whose education has encouraged them to read and think throughout their careers.

Just adding courses won’t do, Theological Literacy for the Twenty-First Century makes clear that thinking about the character of theological literacy leads to good ideas for too many courses to fit into even an expanded seminary program. Many important concerns have to come up within existing courses, and it is therefore the creative design of basic courses that often makes the most difference in the education a school provides. Market forces encourage seminaries to engage in a host of peripheral activities. The core of their missions can get lost in the shuffle. Those who care about theological education need to give seminaries all the help they can to focus on their principal job: preparing theologically literate ministers for the 21st century. This book provides a valuable resource for thinking about the relevant issues.

Hans Frei and the Meaning of Biblical Narrative

 

Hans Frei, who died last September at the age of 66 after a very brief illness, was never famous outside the guild of theologians. He was a perfectionist who wrote slowly and published reluctantly. In over 30 years of teaching at Yale he devoted himself unstintingly to his students, often at the expense of his own research. And what he wrote was never faddish and often technical. Yet future historians just may consider him the most important American theologian of his generation.

Speaking of a prominent theological figure, Frei once remarked in conversation, "He has all the gifts that make a great theologian except for a central passion -- but of course that's the one thing that's indispensable." Frei certainly never thought of himself as a "great theologian, " but he did have a central passion, a central idea. That idea emerged through long study, in the 1950s and '60s, of l8th- and 19th-century ways of interpreting the Bible. He grew convinced that nearly the whole of modern Christian theology, from the radical to the fundamentalist, had taken a wrong turn.

For many centuries before the modern age, most Christian theologians had read the Bible primarily as a kind of realistic narrative. It told the overarching story of the world, from creation to last judgment. Moreover, the particular coherence of this story made "figural" interpretation possible: some events in the biblical stories, as well as some nonbiblical events, prefigured or reflected the central biblical events. Indeed, Christians made sense of their own lives by locating their stories within the context of that larger story.

But somewhere around the 18th century, people started reading the Bible differently. Their own daily experience seemed to define for them what was "real, " and so they consciously tried to understand the meaning of the Bible by locating it in their world.

They did that in -- to overgeneralize -- two ways. They saw the meaning of the biblical narratives either in the eternal truths about God and human nature that the stories conveyed or in their reference to historical events. The Bible thus fit into the world of our experience either as a set of general lessons applicable to that world or as an extension of that world developed by means of critical history.

Those two ways of interpreting the Bible remain prominent. Those who set out the moral lessons of Jesus' teaching or focus on the insights provided by his parables believe that the real point of the Gospels lies in their general lessons for our lives. On the other hand, fueled by Wolfhart Pannenberg's early arguments for the historicity of Jesus' resurrection and continuing scholarly efforts to establish which of the Gospel sayings were really spoken by the historical Jesus, some Christians still tend to treat the Bible as a historical source whose value lies primarily in its historical accuracy.

Hans Frei argued that both these approaches fundamentally distort the meaning of the text. One of the Bible's most obvious characteristics is that so much of it tells stories. Now any literary critic -- or anyone with, common sense -- knows that the meaning of a realistically told story can never be reduced to a moral. The meaning of a Dickens novel is never simply the general lesson that the poor were ill-treated in 19th-century England. The particular characters and episodes of the novel are not dispensable illustrations. Similarly, to reduce to some general principle the Old Testament narratives of Israel's history or the Gospel stories of the life of Jesus misses at least part of their meaning.

On the other hand, if we try to treat these narratives primarily as the raw material for critical history, we again miss the point. To be sure, they sometimes provide that kind of historical information. But the stories themselves, in their indifference to chronology and their occasional inconsistencies, are only loosely related to questions of historical accuracy. Moreover, if we compare the fragments that a modern historian will glean as reliable against, for example, the narrative flow of the passion narratives in any of the Gospels, it is hard to deny that the historian has lost something. Aspects of character and plot development disappear in the face of the historian's questions.

The initial meaning of a realistically told story is that, within the framework of the story, certain characters did certain deeds and underwent certain experiences. When a text provides a realistic narrative, as much of the Bible does, any interpretation that bypasses this literal reading distorts the text.

Unfortunately, for the past 200 years nearly all Christian theology, Frei argued, has been engaged in such distortion. (Jewish scholars, he thought, have by and large remained more faithful to the narrative tradition.) Frei claimed not only to have identified the distortion but to have explained it: theologians have begun with contemporary human experience and tried to make connections with the biblical message. Paul Tillich defined this approach with particular clarity (and therefore in extreme form) in his "method of correlation": "systematic theology proceeds in the following way: it makes an analysis of the human situation out of which the existential questions arise, and it demonstrates that the symbols used in the Christian message are the answers to these questions. " Frei believed that those who develop theology that way, beginning with existential questions arising out of the human situation, will start reading the biblical stories as either historical raw material or timeless truths and moral lessons. Either approach loses sight of the way in which the stories function as realistic narratives.

A Christian theology that respects the meaning of the biblical narratives must begin simply by retelling those stories, without any systematic effort at apologetics, without any determined effort to begin with questions arising from our experience. The stories portray a person -- a God who acts in the history of Israel and engages in self-revelation in Jesus of Nazareth. They help us learn about that person in the way that a great novelist describes a character or that a telling anecdote captures someone's personality. They provide insights that we lose if we try to summarize the narrative in a nonnarrative form. No abstract account of God's faithfulness adequately summarizes Exodus. The Gospels surpass any abstract account of God's love.

Still, the Bible is not simply another realistic novel, and its interpreters need to attend to all its special characteristics. As Erich Auerbach, a literary critic Frei much admired, once wrote of the Bible: "Far from seeking . . . merely to make us forget our own reality for a few hours, it seeks to overcome our reality: we are to fit our own life into its world, feel ourselves to be elements in its structure of universal history. Christians who tell these stories, stories that are rich, enigmatic, sometimes puzzling and ambiguous, can find that their lives fit into the world they describe -- indeed, that our stories suddenly seem to make more sense when seen in that context.

Frei thought that Christian theology ought to be descriptive; it ought to lay out a Christian view of the world. That view will reflect the enigmas and ambiguities of the biblical texts, and it will be a view of the whole world. A Christian theologian, Frei explained, will therefore "do ethics to indicate that this narrated, narratable world is at the same time the ordinary world of our experience, and he will do ad hoc apologetics, in order to throw into relief particular features of this world by distancing them from or approximating them to other descriptions. . . . But none of these other descriptions or, for that matter, argument with them can serve as a 'predescription' for the world of Christian discourse." Letting any such "predescription" set the theological agenda leads to distorting the meaning of the biblical texts.

As I have indicated, Frei distrusted theologies that began with contemporary experience, and he was reticent in discussing his own religious life. He loved to talk, but he rarely talked about himself. When writing about him, one wants to respect that reticence. Still, a word about his life seems in order.

He was born in Germany in 1922, the son of a physician. His family was of Jewish background and had to flee after the Nazis came to power. He received part of his education in Britain before coming to this country and landing a scholarship to study textiles at North Carolina State University. A chance meeting with H. Richard Niebuhr led him to correspond with the theologian and then undertake seminary and graduate study at Yale. (It is fitting that his first major publication, the introductory chapters of the Niebuhr festschrift, Faith and Ethics, and his last completed lecture, read for him at Harvard during his final illness, both concerned the work of this teacher he so admired, even when he disagreed with him.)

After briefly serving a New Hampshire parish and then teaching at Wabash College in Indiana and the Episcopal Seminary of the Southwest in Austin, Texas, he returned to Yale in 1957 as a faculty member. Writing came slowly for him. He published the original version of The Identity of Jesus Christ: The Hermeneutical Bases of Dogmatic Theology in a Presbyterian adult education magazine called Crossroads in 1967, but it did not appear in book form until 1975 (Fortress), the year after he published The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative: A Study in Eighteenth-and Nineteenth-Century Hermeneutics (Yale University Press, 1974). Eclipse traced his historical argument about the wrong turn in hermeneutics; Identity sketched what a Christology based on his principles might look like. Near the end of his life, he published a number of essays, most notably a chapter on D. F. Strauss in Nineteenth-Century Religious Thought in the West (Ninian Smart et al., Cambridge University Press, 1985) and an essay on the literal sense of Scripture in The Bible and the Narrative Tradition (edited by Frank McConnell, Oxford University Press, 1986). Plans are afoot to publish a number of lectures he was reworking at the time of his death.

For many of his students and friends, though, nothing on paper quite captures the Hans Frei we knew, and loved: the devoted teacher; the faithful friend; a man stubborn about his ideas but genuinely, sometimes unnervingly, modest about himself; prone nervously to stay up the night before a presentation to rewrite his lecture. He was the only person I have ever known who both loved gossip and totally lacked malice.

