Archives: Articles

In Alfred North Whitehead’s metaphysical system, God is not the source of creativity and, in that sense, not the Creator-God. For Whitehead, the relation of creativity to God has two sides. On the one hand, he designed his doctrine of creativity to eliminate the need for a Creator-God. Whitehead argued instead that each actual entity is self-creating. He wrote: "There are not two actual entities, the creativity and the creature. There is only one entity which is the self-creating creature" (Religion 202). The term "creativity" names that act of self-creation.

On the other hand, Whitehead’s doctrine of creativity does require the existence of a God, not as creator but as the ultimate source of eternal objects and, thus, of both novelty and order. That is, each actual entity, precisely to be self-creating, requires a supply of possible characteristics with which to create its own identity. It requires, in Whitehead’s vocabulary, a stock of eternal objects. If we ask where these eternal objects come from, Whitehead gives us two answers. At one level, they come from the past (finite) actual entities. But at another level, Whitehead locates the final supply of eternal objects in a single actual entity he calls God. Thus a complete explication of creativity requires a God (in the sense of a location of and a principle of relevance among all eternal objects). But this God is not the source of creativity and therefore not a creator-God.

I will suggest a revised doctrine of creativity in which I affirm God as the source of creativity. I hold that my revision coheres better with the rest of Whitehead’s system than does his own doctrine in that it provides additional evidence for many features of his doctrine of God and in some cases reduces the arbitrariness of those features. I also claim that my revision provides a more fruitful description of human experience. And lastly I maintain that the most powerful reasons for separating God from creativity do not apply to my revised understanding of creativity and of God as the creator.

I. Reasons for the Separation of Creativity and God

The weightiest reason for separating creativity from God, likely in Whitehead’s own thinking and certainly in the arguments of many followers, was to preserve the freedom of the creatures.

Whitehead offered an analysis of freedom among the most subtle and persuasive of any in the twentieth century. The most relevant factors are these: (a) Freedom requires an autonomous subject. That is, freedom requires a decision-making agent that exists in distinction from other agents and whose decisions stem from itself and not from an other. (b) Those decisions are always from among a range of options. The subject’s decision among those options, to be free, must not be totally explicable by reference to efficient causes, to prior causes, whether "internal" or "external" to that subject. To that extent the free decisions are spontaneous and resistant to any causal analysis. (c) The decisions must be for a purpose or have a goal, where this teleology is not reducible to causation. Thus the spontaneity of free decisions, while random from the standpoint of an external, scientific causal analysis, is neither purely arbitrary nor beyond understanding. Free decisions are purposeful and thus understandable. (d) Freedom requires a context of order and causality. The full explications of freedom and causality require reference to each other. And (e) other actual entities establish the limits of the range of options from which the subject can choose. And other agents greatly determine the "quality of those options. And the subject may have only a very limited capacity (that is, lack consciousness, have a deficient environment, etc.) with which to make its choices. Thus freedom is a matter of "more and less." While a subject’s freedom may be restricted and trivial, it is, however, never totally absent as long as the subject remains a subject.

Process thinkers argue that the traditional¹ understanding of God as the creator undercuts the freedom of the creatures because, as Whitehead wrote, "the freedom inherent in the universe is constituted by this element of self-causation" (Process 31). According to the standard process argument, a God who creates ex nihilo, "works the will" of the creatures, thus compromising their autonomy That is, the traditional way of unpacking the claim that God creates "all things in heaven and in earth" results in a view of God as the ultimate cause of each detail of the universe thus compromising finite freedom. Some defenders of the traditional doctrine of creatio ex nihilo hold that cause has a series of analogous meanings, making the divine cause significantly unlike ordinary causes and, thus, not a threat to creaturely freedom. Process thinkers, however, would maintain that this still leaves us with causation, structure, and form, but no genuine freedom. In such a world, the creatures have a fate but not a destiny (to use Tillich’s wonderful phrase). In the past, process thinkers have argued that the best way to "save" creaturely freedom is to separate God and creativity.

By separating creativity from God, according to his advocates, Whitehead also contributed significantly to theodicy. Process thinkers ask: if God is the ultimate creator or cause of each detail of the universe, then is not God the author of evil? It is not hard to find examples of monotheistic theologians against whom this charge could be leveled quite convincingly. Other traditional theologians, however, have argued that God is not the cause of each detail of the universe because God chose to give some creatures "free will." These particular "traditional" theologians agree with the process thinkers that a creature’s decisions cannot be free if God is the cause of those decisions. Most process thinkers grant this advances in the right direction, but not far enough. They have challenged this form of the free will defense on several grounds, the most basic of which we have already mentioned: because the traditional doctrine of creation affirms that God creates the agent’s free will, it ought to follow that the traditional God works the free will of the creatures, where this is inconsistent with the doctrine of freedom outlined above. If, however, we separate creativity from God, so that each creature is self-creative, then clearly God does not work the will of the creature, thus effectively sustaining a free will theodicy.²

It is possible to develop other reasons for the separation of creativity and God that Whitehead himself did not advance and that process thinkers, to my knowledge, have not considered in depth. I have in mind the work of Tillich and Heidegger. In discussing their views, it is convenient to distinguish between (a) a doctrine of God, (b) a doctrine of Being or Being-Itself, and (c) a doctrine of particular beings such as Aristotle’s substances or Whitehead’s actual entities. Tillich designated Being-Itself as God. Tillich then argued, however, that Being-itself could not really function as Being-itself if it were merely "a" being. Tillich, thus, radically separated particular beings (the furniture of the universe) from his doctrine of God/Being-Itself. Whitehead’s creativity may be likened, in some ways, to Tillich’s Being-Itself. And it might be argued that creativity could not really be creativity if it were located in a particular, concrete entity. On this point, Whitehead would agree with Tillich. Unlike Tillich, however, Whitehead chose not to identify his creativity with God. Rather, he considered God to be a particular actual entity Whitehead can even call God a creature, (and, thus, a part of the furniture of the universe). In refusing to identify creativity with any particular being, Whitehead confirms Tillich’s view that Being-Itself must not be "confined" within any particular entity

Heidegger would agree with both Tillich and Whitehead that Being must not be identified with particular beings.³ Unlike Tillich, however, Heidegger also refused to identify Being with God, at least in any traditional definition of "God." This would seem to parallel Whitehead’s refusal to identify creativity with God. In short, the separation of creativity and God, it would seem, both confirms and is confirmed by; these two major twentieth century thinkers.

In the work of John Cobb, we find another powerful argument for Whitehead’s separation of God and creativity Cobb argues that Whitehead’s metaphysics allows us to affirm two absolutes, creativity and God. On the one hand, Buddhism has explored the mystical and metaphysical dimensions of creativity under such rubrics as emptiness and absolute nothingness. Creativity/emptiness may be called the ultimate reality. Christianity has explored the ethical, historical, and personal implications of the existence of God. God is the ultimate actuality. These two absolutes, ultimate reality and ultimate actuality, do not conflict, but rather complement each other. This serves, from Cobb’s point of view, to confirm Whitehead’s separation of creativity from God (Beyond 12).

II. Reasons for Reuniting Creativity and God

Given that the arguments of process thinkers against the traditional doctrine of God the creator are correct, there would appear to be little reason to affirm that God is the source of creativity. There are, however, powerful arguments against the separation of God and creativity.

While my primary arguments in favor of the recombination are metaphysical, I do wish to mention one theological consideration. In the classical monotheistic religions -- certainly in Christianity and perhaps in Islam and Judaism as well -- the term "God" refers to a single ultimate. This single ultimate has no competitor. Anselm’s definition brings this out powerfully: "God is that than which nothing greater can be conceived." The existence of two ultimates, no matter how compatible, defeats the logic of monotheism. Therefore, if creativity and God can both be called ultimates as in Cobb’s argument, or if Being is granted the status of an ultimate but denied the name of God as in Heidegger’s argument, the inner structure of monotheism, at least of Christian monotheism, would seem to be jeopardized thus making their recombination quite imperative.⁴

An interesting point in Cobb’s argument must also be considered. Cobb names God as the ethical, historical, and personal ultimate, that is, where this God is a particular actual entity A good case can be made that ethical principles, historical existence, and personhood cannot exist apart from the specificity of some concrete and particular being. If we grant, as Judaism, Christianity; and (within certain limits) Islam all do, that the category of "God" gives an ultimacy to ethics, history; and personhood, it follows that such a God must somehow be intimately connected with, or even identified with, a particular being. In short, in a monotheistic religion, the term God not only names Being or Being-Itself, it also names an individual entity, a particular being. In Islam, God is the Sovereign who commands our obedience. In Judaism, God is YHWH who led the children of Israel out of Egyptian slavery into the promised land. And in Christianity, God is the Father of our Lord and Savior Jesus Christ who raised him from the dead. In this paper, I intend to defend the claim that God is the source of creativity, thereby reuniting the creator with a particular actual entity. In short, 1 combine what Whitehead, Tillich, and Heidegger all separated, each in his own way, namely, a doctrine of God, a doctrine of Being or Being-Itself, and a doctrine of actuality or, more accurately, of particular "activity"⁵

Langdon Gilkey argues that a Christian understanding of history requires the reconnection of creativity with God:

Gilkey himself, however, does not explain how it might be possible, within a basically Whiteheadian context, to reconnect creativity and God. That is my task.

At a more strictly metaphysical level, it can also be argued, correctly in my opinion, that Whitehead never really deals with the question of creation at its most radical level. Whitehead, like Aristotle, assumes the existence of the universe and then proceeds to deal with the factors needed to account for its structure and character. I will note later that Whitehead, despite himself, does ask why any one particular actual entity exists. Nonetheless, the radical question of existence never systematically enters his metaphysics. I will argue that the separation of creativity and God cannot be considered well-established until that radical question has been raised. And once it is raised, we will discover that there are strong arguments in favor of the recombination of creativity and God.

Other scholars have seen this same issue, although no one, to my knowledge, has fully dealt with it from the general standpoint of Whitehead’s metaphysics. Reto Fetz records the objection of two German scholars, Robert Spaemann and Wolfhart Pannenberg, who held that Whitehead does not deal with creation in the radical sense:

Spaemann’s and Pannenberg’s question is a metaphysical one. To answer it, I will provide a reading of creativity that, while rooted in the Whiteheadian text, expands, moves beyond, and, in some points, reverses Whitehead’s own position. My revised doctrine of creativity will, for its own completion, require the further claim that God is the ultimate source of creativity and, thus, the creator of the universe.

Seriously entertaining Spaemann’s and Pannenberg’s radical question about the being-here of the particular entities within the world will start us down a path that Whitehead himself, as well as most of his disciples, chose not to tread. To take this question as fundamental to my argument opens several new possibilities. First, it facilitates a dialogue between process philosophy and the more traditional Western philosophers, especially Thomas Aquinas. That is, serious reflection on the question of being at its most radical level will allow us to incorporate many aspects of Aquinas’ notion of "being" or "esse" into a process context. This in turn will further allow us to produce a more consistent and less arbitrary process philosophy, particularly but not exclusively a more coherent doctrine of God. In short, taking seriously the radical question of being -- a question that Whitehead did not consider -- will require us to introduce factors and connections that the process literature has mostly overlooked and that, as we will argue, not only produce a more consistent, less arbitrary, and more powerful process philosophy but also a different one.

My arguments in this paper will be metaphysical and only incidentally theological. It is as a metaphysical argument that I will show that my reading of creativity and affirmation of God as the source of that creativity will result in an improvement in the coherence and consistency of Whitehead’s system, including his doctrine of God. I believe, however, that my revision of Whitehead’s doctrine of God offers a more nuanced explication of religious experience, where we may appeal to such experience as significant evidence in support of my revisions. In addition, I am deeply concerned about the issues raised by monotheistic theology in general and Christian theology in particular, and I will, therefore, indicate a few of the theological implications of my revisionist form of process philosophy.

Whitehead insisted that God should not be an exception to the metaphysical system. He expressed this conviction in the memorable phrase that scholars should not pay "metaphysical compliments" to God. This, however, raises the question of what it means to be an "exception" to the principles or categories of a metaphysical system. In my opinion the refusal to pay metaphysical compliments to God should not mean that God has no unique features. Every actual entity has unique features. Nor should it even mean that God has no unique cosmic or metaphysical roles. Not even Whitehead could maintain such a standard. Rather, whatever his own view of "metaphysical compliments," I will take it to mean that everything I want to say about God should be expressible in terms of the basic principles of the system.

III. The Question of Divine Presence in a Postmodern Age

A well-known deconstructionist scholar, while visiting Tokyo, met with a small group of English-speaking Christian theologians for an evening of conversation in which he argued that God is obviously dead. My task now is to recognize that when we unravel what we call the self, or truth, or good and evil, we will find nothing. The rhetorical and metaphorical quality of language is so pervasive that the reference of language is always dubious. As a result, our language must always work to the advantage of some people and to the disadvantage of others. Knowing that he was speaking to theologians, he connected his deconstructionist task with the biblical tradition of unmasking the idols, of lifting the veil that hides sin.

I asked him if he could find any room for creation or salvation as well as for sin. He answered no. The only Christian doctrine that remains is sin. Perhaps, because sin normally means sin against God, he should have talked about a doctrine of evil. His bottom line, however, stood: there is neither creation nor salvation in our "postmodern" world.

The deconstructionist considered his position as "postmodern." Postmodernism, however, is not limited to deconstructionism. According to Nancy Murphey and James Win. McClendon, Jr., the postmodern world differs from the modern world on three counts. First, the modern world assumed that our knowledge and culture must rest on secure foundations. The foundationalists thought that such axioms could be found; the skeptics thought that they could not. The postmodern world is non-foundationalist, not in the skeptical sense, but in the sense that we can have such modest knowledge and cultural forms as we need without any appeal to absolute, apodictic, self-evident, incorrigible, irrefragable, or indubitable foundations. In particular, according to postmodernist epistemologies, our knowledge is given to us in "holistic" units rather than as individual facts as taught in the modern world. Second, the moderns assumed that language can provide truth about the world only if it represents some fact in the world; otherwise, it is merely "expressive" of, for example, the speaker’s own subjective attitudes, commitments, or feelings. In the postmodern world, language is understood in terms of its functions within the cultural and social world which it helps to organize and sustain (as in the overworked slogan, "meaning is use"). Third, in the areas of politics and ethics, modern culture oscillated between individualism and collectivism (between John Locke and Karl Marx). Postmodern culture asserts an "organic" view of society in relation to ethics and politics. It is worth noting that Murphey and McClendon (n29) consider theories that are cosmological in scope to be premodern as opposed to the anthropological orientation of modern and postmodern thought.

A critic could easily construe these deconstructionist and postmodern motifs as arguments for rejecting a "Creator-God." From the critic’s point of view, a "Creator-God" provides a foundation we now know is unnecessary. In addition, it would be all too easy to interpret this divinely sanctioned foundation as the expression of established interests. In short, these motifs constitute powerful arguments in favor of Whitehead’s separation of God from creativity. And, thus, these motifs require us to explain how our reconstructed doctrine of a creator God avoids falling into the pitfalls uncovered and so eloquently articulated by the postmodernists.

Let us note that at the heart of a monotheistic religion, and perhaps of other religions as well, lies a "presence" that cannot be subsumed under the category of sin. It differs from any evil presence. According to John Hick, all the major religions -- at least those emerging during and after the Axial Period -- share a commitment to salvation, whether defined as enlightenment, forgiveness, satori, or something else (21-35). Many years ago, William James made much the same point. According to Nancy Frankenberry, James argued that every religion "consists of two parts: (a) an uneasiness; and (b) its solution"(94). The postmodernists, such as the visiting deconstructionist in Tokyo, clearly have found the pulse of the "uneasiness" that pervades our world. But have they really presented us reasons for discounting the "solution?"

Many postmodernists dismiss out of hand the possibility of any presence that could sustain the religious "solution." David Tracy points to Derrida as such a figure: "Any hope for a full ‘presence’ of meaning is, for Derrida, the most characteristic gesture of Western logocentric thought. This [is an] illusory hope (57). To put the issue in the vocabulary of this paper, a metaphysics of presence seems particularly suspect when pressed into the service as a "foundation" on which to base our philosophies, sciences, religions, morals, languages, notions of truth, or self-understandings. Tracy writes:

Derrida provides another reason for separating creativity from God. If God were simply an actual entity with the extraordinary power of conferring "being" on the creatures, the temptation to draft God into the service of our self-sufficient and self-centered egos might well be overwhelming. Who among us would not want to control his own being, who would not want to be the source of the being of the world around her.

While we must take such criticisms of a "presence" seriously it remains true that religion has yet to disappear from modern, postmodern, or "advanced" societies. In the 1980s, during the Ceausecu regime in Romania, I participated in an "underground seminary" for men and women who served as de facto pastors for Protestant churches. After the cultural revolution in China, I had several opportunities to visit China and to talk with Christians who survived that terrible event. In both cases, European and Oriental, the mere continued existence of faithful Christians served as a powerful sign that Marxism’s modernist analysis of religion had erred. In addition, Christianity shows no signs of disappearing from postmodernist North America, nor Buddhism from postmodernist Japan. Of course, one could say that the continued existence of the religions, and of their witness to a sustaining presence, is a mere anachronism. But one could also wonder if it might not be possible to give an account of the presence to which the religions witness, an account that fully considers the criticisms of our non-foundationalist, holistically-oriented, sometimes nihilistic postmodern situation.

I will argue that my revised view of creativity allows us to illumine the presence to which the religions witness while taking into account our current, postmodern social and intellectual situation. "Taking into account" does not necessarily mean "agreeing with." While generally sympathetic, my affirmation of postmodern themes must include certain elements of dissent. For example, I do not accept postmodernity’s anti-cosmological stance.

IV. Creativity and Particularity

I begin my reconstruction of Whitehead’s doctrine of creativity by drawing attention to an analogy Whitehead himself made between Aristotle’s "matter" and his own "creativity" (Process 31), the key point being that both matter and creativity are protean and need characterization. For Aristotle, the "forms" provides such characterization, whereas for Whitehead, the "eternal objects" provide this characterization. It must be quickly added that this analogy is quite loose and that the differences between matter and creativity are as important as the similarities.

Stated somewhat crudely, we may say that for Aristotle, it is matter that brings the Platonic forms down to earth. Matter, thus formed, is a substance. For Whitehead, eternal objects characterize creativity. Creativity, thus characterized, is an actual entity.

Aristotelian matter and Whiteheadian creativity both point to the concreteness of an actual entity. According to Whitehead, the presence of creativity is what distinguishes the merely conceptual from the physical. It is, therefore, creativity that allows us to feel and not just to think. Indeed, Whitehead claims that thinking emerges Out of feeling, because thoughts about eternal objects are abstractions from our feelings of actual entities (Process 229-30).

For Whitehead, being a real, concrete fact is closely tied to particularity and, thus, to creativity. The "hereness" of a real fact is more than the mere combination of characteristics, of eternal objects; and yet this "more" this "particularity" of a real fact cannot be characterized conceptually since that would reduce it to one more universal or eternal object. This particularity can only be physically felt.

There is another equally important analogy between Aristotle’s matter and Whitehead’s creativity. Whitehead does not himself make this analogy, although it is basic to his metaphysics. Both matter and creativity serve to individuate.⁶ For Aristotle, matter guarantees that one substance is numerically distinct from every other substance. For Whitehead, creativity guarantees that the new actual entity is numerically distinct from every other actual entity, including those past actual entities that, in one sense, have been incorporated into the very identity of that new actual entity. I will make additional use of creativity’s individuating role in Section VII of this paper.

The disanalogies between traditional matter and Whiteheadian creativity are as important as the analogies. For Aristotle, matter is the passive principle. For Whitehead creativity is the principle of activity. In the Whiteheadian triad of creativity, the one, and the many, it is creativity’s role to guarantee the movement back and forth between the many and the one, as we will discuss shortly. Thus creativity has a dynamism -- what I will call an "activity" -- that is lacking in Aristotle’s passive matter. Again, Aristotle’s matter is the ultimate potentiality, whereas Whitehead’s creativity in its role as particular, concrete activity, includes both potentiality and actuality and, thus, is more than either.

Before leaving this section, I wish to raise the question of how to understand creativity. Since creativity has no characteristics, we can neither point to it nor define it in any ordinary sense. My method is to understand creativity by understanding its context in the entire metaphysical scheme. A nuanced and powerful metaphysics will create a rich context for creativity. Creativity illumines the other factors, and the contextual factors illumine creativity. This is different from claiming that creativity has its own characteristics, its own eternal objects that make it to be creativity. Thus, creativity can be understood without appeal to any specific eternal objects that might characterize it; but creativity cannot be understood apart from an analysis of its relation to the category of eternal objects, and other factors, in the metaphysical scheme.

V. Creativity, the One and the Many

Whitehead groups creativity, the one, and the many under "the category of the ultimate"(Process 21-22). For Whitehead, the "category of the ultimate" is the most important context for the articulation of creativity. Creativity is not derived from the one and the man’s; nor are the one and the many derived from creativity. Rather, each is needed to understand the other.

The category of the ultimate describes a world pulsating with many actual entities. In each new actual entity, the many past entities are fused into a new reality in the present. Actuality fuses with potentiality to establish that new reality as an activity, and order fuses with freedom to give the new activity its capacity to create its own identity and, so, to influence its environment. Whitehead calls this fusion "concrescence." Here the many become one.

After the completed feeling has been achieved, that is, after a "satisfaction" has been reached, the dynamic actual entity stops concrescing and thereby becomes a completed actual entity. This completed actual entity is one of many similar completed actual entities. In other words, the appearance of each new completed actual entity adds another member to the set of completed actual entities, thereby creating a new set. Here the one has become a part of the many Whitehead calls this "transition."

Transition, thus, produces a new "many" that is, a new set of completed actual entities. This new "many" must be integrated into yet another "one," into still another new, dynamic actual entity. That is, the many past actual entities must be included in the new concrescing actual entity as potentials for further integration by that new concrescence. This, however, brings us back full circle to the notion of concrescence. In sum, the category of the ultimate presents us with a dynamic universe in constant oscillation between concrescence and transition, between the many becoming a new one, and each new one becoming a part of a new many.

While creativity accounts for both concrescence and transition, we must assign precedence to concrescence. We humans have "life," "decision" "subjectivity," and "enjoyment" only in the process of concrescence.⁷ Thus, creativity’s role in accounting for the concrescence of an actual entity has a certain priority over its role in accounting for the transition between actual entities, although a full understanding of either role requires reference to the other.

I contend that a process metaphysics must understand creativity as more basic than either potentiality or actuality, that creativity gives meaning and context to both. Creativity, in this sense, may be described as including both actuality and potentiality. Not only does creativity name the activity (concrescence) that reduces potentiality to actuality, it also names the process (transition) whereby past actualities become elements of a new potentiality In short, both actuality and potentiality require creativity for their full explication. I explain as follows.

From a process perspective, to identify creativity with actuality alone leads to a loss of dynamism. Process philosophy forms, at this point, a striking contrast with the Aristotelian-Thomistic paradigm which closely correlates actuality with reality. My position is different. I hold that creativity refers in the first instance to present activity where such present activity includes both past actuality as well as future potentiality. Since creativity as activity includes both actuality and potentiality, it is more fundamental and inclusive than either alone.

In order to clarify my claim that actuality’ and potentiality require each other within the context of creativity; let us take a closer look at a past actual entity; according to process thought. Such an entity presents us with pure actuality devoid of all potentiality. It is, so to speak, dead. That is, past entities, having achieved a "satisfaction," are totally actual, with no potentiality; no room for growth in their identities. It might seem that here we have a case of pure actuality that can be adequately described without any reference to potentiality This, however, I deny. Rather, to fully understand such a past, completed actuality; we must still refer indirectly to potentiality For example, a past actual entity once had a potentiality, where this potentiality evaporated upon achieving satisfaction. That is, the past actual entity was once a concrescing entity mixing actuality and potentiality; but when it completed its concrescence, it lost its potentiality for further growth.

There is another sense in which any past actuality’ requires reference to potentiality for its full understanding. Let us note that a past actual entity can contribute to the identity of future actual entities, and in that limited sense, the past actuality has a potentiality We can even call this, if we wish, a form of efficient causation. That is, the past actuality has the capacity to cause the new entity to have this-but-not-that characteristic. The actual entity has this capacity, however, not because the past actual entity somehow survives as an "active entity" into its transcendent future, but because the future actual entity will include that past actual entity as a part of its own identity. Therefore, this potentiality for integration into future actual entities -- that is, this capacity to be an efficient cause -- while essential to those future actual entities, does not affect that past actuality itself. Rather, this "potentiality" properly belongs to the future concrescing actual entities. However -- and this is my point -- we cannot fully understand how that past actual entity may be said to he actual unless we also understand its role as a potential element in future concrescences. The key claims are these: first, actuality in a process metaphysics is not the paradigm case of reality, and, second, a full understanding of actuality requires reference to potentiality.

Just as it is impossible to identify creativity with pure actuality, it would also be a mistake to identity creativity with potentiality alone. In a process metaphysics, potentiality has several meanings, some of which we have already discussed. The paradigm case of potentiality, however, is an eternal object. The point is this: an eternal object is a potential characteristic or quality of a concrescence, where it is the nature of a concrescence to move towards actuality. In short, the potentiality of eternal objects demands, for its complete explication, a reference to actuality.

As we have seen, there is a sense in which past actual entities can also be potentials. Past actual entities, once they have been organized into the "actual world" of the new actual entity; become potentials for further integration. This second form of potentiality, however, also requires actuality for its complete explication. The past actual entities, precisely as potentials, contribute to the new actual entity’s final self-identity, that is, to its actuality. This of course is a different kind of potentiality than that belonging to eternal objects; but in this case also, potentiality incorporates a reference to actuality.

In sum, creativity in naming both concrescence and transition points to the fusion of potentiality and actuality in the act of concrescence, and it points to the interaction between actuality and potentiality in the transition between actual entities. A complete articulation of creativity will also refer to eternal objects, which are potentials for actual entities. Thus any full explication of creativity must incorporate references to both actuality and potentiality.

It may be helpful to dispel a common misunderstanding of creativity. At one point, Whitehead calls creativity the "universal of universals characterizing ultimate matters of fact" (Process 21). By "characterizing," Whitehead does not mean that creativity is an eternal object, not even the "thinnest" or "most abstract" of all eternal objects. Rather, Whitehead means that whatever else may be said about an actual entity, each actual entity must be an instance of creativity. It implies that the category of the ultimate (that is, creativity; the one, and the many) is the final and most basic context for our understanding of any actual entity.

Lastly, I would like to reinforce and expand on a methodological point made before. Whitehead begins, and I follow him on this, by asking what is necessary to understand an actual entity. The full analysis of an actual entity requires us to speak of a factor called creativity; along with other factors such as the ingredient eternal objects. This gives a certain primacy to actual entities. Whitehead gives formal expression to this primacy under the title of the "ontological principle," which he defines this way:

The doctrine of creativity emerges out of the need to find an adequate analysis of actual entities. Therefore, even though creativity is a member of the triadic "category of the ultimate," it does not "float" above all actual entities as if it were a metaphysical mirage of some sort. That is, since creativity certainly functions as a "reason," it follows that, according to the ontological principle, creativity must function as an element in one or more actual entities. Process thought begins by trying to find an adequate analysis of actual entities, and it ends by linking the factors it finds in that analysis, such as creativity; back to those actual entities. This is the naturalistic bent inherent in Whitehead’s metaphysics, a bent I fully affirm.

VI. Creativity in Esse

Consider these quotations from Whitehead, all of which seem to imply a "causative" role for creativity:

It is extremely difficult to know how, within Whitehead’s own system, to interpret such passages. In traditional Christian theology, it is often said that God freely creates our world, and this free act explains why there is a world at all. These Whiteheadian passages might be read as claiming that the explanation for the existence of the world lies, not in God, but in something called creativity. This interpretation is wrong. John Cobb, while admitting that "sometimes it almost sounds as if ‘creativity’ is intended as an answer to that question," goes on to explain, correctly, that the "rejection of the radical question as to why there is anything at all is . . . characteristic of Whitehead" (Christian 208-09).

If creativity does not account for why the world exists, perhaps Whitehead has assigned creativity the more modest role of accounting for the existence of each new actual entity. Here the focus is on particular actual entities as they emerge one by one, case by case. Lewis Ford, however, has considered this possibility and denies that Whitehead had this role in mind for creativity. In Ford’s own terminology, Whitehead did not consider creativity to be a type of "transient causality"’ that brings the actual entities into existence ("Whitehead’s" 396). If nothing else, the ontological principle would prevent Whitehead from assigning such an "effective" role to creativity. According to the ontological principle, only actual entities can be genuine "causes."

Yet we still have these fascinating passages that ascribe an active efficacy to creativity, the power to bring actual entities into existence. And there are other passages to the same effect. Whitehead himself once observed (Process 171) that David Hume’s pen sometimes "slipped," revealing insights that Hume’s own position would not allow him to express. Perhaps Whitehead too occasionally let his pen "slip," expressing important insights beyond his system.

Whatever Whitehead’s position may have been, I will here stake out my own interpretation of creativity Previously I argued that an analysis of an actual entity reveals that each actual entity has a "particularity" for which creativity provides an account. I also argued that an analysis of an actual entity reveals two fundamental factors, the eternal objects and creativity. At this point, I wish to argue that an analysis of an actual entity’ reveals another factor, specifically its "being-here" for which we must also account. This can be compared with Aquinas’ notion of "esse," which has been glossed as "the power ‘to be.’" ⁸ In examining a "really real thing," according to Thomas, I will describe what that thing is, that is, what characteristics it has; but after I have noted the role of "prime matter" (here Aquinas is following Aristotle) in bringing those characteristics together in one particular object, a complete analysis will also require us to note that it exists. To express this insight in a process metaphysics, we would have to say that creativity, in one of its roles, points to and accounts for the activity, the "being-here," the "sheer existence," the "thatness" of a really real thing.

My view of creativity may be compared to Aquinas’ esse in another way. Both point to novelty in the most radical possible sense. Each new actual entity is numerically different from every other entity; each has its own particularity Each actual entity is a new actual entity. This newness is more than a novel rearrangement of eternal objects. It is more than the exemplification of an eternal object, or set of eternal objects, for the first time. It is more than the first-time conceptual grasp of a new eternal object. And this radical novelty is more than the occupation of a new region in the extensive continuum. Rather, this is radically and totally the first time that that actual entity’ has ever existed. It is also, of course, the last time that it will ever exist.⁹ A past actual entity can be included in new actual entities, and in that limited sense, it can be "repeated," but that past entity’ can never be literally repeated because all new entities, while including that past entity, nonetheless are necessarily different actual entities.

In addition to the similarities between my creativity-esse and Aquinas’ esse, however, there are also some important differences. My view of creativity is set within a Whiteheadian metaphysical context and thus possesses at least partially different roles.

First, creativity is tied to the "one and the many" in ways not true of Thomas’ esse. When I say that creativity accounts for the being-here of a new actual entity, I necessarily point to the roles of transition and concrescence. Thus, creativity, within its context of the one and the many, not only accounts for the appearance of any one particular actual entity, it also accounts for its inherent interconnectedness with other actual entities. While neo-Thomistic philosophers have long argued for a more dynamic interpretation of Thomas’ notions of "act" and "esse," I would still argue that Whitehead’s notions of the "one and the many" and "concrescence" provide a hermeneutical context that gives creativity’ a radically "process" orientation. It may also be noted that within the triad of "creativity, the one, and the many," creativity is the basic member because it accounts for the real being-here of the actual entities. Without that being-here of the actual entities, both the "one" and the "many" would be mere abstractions, not real factors accounting for the dynamic pluralism of a real world. Of course, creativity without its contextual factors -- such as the one and the many -- would also be empty, a mere abstraction, but not quite in the same sense as those other factors.

Creativity-esse’s connection with actuality’ gives us a second major difference between it and the Thomistic esse. Creativity does not point to pure actuality so much as it points to activity, that is to process. In the previous section, I made the case that both an isolated pure potentiality as well as an isolated pure actuality are but parts torn from that whole which alone makes them complete and real. Thus creativity-esse accounts for the being-here of an activity in which both potentiality and actuality are intertwined.¹⁰

A third difference is the greater simplicity, and the greater complexity; of my view of creativity-esse. Creativity’ is simpler because it serves as the analogue not only of Thomas’ esse but of his matter as well. In that sense, I have reunited what Aquinas put asunder. At the same time, however, creativity has a more complex set of roles than any one of Thomas’ factors.

This leads to a fourth difference. For Aristotle and Thomas, matter is a kind of potentiality; but for the neo-Platonists and Augustine, matter is more closely identified with nonbeing. That is, for Thomists, matter-potentiality stands in contrast to actuality; while for Augustinians, matter-nonbeing stands in contrast to actuality. For my view of process philosophy; however, creativity as activity includes both potentiality’ and actuality, and either in isolation is nonbeing. Thus, I differ from both Augustine and Thomas in identifying not only pure potentiality but also pure actuality, apart from their interaction with each other, as nonbeing.¹¹

Before moving to the next section, perhaps I should add that creativity may be described as energetic but not as energy. In Whitehead’s earlier writings, especially Science and the Modern World (51, 190), he refers to the "general flux of the world," which is an early description of creativity. We will return to this issue in Section X. Here I wish merely to deny that creativity is a form of energy. If it were a force or energy, it would be an "ordinary" object. Rather than being the esse of actual entities, it would be a "thing" with its own characteristics, about whose esse, and about the source of whose esse, we would have to inquire. This would drive us back from this energy -- from this pseudo-creativity -- to the real underlying creativity. In short, if creativity were a force or a type of energy, it could not function as creativity.

VII. Creativity and Characterization

Creativity cannot stand alone. Just as matter required form for Aristotle, and just as esse required substance for Aquinas, creativity requires the "ingression" of eternal objects for a process metaphysics. An actual entity requires not only creativity but also requires that the creativity be formed or shaped, that it have certain characteristics. I turn now to the connection between creativity and those characteristics.

An actual entity is what it does. An actual entity is the creation of a final, actualized self-identity Or perhaps it would be more accurate to say that an actual entity is the movement towards an increase of definite characterization.¹² An actual entity is the decision to exhibit some characteristics and not others. Creativity is the activity whereby a concrescing entity "creates" its own identity.

Thus, within the concrescence we find two related but distinguishable roles for creativity. First, creativity gives the concrescence its particularity and makes that entity a real agent that truly exists. We may call this creativity-esse (or creativity’ as matter and as esse). Second, this existence is nothing else than the process whereby the new concrescence eliminates some possible characteristics and opts for others, and so creates its own identity We may call this the power of characterization or creativity-characterization.

There is but one creativity. Creativity does not "first" create an existing actual entity that "later" makes decisions. Rather, the actual entity is a process of decision-making, of creating a self-identity. While the roles must be distinguished, creativity-esse is not a separate factor from creativity-characterization. There is the danger of a semantic quagmire here. On the one hand, creativity-as-esse precedes creativity-as-characterization in the sense that esse is the presupposition of characterization. On the other hand, creativity-esse has no identity apart from that characterization. In sum, these two roles must be distinguished and not collapsed into each other, and yet there is only one creativity. The being-here of the actual entity is the actual entity’s process of characterizing itself and, thereby, the world.

Before we can deal more fully with creativity-characterization, we need to ask a prior question: where do the characteristics come from? The actual entity may choose between alternative characteristics, alternative eternal objects -- that is, alternative options for self-identity -- but it does not create them.¹³ This means that the new actual entity always chooses its self-identity within a given context. Not all things are possible for each actual entity. The environment provides a structure and causal order that, on the one hand, provides a range of options to the new actual entity and that provides the stability to make those options genuinely workable; but such structure and order also, on the other hand, limit the range of options. The question, once more, is this: where do these eternal objects come from?

The first answer is: from the past actual entities. The transition of the many past entities into the actual world (at the first stage) of the new concrescence may’ be attributed to creativity-esse. But in that very act, the past entities and their characteristics, at least those that are not excluded via negative prehensions, become a part of the real internal constitution of the new entity These past entities are (a part of) what the new entity is. Thus, their characteristics become characteristics of the new actual entity. The new entity during its concrescence, can do many things with those characteristics, such as recombine them, enhance or diminish their importance, etc. But, at least at its initial stage of concrescence, the new entity cannot not have those characteristics. This is Whitehead’s explanation of the capacity of past actual entities to continue to "function" as efficient causes (that is, as causing the appearance of certain characteristics in the transcendent future). In other words, the past actual entities, precisely’ as included in the new actual entity; are the efficient causes of the initial set of characteristics of the new entity. This clever explanation allows Whitehead to avoid a contradiction between two of his claims: (1) the past actual entities, having reached a satisfaction, are fully actual and not active in any sense, and (2) the past actual entities continue to function as efficient causes into the transcendent future. I will later consider what else the past actual entities contribute to the new actual entity.

The second answer is: eternal objects come from God’s gift of an initial subjective aim to the new actual entity. The many past entities may have conflicting characteristics and conflicting purposes that cannot be integrated into a single feeling. Therefore, the transition from the "many" past actual entities to the "one" new actual entity requires additional structuring beyond that inherent in the many past actual entities themselves. Even if we attribute the transition to the efficacy of creativity, we cannot attribute this additional structuring to creativity alone. The basic reason is this. Creativity, even in conjunction with the one and the many, is not the source of characteristics (any more than matter is the source of form). Rather, this additional structuring, this additional source of eternal objects comes from God’s gift to the new actual entity’ of its initial subjective aim. Thus, while creativity-esse may account for the transition from the past "many" to the new "one," it is God’s gift of a subjective aim that organizes the past world into the actual world of the new entity.

The third answer is this: eternal objects ultimately come from the primordial nature of God. Despite noting how the past actual entities provide some eternal objects and that God’s gift of an initial subjective aim provides additional organization of those past entities into a consistent and compatible "actual world" for the new entity, there remains a need for radically new possibilities. There needs to be a storehouse of characteristics that were not present in nor even implicated in the past. There needs to be, in short, a womb of novelty, both good and evil. Without a source of novelty beyond that implicit in the past, the present would be condemned to repeat the past. It should be noted that God’s primordial nature actually fulfills two cosmic functions. First, it is the source of the novelty that emerges in history; both in natural history and in social history. Second, since creativity requires form (eternal objects) before it can function as the esse, as the being-here of any actual entity; the primordial nature also functions as creativity’s "first limitation."¹⁴

We can now return to the function of creativity The past actual entities, God’s gift of an initial subjective aim, and God’s primordial nature as the storehouse of all eternal objects provide the new entity’ with the resources for its own journey (concrescence) towards a final self-identity. But only the actual entity itself, in its own subjectivity; during its own concrescence can choose among the available options. Only the concrescing actual entity can create itself (within the range of available possibilities). This self-creation, this self-definition is creativity-characterization. In a Whiteheadian metaphysics, the self-definition of the various actual entities accounts for the actual character of our world.

The distinction between creativity-esse and creativity-characterization sheds light on our modern use of the word "creativity"’ in which an artist, a culture, or even nature is creative. In the West, since the end of the Middle Ages, but ever more intensely since the enlightenment, people have been convinced that human history has produced genuinely new facts. And quite apart from humans, nature itself, we believe, has produced new species of plants and animals, new environments, and other important new facts.¹⁵ To interpret this use of the word "creativity"’ from the standpoint of our metaphysics, we may claim that the production of such novelty’ has to do exclusively (with the exception to be discussed below) with characterization. When we describe an artist, a scientist, an historical epoch, or even nature as creative, we are referring to its capacity to characterize the world in new ways. That is, we are referring to its power to actualize novel eternal objects and to actualize old eternal objects in novel combinations. But this is creativity-characterization. What we are as people, our wisdom and stupidity, our goodness and perversity; our industriousness and laziness, our laughing and our weeping, our hope and our fear -- all this is a matter of characterization. We are creative at the level of creativity-characterization.¹⁶

We must, however, place one important limitation on the claim that personhood, culture, freedom, and novelty’ in nature are entirely issues of characterization. Consider our sense of having been "gifted" with being or, put more negatively having been "thrown into" the world. It is through this experience that we become aware that, however creative we may be, the sheer being-here of our creativity does not derive from ourselves. Our existing precedes all aspects of our creativity-characterization -- that is, it precedes our knowing, our ethics, our feeling, our imagining, our inventing, our thinking, our walking, our dancing, our breathing, and anything else -- in this sense: we discover ourselves as thinking, acting, and feeling agents who did not bring into being that thinking or acting. Thus reason, art, culture, and personal identity are more than just the actualizing of new forms and ideas. They also point to the "coming to be" of esse, given by God (as I will argue) and expressed through the concrescing actual entity’s engagement in creativity-characterization.

Thus, reason, art, science, and even life itself have, in Tillich’s phrase, a "depth." To ignore esse would only trivialize the process of characterization and, thus, culture and life. Rather, creativity-esse produces the most radical and fundamental of all novelties, the novelty of creativity/esse/activity/being/act. Other forms of novelty stem from this novelty of esse. All novelties of characterization emerge out of the prior novelty of "esse," deriving their depth from it.

The power of "creativity-characterization" establishes both freedom and order, as well as the subtle dialectic between them. But creativity-characterization, while maintaining a conceptually distinct role from creativity-esse, is nothing other than creativity-esse. Thus freedom, in dialectic with order, structure, and causality, is the being of the world.

VIII. Each Actual Entity is Numerically Distinct

Whitehead’s metaphysics is pluralistic in the sense that each actual entity is a different actual entity from every other actual entity. One role of creativity, in conjunction with the category of the ultimate, is precisely to guarantee this pluralism. If the new actual entity is not a different actual entity, then the notion of creativity, along with the one and the many, loses its significance. Specifically, if the new actual entity is not a different actual entity, then the concrete particularity of each actual entity would vanish and the role of creativity lost.

1 will claim later that God is the sole source of each actual entity’s creativity. We must avoid, however, saying that a "drop" or "spark" of creativity passes from God to the new concrescence. Such a claim would entail that the creature’s creativity is actually a part of God’s creativity and, thus, that each finite entity’s existence is an aspect of God’s existence, completely undermining the pluralism of process metaphysics. Such talk, however, of a "spark of creativity" passing from God to the creature reflects a conceptual confusion. It would require the "drop" or "spark" of creativity to have its own characteristics -- otherwise we could not identify it as the "same" in both God and the creature. It would, in other words, presuppose that creativity is a "thing" or a "form of energy rather than the "protean" factor of particularity. That would turn creativity into another entity -- perhaps even an actual entity.

Because the claim that the creativity in any one actual entity is the same as the creativity in some other actual entity is meaningless, and because, at the same time, creativity guarantees the particularity of each actual entity, it follows that each actual entity is its own act of existence (to use the Thomistic term), its own subjectivity, its own concrescence. It has its own freedom. This requires me to articulate my theory of God as the source of the creatures creativity in monotheistic terms. In particular, it will require me to avoid the conclusion that because God is the source of the creature’s creativity, of the creature’s esse, that God is somehow identical with that creature or with its "being" or that the creature is somehow identical with God, with some aspect of God, or with some aspect of God’s "being."

Concerning the Metaphor of "Inclusion"

I have argued that each actual entity is numerically distinct from every other actual entity. I have also argued that each new actual entity "includes" its past actual entities. This may seem contradictory to many readers. Therefore, I will present a brief but rather technical discussion of this metaphor of "inclusion." The correct reading of Whitehead’s own position is a matter of considerable debate. I believe that the following discussion fairly, if somewhat crudely, presents Whitehead’s position. But even if it does not, I will affirm it as my own.

Let me restate the problem: if one entity enters into the very identity of another entity, then how can we claim that each actual entity is numerically distinct (has a separate existence) from all other actual entities? The following diagram will help us answer this question.

Past Future

Diagram One: An Actual Entity

Diagram One is a two dimensional diagram of a four dimensional reality. (At least in our cosmic epoch, space-time, what Whitehead calls the extensive continuum, is four dimensional.) The arrow represents the time line, so that the remaining dimension on the sheet of paper represents the three dimensions of space.

Circle "a" divides two "cones," the one with thick lines to the left representing the past for the new actual entity, and the one with thin lines to the right representing the future. Each cone, past and future, extends indefinitely; neither has a base. The past cone is divided into regions, which in the diagram are arbitrarily drawn and labeled as region "b," region "g," region "d," etc. There is no "empty space" between the regions, and there is an indefinite number of such regions extending indefinitely into the past.

The new actual entity, which we will call A, exists throughout the entire left-hand cone, including region "a." Region "a" is the position from which the new concrescence prehends its past. Regions "b," "g," "f," "S," "d," etc. all fall into A’s past and, thus, are parts of the very identity of the new actual entity A.

We can also imagine past actual entities B, G, F, S, D, and so forth. Actual entity B would prehend its past from region "b." Actual entity G would prehend its past from region "g," and so forth. It would make the diagram quite messy, but we could draw cones for each of the past actual entities. For example, we could draw a "past cone" for actual entity B to the left of region "b" and a "future cone" to the right of region "b." Region "f" would be a part of B’s past, while region "a" would be in its future.

The key points to note are these: (a) actual entity A is not limited to "a," but exists in all the regions in the left-hand cone; thus (b) actual entity A is a four dimensional reality that includes the indefinite past regions as a part of what it is; (c) actual entity A not only includes the past regions but it includes the past actual entities as a part of its very identity Thus, A not only exists in regions "b," "f," etc., but it also includes actual entities B, F, etc. as parts of its own identity. Or to be more precise, A must include at least some aspects of B, F, etc. The past is a part of the very identity of A. The same analysis holds true of actual entity B. Actual entity B not only is located in region "b" but also exists throughout every region in its past. In addition, B must include actual entity F and its other past actual entities within its own identity; (d) while the past is part of the very identity of the concrescing actual entity, the same is not true of the future. Consider the case of actual entity A. For A, the future regions are purely potential, that is, potential sites from which future actual entities will prehend their worlds. While A will prehend the future regions as potentials, it will not (in any direct sense) prehend the actual entities that will occupy them. The reason is simple: the future actual entities do not exist when A concresces.

Whitehead expresses this point in terms of "internal" and "external" relations. Actual entities are internally related not only to their past regions but also to their past actual entities. In short, the new actual entity requires not only the past regions but the past actual entities as elements In its own constitution. The new entity’s relation to its future, however, is quite different. Actual entities have an internal relation to their future regions but only an external relation to the future actual entities that will occupy those regions. That is, the future actual entities are not a part of the identity of the new actual entity. For example, actual entities B, G, and F all enter into the very identity of actual entity A, because they are in A’s past. But actual entity A does not enter into the identity of actual entities B, G, and F, because A is in their future.

Thus, Whitehead has presented us with a doctrine of "asymmetrical cumulative penetration." The past actualities enter into the identity of the new concrescence, whereas that new concrescence has no effect upon the past actualities. This asymmetry is foundational to Whitehead’s affirmation that each actual entity includes its past entities as a part of its very identity while remaining numerically distinct from those past entities. This asymmetry between the present and the past entails another asymmetry between the present and the future -- namely, an entity does not literally include its future (or for that matter its contemporary) entities within its own identity, and thus it remains numerically distinct not only from its past but also from its future (and contemporary) entities.

Let me make the same point in different terms. I have noted the close association of creativity with subjectivity Past actual entities have completed their concrescence, they are settled in every way, and they have "perished" in the sense that they have stopped functioning. The past actual entities have lost their subjectivity. Therefore, the new entity, even though it includes them as elements in its own identity, cannot enter into their, now vanished, subjectivity/identity In short, the past actual entity and the new actual entity will exist as distinct subjectivities, each actual entity, thus, remaining numerically distinct from all other actual entities. Likewise, the future entities do not yet have their own subjectivity during the concrescence of the new actual entity, and, thus the future entities cannot enter with their subjectivity into the new actual entity. Consequently, the future and the present actual entities remain numerically distinct from each other.¹⁷

IX. Three Grammatical Analogies for Creativity

I have stressed that creativity is an activity. Both at the level of creativity-esse and at the level of creativity-characterization the "actual" entity is really the "active" entity. The actual entity is concrete and particular, and as such it freely creates its own identity. This is the operation of creativity-characterization. The concrescing actual entity has autonomy, responsibility Its destiny -- within the limits of the options given it -- is in its own hands. This brings us to my first analogy. As the activity of the active entity, we may say that creativity is like a verb. The analogy to a verb applies most directly to creativity-characterization.

We may also speak of creativity in the objective case, which is our second analogy. The concrescing entity has physical feelings of past actual entities. These past entities have been infused with that particularity, concreteness, and being-here that we attribute to creativity Yet these past entities are in no sense ‘active" entities. They are completely "actual" entities and, as such, can neither act nor react; but they do retain their stubborn factuality. It is this stubborn factuality that makes it possible for these past entities to be included in the future actual entities and, thereby, for these past actual entities to function as efficient causes of certain aspects of those future actual entities. In addition, as a result of this stubborn factuality, when these objective-case actualities are included in our actual world, it is we who must adjust and not those past actual entities. For example: because of creativity in the objective case, hitting Peter on his head with a sledge-hammer (the hammer, in Whitehead’s interpretation, being a collection of past actual entities) will really hurt Peter and will amuse no one, whereas merely thinking about it is not a disaster and, in certain situations, may make even Peter laugh.

Earlier, I discussed the contribution of past actual entities to the concrescing entity. I noted their contribution of various characteristics to the new entity, a contribution that not only provides (a portion of) the resources with which the new entity creates its own self-identity but a contribution that also limits the range of options available to that new entity. I can now add that the past entities further contribute their objective-case creativity. This is the source of the "heaviness" of the world, of our sense of the past being physically, concretely, and massively in, with, and under us. This is particularly true of the very recent past. In short, the past does not solely contribute eternal objects, that is, mere characteristics. Rather it contributes those eternal objects as embedded in fully concrete past actualities with their solid, weight; and unchangeable objective-case creativity. If that past is good, this heftiness enriches us with joy’s golden destiny If bad, this same solidity oppresses us with sorrow’s leaden fate. In either case, the past contributes its objective-case creativity to the present.

When an "active" entity achieves a final self-identity, being unchangeably related to each element of its world, it becomes an "actual" entity. Creativity-as-a-verb has fossilized, in that situation, into creativity-in-the-objective-case. The subject becomes the superject and, as such, a concretized entity Its subjectivity and activity have vanished. Creativity-characterization has been become actuality. Creativity as a verb has become creativity in the objective case.

My third analogy is creativity as an adverb, which applies primarily to creativity -- esse. This is the poorest of the three grammatical analogies, but we need some way to think about creativity in its role as the ultimate "prius." As I noted at the end of Section VII, at the human level we find ourselves already feeling, thinking, enjoying, hating, loving, and acting; in short, we discover ourselves as existing. This existence, this capacity to be an agent, is not something we create; rather, it is something given to us as the presupposition of our participation in a real world. That is, creativity-esse establishes each new actual entity as autonomous and responsible, but the new entity is not responsible for its own being-here, for being that autonomous and responsible agent. While the responsibility for its decisions (within the limits of its given range of options) rests solely with the new actual entity no actual entity makes a decision to be, to be active, or to be free within a context of causality. Creativity as an ad verb points to our being gifted -- or fated -- to be agents with power within a world of power. Thus we can deny our responsibility and we can hide from it, but we cannot not be responsible. Even the decision to reject freedom presupposes at least some degree of freedom.

While it is easiest to grasp the prius of creativity-esse in the human case, a process metaphysics sees at least a faint glimmer of subjectivity (which for process thinkers does not imply consciousness!) in even the least consequential actual entity. Thus, creativity-esse is not only the prius for the human world, but also for the most remote black hole, for a comet’s energy, and for the photons that travel billions of years in the vast voids between the galaxies.

I call creativity-esse adverbial because it can never be grasped as an object, nor is it an activity -- a verb -- that we can guide or direct or that, in a straightforward way, is available to us or under our control. Adverbial creativity always operates behind our backs, over our shoulders, and around the corner. It moves in the periphery of our vision, not in focal center. Adverbial creativity-esse functions as the presupposition of any investigation or research project, of any wonder or planning. It accounts for the being-here of a real world. I will return to this theme in the final section of this paper.

X. God the Creator: The Basic Argument for the Claim that God is the Sole Source of Creativity

This is not a traditional argument for the existence of God. Rather, I am merely making a proposal to consider God as the sole source of creativity I assume two conditions: (a) that we accept the context of Whitehead’s metaphysics; and (b) that we accept the revised understanding of creativity developed in this paper. I then build a case that given these conditions, my proposal is reasonable and well-grounded.

In this section I will present an argument which may be outlined as follows. I first mention two common but incorrect views of creativity These incorrect views would entail that "creativity" does not need any "location," whether in God or elsewhere. The first of these incorrect views I call "nominalist." According to this view, creativity is merely the name for the general fact that the world consists of actual entities. Therefore, creativity would not need a location. The second incorrect view seems to have been Whitehead’s own opinion at an early stage of his development. According to this view, creativity is the "substantial activity at the base of things." In this case also, though for very different reasons, creativity would not need a location.

In contrast to these two views, my interpretation understands creativity as a factor that accounts for a variety of important things, such as an actual entity’s particularity, its being-here, its capacity to chose freely a self-identity, etc. The ontological principle requires that creativity be "located" in, and thus have its source in, one or more actual entities. There are three possible types of actual entities that might serve as the source of the new actual entity’s creativity. The first is the new actual entity itself. The second is the past finite actual entities. I give reasons for rejecting both these options. The last option is the actual entity that Whitehead calls God. I then present reasons for accepting this option. I reserve for the next two sections exactly what it means to say that God is the source of the new actual entity’s creativity and what the implications are for the structure of a process metaphysics.

(a) Rejection of the Nominalist Interpretation of Creativity

John R. Wilcox has given the name "nominalist" to certain interpretations of Whitehead’s doctrine of creativity. According to Wilcox, the distinguished Whiteheadian exegete William Christian advocated one such nominalist interpretation. According to a nominalist:

I have developed an interpretation of creativity that is far from "nominalist." Creativity emerged from my analysis of actual entities in order to account for the particularity and the being-here of each actual entity Along with the one and the many, it accounts for the actual entity as an active concrescence that freely chooses its final self-identity. And along with the one and the many, creativity accounts for the transition from the many past actual entities to the one new concrescence. Thus, the nominalist interpretation of creativity is incorrect.

Yet there is a certain plausibility to the nominalist interpretation. Apart from actual entities, creativity is just an empty abstraction. In a process metaphysics, the only true agents are concrete, specific active entities. In itself, creativity is the "protean" factor in an actual entity that needs to be characterized by eternal objects before it can be said to be real. Thus, in isolation from actual entities, creativity is just "a name for a general fact" -- and maybe not even that! The same could be said for Aristotle’s matter and Aquinas’ esse, providing that one substitutes, for example, Aristotle’s "substance" for Whitehead’s "actual entity."

The European scholar Jan Van der Veken wants to ascribe four roles to creativity in a process context, where each role may be considered as a counter argument to a nominalist interpretation. They are: (a) creativity is active; (b) as something real; c) as having explanatory value; and (d) as a ground or reason (183). I can affirm each of these four roles so long as they are not assigned to creativity in isolation from its status as a factor in actual entities.

Earlier, I noted the positions of Paul Tillich concerning Being-Itself and of Martin Heidegger concerning Sein. As this essay has unfolded, certain analogies between creativity and Being-Itself and Sein have become gradually apparent, and more analogies will emerge later. But there is at least one major dissimilarity: Tillich and Heidegger affirm Being-Itself or Sein as more than a factor in particular objects. On my analysis, in contrast, creativity cannot function except as a factor in the various actual entities, that is, in the various particular beings. Creativity emerges into a process metaphysics precisely out of an analysis of what it means to be an "active" entity. Creativity apart from its role in actual entities would violate the ontological principle, and there would be no grounds for affirming such an "isolated" abstraction. Any analogies between creativity and Being-Itself or Sein would, from a process perspective, have to take into account the role of creativity as a factor inherent in the actual entities. Heidegger might object to my position as "having become lost in the particular beings." Nonetheless, to the extent that my analysis of creativity has been persuasive, and to the extent that we accept the ontological principle, we have an adequate reason for rejecting the Tillichian and Heideggerian sundering of creativity from the concrete active entities. In short, the doctrines of God and of Being must find their context and metaphysical justification only in connection with a doctrine of particular beings (that is, of active entities).

(b) Rejection of the Interpretation of Creativity as "The General Flux of the World"

Previously (at the end of Section VI) I noted that in his early works, Whitehead sometimes referred to "the general flux of the world" or to a "substantial activity" at the base of things. Whitehead himself abandoned this view of creativity, but some process thinkers have suggested a return to it (Rapp and Wiehl 63).

The idea of such a "substantial activity" comes from Spinoza. In Spinoza’s case, there turned out to be one true substance, which he identified as nature or God, all ordinary substances becoming its modes of being. If we push the analogy between Spinoza’s Nature/God and the early Whitehead’s substantial activity, the result would to turn that substantial activity into the only true actual entity, with all ordinary actual entities serving as its modes through which it expressed itself. In short, pluralism would be lost. In addition, the working of this one ultimate actual entity through its many modes would entail, it seems to me, the loss of the freedom of these subordinate modes as well. Perhaps these problems -- the loss of pluralism, finite autonomy, and freedom -- adequately explain why Whitehead dropped this "substantial activity" and developed his metaphysics in other directions. Another way to express this would be to say that a "substantial activity" at the base of things, if performing the role of creativity -- especially, creativity-esse -- would stand in considerable tension with creativity’s role as the principle of individuation. Creativity explains why each actual entity is numerically distinct from every other actual entity. The substantial activity would, if understood in analogy with Spinoza, compromise creativity’s role as individualizer.

I have four of my own arguments against the reinterpretation of creativity as the substantial activity at the base of things; (a) first, assuming that we reject a nominalist interpretation, and assuming that this substantial activity cannot be parsed as a factor in one or more actual entities, it would have to have some kind of identity of its own. A "free-floating" power divorced from the various actual entities and totally devoid of all characteristics could not "do" anything. To ground this creativity/flux, that is to prevent it from floating freely, we might be tempted to give it some specific characteristics. That, however, would turn this creativity/flux into an actual entity because an "activity" plus "characteristics" defines an actual entity; (b) second, a free-floating cosmic flux that actually provided an explanation for some aspect of our world would violate the ontological principle; (c) third, suppose we understood this substantial activity as a kind of cosmic energy that would account for the general movement of nature and history. In that case, we would need to raise the question of its esse, of its being-here. This cosmic energy, therefore, would not be a substitute for my view of creativity but would be one of the items for whose being-here creativity would have to account; (d) fourth, it is sometimes suggested that the general flux can serve in place of Whitehead’s notion of God (Emmet in Rapp and Wiehl). However, once we articulate the set of roles to be given such a substantial activity, we have an actual entity in all but name. For example, if we assume this cosmic flux accounts for the transition from the many past actual entities to the one new concrescence, then this substantial activity would have to interact with the particularities and specific identities of those past entities. A creativity/flux able to deal with (prehend) such specifics would be functioning as an actual entity Again, suppose we assign this substantial activity such roles as (a) providing the new concrescence with its various positive and negative prehensions of the past entities and (b) giving that new concrescence its initial subjective aim. Such roles would, even more, require that this "general flux" interact with (prehend) the specifics of the past entities. The result would be that this general flux or substantial activity would be another actual entity. It would in fact be indistinguishable from Whitehead’s notion of God. Perhaps this line of reasoning provides an additional explanation of Whitehead s move from his early notion of a general flux to his later category of God.

(c) Creativity and the Ontological Principle

In Section V, I cited Whitehead’s statement of the ontological principle, the main thrust of which is always to bring us back "to earth," to actuality (or activity), to actual entities. The ontological principle is central to my argument. When applied to creativity, as I have developed it, the ontological principle requires that creativity be located "in" one or more actual entities. The only question is which one(s). My answer will be God.

Creativity and the ontological principle interpret each other, nearly as much as creativity and the "one and the many" interpret each other. My doctrine of creativity emerges out of my analysis of actual entities, and I understand the meaning of an actual entity by reference (among other things) to the doctrine of creativity.

Creativity points to the ontological principle in the sense that to understand the doctrine of creativity one must understand actual entities. For example, creativity, the one, and the many have no meaning except as they are worked out in actual entities. Again, creativity in its role as esse requires its completion in its role as characterization, where characterization is nothing other than the process in which an actual entity as a subject creates its own identity.

The ontological principle points to creativity in the sense that it is creativity that makes actual entities to be real agents. It is creativity that distinguishes an actual entity from the idea of an actual entity, that distinguishes experiences of real objects from thoughts about those objects. At a human level, creativity is the "prius" of all our feeling, acting, thinking, and hoping, of our reality as language-speakers and as conscious deciders. In short, to understand an actual entity, one must understand creativity.

In sum, having rejected the nominalistic interpretation of creativity, and having rejected the notion that creativity is the basic flux of the universe, the ontological principle requires us to turn to the actual entities themselves to provide the location(s) of creativity.

(d) Creativity is Not Derived from the New Actual Entity Itself

It is well-known that Whitehead describes actual entities as self-creating. Does this mean that a new entity derives its existence from itself? The answer is no because the functioning of the new actual entity presupposes the past actual entities as already organized into an actual world, it presupposes a subjective aim, it presupposes the availability and relevance of eternal objects that are new for that situation, etc. Self-creation from nothing is, therefore, not an option.

From a starting point, and within the limitations of that starting point, the concrescing actual entity creates its own identity As I have parsed the concept of creativity, however, such self-creativity is only partial and has to do with the power of characterization and not with the radical question of the origin of the actual entity’s esse. Self-creation in the sense of an actual entity’s origination of its own being-here is not an option.

(e) Creativity is Not Derived from the Past Actual Entities

If the new concrescence does not derive its creativity from itself, then does it derive it from the past, finite actual entities? The answer is no, and this for two reasons: first, the past actual entities are, in the most literal sense, actual and not active. They are objects and not subjects; they exhibit only objective-case creativity. Lacking creativity-characterization and, especially, creativity-esse, they cannot function as real agents, and, thus, they cannot establish the new actual entity with its own creativity

The second reason comes from Whitehead, and operates at the level of what I have called creativity-characterization. Whitehead points out that the past actual entities are not all compatible for integration into the new concrescence. The past entities, in their freedom, however slight, developed characteristics that sometimes contradict each other, and they completed their concrescences with appetitions for the future that are sometimes incompatible. The new concrescence, to be an actual entity, must prehend some features of the past positively and some negatively This interweaving of inclusion and exclusion constitutes the new entity’s "actual world." On the one hand, the new actual entity presupposes its actual world with its chiaroscuro of inclusion and exclusion and cannot, therefore be the source of that world. On the other hand, the past entities themselves are not capable of producing that actual world; rather, the mosaic of positive and negative, of inclusion and exclusion, must be imposed upon those past entities. Whitehead therefore postulated the existence of a non-finite actual entity, which he called God. This God organizes the past entities into the actual world of the new entity. That is, this God establishes the mixture of positive and negative feelings of the various elements in the new entity’s actual world upon which it depends.

I reaffirm this argument along with the proviso that the creation of an actual world for the new entity is not just a matter of organizing characteristics. Rather, this organization at the level of creativity characterization presupposes the prior reality of creativity-esse. Without esse, the entire process is just a possible arrangement of possible characteristics, and not an activity in a real, concrete world.

A similar argument could be made in relation to the need for novel characteristics not found in the past in order to account for the emergence of genuine novelty Neither the past nor the present finite entities can provide that novelty. Rather it must be found in a non-finite entity, which Whitehead called God. God thus functions as the organ of novel options for the new actual entities. Again I agree with the proviso that this activity at the level of characterization presupposes the operation of esse.

In sum, the role of a finite past actual entity is: (a) to be an element in the actual world of the new entity; (b) to contribute its solidity and objective-case creativity to the new entity. This is the heaviness of the past; (c) to contribute its characterization to the new entity. This is only true, however. insofar as its characteristics are not eliminated by the new entity’s negative prehensions but are included in a positive prehension; and (d) insofar as the new entity positively prehends a past entity and includes it in its actual world, the new entity can use that past entity as a kind of potential. That is, the new entity can integrate that past entity in various ways into its own final self-identity In that sense, the past "actual" entity functions as a "possibility" and contributes that "possibility" to the new entity: (e) what a past entity does not and cannot contribute is the new actual entity’s esse.

Past actual entities affect the future; they do not effect the future.

(f) An Objection to my Understanding of the Role of Past Actual Entities

The preeminent process theologian and philosopher John Cobb has offered a challenge to my position which we are now in a position to explore.¹⁹ Cobb clearly expresses one kind of counter argument to my project we are likely to encounter among orthodox Whiteheadians.

The essence of Cobb’s objection is this. The past entities form a many. According to the category of the ultimate, these many become one. The many becoming one" is the new concrescing entity Thus, Whitehead’s own metaphysical system, as it now stands, is perfectly capable of accounting for the new actual entity.

Cobb writes: "to treat the many becoming one as itself a one distinct from the one that becomes, . . . is a misunderstanding." Cobb has given us a terse and extremely precise formula It can be expanded as follows. "The many becoming one" refers to the past actual entities that are included in the new actual entity "The one that becomes" is the new actual entity that includes those many past entities. Cobb is claiming that when we understand that the new actual entity is the many past actual entities, then we do not have to ask for the source of the "being" of that new entity as though it were something above and beyond its many constituent past entities. In sum the category of the ultimate accounts for the fact that the many past entities are brought together as the new actual entity, where the new actual entity is nothing other than those many past actual entities in the process of becoming a new determinate fact, that is, a new one.

In support of his position, Cobb notes not only that the past entities have a role to play in their transcendent future, but he claims that this role is active, and not merely passive. In this regard, Cobb can appeal to Whitehead’s own language in which the past entities, as we have already noted, are described as "causally efficacious" in relation to their futures. If the many past actual entities are dominated, for example, by anger, then those past entities become the efficient causes of the appearance of anger in the new actual entity. Thus, if we may restate Cobb’s position, the past actual entities retain an enduring "presence" into their transcendent future that is sufficient to account for -- in conjunction with the category of the ultimate -- the appearance of the new actual entity.

In response to Cobb, let us first note the structure of his argument. His analysis operates at the level of creativity-characterization, and he is in effect arguing that there is no need to move beyond that level to creativity-esse. There is, according to Cobb, no radical question about the being-here of either the world as a whole or of any actual entity in it. Even at the level of creativity-characterization, and even on Whitehead’s own terms, however, we have some questions as to whether "the one that becomes" can be identified with the "many becoming one" without remainder. Consider again Diagram One, above. Of course, this is my diagram, but it does, I believe, accurately reflect Whitehead’s point of view The diagram shows that even on Whitehead’s own account, the "many be coming one" (that is, past actual entities B, G, D, etc.), while included in the "one that becomes" (that is, actual entity A), is not completely identical with the "one that becomes" (that is, with A). For example, neither individually nor as a group, do the past entities prehend their past(s) from region "a." Only the new actual entity A perceives its world from region "a." This gives the "one that becomes" (that is, actual entity A) its own distinct identity This kind of consideration, however, while important, does not bring us to the center of the problem.

We come somewhat closer to the heart of the matter when we turn to Cobb’s claim that the past actual entities retain a type of activity into their transcendent future. We noted that there is a strong exegetical basis in Whitehead’s own writings for the claim that the past actual entities are efficient causes of various factors in the new actual entity Previously I noted that if the past actual entities are dominated by anger, this past anger will become the efficient cause of the new actual entity’s feeling of anger. The question, however, is how to unpack this claim. My interpretation is that the new actual entity includes its past entities as a part of its real internal constitution. Thus the new entity is nothing without the inclusion of those past entities, even though it is more than those past entities. That is, the past entities, with their objective-case creativity and with (some of) their characteristics, have entered into the very identity of the new entity. As a result, during its initial (conformal) stage of concrescence, the new entity will exhibit those characteristics because they have become a part of what that new entity is. Whitehead calls this causal efficacy, or, more precisely; "prehension in the mode of causal efficacy." This is Whitehead’s analysis of physical power. Thus, to return to our illustration of anger, because the past entities with their feelings of anger have been included in the new actual entity as a part of its very identity, then those past feelings of anger are a part of the very identity of the new actual entity which thereby also feels anger.

The new actual entity, during its later stages of concrescence, may move beyond a purely physical relation to its past by enhancing or diminishing those characteristics, (such as anger), but it cannot avoid an initial physical coercion. Notice, however, that while my’ analysis of causal efficacy certainly requires the real being-here of the past entities, it does not require that they be active in any sense of "active" either in ordinary language or in Whitehead’s metaphysics. The past is casually efficacious on the future not because the past entities are "active," but because the future entities will incorporate them into their own identities.

We move still closer to the heart of the issue between the orthodox Whiteheadians and my own, when we note that actual entity A (to return to Diagram One) has its own subjectivity where this subjectivity is distinct from the subjectivities of B, G, D, etc., whether considered singly or as a group. This subjectivity is closely related, in my analysis, to the particularity of the new actual entity, to its activity, and to its status as a real agent in a real world. On my analysis, the new actual entity most truly is, that is, is most fully real, during the activity of its concrescence as it decides its own final identity. When the actual entity achieves that final identity, it becomes something "actual." As actual, we may still say that the actual entity is, but not in the fullest sense of that word.

It is important to note that we may talk about the "identity" of an actual entity in two distinct, albeit related, senses. During its concrescence, an actual entity clearly has an identity It has its own subjectivity, its own particularity, its own power to react to its past, and its own power to choose (to some extent) which characteristics it will actualize. During its concrescence an actual entity possesses some characteristics determinately or actually, while it possesses other characteristics only potentially, This brings us to the second sense of "identity" The concrescing entity’ will choose to actualize some potential characteristics and to not others. The outcome of the concrescence of the finite entities, on Whitehead’s analysis, is a fully determinate self-identity in the sense of a complete set of characteristics, with no room for alteration.

In summary, during its concrescence an actual entity has a self-identity with its own subjectivity, its own particularity, its own mixture of actual and potential characteristics, and its own power to choose among the potential characteristics. In virtue of this first self-identity, the concrescing actual entity is, in the fullest sense of the word. The outcome of the concrescence, however, is an actualized self-identity in which the actual entity is fully characterized with no possible alteration.²⁰ In virtue of this second self-identity, the actual entity is, in the sense of being completely actual, but this is somewhat less than the richest sense of the verb is.

In contrast, the many past actual entities form a mere collection. A collection does not have its own subjectivity and thus cannot make its own decisions. Nor does a collection have its own particularity. To grant the set of past actual entities the power to make decisions or to assert that the set of past entities has its own particularity; its own being-here, would be to commit the fallacy of misplaced concreteness. It follows, therefore, that the self-identity of the concrescing entity cannot be reduced to the identities, either individually or collectively of the many past entities that are included in that new concrescing entity. It is this self-identity for which we must give an account.

At the level of creativity-characterization, Whitehead’s system as it now stands has much to offer. It can account for the contribution by the many past entities of their characteristics and their objective-case creativity to the new actual entity That is, Whitehead offers a convincing explanation of causal efficacy. Whitehead’s system can also account for the concrescence of the actual entity, which includes the many past actual entities, into a new determinate, completely actualized entity, it can give an account of the freedom of the new actual entity’ to choose its own final self-identity (from among a set of alternative possibilities). What Whitehead’s system cannot do, however, is to account for the real being-here of the concrescing entity- that makes all these other factors possible, that makes all these other processes to be genuine events in a real world. Thus, to account for the real "being-here" of the concrescing entity with its own new particularly; subjectivity; and freedom, we must appeal to creativity-esse.

(g) Creativity is Derived from God

An entity called God is already available within Whitehead’s process metaphysics with the following characteristics and roles. God as a single everlasting concrescence is contemporaneous with each new entity;²¹ God contributes the initial aim, organizes the past entities into the new entity’s actual world, contains (in the primordial nature) the potentiality of the universe, and so forth.

Because God is an everlasting concrescence, God’s creativity, either as esse or as characterization, never converts into objective-case creativity. Rather, God is active and contemporary with each new entity and, thus, always available as the source of each new entity’s esse. If such an actual entity were not already available to serve as the cosmic cause of creativity, we would have to invent one.

Note what I have done: I have reunited at the most basic level what Whitehead and most of his followers rent asunder: God and creativity I have combined the notion of "Being" or "Being-Itself" with a particular existent. From Heidegger’s point of view I have located (the source of) Sein within a particular seiende. From the point of view of Tillich, I have combined God as Being-Itself with God as part of the furniture of the universe. Even Aquinas might accuse me of thoroughly’ confusing and commingling primary and secondary causality In relation to Whitehead, Heidegger, Tillich, and Aquinas, my position is highly unorthodox. And yet, despite this consensus of the doctors, certainly the Christian New Testament and the Hebrew Bible, and possibly the Koran as well, picture God as not only the creator of the world but also as able to act within that world. The article as a whole, but particularly the next two sections constitute my argument for this highly unorthodox (but, from the standpoint of the founding texts of the great monotheistic traditions, profoundly orthodox) combination.

XI. The Basic Thesis: God is the Creator

My basic thesis states that God alone is the source of each actual entity’s creativity; That is the most important part, but only a part, of what we mean when we call God the "creator of heaven and earth." In discussing my basic thesis I will make six basic points.

The first point to note is that God’s role as the source of the creature’s creativity does not compromise the creature’s freedom. Once the new entity is established as a concrescence, it is numerically distinct not only from God but from all other actual entities as well.

Previously I denied that a "drop" or "amount" of creativity passes from God to the creature. I can now provide an additional reason for this denial. It is precisely the role of creativity to establish each actual entity as a distinct entity with its own particularity. In this sense, each finite entity’s creativity is its own and not God’s. The resulting actual entity’ is autonomous, making its own decisions. It chooses its own final, completed identity through its own power of creativity-characterization.

God as the sole source of each creature’s creativity, not only establishes that creature in its esse, but also establishes that creature as a free agent with its own capacity to partially choose, that is, to partially characterize its own identity. Yet because that creature is numerically distinct from God, not only its creativity-esse but also its creativity-characterization is its own and not God’s. Therefore, God in the act of giving the creature its creativity does not "work the will" of the creature in any sense. I maintain the creature’s radical freedom to create its own identity, as the process tradition has consistently affirmed.

God and the creature are not locked into a "zero-sum game" over the source of creativity-esse. That is, decreasing God’s role as the giver of esse would not result in an increase in the creature’s role. Rather, the more completely we identify God as the source of all creativity; the more fully we affirm the creature’s own particularity, its numerical distinctiveness from God, and its own concrescence and decision-making.

When we describe God as the sole source (that is, cause) of the creativity’ of the universe, we stand in a tradition that sees God as Being-Itself (for example, Tillich), as Sein (for example, those theologians influenced by Heidegger), and primary cause (for example, the Thomists). In Whitehead’s own metaphysics, however, God has none of those roles. Rather, Whitehead’s God is one particular actual entity who interacts with other actual entities. This raises a question: do we have to choose between these traditions? I answer, no. My revised understanding of creativity allows us to accept Whitehead’s doctrine of God at the same time as we claim that God is the sole source of each creature’s esse. From my perspective, I may say that Whitehead has described God’s operations at the level of creativity-characterization, at the level where God helps shape the character of the world in very specific ways, including its moral, aesthetic, natural, and cultural qualities.

At the level of creativity-characterization, we must admit the legitimacy of many of the traditional concerns concerning divine power. Would not an all-powerful God, at this level, threaten the integrity and reality of creaturely freedom? Whitehead certainly thought so, strongly denying God’s omnipotence. To put this into different language, we may say that, in contrast to the level of creativity-esse, there is, at least potentially, a "zero-sum game" in relation to creativity-characterization. That is, an increase in God’s power may result in a decrease in the creature’s power.²² Here, God is responsible for some things but not others.

We are now in a position to raise our second main point, which I will pose as a question. Exactly how does God shape the world, as one entity among other entities, at the level of characterization? The answers bring us to well-trodden paths in process philosophy which Whitehead himself developed quite elegantly and which I have mentioned previously. Here I will only bring out the implications for God’s role as creator-characterizer, given my revised interpretation of creativity: (a) God gives the new entity its actual world; (b) God provides each new entity its initial subjective aim, in which the new concrescence feels some identities as more desirable than others. In establishing the new entity’s actual world (with its mosaic of inclusion in and exclusion from the identity of the new entity) and in choosing the new entity’s initial subjective aim, God takes account of the specific character of the past actual entities. God must do this because those past entities are part of what the new concrescence is. Thus, not only God but the past actual entities as well shape the world. In addition, of course, during the course of its concrescence, the new actual entity has the freedom to modify its subjective aim, thus once again limiting God’s role in shaping the world; (c) God’s primordial nature houses all possibilities, good and evil, old and new. God chooses those which promote good. By organizing the new entity’s actual world and by giving the new creature a subjective aim, God moves the creatures towards the concrete implementation of the good. And thereby God also moves the creatures towards the implementation of truly novel possibilities. Yet in driving toward the implementation of the good and of the new, God must interact with the character of the past world. Thus even in driving towards goodness and even as the organ of novelty, God shapes the world as only one of many agents; and (d) this brings us back to the concrescing entity itself. With its actual world in place, with its initial subjective aim in place, and with its gift of creativity-esse in place, the new actual entity must then engage in the act of defining itself. Because future actual entities must include (at least) some portion of the concrescing entity’ as a part of their internal constitutions, it follows that by shaping itself the concrescing entity is also shaping its world. This is the sole responsibility of that concrescence. That is, while the character of the past may limit or enhance the range of options available to the concrescing entity; and while God may limit or (as the organ of novelty) expand that range of options, the actual choices come not from the past entities nor from God but from that concrescence itself. Thus, God shares the role of shaping the world not only with the past entities but also, and supremely, with the concrescing actual entity itself.

These considerations point to a pervasive divine influence even at the level of creativity-characterization. According to some process theologians, these pervasive influences warrant the claim that God may’ be called the creator of the universe, quite apart from any consideration of God as the source of each entity’s creativity-esse (Cobb, Christian 203-6). That is, even at the level of "secondary causality"’ (creativity-characterization), God’s influence is so pervasive that we may refer to God as creator. I accept this, so long as we remember that, while it is certainly true that God at this level has unique roles to play (those listed above), yet God is not the only creator. All entities have some share in determining the character of the world. And I accept this so long as we remember that, as the source of creativity-esse, God is the only creator.

We may now move to the third point in my explanation of the thesis that God is the creator. It would be a mistake to say without qualification that creativity-esse causes the emergence of a new actual entity. According to the ontological principle only actual entities can be causes. Thus God, and not creativity-esse as such, causes the new actual entity to emerge as a concrescence. Again it is not creativity-characterization as such that decides how the new entity will shape its reaction to its world; rather, it is the new actual entity-itself that makes those decisions. "Creativity-characterization" is the new actual entity’s capacity to shape (to a greater or lesser degree) its own identity’. Creativity-characterization has a role, power, or explanatory capacity only insofar as it functions as factor to be discovered in an analysis of actual entities. Only actual entities are truly agents. Creativity in any of its roles, apart from actual entities, is a mere abstraction that does not, and cannot, "do" anything.

Fourth, when parsing the doctrine of God as creator, we may note two different types of novelty. There is the radical novelty of creativity as esse. In this context, only God can create something new. A new concrescence is absolutely new That particular entity has never been before and that particular entity never will be again. There is also the novelty of creativity-characterization. In this context, both God and the creatures create new facts. What we call novelty in most artistic, scientific, ethical, and other cultural contexts as well as the natural creativity of the physical and biological world refers to the novelty inherent in creativity-characterization.

The two forms of novelty interact. For example, we may note how creativity-characterization expresses novelty in two way’s: (a) Creatures can and regularly do produce novel forms and ideas; they produce "new things never before seen." As we have noted, such new things depend partially on God and partially on the creatures. (b) Each such novel form, however, is a real fact in a real world. It is a characteristic of one or more actual entities. Each new entity is new in the pure and radical sense of creativity-esse. This radical novelty is the foundation of the novelties of characterization. Until rooted in being, the novel characterizations remain purely imaginary. But rooted in esse, the creatures novelties are real, and have real consequences. Thus, without the radical novelty of creativity-esse, the creatures production of new characterizations would remain purely abstract and hypothetical, unrelated to any event in the world. Previously we noted how creativity-esse may be said to provide a "depth" for the activities of humans and nature. We may also say that the radical novelty of esse gives "depth" -- that is, significance and meaning -- to the derivative novelty of humans and nature.

Whitehead considers God as the organ of novelty. In the divine primordial nature, the womb of potentiality; God envisions all possibilities. God can make new options available to the concrescing entity where these move beyond anything present or implicated in the actual world of the new entity. This is the novelty of characterization. In one sense, all novelty of characterization stems from God, in that it ultimately emerges from God’s primordial nature. But the actualization of those options depends, not just on God, but also on the free decisions of the concrescing entities. Thus, in one sense, at the level of characterization, God is the source of all novelty while remaining only one of several factors needed to account for the actualization of those novelties. In contrast, God is not only the sole source of the novelty of creativity-esse, but no other agent enters, even in part, into the explanation of the source of that radical novelty.

Fifth, does God create ex nihilo? When speaking of God as the source of each new entity’s creativity, the answer is yes. When speaking of God as one actual entity interacting with other actual entities, the answer is no. We turn first to the sense in which God does create ex nihilo. When creating a new concrescence, God does not derive its creativity-esse from the past entities. Nor does God derive that creativity from the new entity. Nor, as I mentioned previously, does God serve as the "material" source of the entity in the sense that a "drop" of creativity’ passes from God to the new creature. Rather God is the "source" of the new entity’s creativity’-esse only in the sense that God brings that entity into being. Thus, God does not create the new entity’ from anything. God creates ex nihilo.²³

When we turn to God’s role as one actual entity among others, all of whom characterize the world, the term ex nihilo is not appropriate. While God has some unique roles to play in the characterization of the universe (organizing the new entity’s actual world, etc.), these roles do not eliminate the reality of each entity’s choice of its own final character, of its own final identity. So in relation to creativity-characterization, God is only one of several agents that create the actual identity of the world. In addition, there is no basic difference in creativity-characterization for God and for the new concrescence. For example, even God’s gift of an initial subjective aim for the new concrescence depends on the character of the past finite entities, that is, on the character of the new entity’s actual world. Therefore, in relation to creativity-characterization, even God’s decisions, while genuinely novel, cannot be absolutely novel. In this sense, both God and the creatures create new forms out of the stock of pre-existing facts and possibilities. Not even God creates ex nihilo at this level.²⁴

Lastly, it may be helpful to compare my understanding of creativity; both in its similarities and its differences, with the thrust of the classical doctrines of creation. Many of these doctrines claim not only that God creates the new entity ex nihilo, but they also claim that God creates the creature’s free decisions ex nihilo. The classical doctrines, in other words, combine what I have distinguished -- namely; God’s creation of the new entity and the new entity’s own acts of introducing novelty and characterizing fact.

My doctrine, however, is similar to the classical doctrine in the following sense. Because I hold that creativity-characterization is nothing other than creativity-esse in another role, and because God gives the creature its creativityesse and, thereby, its creativity-characterization, we can say that God creates the creature’s freedom. But, and this is my central point, we cannot say’ that God creates, ex nihilo, the creature’s decisions. That is, I claim that while God creates ex nihilo the creature’s activity and thus its decision-making, the decisions themselves remain the creature’s and not God’s.²⁵

XII. Additional Conformation for our Doctrine of God

I claim that my revised interpretations of creativity and divine creation enhance Whitehead’s doctrine of God, giving it a greater coherence and reducing its arbitrary features. This greater coherence and reduced arbitrariness constitutes significant evidence for my thesis. I focus on three of Whitehead’s statements about God that, within his own system, seem somewhat arbitrary. My revised doctrines of creativity and God entail that these three statements, far from being arbitrary; are in fact natural and necessary. The three propositions are (a) that God is contemporaneous with every other entity; (b) that, while all finite actual entities originate from the physical pole, God originates from the mental pole, and (c) that while all finite actual entities reach a "satisfaction" and then cease their activity; God is a single never-ending activity; an endless concrescence. I begin with the first claim because it is the least well-established in Whitehead’s own writings.

(a) God as Contemporaneous with Every Other Actual Entity

There are some technical problems with the claim that God is contemporaneous or simultaneous with every other entity;²⁶ I will propose, however, two definitions of contemporaneity that apply to the relation of God and a finite entity. First, if two entities, A and B, should prehend each other, then in Whitehead’s metaphysics it would be appropriate to call them simultaneous. Second, if actual entity A were to prehend actual entity B daring B’s concrescence, then it would be appropriate to call them contemporaries. With regard to the first definition, we may note that even on Whitehead’s original scheme, quite irrespective of any revision, God and each finite actual entity’ mutually prehend each other. That is, the new entity prehends God at the first stage of its concrescence, this being the source of the new entity’s subjective aim and the novel eternal objects that enter the world. And Whitehead plainly states that God prehends each actual entity at the end of its concrescence, with no eliminations or alterations (for example, Process 346). Therefore, even on Whitehead’s original understanding, God and each finite entity mutually prehend each other which means, on the definition provided above, that God is contemporaneous with every actual entity.

Interpreters have had a difficult time dealing with the implications of the mutual prehension of God and an actual entity. Consider just two of the outstanding Whiteheadian exegetes: John Cobb and Lewis Ford. Because, among other reasons, of the problematic status of mutual prehensions between God and an actual entity, John Cobb has suggested abandoning Whitehead’s view of God as a single actual entity and reinterpreting God as a series of actual entities (Christian 188). Again, Lewis Ford notes that Whitehead’s own view requires mutual prehensions between God and each finite entity; and he discusses the problems involved. Ford suggests that not only can contemporaries mutually prehend each other, which is the clear implication of Whitehead’s own view of the relation of God to the world, but that God prehends each entity during that entity’s concrescence ("Whitehead’s" 1-23).

Given my revision of the notion of creativity, it follows that God and each new concrescence must be contemporaneous. Only concrescing entities have creativity-esse and creativity-characterization. If God should cease to concresce, then God could not serve as the source of the new entity’s creativity. God would then have objective-case creativity only, where objective-case creativity is creativity that has "solidified" into a "dead" stasis. Therefore, God must be concrescing during new actual entity’s concrescence. In short, God and the finite entity must be contemporaneous.

I end with a comment about the presence of God, a theme I will continue in the last section. I wish to note that God is present to the new entity in two ways. The first has to do with how God prehends the finite entity; the second, with how the finite entity’ prehends God.

First, God prehends each actual entity throughout its concrescence. Thus, God not only’ knows perfectly, and preserves perfectly; the finite entity’s final satisfaction, but in addition God knows and preserves the entity’s joys and sorrows, hopes and fears as they happen. This is not to say that the entity continues to concresce "in" God. Such a claim would undermine Whitehead’s pluralism and turn it into a pantheistic scheme. It does mean, however, that while every future finite entity’ will prehend and thus "know" that finite entity only as a completed concrescence, God will prehend and thus "know" the concrescence in its subjectivity. This gives us an interpretation of Whitehead’s otherwise mysterious comments that each finite entity is prehended into God’s (consequent) nature without the loss of immediacy -- or in different words, without the loss of the "unison of immediacy," of "mutual immediacy;" or of the "unison of becoming" (Process 340, 346, 349, 350, 351).

Second, the finite entity’ prehends God at the beginning of its concrescence. That means that God is present throughout all stages of the finite entity’s concrescence. I explain this as follows. A concrescence is a development, but it is not a temporal development. In our ordinary sense of time, one moment is gone when a new moment comes. In the case of a concrescence, however, each stage is present to every other stage, giving us a radically different sense of "before and after."²⁷ Thus, God as prehended at the entity’s first stage of concrescence is present throughout every stage of that concrescence. Moreover, in the case of God, the finite entity prehends God during God’s concrescence. Thus, the finite entity prehends the very life, dynamism, and subjectivity of God, which then remains with that entity throughout every stage of its concrescence. While God’s creativity, life, dynamism, and subjectivity remain numerically distinct from the creature’s life and subjectivity, nonetheless God’s life and dynamism are present throughout the creature’s concrescence.

(b) God as a Single, Everlasting Actual Entity

Whitehead argued that God is a single everlasting concrescence. This idea has engendered considerable controversy for two reasons. On the one hand, God is the sole example of such an actual entity; all other actual entities having both a beginning and an end. This is a problem for Whitehead because his explicit goal is to articulate a metaphysical scheme that applies to all actual entities without exception. On the other hand, it may not be necessary that God, under Whitehead’s own system, actually be a single actual entity. I have already mentioned John Cobb’s idea that God is a series of actual entities, a series without beginning or end. Cobb’s proposal seems at least as well grounded in the basic principles of Whitehead’s system as Whitehead’s own view. Thus, the claim that God is a single actual entity, without beginning or end, seems ungrounded and therefore arbitrary

The doctrine of God as I have developed it, however, requires that God be a single, everlasting concrescence. The argument is simple. If God were not everlasting, if God were to come to a satisfaction, then God would be completely actual, inactive, and lacking in subjectivity’. As such, God would have no creativity-esse or creativity-characterization and thus would be incapable of doing anything, including the evocation of new entities into being/activity In fact, God could not even prehend the new finite entities after they reached their satisfaction. Therefore, God is always in act but never actual -- a single, never-ending concrescence.

The same argument, it might be added, applies to the view, such as Cobb’s, that God is a never-ending series of actual entities. My case runs as follows: if God were a series of actual entities, then where would the new divine entity get its creativity? Not from the past divine entity because that entity; having achieved a stasis, would have no living creativity to contribute. Like any other past actual entity, it would have only objective-case creativity. The creativity might come from a "super-God" beyond the series of divine entities. But this super-God would have to be an actual entity, contemporaneous with each member of the series, always active, never coming to a stasis -- in short, this super-God would be none other than the God for whom we have been arguing.

Several interesting consequences flow immediately from my view of God as a single actual entity that as the source of all creativity never reaches a stasis. I argued in Section VII that creativity’ is "activity-" which includes both actuality and potentiality, but that it is more than either. As such, God is the paradigm of activity and cannot be identified with either pure actuality or with pure potentiality.²⁸

I also argued in Section VII that this activity; this concrescence, is the locus of life, subjectivity, and the intensification of experience. It follows that subjectivity increases with the sense of postponed completion, with the possession of an identity that is always in dynamic development. God as the source of creativity must always be an activity and never a mere actuality nor a mere potentiality (though including both), and thus God is the model of intense and heightened subjectivity and life.²⁹

As we have seen, on Whitehead’s own account, God never perishes (that is, never achieves a final, actualized stasis). Thus God does not forget any aspect of the past, and the past never fades for God. This is because God, having no need for negative prehensions, feels the past in its completeness. This much Whitehead himself explicitly affirmed, but my interpretation of the doctrine of creativity adds another dimension to his position. Because God is fully creative in all senses and, thus, the model of subjectivity and vivid feelings, and because God feels the finite entity during its concrescence (and not just after it has achieved its stasis), it follows that God feels the world with a constant freshness and rich intensity that Whitehead’s own position prevented him from fully articulating.

My revision also allows us to retrieve the vocabulary of God’s "eternity" from the classical tradition. Articulating "eternity" has always been difficult. Eternity has never meant mere timelessness. It differs significantly from the "tenseless" truth of mathematics. Nor does it mean merely endless duration through time. Boethius offered the most famous definition of eternity: "the simultaneous and perfect possession of limitless life." Following some hints in Augustine’s Confessions, I have sometimes glossed this for my students as the "simultaneous possession of all nows." This definition, while intuitively plausible, provides no explanation on how this might be. Perhaps I can shed some faint light.

God is a single never-ending concrescence. This may sound as if God has endless duration through time, but that is not what is meant. In process thought, "time" is reserved for the transition between entities. Thus time does not apply to the relations within a concrescence. Rather, Whitehead worked out a sophisticated account of concrescence that (a) allows the use of "before" and "after" in reference to the various stages of concrescence while (b) also affirming that each stage of the concrescence is fully present to every other stage.³⁰ In finite entities, the concrescence has "bounds," that is, we can assign temporal limits "within which" a finite concrescence takes place.³¹ God’s concrescence is not so bounded. Thus, all stages of the divine concrescence are fully present to each other without any bounds of time (or space). In short, God’s concrescence has many of the earmarks of the traditional notion of divine eternity.

The divine concrescence, however, is not simply identical with the traditional notion of eternity. God prehends each finite entity and is prehended by each finite entity. Thus, God prehends or feels the temporal relations of the creatures. This means that God takes those temporal relations into the divine concrescence. God experiences those very temporal relations that God created. This does not mean that God is temporal, that is, it does not mean that God’s concrescence had a beginning in time nor that it will have an end. It does mean, however, that as God incorporates the creatures’ experiences of temporal beginning and end, God experiences (and not just "knows about") temporality within the larger framework of the divine concrescence.³²

We can consider several additional points about eternity The finite creature’s experience of concrescence provides it with an analogue of eternity; and this in three senses. First, the finite entity experiences the objective-case creativity of the past actual entities in its actual world. As the finite entity prehends these past concrescences, it prehends what once was a living image of eternity This is the least significant way in which the new entity experiences eternity. Second, the new concrescence, in its very identity as a concrescence, exercises its creativity-characterization. That is, it expresses its creativity in a verbal mode. Here, the concrescence itself in the free creation of its own identity -- not in time but in its own mode in which all stages are jointly present -- presents an analogy of eternity. To the extent that the concrescence can become reflective on its own activity, it can directly’ experience itself as an analogue of eternity. Third, the new concrescence gets its status in "being" from creativity-esse. Creativity-esse presents the most profound analogy of eternity, because creativity-esse establishes the concrescence as a real entity, with a real subjectivity, with a real freedom to decide (within limits) its own identity, and with a real power to shape the world. Thus creativity-esse points to the togetherness of "before" and "after" in the concrescence, not as a mere theory’, but as the depth and power of concrete existence. Here, eternity is not something merely speculative in the negative sense but is nothing less than the deepest level of each actual entity. We must remember, however, that creativity-esse has an adverbial quality. Even for us humans, it is not the object of our experience, either directly like creativity in the objective case, nor reflexively’ as in the case of creativity in the verbal mode. Thus we do not directly experience the deepest analogy of eternity; it always remains much too close to us for that. This deepest analogy remains around the corner, behind our backs, and in the periphery of our vision. Eternity is not so much what we experience, or what we decide, as it is that out of which we experience and decide.

There is a sense, however, in which each entity moves beyond the possession of mere analogues to eternity and actually contacts eternity and incorporates it into itself. I can explain this as follows: each finite entity; in experiencing God during God’s concrescence, has a direct access to the divine eternity itself. Thus, the analogies in our own concrescence of God’s eternity connect directly with our experience of God’s eternity. The finite entity may lack consciousness and may want the powers of thought and language to become aware of this experience, or the finite entity may suppress that foundational experience during its concrescence as it develops its "normal" modes of consciousness and articulates its "practical" and "secular" concerns, but the experience of God’s eternity is never wholly absent. Thus not only do our lives express their own analogies of eternity,³³ but we always live out of our never-wholly-eliminated, concrete, (normally) preconscious experience of God’s own eternity.

(c) God as Not Originating from the Physical Pole

According to Whitehead, every actual entity has two sides. He calls the one side the physical pole and the other its mental pole. In this case, the term "mental" carries no connotation of "consciousness" nor of "mind" in any ordinary sense. Perhaps Whitehead should have chosen different words.³⁴

In its technical definition, however, the physical pole is the entity’s prehensions of other, past entities in all their actuality, particularity, and concreteness. The physical pole also includes the prehension of the eternal objects as they are embedded in those other actual entities. The mental pole is the entity’s prehensions of eternal objects, not as embedded in past actualities, but as potentials apart from their role in any particular entity. The mental pole also refers to the entity’s use of those eternal objects in constructing its own identity.³⁵

Finite entities originate from their physical pole because they originate out of their feelings of past entities and their feelings of God. God also is dipolar. God’s mental or conceptual pole is termed the "primordial nature," and God’s physical pole is termed the "consequent nature." God, in contrast to the finite entities, originates from the conceptual or mental pole (Whitehead, Process 87, 224, etc.). Whitehead can provide a reason out of his own unrevised system for God’s unique origination, namely, there must be an eternal (in the sense of "timeless") supply of potentiality as the presupposition of any actuality.

My view of God as the source of all creativity provides an additional perhaps more convincing, explanation for God’s unique origination. Rather than arguing that God originates from the mental pole, however, I will be content to argue that God does not originate from the physical pole.

From my perspective, the primary reason a finite actual entity’ originates from its physical pole is that its creativity must be derived from another. It is not the source of its own creativity; The finite entity’s creativity-esse comes from God; and even its "heaviness," in the sense of the drag (or liberating momentum) of history; comes from the past finite actual entities that constitute its actual world. But God does not derive creativity from another, and thus cannot originate out of connections with another entity; However, to say that God does not originate out of the prehension of other entities is to say that God does not originate out of the physical pole.

We can also recast, in terms of my revised doctrine of creativity; Whitehead’s own reason for the priority of the mental pole in God. We hold that creativityesse necessarily issues into creativity-characterization. And so God’s role as the source of creativity-esse wears well with God’s role as the ultimate source of all characterizations, of all eternal objects. God’s existence as an actual entity; in other words, does not derive from God’s physical prehension of the other entities but derives from the divine entity itself, where God is not only the source of creativity-esse but is also the source of all possible characterizations (eternal objects). Thus, both at the level of creativity-esse and at the level of creativity-characterization, it follows that God, as the source of creativity, could not originate from the physical pole.

In this section, I have shown how my revisions reduce the arbitrariness of Whitehead’s God. To avoid arbitrariness, however, does not require us to hold that God has no unique features. Every actual entity has unique features. Nor should this reduction in arbitrariness require us to hold that God plays no unique cosmic/metaphysical roles. Rather, to repeat a methodological point noted at the end of Section II, it means that everything we want to say about God should be expressible in terms of the basic principles of the system.

XIII. Countering the Arguments Originally Offered in Support of the Separation of God and Creativity

At the beginning of this paper, I noted that the primary reason for separating creativity from God was to preserve the freedom of the creatures. No revision reuniting creativity and God, however plausible in other respects, will stand in process thought unless it preserves that creaturely freedom. My revised doctrine of creativity and my revised view of God as creator preserve precisely that freedom.

I explain this as follows: God’s gift of creativity-esse to a new actual entity establishes that entity as numerically distinct from God (and from all other actual entities). That gift of esse also establishes that entity as a subject, having its own interiority and its own subjectivity. When the new entity implements its gift of creativity-esse in the form of creativity-characterization, this is the new actual entity’s own activity. It is not God’s. Thus, its decisions are its own and not God’s (nor any other entity’s). My revised understanding of God as the source of creativity, therefore, maintains the principle that freedom requires the subject’s autonomy.

Freedom not only requires subjectivity, but it also requires a range of alternatives from which to choose. These alternatives have to do with what Whitehead calls eternal objects. This brings us to the level of creativity-characterization. At this level, God operates as one actual entity among others (in all the ways we have noted, such as maintaining causal order, organizing the actual world, providing novel options, and giving the initial subjective aim, etc.). Here, God not only can increase but, when necessary, reduce the range of options available to the new entity. As we have seen, however, God can no more reduce that range to zero than can any’ other actual entity. At the level of creativity-characterization, I have kept intact those aspects of Whitehead’s system that guarantee that even God cannot wholly eliminate that range of options.

There is a deep connection between God’s role as creator ex nihilo and the nature of God’s role as one actual entity’ among other actual entities. To my previous claim that creativity’-esse is creativity-characterization, I can add the further claim that creativity-characterization is the subject’s free choice of an identity within the context of causality-. That is, the very being of an entity during its concrescence is its free subjective functioning within some causal context. To reduce that subjectivity to zero or to reduce the range of available options to zero would be to destroy the freedom of the concrescence and, thus, annihilate it. Since God’s creation ex nihilo of a new entity is the establishment of that entity as a free subject, it follows that it would be a contradiction in terms to imagine that God (or any other agent), at the level of creativity-characterization, could eliminate that concrescence’s subjectivity, reduce its range of options to zero, or wholly destroy its freedom. That is, the finite concrescence s subjectivity and freedom cannot be wholly expunged because the concrescence cannot both be and not be at the same time. Thus my revised doctrine of creativity reinforces Whitehead’s claim that each actual entity is the creator (in part) of its own identity.

To be free, a decision must be made for a purpose, where a purpose is categorically distinct from a cause. Once again, nothing in my revised doctrines of creativity and of God as creator would call this into question. I conclude that my revisions do not in any way undercut the values of creaturely autonomy and freedom that led Whitehead and many others to separate God from creativity. To the contrary, these revisions strengthen that finite freedom.

In Section 1, I noted the closely related argument, common among process thinkers, that the separation of God and creativity results in improvements in theodicy because it establishes a radical freedom for the creatures, where God does not create the creatures’ particular decisions. Basically, this is a version of the free will defense. In the traditional version, the creature free will stems from a voluntary "withdrawal" of God’s power, where God could have intervened but chose not to intervene in the creature’s operations. The key move in process metaphysics was to make creaturely freedom necessarily inherent in the creature’s very existence; and the best way to do this, it was thought, was to separate creativity from God, making each creature "self-creative."