In the1950s and '60s, when Frei was developing his ideas, many of his concerns were thoroughly unfashionable. In a number of ways, his work remains out of fashion, but it is striking that at least four of his interests now seem much more in step with the times.

Half a generation or so ago, most New Testament scholars focused on the individual sayings and stories of the Gospels. Some sought the Christian kerygma, the call to faith, in individual passages. Others evaluated each brief unit as a historical document: When would this story have been told? What does it indicate about the circumstances of its telling? Does it provide evidence about the historical Jesus? Whatever questions they asked, however, not many scholars turned from particular passages to ask about the narrative sweep or pattern of a whole Gospel.

Today, however, biblical scholars increasingly analyze the plot of biblical narratives, the way the literary forms work, the patterns of climax and tension. They often find they have more to learn from, and discuss with, literary critics than with historians; indeed, the literary analysis of the Bible is becoming a minor industry.

Frei certainly did not by himself cause that shift. It has many sources, from redaction critics who started looking at each Gospel as a whole to literary scholars like Northrop Frye and Frank Kermode who have called renewed attention to the narrative shape of biblical texts. But Frei saw the point early on, and his work remains the deepest probing of the theological implications of such approaches.

In addition to anticipating new conversations between biblical scholars and literary critics, Frei's work also pointed to new conversation partners for theologians. His suspicion of systematic apologetics might at first glance make Frei seem a kind of theological isolationist, retreating from wider circles of intellectual discussion. To those who watched him at Yale with his finger in every intellectual and political pie, such a portrait is unrecognizable.

In addition to having an ongoing interest in literary criticism, he had learned from British philosophers like Gilbert Ryle ways of talking about how the narrative of actions and events defines a person's identity. His concern for the way a community sees and describes its world led to affinities with anthropologists like Clifford Geertz and sociologists like Peter Berger. Frei said on at least one occasion that among theologians he claimed to be a historian and among historians he claimed to be a theologian -- but he avoided a complete identity crisis by being consistently clear that he was not a philosopher! On an ad hoc basis, however, he was intrigued by the parallels between his own suspicion of systematic apologetics and the suspicions concerning systematic "foundations" of knowledge growing among deconstructionists and some analytic philosophers. Sometimes the most secular of scholars found that what Frei was doing, with his attention to narrative and his interest in the language that shapes a particular community, made more sense to them than the work of many theologians much more systematically concerned to address other academic disciplines. (Jeffrey Stout's recent Ethics After Babel nicely illustrates this.)

Frei's work seems timely in yet a third way. Much of the most interesting recent work in Christian ethics discusses the way narratives shape our understanding of Christian life. Ethicists as different as Stanley Hauerwas, Gilbert Meilaender and James McClendon (as well as philosophers like Alasdair MacIntyre) propose that ethics is not primarily a matter of making particular decisions in isolation–what Hauerwas calls "quandary ethics." Rather, we make decisions on the basis of beliefs about what sorts of virtues seem important, what sort of human life we believe to be good. To answer that kind of question, a principle or a rule is often less helpful than a story. I may get more help in deciding how to make ethical decisions as a Christian by reading Pilgrim's Progress or a biography of Dorothy Day or Martin Luther King, Jr.-- or by reading the Gospels -- than by reading an academic discussion of medical ethics. Here, too, Frei's interest in the narrative patterns that shape a Christian life now seems prophetic.

Fourth, there is Karl Barth. Frei was not simply a "Barthian" (neither was Barth!), but Barth certainly seemed to him the best exemplar of a "descriptive" theologian who eschewed systematic apologetics and simply tried to lay out a Christian view of the world with attention to its own internal logic. When Frei was writing on these matters in the 1960s, Barth seemed to many obsolete, like a man writing a great defense of Ptolemaic astronomy two generations after Copernicus. There was some interest in his Romans commentary, but the many massive volumes of his Church Dogmatics went largely unread.

Much remains unchanged. But at times, in contrast to theologians, who try systematically to draw out the "religious" implications supposedly underlying all human experience, Barth seems to be the theologian who has taken radical secularity most seriously. At least the situation has grown more ambiguous. It is possible that, in a crazy, postmodern, thoroughly secular time, Christian theologians might discover that the old man in Basel offered us more help than anyone in thinking about how to do theology. In any event, if we do make that discovery, we will find in this matter, as in many others, that Frei was there before us.

Frei was ironic by nature, and never more so than when thinking about his own "influence." He was sometimes credited with founding a "school" called "narrative theology," but he always doubted that there was such a thing -- and would be against it if there were.

He thought the narrative character of the biblical texts had some implications for how those texts ought to be interpreted. But to try to develop some general theory of the narrative shape of human experience as a foundation for Christian theology seemed to him "first to put the cart before the horse and then cut the lines and pretend the vehicle is self-propelled." In a variety of ways, those who offered to agree with him sometimes found that he wasn't sure he quite agreed with them.

Still, I do not want to overstate that ironic spirit. He had worked a long time without many people expressing much interest in his work. In the last ten years or so of his life, his work drew attention and bore fruit. Though he may have mistrusted the taste of some of that fruit, on the whole he was grateful and happy. He was excited by Alasdair MacIntyre's early and enthusiastic review of The Eclipse of Biblical Narrative and later proud and pleased about a new generation of his students beginning in the early 1970s, theologians like Charles Wood and Ronald Thiemann -- proud that they had learned from him, pleased that they were independent enough to disagree with him on occasion. He continued to value his relations with colleagues at Yale like George Lindbeck, David Kelsey, Wayne Meeks and Gene Outka, and he eagerly welcomed the 1984 publication of Lindbeck's Nature of Doctrine, with its model of a "postliberal theology, " for which Frei's work is the paradigm.

Yet no one was more conscious than Frei that he had left many questions unanswered. The Bible is not just one big story, but a complicated collection of narrative and nonnarrative material. Even with straightforward narratives, in the Bible or anywhere else, a variety of critics from feminists to deconstructionists have reminded us that the meaning of a text can lie as much in what it does not say as in what it says. Frei knew that and, with a modesty as frustrating as it was admirable, was likely to admit that he did not himself know how to solve the problems even as he remained convinced that he had glimpsed an insight that was somehow true.

Beyond even such questions, a more fundamental issue remains. Frei's theology is finally church theology: it first of all addresses the Christian community and invites that community to let the biblical narratives shape its vision of the world. To what extent parts of that community will respond to such invitations may be the most important unanswered question regarding Frei's work.

"The most fateful issue for Christian self-description," Frei wrote in the McConnell volume, "is that of regaining its autonomous vocation as a religion, after its defeat in its secondary vocation of providing ideological coherence, foundation, and stability to Western culture." We no longer live in what Kierkegaard called Christendom. But old habits die hard, and Christian theologians had fallen into the habit of trying to delineate the religious dimension of our general culture. Some seem not to notice that our culture, by and large, isn't much interested. Some grow angry at the lack of interest. Some try all the more desperately to make the appropriate connections.

In a post-Christian age, however, Christianity might instead try to regain "its autonomous vocation as a religion." We Christians still have stories to tell -- distinctive stories. Stories about how God worked in the life of Israel, and God's self-revelation in the life of Jesus Christ. Stories that define a community different from the world around us because of the way these stories shape our self-understanding, a community that may sometimes be wildly radical politically and on other issues seem conservative, but will not let anyone else's vision set its agenda. Hans Frei called us to be tellers of such tales.

Thinking Our Way to the Ultimate

BOOK REVIEW:In Face of Mystery, by Gordon Kaufman. Harvard University Press, 509 pp., $39.95.

For nearly 25 years, Gordon Kaufman has been a senior professor of theology at Harvard. His earlier books, such as Systematic Theology: A Historicist Perspective (1968), God the Problem (1972): and An Essay on Theological Method (1975), have been important contributions to this country’s theological discussions. Now, in his late 60s, he has written his best book, tying together a lifetime of theological reflection.

Kaufman is one of a remarkable generation of theologians who were roughly contemporaries as students at Yale. Though their years in residence varied, he, Harvard colleague Richard R. Niebuhr, James Gustafson and George Lindbeck all received their Ph.D.s there in 1955, Hans Frei a year later, Van Harvey a year after that. It must have been quite a place. H. Richard Niebuhr taught them all, and one could tell a significant part of the story of that generation of American theologians as a struggle over the meaning of Niebuhr’s legacy. Frei and Lindbeck followed the Niebuhr of The Meaning of Revelation and Christ and Culture, with his accounts of Christ, the transformer of culture, and of the internal history of the Christian community.