I now have an answer to this "argument from theodicy" for the separation of God and creativity. My reformulation of the notion of creativity maintains the key process insights that (a) freedom is inherent in the very reality of creaturely existence and that (b) freedom belongs to a creature which is numerically distinct from God. Given that I have maintained points (a) and (b), it follows that I have an effective refutation of the "argument from theodicy" for the separation of God and creativity. I believe that I have not only maintained these two points, but that I have established them in a more complete and radical way than Whitehead himself was able to do. In short, whatever advantages for theodicy that are inherent in process thought’s traditional separation of God and creativity remain available on my revisions. In fact, by raising the radical question of the "being-here" of actual entities and showing that their very "being-here" consists in their freedom, those advantages now have a firmer grounding.

I have argued that God is not just Being-Itself but is also an actual entity who provides novel possibilities, organizes each entity’s actual world, and provides each entity with a subjective aim. Here, God’s actions do result in specific characterizations of fact. When referring to such divine activities, the process tradition has taught that God operates through "persuasion," where persuasion is good, much better than "coercion." I agree that persuasion is a valuable method of acting. When this persuasion takes the form of love (as process thinkers assume it normally does), I would argue that it is the supremely valuable form of acting. It is unclear to me, however, why an entity that has the influence that God has at the level of creativity-characterization could never be said to have the capacity to coerce another entity Sureh; through granting and withholding novel forms, through organizing the network of inclusion and exclusion of past characteristics in the provision of the new entity’ with its actual world, and through shaping the very purposes of the new entity; God can sometimes act in ways that in ordinary language we would consider to be coercive.³⁶ But these considerations do not stem from any of my revisions. God’s roles at the level of what I have called creativity-characterization are precisely the set of roles that Whitehead and the process tradition have always assigned to God.

Thus, whatever problems or advantages may stem from the claim that God can (or cannot) sometimes engage in coercive activity; these remain the same in Whitehead’s original version as in my revision. My position, however, does guarantee that this coercion can never be complete and total. To be is to be free, and no matter what influence God, as one actual entity among many, may have on a creature, God cannot, as I have shown, eliminate that creature’s subjectivity nor erase all squiggles of its freedom. My revision of the doctrine of creativity therefore shows how God, in granting creativity-esse to that creature, thereby establishes a freedom so deeply rooted that even God, when acting as one agent among other agents at the level of creativity-characterization, cannot wholly eliminate it. Thus while Whitehead himself claimed that the freedom of the actual entities could never be wholly eliminated, my doctrine of creativity-esse provides a reason and foundation for that claim -- a reason that was missing in Whitehead’s original system.

Finally, in Section 1, I noted the insistence of such scholars as Tillich that God, as Being-Itself, cannot be "a" being, a part of the furniture of the universe. Heidegger went further and distinguished not only’ between Being and particular beings, but between Being and God. In Section II, however, I noted that founding documents of Judaism, Christianity; and Islam never make that sort of separation. If we wish to talk about Being-Itself or Sein in a monotheistic context, it is imperative to locate Being-Itself in a particular being called God. The best response to the concerns of Tillich and Heidegger is to create an actual case in which God functions both as the source of Being, what I called creativity-esse, and as one agent among other agents, at the level of what I called creativity-characterization. I believe I have established such a case. My revision of creativity and the affirmation of God as the Creator not only enhances the coherence of the process doctrine of God and not only is adequate to our postmodern context (as I shall discuss in the next section), but is religiously available at least to the monotheistic heritage.

XIV. The Presence of God in a Postmodern World

In Section III, I noted some postmodernist objections to a "sustaining presence," whether that of the world-founding Cartesian ego, the expressive self of the romantics, or the presence of God. According to the deconstructionists, our language is only arbitrarily connected to the larger world. Therefore, neither nature nor history can provide a sure and certain center to serve as an objective criterion for truth or ethics. Indeed, deconstructionists such as Derrida may be classified as modern gnostics. The original gnostics (considered heretics by the mainstream of early Christianity) claimed that we are innocent souls trapped in a world of matter. To escape that material entrapment, we need special wisdom or knowledge (gnosis). In our contemporary setting, we find Derrida and other deconstructionists asserting that we are "selves" trapped by’ the buildup of past structures, above all by our language. According to deconstructionist thinking, our current language is the silt or residue of past social practices. The deposit of these practices incorporates the unjust, ideological, and power-driven habits of previous generations and thus binds those today who still speak their languages. To escape from this bondage, as our guest in Tokyo said, we need to "deconstruct" those linguistic structures to unmask the idols that still haunt them. This produces the "knowledge" that frees those held captive by the idols, so that they can "get what they want. I might add that such deconstructionists assume that those in the past who produced the entangling structures of language were ideologically; driven and therefore guilty, while those who do the deconstructing are innocent. Presumably those on whose behalf this deconstruction is undertaken, particularly if they qualify as victims, are also innocent.

The following passage describes, quite accurately but somewhat ironically, many post-modernists including Derrida. (‘The irony stems from the claim common among postmodernists -- particularly those engaged in literary criticism -- to have moved beyond the romantic view of the self as finding "truth" through its own pure powers of imagination and the romantic understanding of literature as the expression of that imagination.)

When we turn to Whitehead, we discover many’ passages that read as if he were an extraordinarily’ precocious modern who managed, almost preternaturally, to anticipate the main themes of the postmodern world: each creature as searching for its own "satisfaction"; each creature as possessing not merely re-creative but also creative powers; each creature as expressing its own individual freedom; each creature as creative of its own identity; each creature as living from its own "perspective" from which it "interprets" the world; each creature as "contingent" and therefore not bound by any necessary laws that govern its being; and many more.

Whitehead affirmed all these themes, but only in part. Let me note one example. For many postmodernists, history is a major source of our problems and, thus, liberation means escape from our entrapment by the past. Let me scrutinize this claim from a process point of view. Process thought holds that each new actual entity includes its past (actual) world as a part of its own identity. This inclusion of the past does not threaten the subjectivity of the new actual entity; rather, it makes that subjectivity possible. Thus, the deconstruction’s goal of liberation from the past makes no sense. That is, to be wholly free from the past, one would have to be free from oneself -- not just one’s past self -- but from one’s present subjectivity as well.

Even from Whitehead’s perspective, however, the past can and often does become a heavyweight, crushing the present. The present subjectivity; may and often does need liberation from particular elements in that past. Whitehead observed, however, that we can move beyond those constricting elements in the past only if we have a supply of novel options. But the new actual entity’ cannot produce those novelties de novo from itself. Novel options originate outside the new entity’; they’ come from an "other." In part -- and here Whitehead differs profoundly from the deconstructionists -- the new options come from the past finite entities, but ultimately they come from God who is the womb of potentiality. It is up to the new entity to opt to actualize one or more of those liberating novelties, but it does not create them. In short, liberation does not come from the "self" alone but from the self in relation to the world, to history, to the "other," and to God.

One might also add the note, seldom encountered in postmodernist writings but basic to Whitehead’s metaphysics, that even novelty makes sense only within the context of causal order, where this order is also a gift from the past and from God, and where the new entity must also work to sustain that order. In addition, Whitehead understood that while novelty is a necessary element in our liberation from oppressive structures in the past, the wrong novelty can also destroy those hard-won patterns of order on which depend our life, liberation, and creativity (in the everyday meaning of that word). Only as rooted in a larger world can the self evaluate the promise and the danger of a novelty. Our enchantment, therefore, does not follow from our rootedness in the larger world as such but only’ from certain negative elements in that larger world This point the deconstructionists tend to de-emphasize while Whitehead places it at the heart of his philosophy.

Whitehead’s critique, however, extends to a much deeper level. The late enlightenment, the romantic movement, and postmodernism are all deeply indebted to the philosophy of Immanuel Kant. The heart of Kant’s philosophy lies the split between the noumenal and phenomenal worlds. According to Kant, the noumenal world -- that is, reality as it is "in itself" -- lies forever beyond the grasp of human reason. The phenomenal world -- that is, the world as it enters into our experience -- is not merely discovered, it is constructed. Kant thought there were a priori rules for this construction. His romantic, modernist, and postmodernist descendants argue that we create even those rules. Thus, according to Kant and his descendants, our reason has no access to "reality as such" (the noumenal); the only reality we can know is what we ourselves have constructed (the phenomenal).

In the earliest, first reaction to this philosophy, no one (including Kant himself) was willing to abandon the quest for some relation to reality as it is in itself, to the noumenal world. Kant argued that in ethical action we obtain, if not knowledge of the noumenal world, then at least a relation to it. Later, however, the romantics favored imagination as the approved route to re-establish contact with reality. The romantics, such as Ralph Waldo Emerson, believed that as the individual traveled deeply into his or her imagination, that he or she would find that universal truth (that noumenal reality, if you will) that is the same for all people. To sustain such a philosophy; Emerson had to assume the basic goodness of each person, of each self.

The romantic movement collapsed. In the end, imagination did not produce universal value and truth but only private visions. Romanticism could not sustain a credible belief in the existence, or least the accessibility of, the noumenal world, of reality itself. One way to view the postmodernist movement is to see it as the recognition that we humans have no contact with reality itself, whether through reason, imagination, feeling, or anything else. According to the deconstructionists, however, this decentered world, rather than producing despair, now offers us wider options for human liberation. We are now free to undermine the accumulated prejudices of our languages and allow each individual to construct his or her own world on no other basis than preference and desire.

Another reason, it must be added, for the collapse of the romantic movement was the increasing implausibility’ of assuming the fundamental goodness of the human self. Without this assumption, we have no reason to hope that our imagination can reconnect us with reality its elf, with the noumenal world that is valid for all people. The assumption of an essential human innocence looks implausible, if not obscene, after Freud, Marx, and the other masters of suspicion, to say nothing of two world wars, the Turkish holocaust against the Armenians, the Stalinist purge of the peasants, the Nazi extermination of the Jews, the Maoist rage against the Chinese reactionaries, and the Cambodian communist holocaust against those who could read or merely owned eyeglasses. The deconstructionists, however, have an ambivalent relation to this denial of innocence. They tend to agree on the guilt of the self when referring to those in the past or even those in the present who continue to reinforce the injustices such as we find in the past. They tend, however, to exempt themselves and certain "victims" from this criticism. They need to affirm their own goodness if their deconstruction of the unjust structures of language and society is to be plausible.

Whitehead launched what to me is the most profound critique yet made of the Kantian split of noumena from phenomena³⁷ and thus he launched a most extraordinary attack on the foundations of the late enlightenment, romantic, modern, and postmodern worlds. The heart of his critique lies in two claims: first, the past enters into the very identity of the new actual entity; while the present actual entity does not enter into the identity of the past entities; and second, this is possible because the basic entities are events and not substances as Descartes and the mainstream of Western philosophy after him understood a substance.³⁸ On the basis of these two claims, Whitehead asserts that we are rooted in a reality’ that precedes us, a reality that precedes our knowing, a reality that guides us in the use of our freedom, self-expression, and self-creation, and that provides us with patterns of coordinated value which link us to all other entities. Thus, at the very deepest level, Whitehead, while partially affirming the postmodern emphases, denies the very heart of postmodernism. The world is primary; and all entities, including the human entities with their cultures, first emerge out of the world, and only then do they shape it.

Whitehead’s philosophy does not lead to a naive realism; rather it entails a critical realism. As such, it undercuts the claim that the relation of language to reality is completely arbitrary and conventional (while not denying an arbitrary and conventional element to that relation). And this in turn would undercut Derrida’s claim that our language and culture lacks any normative connection to nature and history. This critique of Derrida and the other postmodern deconstructionists stems from Whitehead’s more basic critique of the Kantian split between noumena and phenomena, between what is the case objectively and what we feel subjectively.

We now are in a position to raise an important question. Does the success of the Whiteheadian critique of the Kantian split between noumena and phenomena, and thus of the deconstructionist bifurcation of the self from the world, lead to a reinstatement of the Cartesian reality-founding ego? The answer is not as clear as one might wish. Whitehead dealt explicitly, clearly, and decisively with certain aspects of Descartes’ philosophy; for example, with the Cartesian split between self and world. Let me note in this connection that Kant affirmed this same split, and therefore Whitehead’s argument against Kant also applies to Descartes. That is, to the extent that the past (as the "actual world") enters into the new entity; we have a strong reason for denying the complete separation of the self from the world, and thus of the absolute self-sufficiency of the new entity, of what Descartes would call the "self." Again, Whitehead has a very effective argument against the Cartesian focus on the self as conscious mind. Whitehead shows how consciousness emerges out of our being-in-the-world, and thus the conscious self cannot "ground" the world in which it lives.³⁹ In this sense, Whitehead truly does have a "reformed" subjectivist principle in contrast to Descartes’ "naive" subjectivist principle.

It may be, however, that Whitehead’s reformed principle is not quite "reformed" enough. Whitehead’s version of each actual entity’s self-creation may lend itself to certain distortions which, we assume, Whitehead did not intend. According to Whitehead, every actual entity prehends God. At the human level, this means that aspects of God’s identity enter into our real internal constitutions. We might call this Whitehead’s "incarnational theme." God becomes an object for us and enters into our identity. We can then use those divine resources we have prehended into ourselves to create ourselves. In doing so, we also shape God and the world. In short, God enters into our identity in such a way that, along with the past finite actual entities, we have a foundation for constructing ourselves and shaping our world. It is but a short step from this interpretation of the entity’s act of self-creation to that distortion in which God, along with the world, functions as a basis for a "reality-founding ego."⁴⁰ In short, the same themes that allow Whitehead to overcome the Kantian split between noumena and phenomena (and this by itself is one of the greatest achievements of twentieth century philosophy) also tend to support -- or at least to allow -- the self-centered aspects of the Cartesian ego.

Depending only on the resources in Whitehead’s philosophy as he developed it, we arrive and remain at this impasse. I believe, however, that my reformulation of the doctrines of creativity and God moves us beyond this impasse. God as the sole source of each creature’s creativity-esse may be said to create ex nihilo. As the creator ex nihilo, God never comes under our control. Whatever we do, or think, or say, or feel, or question, we do as agents who are already real. Even to question God is to presuppose our own reality as questioners and thus to presuppose not only the prior operation of creativity-esse but also the prior reality of God as the source of that esse. God as the creator ex nihilo is always and everywhere present in us and through us, and yet always and everywhere remains hidden in the shadows as the Prior One who has already given reality to our questioning, praying, cursing, loving, and hating.

Can such a God be pressed into support of a reality-founding, self-centered ego? To answer this question, we must remember that there is one God who is the source of all creativity. But just as this creativity can be analyzed at two levels -- creativity-characterization and creativity-esse -- we can also consider God’s operations at two different levels. At the level of characterization, we already have our answer. Not only can we try to use the divine resources to establish ourselves at the world-center, we can actually succeed, at least to some extent. The problem with the Cartesian ego, as it sets itself up as the center of the world, is that it actually works! Descartes was not the first to discover this fact. The author of the story of the fall of Adam and Eve in the garden recognized that same fact all too clearly. Thus, God is truly vulnerable, in all the ways that the events on the cross manifested two millennia ago and that process theologians have recently articulated so well.

It is dramatically different when we turn to God the creator ex nihilo. We can, and often do, try to make ourselves into reality-founding egos, the absolutely secure source of our own being. But we can never succeed. Any effort even to imagine ourselves at the center of reality presupposes our real existence as people who imagine -- that is, we can only imagine ourselves as the guarantors of our own being because we were first established in reality and thus as really capable of imagination. The creature’s attempt to appropriate God’s role as creator ex nihilo, while never successful, always brings tragedy in the trying. The result of the attempt has been, in the post-Cartesian west, the catastrophic isolation of each "self" from other selves (except when it submerges itself in the collective, where it becomes "faceless" and loses its creativity, in the popular sense of that word). This isolation from other selves extends to isolation from history; from nature, from culture, from the world, and from God. In short, on the one hand, we end with the ecological crisis, and on the other hand, we end with the futile attempts of Derrida and other postmodernists to deconstruct the self’s relation to history and nature so that it can create itself on the basis of nothing other than its own desires and preferences. It is absolutely, metaphysically, and categorically impossible that sin, in relation to God the creator ex nihilo, should succeed -- which sadly enough does not prevent us from trying.

We have seen that as one entity among other entities, that is, at the level of creativity-characterization, God is vulnerable to human misuse. God is not vulnerable, however, at the level of creatio ex nihilo, that is, at the level of creativity-esse. Nothing that humans or other creatures can do will ever threaten, to say nothing of actually usurping, God’s role as the creator ex nihilo. Any attempt to co-opt some portion of God’s role as the source of creativity-esse will presuppose the prior operation of God’s power to create ex nihilo, and thus have no effect on that power. The medieval claims that God is impassible, while totally in adequate in relation to the God of the incarnation, of the cross -- that is, inadequate in relation to God at the level of creativity-characterization -- seems quite appropriate to the creator ex nihilo. Nothing could have the slightest effect on this role because the creator ex nihilo operates, absolutely and without qualification, prior to all attempts to usurp that capacity.

We must remember, however, that creativity-esse and creativity-characterization, while conceptually distinguishable, must not be forced apart. Thus, while God is impassible vis-à-vis the capacity to create ex nihilo, the same God is quite passible vis- à -vis the divine roles at the level of characterization. Thus, while the attempt to establish ourselves as the creator ex nihilo has no affect upon God as the sole source of esse, it has a profound affect upon God in other ways, particularly upon God as the one who knows about and cares about each of us. In short, it affects God profoundly in those areas that we called "incarnational."

I have two final points. First, God is present with us. This is most obvious at the "incarnational" level. Earlier, at the end of the subsection (a) of Section XII, "God as Contemporaneous with Every Other Actual Entity;" I showed how God’s very life is present to and throughout the concrescence of the new actual entity. Our relation to God is, therefore, more intimate than to our own bodies, at least as Whitehead explicates our bodily experience. According to Whitehead, before I can experience an actual entity in my own body; that bodily entity must have reached a satisfaction and have become fully "actual." As such, that bodily actual entity has only its patterns of order and its objective-case creativity to contribute to my present subjectivity. These patterns and this particular objective-case creativity (that is, the "withness" of my body and its concreteness and solidity) are of course extremely important to me for without them I cannot survive. Nonetheless, because I experience God during the divine concrescence with its intensely developed subjectivity; it follows that God is more "alive" to me than is my body (or my own past).⁴¹ This presence, however, can be abused and turned into a support for the reality-founding ego.

More fundamentally God is present with us as the source of our being. We may say that while God’s gift of esse establishes the entity in its own reality and as numerically unique, at the same time God as the source of that esse -- that is, as the source of the entity’s reality and uniqueness -- is closer and more basic to that creature than it is to itself. No critique, not even that of the deconstructionists, has the slightest effect upon that presence, for the critique itself presupposes it. This also means that such a presence can never be pressed into the service of the reality-founding ego. Here we find the absolute priority of God. At least in part, we can identify this with religious claim, fundamental not only to Christianity but to Islam and Judaism as well, that God is Lord. This Lordship, unlike many other forms of Lordship in those traditions, never comes under our control and cannot, even in principle, be abused, although we can certainly try with the inevitably tragic consequences.

We have now moved from philosophy and metaphysics back to religion, which brings us to my second point. God at the incarnational level is both comforter and judge. Here we can find both forgiveness and condemnation. And yet we are still in our "ordinary" world. Even as judge, God is not strange to us, Religion in relation to God as the creator ex nihilo, however, moves into a fearful and strange dimension, where nothing is ordinary God’s goodness can be found at both levels. At the incarnational level, God’s goodness is an ordinary goodness -- that is, God urges us on to moral development. At the level of esse, however, God is still good, but in an ontological sense. Being itself is good and is a gift of divine goodness. And yet this divine esse is good because it not only makes ordinary goodness to be really good but because it also makes ordinary evil to be really evil in a real world with real consequences. The divine esse not only makes God’s incarnational goodness to be something real and to be desired, but it also makes God’s incarnational judgment to be something real and to be feared.

In relation to God’s incarnational goodness and incarnational judgment, we can interact with God in an endless variety of way’s: repentance, good works, faith, forgiveness, anger, atonement, and many more. In relation to God’s ontological goodness, we cannot interact, we can only receive. We have no choice but to receive the gift of creativity-esse. Our only choice concerns how we receive. We can receive in faith or in unfaith. If we receive in unfaith, we try the impossible -- to hoard this esse for ourselves, to bring it under our control, to guarantee our own reality. If we receive in faith, we leap into the void-without-characteristics and trust that divine power to sustain us, as the empty air sustains the clouds. This is frightening. As we grasp that this is the same God who becomes incarnationally available to us -- Christians would say, in Jesus Christ -- it is also healing.

Notes

1. When process thinkers refer to the "classical view of God," they normally’ have in mind the doctrine(s) of God as developed in the Augustinian-Thomistic tradition. There is of course enormous variety among just the Thomists, to say nothing of the Augustinian-Thomistic axis. Nonetheless, the process critique, to the extent that it is successful, would apply to the major Augustinian and Thomistic thinkers. Many orthodox Protestants have very similar views of God as the Augustinians and Thomists, for example, the Princeton Theologians including the two Hedges and B. B. Warfield. The process critique, to the extent it is successful, would therefore apply to them also. So far as I am aware, process thinkers have not critiqued the traditional Islamic doctrines of God; but the process arguments would seem to be far more devastating when applied, say; to the "occasionalism" of al-Ashari’s doctrine of divine power than to the Augustinian or Thomistic notions of God.

David B. Burrell, in his Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions (102, 201 n15) complains that process theologians use "classical theism" as a belittling term. I certainly do not intend to use "classical theism" pejoratively. Rather my goal is to move the process and classical doctrines of God towards each other. Burrell restates Aquinas’ doctrine of God so as to avoid the process and other modern arguments against it. In this paper, I will evaluate neither the process critique of the traditional doctrine of God nor the recent defenses of that doctrine as articulated by Burrell and others. Rather, that I offer a reinterpretation of the doctrine of God as creator that, while standing within the larger world of process thought and while consistent with those aspects of the process critique of the traditional view of God I mention in the main text, nonetheless incorporates certain aspects of the classical doctrine that enhance my process understanding of God as the creator.

2. In Chapter Three of his Divine Power in Process Philosophy, David Basinger argues that the theodicy of process theism reduces to one form of the "free will" defense. In this interesting book, Basinger argues that the free will defense is successful, but that the process form of that defense fares no better, and no worse, than the free will defense in a traditional context (which holds that God created some creatures with free will, that God could "intervene" to over-ride that free will, but that God does not normally do so).

There are two important presuppositions here: first, that the category; of "intervention" is coherent, and second that God can create creatures with a free will. I will argue in this paper that whatever "intervention" may mean, any intervention that completely eliminated a creature’s freedom and subjectivity would annihilate that creature. As for the second presupposition, that God can create creatures with a free will, I wholeheartedly agree. What Basinger does not provide, however, is an explanation of how a creator-God can create an agent with genuine free will, assuming that God is the creator of all things in heaven and on earth. This explanation is what I will provide in this paper.

3. Something like this must have been Heidegger’s point when he urged us not to forget "Being" (Sein) by getting lost in the many particular "beings."

4. Cobb argues that his commitment to two ultimates is compatible with the basic thrust of Christianity. Because ultimate reality is empty, God is neither subordinated to it nor threatened by it and, thus, the concerns of monotheism are not jeopardized. This general line of thought have been developed more fully in a creative article by T. Nobuhara, "How Can Principles be More than Just Epistemological or Conceptual?: Anselm, Nagarjuna, and Whitehead."

5. A fascinating dialogue between a Buddhist, Masao Abe and six Christian and one Jewish theologian touches repeatedly on the issue of history, ethics, and personhood. The dialogue was printed as The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation, edited by John B. Cobb, Jr. and Christopher Ives. Abe wants to show how the Buddhist notion of "dynamic emptiness" can shed considerable light on the Pauline notion of kenosis (Philippians 2:5-8). The notion of "kenosis" interests Christians, obviously, more than it interests most Jews. None of the six Christian partners are wholly content with Abe’s presentation of the kenotic theme in Christianity; but none can deny the genuineness of his insight into this traditional, albeit, controversial, Christian doctrine. Their hesitation primarily stems from the question of whether the notion of emptiness, conceived as a dynamic emptying of all distinctions, can sustain a commitment to ethics, history’, and personhood with the seriousness and even ultimacy that they, precisely as people standing in the Christian tradition, think necessary The Jewish participant, while less concerned with kenosis, shares their concern for the potential loss of ultimacy in the realm of historical action with its ethical norms and deep sense of personhood.

Abe has a rebuttal at the end of the book in which he tries to provide a justification for giving history and ethics, and thus persons, the kind of seriousness that the Western participants insist on. But it does not seem successful to me. The problem is precisely the way Abe would empty all distinctions. Once we empty the various distinctions, no matter how dynamically we conceive this emptiness and no matter how seriously we take the claim to have emptied emptiness (which is supposed to bring us back to our world as it is), it is impossible, on Abe’s metaphysics, to grant seriousness, let alone ultimacy, to ethics, history, and personhood. The command, for example, to love one’s neighbor loses much of its urgency if the distinction between you and the neighbor is "empty;" If the whole world is present in this "here-now," and if this "here-now" is present throughout the whole world, then the significance and even the reality of the particular developments in history have been radically compromised. In short, if we take ethics, history, and personhood seriously, and even ultimately; we must also take seriously; and even ultimately, the distinctions which serve as their presupposition. This brings us back to our claim in the main text: our doctrine of God must not only be reunited with a doctrine of Being or Being-Itself, it must also be reunited with a doctrine of particular actualities (or particular activities).

Lastly, I note that not all Buddhist scholars would accept Abe’s doctrine of emptiness. Even within the Kyoto School of Mahayana Buddhism, out of which Abe comes, there are alternative formulations of the doctrine of emptiness that do not accept the emptying of all distinctions. Such articulations of Buddhist emptiness, it would seem to me, might serve as more adequate tools in the attempt to articulate a Buddhist foundation for ethics, history, and personhood.

6. In this paper, I will not distinguish between "particularity" and "individuation." A complete analysis of Whitehead’s theory of individuation would have to analyze his understanding of the role of "regions" in the "extensive continuum." I would be willing to argue however that creativity is more basic than the extensive continuum in this regard: it is creativity, as we shall see, that makes actual entities to be real things, real facts. In addition, one could point to Whitehead’s claim that past, present, and future, are defamed, not by the extensive continuum, but the actual entities in that continuum, which in turn brings us back to the seminal role of creativity. For a fuller discussion of these issues, see Stephen T. Franklin, Speaking from the Depths: Alfred North Whitehead’s Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion 140-69, and especially 142 and 153-54. See also Jorge Nobo’s book, Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity, which is devoted to this issue.

7. It may be that our these categories of human experience will force us beyond Whitehead’s atomism of events to some sort of enduring event or actual entity. That is, to adequately conceptualize our humanity; it may be necessary to consider the possibility of actual entities that maintain their self-identity over the course of the coming to be and the perishing of many other actual entities.

There would be several requirements for such a revision, the most basic of which is this. Whitehead has overcome Kant’s distinction between noumena and phenomena precisely because each new event includes its entire past within itself as a part of his own identity; Among other desirata, a revised understanding of an actual entity would have to maintain Whitehead’s profound refutation of the Kantian split between noumena and phenomena. I have presented the nub of Whitehead’s critique of Kant in this paper. For an in-depth analysis, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths 78-82.

8. The classic exposition of Aquinas’ notion of esse remains Etienne Gilson’s Being and some Philosophers. In his helpful Freedom and Creation, Burrell places the issue of "being and creation" into the larger medieval context in which the Jewish, Christian, and Muslim traditions interact. His primary commitments, however, are to Aquinas, whom he defends not only against modern criticism of the sort made by process thinkers but also against the older criticisms of Medieval Jewish, Muslim and even other Christian thinkers (e.g., Duns Scotus). W. Norris Clarke’s stimulating book, Person and Being, provides a creative interaction between Aquinas and modern scholarship, including process thought, on the issues of "being" and "person."

9. I grant that the rearrangement of eternal objects, the first-time exemplification of an eternal object, and the first time conceptual grasp of an eternal object all constitute enormously important forms of novelty in their own right. I also grant the occupation of new region in the extensive continuum is an important form of novelty. But none of these express the total newness -- the sense of never before with its associated total uniqueness and the sense of never again to which creativity points.

10. In place of Whitehead’s name, "actual entity;" I prefer the term "active entity" to describe the really real things that make up the world. In one sense of the word "process," it is not "process and reality" in my revised metaphysics, but "process is reality"’ (that is, process marks that which is most basic and most real). Only in a rather narrow sense of the word "reality" can we talk about "process and reality." To refer to process and reality, we must limit "reality" to "completed actuality;" which is but one factor in the larger dynamic of transition and concrescence.

11. Thus, I could agree with Thomas’ description of God as pure "act" if that means activity. But I could not agree with his description of God as "actual" if that means an actuality devoid of all potentiality and, thus, of all passion, or all capacity to "under-go."

12. God is an actual entity who on Whitehead’s own account never reaches a final satisfaction. Nonetheless, the divine concrescence always increases in characterization.

13. So far as I am aware, Whitehead always assumes that each eternal object is a fully determinate possibility waiting to be actualized or, to use his vocabulary, waiting to ingress into an actual entity. Nowhere does Whitehead justify his understanding of each possibility as being fully determinate, with a clear identity, prior to actualization. It would be possible to work out a view of eternal objects in which each "possibility" represents a "range" of potentiality. In that case, the actual entity’s free act of creating its own identity would entail that the actual entity also gives precision and determination to that potentiality. In a sense, in addition to creating its own identity; the concrescence would be creating a new determination of possibility. As a range of potentiality; the eternal object would still be "eternal," but the concrescing entity would create not only a new self-identity, would not only actualize a new combination of eternal objects, but would also create a new determination of the ingressed eternal objects, and those determinations would not be "eternal." I suspect that there are good reasons for Whitehead’s assumption that each eternal object is a fully determinate possibility. For example, this may be the presupposition of his understanding of symbolic logic; it may be necessary to account for precise, scientific hypotheses about the future, etc. But it would be helpful to see such arguments spelled out.

Should it be possible to interweave both views of "possibilities," i.e., in some cases as determinate characteristics and in other cases as a range of potentiality which is indeterminate within that range, then an extremely significant result would follow. The concrescing actual entity would not only choose among a set of determinate possible identities (a set of eternal objects), but it would also create, within certain limits, the identity it chooses (it would determine, within certain limits, the eternal object it chooses). That is, the concrescence would not only actualize some "prior" possibility but would, within limits, determine the possibility itself. This would result in a more radical freedom than what Whitehead himself envisioned.

Such a revision would still require that the ranges of potentiality be eternal, and thus it would not eliminate the need for the primordial nature of God. Such a revision would not assign the creature the role of creating the ranges of potentiality; rather, it would only assign the creature the role of "cutting off" a specific possibility that had previously existed only "vaguely" within the range of potentiality. To explicate this, certain analogies from mathematics come to mind. For example, between any two numbers there exist an infinite number of points corresponding, for example, to the rational numbers. Each point is specifiable with a specific rational number, but there are more points than we can actually specify. Transfinite number theory -- such as Casitor’s levels of infinity -- opens up even more interesting way’s of understanding the freedom of a concrescence.

14. In God, the eternal objects are organized at two distinct levels. The first level is also the most abstract: the collection of all eternal objects in the divine primordial nature. The second is this: God has an appetition towards the realization of certain combinations of eternal objects (the good) and an aversion to others (the evil). This appetition and aversion, which stems from God’s own subjective aim, produces an additional level of ordering of the possibilities in God’s primordial nature. For a discussion of this issue, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths 160-62.

At an early stage of the development of his metaphysics, Whitehead had one more source of eternal objects, namely, "reversion." As he thought through the implications of the primordial nature of God, however, he dropped the category of reversion as an independent source of eternal objects. For details of this development in the category of reversion, see Lewis S. Ford, The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics 1925-1929 235-37.

15. In the following passage, Reto L. Fetz shows that the ancients and mediaevals, including Aristotle and Aquinas, did not believe that nature could produce any new thing. Nature could only reproduce what already existed. Thus, in contrast to our modern understanding, they held that nature was not genuinely creative:

According to the notion of creativity adopted in this paper, we may say that creativity-esse precisely is the establishment of the possibility of the production of new characterizations. Thus creativity-esse leads, as expressed in creativity-characterization, not merely to the world’s reproduction of old forms but also to the world’s production of characterizations that had never before been present, either explicitly or implicitly; in the world. This capacity’ to produce novel forms is, in our understanding, what we moderns and postmoderns ordinarily mean when we use "creativity" in its popular sense.

In summary, the implementation of creativity-esse in creativity-characterization allows the concrescence to alter the status of a form from that of a pure potential to an actual determinant of fact. While nature, as I will show later on, is not the source of creativity-esse, it does engage in creativity-characterization and thus is "creative" in the common use of that word in our contemporary culture.

16. The notion of creativity-characterization not only extends the capacity’ of process metaphysics to thematize human personhood, but it also points to an additional area in which a process metaphysics needs to be rethought at the deepest level. I note first the positive side. It is commonly asserted, correctly I think, that personhood is a creation, a construct. It is constructed both through the internalization of social factors and through the individual’s free choice. The development of a "self" requires an adequate nervous system and an adequate supporting environment including oxygen, food, and the like. It also needs an adequate social world. The primary mechanism for mediating between the "internal" self and the "social" world is language. (For an in-depth analysis of Whitehead’s hermeneutics of language, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths.) Whitehead’s system illuminates this dimension of self-hood brilliantly. For example, it takes seriously the "nature versus nurture" debate while subtly integrating that causal side of our formation with the teleological side, thus affirming and explaining the genuine freedom we have to create our own identities within that causal framework. All this works strictly at the dimension of creativity-characterization.

I turn now to the side where Whitehead’s metaphysics must, in my opinion, be rethought. Despite his "reformed subjectivist principle," Whitehead does not, in my opinion, adequately address such high level human experiences as responsibility and our sense of a sustained "being-here" over time. We addressed this issue previously where I noted the need to create a more nuanced understanding of different types of actual entities. We will continue this theme in later endnotes.

17. I will consider the question of prehensions between contemporary actual entities in Section XII (a), "God as Contemporaneous with Every Other Actual Entity."

18. John Wilcox, "Monistic Interpretation of Whitehead’s Creativity"’ 164. I further note that his nominalist interpretation of creativity gives Christian significant problems in understanding how, in Whitehead’s system, past actual entities remain available for prehension by concrescing entities.

19. Personal letter from John Cobb to the author, dated November 2, 1995.

20. This is the standard description of Whitehead’s theory of concrescence. It is incomplete, however, because it does not apply to his doctrine of God. God, on Whitehead’s account, is a single actual entity whose concrescence never reaches a conclusion. Thus, the most accurate description of concrescence one that applies to God also, is not that it leads to a completely actualized self-identity without any potential for growth. Rather, as the concrescence progresses, the new actual entity makes decisions. These decisions result in an increase in definiteness in the actual entity. But at least in the case of God, this increase in definiteness never reaches a climax. The potentiality for further growth always remains.

If we were to reconceptualize conscious agents such as human beings so that, at least in this one regard, they were more like God, then we would have an entire class of actual entities which did not immediately reach complete actuality Rather they would continue to concrescence while prehending, and being prehended by; many other actual entities. In the case of these actual entities also, however, concrescence would always mean an increase in definiteness, in actualized characteristics, even though those actual entities either completely avoided or greatly postponed the attainment of a satisfaction, of a total actuality.

21. Normally, Whitehead defines "time" and, thus, "contemporaneity" in terms of transition between actual entities, and thus "time" is limited to entities occupying the extensive continuum, which of course God does not. Moreover, time does not apply to the sequence within a concrescence. Whitehead defines contemporary entities as entities in the continuum such that neither prehends the other. In contrast, God and the new entity are "contemporary," as I am using the word in this article, in the sense that God prehends the new entity and the new entity prehends God. They are contemporary precisely because they both prehend each other. For a complete explication of Whitehead’s own theory, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths 42-51, 60-61, 132-39.

22. This claim needs several qualifications. First, God is not the only factor that can limit the range of freedom of the new concrescence; the past actual entities also can do so. Thus God’s power, both to increase and decrease the freedom of the concrescing entity, interacts with that of the past. Sometimes the character of the past can be positive, in which case God uses the resources of the Primordial Nature to enhance the range of opportunity for the new entity. Sometimes the character of those past entities can be extremely restrictive and oppressive. At a human level, we all know what it is like to be trapped in a bad situation or to be the prisoner of our own past actions. In this case also, God uses those resources of the Primordial Nature on behalf of the new concrescing entity. But -- and this is the key -- God’s activity on behalf of the new concrescing entity may result in a decrease of options for that new entity, a limitation of the new entity’s freedom. The divine power may result, for instance, in blocking the past’s poisonous influence. Whitehead himself makes this point when he quotes the phrase, "He giveth his beloved sleep." Thus, even though the divine power at the level of creativity-characterization may always be "for the good," this divine power can, and sometimes does, result in the diminishment of creaturely freedom. This is the point I stress in the main text.

This brings us to my second point. An increase in divine power can also result in an increase of creaturely freedom. Whitehead and the process tradition have emphasized this side of God’s power. Even in the case of a bad past, it is not always necessary for God to "give his beloved sleep." God as the organ of novelty (drawing upon the Primordial Nature) can often produce alternatives and options to a bad past which allow the new entity to overcome it. In short, the more power God has, even at the level of creativity-characterization, the more God can use the resources of the Primordial nature to increase the new entity’s options and range of freedom. Thus while the allocation of power at the level of creativity-characterization may be a "zero-sum game," it does not have to be. An increase in divine power can, and normally does, result in an increase in creaturely power.

23. Burrell, in his Freedom and Creation, objects to the theory that God creates by "actualizing" possibilities, where these possibilities are fully formed prior to their actualization. He writes:

In talking about the concrescing entity’s creation of a self-identity, Whitehead routinely refers to it as a process of decision-making and choosing among alternatives. It would be natural to interpret this as a choice between fully determinate options (i.e., an eternal object or a set of eternal objects), each option needing only the addition of "ingression" or "actualization" to make it real. There are, however, some other considerations which must be mentioned before we can develop a full picture of Whitehead’s position on this issue.

First, Whitehead’s writings are remarkably free of references to "all-possible worlds" as if each world were fully determinate, lacking only the addition of "existence." Whitehead had an empiricist bent in his philosophy. His goal was to discover the richest and most adequate set of concepts needed to interpret this world. He never argued, to my knowledge, from the character of any possible world to the character of this world.

Second, Whitehead carefully preserved the integrity of each actual entity’s concrescence. He considered his eternal objects to be potential, though fully determinate, characteristics; that is, he considered them to be possible characteristics. But they never function as a kind of a-priori essence for the actual entity. For Whitehead, the actual entity’s freedom consists precisely in its capacity (within limits) to put these characteristics together in new ways. Thus, one does not pick up from Whitehead’s writings the sense that the concrescence is merely giving "actuality" to an already constituted self-identity; or even choosing among a set of predetermined, fully determinate options. Of course, Whitehead cannot entirely avoid the description of a concrescence as a choice between given options. According to Whitehead, God gives each new entity an "initial subjective aim," where an initial subjective aim is precisely an ideal self-identity. Nonetheless, even here one gets the impression that the given "self-identity" need not be a fully determinate "essence." It could just as well consist of certain "principles" or "parameters" that God thinks that the new concrescence should meet if, given its actual world, it is to sustain maximum intensity of experience and a maximum of achieved value both for itself and for its relevant future.

Third, in note 13, I argued that it might be possible to interpret an eternal object, not as a fully determinate possibility but as a range of potentiality. This would make the concrescence’s act of self-creation into more than a choice to actualize this-but-not-that already-fully-determinate possible identity. Rather, the actual entity would (in some cases) create the possibility that it actualizes. That is, it would specify the precise cut to be made in the "range of potentiality." Thus, the concrescence’s act of self-creation would include choosing among alternatives and would include actualizing this-but-not-that characteristic, but it would be more. It would also include the determination, within limits, among those ranges of possibilities, sometimes creating "cuts" that had never before been even conceived. Here the creature has a power that in a slight way resembles, but falls far short of, creatio ex nihilo.

Lastly; let me mention an additional nuance that flows directly from our revision of creativity. I have argued that there is only one creativity As a result, creativity-esse can never be divorced from creativity-characterization. I also argued that the two roles must not be conflated, the one being the presupposition of the other. Applied to the issue at hand, this means that while creatio ex nihilo can never the divorced from the actualization of particular eternal objects, neither can the ex nihilo ever be identified with such actualization. Rather, just as esse is the presupposition of characterization, so creatio ex nihilo is the presupposition of actualization.

24. Creativity gives the actual entity a deep particularity, making that activity we call creativity-characterization the profound expression of that actual entity’s uniqueness and subjectivity. In the previous endnote, we noticed one way in which the creature’s power of creativity characterization resembles the divine creatio ex nihilo. I may now introduce a second resemblance. Because of each actual entity’s deep particularity and self-determination, we may say that its exercise of creativity-characterization resembles slightly, but only slightly, God’s radical power of creatio ex nihilo. This should not surprise us because the entity’s power of creativity-characterization emerges out of, and, in a sense, is nothing other than the creativity-esse God bestowed upon that entity.

25. In Section VIII, "Concerning the Metaphor of ‘Inclusion,’" I discussed how each actual entity is numerically distinct from every other actual entity but also, and at the same time, internally related to every past entity. The same situation emerges in the creature’s relation to God: God and the creature are numerically distinct from each other, as required by the doctrine of creativity; and yet when the creature prehends God, God (or, more precisely, some aspects of God) becomes a part of the very identity of the creature. Thus there is a parallel between the creature’s relation to God and the creature’s relation to its past finite entities.

Genuine differences between the creature’s relation to God and to the past entities do emerge, however, at two points. First, God and the new creature are contemporaries. As Whitehead’s metaphysical system is presently constituted, the creature is contemporary with no other actual entity. (This is a point at which Whitehead’s metaphysics may need revision, if we are to account for our human experience of a strong continuity over time.)

Second, the new creature’s status as an entity in a real world comes from God’s gift of esse to that new entity. The new entity’ is related in the strongest possible sense to its creativity-esse. In other words, that esse is necessary to the new creature, not in the weak sense that if some characteristic had been different, the creature would have been different, but in the strong sense that without that esse, the new creature would not "be" at all and would have no characteristics of any sort, either essential or accidental. Let me restate this in my own vocabulary. At the level of creativity-characterization, the new entity is related to God in a way no different in principle than its relation to finite entities in its past. But at the level of creativity-esse, the new entity is related to God in that most powerful of all relations: its very esse stems from God and from God alone.

Thomas Aquinas used the phrase "participation in God" to describe something very similar. Given its neo-Platonic roots, the phrase is understandable, though still unfortunate. In a substance philosophy, such as Thomas’, "participation" carries the image of the creature "sharing" some "portion" of God’s creativity, which on my understanding would undermine the numerical uniqueness and particularity of each actual entity and, thus, its proper distinction from God.

26. As we noted in note 21, Whitehead’s definition of simultaneity (contemporaneity) presupposes that the entities are in the extensive continuum. This definition does not apply to God because God, as understood by Whitehead, is not in the extensive continuum. However, Whitehead also defined simultaneity’ in terms of prehensions. This definition (or, more precisely, this aspect of his definition) we develop in the main text.

27. For an extensive discussion of Whitehead’s use of "before" and "after," "first" and "last," "earlier" and "later," and "prior and posterior" within the concrescence, see Franklin, Speaking From the Depths 42-52.

28. There is a long tradition in the west in which actuality is identified with finitude and potentiality with infinitude. Many medieval scholars took it as a self-evident axiom that an "actual infinity" is a self-contradiction in terms. Thomas, for example, seems to have invoked this axiom in ruling out an "infinite regress of causes" in his proofs for the existence of God. In any case, there is some tension in the tradition between the identification of potentiality with infinity on the one hand and the doctrine that God is both actual and infinite on the other.

From my point of view, at the level of creativity-esse, if God transcends the distinction between actuality and potentiality, then God must also transcend the distinction between finitude and infinitude. At the level of creativity-characterization, however, God is finite in some ways and infinite in others. For example, in giving each actual entity its subjective aim, God chooses a certain range of options as appropriate for that entity’s self-characterization and rejects other options. This rejection or cutting off implies a kind of finitude. But God’s envisioning of all possibilities -- that is, God’s Primordial Nature -- is infinite or even transfinite (in Cantor’s sense of various levels of increasingly complex types of infinity). God’s prehension of all the details of the universe -- that is, God’s Consequent Nature -- displays a mixture of finitude and infinitude. The finite entities chose some options and excluded others, which is a type of finitude. In prehending this selection of options, God in a sense incorporates that finitude into the Consequent Nature. At the same time, however, God eliminates no choice ever made by the finite entities, which are themselves infinite in number. Thus God incorporates an infinitely rich number and complexity of details into the Consequent Nature.

29. To argue that God is in dynamic development, a theme shared by all process philosophies and theologies, is not to argue that God’s development is completely open. It is not to argue, for example, that God might turn into a malicious being. The Bible affirms a God who remains unchangingly loyal to the covenants with "the people of God." The New Testament calls God, "the Father of lights in whom there is no shadow of turning." From a process point of view, this is to say that God has a subjective aim towards goodness, variety; and ever-increasing intensity of (rich and positive forms of) experience. This is the permanent and changeless side of God. Here we can speak truly and faithfully about God’s self-identical and unalterable nature. Whatever adventures God may experience during the divine concrescence, they take place within this context. Unlike Nietzsche’s "Overman," not all things are possible for God, and there is absolutely no reason, from a process perspective, why they should be.

30. Whitehead’s position and a defense of it are discussed in note 27.

31. More precisely, each finite entity occupies a region in the extensive continuum from which it feels the world. The new entity- may be said to "occupy" that region. The concrescence includes the entire past continuum and at least some aspects of all past entities in that past section of the continuum. (See the discussion in Section VIII, "Concerning the Metaphor of ‘Inclusion’"). But, and this is the point, the new entity includes that past from the perspective of a particular location, i.e., from the position of the region it occupies. This region always has temporal as well as spatial boundaries. And each stage of the concrescence presupposes the entire temporal spread of that occupied region. Whitehead taught that God, in contrast to the finite entities, does not occupy a particular region in the extensive continuum. It is unclear, but apparently Whitehead also held that God does not occupy the entire continuum.

32. After completing this paper, I discovered Lewis S. Ford’s article, "Boethius and Whitehead on Time and Eternity." On the issue of divine eternity, Ford and I have come to some remarkably similar conclusions. Ford states his case using the helpful notion of an "inclusive simplicity." An inclusive simplicity is "inclusive" because it is a whole that contains within itself subordinate parts, none of which loses its distinctive identity. It is "simple" because the whole in which these parts are included cannot be reduced to those parts. This may be applied to the process view of God. The divine concrescence contains many parts, specifically it includes the prehensions of each finite entity. But the divine concrescence also has an integral wholeness that cannot be reduced to those included parts.

Building on the distinction between "everlasting" and "eternal," Ford argues that God is both everlasting and eternal. God is "everlasting" in the sense that God prehends all finite entities as they occur, one after the other, without any terminus. But God is eternal in the sense that these finite entities are taken up into the divine concrescence where each stage and each element in the divine life is co-present with every other.

My paper adds to Ford’s position in three points. First, whereas Ford holds that "we cannot claim even to approximate any concrete intuition of what this divine presence is like" (52), I would hold that the finite creature’s own concrescence provides it with an analogue of eternity which, as I explain in the main text can take several forms. Second, as I also argue in the main text, each finite entity, because it derives its creativity-esse from God, actually makes contact with God’s eternity I confess, however, that this contact takes place adverbially; that is, behind our backs and in the corner of our eye -- not directly before us. Lastly, the foundation for these analogies and points of contact is God’s creation of each creature ex nihilo through the gift of creativity-esse to that creature. The distinction between creativity-esse and creativity-characterization lies at the heart of our reformulation of the relation between God and creativity-and is not duplicated, to the best of our knowledge, anywhere else.

The three points do not contradict Ford’s position, but they certainly do add new elements to Ford’s discussion, creating a somewhat different context in which to appropriate his insights.

33. Perhaps it would be possible to develop an expanded view of a human being. According to Whitehead, a human being includes a "regnant" actual entity It may be possible to enlarge the notion of an "actual entity" so that some created actual entities, while having a temporal beginning, just as any other finite actual entity; would not immediately attain a "satisfaction" or stasis. Thus, a human being would include a regnant actual entity in an expanded sense. That is, this regnant actual entity would prehend, and be prehended by the many actual entities in that person’s body. Thus, there would be the introduction of new data from the body throughout the life of that regnant actual entity. And the actual entities in the body-or at least some of them-would prehend that regnant actual entity during its concrescence. In that case, human beings at the level of this regnant actual entity or "soul," would have a truly profound analogy in their own innermost being of God’s eternity.

34. Instead of "physical pole," one might suggest the term, "absorptive pole," "receptive pole," or "pole of inclusion (of other, actual entities and eternal objects)." For "mental pole," one might suggest "reactive pole," "self-creative pole," or even "pole of transformation." Whitehead’s own terms, however, are now well established in process thought. That the term "mental pole" carries no necessary reference to consciousness is clear enough to process scholars. Yet it remains a misleading phrase to those who, lacking a technically precise knowledge of Whitehead’s vocabulary, understand the term "mental pole" by analogy to the ordinary meaning of "mental."

35. This is extremely rough as an exegesis of Whitehead. In large part, the power of his system stems, in fact, from the subtle way’s in which he interweaves actuality and potentiality in physical purposes, propositions, conscious perceptions, and intuitive judgments. For an extensive analysis of this side of Whitehead’s philosophy, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths.

36. I can see no way of ascertaining a priori the extent of God’s power, or lack of power, to coerce. The only way to come to a reasonable estimate is to examine the world and to note the mix of good and evil that we find it in. (We may assume that God always works for the good.) At the level of creativity-characterization, not only can God limit the powers of the creatures, but the creatures can limit the power of God. For example, God can only constitute the new entity’s actual world out of the past actual entities that actually exist. If those past entities are consistently evil or trivial, then, perhaps God can do no more than mitigate the influence of that past.

If we conclude that God has some, but not unlimited, power to coerce, we must still confront the traditional argument that it is sometimes best not to use one’s powers of coercion even if one has such powers. It has often been noted, for example, that the capacity for pain adds to the ability to survive. Again the creation of mature persons requires a world in which there are serious moral choices with serious consequences, some of which imply that innocent people will suffer. Such considerations add to the difficulty of coming to a definitive conclusion about the extent of God’s power to coerce. Nonetheless, given the clear existence of Nazi extermination camps, chattel slavery; and intense suffering in some small children, the conclusion does seem inescapable, that God’s power to coerce in particular situations is significantly limited.

It is certainly possible that God, at the level of creativity-characterization, may have other powers in addition to persuasion and coercion. For example, consider this analogy: a master chess player may not be able to predict or coerce the moves of an erratic, unskilled opponent and yet by greater insight and knowledge be able to guarantee victory in the long run. Perhaps God may not be able to coerce or even perfectly predict the decisions of each finite entity and yet, given the conceptual resources of the primordial nature, God may know the general outcome in the long run. Christians have also believed that the resurrection of Jesus points to God’s capacity to overcome evil, at least in the long run for those who trust God. The resurrection points to an additional power: the power to overcome evil by absorbing it and transforming its consequences. Even the resurrection, however, should it be true, does not completely clarify for us the exact mix of God’s persuasive, coercive, cognitive, and transformative powers.

We may conclude that only our actual experience can guide us to an estimate of the extent of God’s powers at the level of creativity-characterization, but that it is difficult in the extreme to come to any precise conclusion. When we move to creativity-esse, however, we may know with certainty that God’s power to create ex nihilo is absolute and unlimited.

37. For a complete and technical elaboration of boxy Whitehead challenges the Kantian bifurcation of reality into noumena and phenomena. See the reference in note 7.

38. A substance, according to the Cartesian tradition, is a subject of change that is itself unchanging except for (a) purely external changes such as location, etc. and (b) its creation or annihilation. In addition if substance X incorporates substance Y, then Y must cease to exist as Y Material substances, according to Descartes, are inert, lacking all subjectivity.

This is not the only possible definition of a substance. As an alternative, we might consider a substance, for example, to be a subject that, while not unchanging, maintains its integrity over a series of interactions with other subjects in which it partially or wholly incorporates those other subjects into its own identity and in which those other subjects partially or wholly incorporate it into their identities. On this definition, God is a substance in Whitehead’s system, for God remains a single subject with a consistent subjective aim and structure while nonetheless prehending, and being prehended by, all other actual entities. On this view of substance, a human being, if we adopt the suggestions in notes 7, 20, and 33 would also be a substance. But this definition of a "substance" would also allow a substance to be an "event," which is a radical departure from the definition that prevailed in Descartes and his heirs as well as from the earlier Aristotelian-Thomistic tradition of substance.

40. For a discussion of Whitehead’s view of consciousness and its context, not just in the mind but in the larger world, see Franklin, Speaking from the Depths, 28-29, 245-47.

41. Of course, at the level of characterization, God can also limit our freedom and thus threaten that same "reality-founding ego."

42. One task of religious language and practice, at least in the Christian tradition, is to shift the living presence of God from the shadowy background of ones consciousness to center-focus.

Works Cited

Basinger, David. Divine Power in Process Theism. A Philosophical Critique. Albany: State U of New York P, 1988.

Burrell, David B. Freedom and Creation in Three Traditions. Notre Dame, Indiana: U of Notre Dame P, 1993.

Cobb, John B. Jr. Beyond Dialogue. Toward a Mutual Transformation of Christianity and Buddhism. Philadelphia: Fortress P, 1982.

____ A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Thought of Alfred North Whitehead. Philadelphia: Westminster P, 1965.

Cobb, John B., Jr. and Christopher Ives, eds. The Emptying God: A Buddhist-Jewish-Christian Conversation. Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1990.

Clarke, W Norris. Person and Being. Milwaukee: Marquette UP, 1993.

Fetz, Reto L. "Creativity: A New Transcendental." Rapp and Wiehl.

Ford, Lewis S. "Whitehead’s Conception of Divine Spatiality." Southern Journal of Philosophy 6 (1968): 1-23.

____"Boethius and Whitehead on Time and Eternity." International Philosophical Quarterly 8.1 (1968): 38-67.

____ The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics 1925-1929. Albany: State U of New York P. 1984.

____ "Whitehead’s Transformation of Pure Act." The Thomist 41 (1977): 381-99.

Frankenberry; Nancy Religion and Radical Empiricism. Albany: State U of New York P, 1987.

Franklin, Stephen T. Speaking from the Depths: Alfred North Whitehead’s Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1990.

Gilkey; Landon. Reaping the Whirlwind: A Christian Interpretation of History. New York: Seabury P, 1976.

Gilson, Etienne. Being and some Philosophers 2nd ed. corrected and enlarged. Toronto: Pontifical Institute for Mediaeval Studies, 1952.

Hick, John. An Interpretation of Religion: Human Responses to the Transcendent. New Haven: Yale UP, 1989.

Lundin, Roger. The Culture of Interpretation: Christian Faith and the Postmodern World. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 1993.

Murphey; Nancy and James Wm. McClendon. "Distinguishing Modern and Postmodern Theologies." Modern Theology 5.3 (1989): 191-214.

Nobo, Jorge Louis. Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity. Albany: State U of New York 1’, 1986.

Nobuhara, T. "How Can Principles be more than Just Epistemological or Conceptual?: Anselm, Nargarjuna, and Whitehead." Process Thoughts (1993): 89-102.

Tracy; David. Plurality and Ambiguity: Hermeneutics, Religion, Hope. San Francisco: Harper, 1987.

Van der Veken, Jan. "Creativity as Universal Activity." Rapp and Wiehl.

Wilcox, John W "Monistic Interpretation of Whitehead’s Creativity." Process Studies 20.3 (1991): 162-74.

Rapp, Friedrich and Reiner Wiehl, eds. Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Creativity. Albany: State U of New York P, 1990.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. 1933. New York: Free Press, 1967.

____Process and Reality. 1929. Corrected Edition. Ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: Free Press, 1978.

____Religion in the Making. 1926. New York: Fordham UP, 1996.

____Science and the Modern World. 1925. New York: Free Press, 1967.

I. Introduction

A conception of time is fundamental to Whitehead’s metaphysics in Process and Reality. The creative advance of actual occasions is inherently temporal. Each actual occasion is a temporally novel act of becoming. When it comes into being, it feels only those actual occasions that have already come into being, i.e., those that are in its "causal past." It does not feel those actual occasions that are in "unison of becoming" with it, i.e., those that are its causal "contemporaries." And those actual occasions that will when they come into being feel it are in its "causal future" (123-26). In short, the creative advance of actual occasions is temporally ordered.

Each actual occasion comes into being through a process of concrescence. Is this process of concrescence also inherently temporal? One of the categories of his metaphysics in Process and Reality states that "(xxvii) In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in which new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent phases" (26). In light of this passage, the above question splinters into several interrelated questions. Is the succession of phases of concrescence a temporal succession? Is each new prehension temporally novel? Is "arising" a kind of (temporal) becoming? Are the prehensions in antecedent phases temporally earlier?

Let me summarize one way of answering these questions. Just as there is a temporal ordering of all of the actual occasions in the universe, so there is a temporal ordering of prehensions in the process of concrescence of each individual actual occasion. In brief concrescence is temporally ordered. To have a convenient label, I shall call this answer temporalism.

There is a contrasting way of answering the questions, one that is widespread in the literature on Whitehead’s metaphysics. This answer is rooted in the following quotation from Process and Reality "This genetic passage from phase to phase [of concrescence] is not in physical time" (283). Let me summarize this contrasting answer. The succession of phases is not a temporal succession, but instead is a sort of nontemporal succession. (Similarly, the succession of integers is a nontemporal succession, albeit of a different sort.) Each new prehension arises by integration of prehensions that are nontemporally antecedent. In brief, concrescence is nontemporally ordered. I shall call this answer nontemporalism.

It would seem that the nontemporalist ignores the adjective "physical" in the quotation, and reads it as saying that the phases of concrescence are not in time. For example, according to Donald Sherburne, "Concrescence is not in time" (38). On the other hand, the temporalist stresses that the word "time" is qualified by the adjective "physical," and suggests that the quotation is compatible with the claim that the phases of concrescence are in some sort of nonphysical time. For example, according to Lewis Ford, there are "two species, physical and genetic time" ("Successiveness" 424-25).¹

While recognizing the plausibility of nontemporalism, I am inclined to prefer temporalism. Temporalism is, I think, more coherent with the bulk of Whitehead’s metaphysics in Process and Reality. In this paper, I shall discuss a conception of temporal order that encompasses both actual occasions and their concrescing prehensions.

Let me sketch a reason for preferring temporalism. In considering the topic of the succession of phases, William Christian asked, "What sort of priority is this?" (80). His answer was a nontemporalist one. The priority is not temporal. Instead, he adds, "we must accept it as something of its own kind" (81). But what is this kind? Why should we postulate such a nontemporal order in addition to the temporal order? One reason for preferring temporalism is its simplicity. It is simpler to have just a temporal order.

What is remarkable, however, is that both temporalism and nontemporalism are in agreement about this: concrescence is ordered. Although disagreeing about whether this order is temporal or nontemporal, they agree that there is order. In this paper, I shall state part of an account of the order of concrescence. Although this incomplete account is stated in temporalist terms, I shall also indicate how it can be restated in nontemporalist terms. Hence those readers who are not convinced by my defense of temporalism might still find this paper of interest.

Note that I shall only discuss Whitehead’s metaphysical views in Process and Reality. To confine my project within a brief paper, I shall not discuss his other writings.

II. What is the Nature of Time?

Let us compare two sorts of answers to this metaphysical question substantivalism and relationism.² Substantivalists hold that time is something substantial, that it is an entity or an assemblage of entities. Commonsensically, we measure the passage of time by means of such quantities as seconds and days. And, in science, time is pictured as a continuum of instants. Accordingly, a substantivalist could claim that instants or time-intervals are entities, and that time is composed of them.

Was Whitehead a substantivalist? To ascertain the types of entities in his metaphysics in Process and Reality, we need to examine his eight categories of existence (22). Certainly, an actual occasion is neither an instant nor a tune-interval. Instants and time-intervals are peculiar sorts of particulars, and so they cannot be eternal objects (or universals). I shall assume, for the sake of brevity, that it is sufficiently obvious that neither instants nor time-intervals fall under any of the remaining categories of existence.

Rather than being a substantivalist, he was, I think, a relationist. Relationists hold that time is relational, that it consists of temporal relations between entities. I have summarized how the creative advance of actual occasions is temporally ordered. Some actual occasions come into being before other actual occasions come into being. Some come into being earlier than others. I want to emphasize that the concept of temporal order is a relational concept, and that the terms "before" and "earlier" stand for a temporal relation. My view is that the conception of time that is fundamental to his metaphysics is grounded on this temporal relation.

There is an important objection to my classification of him as a relationist. His metaphysics was strongly influenced by Einstein’s theory of relativity.³ Instead of a separate space and a separate time, there is, according to that theory, space-time. Consequently, a substantivalist could raise the following objection. Space-time is something substantial; it is an assemblage of entities. In particular, space-time points or space-time regions are entities, and space-time is composed of them. Therefore, Whitehead is to be classified as a substantivalist. For each actual occasion comes into being in a basic region in the space-time continuum. And this space-time continuum is an assemblage of entities -- namely, regions.

Let me reply to this objection. A major difficulty in interpreting Process and Reality is that of reconciling his theory of extension in Part IV with his system of categories in Part I. None of those categories concerns the concept of region. In particular, regions do not fall under any of the eight categories of existence. Why, then, should we think that regions are entities?

Can the hypothesis that regions are not entities be reconciled with his theory of extension in Process and Reality? That theory is (partly) mathematical, in that it is based on "formal properties" of a relation of "extensive connection" (more briefly, "connection") (288, 294-95). Accordingly, my view is that his concept of region should be understood relationally. For regions are "the relata" of the relation of connection (294). Indeed, each region is (in a sense) extended, each has the property of being extended. But this property is relational. It is to be understood in terms of formal properties of the relation of connection (294-97). For instance, that a region is extended implies that it includes other regions as parts. And this relation of "inclusion" is defined in terms of formal properties of the relation of connection (295).

An elementary example of such a formal property is that connection is "symmetrical" (Whitehead 295): if region R is connected with region 5, then S is connected with R. In contrast, the temporal relation earlier is asymmetric: if X is earlier than Y, then Y is not earlier than X. Instead, Y is later than X. The point is that the concept of temporal order is different from the concept of extensive connection. Let us picture this difference through an illustration. Suppose that R is the basic region of actual occasion A and S is the basic region of actual occasion B. And suppose that R and S are connected. It is essential to grasp that this last supposition tells us nothing about how A and B are temporally ordered. A might be earlier than B, or B might be earlier than A, or it might be that neither is earlier than the other.

What, then, determines the temporal order of A and B? To answer this question, let us make a further supposition: when A comes into being, B has not yet come into being. Thus, when B comes into being, A has already come into being. That is, A comes into being before B comes into being. A’s act of becoming is earlier than B’s act of becoming. To generalize, the temporal order of actual occasions is the order of their acts of becoming. The order of time is the order of becoming.

III. The Difference between Time Order and Time Measurement

In discussing the concept of temporal order, I have largely ignored the concept of time measurement. One of Whitehead’s goals in devising his theory of extension in Process and Reality was to provide a theoretical basis for the measurements made by physicists. (Note that the final chapter of Part IV is entitled "Measurement.") Of course, in the theory of relativity, measurements of lapses of time are relative to the observer (or the frame of reference). However, measurements of space-time intervals are not thus relative. For the distance between two space-time points is absolute (or invariant).

Note also that the temporal order of actual occasions is not relative to the observer (or the frame of reference). The fact that actual occasion A comes into being earlier than actual occasion B is an absolute fact: it holds for every observer (or frame of reference).⁴

But the concept of measurement is not to be found in any of the categories of his metaphysics in Process and Reality. "Extensive quantity is," he concluded (in the chapter "Measurement"), "a logical construct (333). Thus space-time distances are logical constructs. The concept of temporal order is metaphysically primary, whereas the concept of time measurement is not.

Let me indicate, very roughly and incompletely, how the concept of measurement and the concept of region are interrelated. Suppose that T is the basic region of actual occasion C. And suppose that T is not connected with the basic region S of actual occasion B. Nonetheless, T and S are "‘mediately’ connected" (Whitehead 294). That is, there is a region Z such that T is connected with Z and Z is connected with S.

The relation of "mediate connection" is ‘symmetrical" (Whitehead 295). Hence these suppositions tell us nothing about how B and C are temporally ordered. To determine their temporal order, let us make another supposition: when B comes into being, C has not yet come into being. Thus, when C comes into being, B has already come into being. B’s act of becoming is earlier than C’s act of becoming.

What amount of time has lapsed between the becoming of B and the becoming of C? More accurately, what is the space-time distance between B and C? According to the theory of extension in Process and Reality, points in the extensive continuum are logical constructs (299). The concept of point is defined there in terms of the concept of an "abstractive set" of regions (297-98). Suppose that p is a point in B’s basic region S and q is a point in C’s basic region T. The space-time distance between B and C is (approximately) the distance between p and q. (To be less approximate, we might want to specify where in S and T the respective points are located.) The main idea is that, to state how the space-time distance between B and C is measured, we need the theory of extension; but, to state how B and C are temporally ordered, there is no need for that theory.

Basic region S of actual occasion B is connected with basic region R of actual occasion A. What amount of time has lapsed between the becoming of A and the becoming of B? What is the space-time distance between them? Basic regions do not overlap. Accordingly, to be more precise, R and S are externally connected," i.e., they do not both include a third region (Whitehead 297). Nonetheless, they do have points in common – namely, the points where their boundaries meet.⁵ Therefore, in terms of one of those common points, our question can be answered as follows: the space-time distance between A and B is O. The concept of space-time distance includes the distance of zero.

Is the concept of space-time distance essential to the concept of temporal order? I shall contrast two answers to this question: metricalism and ordinalism. The metricalist holds that, whenever one entity is earlier than another, there is a space-time distance between them. In contrast, the ordinalist claims that it is metaphysically possible for one entity to be earlier than another without there being a space-time distance between them. Note that the phrase "without there being a space-time distance between them" does not mean that the distance between them is 0. Instead, it means "without there being any space-time distance -- not even a zero distance -- between them."

Which was Whitehead, a metricalist or an ordinalist? The concept of temporal order is fundamental to his metaphysics, whereas space-time distances are logical constructs. Accordingly, I think that it is best to interpret him as an ordinalist, or so I shall argue in what follows.

Although I am concerned here particularly with Whitehead, I do not think that the notion of ordinalism pertains idiosyncratically to him.⁶ For example, the "cosmology" that he found in Plato’s Timaeus strongly influenced his metaphysics in Process and Reality (xiv). Which was the Plato of that dialogue, a metricalist or an ordinalist? The Timaeus states: "there were no days and nights, months and years [i.e., there were no time measurements] before the Heaven came into being" (37E); before the Heaven came into being, the contents of the Receptacle were in" discordant and unordered motion" (30A); nonetheless, "the different kinds [i.e., earth, water, air, and fire] came to have different regions, even before the ordered whole consisting of them came to be" (53A).⁷ Of course, the terms "before," "motion," and "came to have" could be construed as metaphors. On the other hand, in terms of a conception of temporal order without temporal distances, they could instead, I think, he construed literally.

IV. What did Whitehead Mean by "Physical Time"?

In this section, I shall examine some quotations from Process and Reality that lend support to nontemporalism. Drawing upon the distinction between ordinalism and metricalism, I shall give these quotations an alternative temporalist reading.

"This genetic passage from phase to phase is not," Whitehead stated, "in physical time" (283). There is a quotation from the same page that also strongly supports nontemporalism: "The actual entity is the enjoyment of a certain quantum of physical time. But the genetic process [of concrescence] is not the temporal succession" (283). A nontemporalist could interpret this last quotation as follows. The words "temporal succession" express the concept of temporal order. The terms "succession" and "order" are synonymous (or coextensive): one entity temporally succeeds another just in case the latter is earlier than the former. What Whitehead meant by "the genetic process is not the temporal succession" is that the process of concrescence is not temporally ordered.

I want now to give this quotation an alternative temporalist reading. To interpret it properly, we need to examine some sentences that immediately follow:

Significantly, both this quotation and the two above are from the first page of Part IV of Process and Reality ("The Theory of Extension"). Consequently, my view is that we have to understand what Whitehead meant by "temporal succession" not just in terms of the concept of temporal order but also in terms of the concept of time measurement.

The terms "quantum" and "extensive quantum" refer to the concrescing actual occasion’s "basic region" (Whitehead 283). Accordingly, I propose to rewrite the first sentence of the quotation thus: each phase in the process of concrescence of an actual occasion presupposes its entire basic region, and so does each feeling in each phase. Furthermore, a core point in the second sentence can be restated as follows: what is forbidden is the division of the basic region. Hence, to grasp what he meant by "temporal succession," we need to answer this question: how does the concept of temporal succession involve the concept of a division of the basic region?

It should prove helpful to have some terms. A region that is included in (i.e., is a "part" of’) a given region is a subregion of that region (Whitehead 295). Also, according to Whitehead, one region overlaps another region "when there is a third region which they both include" (296). In other words, two regions overlap when they share a subregion. Note that inclusion is a special case of overlapping (296); i.e., a region overlaps its subregions.

Now let us have an illustration. Suppose that actual occasion A has feelings U and V. Whitehead denied that such feelings can be in temporal succession. What is being denied? What is meant by "V temporally succeeds U"? Not only is U earlier than V. But also U does not presuppose A’s entire basic region R, nor does V. Instead, U only presupposes a subregion of R, and V presupposes a different subregion. These two subregions do not overlap. There is a division of A’s basic region into such nonoverlapping subregions. The earlier feeling U presupposes a subregion of R that does not overlap the subregion presupposed by the later feeling V. The time that has elapsed between U and V is measured by means of the space-time distance between their respective subregions.

What, then, did he mean by "the genetic process is not the temporal succession"? My answer includes the following claims. When entitles are in temporal succession, they are in nonoverlapping regions. But an actual occasion’s feelings presuppose its entire basic region. They are not dispersed in nonoverlapping subregions of its basic region. Therefore, the process of concrescence of its feelings does not involve a temporal succession of them.

Interestingly, a nontemporalist could concur with these claims, and supplement them as follows. Because an actual occasion’s feelings presuppose its entire basic region, there are no space-time distances between them. They are not separated by measurable lapses of time. But one entity cannot be earlier than another unless they are in different space-time regions. They cannot be temporally ordered unless there is a space-time distance between them. Therefore, Whitehead’s denial of temporal succession amounts to a denial of temporal order. He was a nontemporalist. Note that these supplementary claims assume metricalism.

In contrast, my view is that it is better to interpret his philosophy of time in terms of ordinalism. Consequently, I shall supplement my answer with some different claims. The concept of temporal order is fundamental to his metaphysics, whereas the concept of time measurement is not. For space-time distances are logical constructs. Accordingly, it is metaphysically possible for one entity to be earlier than another without there being a space-time distance between them. Therefore, even though there are no space-time distances between an actual occasions feelings, it is metaphysically possible for some of those feelings to be earlier than others. Even though an actual occasion’s feelings presuppose its entire basic region -- and so they are not in temporal succession -- they still can be temporally ordered. Note that my supplementary claims assume ordinalism.

Whitehead advocated an "‘epochal theory of time"’ in Process and Reality (68). His argument for that theory establishes the following conclusion:

In light of my interpretations of the preceding quotations, it should be evident how the present quotation can be given alternative nontemporalist and temporalist readings. Admittedly, the quotation is incompatible with the claim that the process of concrescence is divisible into temporally earlier and later feelings which correspond to nonoverlapping subregions of the basic region. Hence, when metricalism is presupposed, the quotation supports nontemporalism.⁸ In contrast, when ordinalism is presupposed, the quotation is compatible with temporalism. For it is compatible with the claim that there are temporally earlier and later feelings which do not correspond to nonoverlapping subregions but instead have no space-time distances between them.

What, in conclusion, did Whitehead mean by "physical time"? Physical time is the time of physics. It is a time that can be measured. Therefore even though the feelings in the process of concrescence are not in physical time -- even though there are no space-time distances between them -- they still can be temporally ordered.

V. The Temporal Order of Actual Occasions

With the aim of shedding some light on the temporal order of concrescing prehensions, I shall first discuss the temporal order of actual occasions.

Central to Whitehead’s metaphysics in Process and Reality is his rejection of "the classic notion of ‘time"’ (35): "There is a prevalent misconception that ‘becoming’ involves the notion of a unique seriality for its [creative] advance into novelty" (35). Instead, he accepted "the ‘relativity’ view of time," the view of time that he found in the theory of relativity (66).

What is the classic notion of time as uniquely serial? Time involves a succession of instants. Some instants are earlier than others. Let me state the formal properties of this relation of being earlier. It is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. And it is connected: any two instants are such that one is earlier than the other. The property of connectedness ensures that the succession of instants is uniquely serial (i.e., "linear"). (This use of the word "connected" is standard in the logic of relations, and is entirely different from Whitehead’s use of the word to abbreviate "extensive connection.")

Any relation with these four formal properties is a serial relation. By removing the property of connectedness, the concept of serial relation is generalized as follows: any relation that is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive is a strict partial order.⁹ Note that the concept of strict partial order is inclusive, in that a serial relation is a strict partial order that is connected. An example of a nonconnected strict partial order is the following relation among human beings: being a descendent of. Unique seriality does not abound in genealogies.

According to the theory of relativity, simultaneity is relative (to the observer or the frame of reference). There is no absolute present. And so time does not involve such uniquely serial instants.

Adopting this relativity view of time, Whitehead maintained that the temporal order of actual occasions is not uniquely serial. More explicitly; the formal properties of the relation earlier that holds among actual occasions are these: it is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive; but it is not connected. For some actual occasions are contemporaries, i.e., some are in unison of becoming. Suppose that actual occasion A and actual occasion D are contemporaries. A is in unison of becoming with D. In other words, when A comes into being, D has not already come into being; and, when Ii) comes into being, A has not already come into being. That is, A does not come into being before D comes into being, nor does D come into being before A comes into being. A’s act of becoming is neither earlier nor later than D’s act of becoming. The order of becoming is not uniquely serial.

Furthermore, he claimed in Process and Reality that, even though there is no absolute present, there are "durations." A "duration is a cross-section of the universe" (125). Each actual occasion "lies in many durations" (125). It does not lie in a cross-section of the universe that is unique. The temporal order of durations is not uniquely serial. Instead of instants in a serial order, there are durations in a strict partial order.¹⁰

Moreover, he held that the temporal order of actual occasions is not (mathematically) continuous (35). For his epochal theory of time is based on "the principle that every act of becoming must have an immediate successor" (69). (In accordance with his rejection of the classic notion of time as uniquely serial, every act of becoming can have more than one immediate successor.) In brief, the temporal order is discrete rather than continuous. Because of the term "immediate successor," this principle (apparently) involves not just the concept of temporal order but also the concept of time measurement. (Cf. the discussion in the preceding section of the term "temporal succession.") When we abstract from the concept of time measurement, we obtain a more general principle that involves just the concept of temporal order: the principle that every act of becoming is such that there is another act of becoming that is immediately later. Let us call it the discrete-order principle. Note that act of becoming L is immediately later than act of becoming K just in case (1) K is earlier than L and (2) there is no act of becoming that is both later than K and earlier than L. This definition does not involve metrical concepts, and so it is compatible with both metricalism and ordinalism. Consequently, a temporalist can claim that the discrete-order principle also holds of feelings in the process of concrescence.¹¹ I shall illustrate this claim in a later section. Temporalism is coherent with the epochal theory

Finally, let us consider a question about the temporal order of actual occasions. Nontemporalism is "dualistic," in that it postulates a temporal order of actual occasions and a nontemporal order of concrescing prehensions. It might be contended that temporalism also is "dualistic," in that it postulates space-time distances between actual occasions and the absence of space-time distances between concrescing prehensions. But is this dualistic contention correct? Whenever one actual occasion is earlier than another, is there always a space-time distance between them?

I shall answer this question by means of Whitehead’s discussion in Process and Reality of our "cosmic epoch": "that widest society of actual entities whose immediate relevance to ourselves is traceable" (91). Whereas "the simpler characteristics of extensive connection" are most likely "ultimate metaphysical necessities" (288), "measurement is a systematic procedure dependent on the dominant societies of the cosmic epoch" (332). Consequently whenever one actual occasion is earlier than another -- and they both are members of these dominant societies -- there is a space-time distance between them. Note, however, that: "Beyond these societies there is disorder" (92); and that, in accordance with Plato’s Timaeus, "the origin of the present cosmic epoch is traced back to an aboriginal disorder" (95). Nevertheless, even "a state of chaotic disorder," actual occasions come into being (92). The main point is that there are actual occasions that came into being before (i.e., earlier than) our cosmic epoch. Let X be such an actual occasion. There is no space-time distance between X and any actual occasion that has come into being in our cosmic epoch. For X is not a member of the dominant societies in our cosmic epoch upon which the systematic procedure of measurement depends.

Whitehead wrote Process and Reality before the fruition of modern evolutionary cosmology, although his own "evolutionary doctrine" can, I think, accommodate that cosmology (95). In explaining the scientific theory that the universe originated in a big bang, Paul Davies remarked: "The conditions at the big bang imply an infinite distortion of time, so that the very concept of time (and space) cannot be extended back beyond the big bang" (24). And he also remarked: "It is evidently meaningless to ask (as many people do) what happened before the big bang, or what caused the explosion to occur. There was no before" (24).¹² My view is that his remarks hold of the concept of time measurement. And so, in terms of a conception of temporal order without temporal distances, we can still meaningfully ask what happened before the big bang.

VI. The Order of Becoming

What, then, is the time of concrescence? Suppose that actual occasion A has feelings U and V. And suppose that, when U comes into being, V has not yet come into being. Thus, when V comes into being, U has already come into being. That is, U comes into being before V comes into being. U comes into being earlier than V comes into being. To generalize, the temporal order of concrescing prehensions is the order in which they come into being. The order of time is the order of becoming.

Therefore, there is a temporal order that encompasses both actual occasions and their concrescing prehensions. Some actual occasions come into being earlier than others, and some of each actual occasion’s prehensions come into being earlier than others. The term "earlier" expresses a relation that is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive but not connected (i.e., a strict partial order). Just as the temporal order of actual occasions is the order of their acts of becoming, so the temporal order of prehensions in the process of concrescence is the order of their becoming.¹³

It might be objected that the concept of becoming pertains only to actual occasions, that only actual occasions come into being. Note, however, that one of Whitehead’s categories in Process and Reality states: "(iii) That in the becoming of an actual entity, novel prehensions, nexus, subjective forms, propositions, multiplicities, and contrasts, also become" (22). In other words, entities in every category of existence except that of eternal objects come into being (22). And so, when an actual occasion comes into being through its process of concrescence, its concrescing prehensions also become.

Let me sketch another objection. I have ignored Whitehead’s notion of "time as perpetual perishing" in Process and Reality (128). Note that an actual occasion perishes with the completion of its "final phase" of concrescence (25-26). In terms of that notion, it should be said instead that the temporal order of actual occasions is the order of their perishing. But concrescing feelings perish together with the completion of the final phase of concrescence. None of them perishes before any other. Therefore, in terms of the notion of time as perpetual perishing, it cannot be said that some concrescing prehensions are earlier than others.

In response to this objection, my view is that the concept of becoming in Process and Reality has primacy (22). The process of concrescence of an actual occasion begins with a "first phase" that consists of the coming into being of a "multiplicity of simple physical feelings" (236). And it ends with a "final phase" that consists of the coming into being of that actual occasion as one complex, fully determinate feeling" (26). There is an order of becoming that encompasses both actual occasions and their component prehensions. This order of becoming is inherently temporal.

There is a third objection. I am interpreting the order of becoming in terms of the relation earlier. That relation presupposes the distinction between past, present, and future. However, we cannot say that some of an actual occasion’s prehensions are past, some are present, and some are future. For none of its prehensions are in its causal past, and none are in its causal future. Therefore, we cannot say that any of its prehensions is earlier (or later) than any other.¹⁴

The problem with this objection is that it ignores the adjective "causal" in the terms "causal past" and "causal future." For there also is a distinction between past, present, and future that holds of concrescing prehensions. In the above illustration, A has feelings U and V. When U comes into being, V has not yet come into being. And, when V comes into being, U has already come into being. In the preceding two sentences, the locutions "has already come into being," "comes into being," and "has not yet come into being" express a sort of distinction between past, present, and future. Using the terms "present(ly)" and "past", let me provide a rough example. During the present (actual) occasion of my experience -- the one that is (as I am writing this paper) presently coming into being through a process of concrescence -- one of my intellectual feelings is presently coming into being through the integration of past feelings (i.e., ones that came into being earlier in that process of concrescence). In short, my interpretation of the order of becoming involves both a relation earlier and a sort of distinction between past, present, and future.

In conclusion, let us consider again a key passage in Process and Reality; "(xxvii) In a process of concrescence, there is a succession of phases in which new prehensions arise by integration of prehensions in antecedent phases" (26). Utilizing the concept of becoming, I would interpret this passage as follows. In an actual occasion’s process of concrescence, new prehensions come into being by integrating prehensions that have already come into being.

The old (i.e., past) prehensions came into being in antecedent phases, and continue to exist as components in prehensions in subsequent phases. Thus the old prehensions came into being (i.e., originated) earlier than the new prehensions. There is a temporal order of becoming of prehensions in the process of concrescence. The main point is that this order of becoming is an order of beginnings (i.e., originations).

VII. The Temporal Order of Simple Physical Feelings

For the sake of illustration, I shall now state an account of the temporal order of simple physical feelings. A simple physical feeling is simple because it is the feeling of a single actual occasion. Each actual occasion has a simple physical feeling of every actual occasion that has already come into being. Each feels all of the actual occasions in its causal past (i.e., its actual world) (Whitehead 239). No matter how remote an actual occasion may happen to be in the causal past, there is a simple physical feeling of it even if it comes into being in the first second of our expanding universe.

Is a remote actual occasion felt differently than a proximate one? Let me contrast two sorts of answers to this question: mediatism and immediatism. The immediatist holds that every past actual occasion -- no matter how temporally remote -- is felt directly. (Cf. the concept of action at a distance.) On the other hand, the mediatist claims that only those past actual occasions that are neighbors are felt directly. (Cf. the concept of action by contact.) It is through the medium of neighboring actual occasions that actual occasions in the more distant past are felt.

Let us explore mediatism further, utilizing an illustration. When actual occasion E comes into being, actual occasion F has already come into being. F’s act of becoming is earlier than E’s act of becoming. Also, E’s basic region is connected with F’s basic region, and so F is a neighbor of E. Thus E’s feeling of F is direct. Furthermore, when F comes into being, actual occasion G has already come into being. G’s act of becoming is earlier than F’s act of becoming. And their basic regions are connected, and so they are neighbors. Thus F’s feeling of G is direct.

Although G is a neighbor of F and F is a neighbor of H, G is not a neighbor of E. Hence H’s feeling of G is not direct. Instead, H feels G through the medium of F. To understand this last claim more fully, note the following about the concept of simple physical feeling: the initial datum of such a feeling is a single actual occasion, and the objective datum is one of that actual occasion’s own feelings (Whitehead 236). Thus the objective datum of H’s feeling of F is (or includes) F’s feeling of G. E feels G through the medium of F’s feeling of G.

Moreover, when G comes into being, actual occasion H has already come into being. H’s act of becoming is earlier than G’s act of becoming. And their basic regions are connected, and so they are neighbors. Thus G’s feeling of H is direct. But F’s feeling of H is not direct. Instead, F feels H through the medium of G. And H feels G through the medium of F. Consequently, E feels H through the medium of both F and G. To generalize, a temporally remote actual occasion is felt through the medium of a honeycomb of interconnected neighbors.

Why, then, are simple physical feelings temporally ordered? Let me suggest how a mediatist could answer this question. In the illustration, E obtains its feeling of G through the medium of its feeling of F. Therefore, it feels F before it feels G. Its feeling of F comes into being in its process of concrescence earlier than its feeling of G. To generalize, Whitehead’s process metaphysics encompasses the following kind of process: the process of obtaining feelings of earlier actual occasions from feelings of later actual occasions. The feelings of later actual occasions come into being in the process of concrescence earlier than the feelings of earlier actual occasions.

In this way, the temporal order of concrescing simple physical feelings mirrors the temporal order of past actual occasions. Neighboring actual occasions are felt first. The later the actual occasion the earlier the feeling of it. The earlier the actual occasion the later the feeling of it. Very remote actual occasions are felt very late. To summarize, the mediatist accepts the following mirroring thesis: one simple physical feeling comes into being earlier than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being later than the actual occasion felt by the latter.¹⁵ (It is assumed that the two feelings are in one and the same process of concrescence.)

I have discussed (in Section V) a principle that is implicit in Whitehead’s epochal theory of time: the principle that every act of becoming is such that there is another act of becoming that is immediately later. I want now to show how this discrete-order principle holds of concrescing simple physical feelings. For example, in the above illustration, F is immediately later than G. And E both feels F directly and feels G through the medium of F. Thus, during E’s process of concrescence, E’s simple physical feeling of G is immediately later than E’s simple physical feeling of F. To generalize, the mediatist accepts the following thesis, which follows from the mirroring thesis and the definition of "immediately later": one simple physical feeling is immediately later than another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the latter is immediately later than the actual occasion felt by the former. (It is assumed that the two feelings are in one and the same process of concrescence.)

To the immediatist, mediatism is problematic. Earlier actual occasions are seen through the lens of later ones, and that lens might overly distort. Since there is no room in this paper to arbitrate between these two views, I shall limit my discussion of immediatism to a few remarks. An immediatist might claim that no simple physical feeling comes into being earlier than any other, or that earlier actual occasions are felt earlier than later ones. But my view is that the immediatist should instead claim that later actual occasions are felt earlier than earlier ones. For feelings of very remote actual occasions tend to be "vague, trivial, and submerged" (Whitehead 239). On the other hand, feelings of neighboring actual occasions are likely to be of greatest significance. (cf. the concept of action by contact.) The main point is that the mirroring thesis could also be embraced by an immediatist.

It might be objected that the mirroring thesis was not explicitly stated by Whitehead, and that not enough passages support it. But a fundamental problem in interpreting Process and Reality is that important aspects of his metaphysics are stated too compactly and thus need to be developed further. Even if not implicit in his metaphysics, the thesis is coherent with it, and hence could be added to it. Admittedly, some alternative theses also are coherent with it. At least, the mirroring thesis serves to illustrate the claim that the order of concrescence is temporal, even if some alternative proves to be preferable.

Because I am inclined to accept temporalism, I have stated an account of the order of simple physical feelings in temporalist terms. I would like now to indicate how that account can be restated in nontemporalist terms. Instead of the temporal relation earlier, we utilize a nonconnected strict partial order that is nontemporal (which we term "precedes"). Of course, the nontemporalist needs to provide an appropriate metaphysical interpretation of the relation precedes. Let us assume that this task has been accomplished. Accordingly, a nontemporalist can revise the mirroring thesis (roughly) as follows: one simple physical feeling (nontemporally) precedes another simple physical feeling just in case the actual occasion felt by the former comes into being (temporally) later than the actual occasion felt by the latter. (It is assumed that the two feelings are in one and the same process of concrescence.)

In conclusion, I have stated part of an account of the temporal order of concrescing prehensions. That account is incomplete because it does not include prehensions of the other types -- e.g., conceptual feelings and intellectual feelings. However, there is no room in this paper for a more complete account. My view is that a discussion of the other types of prehensions would confirm that the order of concrescence is temporal. For instance, conceptual feelings are derived from physical feelings, and so each conceptual feeling comes into being later in the process of concrescence than the physical feeling from which it is derived. Also, intellectual feelings come into being by a process of integration ultimately from simple physical feelings and conceptual feelings, and so each intellectual feeling comes into being later in the process of concrescence than such feelings that it integrates.

VIII. Is the Order of Concrescence Temporal?

In this final section, I shall defend temporalism by responding to some problems. First, it might be thought that I have not considered some passages in Process and Reality that show that Whitehead was a nontemporalist. But that book is complex and obscure, and thus open to diverse interpretations. In a short paper, I cannot defend my temporalist interpretation conclusively. If he was in fact a nontemporalist, my paper can be read as a proposal for revising his metaphysics.

I have not explored the development of his thought. But his earlier writings that concern the nature of time are quite difficult and significantly different from Process and Reality, and so there is no space in a short paper to discuss them adequately. Nonetheless, I will sketch a speculation. To repeat, a major difficulty in interpreting Process and Reality is that of reconciling his theory of extension in Part IV with his system of categories in Part I. His theory of extension was based on his earlier writings about the "method of extensive abstraction" (287). In those earlier writings, he was a metricalist. In writing Part IV, he continued to think (to some extent) in metricalist terms. In contrast, in developing his system of categories, he thought (or began to think) in ordinalist terms. Discordant quotations from Process and Reality about the order of concrescence reflect unresolved tension between Whitehead the metricalist and Whitehead the ordinalist. But this is just a speculation, concerning which I am quite uncertain. If it is correct, my paper can be read as a proposal for resolving the tension in favor of ordinalism.

I have been discussing the actual occasions in the "temporal world" in abstraction from Whitehead’s conception of God in Process and Reality (342). Through a "consequent nature," God feels actual occasions (31). For example, actual occasion A comes into being, and God feels A. Later, actual occasion B comes into being, and God feels B. Because A comes into being earlier than B, it is reasonable to think that God’s feeling of A comes into being earlier than God’s feeling of B. Note that there is no "mirroring," since God directly feels each actual occasion upon its perishing. God’s process of becoming is concurrent with the creative advance of actual occasions. Of course, there is a sense in which God is "outside the temporal world": God does not come into being in a basic region in the extensive continuum. But God’s feelings of A and B can be temporally ordered without there being a space-time distance between them. Even though God’s feelings of actual occasions come into being outside the extensive continuum, they still can be temporally ordered. In short, a reason for accepting temporalism is that it makes best sense of a conception of God that is epitomized by Whitehead thus: "God is fluent" (348).

With the brief exception of Plato’s Timaeus, I have not discussed the relationship between Whitehead and the philosophers who influenced him. Admittedly, such a discussion would be illuminating, but -- particularly because of the large number of philosophers that he considered in Process and Reality -- I cannot accomplish it here. Let me mention another example. Bergson claimed that there is "an order of succession in [pure] duration," an order that is "without any admixture of extensity" (101-03). Let me restate his claim in my terminology. In pure duration, there is temporal order without temporal distances. Most especially, when there is "mutual penetration" (or interpenetration) between a past psychic state and a present psychic state, there is no temporal distance between them. Nonetheless, one is past and the other is present -- i.e., they are temporally ordered. Whitehead acknowledged that he was "greatly indebted to Bergson" (xii).

I have not considered Whitehead’s method of obtaining metaphysical concepts in Process and Reality: "imaginative generalization" (5). He obtained such concepts by generalizing "particular factors discerned in particular topics of human interest; for example, in physics, or in physiology, or in psychology" (5). We have already encountered the topic of physics. He was strongly influenced by the theory of relativity, and so he held that the temporal ordering of actual occasions is not uniquely serial.

He also was strongly influenced by "Descartes’ discovery that subjective experiencing is the primary metaphysical situation which is presented to metaphysics for analysis" (160). Accordingly, my suggestion is that he obtained his metaphysical concept of the order of concrescence (at least in part) by generalizing a concept of the temporal flow of subjective human experiencing. Although there is no room to elaborate this suggestion, I want to make a few pertinent remarks. Arguably, internal time-consciousness reveals order without distance. In remembrance, memories can flow by, their order evident, but not their dates. In dreams, one event can abruptly follow another, with no discernible lapse of time between them. Ordinalism is illustrated concretely in the temporal flow of subjective human experiencing. Consequently, because he generalized a concept of that flow, it is reasonable to think that the resultant concept of the order of concrescence is ordinalist.¹⁶

Notes

1. Ford’s "Successiveness" was published three decades ago. He continued his classic defense of temporalism in "Coordinate" (1971). Nonetheless, nontemporalism has persisted as the dominant view in Whitehead studies; see, for example, Kraus, Nobo, Rosenthal ("Contemporary"; "Continuity"), and Wallack. More recently in "Epochal" (1997), Ford responded to Rosenthal’s "Continuity" (1996) and again defended temporalism. (Rosenthal answered Ford in "Ongoing.")

2. For a comparison of substantivalism and relationism, see Sklar.

3. I discuss how relativity theory influenced his metaphysics in my article on Whitehead in the Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy.

4. Especially helpful for understanding Whitehead’s metaphysics is the discussion of "absolute approaches" to relativity theory in Lucas and Hodgson.

5. A region has "a certain determinate boundedness" (Whitehead 301). I am assuming that this implies that a region is (topologically) "closed." For a discussion of this assumption, see Palter 106-07 (note 3).

6. More generally, I do not think that the idea of order without measurement pertains idiosyncratically to the philosophy of time. For example, some (ethical or economic) theories based on the satisfaction of preferences assume that preferences can be nonmetrically ordered (e.g., Arrow 9-11).

7. Emphases added. The quotations are from the translation of the Timaeus by Cornford.

8. See, for example, Nobo 248.

9. See Suppes 222.

10. I discuss the ideas summarized in this paragraph and the preceding paragraph more fully in "Whitehead’s" 30-33. Central to McTaggart’s philosophy of time is his distinction between the A-series (based on concepts of past, present, and future) and the B-series (based on concepts of earlier and later). In "Time," I generalize McTaggart’s notions of A-series and B-series, and contrast four theories of temporal order, one of which is illustrated by Whitehead’s conception of the temporal order of actual occasions.

11. According to Rosenthal’s interpretation of Whitehead, the "becoming of an actual entity must be prior to time precisely because it is a continuous process while the coming to be of time requires a succession of ontologically discrete units" ("Contemporary" 274). In contrast, my view is that, in accordance with the discrete-order principle, there is a temporal order of discrete feelings in the process of concrescence.

12. See also Davies 123.

13. In contrast, the answer that Ford provides in "Epochal" involves a concept of "the order of determination" (977). Since his answer is quite complex, I have no space to discuss it adequately.

14. For such an objection, see Rosenthal, "Continuity" 546-47.

15. This mirroring thesis can be restated mathematically as follows. There is an order-isomorphism between the following two sets: the set (ordered by later) of the actual occasions in the causal past of a given subject actual occasion, and the set (ordered by earlier) of the simple physical feelings in the process of concrescence of that subject actual occasion.

16. I would like to thank the anonymous referee for some insightful comments.

Works Cited

Arrow, Kenneth J. Social Choice and Individual Values, 2nd ed. New York: John Wiley, 1963.

Bergson, Henri. Time and Free Will. New York: Harper, 1960.

Christian, William. An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. New Haven: Yale UP, 1959.

Davies, Paul. The Last Three Minutes. Conjectures about the Ultimate Fate of the Universe. New York: Basic Books, 1994.

Ford, Lewis S. "Genetic and Coordinate Division Correlated." Process Studies 1(1971): 199-209.

____ "On Epochal Becoming: Rosenthal on Whitehead." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (1997): 973-79.

____"On Genetic Successiveness: A Third Alternative." Southern Journal of Philosophy 7 (1969-70): 421-25.

Kraus, Elizabeth M. A Companion to Whitehead’s Process and Reality. New York: Fordham UP, 1979.

Lango, John W. "Alfred North Whitehead." In Blackwell Guide to American Philosophy. Ed. A. T. Marsoobian and J. Ryder. New York: Blackwell, 2001.

____"Time and Strict Partial Order." American Philosophical Quarterly 37 (2000): 373-87.

____ "Whitehead’s Category of Nexus of Actual Entities." Process Studies 29 (2000): 16-42.

Lucas, J. R., and P. E. Hodgson. Spacetime and Electromagnetism: An Essay on the Philosophy of the Special Theory of Relativity. Oxford: Clarendon P, 1990.

McTaggart, J. M. E. "The Unreality of Time." Mind 18 (1908): 457-74.

Nobo, Jorge Luis. Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity. Albany: State U of New York P, 1986.

Palter, Robert M. Whitehead’s Philosophy of Science. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1960.

Plato. Timaeus. In Plato’s Cosmology: The Timaeus of Plato. Translated, with a running commentary, by Francis McDonald Cornford. Indianapolis: Bobbs- Merrill, n.d.

Rosenthal, Sandra B. "Contemporary Process Metaphysics and Diverse Intuitions of Time: Can the Gap be Bridged?" The Journal of Speculative Philosophy 12 (1998): 271-88.

____"Continuity, Contingency, and Time: The Divergent Intuitions of Whitehead and Pragmatism." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 32 (1996): 542-62.

____"Whitehead and the Ongoing Problem of Temporality: A Response to Lewis Ford." Transactions of the Charles S. Peirce Society 33 (1997): 981-84.

Sherburne, Donald W. A Key to Whitehead’s Process and Reality. New York: Macmillan, 1966.

Sklar, Lawrence. Space, Time, and Spacetime. Berkeley: U of California P, 1974.

Suppes, Patrick. Introduction to Logic. Princeton, New Jersey: Van Nostrand, 1957.

Wallack, F. Bradford. The Epochal Nature of Process in Whitehead’s Metaphysics. Albany: State U of New York P, 1980.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Process and Reality. 1929. Corrected Edition. Ed. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: Free Press, 1978.

Whitehead’s process metaphysics is also a relation metaphysics. For instance, one of the categories in his categoreal scheme in Process and Reality is the "principle of process," and another is the "principle of relativity." Most significantly, prehensions are "Concrete Facts of Relatedness" (22-23). Although it is customary to classify him as a process philosopher, it is reasonable to classify him also as a relation philosopher.¹

Because he also is a relation philosopher, my view is that it is sometimes fruitful to interpret aspects of his metaphysics in terms of the logic of relations. One of his categories of existence is that of "Nexus" (Process 22). A nexus consists (roughly speaking, in actual entities interrelated through their prehensions of one another. In this paper, I shall draw upon the logic of relations in an attempt to understand what nexus are. The importance of the category of nexus lies partly in its great generality, a generality that can be fully represented in terms of the logic of relations.

Studies of Whitehead’s metaphysics usually concentrate on the category of actual entities, and consider the category of nexus incidenrally.² My aim in this paper is to supplement these studies by focusing on the category of nexus.³ Let me indicate why it is of value to investigate his metaphysics in this way. Central to Process and Reality is a discussion of the order of nature that stems from a variety of societies of actual entities (e.g., material bodies and living organisms). This notion of "society" is essential to his metaphysics because it helps to link his speculative conception of actual entities with entities of ordinary experience. Societies are a particular type of nexus. Therefore, to understand how societies bring order to nature, we need to understand the unity of interrelatedness provided by nexus.

Let me mention another reason for focusing on his category of nexus. His metaphysics can be understood as a sort of metaphysics of events. "An actual occasion is," he remarked, "the limiting type of event with only one member." More generally, an event is "a nexus of actual occasions" (Process 73).⁴ Just as he used his technical term "eternal object" rather than the standard term "universal" (Process 48), so he used his technical term "nexus" rather than the standard term "event." Although Process and Reality is centered on the standpoint of a single subject actual entity, it also is important to grasp how his metaphysics pertains to larger events.

At the end of Whitehead’s Modes of Thought there is the following sentence: "Poetry allies itself to metre, philosophy to mathematic pattern" (238). Hence we should expect the metaphysics of Whitehead the mathematician to embody mathematical patterns. Now it should be realized that the logic of relations is a branch of mathematics.⁵ In using that logic to interpret the category of nexus, I shall claim that nexus exhibit very general mathematical patterns. Such a claim is compatible with understanding them also as processes.

But the logic of relations cannot by itself provide an adequate analysis of the category of nexus. The metaphysics of nexus needs to be thoroughly discussed before that logic can be utilized adequately Accordingly, this paper is divided into two parts: in the first part, "The Metaphysics of Nexus," the text of Process and Reality is examined in order to try to determine what White-head understood nexus to be; in the second part, "The Mathematics of Nexus," nexus are interpreted in terms of the logic of relations. The discussion in this second part is nontechnical and intuitive.

Note that, in order to have sufficient focus, I shall not examine his other writings. The purpose is to avoid difficult questions about reconciling discrepancies between them and Process and Reality. This paper is not a study in the development of his thought.

Part One: The Metaphysics of Nexus

I. The Question of Ontological Status

What sort of entities are nexus? What is their ontological status? The text of Process and Reality suggests different answers. I shall contrast two answers, which I shall call the realist thesis and the eliminativist thesis. (Later, I shall consider four additional theses about nexus, the subjectivist thesis, the transcendentist thesis, the inclusivist thesis, and the abstractivist thesis.)

That there can be different answers is indicated by the two sentences that immediately follow the list of categories of existence. The first is this: "Among these eight categories of existence, actual entities and eternal objects stand out with a certain extreme finality" (22). In a paper of this brevity, I have to assume that the reader is largely familiar with actual entities and eternal objects, in order to have adequate space for a discussion of nexus. For the sake of simplicity, I shall limit my discussion to actual entities other than God (i.e., to actual occasions). Hence by "actual entity" I shall mean "finite actual entity" (i.e., "actual occasion").

And the second sentence is this: "The other types of existence have a certain intermediate character" (Process 22). It follows that nexus have an intermediate character. But what is that intermediate character? The realist and the eliminativist provide different answers which I want now to contrast.