Kaufman and Gustafson have emphasized the side of Niebuhr that took clearest form in Radical Monotheism: the Niebuhr who was most suspicious of the claim of any particular symbol or tradition to capture the One beyond the many. Kaufman, more than Gustafson, has added a political passion: a concern for feminist issues, racial justice, and the threat of nuclear annihilation or ecological catastrophe as the context for theological reflection. Indeed, Sallie McFague, a feminist and ecologically sensitive theologian, has said that hearing Kaufman’s 1982 American Academy of Religion presidential address, "Nuclear Eschatology and the Study of Religion," was an important moment in her own theological development. This new book is full of cautiously crafted theology, but that passion is never far from the surface.

"What are we to make," Kaufman begins by asking, "of the fact that Christian institutions, communities, and traditions have been responsible for so much oppression and suffering in human history?" If Christian symbols have been used at various times to oppress women, justify slavery and foster environmental destruction, then we cannot just keep using those symbols uncritically. To take their "innocence and correctness ... for granted. . . may well only add to our deepest human problems." Yet Kaufman believes that the central Christian symbols "continue to provide a significant resource for the orientation of human life." He doesn’t simply want to give them up. Theology therefore needs to be a process of "imaginative reconstruction," of rethinking and modifying Christian symbols to further the goals of human and cosmic flourishing.

That process of criticism and reconstruction will examine the related ways we think about human beings, our world and God. It will move only in cautious steps. Kierkegaard’s influence has led both neo-orthodox theology and existentialism to talk about a "leap of faith." It is a metaphor, Kaufman argues, that does not really describe the process by which we come to faith. Our belief in God "is built up, rather, out of a number of metaphysical moves and claims which, when they cumulate into a full-blown understanding of reality, and of the human place in this reality, constitute a theocentric world picture."

Kaufman identifies six "small steps" which lead to Christian faith. Each is a step of faith; none can be proven. Yet each represents an intellectual choice that is as defensible as its alternatives. Breaking the movement to faith into this series of steps not only better captures our experience; it also reminds us that there are honest faith positions that stop short of Christianity. One can take some of these steps without taking others.

The first step is "to commit ourselves to the possibility and the desirability of attempting to think through (at least in a rudimentary way) our position on some aspects of the ultimate questions about life, death, and reality." Unlike nihilists and positivists, we will look for answers to ultimate questions. Unlike the dogmatic adherents of various traditions, we will think about these matters, not just accept what some tradition proclaims to us.

To take the second step is to think about the world of our experience "as a part, and expression of, a cosmic evolutionary-historical process that characterizes or pervades all reality" rather than "as transpiring within an eternal structure of things which follows essentially the same patterns forever." Though here again he does not assert that this claim can be proven, Kaufman believes that this choice makes better sense of the historicity of human experience. Human development really does generate something new, not just new repetitions of the same old cycle. To think in terms of history and process, however, is to find the myths of ancient Israel and Christianity with their historical sense of reality, more attractive than the myths of eternal cycles common to many other cultures.

The third step involves claiming that "significant creativity occurs in this cosmos" and that "the emergence of historicity and spirit" is "a manifestation of that creativity." That accepted, "the course of biological evolution on earth, including the emergence of our own human historical mode of being, could properly be regarded as a significant clue to the ultimate mystery of things." In other words, in the cosmic process of change, genuinely new levels emerge: life, human consciousness. And somehow the possibility of their emergence is built into the nature of the cosmic process itself.

The fourth step goes a bit further, to see "the trajectory eventuating in the creation of human historical existence" not "as a metaphysical surd but rather as grounded in the ultimate nature of things, in the ultimate mystery." That this creative process produced human beings is not a fluke but somehow in accord with the deepest structure of how things are.

Fifth, Christians choose to use "God" as the symbol for the ultimate mystery of this creative process, so that "life must at all points be lived in awe and respect before the ultimate mystery of things. But now this mystery is apprehended as profoundly humanizing as well as relativizing: it is a mystery, therefore, that can be loved as well as feared, a mystery within which we can feel at home." The symbol of God, Kaufman maintains, points with particular effectiveness at once to the ultimate mystery and to the relativity of all human expressions of that mystery.

Sixth, "we introduce the symbol ‘Christ’ as a major interpretive category into our theistic world picture." By "Christ," Kaufman means (and claims that at least parts of the New Testament mean) not just Jesus but "that larger, more complex reality surrounding and including and following upon the man Jesus: the new Christian community with its spirit of love and freedom, of mutual sharing and forgiveness of one another." Peter Hodgson’s God in History, Mark Kline Taylor’s Remembering Esperanza, and a number of feminist projects have recently made similar claims. To speak of Christ, for these theologians, is not to speak of one person as savior, and in particular not of one male person, but to say something about a process emerging in the whole life of a community. In taking this sixth step, Christians affirm that the "tendency toward the human and the humane (toward ‘Christ’) in the ultimate nature of things" which has existed since the beginning of time "has become evident and clear only now in the new order of relationships just coming into view" in the Christian community To be sure, "any community which becomes a vehicle in history of more profoundly humane patterns of life" can be a part of this new order, but the events around Jesus have at least a kind of priority as its first clear manifestation.

Christians, then, are people who have decided (1) to think about ultimate questions, (2) to think about them in terms of evolutionary process rather than static order, (3) to think of that process as creative of life and consciousness, (4) to think of its creativity as directed to humanness and humaneness, (5) to use the symbol "God" for the mystery of this process, and (6) to believe that the meaning of the whole process becomes clear in the events surrounding and including Jesus of Nazareth.

The third step, with its claim about creativity may be the crucial one for the nature of Kaufman’s particular project. Traditional theology has thought of creativity as presupposing a creator. If human history has the elegant shape of a well-formed pot, then there must be a potter at work in the fashioning of it. Kaufman rejects this model as no longer credible—and dangerous besides. Since "our modern concept of the universe is of a selfcontained, intradependent whole, the idea of a God who is ‘outside’ the universe is scarcely thinkable today." Moreover, "the conception of the all-powerful cosmic agent can easily become ....a notion of an essentially authoritarian tyrant" demanding unquestioning obedience and thus the excuse for holy wars, persecutions, inquisitions, crusades and tortures.

Kaufman therefore favors an alternative model of creativity as emerging from the serendipity of history. In a good basketball game or a good conversation, the players or speakers "create" something beyond themselves and something genuinely new that none of them could achieve as individuals. Yet we do not look for some creator outside the process; the creativity emerges from the interactive process itself. Analogously, Kaufman sees no need "to think in terms of some ‘cosmic person’ out there somewhere"; his God lies in the mystery of the cosmic process itself. Bultmann’s project of demythologizing, he thinks, didn’t go far enough, for he still spoke of an "other side" or "other world" to which mythological language, however inadequately, points. But this is the only world there is, and creativity comes out of the interaction of forces and agents within it.

But does that process embody as much direction, advancement, and reason for hope as Kaufman wants to claim? Spinoza, who identified God with the cosmos even more unambiguously, concluded that it made no sense to see any teleology at work in nature. Spinoza’s universe simply is—without direction, purpose or goal. Gustafson, with whose work Kaufman’s has much in common, would dismiss Kaufman’s faith that the cosmic process is somehow oriented to humanness and humaneness as unjustified anthropocentrism. "We can say," Kaufman writes,

of the cosmic and historical process which has brought forth human life on earth (paraphrasing Job): ‘Though it slay us—as individuals, even as whole communities—yet will we trust in it.’ For we believe and hope that the cosmic trajectory which has brought us into being is drawing us onward toward a humane ordering of life.

Really? The cosmic process alone?

In all the vast cosmos, after all, we have little knowledge of what has been thrown up anywhere but on the third planet of the minor star we call the sun. In the evolutionary process on this earth, the fittest survive, and, even if we humans do not blow ourselves up, the cockroaches may yet outlast us all. Does the process, overall, really point to humanness and humaneness? If there isn’t a writer or a director, why assume that the play makes any sense, let alone that it will have a happy ending?

Kaufman fudges just a bit at this point. God, he says, "is to be understood as the underlying reality (whatever it may be)—the ultimate mystery—expressing itself throughout the universe and thus also in this evolutionary-historical trajectory... which has produced humankind." So while Kaufman thinks that God isn’t a "cosmic person out there somewhere" and that Bultmann didn’t go far enough because he posited an "other world" to which myths point, nevertheless the universe isn’t quite the only reality: there is an "underlying reality" or "ultimate mystery" that "expresses itself" throughout the universe. To be sure, it’s hard to imagine anyone being more cautious than Kaufman here. "Mystery" gets assigned no personal qualities, and it isn’t one entity, let alone one agent, in the world. Yet a mystery remains tantalizingly behind the process, and one wonders if we have moved quite so far from Bultmann’s appeal to another world as Kaufman claims. And if Kaufman qualifies his position here, is it perhaps because the cosmic process alone isn’t enough to warrant trust, much less worship?