The eliminativist thesis was summarized well by Dorothy Emmet:

Presumably, a mode is not an entity; since nexus are merely modes in which entitles can be together, they are not themselves entities. Note that the category that best supports her claim is Whitehead’s nineteenth category of explanation, with its word "community" (Process 25).

In light of this quotation, the eliminativist thesis can be stated briefly thus: Nexus are not entities. But we can still ask this: What sort of modes of togetherness are they?

In contrast, the realist thesis is briefly this: Nexus are entities. Although intermediate, they still are real, they really are entities. In this paper, I shall defend realism against eliminativism.

II. The Fourteenth Category of Explanation

Among Whitehead’s categories of explanation, there is one that explains nexus:

This category is the focal point of my paper. It expresses a general definition of nexus that I shall discuss in the next part in terms of the logic of relations.

For purposes of illustration, let us have a simple example: A and B are actual entities, and B prehends A. And so there is the nexus -- call it the A-B nexus -- that is constituted by B’s prehension of A.⁶ The phrase "prehensions of each other" in the category suggests that, in order to have a nexus, A must also prehend B. However, I think that Whitehead used that phrase loosely, and so its meaning can also be expressed as "prehensions of one another." Characterizing exactly how the actual entities in a nexus are linked with one another through prehensions is a main aim of this paper.

The question of ontological status is exemplified as follows: Is the A-B nexus itself an entity? Are there three different entities, namely, A, B, and the A-B nexus? Or, is the A-B nexus merely a mode of togetherness of the two entities A and B? Are there only two entities, namely, A and B?

An eliminativist could answer these questions as follows: The key to interpreting the category is the word "set." Nexus are not entities (i.e., individuals); rather, they are sets. The word "relatedness" refers to the relation of prehension. A nexus is a set of actual entities among which this relation of prehension holds.⁷ The mode of togetherness of the actual entities in a nexus is this relation of prehension. Consider, for example, the A-B nexus: Let S be the set whose members are just A and B. Because B prehends A, it follows that the set S is a nexus. But the nexus S is not a third entity (i.e., individual) in addition to A and B. The nexus S is only a set.

But what is the ontological status of sets? Why are they not entities? The eliminativist could answer thus: Whitehead’s use of the term "set" in the category is misleading. To conform more with his categories of existence, he should have used the term "multiplicity" Multiplicities, even though included among the categories of existence, are not to be called "entities." A multiplicity consists of many entities; it is not itself one single ("proper") entity (Process 30). What he meant to say in the category is this: A nexus is a multiplicity of actual entities interrelated by prehensions. In brief, nexus are not ("proper") entities; rather, they are multiplicities.

My view is that these answers are mistaken. Nexus are neither sets nor multiplicities (228). Let me explain.

III. The Relation of Prehension

The eliminativist claims that the actual entities in a nexus are interrelated by a relation of prehension. How are we to understand this relation? What is its ontological status? A standard view is that properties and relations are universals. Hence, the relation of prehension could be construed as a sort of abstract entity, namely, a universal. However, instead of the standard term "universal," Whitehead preferred his own term "eternal object." Consequently, it would be better to say this: The relation of prehension is an eternal object.

Accordingly. the eliminativist could enlarge the above interpretation of the fourteenth category of explanation as follows: A nexus is a set of actual entities that are linked together by means of an eternal object, the relation of prehension. The mode of togetherness of the actual entities in a nexus is to be understood in terms of the conception of "eternal object." There indeed is a third entity in the A-B nexus in addition to A and B, namely, an eternal object. But there is not a fourth entity, the nexus itself. Thus do "actual entities and eternal objects stand out with a certain extreme finality" (Process 22).

I think that this eliminativist interpretation is incorrect. In discussing the topic of universals and particulars, Whitehead stated that, in addition to actual entities, "prehensions and subjective forms are also ‘particulars"’ (Process 48). How, then, can the relation of prehension be a universal, when prehensions are particulars? My answer is this: Indeed, properties and relations are universals. For instance, there is the property of being an actual entity. This property is a universal (i.e., an eternal object). Particular actual entities are instances of that property. Similarly, particular prehensions are instances of the relation of prehension. Just as properties have instances, so there are relation instances.⁸

To have an example, let me enlarge the one above by adding a second simple nexus, the C-D nexus: C and D are actual entities, and D prehends C. The point is that D’s prehension of C is (numerically) different from B’s prehension of A. And both are instances of the relation of prehension.

IV. Simple Physical Feelings

Such prehensions are particulars. This claim should be understood in terms of Whitehead’s conception of "simple physical feeling." A physical feeling is simple when it has just one actual entity as its (initial) datum (Process 236-39). For instance, in the two simple nexus, B has a simple physical feeling of A, and D has a simple physical feeling of C. The two simple physical feelings are (numerically) distinct, and both are instances of the relation of prehension.

Therefore, my view is that, when Whitehead used the term "prehensions" in the fourteenth category of explanation, what he meant was "simple physical feelings." Henceforth, for the sake of brevity, I shall usually abbreviate "simple physical feeling" as "feeling." Briefly, actual entities that feel one another constitute a nexus.

It should be realized that Whitehead’s conception of "simple physical feeling" is more elaborate. It is the feeling of a prehension. In the A-B nexus, B feels A by means of one of A’s own prehensions. B’s feeling has A as its "initial datum" and A’s prehension as its "objective datum." A’s prehension is called the "objectification" of A for B (Process 236), which clarifies the meaning of the term "objectification" in the second part of the category.

Accordingly, I propose to rewrite the category as follows:

V. The Realist Thesis

In light of this interpretation of the category, the realist thesis about nexus can be stated thus: The nexus itself is a particular entity. Rather than merely being a set of actual entities interrelated by their feelings of one another, a nexus is a particular entity in addition to those actual entities and their feelings. For instance, the A-B nexus involves these five particulars: actual entities A and B, B’s feeling of A, one of A’s prehensions, and the A-B nexus itself.

The realist thesis is expressed in the following passage:

Thus a nexus is not a multiplicity; it is not many entities. Instead, it is "individual," it is a single entity. And it is not a set; it is not an abstract entity. Instead, it is "real" and "particular." When actual entities are interrelated by feelings, the resultant nexus are themselves "real individual facts."

What, then, is the "intermediate character" of nexus? The realist answer is this: Indeed, actual entities are the "Final Realities" (Whitehead, Process 22). But nexus also are realities, albeit intermediate realities. They are intermediate in this sense: Without actual entities, there would not be nexus. For nexus come into being when actual entities have simple physical feelings of one another. In this sense, nexus are composed of (i.e., have as constituents) actual entities. Just as living cells -- although composed of molecules -- are not just sets of molecules; so nexus -- although composed of actual entities -- are not just sets of actual entities.⁹

VI. The Process of Becoming of a Nexus

Whitehead was both a process philosopher and a relation philosopher. I have been discussing the relatedness in a nexus in abstraction from the idea of process. But it is important to understand how nexus involve processes. How does a nexus come into being when actual entities have feelings of each other?

An actual entity comes into being through an internal process of concrescence (Whitehead, Process 22). In that process of becoming, there is a succession of phases (Whitehead, Process 26). The first phase of concrescence involves a "multiplicity of simple physical feelings" of antecedent actual entities (Whitehead, Process 236). Later phases involve derivations of conceptual prehensions and integral prehensions (Whitehead, Process 26). In the final phase (i.e., the satisfaction), the actual entity comes into being as "one complex, fully determinate feeling" (26). That one fully determinate prehension is complex insofar as it has as components prehensions from earlier phases.

How does the A-B nexus come into being? First, A comes into being through such a process of concrescence. Then B comes into being, in a process of concrescence that includes the following: In the first phase, there is a feeling of A. In later phases, B integrates that feeling of A with other prehensions. In the final phase, B comes into being as one complex prehension, a prehension that retains as a component the feeling of A. This complex process of becoming is the process of becoming of the A-B nexus. The two final realities A and B come into being, and in that process the intermediate reality the A-B nexus comes into being.

To generalize, the actual entities in a nexus come into being, and in that process the intermediate reality, the nexus of those actual entities, comes into being. Just as each actual entity is an entity that is (numerically) distinct from its component prehensions, so each nexus is an entity that is (numerically) distinct from the actual entities that constitute it.

VII. The Subjectivist Thesis

In discussing the question of the ontological status of nexus, I have been contrasting two theses, realism and eliminativism. I shall now discuss a third: subjectivism.

Whitehead distinguished two uses of the term "nexus" in Process and Reality. According to "the second use of the term nexus," a nexus is "merely relative to the feeling" of it (231). In this sense of the term, nexus fall under the category of contrasts (228). This second use suggests the following subjectivist thesis about the ontological status of nexus: When a subject actual entity prehends a nexus of antecedent actual entities, that nexus only exists as that subject’s "perspective" on those antecedent actual entities (221). The antecedent actual entities only become a nexus from the perspective of the subject. Nexus exist only in the eye of the prehender.

How is a nexus prehended? For an illustration, let me add the following to the description of the two simple nexus: D feels B, and D feels A. And, to repeat, B feels A. Consequently, D has a complex physical prehension of the nexus between A and B. It is vital to understand the process whereby D’s prehension of the A-B nexus comes into being. This complex process involves the following succession of processes: A comes into being. In B’s first phase of concrescence, B feels A. B comes into being. In D’s first phase of concrescence, D has feelings of A and B; in particular, D feels B’s feeling of A. In a later phase, D synthesizes those two feelings into a complex prehension of the nexus between A and B (see Process 226).

The main point is this: The nexus between A and B does not come into being because D prehends it. Instead, B’s feeling of A has already come into being before D begins its process of concrescence. And, therefore, the nexus between A and B has already come into being before D begins its process of concrescence. The subjectivist thesis is not correct.

But suppose that the realist thesis can be refuted, and that subjectivism is correct. The subjectivist could still read the second part of this paper as providing a definition of what nexus are from the standpoint of a subject actual entity. Similarly, the other definitions discussed there could be relativized to subject actual entities. The logic of relations is neutral between subjectivism and realism.

In conclusion, the realist thesis is this: To say that actual entities are the final realities does not mean that nexus are merely multiplicities (or sets), nor does it mean that they are merely subjective. Even though actual entities are the final realities, nexus also are objective realities.

VIII. The Transcendentist Thesis

Whitehead mentioned his "first use of the term nexus" in a paragraph about nexus and God (Process 231). Lewis Ford claims that Whitehead inserted the paragraph to "resolve one problem about the ontological status of the independent nexus" (232). Briefly, Whitehead’s paragraph says this: The ontological principle requires nexus to be "somewhere," and so they have to be in the consequent nature of God (231). Thus the paragraph can be read as containing what I shall call the transcendentist thesis about the ontological status of nexus, namely, that they only exist as real entities in God. (In thus relativizing nexus to a single divine subject actual entity, transcendentism might be construed as a form of subjectivism.)

I am skeptical about the transcendentist thesis. Whitehead’s ontological principle "means that actual entities are the only reasons" (Process 24). For example, the two final realities A and B are the reasons for the intermediate reality the A-B nexus. They come into being, and in that process it comes into being. Hence the A-B nexus is somewhere -- it is where A and B are. Indeed, God prehends A, B, and their nexus. But, just as A and B are final realities that are (numerically) distinct from God, so their nexus is an intermediate reality that is (numerically) distinct from God. Whatever motivated Whitehead to insert the paragraph about nexus and God, I do not think that the transcendentist reading of it is coherent with the metaphysics of nexus found in the bulk of Process and Reality. But I have no space to discuss the role of God in Whitehead’s metaphysics more fully. Those who accept the transcendentist thesis can read the second part of this paper as containing a discussion of nexus as they exist in the consequent nature of God.

In conclusion, the realist thesis is this: To say that actual entities are the final realities does not mean that nexus are merely multiplicities (or sets), or that nexus are merely subjective, or that nexus only exist in the consequent nature of God. Even though actual entities are the final realities, nexus also are objective realities that exist in the universe together with the actual entities that constitute them.

IX. Societies

Let me repeat an analogy: A cell is not a set of molecules, but rather is composed of them. But there is more than an analogy here. According to Whitehead, cells and molecules are societies of actual entities. The derivative notion of "society" is essential to his metaphysics, for it serves to link his speculative conception of actual entities with entities of ordinary experience, such as material bodies and living organisms (including cells and molecules). Note that he called his method of philosophy "speculative philosophy" (Process 3). From the standpoint of common sense, the thesis that the universe is a plenum of actual entities is indeed speculative. Hence the notion of "society" helps to make his metaphysics more comprehensible.

What, then, are societies? What is their ontological status? Societies are nexus. They are nexus of actual entities that are ordered by means of a "defining characteristic" (i.e., an eternal object). This defining characteristic is "inherited" by later actual entities in the society from earlier actual entities in the society. Each actual entity in the society has a conceptual prehension of the defining characteristic which it derives from its feelings of earlier actual entities in the society (Whitehead, Process 34). One of my aims in this paper about nexus is to shed some light on the notion of "society."

There is a problem of terminology. To common sense, there are three stages in the history of a living organism: coming into being, enduring, and perishing. But living organisms are categorized as nexus. And so, to generalize, we could distinguish three stages in the history of any nexus: coming into being, enduring, and perishing. Here the term "coming into being" refers to the beginning of the nexus, the coming into being of its earliest constituent actual entities. Analogously, the history of an actual entity has three stages: its first phase of concrescence, its supplementary phases, and its final phase. But Whitehead called the whole history of an actual entity its process of becoming. Here the term "becoming" refers to the actual entity in its entirety, to all of its phases of concrescence. Analogously, I have been calling the whole history of a nexus its process of becoming. In this use of the term "becoming," I am referring to the nexus in its entirety, to all of its constituent actual entities. For the sake of simplicity, I shall continue to use the term "the becoming of a nexus" in this broader sense.

To common sense, each physical object is one single entity. How does the notion of "society" capture this idea? One answer is that a society is one entity because it has a defining characteristic. But this answer is problematic. Because of its defining characteristic, a society has one nature. But two societies can have the same nature; each can have identically the same eternal object as its defining characteristic. Therefore, that a society has a defining characteristic does not explain why it is one entity. Instead, it is a single entity because it is a nexus. Because nexus are "real, individual, and particular" (Whitehead, Process 20), societies are real, individual, and particular. In opposing eliminativism, I have argued that a nexus is not just a set of actual entities and an eternal object (i.e., the relation of prehension). Similarly. my view is that a society is not just a set of actual entities and an eternal object (i.e., a defining characteristic). Thus the realist thesis about nexus elucidates how Whitehead’s metaphysics can construe material bodies and living organisms as single entities. Although speculative, his metaphysics does conform somewhat to common sense.

X. Contemporaries

Simple physical feelings were also termed by Whitehead "‘causal’ feelings": "A simple physical feeling is an act of causation" (Process 236). Each actual entity feels only those actual entities that have already come into being -- i.e., that are in its "causal past." Hence, it cannot feel actual entities that are in a "unison of becoming" with it -- i.e., that are its causal "contemporaries" (Process 123-25): For "contemporary events happen in causal independence of each other" (Process 61).

Therefore, a set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities does not constitute a nexus. Let me rephrase this essential point in the language of the fourteenth category of explanation: A set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities does not have a "unity of the relatedness constituted by their prehensions [i.e., simple physical feelings] of each other" (Process 24).

For an illustration, let me expand the description of the two simple nexus. To repeat: B feels A, and D feels C. Moreover, C feels A. But C does not feel B, and B does not feel C. Instead, B and C are contemporaries, B and C are in a unison of becoming. Let us call them the B-C unison. The main point is that there is no B-C nexus. B and C do not have a unity of relatedness constituted by a feeling. The B-C unison is only a multiplicity.

Nonetheless, B and C do have a common past. Both feel A. They both are linked to A by means of feelings. Therefore, there is a unity of relatedness among the three actual entities, B and C and A, that is constituted by their feelings of each other. There is a B-A-C nexus.

The main claim illustrated by the B-A-C nexus is that two actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated indirectly by means of simple physical feelings. They may be interrelated through the mediation of other actual entities.

This claim is fundamental to Whitehead’s complex doctrine of perception in the mode of presentational immediacy. This doctrine too is essential to his metaphysics. For it serves to link his speculative conception of actual entities with the common-sense view that we have sensory perceptions of physical objects. Hence, it also helps to make his metaphysics more comprehensible. Briefly, it includes the following ideas: I perceive sense-data. But I do not directly perceive a physical object as qualified by sense-data. Instead, I derive the sense-data that I attribute to the physical object from antecedent states of my own body (i.e., from the causal past). Those past states of my body were causally affected by the physical object (e.g., by means of light waves).¹⁰

Accordingly. the claim can be illustrated more complexly as follows: My present subject (actual entity) and contemporaneous actual entities in the physical object do not constitute a nexus. But the following actual entities do constitute a nexus: my present subject (actual entity), contemporaneous actual entities in the physical object, some past actual entities in my body. and some past actual entities in the physical object.

XI. Inclusivism

In summary, my view is that a nexus is composed of actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another. And so actual entities that are mutually contemporaneous do not comprise a nexus. In contrast, Jorge Nobo contends that "any set of occasions constitutes a nexus." In particular, he contends that "a group of mutually contemporaneous occasions constitute a nexus" (21). I want now to discuss this inclusivist thesis, the thesis that every collection of actual entities constitute a nexus.

Nobo provides as textual support a quotation from Adventures of Ideas (258-59), a quotation that links "the term Nexus" to the idea of "mutual immanence" (Nobo 21). "Contemporary occasions are," he contends, "mutually immanent" (21). His defense of this contention involves Whitehead’s theory of extension, a subject too complex for consideration here. If Nobo is right about Adventures of Ideas, my suspicion is that Whitehead’s conception of nexus evolved. Nevertheless, my concern is with how he understood nexus in Process and Reality. I do not think that the fourteenth category of explanation -- the primary category in which nexus are explained -- supports inclusivism. But the inclusivist thesis is supported by certain passages in Process and Reality. Some examples are these: "the contemporary nexus perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy" (126), and "the nexus of contemporary actual entities" (317).

Whitehead also stated (in the paragraph from which Nobo quoted) that the "mutual immanence of contemporary actual entities is "of the indirect type" (Adventures 259). In the B-A-C nexus, B and C are contemporaries, but they both feel A, and so they are interrelated indirectly. It is important to distinguish the set containing just B and C from the set containing B, C, and A. The former set does not contain actual entities that by themselves constitute (in my sense of the term) a nexus, because it does not contain an intermediary actual entity that interrelates the two contemporaries. In contrast, the latter set does contain actual entities that constitute a nexus, because it does contain such an intermediary. In general, my view is that a set of actual entities cannot constitute a nexus unless it contains sufficient intermediaries.

What, then, did Whitehead mean by "the contemporary nexus perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy" (Process 126)? In light of the difference between the B-C multiplicity and the B-A-C nexus, let me contrast two answers: On the one hand, this passage could be read as referring to mutually contemporaneous actual entities in abstraction from actual entities in their common past. On the other hand, it could be read as referring to mutually contemporaneous actual entities together with actual entities in their common past. (cf. the illustration at the end of the preceding section.)

I am skeptical about inclusivism, but there is no space to dispute Nobo’s contentions further. And so my response to them is this: Let us suppose that the inclusivist thesis is correct. My paper can still be read as a discussion of an important type of nexus, namely, those nexus that are interrelated by means of simple physical feelings. Let us call nexus of this type cohesive nexus. Also, to have a term that contrasts with "inclusivism," I shall call my view about nexus cohesivism.

Clearly, the A-B nexus -- in which B coheres concretely with A by means of a simple physical feeling -- is different from the B-C unison -- in which B and C come into being independently. If the inclusivist thesis is correct, the A-B nexus is to be classified as a cohesive nexus, whereas the B-C unison is to be classified as a noncohesive nexus. The main point is that the inclusivist can read the second part of this paper as an attempt to understand cohesive nexus in terms of the logic of relations.

XII. Abstractivism¹¹

To review, a nexus is constituted by actual entities that are interrelated by their simple physical feelings of one another. Some of the actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated through the mediation of other actual entities in that nexus. Actual entities that are mutually contemporaneous do not constitute a nexus.

But actual entities may also be interrelated through the mediation of entities of other categoreal types. In particular, they may be interrelated indirectly by means of their conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal object. Accordingly. in opposition to my claim that mutually contemporaneous actual entities do not constitute a nexus, there is the following abstractivist thesi:¹² When actual entities are thus interrelated through the mediation of an eternal object, they constitute a nexus.¹³ Let us call such a nexus an abstract nexus.

Utilizing Whitehead’s doctrine of "perception in the mode of presentational immediacy." the abstractivist thesis can be illustrated as follows: Another person and I are presently perceiving one and the same sense-datum. Let S be my present subject (actual entity), let T be a contemporaneous subject (actual entity) of that other person, and let O be the sense-datum. Because a sense-datum is an eternal object (61), S and T have conceptual feelings of one and the same eternal object. Hence S and T, even though mutually contemporaneous, constitute a nexus. Let us call this abstract nexus the S-0-T nexus.

I am skeptical about the abstractivist thesis. Actual entities are "real, individual, and particular," and so "in the same sense" are nexus (Whitehead, Process 20). In the B-A-C nexus, B and C are interrelated indirectly by means of their simple physical feelings of A. Because B and C are interrelated through the mediation of A -- an entity that is real, individual, and particular -- the nexus among B, A, and C is itself real, individual, and particular.

In contrast, in the putative S-O-T nexus, S and T are interrelated indirectly by means of their conceptual feelings of an eternal object. But that eternal object is not an entity that is real, individual, and particular. Instead, it is a universal (Whitehead, Process 48). Because S and T are interrelated through the mediation of a universal -- an entity that is not real, individual, and particular -- the interrelatedness of S, T, and the eternal object does not constitute an entity that is real, individual, and particular. In brief, there really is no S-O-T nexus.

I have voiced an objection to the abstractivist thesis, but there is no space to examine it more fully. In conclusion, my response to it is this: let us suppose that it is correct; let us suppose that there are such abstract nexus. My paper can still be read as a discussion of cohesive nexus. The main point is that the abstractivist can read the second part of this paper as an attempt to understand cohesive nexus in terms of the logic of relations.

Although I have been defending my own interpretation of the category of nexus, one of my aims has been to distinguish alternative interpretations. Since the logic of relations is neutral between these competing views about the metaphysics of nexus, my hope is that those who disagree with my interpretation will still find the second part helpful.

Part Two: The Mathematics of Nexus

I. Introduction

Having explored the metaphysics of nexus with reference to the text of Process and Reality, I shall now interpret the category of nexus in terms of the logic of relations. Although the term "logic" might suggest otherwise, I shall not be concerned with deductive arguments about nexus. Instead, I shall discuss some mathematical patterns exhibited by nexus that are definable in terms of the logic of relations. In addition to mathematical patterns that are evident in Process and Reality, I shall discuss some mathematical patterns that are implicit there.

"Whitehead is," Charles Hartshorne remarked, "the first to embody modern relational logic in a fairly complete metaphysical system." And, he added, "Metaphysics ought to be the study of relational structures as embodied in reality as such" (14). In this second part of my paper, I shall attempt to discern some relational structures that Whitehead’s metaphysics attributes to reality: relational structures involving nexus.

In particular, the logic of relations is used to formulate a definition of nexus. Also, it is used to distinguish various sorts of nexus. Although I have been defending the realist thesis, closely similar definitions could be utilized by the eliminativist, the subjectivist, and the transcendentist. The logic of relations is neutral between these competing views about ontological status. Note also that the inclusivist and the abstractivist can understand me to be defining cohesive nexus.

In addition, I shall discuss the type of order involved in the creative advance of actual entities. The goal is to determine the type of order involved in the creative advance of nexus. Although Whitehead’s idea of "creative advance" does not involve "the notion of a unique seriality" (Process 35). the creative advance of actual entities and nexus is ordered nonserially. In so doing, I shall consider his definition of durations. Even though durations are not nexus, the topic of durations is quite relevant. The nonserial ordering of actual entities induces a nonserial ordering of durations.

My view is that just as the process of becoming of an actual entity involves phases, so does the process of becoming of a nexus. To show that defining nexus in terms of the logic of relations is compatible with understanding them as processes, that logic is used to define the phases in the process of becoming of a nexus. Just as a "duration is a cross-section of the universe" (Whitehead, Process 125); so a phase of a nexus is a cross-section of that nexus. The nonserial ordering of actual entities induces a nonserial ordering of these phases. The creative advance of actual entities involves a creative advance of phases of nexus.

II. The Relation of Simple Physical Feeling

Let me preface this section with a comment by Bertrand Russell about the "calculus of relations": "A careful analysis of mathematical reasoning shows [. . .] that types of relations are the true subject-matter discussed" (23). Similarly, my view is that an analysis of Whitehead’s categoreal scheme shows that (mathematical) types of relations are importantly involved there.

In an earlier section, I discussed the relation of prehension, a relation that has particular prehensions as instances. Subsequently, I rewrote the fourteenth category of explanation in terms of the conception of "simple physical feeling." In this second part of my paper, I shall focus on the relation of simple physical feeling. For the sake of brevity, I shall term this relation "feels." Particular (simple physical) feelings are instances of the relation feels. What type of relation is it? The aim of the present section is to answer this question.

The theory of types of relations is a sort of mathematical theory. For the type of a particular relation is definable in terms of purely formal properties of the relation. Consider, for example, the relation being a (natural) parent of. Your child cannot be your parent. To generalize, a relation R is asymmetric when it has the following formal property: For any entities x and y, if xRy, then it is not the case that yRx.

The relation feels is asymmetric. Each actual entity feels only those actual entities that have already come into being, and so they cannot feel it. Actual entities cannot be both in the causal past and in the causal future. Consider, again, the A-B nexus: When B comes into being, A has already come into being, and so B feels A. But when A comes into being, B has not yet come into being, and so A cannot feel B. A cannot be both in B’s causal past and in B’s causal future.¹⁴

You cannot be your own parent. In general, a relation R is irreflexive when the following formal property holds: For any entity x, it is not the case that xRx. The relation feels is irreflexive. When an actual entity is coming into being, it has not already come into being. It is not in its own causal past. Thus it cannot feel itself.

Another relation is being an ancestor of. An ancestor of any of your ancestors is also your ancestor. Generally speaking, a relation is transitive when it has the following formal property: For any entities x, y. and z, if xRy and yRz, then xRz. Thus, if x is an ancestor of y and y is an ancestor of z, then x is an ancestor of z.

The relation feels is transitive. Each actual entity feels all of the actual entities in its causal past, i.e., its actual world (Whitehead, Process 239). In the two simple nexus, D feels C, and C feels A. Thus C is in D’s causal past, and A is in C’s causal past. Consequently, A is in D’s causal past. And so D feels A. In general, for any three actual entities x, y. and z, if z is in the causal past of y and y is in the causal past of x, then z is in the causal past of x. And so, if x feels y and y feels z, then x feels z.

In these introductory remarks about the logic of relations, I have described three formal properties of relations. In summary. the relation of simple physical feeling is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive.

III. Nonseriality

‘There is a prevalent misconception," Whitehead asserted, "that ‘becoming’ involves the notion of a unique seriality for its advance into novelty" (Process 35). In terms of these three formal properties of relations, I want now to show how actual entities are ordered nonserially.

The integers do have a unique seriality; they are ordered serially by the relation is less than. This relation is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Also, any two integers are such that one is less than the other. In general, a relation R is connected when it has the following formal property: For any two distinct entities x and y. either xRy or yRx. The integers have a unique seriality because the relation is less than is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and connected. Any relation that has these four formal properties is a serial relation (Carnap, Symbolic 123).

Equivalently. the integers are ordered by the disjunctive relation "either is less than or is equal to." This relation is reflexive, antisymmetric, transitive, and connected. A relation with these four formal properties is a simple order (Carnap, Symbolic 123). Note that a relation R is reflexive when it has the following formal property: For any x, xRx. And it is antisymmetric when it has this formal property: For any x and y, if (a) xRy and (b) x is not identical to y, then it is not the case that yRx.

Obviously, the relation being a parent of is not connected. Similarly, the relation feels is not connected. And so actual entities do not have a unique seriality. The relation feels is not connected because actual entities do not feel their contemporaries. In the B-C unison, B does not feel C, and C does not feel B. In general, for any two actual entities x and y. there are three mutually exclusive alternatives: Either (1) x feels y, or (2) y feels x, or (3) x does not feel y and y does not feel x (i.e., x and y are contemporaries).

Even though the creative advance of actual entities does not have a unique seriality, actual entities are still ordered nonserially. This claim can be understood as follows: Even though the relation feels is not connected, it is irreflexive, asymmetric, and transitive. Any relation that has those three formal properties is a strict partial order. The concept of "strict partial order" is a generalization

of the concept of "serial relation." For example, the relation being an ancestor of has those three formal properties, and so human beings have the nonserial order recorded in genealogies.

There is an equivalent generalization of the concept of "simple order": A relation R is a partial order when it is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive.¹⁵ A set whose members are interrelated by such a relation is a partially ordered set. The disjunctive relation "either is felt by or is identical to" is a partial order. And the set of actual entities as ordered by that relation is a partially ordered set. Although the creative advance of actual entities does not have a unique seriality, their creative advance is partially ordered.

IV. Durations

Influenced by Einstein’s theory of relativity, Whitehead rejected the "‘classical’ theory of time." In particular, because of the relativity of simultaneity, there is no absolute present. Included in the idea that the creative advance is not uniquely serial is the idea that there is not a unique present state of the universe. Nevertheless, there are durations, and a "duration is a cross-section of the universe." But each actual entity "lies in many durations"; it does not lie in a cross-section of the universe that is unique (Whitehead, Process 125). The nonserial creative advance involves a nonserial succession of durations.

A duration is a maximal set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities. Hence durations are not nexus. Although this paper is about nexus, the topic of durations is (as we shall see) quite relevant. More explicitly. a duration D is a set of actual entities that satisfies the following two conditions (see White-head, Process 320): The first condition is that each actual entity in D is contemporaneous with every actual entity in D.¹⁶ The second condition makes D a maximal set of contemporaries: Any actual entity that is not in D either feels or is felt by some actual entity in D. In other words, any actual entity that is contemporaneous with every actual entity in D is itself in D.¹⁷

This definition of durations can be understood in terms of the logic of relations. The relation is identical to is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive, and thus an equivalence relation. A relation R is symmetric when it has the following formal property: For any entities x and y. if xRy. then yRx. The relation is identical to partitions the set of unreduced fractions into mutually exclusive equivalence classes (e.g., {1/3, 2/6, 3/9, etc.}). But simultaneity is relative. There are actual entities X, Y, and Z such that X is contemporaneous with Y, and Y is contemporaneous with Z, but X is not contemporaneous with Z. Consequently. the relation of contemporaneity -- i.e., neither feels nor is felt by -- although reflexive and symmetric, is not transitive (Whitehead, Process 320). A relation that is reflexive and symmetric is a similarity relation (Carnap, Structure 21-22, 112-13). Although such a relation need not partition a set in which it is defined into mutually exclusive classes, it does divide such a set into (possibly) overlapping similarity circles. In short, durations are the similarity circles of the relation of contemporaneity (Lango 89-92).

V. The Partial Ordering of Durations

Whitehead’s conception of "duration" illuminates how the universe in its entirety is in a process of becoming. For the creative advance of actual entities involves a creative advance of durations. Contemporaneous actual entities come into being in a "unison of becoming" (Process 124). The process of becoming of a maximal set of contemporaneous actual entities is the process of becoming of a duration.

This creative advance of durations is not uniquely serial. Nonetheless, because actual entities are ordered nonserially, my view is that durations also are ordered nonserially. The key point is this: The relation feels induces the following relation between durations. Duration E is later than duration D when the following two conditions hold: (1) D and B are not identical. (2) Each actual entity that is in E but not in D feels an actual entity in D.

Obviously. the relation is later than is irreflexive. Moreover, it is transitive: Let F be later than E, and E later than D. Each actual entity in F (but not in E) feels an actual entity in E. And the latter either (a) is in D or (b) feels an actual entity in D. Therefore (by the transitivity of feels), each actual entity in F (but not in D) feels an actual entity in D. Hence condition (2) is satisfied. Also, by a similar transitivity argument, condition (I) is satisfied: If F were identical to D, each actual entity in F would feel an actual entity in F, contradicting the definition of "duration."

And, since any irreflexive and transitive relation is asymmetric, the relation is later than is asymmetric. However, it is not connected. For simultaneity is relative. And so each actual entity "lies in many durations" (Whitehead, Process 125). Consequently, there can be two durations that have the following property: actual entities in each duration feel actual entities in the other. Let D and E be two such durations. And let X be an actual entity in D that feels an actual entity Y in E. If B were later than D, Y would feel an actual entity Z in D (or Y would be in D). And so (by the transitivity of feels) X (in D) would feel an actual entity in D, contradicting the definition of "duration." Hence B cannot be later than D. By the same type of transitivity argument, O cannot be later than B.

Therefore, the relation is later than is a strict partial order. Hence, the disjunctive relation "either is later than or is identical to" is a partial order. And the set of durations as partially ordered by it is a partially ordered set. The partial ordering of actual entities induces a partial ordering of durations.

This temporal ordering of durations presupposes only the relation of simple physical feeling. It does not presuppose Whitehead’s theory of extension in Part IV of Process and Reality, a theory that evolved from his earlier method of extensive abstraction (287)¹⁸ In contrast, the concept of a "time-system" in his Principles of Natural Knowledge presupposes the method of extensive abstraction; note that, in a time-system, moments are "arranged in serial order" (114). The theory of extension in Process and Reality is problematic: What are regions? What is their ontological status? More generally. why is the theory of extension coherent with the categoreal scheme of Part I? I cannot try to answer such difficult questions in this paper. My main point is that implicit in the categoreal scheme is a conception of the temporal ordering of durations that is independent of the complexities of the theory of extension.

In general, all of the mathematical patterns discussed in this part of the paper are independent of the theory of extension. The logic of relations can be used to define very general mathematical patterns involving actual entities that are not specifically geometrical (or topological).

VI. A Definition of Nexus

According to the fourteenth category of explanation, a nexus is a multiplicity of actual entities in the unity of the relatedness constituted by their simple physical feelings of one another. Let us term any set of actual entities that constitute a nexus a nexal set. For the realist, each nexal set corresponds to a nexus. For the eliminativist, the nexal sets are the nexus. The subjectivist can relativize nexal sets to a subject actual entity. The transcendentist can understand the nexal sets as corresponding to nexus as they exist in the consequent nature of God. And the inclusivist and the abstractivist can understand the nexal sets as corresponding to (or as being) cohesive nexus.

Accordingly. in order to define the category of nexus, I shall provide a definition of the class of nexal sets.

Let me begin with an example, the B-A-C nexus. B and C are contemporaries, but they have a common past. Both feel A. This illustrates the following claim: Two actual entities in a nexus may be interrelated indirectly by means of simple physical feelings. They may be interrelated through the mediation of other actual entities. Now consider the nexal set that contains just B, A, and C. Any two actual entities x and y in that nexal set are interrelated in one of the following two ways: (1) x feels y or x is felt by y. (2) x feels or is felt by y through the mediation of a third actual entity in the nexal set. More explicitly. (2) there is an actual entity z in the nexal set such that (a) x feels z or x is felt by z, and (b) z feels y or z is felt by y.

This example can be expanded as follows: There is a fourth actual entity B. C feels E. But B is contemporaneous both with B and with A. (Although B feels A, E lies in many durations, including one that contains B, and one that contains A.) Hence there is a B-A-C-B nexus. Let us consider the nexal set containing just B, A, C, and E. Any two actual entities x and y in that nexal set are interrelated in one of the following three ways: (1) x feels y or x is felt by y; (2) There is an actual entity z in the nexal set such that (a) x feels z or x is felt by z, and (b) z feels y or z is felt by y. (3) x feels or is felt by y through the mediation of two actual entities in the nexal set. More explicitly. (3) there are actual entities z and w in the nexal set such that (a) x feels z or x is felt by z, (b) z feels w or a is felt by w, and (c) w feels y or w is felt by y.¹⁹

And so forth. But how much forth? Let us assume that there are two durations that satisfy the following three conditions: (1) One is later than the other; (2) they do not have members in common; and (3) the set containing all of the actual entities from both durations is a nexal set.²⁰ In that nexal set, there are chains of actual entities, linked together by simple physical feelings, that span the entire universe. Let one such chain contain B, A, C, and B. Continuing the chain in one direction, there is an actual entity F that feels E, there is an actual entity G that is felt by F, there is an actual entity H that feels G, and so forth across the entire universe.

In light of these examples, I shall use the concept of "the ancestral of a relation" to define the category of nexus. An ancestor is a parent of a parent of a parent, and so forth. You are linked to your ancestors by chains of parents. The relation being an ancestor of is the ancestral of the relation being a parent of. The concept of ancestral can be understood roughly as follows: For any entities x and y, x has the relation "the ancestral of R" to y when the following condition is satisfied:²¹ Either (1) xRy, or (2) there is an entity z such that xRz and zRy. or (3) there are entities z and w such that xRz and zRw and wRy, or (4) there are entities a, w, and v such that xRz and zRw and wRy and vRy. or (5) -- and so forth. The meaning of "and so forth" is explicated by means of a more exact definition of "ancestral" (Carnap, Symbolic 146-48).

Consider the following relation: feels or is felt by. Very roughly speaking, any two actual entities in a nexus are linked by the ancestral of the relation feels or is felt by. More precisely, the class of nexal sets is defined as follows: A set N of two or more actual entities is a nexal set when it satisfies the following condition: For any two actual entities x and y in N, either (1) x feels or is felt by y, or (2) there is an actual entity a in N such that (a) x feels or is felt by z and (b) a feels or is felt by y. or (3) there are actual entities a and w in N such that (a) x feels or is felt by z and (b) z feels or is felt by w and (c) w feels or is felt by y. or (4) there are actual entities z, w, and v in N such that (a) x feels or is felt by a and (b) a feels or is felt by w and (c) w feels or is felt by v and (d) v feels or is felt by y. or (5) (and so forth). The meaning of "and so forth" is to be understood in terms of the concept of ancestral.²²

The actual entities in each nexal set constitute a nexus through their simple physical feelings of one another.²³

VII. Nonseriality and Nexus

The creative advance of actual entities does not have a unique seriality. Consequently, the actual entities in a particular nexus could be ordered nonserially. but they also could be ordered serially. For example, an "enduring object" is a society of "serially" ordered actual entities. Note that Whitehead’s definition of "serial ordering" also holds of the vastly many serially ordered nexus that are not societies (Process, 34). Let me define a general concept of "serially ordered nexus." A nexal set N of actual entities is serially ordered when it satisfies the following condition (cf. Davies and Priestley 3); For any two actual entities x and y in N, either x feels y or x is felt by y Hence there are no contemporaries in N. A serially ordered nexal set is a nexal set in which the relation feels is a serial relation (i.e., a relation that is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, and connected). A nexus is serially ordered when the nexal set of its members is serially ordered.

Whitehead held that physical objects (other than elementary particles) are societies of actual entities that are not serially ordered (Process 35). Nevertheless, they still are nonserially ordered. Of course, vastly many nexus of actual entities that are not serially ordered are also not societies. Let me define a general concept of "nonserially ordered nexus." Although the actual entities in a nexus are interrelated through their feelings of one another, some might be contemporaneous, some might not feel each other. Consequentl₃; a nexal set is nonserially ordered when it contains at least two actual entities that are contemporaneous. A nexus is nonserially ordered when the nexal set of its members is nonserially ordered.

Note that any nexal set that contains only two contemporaneous actual entities is nonserially ordered. Hence this definition is very general. At the opposite extreme, let us say that a nexal set is entirely nonserially ordered when each of its members is contemporaneous with at least one of its members. A nexus is entirely nonserially ordered when the nexal set of its members is entirely nonserially ordered. Ordinary physical objects are societies of actual entities that are entirely nonserially ordered.

VIII. Temporally Fragmented Nexus

The importance of the category of nexus lies partly in its great generality I want now to illustrate further the enormous variety of sets of actual entities that are nexal sets. In particular, I shall provide an illustration that is especially relevant to the problems of identity through time and the nature of the human mind.

To common sense, a human mind retains its personal identity through the passage of time. Similarly, to Whitehead, a "human mind" is an "enduring object" (Process 109). That is, a human mind is a society of serially ordered actual entities that inherit a defining characteristic (Process 34). Thus a human mind has identity of character through time because it is a society. And it is a single entity because it is a nexus.

A standard view is that identity through time involves spatiotemporal continuity But it is questionable whether the human mind is thus continuous. An adequate theory of the human mind has to account for such phenomena as sleep, unconsciousness, comas, and amnesia. It is conceivable, then, that our minds are temporally fragmented, that our mentality sometimes ceases while we are asleep or unconscious. Now a nexus is a unity, not because it has spatiotemporal continuity, but because the actual entities in it have feelings of one another. Hence, because of the great generality of the conception of nexus, a nexus that constitutes a human mind can be temporally fragmented. Its identity of character can be transmitted across a temporal hiatus.

What, then, are temporally fragmented nexus? How are nexus of this type to be defined? To answer these questions, we need some definitions. Each duration is a cross-section of the universe. A set S of actual entities is in the past of the duration D just in case each actual entity in S is felt by some actual entity in D. A set T of actual entities is in the future of the duration D just in case each actual entity in T feels some actual entity in D (cf. Whitehead, Process 320). Consequently, part of a nexus can be in the past of a duration, and part of it can be in the future of that duration.

A nexal set N is temporally fragmented by a duration D when the following three conditions hold: (1) Some members of N are in the past of D; (2) some members of N are in the future of D; and (3) but no members of N are in D. Thus D is a temporal hiatus in the becoming of N (see Whitehead, Process 322). Since any two temporal fragments of a nexus can be separated by many durations, the temporal hiatus between two fragments of a nexus could be measured by the time spanned by intermediate durations. Thus a nexus is temporally fragmented when its nexal set is temporally fragmented by at least one duration.²⁴ And a nexus is temporally continuous when its nexal set is not temporally fragmented by any duration.

IX. The Phases of a Nexus

My view is that using the logic of relations to understand nexus is compatible with understanding them as processes. In support of this view, I shall use that logic to define the phases in the process of becoming of a nexus.

An actual entity comes into being through an internal process of concrescence. "It repeats in microcosm what the universe is in macrocosm" (Whitehead, Process 215). Thus the creative advance of the universe involves a succession of durations. Each duration consists of mutually contemporaneous actual entities. Analogously. a nexus comes into being through a succession of phases. Each phase consists of actual entities in that nexus which are mutually contemporaneous. Just as a duration is a cross-section of the universe, so a phase of a nexus is a cross-section of that nexus.

The definition of nexal phases is built upon the following idea: Nexus are intersected by durations, and each such intersection is a phase of a nexus. Each duration is a maximal set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities. And so each phase of a nexus is a maximal set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities in that nexus. Accordingly, the phases of a nexus are defined (roughly speaking) by restricting the above definition of durations to the actual entities in that nexus.

More exactly. the definition is this: Let N be a nexal set. A phase P in N is a subset of N that satisfies the following two conditions: The first condition is that (I) each actual entity in P is contemporaneous with even’ actual entity in P. The second condition makes P a maximal set of contemporaries in N; (2) Any actual entity in N that is not in P either feels or is felt by some actual entity in P. In other words, (2) any actual entity in N that is contemporaneous with every actual entity in P is itself in P. The phases of a nexus are the phases in its nexal set.

In light of this definition, let me suggest an answer to a question raised above:²⁵ What did Whitehead mean by "the contemporary nexus perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy"? (Process 126). This passage could he read as referring to a contemporary phase of a nexus -- i.e., the phase that is perceived in the mode of presentational immediacy. Let us call it the "presented phase." Perception in the mode of presentational immediacy objectifies the actual entities "within one particular duration": "the ‘presented duration"’ (Process 321). The presented phase is the intersection of the nexus with the presented duration.

X. The Ordering of Phases

The universe consists of actual entities interrelated by their feelings of one another. Hence, the universe is a nexus, and durations are its phases. We have seen how durations are ordered by the relation is later than. The intersections of durations with a nexus -- i e its phases -- are ordered analogously. In brief, the process of becoming of a nexus involves a strict partial ordering of phases.

The key point is this: The relation feels induces the following relation between the phases of a nexus: Let P and Q be phases in a nexal set N. Q is later than P when the following two conditions hold: (1) p and Q are not identical. (2) Each actual entity that is in Q but not in P feels an actual entity in P

Just as the relation is later than between durations is a strict partial order, so this relation between phases of a nexus is a strict partial order. This claim can be established by transitivity arguments similar to the ones above.

An actual entity has a first phase and a final phase of concrescence. Analogously. a nexus can have a starting phase or a terminal phase. B is a starting phase in a nexal set N when B is not later than any phase in N. And F is a terminal phase in a nexal set N when no phase in N is later than F. Just as there is not a unique present state of the universe, so a nexus might have more than one starting phase or more than one terminal phase (cf. Davey and Priestley 15). On the other hand, these definitions do not require a nexus to have either a starting phase or a terminal phase. The universe is a nexus, and there is controversy about whether it has starting phases or terminal phases.

XI. Examples

The causal past of an actual entity is a nexus, and so is its causal future. An actual entity’s causal past involves a nonserial succession of phases that (in a sense) converge on it, and its causal future involves a nonserial succession of phases that (in a sense) radiate from it.

When actual entity B feels actual entity A, there (usually) are actual entities "between" them, namely, those actual entities that the causal future of A has in common with the causal past of B. More exactly. the medium between A and B is the set that contains any actual entity that both feels A and is felt by B.²⁶ When the medium between two actual entities is (as it usually is) a nexal set, the succession of its phases (in a sense) radiate from the earlier actual entity to the later one.

There are nexus with phases that are ordered nonserially. but there also are nexus with phases that are ordered serially. Enduring objects (e.g., human minds) are societies of serially ordered actual entities (Whitehead, Process 34). The phases in the process of becoming of a serially ordered nexus are quite simple: each is a set containing a single actual entity. Obviously, those phases are serially ordered.

In contrast, physical objects (other than elementary particles) are societies of actual entities that are nonserially ordered. Such a physical object is intersected by a multitude of durations, and each such intersection is one of its phases. A maximal set of mutually contemporaneous actual entities In such a physical object is a phase of that physical object. The process of becoming of such a physical object involves a succession of phases of mutually contemporaneous actual entities. If simultaneity is not relative over sufficiently small distances, some such physical objects have phases that are ordered serially. But physical entities of sufficient extent (e.g., galaxies) have phases that are ordered nonserially.

Arguably, physics is committed to the real existence of entities other than particles -- e.g., fields and waves. Thus Whitehead suggested that there is an "electromagnetic society" (Process 98). And he remarked also that a "train of waves" is a society (36, 98). The actual entities in such a society have "physical purposes of the "second species": "It is due to this second species that vibration and rhythm have dominating importance in the physical world" (Process 277). In particular, an "enduring object" can involve "physical vibration" (Process 279). Let me augment his discussion of the metaphysics of waves as follows: In addition, there are nonserially ordered societies involving physical vibrations -- e.g., light waves emanating radially from the sun. Such a society has a defining characteristic that is inherited from phase (of mutually contemporaneous actual entities) to phase (of mutually contemporaneous actual entities). And these phases are ordered nonserially. The actual entities in each such phase have physical purposes of the second species. Hence the phases thus ordered exhibit vibration and rhythm.

The idea of "creative advance" includes the creative advance of nexus of actual entities, a creative advance that unfolds in phases.

Notes

1. To situate my project in a broader historical context, see McHenry. He interprets Whitehead’s metaphysics as including the fundamental thesis that "the universe evolves by an asymmetric process of causality in which former actualities [i.e., actual entities] are prehended by latter ones, but not vice versa (90). In this paper, my aim involves exploring how that thesis pertains collectively to nexus of actual entities.

2. For example, Kraus has a chapter on the theory of concrescence and a section on eternal objects. But, although her index has many entries for the term "nexus," there is no part of her book that focuses on the topic of nexus. Instead, the term "nexus" is briefly introduced in a discussion that focuses on the topic of actual entities (51). And, shortly later, there is a section devoted to the topic of societies. A theme of my paper is that, to understand the derivative notion of societies, we first need to understand the category of nexus.

3. In Whitehead’s Ontology, I interpreted his categories of existence in terms of the logic of relations. Since that book considered the category of nexus incidentally, the present paper also supplements it.

4. More fully, an event is "a nexus of actual occasions, inter-related in some determinate fashion in one extensive quantum" (Process73). My view is that the actual entities in a nexus need not be interrelated in one extensive quantum. Hence the concept of "nexus" is broader than this concept of "event." Some nexus are not events.

5. The logic of relations is integral to the project about the foundations of mathematics in Principia Mathematica. However, this paper is not a study in the development of Whitehead’s thought, and so I shall not speculate about the relationship between that work and Process and Reality.

6. One of Whitehead’s examples of such a nexus with two members is this: "D in its nexus with C" (Process 226).

7. Lawrence asserts that the term "nexus" refers to "a group of actual occasions" (81); does his term "group" mean "set" (or "class")? Similarly, Nobo calls a nexus "an interrelated group" of actual entities (2); later, he uses the term "set" (21).

8. Concerning the subject of relation instances, see Mertz.

9. It would seem that Kraus holds the realist thesis about nexus. In briefly introducing the term "nexus," she states that a nexus is "as real, individual, and particular as the actual entities comprising it" (51). And it would seem that Christian holds the thesis (233); see also his discussion of Whitehead’s two uses of the term "class" (260n).

10. See Whitehead’s Process and Reality 61-65, 117-26, 311-18.

11. I am indebted to Lewis Ford for some illuminating comments on an earlier draft of this paper. In light of his comments, I have added this section.

12. Actual entities and nexus are "concrete" (Whitehead, Process 18), whereas "universals" are "abstract" (Whitehead, Process 20). Accordingly, the thesis that a nexus can be formed thus through the mediation of an abstract entity is termed "abstractivism."

13. In commenting on an earlier draft of my paper, Ford proposed that the category of nexus can be understood solely in terms of something like this thesis. His interpretation of that category involves his analysis of the compositional history of Process and Reality (and Science and the Modern World). My view is that, whatever its compositional layers, Process and Reality contains a coherent system of metaphysics, one that is summarized effectively in its second chapter ("The Categoreal Scheme"). Accordingly, I have focused on a key category, the fourteenth category of explanation.

14. In Whitehead’s eighth categoreal obligation, there are the words "anticipatory feeling" (Process 27). But how can there be a prehension of an actual entity that has not yet come into being? However this problematic question is answered, there cannot be a simple physical feeling of a future actual entity. Simple physical feelings are only of the settled past.

15. Davey and Priestley abbreviate the term "partial order" as "order," and thus they use the term "strict order" instead of "strict partial order" (2, 21). For the sake of emphasis, I retain the word "partial."