A more basic question about Kaufman’s method also emerges from his talk of this ultimate mystery. He believes that all our religious symbols are inadequate to express it. To take any religious symbol as basic and nonnegotiable is therefore a form of idolatry—taking a particular image for the divine reality that lies beyond all images. Therefore Kaufman says that we have to be constantly criticizing and reformulating our religious symbols in the light of the contribution they make to human flourishing and (remembering ecological concerns) the flourishing of the universe in all its parts. We should use the symbol God "functionally," to refer not to any particular ideas about God "but rather to that reality whatever it might be which draws us on toward full and responsible humaneness."

The problem with such theological functionalism is that the ethical goal seems a given, in terms of which we interpret and evaluate the theological symbols. We know (somehow) what we value for the universe and for human life, and we pick the religious symbols that best serve those ends. Religious ideologues of the left and the right are often accused of using religion to foster a political agenda. Substitute "moral" for "political," and, in a very sophisticated way, that seems what Kaufman is saying we ought to do. Kant lies not too far in the background.

Alternatively, one might say that religious symbols (or myths or narratives or languages) so shape the way we understand the world that they quite fundamentally form what we value for human beings and the cosmos. Our ethics comes out of our theology, not the other way round.

To put the issue like that of course oversimplifies both sides. Kaufman knows that religious symbols evoke connotations and creatively juxtapose ideas in ways that change the way we think even about our basic values. And any plausible critic of his position has to acknowledge all the evil that has been done in the name of religion, and the need for critical examination of religious symbols and their use. Still, theologians differ on the priorities, and those differences constitute one key way of sorting out contemporary theologians.

For functionalists like Kaufman or Peter Hodgson, Sallie McFague or John Hick, another agenda finally provides the criteria for evaluating theological symbols. "If the story of Jesus," Kaufman remarks at one point, "provides significant insight into and orientation for today’s human life and problems, christology can and should continue to have an important place in our theological reflection and our religious devotion; if not, it should be allowed to fall away. For nonfunctionalists like George Lindbeck, Stanley Hauerwas, Elizabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, James Cone or (this can be a tricky case) David Tracy, nothing outside the Christian symbols (or stories) can provide anything like objective criteria for evaluating them, and we do our religious thinking, however critical, within the context of the symbols and stories of our particular tradition. They define what counts as most real and most worthy of value.

My own vote goes for the nonfunctionalists, for a variety of reasons. First, I just don’t know where to get reliable criteria for evaluating religious symbols. Kant, perhaps the greatest theological functionalist, thought he could prove the rationality of a particular set of moral principles, and therefore pick the religious symbols that served those principles best. Can we now be as confident of having a solid place to stand, clear standards of humanness and humaneness, as we evaluate the symbols of religious traditions? If not, perhaps better to begin with a religious tradition whose particularities our situation of religious pluralism will make it impossible to ignore than to start with an unexamined set of values somehow supposedly prior to any set of religious symbols.

Second, I would raise these questions: Is theological functionalism faithful to what religious traditions really mean to say, to the reasons they have such power for us? Do we lose the power of the claim that an itinerant Jewish preacher who taught about love and was murdered by the political establishment of his time was God become human flesh if we turn out to mean only that it’s useful to say that? Can we say of the ultimate mystery, "Though it slay us, yet will we trust it," if we do not flesh out the identity of that mystery with nonfunctionalist content?

Even if one disagrees with its conclusions, however, this is a major book by a major theologian. I especially admire the moral tone of Kaufman’s voice. Early on, having admitted the difficulty of speaking of ultimate mystery at all, he adds, "This does not mean that it is not worth saying, that it is just empty talk... I do have some things to say, but. . . I want it understood from the outset how problematic all of this is, how uncertain; but however uncertain, these are matters worth attending to, worth trying to understand as well as we can." Kaufman is unafraid to be—to use two of his favorite adjectives—both human and humane, honest about both his caution and his passions, and in that he provides even those of us who disagree with him with an admirable model of how to be a theologian.

Is the Bible True?

Whenever there's a really intense fight among American Protestants, sooner or later it seems to turn into an argument over the truth of scripture. At one extreme, some dismiss any appeal to the Bible out of hand and consider "authority" a dirty word. Others confidently assert that only their literalistic interpretations really count as believing the Bible to be true. Many of us find ourselves wandering around confused in the middle, wanting to believe in the Bible, not thinking of ourselves as biblical literalists, but unsure how to characterize our position. Indeed, much of the, notorious malaise of mainstream Protestantism derives from a perception that, to the question, "Is the Bible true?" the moderate answer is, "Well, sort of . . . " followed by either a lot of confusing talk or an embarrassed silence. ,

That perception isn't entirely false. Nonfundamentalists' discussions of appeals to the Bible have often consisted principally in ridiculing fundamentalism, without defining any clear Christian alternative to fundamentalism. I'm going to try, in limited space, to sketch an alternative way of saying, "Yes, the Bible is true."

This claim entails two secondary claims.

First: to say that the Bible is true is to say that what it means is true -- and what it means is shaped by (among other things) the genres in which the Bible is expressed, the attitudes it takes to history, and the ways cultural contexts shaped the meanings of the words that it uses.

Second: to say that this particular book is true is to say that we can trust it, trust it as a guide to faith and life which provides not only specific claims about God's faithfulness and how we ought to live our lives in response to it, but also a way of understanding the whole world and a language in which to speak about that world. These secondary claims may seem a bit complicated, but acknowledging complexity is a way not of hedging commitment to the Bible's truth but of fully attending to the complex ways in which the Bible is true.

First, then, let us consider the relation of truth and meaning. It's an obvious point, really-the truth of a statement or a book depends on what it means. Yet the point often gets lost in discussions of biblical truth. Consider the question of genre-the literary term that refers to the kind of work a particular text is. A novel represents a different genre from a work of history, which is different from a lyric poem, and so on. Different genres make different kinds of truth claims.

A work of fiction, for instance, operates differently from a work of history. If David McCullough simply made up some of 'the episodes recounted in his biography of Harry Truman, then that counts as a fraud-it's not as good a book as we thought . s was, not to be trusted after all. But if Charles Dickens made up Oliver Twist, that doesn't make the novel a lie. Since it belongs to the genre "novel," it isn't supposed to report historical facts accurately.

The distinction between McCullough and Dickens is obvious. Other cases are more difficult. If we pick up one of James Michener's big historical novels, for instance, we know we're reading a work of fiction. Most of the leading characters are imaginary But Michener is famous for his thorough research, and we'll expect that the backgrounds, landscapes and historical contexts are presented with considerable accuracy. If not, then Michener hasn't done his usual homework. If we're reading Mark Twain's A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court, on the other hand, we soon recognize that Twain is having all sorts of fun with deliberate anachronisms, and we don't expect any sort of historical accuracy. To take another example, if we're reading a movie star's autobiography, we assume it will have a more casual relation to the facts than an academic historian's biography of a British prime minister. Different genres have their different rules.

The Bible includes a variety of different genres. When we read in Luke's Gospel Jesus' story about the good Samaritan ("A man was going down from Jerusalem to Jericho, and he fell among robbers, who stripped him and beat him, and departed, leaving him half dead") we are not inclined to check the story against 'the police blotter for the Jerusalem-Jericho highway patrol. We recognize that Jesus is telling a story to illustrate a moral point, and that such stories often don't claim to correspond to actual events.

The opening chapters of Genesis represent a different genre - Karl Barth called it "saga," "an intuitive and poetic picture of a pre-historical reality of history" (Church Dogmatics 3/1). Events get described which no human being could have witnessed. Animals talk. People live for centuries. We're in a different genre here from that represented by, say, the Gospel narratives of Jesus' last days or the stories of the reign of King David in 2 Samuel, which read much more like eyewitness history.

In its intuitive, poetic way, saga communicates truths about the ultimate origins of things, just as the narrative history in the Bible presents truth in a different way, stories with a moral lesson like the good Samaritan in another, and the poetry of the Psalms in yet another. "We are," Barth says, "no less truly summoned to listen to what the Bible has to say here in the form of saga than to what it has to say in other places in the form of history, and elsewhere in the form of address, doctrine, law, epigram, epic and lyric." But we listen faithfully only when we realize what genre we are encountering.

Texts often provide clues as to their genre. When a story begins, "Once upon a time . . ." we expect a fairy tale. When we flip on the television and see someone saying, "A guy walked up to a man in a bar. . ." we know we're watching a comedy club, not the evening news.

But sometimes, particularly when encountering a text from a different culture, it's hard to recognize the genre. For example, Data, the android on Star Trek, can't recognize jokes. He takes them literally, and often finds himself puzzled.

Similarly, when we read an apocalyptic text like Daniel or Revelation, we often find ourselves puzzled, not knowing how we are supposed to understand these particular texts. We're not taking their truth more seriously if we take them as literal predictions about the future, any more than Data is interpreting more accurately when he misses the joke. To misunderstand the genre is to misinterpret the text.

Somewhat different from the question of genre is the issue of how different cultures and different authors understand history and its recording. In his History of the Peloponnesian War, for example, Thucydides recounts speeches at key points in his narrative: "Cleon ... spoke as follows:..." "So Cleon spoke. After him Diodotus ... came forward ... and spoke as follows: . . . " And so on. A modem reader might expect that the reports represent something like transcripts. But in his introduction, Thucydides explains:

I have found it difficult to remember the precise words used in the speeches which I listened to myself and my various informants have experienced the same difficulty; so my method has been, while keeping as closely as possible to the general sense of the words that were actually used, to make the speakers say what, in my opinion, was called for by each situation.

This explanation involves some ambiguity. Keeping "to the general sense of the words that were actually used" sounds like at least a rough paraphrase. But making the speakers say what "was called for by each situation". implies that he imposed his own view of what ought to have been said by the speaker, whether it bears any relation to an actual speech or not. It's at least clear that Thucydides, in many ways the most skeptical and careful of ancient historians, adhered to conventions of "reporting" that a modem historian or newspaper reporter would not be permitted to adopt.

Even in his classic account of the plenary inspiration of scripture, the 19th-century Princeton theologian Charles Hodge acknowledged that "the sacred writers impressed their peculiarities on their several productions." "If a Hebrew was inspired, he spake Hebrew; if a Greek, he spake Greek; if an educated man, he spoke as a man of culture; if uneducated, he spoke as such a man is wont to speak."

And, I would go on to argue, if biblical authors wrote in a culture with an attitude different to historical reporting from ours, then they wrote as the products of such a culture. The Gospels, John Calvin once remarked, were not written "in such a manner as to preserve, on all occasions, the exact order of time." "We know that the Evangelists were not very exact as to the order of dates, or even in detailing minutely everything that Christ said or did." The standards of the best modern journalism or critical history were simply not around in the first century, and it's an anachronism to expect the biblical authors to have followed them.

Regarding historical detail, then, as with respect to understanding genre, we believe in these texts most faithfully when we understand the sort of texts they are and believe what is appropriate in respect to such texts. To treat them as having an attitude to history different from what they do is not to interpret them with maximum accuracy, but to get them wrong.

Another source of confusion in interpreting the Bible, or any text that originated in a culture different from our own, lies in the different social conditions of that different time and the ways those conditions give terms different meanings. For instance, slave owners in the American South regularly cited the positive biblical references to slavery to support the ownership of slaves. But slavery in ancient Israel was a very different sort of institution. It was not based on race. Many slaves were supposed to be freed at the end of seven years, and there was a good bit of movement back and forth between slavery and freedom. Israelite slavery may have been a bad institution, but it was a very different institution from that of American slavery. It was more like the hiring of indentured servants, if one wants an American analogy. So one can’t simply transfer what the Bible says about "slavery" to an American context where the institution and the circumstances are very different and the word therefore has a different meaning.

Similar issues arise with the much-debated issue of homosexuality. We don’t know much about what forms homosexuality may have taken in ancient Israel. In some surrounding cultures, homosexual prostitution was practiced in conjunction with the worship of Baal, and Hebrew law might have condemned such activities because they were homosexual or because they involved prostitution or because they were connected with Baal worship. Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 focus on the issue of male homosexual intercourse: "You shall not lie with a male as with a woman; it is an abomination." "If a man lies with a male as with a woman, both of them have committed an abomination." However, the word used to condemn these actions, toevah (abomination), usually refers to acts that make you ritually unclean, like eating pork or engaging in intercourse during a woman’s menstruation—in contrast, say, to actions such as theft or murder—and these condemnations occur in the midst of others that have mostly to do with ritual purity. It’s hard to be sure what .the practices were or what about them was judged objectionable

.

If two men in the contemporary U.S. (notice that the Levitical passages do not refer to lesbian relations at all) come to love each other, move in with each other and share their lives while having regular sexual intercourse, they are almost certainly doing something unlike anything anybody in ancient Israel did. The cultural context inevitably generates different practices. So when the Bible condemns some activities that were being done in ancient Israel, should we assume that it also condemns these differently contextualized activities today? I’m not sure I know the answer to that question; my point is simply that it’s a complicated question.

Similar issues arise with Paul’s condemnation of malakoi and arsenokoitai in 1 Corinthians 6:9. The first word derives from a word meaning "soft" and could apparently refer to effeminacy or masturbation. (On this and other points I am drawing on John J. McNeill’s The Church and the Homosexual and John Boswell’s Christianity, Social Tolerance, and Homosexuality, though I do not accept all their conclusions.) The second is a very unusual word, which appears in Greek in this grammatical form for the first time in this letter. In its first usage outside the New Testament, in the second-century Apology of Aristides, it probably means something like "an obsessive corrupter of boys." In neither case is it obvious that the word refers to all (male) homosexuals.

For that matter, there just isn’t a word in classical Greek (or Hebrew or Aramaic) that exactly corresponds to our modern English word "homosexual," because there wasn’t anything that exactly corresponds to today’s homosexuality—which is itself, of course, a most diverse phenomenon. In part of the ancient Creek world (Kenneth Dover’s Greek Homosexuality provides the best account), it was common for young adult men to be the active partners in sexual relations with adolescent boys. The boy was not supposed to take any pleasure in the sexual act—that would be a disgrace to him— but to experience it passively as a way of expressing his appreciation for the man’s patronage. Homosexual relations represented a stage in some young men’s lives, after which they would settle down to heterosexual marriage. There are all sorts of reasons one might want to condemn such behavior, which represented at least one common pattern of male homosexual behavior Paul would have encountered in his culture—that it involved young boys, that it was not a matter of mutual pleasure, that it was a way of expressing one partner’s superiority over the other, and soon—while perhaps not condemning some of the different forms homosexual activity takes in our culture.

I’m not defending any particular conclusion in the debates on biblical views of homosexuality. Given the logic of my position, arguing for any particular conclusion would require more detailed historical analysis than I can offer here. Many recent discussions seem to assume, however, that the only alternatives are either to quote a few passages, as if what they said ended debate, or else not to care what the Bible says about these matters. I think there is an interpretive middle ground on this and many other issues: to figure out the real point of biblical passages, understood in context. I’m not sure how the debate on homosexuality would turn out if defined that way, but I believe it would be more edifying than many recent discussions of these matters have been. And in proceeding in such fashion, we’re not watering down our fidelity to what the Bible says. On the contrary, by trying to understand its meaning better, we’re trying to be more faithful to it.

To understand how the Bible is true, therefore, we must understand its genres, recognize its attitudes toward the reporting of historical details, and consider the social context in which it was written. This much could be said about any text of sufficient complexity.

All this makes understanding the Bible sound very complicated. It may also seem that the truth of the Bible is getting lost in a morass of qualifications. The issues are complicated, but we needn’t despair of finding biblical truth because, finally, we can trust the Bible. In this respect, Christians read the Bible differently from the way they read any other book.

Some years ago, Anglican Bishop John A. T. Robinson wrote a book called Can We Trust the New Testament?—and "trust" provides a good category for thinking about the special attitude Christians take to this book. When we trust people, we recognize their jokes as jokes, their metaphors as metaphors, and their fishing stories for the tall tales that they are. We also recognize that on the things that really matter, they won’t lead us astray. So with the Bible. With all qualifications duly noted, we can still think that, as a guide to Christian faith and life, it won’t lead us fundamentally astray. Turning the question "Is the Bible true?" to a question of trust is faithful to the Bible itself, for the Hebrew word we translate as "truth" carries the connotations of "trustworthiness" or "steadiness" or "faithfulness." The true person, in Hebrew, is the one you can trust—and so the true book as well.

Why should we trust this book in particular? That’s a question that admits of no short answer. In part, we trust the Bible because we find that it keeps making sense of the world in which we live. Using nearly every genre and every attitude to historical detail imaginable, the Bible lays out a richly diverse vision of the world, from beginning to end, and says, in effect, "This isn’t some imaginary world, like Tolkien’s Middle Earth. This is the real world, the only one there is. So if you buy into this basic picture of things, then anything real has to fit somewhere into this framework. Your life and the events around you thus will make sense only as they have their place within this grand story."

And Christians find that, if they keep reading this book and live their lives in the context of the community that reads it, that promise keeps getting fulfilled, albeit always tentatively and incompletely. The categories the Bible uses, the models it offers for understanding human life and the world around us, and the God about whom it tells can seem at first strange, but we find them ever and again providing clues that put together pieces of our fragmented world in unexpected ways.