16. Utilizing the mathematical concept of "antichain" (Davies and Priestley 3), let us say that any set of actual entities that satisfies this first condition is an antichain. Hence a duration is an antichain of actual entities that satisfies the second condition.

17. In his Principles of Natural Knowledge, Whitehead defines "durations" in terms of percipient events: a duration relative to a percipient event is "that complete whole of nature simultaneous with the percipient event" (68). Hence what that work calls a "duration" is termed in Process and Reality a "presented duration" (321). The point is that, in contrast to Principles, the definition of durations in Process and Reality does not presuppose a conception of "perception." Instead, it presupposes the conception of "(simple physical) feeling." Note that it is of far greater generality than the definition in Principles When a presented duration corresponds to a strain-locus, it is (so to speak) flat (Process 322-23). Other durations can have many undulations in snaking across the universe -- as long as no undulation is so bent as to allow one actual entity to feel another.

18. His most definitive discussion of durations is in Part IV, presumably to show how the theory of time in Process and Reality is related to the theory in Principles. What this placement obscures is that there is a temporal ordering of durations simply in terms of feels.

19. Chiaraviglio construes nexus as sets of actual entities (88). His definition of nexus is as follows (88): The relation prehends is transitive and irreflexive. A set S of actual entities is a nexus when it satisfies at least one of these conditions: (1) For any two actual entities x and v in 5, there is a third actual entity that prehends x and prehends y. (2) For any two actual entities x and y in S. there is a third actual entity that is prehended by x and that is prehended by v. According to his definition, what I call "the A-B nexus" is not a nexus. Also, what I call "the B-A-C-B nexus" is not a nexus. Because his definition requires the mediation of just one actual entity (no more and no less), it is not sufficiently general.

20. This claim does not follow from the definition of "duration." However, it is reasonable to think that the claim holds of pairs of durations in our "cosmic epoch" (Whitehead, Process 91).

21 There are two kinds of ancestral (Carnap, Symbolic 147). For simplicity, I use the second kind of ancestral. If the first kind were used instead, the next sentence in the main text should be enlarged as follows: Either x is identical to y, or (I) xRy or (etc.).

22. Let me be more explicit about the role of the concept of ancestral in this definition. Let S be a set of actual entities. We define the relation F as follows: xF₅y if and only if (1) x feels or is felt by y and (2) x and y are in S. If each actual entity in S is related by the ancestral of F₅ to every actual entity in S,S is a nexal set.

23. Let me comment on my earlier and quite different definition of nexus in Whitehead’s Ontology 94. There the goal was to distinguish the category of nexus from the other categories of existence (Ontology 14-15). In the present paper, the goal is to have a definition that reflects the internal structure of nexus.

24. Human history is rich with putative examples: Political entities could be temporally fragmented (e.g., the Persian Empire). The society consisting in the users of a language (e.g., Hebrew) could be temporally fragmented (cf. Whitehead, Process 90). Also, could an "entirely living nexus" (Whitehead, Process 103-17) be temporally fragmented?

25. See the section above on inclusivism.

26. Whitehead’s definition of the "medium" between two actual entities is problematic: Suppose that actual entity A feels actual entity D. "The medium between D and A consists in all those actual entities which lie in the actual world of A and not in the actual world of D" (Process 226). The problem is that an actual entity Z may be both in the actual world of A and contemporaneous with D. But then Z does not feel D, and so A cannot feel D through the medium of Z.

Works Cited

Carnap, Rudolf. Introduction to Symbolic Logic and Its Applications. New York: Dover, 1958.

The Logical Structure of the World. Berkeley: U of California P, 1967.

Chiaraviglio, Lucio. "Whitehead’s Theory of Prehensions." Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy. Ed. George L. Kline. Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963. 81-92.

Christian, William A. An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. New Haven: Yale UP, 1959.

Davey, B. A., and H. A. Priestley, Introduction to Lattices and Order. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1990.

Emmet, Dorothy. Whitehead’s Philosophy of Organism. 2nd ed. New York: St. Martin’s, 1966.

Ford, Lewis S. The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. Albany: State U of New York P, 1984.

Hartshorne, Charles. Whitehead’s Philosophy. Selected Essays, 1935-1970.

Kraus, Elizabeth M. A Companion to Whitehead’s Process and Reality. New York: Fordham UP, 1979.

Lango, John. Whitehead’s Ontology. Albany: State U of New York, 1972.

Lawrence, Nathaniel. Alfred North Whitehead. A Primer of his Philosophy. New York: Twayne, 1974.

McHenry, Leemon B. Whitehead and Bradley: A Comparative Analysis. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.

Mertz, D. W. Moderate Realism and Its Logic. New Haven: Yale UP, 1996.

Nobo, Jorge Luis. Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity. Albany: State U of New York P, 1986.

Russell, Bertrand. The Principles of Mathematics. 2nd ed. London: George Allen, 1937.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Adventures of Ideas. New York: Free Press, 1967.

-- An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Natural Knowledge. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1955.

-- Modes of Thought. New York: Free Press, 1968.

-- Process and Reality. 1929. Corrected Edition. Bd. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: Free Press, 1978.

I. Preliminary Consideration

I would like to make a couple of points concerning two popular misunderstandings of Bergson. The first is the impression that this philosophy is "irrationalist. The second, often incongruously con₁oined with the first, is the suggestion that his philosophy is -- for lack of a better word – "literary." Though this essay is primarily an effort to situate and explain Bergson’s use of fundamental concepts of the calculus, one of its goals will be, in the process, to correct these two errors.

That Bergson is an "irrationalist" is often claimed: explicitly by Benedetto Croce, Leonard M. Marsak, WalterJ. Slatoff, Gerhardt Lehmann, Egon Friedall, Raymond Bayer, Walter Bruning, implicitly by Bertrand Russell and George Santayana.¹ I will spare the reader further citations; they are easy to find in the literature. This term, as I hope to show, is radically imprecise (slipshod in fact) as applied to Bergson, whose duration has "form," whose intuition is "reflection:" whose goal is renewed conceptual creativity. My basic objection to it, however, is not so much its inaccuracy as its noetic destructiveness. One can hardly comprehend a philosophy if one begins with the assumption that it is intrinsically incomprehensible. The ascription of the term "irrationalist" prevents both oneself and others from gaining understanding, where understanding is to be had.

As for Bergson’s "literary" aura, one seeks in vain for adequate synonyms to explicate it. "Superficial," "facile," "trendy" "poetic" help but do not go far enough. Will Durant states that Bergson’s lecture rooms became the salon of splendid ladies "happy to have their hearts’ desire upheld."² Biologist Jacques Monod dismisses his philosophy as ". . . a metaphysical dialectic bare of knowledge but not of poetry."³ Monod not only condemns Bergson to the hinterland of the poetic, he also, like Russell and Bochenski, types Bergson as irrational (or anti-intellectual, a kindred classification) for his "rebellion against the rational"(27). André Gide complains: "What I dislike in Bergson’s doctrine is all I ever thought without his saying it, and everything that is flattering, even caressing to the mind . . . he himself belongs to the epoch and constantly yields to the trend."⁴ Bergson, we recall, won the Nobel Prize for literature. In some quarters this is tacitly assumed as evidence that he could not think straight. I hope to show that he could.

Since he is not widely read in English-speaking philosophical circles, it should prove helpful, in sections two and three, to outline some fundamental features of Bergson’s philosophy. This will help us to understand some of the basic problems to be examined below. Since most of these problems involve his philosophy of mathematics, and since the mathematics with ‘which he is concerned is primarily the calculus, it will help also, in section four, to sketch, briefly, a number of its fundamental features. This will make it possible, in section five, to analyze the centrality of the calculus to Bergson’s philosophical method (hence to both his epistemology and his metaphysics).

II. Bergson A Refresher Course

Bergson’s philosophy sprang, he tells us, from an analysis of Herbert Spencer’s First Principles, undertaken to update and clarify Spencer’s physics -- particularly his concepts of space and time.⁵ The young philosopher was astonished to discover, through this analysis, that there is a yawning chasm between the time physicists use and the time human beings (including physicists) experience.

On one side, there is mathematical ("clock") time, composed of instants. each of which is entirely distinct from all others, none of which, clearly conceived, can move, transform, or change itself. Or, we have units (minutes, hours, etc.) each of which is entirely homogeneous within its boundaries and identical with all units of equal length. This is a strange sort of time indeed, made up of static parts, all the same, each entirely distinct from the others. Rather than call this real time, Bergson concluded, it would be more accurate to term it a "fourth dimension of space" (TFW 109).

Meanwhile there is actually experienced time which, Bergson found, looks less like mathematical time the more one explores it. "Lived time," far from being made up of instants, is dynamic throughout. No two "segments" of it -- if there are segments -- are identical; all differ qualitatively. And, far from being separate, successive states of consciousness merge into each other without sharp boundaries. Bergson calls this inner time "duration" to distinguish it from mathematical time and to stress the fundamental endurance of each of its moments into the next.

To treat duration and its continuity as a kind of calibrated spatial co6rdinate -- to spatialize and spatially segment it -- is, Bergson agrees, extremely useful. Without spatialization we would not only not have modem physics: we would not have clocks, calendars, and the kinds of organized societies they make possible. But it is a mistake to raise distinctions made for pragmatic purposes to the level of fundamental theoretical postulates without first submitting them to a critique. In this case a critique demonstrates the real time -- real duration -- is neither static nor homogeneous nor internally discrete. Real duration is dynamic, heterogeneous, and (qualitatively) continuous.

This fundamental distinction, between lived time and dock time, and the insight into the character of experienced time on which it depends, mark the starting-point of Bergson’s philosophy From this base, his thought is continually broadened to include embodied human consciousness (Matter and Memory, 1896), biological evolution and physical cosmology (Creative Evolution 1907), and human history and prehistory (The Two Sources of Morality, and Religion, 1932).

In each of these works one finds a tension, and a resulting conflict between two contrary tendencies: one creative, expansive, dynamic, the other conservative, repetitive, static. In Time and Free Will this conflict juxtaposes an "inner self" capable of singular free, spontaneous acts with an outer self which is both habitual and superficial. In Matter and Memory, mind (conceived primarily as memory) is contrasted with body (brain, nervous system, motor and perceptual organs). The body, Bergson concludes, acts in two respects as a kind of "choke filter." The brain functions to exclude the bulk of our accumulated memories, allowing the emergence of only those which help us to recognize and cope with present situations.

Analogously, sense organs filter out of the welter of our environment all those influences that would keep us from responding effectively to our surroundings. The result is a stable, pictorial world. These joint constraints, however, make possible our focused consciousness. They allow us to deal with our ordinary affairs in ordinary ways. They also make possible those exceptional acts which, Bergson states -- echoing the fundamental conclusion of Time and Free Will -- express our freedom.⁷

Creative Evolution is an extrapolation of the mind-matter duality of Matter and Memory. It opposes not individual mind, but "life," to the downward drift of a partly-reconceived matter. Life, Bergson argues, is a tendency towards increasing flexibility, organization, consciousness. Matter, inversely, is a drift towards dispersion, loss of form, degradation of potential energy. The tension between matter and life results in the endlessly renewed creativity of life, vectored not towards a single preestablished goal but towards a multiple branching of diverse forms.⁸

In The Two Sources of Morality and Religion a similar tension (‘with its potential for conflict) is explored in terms of human anthropology, sociology, and history.’ Here Bergson contrasts two root impulses in human nature: one creative, outgoing, free; the other conservative, constraining, quasi mechanical. The first leads to the open society -- or to the continual opening-out of societies; the second leads to the closed society -- or to societies primarily closed and (therefore) arrayed against each other, The first would lead to the brotherhood (and sisterhood) of humankind; the second is forever vectored towards war, and defense, and conquest.

This sketch of the development of Bergson’s philosophy conveys neither the depth and suggestiveness of this thought nor the seriousness of the conceptual problems to which it leads. Though an extensive analysis of this sketch cannot be attempted here, some amplification of it is needed. And since the present essay concerns Bergson’s philosophy of mathematics, what follows will emphasize his concept of matter: its status, and its aptness for mathematical prediction and description.

III Structures of Duration

1. Matter and Mind

In Time and Free Will, duration possesses only continuity a "fluid" character (TFW 135), with "interpenetrating" contents (TFW 104, 162), whose moments "melt" (TFW 100, 127, 128. 138, 163) into their successors. Such a continuity, though qualitatively heterogeneous, lacks structure. It appears amorphous. Any "cut" in its perpetual flow would appear to be arbitrary. This in itself is a problem. But is a problem that creates further problems. For example, Bergson describes his exceptional free act as gradually elaborating itself and then suddenly emerging into behavior (TFW 169-170, 176). But how, on the terms available in Time and Free Will could one meaningfully distinguish the length or slowness of this elaboration from the brevity of its expression? On Bergson’s terms, in this work there is only amorphous becoming, having nothing in common with tempos or proportions . . . or, of course, numbers of any kind.

This problem is rendered especially acute in Time and Free Will through a radical bifurcation of self and world. Within us, Bergson states, ". . . there is succession without mutual externality; outside the ego, in space, mutual externality without succession," (TFW 108, italics mine; cf. also TFW 116, 227), If Descartes’ dualism is famous for the problems to which it leads, how many more will result from Bergson’s joint assumption of an unextended durational mind and a geometrical and static world?

Matter and Memory is an effort to outflank both the famous Cartesian dualism and Bergson’s own, even more stringent, bifurcation. This is done in three ways: First, by describing matter, like mind, as a kind of duration. Second, by conceiving both sorts of durations as quasi-epochal (i.e., consisting of "rhythms"). Third, by rejecting two insidious dogmas of Cartesianism: that the mind is entirely unextended and, inversely, that matter is pure (geometrical) extension. These three moves jointly establish a conceptual context in which interrelations between mind and matter become intelligible, and in which also there is an ample realistic basis for the mathematization of the real.

The fundamental problem, Bergson argues, is our spatial notion of the relations between mind and world: "Questions relating to subject and object, to their distinction and their union, should be put in terms of time, rather than of space" (MM 77). Throughout the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries matter had been conceived as comprised of passive, simply-located particles whose most fundamental character is their imperviousness to change. Bergson takes a contrasting view, conceiving matter as: ". . modifications, perturbations, changes of tension or of energy and nothing else" (MM 266). That is: matter is a kind of duration, a succession of "rhythms," a present which is "always beginning again." Relative to human duration ‘with its directed spontaneity, matter is inert. In itself it "lives and vibrates" (MM 270).

The rhythms of human consciousness are given an elaborate analysis in Matter and Memory. The highest psychological rhythms (a term treated as synonymous with "tensions") here have the greatest breadth, the lowest the greatest brevity (MM 279). Even the briefest rhythms of consciousness, however, are far broader than, and extend over, those of matter. Bergson notes that in one second red light goes through 400 billion vibrations: "Now the smallest interval of empty time which we can detect equals, according to Exner 1/500 of a second; and it is even doubtful whether we can perceive in successions several intervals as short as this. Let us admit, however, that we can go on doing so indefinitely" (MM 272). If this were possible, then to watch each of 400 billion vibrations separated by 1/500 of a second from the next would require the passage of 25,000 years.

There is a certain artifice involved in setting up this simple calculation, Bergson admits. It is necessary to "separate the vibrations" sufficiently to allow us to count them (which suggests as will be shown below, in section 51, that some distancing between them is already present). The result is unmistakable, however; the arithmetic relationship at with Bergson arrives here is presented by him not as illusory but as having an objective basis. Between the rhythms of consciousness and those of matter there is an element of quantitative commensurability. Indeed, there is the unmistakable suggestion that it is the indivisibility of the rhythms, of both sorts, which grounds the possibility of quantitative relations.

The theory of differing breadths of duration, capable of extending over each other, and the notion of matter ‘which results from it, are further developed in Creative Evolution through reflections on thermodynamics. The constant production of entropy and the increasing unavailability of energy to perform work which thermodynamics depicts suggest, Bergson speculates, that the physical world may have possessed characteristics in the past that it does not now have, and that characteristics it now has may be lost in the future. The direction of all these changes, however, is constant Matter possesses a kind of history But it is the history of an unbecoming ". . . . changes that are visible and heterogeneous will be more and more diluted into changes that are invisible and homogeneous, and . . . the instability to which we owe the richness and variety of the changes taking place in our solar system will gradually give way to the relative stability of vibrations continually and perpetually repeated" (CE 243). This process results in a continual extension of matter into space (CE 203), a process never completed. There are, therefore, "degrees of spatiality" (CE 205) in nature. As matter descends towards space, it becomes more homogeneous, its successive moments become less mutually continuous, its stability increases. But if matter "stretches itself out in the direction of space" (CE 207), it never reaches this limit.

Thus, in Creative Edition Bergson develops a theory already proposed in MM: namely, that matter is (a term proposed by William James) "extensive." It does not have pure spatial extension: it is neither as extended as geometrical space nor, simply, extra-spatial. "Extensity" is used to described not only matter, but mind. Bergson denies that mind is entirely unextended: thus denying a Cartesian dogma which has dominated modern philosophy. Rather, Bergson argues, mind is dipolar. Pure memory the "mental" pole, approximates Cartesian nonextension. Pure perception, the "physical" side, approximates the extensity of matter (MM 74). Hence our perception is capable of participating in matter, and it becomes comprehensible (at least it ceases to be incomprehensible) that mind could act on matter (and vice versa).

This universal "movement" of matter not only involves an expansion of the physical universe. It also helps to explain why there is an "approximately mathematical" order in nature which science "approaches in proportion to its progress" (CE 218). When a physicist validly marks an event as starting at time t there is a real almost instantaneous event: a rhythm, to which this variable refers. When a physicist describes a motion from a to b there is, first of all, real motion, and second, an approximately -- geometrical a location and b location.

2. Life and Matter

The theory of matter developed in Creative Evolution is an exact inverse of the theory of life developed there. But where Bergson’s theory of matter is close in many respects to contemporary cosmology and physics, his biological theory appears not only far removed from present biochemistry, taxonomy and paleontology, but devoid of content. What is élan vital except a myth? Bergson does provide conceptual content with which his biology can be understood, however. It is found in his notion of the durations (the rhythms) of life and of matter, and their interrelations.

That these concepts are present in Creative Evolution is a fact easily overlooked. In fact, they are omnipresent. The universe, Bergson states, consists of two movements, of ascent and descent The ascending movement: ". . . which corresponds to an inner ripening or creating: endures essentially and imposes its rhythm on the first, which is inseparable from it" (CE 11).

The resulting "progress," with is multiple branching, is continuous from beings that vibrate almost in unison with the oscillations of the ether, up to those that embrace trillions of these in their shortest perceptions" (CE 201). The "proportionality" between consciousness and the durations of matter outlined in Matter and Memory is thus retained in Creative Evolution. Here the proportionality becomes part of a non-reductionist biology sustaining the thesis that life proceeds by creating organisms whose temporalities increasingly broadened over those of matter -- whose fundamental rhythms are both greater in breadth than those of matter, and richer in content. Evolution, a temporal process, endeavors to create broader temporalities.

The theories of Creative Evolution thus become more comprehensible if viewed through the lenses of chronobiology. Each species, on Bergson’s terms, has a unique rhythm, a distinctive temporality. This rhythm is correlated with the briefer rhythms which constitute its materiality. Interestingly -- and, I think, unexpectedly -- it will be Bergson’s understanding of the role that the calculus plays in effecting these correlations that will help explain them.

3. Notes on the Calculus

The "infinitesimal calculus" was developed by Isaac Newton and Gottfried Leibniz, independently, in the late seventeenth century. Their achievement scarcely took place in a noetic vacuum. Newton was right to protest that if he saw so far it was because he stood on the shoulders of giants. Both he and Leibniz were deeply indebted to a large set of mathematicians: Archimedes, Cavalieri, Wallis, Descartes, Barrow, and Fermat among them. Nor were Newton’s and Leibniz’ achievements complete as they stood. Extensions, corrections, reorganizations of the calculus continued long after their work, leading after more than two centuries to its present, presumably rigorous, foundations.

From its beginnings the calculus has consisted of two contrasting parts, each designed to solve different sorts of problems. The differential calculus was developed to deal with motion -- velocity at a point and acceleration being fundamental concepts. Quantities representing velocity are termed first derivatives, those dealing with acceleration, second derivatives. The integral calculus, by contrast, was developed to deal with areas ("areas under curves") and, by extension, volumes.

Both parts of the calculus have been extended beyond their original scope. The differential calculus, though designed to deal with states of motion, can be used in fields far removed from planetary orbits or falling bodies. In the words of Edward Kasner and James Newman: "Structural engineers, concerned with the elasticity of beams, the strength columns, and any phase of construction where there is shear and stress, find first, second, third, and fourth derivatives indispensable . . ."¹⁰ As will be noted shortly there is no limit to the number of a derivative.

The integral calculus, similarly, is more complex than it at first appears. This complexity is summed up in the elegant Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, which establishes both that there are two sorts of integrals with precise equivalences and -- a quite different idea -- that there is an inverse relation between the integral calculus and the differential calculus.

The two fundamental integrals are the definite and the indefinite integral. The indefinite integral is a number, while the indefinite integral is a function. In the words of David Berlinski:

Integration, from the vantage point of the indefinite integral, involves following the generation of a curve up to a point, thus finding a "changing quantity" from its rate of change.

The Fundamental Theorem also demonstrates that it is possible to generate a definite integral (a number) from any indefinite integral (a function). The simplicity of this computation turns out to be a boon to mathematicians, who otherwise, to get their definite integrals, would have to go through laborious computations based on Riemannian sums.

It is both interesting and important to note that in the calculus one can pass from functions to numbers, and simply. It is equally important to see that one can also pass from integrals to derivatives (from the integral calculus to the differential calculus) and then back again. The creators of the calculus knew this, That is, they understood that integration and differentiation are the "inverse" of each other, in the way that addition and subtraction stand in inverse relations.

What is meant by such inverse relations can be conveyed by very elementary symbolism. By differentiating y=f(x) we get dy/dx (a derivative); by integrating dy/dx we get y=f(x) again (the original integral). The relationships entailed by the Fundamental Theorem stretch well beyond this simple one-step-forward, one-step-back progression, however. Chains of differentiations and integrations are also possible, reaching from the most local of derivatives, by single steps, though the most global of integrals; and from the most global of integrals it is possible, inversely, by single steps to find to the most local of derivatives.

This chaining relationship can be outlined using the language of first, second, third, and, in general, n^th derivatives. From a third derivative we can move, by integration, to a second derivative, which will be its (the third derivative’s) integral. From a second derivative we can generate a first derivative; which will be the second derivative’s integral. From the first derivative, we can by the same calculation, arrive at the "zero-eth" derivative. The inverse procedure allows us, given any integral, to generate its derivative, and so on, ad indefinitum. Integration and differentiation thus form chains with some resemblance to hierarchies. If these "chaining" relationships are stressed here, it is not only because of their intrinsic interest I will argue later that they are treated by Bergson as parallel with his concept of hierarchies of duration.

Originally the calculus was established by using, not the concept of a function but that of a limit, and of the notion of "convergence" to a limit. To the beginner the notion of convergence to a limit, with its sense of endless approximation, may appear clumsy or counterintuitive, as if one were being required to "corner" velocity or acceleration or area by endlessly patching together ever smaller (or, in the case of the integral, larger) bits of time or space. In fact, if the "bits" are understood not as ad hoc increments but as parts of a series, and if the series are allowed to converge, the sought-for quantities suddenly appear as if by magic. In the calculus the student discovers a new way of thinking, one which is both dynamic and supple.

It is interesting, and a bit puzzling, that this new way of thinking did not emerge until the seventeenth century. Greek mathematicians had worked out many of the concepts necessary to it. Yet they seem to have halted at the entrance. One major problem lay in their unwillingness to accept change on its own terms. According to Morris Kline, the problem was both mathematical and cultural:

In the terms of another historian of mathematics, Salomon Bochner, there is simply an immense gap between modern "analytical variability" and "Greek stationarity." Bergson could have added a second "static" limitation of Aristotle’s thought in this regard: his refusal to countenance kineseos kinesis (motion of motion)." Motion of motion, is of course, the definition of acceleration. Bochner asserts "Aristotle’s statement . . . ‘There cannot be motion of motion or becoming of becoming or in general change of change’ is a devastating self-indictment of Greek rational thinking at its root" (Bochner 168). The reference here is to Chapter 2, Book V of Aristotle’s Physics. Cf. J. P Anton, Aristotle’s Theory of Contrariety [New York: Humanities Press, 1957], 219-221).

This was not the only difficulty. The very logical rigor which made Greek mathematics exemplary also stood in the way of introducing any idea which could not be rigorously defined. Carl B. Boyer explains:

It is arguable that breakthroughs in the sciences require, first of all, imagination and audacity Later it will be possible to formulate the original intuition with sharp precision.

This sketch of some basic concepts of the calculus and of factors involved in its creation is intended neither a complete outline nor as a technical account It is intended, rather, to set the stage for Bergson’s appropriation of the calculus as fundamental to his metaphysics and epistemology; Bergson believed that the calculus represented (and furthered) a profound shift in understanding, one which made modern science possible. This shift involved both increased linguistic precision (mathematical precision) and a deepening sense of change -- of mobility of all kinds. A renewed scientific and philosophical effort is necessary, he believed, to take account of it.

4. An Introduction to Intuition

1903 saw the publication of An Introduction to Metaphysics, in which the term "intuition" is introduced for the first time and contrasted with its contrary "analysis." Many approaches might fruitfully be taken to this brief essay. It could, for example, be usefully interpreted in terms of musical form. But interestingly, in its culminating sections it is the calculus which is singled out not only as decisive for the natural sciences but as a key to the understanding of intuition and to the development of metaphysics. The reader of this article will probably not, by now, be surprised at this. But in the massive Bergson literature very little has been written about it.¹⁵

A thorough analysis of An Introduction to Metaphysics cannot be attempted here. What follows is an exposition and interpretation of some of its key passages. I hope this approach will dispel some of the confusions surrounding Bergson’s position in this work. I hope also, it will, by shedding further light on the place of mathematics in Bergson’s universe, allow us to make sense of the otherwise murky "vitalism" of Creative Evolution, and of the possible heuristic value of Bergson’s approach to biology.

Our usual way of thinking, Bergson observes, starts from static concepts (points, instants, lines, etc.) "in order to grasp by their means the flowing reality" (CM 224). But, he insists, we are capable of the reverse procedure, of working away from our usual concepts and assumptions towards the "flowing reality" This will upset our categories. But it may help us to arrive at fluid concepts "capable of following reality in all its windings" (CM 224). The procedure does not end here, however. From intuition, with its fluid concepts, it is possible on Bergson’s terms to return again to analysis. But this return may involve new conceptual systems and new symbols: new modes of analysis. An intuition is, thus, a "generative concept" (CM 225); transcending analysis through an inversion of our usual modes of thought, it nonetheless can enrich analysis and transform it.

Bergson proposes, therefore, that metaphysics adopt the "generative idea" behind the calculus and extend this to reality in general. Hence he concludes that one of the aims of metaphysics is to "operate qualitative differentiations and integrations" (CM 226).

The notion of qualitative differentiations and integrations, nonetheless, will seem strange to many thinkers. Possibly it will become clearer and less arcane if Bergson’s uses of it are explored. What follows will be an examination of three of these uses: (i)differentiation and the limit concept, as applied to matter (ii) integration and the relation of wholes to parts; (iii) temporal hierarchy and the interrelations of differentiation and integration.

i. Limit Concepts and Qualitative Rhythms

A rigorous limit concept was not introduced into calculus until the work of Augustin-Louis Cauchy in the early nineteenth century. Until then mathematics worked -- often uneasily -- with concepts like "infinitesimal" and "motion at a point." Bergson’s qualitative calculus is not intended to replace rigorous quantitative thinking. Rather, it is intended to provide, among other things, a realistic basis not only for more mundane practical activities but also for the natural sciences, particularly astronomy and physics. His qualitative "differentiation" of matter terminates, at the limit, in rhythms which, however brief; are still rhythms, and dynamic.

The extent to which physical reality can retain its durational, modal character for Bergson and yet present characteristics which justify mathematical representations can be seen by examining a passage from Duration and Simultaneity. Suppose, he states, we try to imagine adding one instant to another to produce real process. In doing so we try to:

There is thus, in material reality a minimal but real connection between successive events and a "forgetting" by them of their predecessors. (DS 48) One thus has a quasi-epochal theory of material duration.¹⁷ Prom the viewpoint of applied mathematics this theory has obvious advantages. As noted above, it gives an objective basis to counting (since there is a real aspect of discreteness to the epochs or rhythms). It also provides such a basis for measuring temporal breadths (e.g., frequencies), so long as these are taken not as absolutes but as quasi-discrete. Temporal boundaries would have also been taken as approximative, that is, as limits. The same would hold for spatial location and extent, and for motion. But for Bergson, these limits are strictly ideal. Taken in themselves (as mathematical points and instants) they do not exist

This account of systematically approximative character of mathematical descriptions will doubtless appear familiar to readers of Whitehead. Both Bergson and the early Whitehead conclude that, to quote Whitehead, ". . . an abstractive set as we pass along it converges to the ideal of all nature with no temporal extension, namely, to the ideal of all nature at an instant. But this ideal is in fact the ideal of a nonentity."¹⁸

Though Bergson did not develop an elaborate theory of extensive abstraction, it is not surprising that he should have viewed Whitehead’s The Concept of Nature, in which this theory is given its classic formulation, as "one of the most profound (works) ever "written on the philosophy of nature" (DS 62n).

ii. Integration: Real Parts in Real (Dynamic) Wholes

Philosophy bristles with theories of "wholes" and "parts," theories which reach from extreme atomisms (in which there are only parts, and wholes are at best mere aggregates) to extreme monisms (in which putative parts lose their identities to the whole). Bergson’s language, which stresses the wholeness of duration against the static fragmentariness of space, leads to the suspicion that his philosophy (as is argued in a recent essay in Process Studies") falls into the latter camp, dissolving parts back into the whole, (and us, apparently with them).

Here, as is true more than once in this study, it is not possible to deal with an important question in depth. What can be done here is to point out the language which Bergson uses to talk about one self: that is, about parts (as opposed to mere "elements") and about "integral experience." The one-many view ‘which Bergson takes of the self will be applied by him both to biological evolution and to social organization.

The self Bergson states, is mathematically neither one nor many. Seen in itself; it is both (CM 198-199, 206-207, 218-219). In it "real parts" must be distinguished from partial expressions and partial notions (CM 202); lust as they must be distinguished from "elements," which are abstractions (CM 199, 201, 206); just as actual parts must be distinguished from "fragmented parts" (CM 198) or from parts that are merely "juxtaposed" (CM 196). Equally, parts of movement must be distinguished from points of space. (CM 213, 215). It goes without saying that this is not the language of extreme monism. Nor is it the language of atomism. Speaking of states of the self; Bergson insists:

The Bergsonian self resists fragmentation into distinct, juxtaposed parts (as is attempted in, for example, associationist psychology). Yet even though the self must be conceived as a whole, it contains (consists of real parts which "encroach upon one another" (CM 198), which "dovetail." This is not a unity which ablates its parts, it is a unity of parts. The parts, constituted by their mutual relations, constitute a whole which, in turn, influences its parts.

This is extremely important in understanding Bergson’s position, because the knowledge of the self by the self, is, he insists, the "privileged case" (CM 236) of his philosophy. It provides a model in terms of which other levels of reality are to be understood. Interestingly, he characterizes this kind of knowledge as "integral experience" (CM 237). Nothing could appear more qualitative than the Bergsonian self; nothing could seem more out of place with regard to it than metaphors taken from the calculus. Yet his language is clear. Intuition -- even in the case of the self -- is for him a qualitative Integration. A timeworn textbook example may be helpful here. If we are to find the area of a circle, we can circumscribe it with regular polygons with indefinitely increasing numbers of sides. By increasing the number of sides we never reach the exact area. But if integration is introduced, there is an almost-magical effect The limit of the series appears, the area is attained. So with the knowledge of the self by the self. As the patchwork of partially misleading "views" of analyses which misrepresent (yet circumscribe) it disappear, the fundamental insight is given. Without comparing many psychological analyses, Bergson insists, we cannot achieve such as insight (CM 236). But this insight, and the higher degree of temporality it achieves, follows from the integration of the parts, not from their obliteration (CE 152).

This sketch is of interest as it stands. It is of equally great interest in terms of its applications (which Bergson intends to carry out) to the rest of his philosophy. A biological organism is a whole for Bergson; yet he points out that each cell is itself an organism (CE 41-42, 162) hence an organism is a whole comprised of real parts. A society, he points out in The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, is a whole, and can be compared to an organism. Yet he is extremely careful to point out that it is a whole comprised of individuals, each of which has free will. (TSMR 3,73,107, 109) Evidently -- certainly, with regard to these two cases -- integral experience dissolves neither the knower nor the known.

iii. Temporal Hierarchy and the "Fundamental Theorem"

We have noted, in Matter and Memory, the importance of Bergson’s idea that longer durations (of human awareness) can extend over far briefer physical durations. It is interesting that this notion is extended in the same work to include a hypothetical ordering of living organisms in terms of a hierarchy of durations: "In reality there is no rhythm of duration; it is possible to imagine many different rhythms which, slower or faster, measure the degree of tension or relaxation of different kinds of consciousness, and thereby fix their respective places on the scale of being" (MM 275). This speculation occurs in the context of a discussion of Bergson’s theory of psychological duration. In subsequent passage, however, he adds that it is possible to conceive "an infinite number of degrees" between matter and fully developed spirit: "Each of these successive degrees, which measures a growing intensity of life, corresponds to a higher tension of duration and is made manifest externally by a greater development of the sensory-motor system" (MM 296, Cf. also MM 332). Thus a full-blown temporal hierarchy is postulated, from the rhythms of human consciousness, through those of countless species of living organisms, to those of matter -- longer durations extending over briefer durations, these extending over briefer durations still.

The concept of temporal hierarchy first stated in Matter and Memory is introduced again in An Introduction to Metaphysics,, this time in extremely general terms:

This passage is two-sided. It is epistemological, describing different sorts of intuition, each correlative to the level of understanding on which it operates: "an indefinite series of acts, all doubtless of the same genus but each one of a very particular species" (CM 217). There is thus no one intuition, to which this term refers. There are many sorts of intuition, each appropriate to the rhythms and the qualities of its particular object It is metaphysical, since the different sorts of intuition are said to correspond to the different "degrees of being" (CM 217; cf. also CM 218).

So far this study has isolated two factors which are fundamental to Bergson’s thought: temporal hierarchy and the calculus. It is very likely that these two factors will be interrelated in some manner. But how? The reader will recall the brief but terminologically dense sketch, above, of the Fundamental Theorem of the Calculus, with its chaining of inverse relationships between differentiation and integration. It is a central thesis of this paper that the hierarchy involved in this chaining is understood by Bergson as congruent with the hierarchy which he describes as comprised of broader and briefer rhythms of duration.

That there should be a precise parallel between Bergson’s hierarchy of durations and the indefinite chaining of derivatives and integrals may seem unlikely. But closer inspection will render it plausible. From the vantage-point of his metaphysics, the goals will be, as noted above, to operative qualitative differentiations and integrations. But on these same terms, what else can there be to integrate/ differentiate in his universe except different "levels" of duration, broader or briefer. In the last analysis, for Bergson such durations are all that exist. To integrate will be to move towards broader, more inclusive durations: that is, towards durations which include the briefer durations as real parts.

iv. Èlan Vital as Mathematics

To explore these conclusions it will be necessary to take a second look at Creative Evolution. Not only will this best known of Bergson’s works turn out to be a compendium of mathematical metaphors, but its central actor, the vital impetus (élan vital), will appear to have something intelligible to do: to create increasingly broad rhythms of duration. The evolution of life will be understood as the integration of lesser into higher temporalities, with an accompanying rise in the behavioral independence of the living organism relative to its environment. This will be the central meaning of Bergson’s "vitalistic" biology.

Life, Bergson proclaims, is not reducible to physico-chemistry But if he rejects mechanistic explanations of life, he also denies another kind of reductionism, which equates life with the simple step-by-step filling in of a plan. Both mechanism and finalism presuppose that "All is given," the first through efficient causes, the second through a kind of cosmic blueprint present at the beginning (CE 39- 41,45,46) In rejecting both, Bergson insists that evolution operates within inherent limitations. Matter, with its entropic drift towards increasing disorder (CE 245-246) constitutes an obstacle. The ‘vital impetus, in turn, is not omnipotent. (CE 125, 141-142, 149) It is thus not surprising that the course of biological evolution, in its innumerable branchings, should exhibit so many dead ends (CE 107,116,129), halts (CE 104, 113, 125n, 132, 134), and regressions (CE 40,50-51, 100, 127, 131), or that is progress should be accompanied by increasing conflict (CE 103).

Life on this planet has, in the context of its limitations, managed a threefold success: plant and animal life, and among the animals, arthropods (including social insects) and vertebrates (including humankind. Plants, Bergson asserts, are "societies" (CE 16; 12) whose evolution may not require a vital principle. With animals, Bergson concludes, something more than mutation and natural selection is required.

An Introduction to Metaphysics precedes Creative Evolution by four years. The joint emphasis of the former on temporal hierarchy and the calculus emerge, not surprisingly, in the latter.

The change in outlook which led to modern physics and its mathematics thus might, extended to biology, lead to a new, more flexible, more temporalist paradigm (and perhaps to a new mathematical understanding of biology).

The creative action by which a new species is formed would involve a saltation which raises the species to a higher temporality. It would involve an integration from which, however, it would be possible to derive a derivative:

He adds that just as an infinity of functions may have the same differential (functions which differ from each other by a constant -- the so-called "constant of integration") so the integration of physico-chemical elements (a "summation" which, inversely, proceeds from the derivative to the function) would determine the vital action only in part. A part would be "left to indetermination" (CE 33).

A detailed discussion of the questions raised by these ideas would require a second article, longer than the present one. Perhaps the following comments will help explain what is meant. First, Bergson’s speculations here are not conceived by him as imaginary That is, they are understood by him in terms of the actual chemicals, energies, physical principles without which life could not exist. Second, they are understood by him as putative extensions into biolog, of fundamental insights which he believes are at the root of the paradigm shift which lead to modern physics and its mathematics. It would be consistent for him to hold that another such "inversion" could lead to a more dynamic, less reductionist scientific biology, one which could avoid strict deterministic explanations.

In what sense are we to understand these speculations? Bergson believes that the chemicals, energies, and physical principles without which life could not exist are misconstrued by us as being perfectly spatial, not as possessing degrees of spatiality (i.e, as characterized by their "extensity"). It is thus easy to understand the extent to which these factors, extensive and durational, could be believed by Bergson to be brought together into forms possessing broader durations. The qualitative calculus of life can be taken as having done so on our planet -- to use one of William James’ favorite phrases -- so far forth. But can a quantitative calculus, of any kind, succeed in fully understanding evolution and living organisms? As noted above, Bergson denies -- in spite of the overwhelming success of the Newtonian physics of his time -- that there will be a "theory of everything" in physics. (There is not, one notices, one at the present time.) So he denies that the utopian integration he suggests can be "more than dreamed of " (CE 33).

Yet it is clear that it is in this direction -- towards a more temporalist biology, utilizing a mathematics more suited to the "sinuousities" (CE 212-213) of life -- he believed biology could most profitably proceed.²⁰ An adequate answer is suggested, however, by Bergson’s statement in Mailer and Memory (quoted above) that levels of consciousness (hence breadths of duration) in each organism are precisely commensurate with the organism’s capacity for movement -- more precisely, for its capacity to employ a wide behavioral repertoire, coupled with necessity of having to choose between specific acts. This capacity and its imperatives are dependent on the organism’s neuromotor system. A brain and nervous system in a vat are not an organism. The organism is a brain and nervous system intimately connected with a sensorimotor system. A higher organism, Bergson states, is essentially a neuromotor system installed on systems of digestion, respiration, secretion, etc., "whose essential function is to cleanse and protect it. . . . ." (CE 124; cf. also 121, 123, 126, 252) A Bergsonian temporal hierarchy in a higher organism must then be essentially threefold: Consciousness, brain and nervous system, and motor system, with the rhythms of the first "extending over" the second and those of the second over the third. It is interesting to note, in this context the importance brain rhythms have assumed for contemporary neurophysiologists. What science might lose in certainty it might regain in understanding, and in practical results. It is instructive in this regard to cite Bergson’s letter to C. Lloyd Morgan of November 21, 1912, expressing his belief that science did not have to remain as mechanistic as it was in their time.²¹

v. A Mechanism for "Vitalism"; Hierarchical Integrations

The present essay could halt here. Its basic contentions have been sketched out, at some length, and, I hope, in such a way as to be intelligible. But to have stressed his theses of the part which an increasing awareness of temporality has played in the genesis of modern science, and to have indicated the way in which he parallels his theory of levels of duration with the "chaining" of integration/differentiation leaves one fascinating problem unsolved: namely, that of how, given what is known of genetics, Bergson could have imagined that the "vital impetus" effects its evolutionary saltations. What follows is a speculation on Bergson’s ultimate speculation.

One advantage that a broader duration will have over the briefer durations with which it is contemporaneous is its capacity to sum up successive briefer duration; making them simultaneous.²² We have already seen that this is Bergson’s explanation of the manner in which the successive "vibrations" of objects around us are transformed by us into stable, unchanging surfaces. We are not aware of the successive release and absorption of photons in physical objects around us. The transformation of such activity into simultaneity and passivity is a function for Bergson of human perceptive consciousness. A similar integration is used by him to suggest how mind (i.e., memory) can act on matter (i.e., the brain). There is, he speculates, an element of indeterminacy in matter. By summing up this spontaneity (making its successive moments simultaneous) sufficient energy could be accumulated and released to influence the "hair-trigger" behavioral mechanisms of the brain.²³ A similar explanation is available to Bergson to account for the manner in which the vital impetus could influence evolution,

Bergson was anti-Lamarckian. He rejected the ‘view that the state of the environment can influence the genes. Like the majority of contemporary geneticists, he held the opposite view the genes influence the body, and only changes in the genotype can influence the phenotype. Obviously, given what has gone before, he offers a different explanation of how the genotype is altered (mutations) than do contemporary geneticists. The two kinds of synchronization sketched above are different in kind. The first (synchronization of the perceptual object) leads to static spatiality, the second (synchronization of successive indeterminacy) to summed spontaneity. Either or both could influence the DNA double helix, systematically.

It will be objected that this explanation is closer to science fiction than to science. It no doubt appears so. The main point of this essay is that this theory -- though it could well be wrong – is intelligible. The vital impetus is construed here as destabilizing and respatializing the genetic material, by a twofold synchronization. But it is hardly enough for a thesis to be understandable. It is also important that it be believable. For this latter eventuality to transpire, a number of prior claims would have to be established. Is there an element, however infinitesimal, of indeterminism in matter? Is matter really only partly extended in (into) space? The concept of fractal dimension at least gives us a way to make this possibility intelligible.²⁴ Is DNA really a static "spiral staircase," or does it contain an unsuspected dynamic, rhythmic structure? Can we conceive of nature as essentially dipolar, as possessing both "bottom up" and "top down" causality, the former tending towards mechanism, the latter towards spontaneity? This essay does not try to answer such questions. But its author cannot see that it is wrong to speculate, so long as speculations are labeled as such.

Notes

1. Benedetto Croce, What is Living and What is Dead in the Philosophy of Hegel? Trns. D. Ainslie. (London: MacMillan, 1915), 213-215. The author argues that Bergson’s Philosophy requires "..... the renunciation of thought" Leonard M. Marsak, Editor French Philosophers from Descartes to Sartre (New York: World Publishing Co., 1961). The author takes an interesting tack, arguing that while Bergson’s intuition is not irrationalist. his universe is irrational. For a similar view, cf. A. Tymieniecka, Why is there Something Rather than Nothing? (Assen: Van Gorcum, 1966), 10-11. Walter J. Slatoff, Quest for Failure (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1960), 242-248. The author finds "irrationalism" to be common and basic to both Bergson and W. Faulkner. Gerhardt Lehmann, Geschichte der Philosophie. Die Philosophie im ersten Drittel des XX Jabbrbunderts, vol.10 (Berlin: de Gruyter 1957), 128. Egon Friedell, A Cultural History of the Modern Age, vol.3, trans. C. F. Atkinson (New York: Knopf. 1954), 372-373. Raymond Bayer Epistemologie et logique depuis Kant jusqu’a nos jours (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1954), 95. Walter Brunting, "La filosofia irraciotialista de la historia en la actualidad" in Revista de Filosofia, 5,2 (1958), 3-17. The author treats Nietzsche. Ludwig Klages and Bergson as asserting irrationalist philosophies of history. Bertrand Russell, "The Philosophy of Bergson," Monist, 22/3 (1912), 321-347. George Santayana, Winds of Doctrine (New York: Scribner’s, 1913), 58-109.

2. Will Durant, The Story of Philosophy: The Lives and Opinions of the Great Philosophers of the Western World, 2nd ed. (New York: Simon and Schuster 1961), 349. Cf. also 343.

3. Jacques Monod, Chance and necessity: An Essay on the Natural Philosophy of Modern Biology (New York: Vintage Books, 1972), 26.

4. André Gidé, The Journals of André Gidé, vol.2. trans. J. O’Brien (New York: Knopf, 1948), 348.

5. Henri Bergson, The Creative Mind trans. Mabelle L. Andison (New York: Philosophical Library, 1946), 221. All further references to this work will he cited in the text as CM.

6. Henri Bergson, Time and Free Will, auth. trans. F.L. Pogson (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1950). 109. All further references to this work will be cited in the text as TFW.

7. Henri Bergson, Matter and Memory auth. trans. Nancy Margaret Paul and W. Scott Palmer (London; George Allen and Unwin Ltd_.; New York: The Macmillan Company. 1911), 339. All future references to this work will be cited in the text as MM.

8. Henri Bergson, Creative Evolution, auth. trans. Arthur Mitchell, intro. Pete A. Y. Gunter (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 1983), 301. All future references to this work will he cited in the text as CE.

9. Henri Bergson, The Two Sources of Morality and Religion, auth. trans. R. Ashley Audra and Cloudesly Brereton with W. Horsfall Carter (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1935), 308. All future reference to this work will be cited in the text as TSMR.

10. Edward Kasner and James Newman, Mathematics and the Imagination (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1940), 329. Beyond the second derivative, simple physical or geometric interpretations of third, fourth and higher derivatives, the authors point out, do not exist. Even if such concepts, applied to nature, are in this sense conventional, they are no less useful.

11. David Berlinski, A Tour of the Calculus (New York: Pantheon Books, 1995), 278. The indefinite integral is also, Berlinski points out, a means towards the creation of new functions. It is "the instruments by which new functions are created, the plain and prosaic extension of area into the indefinite integral serving in what is to come as the fecund source of creation, the place where the new is generated from the old" (278).

12. Moms Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture (New York: Oxford University Press, 1953), 57.

13. Salomon Bochner, The Role of Mathematics in the Rise of Science (Princeton, New Jersey Princeton University Press, 1966), 195.

14. Carl B. Boyer The History of the Calculus and its Conceptual Development, pref. Richard Courant (New York: Dover Publications, 1949), 301.

15. Jean Milet, Bergson et le calcul infinitèsimal, ou La raison et le temps, prèf Jean Ullmo (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1974, 1. Jean Milet, "Bergsonian Epistemology and its Origins in Mathematical Thought," in Bergson and Modern thought: Towards a Unified Science, eds. A. C. Papanicolaou and Pete A. Y. Gunter (New York: Harwood Academic Publishers, 1987), 29-38. I am indebted to these excellent studies, but disagree with the author over the extent to which Bergson accepted the calculus as a quantitative science as a description of the real.

16. Henri Bergson, Duration and Simultaneity, trans. Leon Jacobson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965), 48-49. All future references to this work will be cited in the text as DS.

17. This account of the duration of matter is also given, in almost exactly the same terms, in "Life and Consciousness", the Huxley lecture, given in 1911 at the University of Birmingham, and published in Mind Energy: Lectures and Essays, auth. trans. H. Wildon Carr (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1920), 3-36. Bergson states on page 8: "A consciousness unable to conserve its past, forgetting itself unceasingly, would be a consciousness perishing and having to be reborn at each moment and what is this but unconsciousness? When Leibniz said of matter that it is a ‘momentary mind,’ did he not declare it, whether he would or not; insensible?" Cf. 22,41. On this point cf. also David A. Sipfle "Henri Bergson and the Epochal Theory of Time" in Bergson and the Evolution of Physics, ed. Pete A. Y. Gunner (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969), 275-.294. I am in essential agreement with professor Sipfle on this point, but prefer to say that Bergson has a quasi-epochal theory of the duration of matter, to distinguish it from the epochal theory of Process and Reality with its absolutely distinct units of becoming.

18. Alfred North Whitehead, The Concept of Nature (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1955 [1919]), 61.

19. Richard L Brougham, "Reality and Appearance in Bergson and Whitehead," in Process Studies 24 (1995), 39-43.

20. That there is for Bergson a hierarchy of durations, a scala naturae, resulting from the divergent developments of evolution, is dear. The question immediately arises as to whether such a hierarchy also exists within each organism. Bergson does not give an unqualified answer to this question, but it would seem that on his own terms some such hierarchy sub specie durationis within the living organism must exist If each organism has its one unique rhythm of existence, and each cell is an organism, then it follows (a straight forward syllogism) that each organism contains as many temporalities (rhythms and sub-rhythms) as it has cells. This is interesting as it stands, and entirely up-to-date. (Cf E. Pennisi, "Multiple Clocks Keep Time in My Tissues," in Science,, 278, No.5343(1997 (1560-1561). But it does not answer the question of hierarchical organization.

21. This letter is in the archives of the University Library at the University of Bristol. Provisions in Bergson’s will make it impossible to publish his previously unpublished writings, including his letters. I believe that in citing his opinion in this way, without quotes, I am not transgressing any official prohibition.

22. Another advantage of broader over briefer durations is the capacity of the former to constrain the latter. This is one of Bergson’s fundamental contentions. It has been introduced by H. H. Pattee as a factor without which the cohesiveness of the organism cannot be understood. Cf. H. H. Patter, "The Problem of Biological Hierarchy," in Towards a theoretical Biology, vol. 3 (Chicago: Aldine, 1970), 117-135.

23. This theory is introduced by Bergson "The Soul and the Body," a lecture first given April 28, 1912, and published in Henri Bergson, Mind-Energy 37-74 (cf. 21-22. also 18-19, 44-45). On this point also cf. Milic Capec, "Bergson’s Theory of the Mind-Brain Relation," in Bergson and Modern Thought: Towards a Unified Science,, esp. 139-143.