Perhaps the most important element in this mix is that we trust the Bible because we have come to trust the God about whom it tells us. The process of coming to this kind of trust moves in a kind of circle: we trust in that God in significant part because of what we learn in the Bible. It’s a mistake to look for a single entry point into this circle. No one doctrine provides the foundation on which we believe all the others. We find ourselves trusting, in the way we sometimes find ourselves in love, without being able to define the steps that led to that state, and the elements that shape our trust are tied together in complicated ways. Even a complete systematic theology will not fully explain such matters, but it follows that we cannot work out even a fairly good doctrine of scripture without, for instance, a doctrine of the Holy Spirit, and then, in turn, a doctrine of the Triune God. If the Bible invites us into the world it narrates and describes, it also gives us a language in which to think about the world. The experience of finding yourself thinking in a previously foreign language offers another analogy for what it is like to learn to trust the Bible. Moving into a new culture or learning a new skill often involves learning a new language. To understand Japan, I need to learn Japanese. To become a lawyer, I need to learn the vocabulary of the law. When I learn these new languages, I’m not just acquiring a new stock of words; I’m learning to think in a different way.

Christians today often think of their world in the vocabularies of contemporary politics or popular culture. But the Bible offers us an alternative. Those poor folk across town are not just "welfare recipients" or even "fellow citizens"; they’re. "neighbors." That action wasn’t just "inappropriate behavior" or even "crime"; it was "sin." When we use such a vocabulary, we find ourselves thinking about the world in different ways—and sometimes, at least, we may find common ground with other Christians from whom we were divided when our only language was that of contemporary politics.

To trust the Bible, to let it define our world and provide a language for thinking about the world, can transform our lives. But it does not make understanding the Bible easy. We have to get down to hard work—to reading the Bible and immersing ourselves in its world and its language. We need to know the Bible well enough so that, as was true for Augustine or Luther or Calvin, one passage reminds us of another that offers a qualification, another that provides support, another that sets out a different frame of reference.

Such immersion in the biblical world and its language leads to much richer interpretation than either quoting proof texts or picking and choosing passages we like. When we really know the Bible, we realize its complexities, its diversities, its ambiguities. One of our problems these days, whether we are "liberals" or "fundamentalists," is how few of us can do that. Fundamentalists quote a single proof text to settle the matter, and liberals can’t remember any passages at all. If we are to get beyond such a state of affairs, we will have to study the Bible much more seriously. But if we believe the Bible is true, if we really trust it, we ought to be willing to do the work.

Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible: A Resource for Preaching

Rhetoric and preaching - what do the two have to do with one another? The question is as old as the early church's concern over the use of pagan practices of oratory. Today, many are wary that the study of ancient and contemporary rhetoric will cause their preaching to become pompous, rigid and loaded with false gimmickry. Yet the study of rhetoric can be very profitable for preaching, not because it teaches a "bag of tricks," but because it raises the important issue of persuasion. Aristotle did this when he defined rhetoric as "an ability, in each particular case, to see the available means of persuasion." Instinctively we know that our best preaching comes about when we have discovered the ways in which the biblical writers sought to change minds, hearts, and lives and then have taken those "available means of persuasion" with us into the pulpit. This essay then, is about the use of rhetoric to study Scripture in preparation for preaching. Its goals are two. The first is to introduce rhetorical criticism of the Bible by reviewing recent publications on the subject. The second is to demonstrate one way to use rhetorical criticism for study and preaching, using as an example the story of Joseph in Potiphar's house.

I. Rhetorical Criticism of the Bible: Recent Publications

Rhetorical criticism of the Bible is nothing new; it can be traced back at least as early as Augustine, but the twentieth century practice of rhetorical criticism finds its origins in James Muilenburg's work with Hebrew poetry and Amos Wilder's lectures on early Christian rhetoric. Both focused their attention on the literary qualities of the text and used analysis of the writer's styles to enhance appreciation and deepen understanding. Muilenburg's practice of close reading and compositional analysis influenced a generation of scholars. Two of those students have written methodological works.

Phyllis Trible in Rhetorical Criticism: Context, Method and the Book of Jonah reviews the discipline of rhetorical criticism as practiced in the fields of speech communication and biblical studies, directing the reader to significant works that have been produced in both. She outlines Muilenburg's method and surveys the many and varied approaches of interpreters who name him as an influence. Two summaries of her own approach to rhetorical criticism are presented, one at the beginning of the book and one at the end. The first lists ten steps one can take in response to Muilenburg's dictum: "proper articulation of form yields proper articulation of meaning." The steps will be most useful to those who use Hebrew, since great attention is paid to word choices and patterns in the Hebrew text. A second summary, "guidelines for continuing," raises important questions about authorial intention, reader subjectivity, and the relationship between artistry and theology. Between the two is an extensive demonstration of the method at work with the book of Jonah.

Probably Trible's treatment of the dialogue between YHWH and Jonah best highlights the advantages and limitations of her approach. The discovery of a chiastic structure (in which the structure of the first half of the discourse is mirrored by the second) is used to explicate the theology of the book. Observing that YHWH's compassionate words for Nineveh have no parallel in the dialogue (as every other sentence does), she concludes that YHWH's pity for the city is to be compared to Jonah's pity for the plant. The responses are reciprocal: "The two passages counter each other as angry Jonah berates YHWH and merciful YHWH seeks to persuade Jonah. Both passages surprise the reader; the rhetoric of gap filling discloses the unexpected in Jonah."

Trible's careful attention to the repetition of the word "pity" has produced this reading, and certainly the many pages of verbal and structural analysis show this to be her strength. However, the book lacks a broad concern for the nature and power of rhetoric as a social phenomenon. By omitting this, I believe that Trible does not offer as much help in understanding the importance of Scripture for personal and societal transformation. Her book does provide a wide-ranging introduction to the study of rhetoric and a clear and useable method for textual analysis.

For Dale Patrick, another of Muilenburg's students, and Allen Scult, a rhetorician, the question of audience becomes more central. They believe that the call for rhetorical criticism by Muilenburg and followers intended to "encounter texts in their concrete particularity," yet the method's emphasis on stylistics kept their work from becoming a true rhetorical criticism. In Rhetoric and Biblical Interpretation they recommend that the definition of rhetoric be broadened to its fullest range in the classical tradition, namely as "the means by which a text establishes and manages it relationship to its audience in order to achieve a particular effect." They also claim that the rhetorical perspective provides a way to "balance and integrate" the competing concerns of critical analysis and persuasive religious reading.

In their view, the narrative of the Hebrew Bible does possess an innate rhetorical component that is distinct from the political and somewhat abstract formulations of Greek rhetoric. The biblical writers used narrative to report the acts of God in "imitation of the divine rhetorical impulse." In other words, God spoke through his mighty acts to call humankind to faith and conformity to his will. The narratives of the Bible report those acts for the same purpose and even prescribe ritual events for the telling and retelling of the sacred stories. The writers contend, against that view of Robert Alter in The Art of Biblical Narrative, that the narratives of the Hebrew Bible were not meant to be read as fiction that imagines what could happen to the individual reader, but as real events reported to a collected audience. The result of such address is the creation of a community with a common identity. Patrick and Scult do not ignore the matter of close and careful examination of the text. They point out matters of style and structure, and they ask about the persuasive intentions that motivated those choices. For this reason I am grateful for their extended discussion on aims, purposes, and method. Chapters on Job and the creation narratives round out this fine work.

Two other books deal with rhetorical criticism of both the Old and New Testaments. Duane Watson and Alan Hauser have compiled a bibliography that stands as both an excellent reference work and a solid introduction. The Old and New Testament sections each include an essay on history and method, noting the differences in practice. Hauser's Old Testament essay defines rhetorical criticism as a form of literary criticism that highlights the artistry in the text in order to discuss its message and its impact on audiences. It makes comparisons with the content, literary style and structure of other ancient Near Eastern texts. The bibliographies therefore list works of both literary criticism and rhetorical criticism.

The New Testament essay by Watson speaks with contagious enthusiasm. A brief historical sketch notes the rhetorical exegeses of Augustine, Melanchton and Calvin, and even Bultmann's doctoral dissertation. Yet New Testament studies became increasingly isolated in the nineteenth century as the study of rhetoric was given a back seat in school curriculums and limited to the study of style and ornamentation (Watson names Nils Lund's Chiasmus in the New Testament as a notable exception). Revival came with the work of Amos Wilder and others like Hans Dieter Betz, whose commentary on Galatians sought to demonstrate the influence of Quintilian's Institutio Oratoria and other rhetorical handbooks.

Here is the major difference in method. Rhetorical criticism of the Old Testament makes comparisons with writings of the time, but New Testament critics can refer to speeches, letters and the instructional manuals that document the rhetorical cultures of Greece and Rome. For example, criticism of the gospels has been enhanced through study of the chreia, a short and pithy saying recorded and attributed to a famous character because it was regarded as useful for living. Watson also explains the debate over the influence of rhetorical training on Paul, arguing that his letters must be understood in light of their persuasive purposes. Yet he admits that the use of classical rhetoric has its limitations and problems, especially in establishing the conscious use of standards for oratory in the writing of narratives and letters. Modern theories of rhetoric have also been used to place new emphasis on argumentation, since much classical criticism has been overly concerned with arrangement and style.

The bibliographies are nicely organized into sections for each biblical book under study. A few other sections treat rhetorical criticism in general; one directs the user to foundational works in the field, while others introduce terms and concepts particular to Greco-Roman rhetoric, the Jewish rhetorical heritage, and contemporary approaches. This is certainly the best one-volume survey of the field available.

The Bible as Rhetoric: Studies in Biblical Persuasion and Credibility is a collection of essays that explore "the ways in which the persuasive (and related literary) procedures of the biblical writers cut across or reinforce their concern with truth." Contributors come from the fields of philosophy, religion, biblical studies, English literature and, in the case of one professor, classical rhetoric. John Barton shows how the prophets used persuasive techniques that are found in ancient Near Eastern literature. David Clines deconstructs Job. The New Testament essays are mostly related in some way to the truth claims of the Gospels and their authoritative claims on readers.

It is profitable to observe the uses of rhetoric made by scholars from the different fields, although each does speak in a tongue perhaps best understood by members of the same scholarly community. The positions alternate between skepticism and affirmation, questioning and doubt, and this is how it should be, given the nature of the conference at which these papers were delivered. There are some very insightful essays on biblical texts here (one on allegory stands out in my mind) but as an introduction or explication of the methods of rhetorical criticism, it will not be of as much help.

Three more works deal with the New Testament alone. George Kennedy, a renowned classical scholar, became interested in rhetorical criticism of the Bible when graduate students in Old and New Testament asked to study with him. He wrote, in New Testament Interpretation through Rhetorical Criticism, "For some readers of the Bible rhetorical criticism may have an appeal lacking to other modern critical approaches, in that it comes closer to explaining what they want explained in the text: not its sources, but its power."

The book makes two important contributions. First, Kennedy outlines a method that the biblical interpreter can use to practice a form of rhetorical criticism. The interpreter identifies and examines the rhetorical unit to be studied, the rhetorical situation in which the original communication was accomplished, the rhetorical problem that was addressed, and the rhetorical strategy chosen to answer it. Second, Kennedy engages the text as a rhetorician, so his commentary is quite unlike those we often use in preaching. He not only shows how Jesus, the gospel writers, or Paul used well-known rhetorical techniques, he also helps us to listen to the urgency with which the Scriptures were written.

Kennedy urges the biblical interpreter to pay close attention to the persuasive purpose that motivates the communication. Does the text seem to be designed to strengthen the believers' faith, helping them to believe "more profoundly?" Then its elevation of faith as praiseworthy shares the purposes of epideictic, the rhetoric of praise or blame. If the passage calls its audience to choose or reject certain actions, as, for example, Paul warned the Galatian males to reject circumcision, it is an example of deliberative rhetoric. Accusations and defenses are examples of judicial rhetoric, as illustrated by Paul's defense of his apostleship in 2 Corinthians.

Preachers will most likely find that this is a helpful introduction to rhetorical criticism. It is thorough without becoming overly technical, and it keeps its main purpose of reading biblical texts at the forefront. Kennedy's method has been reproduced in a number of books and essays on rhetorical method, and so it has become something of a standard.

Wilhelm Wuellner's article, "Rhetorical Criticism," in The Postmodern Bible outlines Kennedy's method before it goes on to raise questions about the rhetoric of interpretation itself. He first applies Kennedy's method to 1 Cor 9:1-10:13 and then uses it as a base from which to launch a critical examination of that approach. Wuellner's stated goal is to examine "the need for rhetorical analysis not only of texts but also of the practices of reading texts." In his view, Kennedy's method is a very important and necessary first step, but it does not practice such self-reflective analysis nor does it appreciate how critic and text work together to create meaning.

Wuellner views the early christian rhetoric of the New Testament writings as a new form of persuasive communication that, due to the influence of Jewish rhetorical practices, went counter to the prevailing norms and regulations of Greco-Roman rhetoric. What is most important to his view is the focus on the rhetorical situation, "the particular situation in which someone attempts to persuade someone else." It is the rhetorical situation, the persuasive demands of the audience and the occasion, that stands between the historical and cultural context and the literary or poetic strategies of the text. Kennedy also recommends study of the rhetorical situation in his approach, but Wuellner brings a social critique. He believes that without an appreciation of the rhetorical situation and its contexts, the rhetoric of interpretation can silence minority viewpoints and fail to challenge the unjust use of power. These important observations that remind us that both interpretation and proclamation of the biblical texts are exercises of power in themselves that should not go unexamined.

Burton Mack is another interpreter who believes that interpreters must pay attention to the cultural context in which a rhetorical act takes place. Mack argues at length in Rhetoric and the New Testament that rhetoric is not to be understood as stylistic ornamentation, but as persuasive argumentation. His history of the loss and recovery of rhetoric in biblical interpretation highlights the publication of Perleman and Olbrechts-Tyteca's The New Rhetoric: A Treatise on Argumentation in 1969. The new rhetoric they described was actually a restatement and reappropriation of the classical principles of argumentation combined with a new sense of the rhetorical situation and its importance. This meeting of new and old guides Mack in his approach.

Mack provides a thorough survey of classical rhetoric and an extended demonstration of argument analysis, examining the structure of argument in the teachings of Jesus, the epistles of Paul, the epistle to the Hebrews, the Gospels and Acts. However, argument analysis and its long lists of labels can look like a lot of bean sorting. What new understanding is gained by listing the different steps in an argument? Mack shows how Paul was able to use the judicial argument for his apostleship in I Corinthians 9 to deliver an encomium, an epideictic speech of praise. Paul took his self-defense as an opportunity to build up his pedigree, education, virtues, manner of life, deeds, achievements and rewards in order to establish his authority. The argument begins with Paul arguing for his rights as an apostle and ends by establishing his authority to speak for God.

Mack believes that a study of the sources Paul used to construct his authority also helps the interpreter to reconstruct and describe the social situation Paul addressed, one in which standards for authority were unclear and under negotiation. In this way, rhetorical criticism fills the gap between historical and sociological approaches to biblical study. Readers will probably find his insights into the arguments for authority stimulating and challenging (he believes they are sometimes one-sided, harsh, and divisive), and they may find it difficult to use his method of argument analysis without some background in classical forms. Still, Mack's book is helpful in alerting the preacher to the structures of argument at work in many biblical texts and to the social situations that produced them.

Now that we have looked at a number of books on the subject, where are we? We began talking about the close study of word patterns and structures and ended up reflecting on the authoritative function of biblical texts. Along the way, we have observed two basic elements in these approaches to rhetorical criticism, the careful and detailed examination of the biblical text and the broader demonstration of persuasive purpose. To summarize in very broad strokes, we've seen that Trible's attention to the structures and details of the Hebrew text is complemented by Patrick and Scult's stress on the negotiated relationship between writers and readers. Likewise, Kennedy's search for the persuasive genre of a New Testament text is complemented by Mack's focus on the details of classical argumentation. Therefore, as preachers try to learn from and use the growing body of biblical scholarship on rhetorical criticism, they will find it necessary both to comb the text for signs of literary-rhetorical artistry and to step back and identify their persuasive function. While a close reading of the text will usually come first, the two procedures go hand in hand, informing one another as the study progresses.

II. Joseph in Potiphar's House (Genesis 39)

I began to prepare for a homily on this narrative by noting the repetitions of "the LORD" in the chapter. I also observed that Joseph names the name of God. His answer to Potiphar's wife, "How could I do this great wickedness and sin against God?" is Joseph's first speech about God in the story. This speech is quite different from the indiscreet and grandiose report of his dreams in Genesis 37. There Joseph seems unaware of God and perhaps more than a little self-centered, but here he presents himself as a mature and pious young man.