24. Benoit B. Mandelbrot, The Fractal Geometry of Nature, updated and augmented ed. (New York: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1983), 1, 15, 17-18, 29-31, 362-368. Fractal dimensions need not he unitary; they can he fractions (of a dimension). One thus has a way, taken from a mathematics, of understanding Bergson’s notion that matter and mind are not fully extended in space. However, this matter is complicated. No more is asserted here than an analogy.

Time and again, process theology has been accused of reducing theology to metaphysics, thereby eliminating the genuine source of theology, i.e., the experience of God’s revealing reality. In this regard, one recalls Langdon Gilkey who deplored this collapse of all problems to metaphysical problems.¹ According to Gilkey, the problem with "metaphysics" occurs when it loses its flowing, critical structure and begins to solidify into a constructional, systematic theory. Then, process theology seems to mutate into a guardian of a true, if not the only true, metaphysical theory. Consequently, the traditions of revelation devolve to mere variables of the solidified metaphysical constant. Moreover, the unique events relevant to theology, the genuine intuition of religious experience, and revelation-theological reflection cannot reach into the metaphysical core anymore and at all.² David Pailin appropriately summarizes this process-theological confession for the dissolution of revealed theology into general metaphysics in saying:

Nevertheless, in order to understand the genuine sources from which theology legitimizes its irreplaceable intuition, and in order to preserve the revelation-theological relevance of process-theological theory, we may contrast the main position of process theology by identifying the counter question: Can there be found any genuine place for a revealed theology within Whitehead’s work so that theology does not have to be subordinated to general metaphysics but, rather, finds its connection to metaphysics in mutual influence?⁴ Affirming this question, the thesis will be presented that, first, Whitehead knows of, or at least implicitly enables us to understand, a genuine claim of revelation which cannot be justified metaphysically (without being metaphysically irrelevant); and that, secondly, metaphysics becomes relativistic in the view of a genuine revealed theology. The somehow negative-theological solution desired in this twofold thesis reads as follows: God’s revelation cannot be grasped either non-historically by metaphysical categories alone or a non-eschatologically by historical events already passed.

I will present my thesis in two parts. First, I will reflect on the non-metaphysical nature of revelation, its uniqueness, and some hypotheses affirming the project of a genuine revealed theology in the context of process theology. Secondly; I will try to support the possibility of a process-theological notion of genuine revelation by pleading for a more fluid interpretation of the relation of metaphysics and theology.

Part I: "Universality of the Singular" Three Reflections on the Non-Metaphysical Origin of Revelation

1. Religious Intuition: "Special Occasions"

In Whitehead’s "theory of religion," the development of religion leads (at least in its last level that we know of) to a rationalization of religious experience (LM 20-36)⁵ Although, at first, religious concerns were preoccupied with rituals, partial myths, and emotional stabilization, later religious consciousness evolved increasingly towards the recognition of universal connectivity, leaving behind provincial rituals and social bindings (RM 28). For Whitehead, this process of the "rationalization" of religion occurs within reciprocal movements towards solitariness and solidarity. Together these opposite features reveal the meaning of "religious intuition," namely, to be the universal mediation of uniquely experienced events.

In Whitehead’s words: The contrast of singularity and universality, solitariness and solidarity, illuminates "the origin of rational religion" (RM 58). "Religion is what the individual does with his own solitariness" (RM 16) and "religion is world-loyalty" (RM 59). In this contrast, the religious experience of uniqueness is both the experience of "solitariness" and that of the "loyalty" to the world (RM 86). It is this two-faced structure that expresses Whitehead’s theory of "religious intuition":

"Religious intuition," as analyzed, has two aspects, or directions of motion: (1) Singularity: religious intuition is a "direct intuition" which cannot be resolved by general terms (rationality, metaphysics), but may only be experienced. Hence, religious intuition cannot be conceptualized completely, but is bound to the uniqueness of the experienced over against all conceptual generality (cf. RM 65).⁶ And in this unpronounceable uniqueness, religious intuition constitutes "the ultimate religious evidence, beyond which there is no appeal" (RM 65); (2) Rationality: although "intuitions" occur as events under unique conditions, they must, due to their accessibility for others, be subject to a process of communicability by theoretical transformation, i.e., the process of their "rationalization" (cf. RM 63).⁷ "Intuitions," as it were, introduce the uniquely new into the world. However, at the same time, they must be generalized to be accessible for others experience.⁸ Or, as Whitehead says, the relevance of its concepts can only be distinctly discerned in moments of insight, and then, for many of us, only after suggestion from without.

It is important to realize that, in Whitehead’s thought, "religious intuition" has irreplaceable meaning for any general "theory of the world." On the one hand, it allows for a unique base of experience, or "one select field of interest" (RM 86).⁹ On the other hand, it maintains that concepts of religion, "though derived primarily from special experiences, are yet of universal validity" (RM 31). For a general theory of the world, the irreplaceable contribution of religious experience consists in the fact that it proceeds from the "super-normal experience of mankind in its moment of finest insight" (RM 31).

2. Revelation, Part I: "Feelings Feel Particular Existents"

As Johann Baptist Metz and John Cobb have seen in correspondence, it is the memoria of the Christ-event that plays a crucial role in the theological notion of revelation.¹⁰ In this view a certain historical tradition of narration and reflection recalls the experience of a unique revealing event by memory. Nevertheless, universality comes to this historical revelation only if it remains itself "in experience" for different generations (although modified and under different conditions). This is the function of memoria or anamnesis. Hence, theological reflection on the revelation of God is founded historically, by the universal relevance of unique events. Or in turn: only singular events have universal meaning.¹¹

In order to interpret this core-principle of revelation, we must understand its essential presupposition; namely, that events are present "in" other events-present not just abstractly (through "eternal objects"), i.e., mediated by the "general," but as singular events that effect their further history by their unique concreteness (PR 338).¹² Whitehead recognizes precisely this constellation when he says: "[T]he truism that we can only conceive in terms of universals has been stretched to mean that we can only feel in terms of universals. This is untrue. Our perceptual feelings feel particular existents. . ." (PR 230).

A first step to obtaining an understanding of the presence of unique revelational events in others can be made by applying Whitehead’s theory of hybrid prehension. In short, and already centered on the our problem, we can say in a "completely living nexus," mental prehensions, whereby novelty enters into events, have a particular form: They can be passed from occasion to occasion in a certain completeness (PR 161) because, in each case, the occasions following their predecessors are not objectified regarding their physicality, but regarding their mentality (PR 245-247). Whitehead speaks both of a direct, non-mediated immanence of occasions (cf. PR 226) and of direct, non-physically Mediated contact of mental prehensions of occasions lying far apart physically (PR 307-308).¹³ The universality of unique revealing events, thus, lives by "an element of immediacy in the relations of the mental side" (AI 248) of occasions that constitute a historical route. We may even think of a kind of "transmutational" character of this mentally connected thread of occasions (according to Cat. Oblg. VI: PR 27) in which we recognize the historical route of revelational occasions as one "revelational event."¹⁴

Now, we can further investigate the character of this "immanence" of the singularities by introducing Gilles Deleuze’s theory of the "universality of the singular." In his main work, Difference and Repetition (1968), he has shown why the conception of concrete immediacy in and between occasions must not be considered naive in a post-Hegelian sense, but post-Hegelian altogether.¹⁵ In order to achieve this aim, Deleuze replaces the categorization of the world into the general and the individual in favor of the distinction of the universal and the singular.¹⁶ On the level of abstraction, "mediation" describes the analysis of that which is subjected to a "law." The "singular," on the other hand, is not mediated by "laws," but is directly effective in universality.¹⁷ Under the paradigm of the "general," there is no "uniqueness." The "general," i.e., a "law," permits only "something similar" or "the same," yet the character of the similar is that it is exchangeable under a general law. Contrary to the "general," it is the essence of the "unique" not to be "exchangeable." Paradoxically, the "singular" can only be repeated. Therein, however, it is universally effective:

Deleuze’s idea of the "repetition" as "universality of the singular" may interpret Whitehead’s idea of "repetition," i.e., the apparent paradox that only the unrepeatable become present in other occasions by a "conformal transference of subjective form."¹⁹ Like Deleuze, Whitehead’s "repetition" does not mean the "repetition of the being," i.e., that what was, and it does not indicate any new realization of what is "similar." Such process ‘would create merely an exchangeable similarity under the paradigm of the general. Instead, "repetition" states and confirms the unrepeatable. Again, Deleuze:

[Repetitions] do not add a second and a third time to the first, but carry the first rime to the "with" power. With respect to this power, repetition interiorizes and thereby reverses itself as Péguy says, it is not federation Day which commemorates or represents the fall of the Bastille, but the fall of the Bastille, which celebrates and repeats in advance all the Federation days.²⁰

What can we gain by this notion of "universality?" Since "universality" does no longer justify itself by "exemplary instantiations" of laws and rules, but proceeds as the universal effectiveness of the unique, this structure enables us to understand how singular events can become reasons of universal revealing.

3. Revelation, Part II: "Transcendence is Self-Revelation"

I have tried to prepare the ground for a process-theological speech of "revelation." First, a unique revealing event cannot be conceptually exhausted or completely resolved into any system; it cannot be completely contained by any generality or in its specific singularity removed by any general experience. In its singularity the revealing event is transcendent, i.e., irreplaceable with "generality."²² And secondly, the revealing event, nevertheless, is universal. It repeats itself in its singularity in other events that memorize and re-activate it. In its universality, the revealing event is imminent, i.e., immediately effective in other events.²³

"Universalization" of singular revealing events names the "repetition of the unrepeatable." And this process must be recognized as a "transference" of the internal essence of one occasion to others by which the transferred event sacrifices its internity, uniqueness. and immediacy. The self-transcendence of any event, which makes it immanent for others, does not, however, only signify a process of "objectification," loss, and what Whitehead called "objective immortality," but it highlights the "repetition" of the singular as singular. Finally, this is the process of what Whitehead calls "self-revelation."

In its self-transcendence, each and every occasion is the self-revelation of its singularity for and in other events. At least three elementary consequences may follow for an theological understanding of "revelation" (which is process-theologically legitimized):

(a) God’s nature is God’s self-revelation: God reveals God’s nature as relational, as all-relating, as essentially "pro-existent."²⁴ More precisely: God’s nature is God’s self-transcendence which is God’s self-revelation. Such divine self-revelation covers the infinite abundance of God’s graceful affection for the world, but also God’s self-sacrificing and kenotic emptying.²⁵

(b) "Repetition" is the universal effectiveness of the singular revealing events within their concrete history. Objections notwithstanding, in terms of its universality, God’s self-revelation is related to a concrete history of unique events. Revealing events, as it were, constitute a history of the anamnesis of their singularity.²⁶ Their uniqueness cannot be extracted theoretically from the history of revealing events. Instead, it is the coming history in which the revealing event "repeats" itself. It has its own power to "re-enact" itself. ²⁷

(c) It is the function of theology to universalize its "own contribution of the immediate experience"(RM 77). Consequently, the immediacy of the singular revealing event, which becomes universally "repeated" within the feelings of other events, preserves an irreplaceable element that cannot be reduced to metaphysical conceptuality-namely religious intuition’s "super-normal experience of mankind in its moments of finest insight" (RM 31).²⁸

Part II: "No Triumphs of Finality": Three Reflections on Metaphysics and Revelational Theology

4. Revelation within Metaphysics "Extension to What is General"

It is questionable whether Whitehead would have ever introduced "God" to his metaphysics if he had not been convinced of the religious, i.e., non-metaphysical, meaning of the notion of God.² Whitehead consciously developed his cosmology in the context of an "immediate comparison with the deliverances of religious experience" (RM 87). He knew that ‘whatever suggests a cosmology, suggests a religion" (RM 136). Indeed, as some interpreters have noticed, Whitehead’s cosmological vocabulary is "itself of an elementary theological meaning."³⁰ But no earlier than in Whitehead’s Adventures of Ideas does the philosophical relevance of revelation-theological content assume reflexive shape.³¹

Especially in his sketch of the general development of European metaphysics within "three steps" (cf. AI 166-167), Whitehead realizes two transitions: first, from the primordial "intellectual discovery" of Plato to the "exemplification" of its contents in Jesus’ life; then, secondly, from the Christ-event to its "metaphysical interpretation" within the generalizations of the Alexandrian theology (AI 166). In Jesus’ life of "non-violence," Whitehead finds in actu what Plato constructed in mente: the true "Icon" of the divine nature as the Eros of self-transcendence and as self-revealed power of persuasion (AI 167, cf. RM 19)³² The Alexandrian theology again rationalized the unique power of the Christ-event, thereby generalizing what has been the novelty of the revealing event over against Plato’s metaphysical suggestions; namely, the modes of "mutual immanence" of singular actualities.

Although one can expect, to a certain extent, such an influence by revealed theology on the developments of metaphysics, especially in the context of Whitehead’s theory of "religious intuition," Whitehead appreciates the Alexandrian theology not for its specific content and "highly special form" (AI 167), but to the extent that it suggests "the solution of a fundamental metaphysical problem" (AI 167). Hence, Whitehead notes: "I am not making any judgment about the details of their theology, for example, about the Trinitarian doctrine" (AI 169).

When Whitehead protests, however, that Alexandrian theology has "made no effort to conceive God in terms of the metaphysical categories which they applied to the World" (AI 169), his claim does not conform to the implications of his own theory of "religious intuitions." The Alexandrines developed their Trinitarian theology universalizing the Christ-event, so that the metaphysical categories arose in the light of the uniqueness of a revealing event. Whereas the general analysis of the structure of experience is philosophy’s concern, theology, instead, interprets the general structures of experience through the uniqueness of the historical Christ-event. This "universalization" is the genuine contribution of revelational theology to metaphysics’ "generalization."

5. Metaphysics within Revelational Theology "The Way in which the Human Spirit Cultivates its Deeper Intuitions

Laurence Wilmot has proposed the reasonable thesis that Whitehead’s metaphysical vision and the advancement of his metaphysical categories permit a correction in the light of the salvational reality of Christianity:

Since generality permits only exchangeable relations, metaphysical systems of principles and categories represent a general order that cannot grasp the singularity of the events theology draws upon. As Deleuze writes, the "universality of the singular" is "by nature. . . always revealing a singularity opposed to the particulars subsumed under laws, a universal opposed to the generalities which gave rise to law."³⁴

In the light of such a critical function of theology in relation to the generalizations of metaphysics, metaphysical "principles," "laws," and "categories" do not appear as (transcendental) conditions of any possible experience, but as that of real experience.³⁵ In a certain sense, Whitehead found a way to initialize a theological project without developing it; and he grounded it in the imperfection of all metaphysical systems in relation to actual events that have the power to reconstruct categories in the passage of the events. And, as Deleuze adds, the actual imperfection of the "list of empirico-ideal notions that we find in Whitehead . . . makes Process and Reality one of the greatest books of modern philosophy."³⁶

From the theological reconstruction of metaphysics, we have gained a new principle concerning the relativity of metaphysical requirements. This principle reads: No a-historical matrix can ever deliver a "form" for all possible actualizations of all possible future events -- hence, for singular events of revelation, too.³⁷ Since no "form" exists beyond its future actualizations, there is no "rule" or "law" that can determine future activity in such a way that the "rule" could not be changed by the future process of becoming.³⁸

A crucial, but rarely examined paragraph in Whitehead’s Adventure of Ideas, formulates the correction of metaphysics and allows its integration within revelational theology:

This passage emphasizes the following main points: (1) no philosophical system can construct a perfect "system of eternal truths" for all possible worlds, taken off from the run of the things; (2) the relation of "system," "intuition," and "reality" is an historical process that does not contain a promise of finality, i.e., of achieving final clarity and security of how things really are; (3) despite Whitehead’s consideration elsewhere, one cannot attain any coherent metaphysics of all possible worlds. Even regarding a reasonable "cosmology" as a theory of this current world, security is impossible; (4) in actual processes, "rules" have the status of structural facts of already realized actualities rather than that of any transcendental apriority. They do not indicate how a process "functions," or must function, due to some underlying "law," but how it "will have functioned" when it has already happened.³⁹

This relativity of metaphysical systems enables us to keep our thought open for a non-metaphysical dimension of rationality. Since the events of self-revelation are pre-regular, they are a gift of novelty and of grace, rather than a mere exemplification of faceless rules. The conception of the self-revelation of God as radical novelty over against any world highlights God’s radical eschatological breaking-through of all automatic self-containing loops of rules.⁴⁰

6. Christian Theology: The "Empirical Basis" of Soteriology

In summary of the argument so far, we may say that theology reflects the radical novelty and universality of singular events, which no concept can seize, but only the events of anamnesis can demonstrate.⁴’ In his "general principle of empiricism," Whitehead appropriately realizes this "anamnetic structure" of theology when he writes: "[T]he general principle of empiricism depends upon the doctrine that there is a principle of concretion which is not discoverable by abstract reason. What further can be known about God must be rest on an empirical basis (SMW 178).

That is to say at least the following: God does not enter into metaphysics as a system seeking to interpret the most general structures of experience in the world (PR 3). Prior to the general structures explored by "abstract reason," concrete actuality happens, i.e., a concrete history of the self-revelation of God that is not replaceable by any philosophical rationality (MT 89; cf. RM 79).⁴²

Since metaphysics investigates general structures beyond any specific basis of any special experience, it is understandable that it abandons the religious base of general structures of experience. The philosophical "God" is understood, if not independently of religious intuition, then definitely beyond its singular appearance (RM 88)⁴³ Over against the philosophical approach, Christianity developed the double strategy which we have analyzed as "religious intuition" contributing finally to the formation of revelational theology:" (1) Christianity proceeded not from any metaphysics, but it "has always been a religion seeking a metaphysics" (RM 50).⁴⁵ Christianity strove for theological rationalization,⁴⁶ (2) Christianity, however, did not follow any certain metaphysics (PR 66-68), but "has been true to its genius for keeping its metaphysics subordinate to the religious fact to which it appeals" (RM 69). Christianity understands itself in its linkage to the unique Christ-event and its anamnesis (cf. RM 55).⁴⁷ Only in the process of a permanent critical revision of theological terms, the events, upon which theology reflects, can be "re-presented" (come into presence again) and -- in anamnesis -- may be "re-activated."

The notion of "Christian theology," then, means that a singular revealing event, i.e., the Christ-event, dwells as the focal point of Christian religious intuition. This theology, however, does not deal with its revealing event in order to transform it into a sample of a general patterns of how things are, but theology tries to understand its very singularity. It is the concern of Christian theology then, to relativize all general terms, categories, and principles, thereby initializing the universalization of this singular event. This "empirical basis" of theology produces an irremovable contrast to the "general set of rules" that a metaphysics of general structures of experience is designing.⁴⁸ In light of the "general principle of empiricism," and in order to remain loyal to the universality of its singular revealing events, Christian theology performs a three-way movement of a historical an eschatological, and a soteriological type:

(a) Historical movement: Any general matrix of experience and, hence, the character of the general as such, have an historical structure." Certain historical events, however, will be re-presented directly in the memory of the revelational events?

(b) Eschatological movement: God’s transcendence radically breaks with all "repetition."⁵¹ Since a world, in which God reveals Godself as an eschatological event, is of almost apocalyptic nature, no one can claim to know any given rule or any world-law that God has to follow. Instead, God is the eschatological limit of any world-immanent logos.⁵²

(c) Soteriological movement: God, who for Whitehead is the beginning of each event (PR 244) and the original power of novelty (PR 67), is also the release from the repetition of the past, i.e., the repetition of evil, guilt, and death.³³ On this basis, theology can follow its soteriological function; namely, "to show how the World is founded on something beyond mere transient fact, and how it issues into something beyond the perishing of occasions" (AI 172). Finally we may say: Seen under the scope of the possibility of process theology, we can, indeed, construct a revelational theology which is not the performance of a metaphysical investigation. Rather, such theology generates a "rational" and "anamnetical" interpretation of the universal meaning of unique revealing events in historical, eschatological, and soteriological dimensions.

Notes

1. Cf. Gilkey (1973) passim.

2. This was the criticism brilliantly addressed by Gilkey. On part of process theology, rarely anyone really answered-with exception perhaps B. Loomer, who understood himself as a theologian, to whom metaphysics interprets, but not constitutes "revelation."

3. Pailin, in Holz/Wolf-Gazo (1984) 285. Further "A "process theology" that is true to Whiteheadian (and Hartshornean) insights does not provide a case for affirming certain limited affirmations about the reality of God which are then to be augmented by a distinct kind of "revelational theology." Rather it derives its theological understanding from the character and processes of reality in all its aspects and taken as an inter-locking whole throughout which God is creatively active even thought [sic!] it may consider that God’s activity is more apparent in some series of events than in others."

4. In LM 76, ‘Whitehead himself notes this "mutual dependence" of metaphysics and religion.

5. Cf. Lowe (1966) 79-116 and Wilmot (1979) 19-29. Cf. For Whitehead’s theory of the four steps of the development of religion Welker (1965) 287-291.

6. In RM 65, Whitehead compares this experience of the unpronounceable that is, nevertheless, known with the knowledge of the mother, who "can ponder many things in their hearts which their lips cannot express."

7. Cf. RM 63: "But reason is the safeguard of the objectivity of religion: it secures for it the general coherence denied to hysteria."

8. This applies in particular to the religious experience. in which "novelty" cannot be expressed by any "formula." Nevertheless, religious experience becomes (and remains) accessible by its rational generalization (RM 129 ff.). Cf. a quite similar description of "intuition" in Lachmann (1994) 84-88.

9. Cf. the formulas of RM 31: "a small selection from the common experience," or "one among other specialized interests of mankind whose truths are of limited validity."

10. Cobb (1982) 51-53 takes account of this central moment of Metz’s theology. namely, the memoria, while generalizing it at the same time.

11. In Christian theology. Jesus Christ is understood as revealing-event, as universale concretum.

12. Generally, process thought holds that that occasions can be present in other occasions only by simultaneous abstraction of their uniqueness. So did Whitehead’s. In his early work, he had gone out of analysis of "events" as unique and of "objects" as that which, can ingrediate as the repeatable within several events (CN 169).

13. Cf. Griffin (1992) 88-95. PR 226 stresses that, although between event A and D still are events B and C, D does not only mediate by B and C, but appears to be directly connected as a physical cause of A . PR 308 speaks of "hybrid physical prehensions." In those mental prehensions are subject to "immediate objectification" in contrast to the "mediate objectification" of physical prehensions. Thus, "universal, but concrete effectiveness" can take place by means of "hybrid prehensions" of passed events regarding their identity, forming novelty ("mentality’) in an immediacy of actualization, which cannot sufficiently be attained by any physical causality. Cf. in addition Hamilton (1967) 82-86.

14. Cf. Whitehead’s definition of "event" in PR 73, in which he forged "the difference between actual occasions comprised in some determined event." For the objective character of the transmutation in the defining characteristic of the nexus of occasions itself cf. (AI 213.)

15. This is the reproach against Whitehead’s thesis of "immediacy" which, in PR 25, CatExpl XXIII, constitutes the "subjectivity" of events, i.e., their privateness that cannot be objectified. Hegel’s notion of "concept." which is a process of dialectic mediation, leaves us with the impression of abstractness; cf. Kline (1990) 150- 151. As Deleuze (1994) 8 writes, the "objection to Hegel is that he does not go beyond false movement -- in other words, the abstract logical movement of ‘mediation."’

16. Deleuze (1994) 70-128.

17. Deleuze (1994) 10: "This is what we are told this movement, the essence, and the interiority of movement, is not opposition, not meditation, but repetition. Hegel is the one who is denounced as the one who proposes an abstract movement of concepts instead of the Physis and the Psyche. Hegel substitutes the abstract relation of the particular to the concept in general for the true relation of the singular and the universal in the Idea. . . .We must see how Hegel betrays and distorts the immediate in order to ground his dialectic in that incomprehension, and to introduce mediation in a movement which is no more than that of his own thought and its generalities."

18. Deleuze (1994)1.

19. Nobo (1986) 18-19, 61-106, builds his understanding of "causality" on this notion. Cf. Deleuze (1994)1-2. For elucidation of the difference of the repetition of the singular to the forming of laws, Deleuze points to Kant’s paradigm of the "Categorical Imperative," which states a individual standard as general law of the same or similar actions, and opposes it to Nietzsche’s anti-legalistic postulate of the "eternal return": It is the repetition of the singular which cannot be understood by any law. In Deleuzes interpretation, Nietzsche’s "will to power" represents precisely the will of the singular in its universal potensation; cf. Deleuze’s (1994)5-11.

20. Deleuze (1994) 1. Theologically, this is of crucial importance for the presence of an unique event through its history, for instance for the memory of death of Christi in the Eucharist.

21. In its "subjective form," an event transfers not only that what can be abstracted from it, but also its singularity.

22. Here, we apply the "ontological principle" which, in this context, means that history must not only be interpreted either by reason or by communication, but in the light of the "diachron transcendence" of passed and future events.

23. Note that a new event does not decide to "repeat" the revealing event, rather the revealing event repeats itself in certain way with us own power. The new event is always already a reaction to this revelation.

24. Both the "primordially nature" and "consequent nature" are defined as "objectively immortal" (PR 32), i.e., they are relatively related to the world; cf. the "relativity principle." Here, we do not wont to hold that God must reveal itself ad extra, but that the internal reference of God to everything that is not God is of a relational type, i.e., essential for world events and their nexic connections beyond the difference of God’s "nature" and "will."

25. It is not presupposed, however, that God’s nature already is kenotic "from eternity." That opinion would be based on a gnostic misinterpretation for which the highest form of the love is the painful renouncing and suffering love; cf. against this misinterpretation: Faber (1995) 405-420. Here, rather, I understand God’s nature as always already receptic and pathic; cf. Ford (1977) 382 et alia. In this sense, God’s nature is always already empty. Cf. the Buddhist interpretation of the Whitehead’s notion of God in Inada (1975) passsim, and Odin (1981) 65 ff. Cf. further Whitehead’s note that the essence of a thing is to be prehensive, receptive, and relational (PR 41).

26. It is justified to discern a "final revelation" from a "complete revelation," as Cobb already knew in his dissertation (1952) 155 The uniqueness of the Christ event justifies its universality and an open-endedness at the same time.

27. One can say that Whitehead knows of the distinction between a general and a special history of revelation. Whereas the general history of revelation relates to the "subjective aims" of all events (and God’s presence in it), the special history of revelation is connected with the universality of certain events. Cf. Hosinski (1993) 231.

28. Then, the "singular" would lose its "universality" thereby gaining "generality." But "generality" would make it "exchangeable."

29. Hosinski (1993)178 n2 "Clearly, Whitehead would not have introduced the concept of God into his philosophy if he judged that there was no presence of God which supported his concept."

30.The original text is written in German ". . . selbst eine elementare theologische Bedeutung," Koch (1983)146. By any means, however, Whitehead’s stream of thought is not "dictating to him a specific view of God," as Johnson (1956) 82, has seen. One can differentiate between a metaphysical and a religious function of Whitehead’s notion of "God." Cf. Cobb (1952) 150f, who discerns the "secular function." God concerning "eternal objects" from God’s "religious function." Cf. also Lederer (1974)35 ff., who speaks of a "God of the religion" within Whitehead, apart from a metaphysical notion of "God." The soteriological dimension is, however, cannot be exhausted by metaphysics. With poetic weight, Whitehead formulates that events -- by themselves and without God -- are a "flash of occasional enjoyments lightening up a mass of pain and misery, a bagatelle of transient experience" (SMW 192); cf. Lowe (1990)188. The world "process" contains motions of adventure and tragic: "The Adventure of the Universe starts with the dream and reaps tragic Beauty"(AI 296). Hence, world-process and men are "haunted by a vague insistence of another order, where there is no unrest, no travel, no shipwreck "There shall be no more sea." (PR 340).

31. It was the "Galilean vision" that Jesus had of a God of love that influenced Whitehead’s cosmology in its basic constellations (P1343). In defending such a genuine Christian vision of God working in the world by "persuasion," weakness, and love, he was disappointed by the penetration of the later Christian theology of anthropomorphic ideas of "God" (ruler, moralist, first mover). Cf. Price (1954)174". . . I consider Christian theology to be one of the great disasters of the human race. Later, Whitehead explains the division of the God understanding into the vision of Jesus of a loving God and God as a ruler, on the other hand, from which Whitehead felt deeply repelled (pp. 175f). Later theology for Whitehead, hence, distorted Jesus vision of "gentleness and mercy" by an "old ferocious God . . . , the Oriental despot, the Pharaoh, the Hitler; with everything to enforce obedience, from infant damnation and eternal punishment," Price (1954)176.

32. CE AI 167: ". . . the life of Christ as a revelation of the nature of God and of his agency in the world". CE further "The Mother, the Child, and the bare manger; the lowly man, homeless and self-forgetful, with his message of peace, love, and sympathy the suffering the agony, the tender words as life ebbed, the final despair and the whole with the authority of supreme victory."

33. Cf. Wilmot (1979) 72

34. Deleuze (1994) 5.

35. Bradley (1994) 155 ff. undertook an attempt of such an interpretation. Baugh (1996)34 defines this connection of the conviction to have an access to the possess of real experience (and not the bare projection of it) and, at the same time, the specification of the conditions of the possibilities of this experience as "transcendental empiricism." Deleuze does not look for necessary conditions as Kant did, however, he finds transcendental conditions of actual experience.

36. Deleuze (1994) 284-285.

37. Cf. Rorty (1995)3, who underlines that "the fundamental insight of a post-Heglian philosophy" is "the abandonment of a claim to a transhistorical frame of orientation beyond linguistic differentiation."

38. Jean-François Lyotard (1994) 202-203 stands for a significant similar to our reinterpretation of Whitehead’s ‘ontological principle," when he notes:

"Ein postmoderner Künstler oder Schriftsteller ist in derselben Situation wie ein Philosoph: Der Text, den er schreibt, das Work, das er schafft, sind grundsätzlich nicht durch bereits feststebende Regeln geleitet und konnen nicht Mafsgabe eines bestimmenden Urteils beurteilt werdenm, indem auf einen Text ode rein Werk nur bekannte Kategorien angewandt werden. Diese Regeln und Kateorien sind vielmehr das, was der Text oder das Werk suchen. Künstler und Schriftsteller arbeiten also ohne Regeln; sie arbeiten, um die Regeln dessen zu erstellenm, was gemacht worden sein wird. Daher rübrt, dafs Werk und Text den Charakter eines Ereignisses haben. Daher rübrt auch, dafs sie füribren Autor immer zu spät kommen oder, was auf dasselbe binausläuft, dafs die Arbeit an ihnen immer zu früb beginnt. Postmodern ware also das paradoxon der Berzukunft (post-modo) zu denken."

39. In this sense, the "ontological principle" may be interpreted not only as principle of history, but as principle of eschatology: The past is justified in the present, which creatively follows no rule. The present, therefore, grounds in the future, which will create its own rule for its appearance. "Continuity" implements itself in the self-revealing of God as the promise of reconciliation-b₉ondof the repetition of the past. In an reversal of the time-index of the "ontological principle," we do not know what rules the future will set up for becoming.

40. While in metaphysics discontinuity is neutralized by a general pattern of the things, theology detects the surprising salvation of the old in the new. The Biblical passage, found in Rom. 3:21-25, exemplifies beautifully this structure. Discontinuity-the act of salvation in Christi-creates "continuity" because it justifies the old as saved.

41. Here, the importance of the structure of anamnesis can function for a process theological interpretation of the presence of Christ in the Christian liturgy.

42. In RM 79, Whitehead underlines the indispensability of the uniqueness of religious experience for the "generalizations" of metaphysics in saying, that the "rational religion must have recourse to metaphysics. . . . At the same time it contributes its own independent evidence, which metaphysics must take account of in framing its description."

43. Thus it comes that Whitehead can speak of a "secularization" the notion of "God" in making it independent of any special religious intuition. "[T]he concept of religious feeling is not an essential element in the concept of God’s function in the universe" (PR 207). Whitehead does not want to negate religious experience, but, in defining a philosophic meaning of "God" within a general "theory of the world," he excludes it. As Hosinski (1993) 23, proposed, Whitehead interprets "religious intuition" and "God-experience" in reciprocal connection. God is not only subject to religious experience, but also of "secular experiences." There exists a difference between both, but not in the difference of the object (the religion, the cosmology), rather in the "subjective form" of the experience, i.e., the way in which the "object" is assumed. In "secular experience," God appears to be one of those general "factors which are either non-actual or non-temporal, disclosed in the analysis of what is both actual and temporal" (RM 87). For the analysis of the items "non actual," "non temporal," "actual," and "temporal," which represent the Aristotelian side Whitehead’s notion of "God" cf. Dalferth (1986) 163-175.

44. Every religion stands within the uniqueness of religious intuition (whereby intuitions also can contradict or have a only volatile character, without losing thereby the character of intuitions: cf. FR 38, PR 13, MT 50) and general theory about the nature of thing" (1LM49). Not every religion, however, creates a "theology." For Whitehead, the specific feature of the Christianity exists in its unique relation it maintains to its unique revelational event-the Christ event (RM 55).

45. Cf. RM 50 "Buddhism is the most colossal example in history of applied metaphysics."

46. Rationalization: Theology is the movement of uniqueness, which it justifies, into generalization. This "uniqueness" does not just mean a unique "intuitive experience" of God, but the "historical event" by which the intuition appears within the world. Thus, rationalization does not begin with purely subjective experience of immediacy, as for religion in general may apply (RM 16), but with one "inspired moment of history," i.e., "the life of Christ" (RM 55). Cf. RM 16: "Religion is the art and theory of the internal life of man." Although uniqueness is irreplaceable, the "completely novel intuition (RM 130) must be generalized to become understandable. As Wilmot (1979) 22 underlines, Whitehead is convinced of an "objective truth" of the experiences of faith -- similar to the Proslogion of Anselm and, earlier, Augustin.

47. Anamnesis: Cf. Lachmann (1994) 85. Cf. auch Reikerstorfer (1992)108, who speaks of "anamnetic reason" which does not fade out the "aporetic of unreconsilable existence." In the memory of the singular revealing event and in contrast to the movement of "rationalization," it happens an "actualization" of the uniqueness of the original event. In the context of rationalization, the critical function of the anamnesis of the uniqueness of the original revealing event results from the correction of each theoretical "distortions" of concrete experience. The memoria of the event establishing revelation happens as actualization of the immediacy of this event. In order to present it as active, anamnesis actualizes its original freshness. This has a critical consequence for revealed theology: Theological terms that interprets the singular revelational events exist not just for generalization, but also for their new actualization. In order to gain this aim, the theological vocabulary must be robbed of its "substantiality."

48. In theology, this is represented by the connection of general experience of not being reconciled, e.g., in "the moral evil . . . the pain and the suffering" (RM 49) and the special experience of salvation by Christ, carrying the evil in by his "solitary . . . on the Cross" (RM 19).

49. The connection of "immediacy" and "historicity" is essential for the reconciliation of the classical dissenses between the two doctrines of De Deo uno and De Deo trino, and, hence, of natural and revealed recognition; cL Faber (1995)38-77 & 176-192.

50. Whitehead, indeed, has seen the dialectic of "immediacy" and "history" regarding "religious intuition "in saying that the inspiration of religion lies in its history, i.e., the primary expressions of its intuitions; cf. RM n144.

51. Any theology, which argues with the help of the intermittent structure of unique events and their connection, seems to be preoccupied with infinite continuity. Process-theological models stand generally under the cosmological assumption of an infinite process of the production of always new events without end and aim -- an assumption, to which Whitehead gave the name of the "remorseless working of things in Greek and Buddhist thought" (PR 244). Nevertheless, this presumption is not conclusive by any means.

52. The singularity of the self-revelation of God is not "regular," but rather "pre-regular." As Deleuze formulates: "If exchange is the criterion of generality, theft and gift are these of repetition," Deleuze (1994) 1. Therefore, the self-revealing of God is the gift of novelty, of renewal, of grace, and of reconciliation. Cf. that "which cannot be and nevertheless ‘is"’ in PR 350.

53. For Deleuze, there are only these two possibilities-"memory" or "repetition." Deleuze (1994)14-15: "When the consciousness of knowledge or the working thought of memory is missing, the knowledge in itself is only the repetition of the object it is played, that is to say repeated, enacted instead of being known . . . the less one remembers, the less one is conscious of remembering one’s past, the more one repeats it." Cf. the similarity to the process-theological interpretation of the original sin in Suchocki (1995) 14- 27, thereby following Whitehead’s theory of causality, as a repetition of the (evil) past, as the inheritance from occasion to occasion, from society to society, from person to person, as a curse of the continuity with the old.

References

B. Baugh. "Deleuze und der Empirismus," Gilles Deleuze-Fluchtlinien der Philosophie. edited by Balke F./Vogl J. München 1996, 34-54.

J. Bradley. ‘Transcendentalism and Speculative Realism in Whitehead," Process Studies 23 (1994), 155-191.

J. B. Cobb, Jr. The Independence of Christian Faith from Speculative Beliefs, Ph.D. Dissertation, Chicago Divinity School, 1952.

J. B. Cobb, Jr. Process Theology as Political Theology, Manchester, 1982.

I. U. Dalferth. Die theoretische Theologie der ProzeBphilosophie Whitehead’s," Religion im Denken unserer Zeit edited by W. Härle and E. Wölfel Marburg. 1986, 127-191.

G. Deleuze: Difference & Repetition, New York, 1994 Columbia University Press.

R. Faber. Der Selbsteinsatz Gottes. Grundlegung einer Theologie des Leidens und der Veränderlichkeit Gottes, Würzburg, 1995.

S. Franklin. "A Process Theology of the Lord’s Supper," The Northeast Asia Journal of Theology 26/27 (1984), 106-129.

L. S. Ford. "Whitehead’s Transformation of Pure Act," The Thomist 41 (1977), 381- 399.

L. Gilkey "Process Theology," Vox Theologica 43 (1973), 5-29.

D. B. Griffin. "Hartshorne, God, and Relativity Physics," Process Studies 21(1982), 85-112.

P. Hamilton. The Living God and the Modern World, London, 1967 Hodder and Stoughton.

T. Hosinski. Stubborn Fact and Creative Advance: An Introduction to the Metaphysics of Alfred North Whitehead. Lanham, University Press of America, 1993.

K. Inada. "The Metaphysics of Buddhist Experience and the Whiteheadian Encounter," Philosophy East and West 25 (1975), 465-488.

A. H. Johnson. Whitehead’s Philosophy of Civilization. Boston: Beacon Hill, 1958.

G. Kline. "Begriff und Konkreszenz über einige Gemeinsamkciten in den Ontologien Hegels und Whitehead’s," Whitehead und der Deutische Idealism edited by G. Lucas G. and A. Braeckman, Bern 1990,145-161.

K Koch. "Schöpferischer Lockruf im ProzeB der Welt Perspektiven der Gottesfrage in der amerikanischen ProzeBtheologie," Theologische Berichte 12 (1983), 129-171.

R. Lachmann. Ethik und Identität Der ethische Ansatz der Prozefsphilosphie A. N Whitehead’s und seine Bedeutung für die .gegenwärtage Ethik, Freiburg i.B., 1990.

M. Lederer. The Term "God" in Whitehead’s Philosophy, Ph.D. Dissertation, Temple University, 1974.

B. Lee. ‘Towards a Process Theology of the Eucharist," Worship 48(1974), 194-203.

V. Lowe. Alfred North Whitehead, The Man and His Work. II:1910-1947. Edited by J.B. Schneewind, Baltimore, 1990

F. Lyotard. "Beantwortung der Frage: Was ist postmodern?" Welsch W. (1994): Wege aus der Moderne. Schlüsseltexte dir Postmoderne-Diskussion, Berlin 2nd ed., 193-203 (Acta humaniora), 1994.

J. L Nobo. Whitehead’s Metaphyics of Extension and Solidarity, Albany: State University of New York Press, 1986.

S. Odin. "A Metaphysics of Cumulative Penetration Process Theory and Hua-yen Buddhism," Process Studies 11 (1982), 65-82.

D. Pailin. "God as Creator in a Whiteheadian Understanding," Whitehead und der ProzeBbegriff Beitrage zur Philosophie Alfred North Whitehead’s auf dem Ersten Internationalen Whitehead-Symposion 1981, edited by H. Holz and E. Wolf-Gazo. Freiburg i.B.1984, 273-299.

L Price L. Dialogues of Alfred North Whitehead Boston, Atlantic Monthly Press, 1965.

J. Reikerstorfer. "Zur Ursprünglichkeit der Religion,"Fides quaerens intelletum. Beiträge zur Fundamentaltheologie, edited by M. Kessler, W. Pannenberg and H.J. Portmeyer Tübingen, 1992, 3-16.

B. Rorty. "Dewey Between Hegel and Darwin," Rorty & Pragmatism: The Philosopher Responds to His Critics. edited by H.J. Saatkamp. Nashville 1995,1-15.

M. Suchocki. God-Christ-Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology (1982; revised edition, 1989), New York Crossroad.

M. Welker. "A. N. Whitehead: Relativistische Kosmologie," Grundprobleme der groBen Philosophen. Philosophie der Gegenwart I, edited by J. Speck. Göttingen 3rd ed. 1995, 269-312 (1985).

L Wilmot. Whitehead and God Prolegomena to a Theological Reconstruction. Waterloo, Ontario: Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 1979.

Mainstream process thinkers have clearly repudiated the traditional Christian view that God created our universe out of nothing, ex nihilo, at some point in the finite past. They affirm instead that God created our universe out of the chaotic remains of some prior universe or cosmic epoch, which in turn was also created out the chaotic remains of some prior universe, and so on to infinity, because every finite actuality was partly created by and out of some prior actuality. As David Griffin put it, "Creation of our particular world was not initiated by a creation ex nihilo, in the sense of a total absence of finite forms of actuality, but was a creation out of chaos, out of a less ordered realm of finitude" (Physics 139). When integrated into process theology, the claim that every reality is created partly by and out of antecedent realities (and partly by God) implies that our universe or cosmic epoch is just the latest member of an infinite sequence of antecedent universes that God created necessarily because God is necessarily creative, social, loving, and embodied in some universe -- ad infinitum.

I wish to show that and how we can retain valuable process insights, such as that God is necessarily creative, social, loving, and embodied in some actual universe, and still affirm creation ex nihilo for our universe. Without relating his metaphysics to recent developments in scientific cosmology, Robert Neville, both a friend and a severe critic of process theology, has previously championed creation ex nihilo (God; Theology 28-48; Creativity 33-35, 44-46). However, most philosophical-minded process theologians have not been able to conceive of a way to get around the principle that all realities are partly created out of prior actualities and still preserve God’s necessary creativity, sociality, love, and embodiment. I hope to show that and how it can be done quite successfully by employing concepts that are quite readily available in contemporary Big Bang astrophysics and cosmology, and that reasons given by process thinkers for repudiating creation ex nihilo can be bypassed. In developing these points, I also hope to show how process thought can relate its insights to contemporary scientific Big Bang cosmology, and that traditional process thought contains elements out of which a process understanding of creation ex nihilo can be constructed.

I. A New Framework for Understanding Creation Ex Nihilo

In answering the question "Is God Creator Ex Nihilo?" on the Process and Faith website, John B. Cobb, Jr. replies that "Whitehead knew nothing of the ‘Big Bang’ and thought instead of cosmic epochs evolving out of earlier cosmic epochs with no singularities involved. Process theology followed him." Process thinkers have indeed followed Whitehead in affirming that our universe, our cosmic epoch, was created out of the ashes of some temporally antecedent universe, and that both universes belong within an infinitely prolonged series of created universes that collectively fulfill the necessity of divine creativity, sociality, love, and embodiment. Charles Hartshorne affirmed, admittedly with some hesitation:

In his "Response to Alston," Hartshorne fleshes out his cosmology of finite space and infinite time by linking it to Whitehead’s doctrine of cosmic epochs, telling us that "I incline to Whitehead’s view of cosmic epochs, each with its own laws" (100). Presumably this all means that a series of spatially finite cosmic epochs extends infinitely into the past, and that our universe was created out of the remains of the preceding epoch. The same interpretation must also be placed upon Lewis Ford’s "Alternative to Creatio Ex Nihilo," which affirms: "For if the world is not created from nothing, it can possibly have an infinite past. If every creative act creates itself out of past acts, ad infinitum, the world must have an infinite past" and upon Cobb and Griffin’s "Process theology rejects the notion of creatio ex nihilo, if that means creation out of absolute nothingness. Process theology affirms instead a doctrine of creation out of chaos" (65). Griffin positions this chaos within a temporally ordered set of oscillating universes when he explains that "There was no beginning. The chaos from which our world began can be considered the final state of a previous world. Creation is the gradual bringing of order out of chaos" (Evil 23).

How does all of this relate to what is going on in contemporary scientific cosmology? Today, for the most part, cosmology is being done by astrophysicists rather than by philosophers or theologians. Most of these scientific cosmologists do not believe in God and seem to know little or nothing about process philosophy. They wish to leave the impression that their atheistic cosmological speculations are somehow "scientific," although this is far from being the case, as will be explained later. Still, for convenience, let us call cosmological speculation being done by astrophysicists and other professional scientists "scientific cosmology."

Contemporary scientific cosmology is very diverse. The variety that best correlates with the views of mainstream process theologians is Oscillationism even though process thinkers have not explicitly affirmed it by using the word "oscillationism." Contemporary scientific Oscillationists¹ usually affirm that our universe is but the most recent in a temporally infinite series of cosmic epochs, that it was created entirely, not by God, but by an influx of energy from an antecedently existing universe, that this prior universe originated from its own Big Bang, enlarged to the maximum allowed by the tension between the expansive kinetic energy of its Bang and the constrictive force of its gravity, then began to contract after gravity ultimately prevailed, and finally ended in a Big Crunch, from the ashes of which our own Big Bang rebounded.

Most scientific Oscillationists also affirm that the series or set of Bang-to-Crunch epochs extends infinitely into the past. They do so primarily because they think that this is a way of avoiding God. As Alan M. MacRobert recognized in Sky and Telescope in 1983, "the idea of an oscillating universe, in which the Big Bang resulted from the recollapse of a previous phase of the universe, gained currency merely because it avoided the issue of [divine] creation, not because there was the slightest evidence in favor of it" (211).

The naiveté of the view that an infinitely prolonged natural or spatiotemporal order of things needs no God would be readily apparent to philosophers, from Aquinas to Whitehead and beyond, who understand that an infinitely prolonged universe or set of successive universes would likely lack the complete self-sufficiency essential for naturalistic atheism and would be contingent upon God in many respects. For instance, God could and most likely would be required by each cosmic epoch to squeeze out any residual entropy or chaos inherited from an antecedent epoch, to select desirable laws (especially life-supporting ones) for each new universe, and to choose its initial conditions (like the quantity of stuff energy, or mass in the universe, the strength of the basic physical forces, and the asymmetry of matter over antimatter -- or vice versa). Process thought would add that God is essential to provide each spatiotemporal occasion in every epoch with an "initial aim" that includes novel possibilities to be creatively actualized by the choice or initiative of every creature, and that God preserves and cherishes forever in his faultless memory the values created by existing individuals in each cosmic epoch and gives them "objective immortality."

Pure Oscillationism, which affirms a single infinitely prolonged strand of successive universes, has some stiff competition in contemporary scientific cosmology. The main competition comes from the "many worlds" view, or what I call "Big Fizz Cosmology," according to which both time and space are infinitely extended and creative. Space in today’s astrophysics is not just nothingness or an empty Newtonian or Kantian form that separates physical objects and processes. As Whitehead recognized, a lot is going on in so called "empty space" (Science 153-54; Process 92, 177, 199). Actual occasions constantly occur there, but they do not consolidate into persisting societies.

Today’s cosmologists are convinced that space itself is a kind of physical something, a field with its own physical properties, its own actualized mass/ energy and density. It has a fine-grained foamy texture, best described by the laws of quantum physics; and it can be bent, stretched, shrunk, warped, vibrated, and knotted. The seemingly emptiest spatial regions are seething or bubbling with "virtual particles" awaiting birth or actualization. Scientific-minded cosmologists think that quantum indefiniteness allows these virtual or real potential particles to be converted briefly into actual particles, so long as they promptly cease to exist so as not to violate -- for more than an instant -- the principle of the conservation or constancy of energy (Misner 1202-03; Rozental 88-95, 107-10; Linde 612-20; Gribbin, Beginning 244-55).

Matter and antimatter particles are constantly being created in empty space; usually they annihilate one another almost immediately, but not always. The cosmology proposed by highly influential Inflation Theory says that effervescent virtual particles occasionally escape from "empty space" into more enduring actuality, as allowed by the random fluctuations recognized by quantum theory, and then they inflate into an entire universe (Guth 167-87, 245-52; Ferris 349-66). This happens more than once; most inflation theorists think that it happens an infinite number of times to actualize every possible world.² Process thinkers should agree here with Hartshorne (and Leibniz) that the notion of actualizing every possibility is absurd since there are incompossible possibilities within and among every conceivable world. Quantum Cosmologists seem to think that every possibility is actualized, even if it takes an entirely new universe to accommodate each one. Process thinkers dissent, however, on the grounds that for moral and aesthetic reasons, God would not create the innumerable horrible, trivial, or boring worlds that are logically possible.

Our spacetime system, the only one we can observe directly (at least in part), the one whose origins we can trace back to a chaotic Big Bang, originated around 15 billion years ago. All events that compose our spacetime system are causally connected with other events within that system, which is in principle traceable back to the Big Bang. The cause of the Bang itself lies outside our spacetime system; but it may or may not have been God.

Most Quantum Cosmologists, those who apply quantum theory to cosmological questions, hold that our universe is but one of infinitely many universes spawned, not by God, but by and from the near-nothingness of quantum-foamy empty space. According to this "many worlds" Big Fizz inflationary scenario, the relevant infinitely fertile "empty space" is not a part of does not belong to, our cosmic epoch. Big Fizz Cosmology postulates a transcendent quantum-fizzy Motherspacetime or Superspacetime within which infinitely many child-worlds or universes co-exist in infinitely extended space throughout infinite time. After child worlds are thus spawned, they may or may not then begin to oscillate.³

Let us consider the "many worlds" notion of infinite Superspace that supposedly accommodates an endless number of independently co-existing and spontaneously conceived child universes. According to cosmological theories widely accepted today, since infinite Superspace has always existed, it co-exists with infinite Supertime. When a spatiotemporally finite universe like ours expands, it pushes into pre-existing Superspacetime, not into absolute nothingness. Believe it or not, many scientific-minded cosmologists take all of this stuff very seriously!