The rest of Joseph's short speech lists the honors and responsibilities Potiphar had given him, and one would expect Joseph to conclude that he could not sin against Potiphar by repaying his master's good with evil. However, Potiphar is not the only one who has been good to Joseph; the narrator reports that "His master saw that the LORD was with him and that the LORD caused all that he did to prosper in his hands" (Gen 39:3). Twice the verse states that "the LORD was with him" and the same phrase is repeated in verses 2, 21 and 22. The idea is reinforced as the LORD's blessing is noted in verses 2, 5, and 23. The narrator does not mention God when Joseph and the wife are alone in the house, but the incident is framed with the narrator's reports of the LORD's presence and blessing in the houses of slavery and prison. These notices take on greater significance when the reader observes that they are not found elsewhere in the story of Joseph and his family. Nearly all other notices of God's activity are found in the speech of the characters as if to reveal their growing awareness of what the storyteller has told the reader; God is present and active, even when God remains hidden from view.

To summarize, by paying attention to the presence and absence of words about God in both Genesis 39 and the larger context of Genesis 37-50, I discerned the significance of Joseph's first words about God. They show that Joseph is aware of what everyone else (with the possible exception of Potiphar's wife) sees: God is with him and gives him success.

Moving to the second part of the rhetorical process, I tried to discern the writer's persuasive purpose and its bearing on the interpretation of the incident. The story seems to be cast in the mold of a moral tale, the kind in which the good are rewarded and the wicked are punished. But that is just the opposite of what happens here; Joseph is punished with prison and nothing more is said about Potiphar's wife. Obviously, we cannot use the story by itself to teach a moral lesson, unless we want to say that Joseph did the right thing without regard for his own welfare.

Then again, the story wasn't written to be understood apart from its context. The frequent mention of the LORD's presence might also work to assure the audience that God has not abandoned Joseph and the story will not end with Joseph in prison. The incident in Potiphar's house should therefore be set in the larger context of the whole story of Genesis 37-50. At its end, Joseph's words about God make the theology of the story clear; God was at work in this family for its salvation and the salvation of many others. The brothers intended evil, but God intended good (Gen 45:7-8; 50:19-20). The story as a whole was written to persuade the reader that God is present and active, even when that activity is hard to see in the face of human choices.

Joseph's first words about God in Potiphar's house seem to be a foreshadow of the weighty words of revelation that come at the end. They point to Joseph's realization that his success is a gift. They also point to the importance of human choices, large and small. Choices are ultimately responses to God, and they have significant consequences that often are not immediately seen. Therefore Joseph's flight from Potiphar's wife is more than a moral example, it is Joseph's first acknowledgement that he sees God at work in the world of cause and effect. He sees God, needs God, and on that basis senses his responsibility to God. The story does not simply give advice on how to behave; it urges its audience to develop God-centered sensitivities and responses. It persuades the audience that life is to be lived in reverent awareness of the presence of God.

HOMILY: JOSEPH IN POTIPHAR'S HOUSE

I read Genesis 39:1-6 (NRSV) that ends with the sentence, "Now Joseph was handsome and good looking."

I need to stop a minute before I tell you the rest of the story- not because it is too racy to talk about in chapel (after all it is in the Bible), but because we know it so well. Most of us can recite the story of Joseph, the boy who just said no to the advances of Potiphar's wife. Not only does he tell her no, he runs and leaves his tunic in her hands after she makes one last desperate grab for him. We know what happens next; she accuses Joseph and her angry husband throws him into prison.

We read the story as an example of virtue in action. It has been called a wisdom story that dramatizes the proverb, "keep away from the adulterous woman." It has been used to illustrate what Paul meant when he warned Timothy to "flee youthful lusts." It is a morality play for young men that we generalize to include everyone who is tempted. We know what it means for us; cross to the other side of the street to avoid temptation; run to the other side of town if you have to.

You would expect a story like this to be included in William Bennett's Book of Virtues, now in two volumes. I checked. The entire story of Joseph and his brothers is included, but this incident is left out. It only says that Potiphar's wife told lies about him and so Joseph was thrown into prison. Now I can understand the logic behind that decision; there is plenty of virtue in the rest of the story and this part will be difficult to explain to children, so it can't hurt to skip over it. But if we take out the story of Joseph in Potiphar's house we lose something more than a morality play. It is what Joseph says to Potiphar's wife that is important, perhaps even more important than what he does, because it is the reason for what he does. We need to look at why he says no and to whom he says yes.

Notice what Joseph says to the woman's pleas. "Look, with me here, my master has no concern about anything in the house, and he has put everything that he has in my hand. He is not greater in this house than I am, nor has he kept back anything from me except yourself, because you are his wife. How could I do this great wickedness and sin against --- God?" (Gen 39:9) We're probably not surprised that Joseph speaks of God here, but perhaps we should be. Everything he has described makes it sound as though Joseph owes Potiphar for the master's confidence in him. But Joseph doesn't say, "How could I do this to Potiphar?" or even, "How could I compromise my integrity?" No, Joseph says, "How could I do this thing against God?" Joseph is aware of God. It is the first time he has spoken of God. From the moment we first saw him in his expensive coat and heard him boasting of his dreams, we have not heard him talk about God until now, and this is important. It reveals that he is aware of what the storyteller has already told us, that God blessed Joseph and caused what he did to prosper. We know it, and we read that Potiphar saw it, but until Joseph calls out the name of God we are not sure that he sees it.

But see it he does. Joseph saw what God was doing. Joseph saw that God blessed him and was at work in his life. Bottom line, it wasn't Potiphar who did all this good for him, and it wasn't Joseph's own doing either. Neither Joseph's cleverness nor his connections brought about his success; it was God who made him who he was, and it was God who put him where he was. Because God was with him Potiphar put all things into his hands. Because he was aware of God, he knew that taking Potiphar's wife would be a sin not just against Potiphar, but against God. Joseph saw God at work in his life and it made all the difference.

These are tough days for ministry, perhaps no tougher than any that have gone before, but they are still tough. We talk to our youth groups and try to tell them to do the right thing, and they look at us and say with their eyes, if not their words, "WHY?" We try to encourage adults who want to make a difference in this world but ask themselves if the good they do does any good. Somehow, telling them to just do the right thing doesn't seem to say enough.

The writer who gave Generation X its name, Douglas Coupland, has written a book called Life After God. It is a collection of stories about "the first generation raised without religion." The last of these is told in first person by a young man called Scout. Scout hates his job at a small software company he calls the Evil Empire. He has just decided to stop taking the little yellow pills that have helped him through a rough patch of depression. He says that they made him into a nicer person and a more productive worker, a well-adjusted member of society, but he threw the pills away because he wants to feel something.

Scout tells his story through the stories of the his high-school friends. He remembers the times they swam together in their warm swimming pools, floating like embryos. Their life, he says, was an earthly paradise but in exchange for God, they were left with an inability to believe in love, an irony that "scorched everything it touched."

It is fifteen years later, and the friends have had a hard time. Mark, the one with the powerful body, is dying of AIDS. Stacey, blond hip-chick with the Malibu Barbie body, is a divorced aerobics instructor and an alcoholic. Todd plants trees for a logging company and blows his income on drugs, a lifestyle Scout calls "wake and bake." Julie was the normal one, the sensible one. She got married and is raising two kids in the suburbs. Scout sometimes goes to visit her and her good-guy husband Simon. Once she said to him, "You know - I'm trying to escape from ironic hell: cynicism into faith; randomness into clarity; worry into devotion. But it's hard because I try to be sincere about life and then I turn on a TV and I see a game show host and I have to throw up my hands and give up. Too many easy pickin's!"

On an impulse Scout decides to make a pilgrimage into the forest where his dad took him camping as a boy. Not bothering to change out of the coat and tie he wore to work, he packed his boy scout tent, drove a few hours, and walked another hour into the woods. He set up the tent underneath thousand year old pines and spent the night in it, thinking. The next morning he was thirsty, so he went down to the stream for a drink. The water was cold, and he took off his shoes and socks and stepped into the stream. The icy water stung, but he didn't mind it. He stripped off the rest of his clothes and waded into a pool until the water came up to his waist, his shoulders, his neck. Finally, he buried his head under the water that had been ice the day before. He pulled up his legs into a fetal position and floated, listening to the roar of the waters that sounded like a thousand hands clapping, "the hands that heal; the hands that hold; the hands we desire because they are better than desire."

Scout said this: "Now - here is my secret: I tell it to you with an openness of heart that I doubt I shall ever achieve again, so I pray that you are in a quiet room as you hear these words. My secret is that I need God - that I am sick and can no longer make it alone. I need God to help me give, because I no longer seem to be capable of giving; to help me be kind, as I no longer seem capable of kindness; to help me love, as I seem beyond being able to love."

Two stories, and both are about seeing. Joseph saw God at work in his life, Scout saw his need for God. The story of Joseph, all the stories of the Bible are not just stories in a book of virtues, they are stories of people who see God at work in their worlds, who see that they need God desperately. Isn't that what we want for the people we serve now and those we will minister with in the years to come? Isn't that what we want for ourselves?