Developments in contemporary cosmology outlined thus far may strike you as utterly wild speculation, having little or nothing to do with empirical natural science, even if it originates with professional astrophysicists. Indeed, it is just that! All postulated antecedent and contemporary universes, and the infinite Supertime and quantum-foamy Superspace within which they are located, transcend our cosmic epoch and are totally inaccessible to human experience. They exist before and beyond our spacetime system in a time prior to the beginning of our time and in a space beyond and outside of our space, so we can never observe them. They are supernatural realities, if real at all, that transcend our system of nature or spacetime. If they exist, they are supernatural other worlds. Even science, if this is science, cannot get along without the supernatural. As philosophical postulates or explanatory hypotheses, their reality (or lack thereof) can be considered and debated; but that would take us far beyond the scope of this article. To get the intricate details of that, you must await the publication of my What Caused the Big Bang? It should be obvious to anyone, however, that any explanatory appeal to realities that transcend our spatiotemporal natural order of things always leaves empirical natural science far behind. Hereafter, "scientific" cosmology will appear in quotes.

So, what does this have to do with creation ex nihilo? The concept of transcendent Superspacetime developed by Big Fizz Cosmologists is purely theoretical and has nothing to do with verifiable natural science, but it may nevertheless be extremely useful to theologians! I began by saying that process theologians have been unable to conceive how to make sense Out of creation ex nihilo and still affirm infinite Divine creativity, love, sociality, and embodiment. This is largely because they assumed that finite space is the only possible complement to infinite time. Hartshorne, for instance, says that "the divine actuality so far as I can grasp the relevant concepts, must involve a numerically infinite number of past creatures, but the creation need not, and I think must not, be spatially infinite" ("Martin" 74); and he repeatedly asserts the finitude of space while affirming the infinity of time. (Creative 30, 125, 126) By default, if in no other way, other process theologians seem to agree. What would happen if, contra Hartshorne, the conceptual framework of process theology were expanded to include not only Hartshorne’s infinite Supertime, but also the infinite Superspace postulated by so many contemporary "scientific" cosmologists? Here, our objective is simply to extend our way of conceiving of the arena of infinite Divine creativity, love, sociability, and embodiment; and this has nothing to do with verifying propositions about other transcendent worlds, which we mortals could never do. Neither infinite Supertime (previously assumed or affirmed by process theology) nor infinite Superspace (hitherto denied by process theology) are verifiable by us. Only God could do the job.

Within infinite Divine Superspacetime, God could be infinitely loving, social, embodied, and creative without being tied to a single temporal strand of spatially finite antecedent-and-successive universes. Within infinite Superspace and throughout infinite Supertime, God could create many co-existing universes Out of nothing, or nothing more than "empty" Superspace itself, and God could be infinitely creative, social, loving, and embodied in relation to them. No co-existing universes would have to be created out of antecedent universes, although some might be. As God wills, some or all co-existing universes could be completely independent causally of all the others, so the crucial barrier between mainstream process theology and traditional Christian theology would no longer exist.

Divine creation of universes ex nihilo, thus understood, always presupposes other actualities, i.e., God’s embodiment somewhere in Superspacetime, but actual universes or Divine bodies need not be created out of other actualities, such as temporally antecedent universes. Process theologians can consistently affirm that throughout everlasting Supertime, God may create, as willed, many independently existing universes out of nothing, or the near-nothingness of "empty" Superspace; and that if, once initiated, some universes form an oscillating series, this is not true of our universe, which God could have created ex nihilo.

In infinite Superspacetime, all child universes could be so far removed from every other -- infinitely far apart if necessary -- that they could never contact or causally influence one another or be derived causally from preceding universes. Or, if God wills, some might have tangential contacts with others, being connected perhaps by wormholes or creative acts of God. Some of these co-existing child universes might even be Heaven, Purgatory, or Hell; and God might be able to figure out how to get us from one to the other! "Beam us over, God!" After we die, God could just re-constitute us in transformed and much improved resurrected bodies (as John Hick suggests) in the spacetime of another world that co-exists with our universe in infinite number will always remain to be created. God also realizes that many possible worlds are too horrible, or too trivial and boring, to be created at all. As Whitehead noted, "It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good"(Religion 153) Divine Superspacetime need not be conceived as resembling the quantum-foamy spacetime of our universe, in which actual particle-occasions are constantly emerging spontaneously but briefly from virtuality. Instead, Superspacetime Again, the point is just to conceive of such things, to make them intelligible, not to verify or confirm any beliefs we may have about them.

The concept of infinite Superspacetime is neither the Newtonian notion of absolute space and time, nor Einsteinian relativity spacetime. It derives not from classical or relativity physics but from quantum physics applied imaginatively to cosmology. My suggestion that God might recreate an improved edition of us in another co-existing spacetime system is not as un-Whiteheadian as it may seem. If order, as we know it, is usually a complex emergent achievement from pre-existing order, this could not be true of creation ex nihilo; and even if true, in light of what quantum physicists have discovered about non-local causality we can no longer assume that all causal influence requires spatiotemporal contiguity or proximity, Even the telepathy in which Whitehead believed (Process 253, 308) did not presuppose that. According to quantum physics, what Einstein called "spooky action at a distance" is a reality; and within Superspacetime, that action could transcend local universes. Whether it actually does or not, we do not know

If God is actualized in both infinite Supertime and infinite Superspace, the everlastingness of divine sociality, love, and creativity would not be subverted if a finite universe like ours was created out of nothing about fifteen billion years ago. Why should God’s everlasting creativity be tied to a single temporal strand of spatially finite universes, of which ours is the most recent member? God could be everlastingly creative in Superspace as well as in Supertime, where particular universes need not emerge from antecedent universes. To reconcile process theology with the creation of our universe ex nihilo, we need a concept of Divine Superspacetime as God’s sensorium and arena for infinite creativity, as further explained in the following discussion. If my analysis is successful, process theology should adopt the view that God’s potential embodiment is coextensive with infinite Superspacetime; and God’s actual embodiment is coextensive with all the worlds God has chosen to actualize within Superspacetime. God’s present body is not confined to our finite Big Bang spacetime epoch, which may, or may not have antecedents, depending on the plausibility of Oscillationism.

Taking the general concept of Motherspacetime or Superspacetime from contemporary "many worlds" cosmology does not and should not commit process theology to much of the baggage that has been attached to it. Process thinkers will want to reject the Principle of Plenitude, so popular with today’s "scientific" cosmologists, according to which all possible worlds are actual worlds. Instead, in infinite Superspacetime, God creates all the worlds that God chooses, but not all possible worlds. For many good reasons, God is not driven by the ideal of Plenitude, which requires the creation of all possible worlds. God may have created an infinite number of worlds in Superspacetime, but God understands that infinity cannot be used up and that an infinite number will always remain to be created. God also realizes that many possible worlds are too horrible, or too trivial and boring, to be created at all. As Whitehead noted, "It is not true that God is in all respects infinite. If He were, He would be evil as well as good" (Religion 153). Divine Superspacetime need not be conceived as resembling the quantum-foamy spacetime of our universe, in which actual particle-occasions are constantly emerging spontaneously but briefly from virtuality. Instead, Superspacetime is God’s arena for deliberate but selective creativity; and it has all the properties that God wants to give to it, even though we may not know what they are.

Mainstream process theologians were unable to conceive of creation ex nihilo because they were wedded, implicitly if not explicitly, to the model of a single strand of spatially finite oscillating universes extending infinitely into the past, each member of which arises causally from both God and from its immediate predecessor. Hartshorne affirmed "an infinity of earlier universes each produced out of its predecessor, more or less catastrophically or gradually"; but God created them all, including our universe, out of their predecessors (Man’s 94; see also 234, 239). This cosmological model precludes the possibility that a universe could arise causally only from God at some point in the finite past -- the essence of creation ex nihilo. It assumes that God’s infinite creativity was only temporally ordered; but it max’ also be spatially ordered as Divine Superspacetime, where God might be everlastingly creative of multiple universes that have no causal relations with our system of spacetime; and our system of spacetime could arise directly from God’s Superspacetime and creative will alone, without being preceded by antecedent universes. Other universes or cosmic epochs could be "beyond" ours spatially, to use Whitehead’s word for it, without being "before" ours temporally, as mainstream process theology has assumed.

II. Elements of Superspacetime in Process Thought

Elements out of which a theory of Divine Superspacetime can be constructed already exist in process theology In discussing the possible existence of many independent worlds in an essay in Essays in Science and Philosophy, Whitehead proposed that and how we might conceive of independently existing universes that have no causal, temporal, or even spatial relations with one another:

Despite any philosophical problems one might find with Whitehead’s dream world proposal, this shows that the idea of multiple worlds is not entirely alien to process thought. However, the most effective and trouble-free way to conceive of independent worlds and to relate process theology to contemporary Big Bang cosmology is to think of other worlds as co-existing, not in dreams, but within Divine Superspacetime, within which some worlds (like ours) could be created deliberately out of nothing, i.e., out of the real potentiality and virtuality of genuinely "empty space."

Whitehead was unaware of Big Bang cosmology, as Cobb indicates. Hartshorne, by contrast, was well aware of it; but he neither made a serious and detailed attempt to relate his cosmological commitments to it nor verbally affirmed Oscillationism. However, he clearly has a concept of Divine Supertime, i.e., of God’s time before (and after) our time, the time of our 15 billion year old universe. He wrote:

As we have seen, today’s "scientific" cosmologists do nor restrict themselves only to our epoch, but this just makes them metaphysicians in disguise! I suggest that today’s metaphysical (and only pseudo-scientific) cosmologists have done process theologians a great service in providing us with a concept of Superspace to complement the Super-time that Hartshorne and mainstream process theologians postulate to accommodate antecedent cosmic epochs. Superspacetime is the proverbial transcendent space beyond our space and time before our time. Although the concept of Superspacetime originated with an infinitely many worlds atheism, it can be united with the process concept of God to form the notion of a Divine Superspacetime, within which both infinite divine creativity and universes created out of nothing are possible and conceivable. If time and space are inseparable, as process thought and contemporary physics both suggest, then divine Supertime, affirmed by Hartshorne, also implies divine Superspace. Divine Superspace can be more inclusive than the finite space of our own and preceding oscillating epochs; it can embrace other co-existing universes.

In all likelihood, Hartshorne had only the spacetime of our cosmic epoch, (or similar antecedent oscillating epochs) in mind in insisting upon the finitude of space. If so, his insistence on the spatial finitude of our cosmos in no way conflicts with affirming infinite Superspacetime as the ultimate arena for divine creativity. As far as I have been able to determine, Hartshorne does not give a good argument for his insistence that space must be finite. He just affirms spatial finitude without argument, as if it were intuitively certain or obvious, which it clearly is not to contemporary scientific" cosmologists; but his writings were never informed by the concept of Superspacetime that they have developed. A good argument for the finitude of our space can be given as follows: at or immediately after the onset of the Big Bang, the space of our universe began as finite (slightly larger than a singularity); it has since expanded at a finite rate (the Hubble constant or cosmic expansion rate, plus perhaps a brief exponential but still finite inflation rate); and the expansion has endured for only a finite amount of time (about 15 billion years). From these premises we can conclude that our space is finite. A parallel argument shows that our time is finite and has a "first moment"; but this is perfectly compatible with the idea that our finite spacetime exists within and is expanding into the "empty" quantum-foamy virtuality of infinite Superspacetime, which has no "first moment."

One might conjecture, as suggested to me by Lewis Ford, that Hartshorne would argue for the finitude of space by appealing to the premise that there can be no actualized infinities at all, that such things are unintelligible, from which we could conclude that there can be no actualized infinity of space, that space is finite. Yes, but when reflecting on the far distant past, Hartshorne bites the bullet and reluctantly admits that process thinkers must affirm an actual infinity if they hold that each creaturely event is created out of some other creaturely event -- ad infinitum; otherwise one must affirm creation ex nihilo! (Creative 63, 65, 125, 126). In these passages, Hartshorne clearly affirms an actual, not just a potential, infinity of past events for our world and for God. Anyone who wants to avoid creation ex nihilo is logically committed to an actualized infinity and thus must repudiate the above argument that space is finite.

As quoted earlier, Cobb says that process theologians accept Whitehead’s notion of distinct "cosmic epochs." Whitehead invented this terminology, though he was not very specific about its scope. Under the influence of early quantum theory in the 1920s, Whitehead thought that our own cosmic epoch is dominated by electromagnetic energy that exists only in discrete quanta, and he defined a "cosmic epoch" as "the widest society of actual entities whose immediate relevance to ourselves is traceable" (Process 91). Our present cosmic epoch can be traced "to an aboriginal disorder, chaotic according to our ideals" (Process 95), Whitehead believed; but there are other cosmic epochs "far beyond our immediate cosmic epoch" that are ordered very differently from our own (Process 97). He knew nothing about Big Bang Cosmology, which was still in its infancy when these words appeared in Process and Reality in 1929; and he did not explain whether his "beyond" is to be construed spatially, temporally, or both. Mainstream process theology has interpreted Whitehead’s wording temporally; but "widest" and "beyond" are actually spatial words, not temporal words; and he did not say "oldest" or "before." Perhaps Whitehead spoke better than he knew! Or perhaps he knew about Superspace as well as Supertime! Isn’t it just his "extensive continuum" construed not simply as the realm of "real potentiality" for our own cosmic epoch, but "in its full generality beyond the present epoch"? (Process 66, 97, 288-89). Notice especially his emphasis on potentiality The in-depth explication of Whitehead’s concept of "extensive continuum" by Jorge Luis Nobo (205-18) is almost perfectly compatible with the understanding presupposed here. Whitehead distinguishes this more general extensive continuum from that of our own epoch, which is dominated by societies of electromagnetic occasions (Process 98). He describes it in Process and Reality as

Whitehead clearly uses the spatial word "beyond" rather than the temporal word "before" to refer to alternate cosmic epochs. He certainly does not say that our epoch’s "whole environment" is merely temporal, as pure Oscillationism would have it. Co-existing universes in infinite Superspace are no more "traceable" by us than antecedent universes in infinite Supertime.

III. Process Objections to Creation Ex Nihilo

As documented at the beginning of this discussion, mainstream process theologians have clearly repudiated the traditional Christian belief in creation ex nihilo, and they have given a number of reasons for rejecting this belief. With one such reason I wholeheartedly agree, namely, that the (Protestant) Bible teaches only that our universe was ordered out of chaos, hut not unequivocally that it was created out of nothing. (Edwards, Reason 172; Ford, Lure 21) Let us begin with the reasons that Cobb gives in his Process and Faith website discussion of "Is God Creator Ex Nihilo?"

First, Cobb explains, the traditional theology of creation out of nothing reserves the word "‘creation’[. . .] for a single act, the one in which the world is brought into being out of nothing." To this he opposes the process view that "God is creatively at work at all times and places." However, there is no real opposition between these positions. Whether Cobb intends to make a historical point or a logical point here is unclear, but much of the hostility of mainstream process theologians toward creation out of nothing may issue from confusing historical associations with logical connections. It is true historically that traditional Christian theology tended to reserve the word "creation" for God’s origination of our universe from nothing, but it did not deny that God is creatively at work at all times and places. It just used other words for God’s ongoing creativity, words like "sustaining" the universe and exercising general and special "providence" over and within it.

Of course, traditional concepts of God’s sustaining and providential activities were usually qualified by the deterministic or predestinationistic assumption that everything that happens is implicit in creation itself from the very outset, or from the immutable vantage point of God’s changeless eternity Perhaps something like this is what Cobb has in mind. In their Process Theology: An Introduction Exposition, Cobb and Griffin raise this more subtle metaphysical objection. They tell us that the doctrine of creation out of absolute nothingness "is part and parcel of the doctrine of God as absolute controller"(64).

However, viewed logically rather than historically, creation out of nothing, ongoing creation, and the creation of co-creative creatures are in no way incompatible with one another. Creation out of nothing is logically contradicted by the mainstream process assumption of creation out of something, but not by the notion of God’s ongoing creative activity within our world; and God’s creating co-creative creatures is logically contradicted by the traditional notion of creating totally programmed non-creative creatures, but not by the notion of God’s creating the universe out of nothing. No logical obstacles exist to combining creation ex nihilo with ongoing divine creativity and divine creation of co-creative creatures.

Cobb clearly wants to make a logical point when he says that "the implication of the doctrine of creation is that God is quite external to the world and the world quite external to God." Closely related is Cobb’s charge that creation ex nihilo encouraged "exclusive emphasis on divine transcendence" ("God"). However, historically classical theologians consistently affirmed God’s immanence as omnipresence and made some solemn efforts to take this seriously; so it is not entirely true that classical theology made God and the world to be totally external to one another. The real difficulty is that what the classical theologians gave with one hand, they usually took away with the other. They did indeed characterize the contrast between God and the world so severely (pure being/pure becoming, pure cause/pure effect, spatially extended/incorporeal, etc.) that the two were "quite external" to and mutually exclusive of one another (Edwards, Reason 175).

Does creation out of nothing inevitably involve such catastrophic contrasts? I can’t see that it does. The opposition here is between our universe or epoch as caused by both God plus a series of antecedent worlds extending infinitely into the past, and as caused solely by God at the beginning of its finite past. Both have God as a causal factor; the latter has only God. Necessary and everlasting Divine creativity, sociality, love, and embodiment presuppose the everlasting actualization of other universes somewhere in Superspacetime, but God’s creative actualization need not be confined to a single line of temporally ordered and spatially finite cosmic epochs in Supertime, of which ours is the latest member. If the laws of quantum physics apply throughout Superspacetime and its products and are not limited just to our spacetime and its antecedents, then every actualized universe is grounded in indeterminateness, spontaneity, and creativity, just as process metaphysics affirms. However, there is no logical necessity that "empty" Superspace be quantum-fizzy. A purely Newtonian Superspace is at least logically conceivable.

Cobb himself recognizes that "the event in which our universe arose certainly seems to be markedly different from all the subsequent events" ("God"); and process metaphysics has its own ways of differentiating between God, the world, and occasions within the world without implying that God, the world, and finite occasions are "quite external" to one another.

Some process thinkers like the late Bowman Clarke are also in danger of making God and the world quite external to one another (See Edwards, "God"). They hold that God is merely a final cause who acts only by luring or persuading existing events, and that God is in no sense an efficient cause who acts by creating, infusing, or reordering energy As final cause, God acts on actualities within the world only by providing them with their "initial aims," the relevant sets of possibilities, weighted slightly toward the good, from which they must create themselves. A neat solution to the problem of theodicy results: since God is not the efficient cause of anything, God could not be the efficient cause of evil; and God could not intervene in nature and human history to prevent the most horrendous evils because God lacks the causal power to do so. A good case can be made, however, for the claim that Whitehead’s God is both an efficient and a final cause of events, that providing initial aims to actual occasions and choosing beneficent laws for created universes involves efficient as well as final causation (Edwards, "God" 52-55).

Because he defines the terms differently, David Griffin would not phrase his very similar position on theodicy in terms of "efficient" versus "final" causation. Griffin identifies efficient causation with transitions between occasions and final causation with the internal concrescence of occasions (Evil 101). This implies, unfortunately, that there can be no teleological, purposive, persuasive relations of final causation between actual occasions or entities -- a conclusion that Griffin clearly would not want to accept. My preference is to define "final cause" in a more ordinary or Aristotelian sense that permits final or teleological causation both between and within actual entities. Griffin himself recognizes the legitimacy of this broader and more conventional meaning (Evil 100, see bottom paragraph).

Despite our terminological differences, Griffin’s power-deficient God is not far removed from Bowman Clarke’s. Griffin holds that God simply lacks the power to prevent evil, to create a universe out of nothing, or to bring about any effects where "persuasion" is not involved. (Evil 24-25, 99-100) But must process thinkers presume that persuasive final causation applies absolutely everywhere? Might there not be some "markedly different" situations, e.g., originating universe -- creating the mass/energy out of which partly self-creative actual Occasions emerge -- in which God acts only as an efficient cause without being a final cause in the sense of giving initial aims to occasions that issue from pre-existing societies? Insisting that God, who has His own aims for newly created universes, must be able to persuade everything by imparting initial aims to successive occasions could not apply before the first moment of creation ex nihilo. Before that, nothing exists to be persuaded; the first moment of creation out of nothing succeeds nothing. Beginning with the very first moment, however, something may exist to be persuaded. Of course, the absolutely original grandly unified and undifferentiated mass/energy presumed to exist at the very beginning of our Big Bang might not be susceptible to persuasion; but as soon as it is sufficiently unwound, expanded, and diversified to generate actual occasions, it would. We cannot simply equate physical energy with persuasive creativity; the basic physical conditions that make partly self-creative entities possible must come first. Dictating that persuasion must be exercised even on the non-existence that preceded our Big Bang is an irrational demand, like insisting that circles must be squared. Non-existence cannot be a co-creator with God; but from or very near the outset, a new universe created ex nihilo could be.

In his website discussion, Cobb relates the process view of infinitely prolonged ongoing creation to Big Bang cosmology by indicating that the latter calls for an initial "singularity" from which our universe emerged, and by expressing the doubt that this does not mean strictly "out of nothing"("God"). About this, at least four points need to be made.

First, singularities are defined as being infinitely small, dense, compressed, hot, and curved; and they have no magnitude or locus in our spacetime since that is what emerged from the initial singularity. Some versions of Big Bang cosmology really do affirm that our universe emerged from a singularity. Clearly, however, something infinitely small is absolutely nothing empirically and physically. Not even God could perceive something infinitely small, and nothing can be physical that is absolutely devoid of all spatial properties, i.e., that has no size at all, because spatial extension is the very definition of the physical. As all modern philosophers agree, "All bodies are extended."

Initial singularities have many problems that make them cosmologically unattractive. In brief, being absolutely nothing empirically and physically is surely one of the most serious difficulties; another is that non-physical things cannot be physical causes, so an initial singularity does not provide a physical explanation for the origin of our universe. Closely related is the problem that no one knows what would make a singularity explode because no known laws of physics apply to them. Again, cosmic epochs separated by singularities could not belong to a single, continuous, spatiotemporal, causal sequence because space, time, physical causation, and all natural laws break down completely and do not exist in or apply to singularities. Yet again, we could not reason back to singularities separating cosmic epochs or to even earlier epochs by extrapolating from the natural laws that we know because these laws presuppose spacetime for their application and terminate absolutely at singularities.

Second, Oscillation Cosmology is not bound inextricably to the idea that successive universes arise from and are separated by singularities. Many contemporary Oscillationists agree with Stephen Hawking that quantum effects would prevent a prior universe undergoing gravitational collapse from shrinking to a singularity (50, 113, 132-36). According to Big Bounce Oscillationists, a universe or cosmic epoch being terminated by a Big Crunch would rebound from a small finite state of intense compaction into a subsequent cosmic epoch initiated by a Big Bang without first proceeding all the way to total collapse into an infinitely condensed singularity. (Markov 333-55; Barrow and Dabroski 851, 858; Gribbin, Beginning 166) As Cobb indicates, Whitehead thought "of cosmic epochs evolving out of earlier cosmic epochs with no singularities involved" ("God"). Process Oscillationists would presumably find Big Bounce Oscillationism very congenial, for it requires no singularities between crunch/bounces. It has its own problems, which I cannot discuss here, but by appealing to it Process Oscillationism could affirm a Big Bang that rebounds from an antecedent universe without having to embrace troublesome singularities.

Third, our universe may not be derived from a singularity or a crunched-up antecedent cosmic epoch at all. If and when singularities form at the end of a Big Crunch, why don’t they just stay there forever? No one knows what would cause a singularity to explode. No physical laws that we know could account for it, for all of them break down in singularities. The quantum fluctuations to which Inflationary Cosmology appeals would not do the job because they presuppose the laws of quantum physics, which, along with all other natural laws, would also break down in singularities. Inflationary Cosmology does not derive its many worlds from singularities or from crunched-up antecedent universes. Inflation requires just the right kind of quantum-foamy empty space" in Superspacetime; and singularities and crunches just aren’t the right stuff!

For the reasons just given, with or without singularities, Process Cosmology need not and should not give an oscillationistic account of the origin of our universe. The most plausible view is that our world or cosmic epoch was not created out of a preceding universe. Instead it was created out of nothing (without antecedents) within divine Superspacetime. If our low mass universe is open, as it now appears to be, especially in light of the very recent revolutionary discovery that the rate of Hubble expansion is increasing, not decreasing as previously assumed,⁴ then our universe does not belong within any kind of an oscillating series because all members of such a series must be closed to sustain infinite oscillations.

Fourth, Cobb doubts that the nothingness to which contemporary cosmologist appeal is really nothing. Although singularities are empirically nothing and have many other problems, what about the "empty space" of Superspacetime? Well, it is not a full-fledged antecedent universe, so we are at least that close to creation out of nothing. Superspacetime may but need not have the actualized quantum-foamy physical mass/density that contemporary cosmologists assign to "empty space" within our existing spacetime system; on no empirical or scientific grounds can we infer that Superspacetime is like our universe’s quantum-fizzy spacetime "vacuum." It could be closer to a realm of real potentialities than to an actualized energy field. Aside from the coexisting universes that God has created, Superspacetime could consist mainly of potential rather than actual occasions; and nothing is to potentiality as something is to actuality. As the everlasting arena for creativity, Divine Superspacetime is God’s infinitely extensive potency for creativity and social sensitivity. Its "spontaneity" is God’s well-considered selectivity. The actualized regions of Divine Superspacetime would contain not all possible worlds, but only those universes deemed desirable by an infinitely loving Creator. Just how many co-existing worlds there are only God knows; but at least one universe must exist in perpetuity to satisfy God’s loving, social, creative nature and the plausible requirement that all minds are embodied. Any number of successive and/or co-existing universes could come and go, given an infinite amount of time to play with them. Unlike us, God doesn’t have to rush to do anything. Presumably, as many universes would co-exist as God freely chooses to be involved with; but only God knows how many. The view proposed here does not locate God entirely outside of our cosmos. It allows for all the divine immanence that metaphysics and religion find desirable; but it recognizes, as do most process theologians, that the everlasting and omnipresent features of divinity, God’s primordial nature, does transcend our cosmic epoch. It also does not violate Whitehead’s ontological principle, according to which explanatory reasons are always located in actual entities, but not necessarily in actual occasions (Process 19). God is not located in Superspacetime; rather, it is located in God, the ultimate actual entity, without whom there would be no space, no time, no actuality, no potentiality.

Finally, Hartshorne argues very explicitly that the finitude of past time is inconceivable. After conceding that if we conceive of the past as infinite, what we could know of it is "negligibly small," he then argues:

In response, we must distinguish the finitude of our spacetime, which is conceivable, from the infinitude of Superspacetime. Creation of our universe ex nihilo does not presume an absolute "process preceded by no process."

It presupposes the everlasting processing of Divine creativity, which need not be located solely in oscillationist Supertime but could be expressed in many worlds that either co-exist within and/or are created successively within Divine Superspacetime. If so, God’s occasions or experiences of created worlds would always be preceded by other divine occasions or experiences, even if the series of occasions that constitute our world originated ex nihilo around fifteen billion years ago. The God of process theology can be both the final (purposive), efficient (creating ex nihilo ), and formal (the Divine vision of eternal objects) cause of a universe created out of nothing. If efficient causation acts from the past to the present, God’s creative act of bringing our world into being out of nothing could be in God’s past without being in our world’s past. Creation ex nihilo is possible and conceivable without violating the "no process preceded by no process" principle from God’s perspective, though it might seem so from a non-process-theism human perspective. If the "all creation" refers to Superspacetime, God could still be "not before all creation but with all creation" (Whitehead, Process 343) while definitely and necessarily existing "before" the creation of our spacetime system fifteen billion or so years ago.

Is it God as transcendent cause, or the world as an ex nihilo effect, that Hartshorne regards as inconceivable?

If God is everlastingly creative in Superspacetime, God’s creation of our universe out of nothing would not be an inconceivable effect of "an Inconceivable cause" because God, the cause, really is conceivable, at least in the abstract. Hartshorne has argued extensively and persuasively that we can and do have an abstract concept of God (the cause) without knowing God’s full concreteness. The crucial issue is whether a universe caused by God alone is any less conceivable than a universe produced by God out of an antecedent universe. If God is conceivable at all, then a universe caused by God alone would not result from an "inconceivable cause." Perhaps it is inconceivable that a necessarily creative, loving, social, and embodied Supreme Becoming should exist without having created anything to love, but other universes in Superspacetime having no causal relations with our own epoch could fill the bill.

Hartshorne’s main point could be that a universe created out of nothing would be an inconceivable effect. I contend, and I believe Hartshorne would agree, that the notion of causation as such is broader than that of physical, i.e., spatiotemporal, causation. It is the notion of conditions that are either necessary and/or sufficient for producing an effect. Even if, contrary to the absolute incorporeality and timelessness of the classical God, all efficient causal conditions must be in some sense spatiotemporal, then the relevant spatiotemporality for creation ex nihilo could just be transcendent Divine Superspacetime; it need not be the spacetime of an antecedent universe from which our universe was causally derived. Our Big Bang could have been created out of nothing within God’s Superspacetime without violating any defensible presupposition of process theology.

Thus, subtle and not so subtle replies can be given to the central objections that mainstream process theologians have raised against the traditional doctrine of creation ex nihilo. The preceding account of how process theology can accommodate creation ex nihilo may need a bit more tweaking and development here and there; but its affirmation would permit process theology to avoid alienating those more conventional Christians who are convinced that in the beginning, God created our universe out of nothing.

Notes

1. See Barrow, Gribbin, Rees, and Markov. Here and in the discussion to follow, I will try to give a few examples of contemporary scientific cosmologists who hold or discuss the positions that I identify. My claims about what Oscillationists and other contemporary scientific cosmologists affirm are much more extensively documented in my as yet unpublished book titled What Caused the Big Bang?

2. See Guth 15, 247-48; Rozental 91, 97, 124; Drees 51, 63-64, 97; Linde 607, 618, 620-21; Gribbon, Beginning 245.

3. See Rozental 8, 122-24; Drees 46-52; Linde 620, 625, 626-27; Gribbin, Beginning 244-55.

4. See Ann K. Finkbeiner, "Cosmic Yardsticks: Supernovae and the Fate of the Universe," James Glanz, "Breakthrough of the Year: Astronomy: Cosmic Motion Revealed," and James Glanz, "American Physical Society: Celebrating a Century of Physics, en Masse."

Works Cited

Barrow John D. and Mariusz P. Dabrowski. "Oscillating Universes." Monthly Notices of the Royal Astronomical Society 275 (1995): 850-62.

Cobb, John B. Jr. "Is God Creator Ex Nihilo?" Process and Faith website, July-August, 1999. <http://www.ctr4process.org/p&f/isgod1.htm>.

Cobb, John B. Jr. and David R. Griffin. Process Theology: An Introductory Exposition. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976.

Drees, Willem B. Beyond the Big Bang Quantum Cosmologies and God. La Salle: Open Court, 1990.

Edwards, Rem B. "God and Process." Logic, God and Metaphysics. Ed. James F. Harris. Dordrecht: Kluwer, 1992. 41-57.

-- Reason and Religion. Lanham: UP . Paidia of America, 1979.

-- Religious Values and Valuations, 2000.

Ferris, Timothy. Coming of Age in the Milky Way. New York: William Morrow. 1988.

Finkbeiner, Ann K. "Cosmic Yardsticks: Supernovae and the Fate of the Universe." Sky And Telescope 96 (1998): 38-45.

Ford, Lewis S. "An Alternative to Creatio Ex Nihilo." Religious Studies 19 (1983): 205-13.

--- Lure of God: A Biblical Background for Process Theism, Philadelphia: Fortress, 1978.

Glanz, James. "American Physical Society: Celebrating a Century of Physics, en Masse." Science 284 (1999): 34.

--- "Breakthrough of the Year: Astronomy: Cosmic Motion Revealed." Science 282 (1998): 2156-57.

Gribbin, John. In the Beginning. Boston: Little Brown, 1993.

--- "Oscillating Universes Bounce Back." Nature 259 (1976): pp.?

Griffin, David Ray. Evil Revisited, Albany: State U of New York P, 1991.

--- God, Power, and Evil: A Process Theodicy. Philadelphia: Westminster, 1976.

--- ed. Physics and the Ultimate Significance of Time. Albany: State U of New York P, 1986.

Guth, Alan H. The Inflationary Universe. Reading: Perseus, 1997

Hartshorne, Charles. Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method 1970. Lanham: UP of America, 1983.

--- Man’s Vision of God and the Logic of Theism. 1941. Hamden: Archon, 1964.

--- "Response to Alston." Existence and Actuality: Conversations with Charles Hartshorne. Eds. John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin I. Gamwell. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. 98-102.

--- "Response to Martin." Existence and Actuality. Conversations with Charles Hartshorne. Eds. John B. Cobb, Jr. and Franklin Gamwell. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1987. 66-77.

--- Wisdom as Moderation: A Philosophy of the Middle Way. Albany: State U of New York P, 1987

Hawking, Stephen W. A Brief History of Time: From the Big Bang to Black Holes. New York: Bantam, 1988.

Linde, Andrei. "Inflation and Quantum Cosmology." Three Hundred Years of Gravitation. Eds. Stephen Hawking and Werner Israel, Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1987: 604-30.

MacRobert, Alan M. "Beyond the Big Bang." Sky and Telescope March 1983: 211-13.

Markov, M. A. "Problems of a Perpetually Oscillating Universe." Annals of Physics 155 (1984): 333-57.

Misner, Charles W., Kip S. Thorne, and John A Wheeler. Gravitation. New York: W. H. Freeman, 1973.

Neville, Robert C. Creativity and God: A Challenge to Process Theology. New York: Seabury, 1980.

--- God as Creator. Chicago: U of Chicago P, 1968.

--- A Theology Primer. Albany: State U of New York P, 1991.

Nobo, Jorge Luis. Whitehead’s Metaphysics of Extension and Solidarity. Albany: State U of New York P, 1986.

Rees, Martin J. "The Collapse of the Universe: An Eschatological Study." Observatory 89 (1969): 193-98.

Rozental, I. L. Big Bang Big Bounce, New York: Springer-Verlag, 1988.

Whitehead, Alfred North. Essays in Science and Philosophy. Patterson: Little-field & Adams, 1964.

--- Process and Reality. 1929. Corrected Edition, Eds. David Ray Griffin and Donald W. Sherburne. New York: Free Press, 1978.

--- Religion in the Making. New York: The Macmillan Co., 1926.

--- Science and the Modern World. 1925. New York: Free Press, 1967.

I. Introduction

The philosophy of Gilles Deleuze is often classified, in the Anglophone world at least, under the heading "poststructuralist."¹ While there may be some justification for this categorization, it nevertheless fails to capture the theoretical scope and philosophical ambition of what is perhaps the most important of Deleuze’s works: Difference and Repetition (1968). It would not be completely wide of the mark to categorize this work as an exercise in speculative cosmology, a process philosophy even. At any rate, Deleuze himself invites the comparison, referring to Process and Reality as "one of the greatest books of modern philosophy," and linking his own use of "descriptive notions" to that deployment of "empirico-ideal notions [which] we find in Whitehead" (cf. D&R 284). Although this essentially methodological affinity has been duly recorded and commented upon (most notably by Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers²)there has, as yet, been no exploration of the extent to which Deleuze’s metaphysics parallels that of Whitehead in terms of its content -- the extent to which his own system of "descriptive notions" mirrors, departs from, or fractures, the categoreal scheme of Process and Reality.

While there are, of course, no straightforward one-to-one correspondences between the components of the two systems (there is, for instance, nothing obviously resembling an "actual entity" in the Deleuzean cosmology), there are nonetheless a number of ostensible conceptual affiliations. To pick out just three: that which Deleuze theorizes as "the virtual" bears a certain similarity to Whiteheadian pure potentiality; likewise, the elements of the virtual, namely, what Deleuze calls "Ideas," play a role comparable to that attributed to eternal objects; finally, the factor in the Deleuzean system which corresponds most closely to Whitehead’s notion of creativity -- that ultimate principle by which the production of novelty is to be thought -- goes, for Deleuze, under the name of "productive difference," or "Difference in itself?’

Rather than explore these various parallels directly, my immediate concern here will be to establish the essential difference between the Whiteheadian and the Deleuzean systems. Perhaps the quickest way to encapsulate that difference is as follows: while Process and Reality represents a systematic cosmology, Difference and Repetition develops a speculative "chaosmology" At its most simplistic, the distinction in play here is that between a cosmos in which order is imposed upon a primordial chaos "from outside," or transcendently, (as when Form is imposed upon matter by the Platonic demiurge, or harmony established a priori by the Leibnizean deity), and a chaosmos in which order is generated "from within," by a wholly immanent process of self-organization. In these very general terms, perhaps the closest approximation to a chaosmology amongst Whiteheadian thinkers is to be found in Donald Sherburne’s vision of "a Whitehead decentered. . . a Whitehead without God … a neo-Whiteheadian naturalism." From this perspective, as from Deleuze’s, "there is no one overarching center of value, meaning and order," rather, "patterns of meaning and order emerge gradually, fitfully, and unevenly from [a] churning multiplicity of value centers."³ Thus, or so it would seem, the term "chaosmology" is simply a fancy neologism for speculative naturalism -- for a cosmological system which lacks a God.

This simple picture, however, is more than a little complicated by the fact that Deleuze himself -- in his one and only sustained discussion of Whitehead’s philosophy (cf. TE 76-82) -- sketches out the possibility of a chaosmology within which Whitehead’s God would have a positive, indeed an essential, role to play. My aim in the present paper is twofold: first to argue, pro Sherburne and contra Deleuze’s reading, that there is no place for God -- even for Whitehead’s God -- in a "chaosmos" worthy of the name; but secondly, following Deleuze and departing from Sherburne, to outline one way in which the operation of "decentering Whitehead" might lead to somewhere other than to a naturalism. To this end, I shall focus almost exclusively upon a singular and sensitive point in the Whiteheadian system; namely, that moment at which "the barren inefficient disjunction of abstract potentialities" -- the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects -- "obtains efficient conjunction of ideal realization" within the primordial nature of God (cf. PR 40).

II. Deleuze’s Reading: A Question

In the following passage from The Fold: Leibniz and the Baroque, Deleuze sets out what he takes to be the key difference between the Leibnizian and the Whiteheadian cosmologies:

This passage concludes Deleuze’s brief account of the difference between Leibnizian monads and Whiteheadian actual entities (or "prehensive units"). As he suggests, while it is true that

My question to Deleuze is this: is the (undeniable) fact that Whitehead’s prehensive units are naturally open sufficient grounds for describing the Whiteheadian universe as a "chaosmos"? Might it not still be the case that, given his theology, his universe remains "semi-open and partially predictable" -- as George Kampis has suggested, in explicit contrast to the closed, predictable Leibnizian system on the one hand, and to the open, unpredictable, unfinished-in-every-dimension system of Bergson on the other?⁴ The answer to this question will depend (as Deleuze clearly recognizes), not simply upon an analysis of the nature of monadic units, but on confronting the issue at its most sensitive point, namely, with respect to the difference between the Leibnizian God who "compares and chooses," and the Whiteheadian God who "affirms incompossibles and passes them through."

In his comprehensive study of Whitehead’s metaphysics, William Christian offers an interpretation which prefigures that adopted by Deleuze. Like Deleuze, he recognizes that the crucial distinction lies between the Leibnizian and Whiteheadian conceptions of divinity:

In other words, so Christian argues, the lack of a fixed, necessary or preformed order of potentiality logically follows from the principle that God affirms (or "values," to use Whitehead’s term) all incompossibles. But if this is the case what are we to make of those several passages in which Whitehead speaks variously of an "inevitable ordering of things, conceptually realized in the nature of God" (PR 244, italics added, or of "the eternal order which is the final absolute wisdom" (PR 347, italics added)? Indeed, Christian himself suggests that we understand the "fixed and necessary order" which appears in chapter ten of Science and the Modern World as "describing eternal objects as they exist in the primordial vision of God" (cf. IWM 259 and 262). Should we identify here a contradiction that vitiates the Whiteheadian system as a whole, or is it the case that a more careful reading of Whitehead’s theology is called for? The same question might be raised on the basis of Deleuze’s own remarks: In The Logic of Sense, he makes it quite clear that what he calls the "immanent consistency" of the chaosmos necessarily excludes the "coherence" traditionally supplied by a transcendent God (cf. LS 176). And yet, in his commentary on Whitehead, he seems to hold open the possibility of a chaosmos which would include a divine element. Again, if this is not a simple case of self-contradiction, does it suggest a reading of Whitehead’s theology which would render it compatible with a Deleuzean chaosmology? My attempt to resolve these issues will involve a detailed examination of Christian’s defense of Whitehead’s non-Leibnizian God, together with an interpretation of Deleuze’s highly paradoxical notion of "disjunctive synthesis."

III. Christian’s Reading: Some Criticisms

One significant point of agreement between Deleuze and Whitehead concerns their critique of Aristotelian systems of classification within which a concrete individual is conceived as being merely a member of a certain class or an instance of a certain kind. Christian formulates Whitehead’s view as follows:

Insofar as the "many" refers to the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects it is not representable in terms of a logic of genera and species. The many of pure potentiality constitutes a multiplicity within which "there are no ultimate exclusions, expressive in logical terms," for the simple reason that "such exclusions are decided by the finitude of circumstance" (cf. MT 75–76). The error of the principle of classification lies in its tendency to posit an exclusiveness of pure potentials among themselves without recognizing that such incompatibilities are established through, or decided by, the negative prehensions which are constitutive of actual entities. Similarly from a Deleuzean perspective, the error of such classification lies in its failure to recognize that the exclusiveness of incompossibles is a feature unique to the actual, a feature for which there is no precedent in pure potentiality. As Deleuze puts it in The Logic of Sense "Would two events [pure potentials] be contradictory because they were incompatible? Is this not a case, though, of applying rules to events, which apply only to concepts, predicates and classes?" (LS 170). Rather, "incompatibility is born only with [the] individuals and worlds in which events [pure potentials] are actualized but not between events themselves" (LS 177, italics added).

Given the Whiteheadian doctrine that the exclusiveness of incompossibles is logically dependent upon the decisions made by actual entities, the question then becomes: what effect does the "initial decision" made by God, the ultimate actual entity, have upon the logical status of pure potentiality? There can be no doubt that God makes decisions a propos of the disjunctive multiplicity of eternal objects; the difficulty is to establish in precisely what sense these divine decisions are distinguishable from the choices and calculations made by the Leibnizian deity Whitehead’s dilemma seems to be this: on the one hand, the principle of classification is to be challenged by positing the primordiality of a world of eternal objects that knows "no exclusions, expressive in logical terms"; on the other hand, positing pure potentiality as a "boundless and unstructured infinity" (IWM 252) lacking all logical order would seem to be precisely that conceptual move which renders it "inefficacious" or "irrelevant." Over and above the "special relevance" which selected eternal objects may have in relation to particular, finite actual entities, it is necessary that there be a kind of "relevance in general," a real togetherness of all eternal objects amongst themselves, effected by an eternal, infinite actuality: "Transcendent decision includes God’s decision. He is the actual entity in virtue of which the entire multiplicity of eternal objects obtains its graded relevance to each stage of concrescence" (PR 164). The question is whether this transcendent decision necessarily involves that element of limitation and exclusion characteristic of decisions in general (cf. PR 164: "The limitation whereby there is a perspective relegation of eternal objects to the background is characteristic of decision"). Christian thinks not, and Deleuze appears to follow him.

Clearly, everything turns on the nature of "synthesis," i.e., on the precise manner m which incompossible potentials are "held together." Deleuze distinguishes between two kinds of synthesis: the conjunctive and the disjunctive; and within the latter he distinguishes between two uses of disjunction: an immanent use, at once inclusive, nonrestrictive and affirmative, and a transcendent use which is exclusive, limitative and negative (cf. LS 172 and 176). Following Leibniz, both Deleuze and Whitehead agree that the actualization of individuals and worlds is subject to a condition of conjunctive synthesis, conceived, in Deleuze’s terms, as "a method of constructing convergent series" (LS 174) or, in Whitehead’s terms, as "that principle by which the many (disjunctively)" become one (conjunctively)" (cf. PR 21). Nor would there be any disagreement over the fact that; once an actual world has been formed, limitation, opposition and negation become characteristic features of the world as actualized. But the whole question is to know whether such factors are also primary, or whether they are merely the secondary effects of an originary movement of "disjunctive synthesis," that is, a synthesis which somehow holds incompossibles together; but does so without limitation, opposition, or negation -- i.e., a synthesis of "total affirmation." It is in relation to this question that Deleuze’s distinction between the two uses of disjunction is most pertinent: if; as Whitehead at times suggests, principles of limitation, exclusion etc. are indeed operative in creating the conditions for the production of novelty, then the disjunction involved here cannot be "properly speaking a synthesis, but only a regulative analysis at the service of conjunctive synthesis, since it separates the nonconvergent [incompossible] series from one another" (LS 174). But if, as Deleuze insists, that factor he calls "difference in itself" creates the requisite conditions for novelty, then the disjunction involved will be a genuinely affirmative synthesis within which "divergence is no longer a principle of exclusion, and disjunction no longer a means of separation. Incompossibility is now a means of communication" (LS 175). Furthermore, as Deleuze goes on to make explicit, any attempt to introduce a principle of limitation into pure potentiality itself will require appeal to the "form of God [as] guarantee [of] disjunction in its exclusive or limitative sense" (LS 176). This is the truth Deleuze uncovers in Kant’s discussion of "The Ideal of Pure Reason" in the first Critique. In a manner which to some extent prefigures Whitehead’s own recasting of traditional theology (God, not as creator, but as the first accident of creativity), Kant’s God is here

It is precisely this God, along with his humble task, which are together excluded from the chaosmos theorized by Deleuze, and it is the very same deity which appears in Whitehead’s "first reference to the conception of God he will later elaborate and defend" (IWM 262). The task appointed to God in chapter eleven of Science and The Modern World is nothing more, and nothing less, than that of instituting "an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries, grades, and oppositions" into the totality of possibility (the realm of eternal objects): "Thus this first limitation is a limitation of antecedent selection" (SMW 221). Since the God who appears here is patently a reincarnation of Kant’s "master of the exclusive disjunction," it follows that any attempt to interpret the system of Process and Reality as representing a nascent chaosmology will have to demonstrate that the theology developed in the later work positively supersedes and excludes, rather than, as Christian claims, "elaborates and defends," the theology of the earlier. Christian does, however, present a strong case for an element of elaboration by showing how, between the two works, the realm of eternal objects ceases to be a realm in any meaningful sense, since they are no longer "related in any single fixed order" (IMW 277). His conclusions are presented as follows:

Two objections to this solution might be raised. First, given that the characteristic feature of decisions in general is limitation (following PR 164), Christian still has to make sense of Whitehead’s reference to the "transcendent decision of God" a propos of pure potentiality. Secondly, there is an element of near tautology affecting the formulation of the solution, specifically in the first sentence: "order," in its "weak" (non-Leibnizian) sense, is to be defined only in terms of "togetherness" (on this Deleuze could perhaps agree); but the difficult question is to know how togetherness (synthesis) is to be defined (since it can’t be defined in terms of "order" without collapsing into bare tautology) -- that is, to know precisely how incompossibles are held together through an analysis of the exact mechanism involved, and this Christian does not provide.

The first objection refers back to the question I raised above: precisely how does the transcendent decision of Whitehead’s God differ from the choice/selection made by Leibniz’s deity? Although he does not address this question explicitly, the rudiments of an answer are implicit in the passage from Christian cited earlier: "Unlike the God of Leibniz’s system, Whitehead’s God does not choose any of the possible worlds. Rather he values them all, even though they are not compossible" (IMW 276, italics added). Thus, if God’s transcendent decision refers only to this operation of evaluating incompossible worlds while refraining from selecting any one of them, then it does indeed make sense to speak here of a "decision" which is not yet a "choice." The question then arises as to whether this non-selective decision still involves any necessary element of limitation or restriction. Given that the decision is one of value the answer can only be yes, as Whitehead himself clearly recognized: "Restriction is the price of the value. There cannot be value without antecedent standards of value, to discriminate the acceptance or rejection of what is before the envisaging mode of activity. Thus there is an antecedent limitation among values, introducing contraries. . . [etc.]" (SMW 221). Prima facie, this would seem to be the end of the line for Christian’s argument in favor of a divine "total affirmation": Whitehead’s God holds incompossibles together, and excludes none, simply because he values them all; but if restriction and limitation are the conditions of value then it would appear that even here God is still required to enact, or at least to found, disjunctions which are not yet positively synthetic or wholly affirmative. The element of choice (or selection) may have been removed, but the element of comparison remains (standards of value implying comparisons of better and worse), and thus at least one aspect of the role Leibniz attributes to his God is still in operation.

Nonetheless, Christian can call upon some powerful evidence from the later work which would militate against this conclusion. Most notably, upon Whitehead’s remark that precisely "because it arises out of no actual world [the primordial nature] has within it no components which are standards of comparison" (PR 47). Clearly, the problem now becomes: how to square this claim with the earlier doctrine according to which God provides the necessary antecedent standards of value. Following Lewis Ford, there is an apparently simple solution: interpret the earlier passage in such a way that it does not (or at least not only?) refer to God, but rather (or also?) to the complex of relations an individual actual occasion has with past actual occasions and eternal objects (cf. EMW 116). Ford’s general and surely correct thesis is that between Science and the Modern World and Process and Reality there is a shift from monism to pluralism, a devolution of creative power from a Spinozistic substantial activity to the self-creating activity of actual occasions. It would then be wholly consistent for a similar shift to have taken place with regard to the sources of value. Nonetheless, even taking this devolution into account, the precise role that God plays in the process of evaluation remains unclear. Pace Donald Sherburne’s solution (viz. ditching God altogether, positing the multiplicity of actual entities as the only source of a plural "order, meaning and value"), one possible response might run as follows: in the primordial nature there are no general (fixed a priori) standards of value, there is only the capacity to offer "guidelines" relative to already individuated worlds, This, or something very like it, seems to be the solution implicitly adopted by Christian when he says of the primordial nature:

This certainly gets rid of the last remaining element of divine limitation, but at what cost? If it is true that God can find within himself no standards of comparison, then his capacity to evaluate becomes wholly parasitic upon actual worlds, and Sherburne’s naturalism beckons. But the most immediate problem here is that raised by our second objection to Christian’s solution: specifying precisely how incompossibles are held together. If the requisite disjunctive synthesis cannot be explained by appeal to the doctrine that God values all possible worlds, this is not so much because evaluation is logically dependent upon gradations of importance, but because (accepting Christian’s explanation of the absence of such gradations in the primordial nature) the logic of the doctrine itself entails that God be inextricably involved in the formation of actual worlds as "circles of convergence," i.e., in "the orderings effected by individuals in the course of nature." And thus, at least with regard to the process of evaluation, God is always already functioning at the service of conjunctive synthesis, i.e., providing "guidelines" with a well-meaning regard for what is actually compossible.

The very best evidence Christian has for his interpretation -- namely, that "God’s . . . conceptual experience is . . . limited by no actuality that it presupposes. It is therefore infinite, devoid of all negative prehensions" (PR 345, italics added) -- remains subject to a similar qualification: all negativity may have been removed, de jure, from the primordial nature, but is this enough? If stripped of all technical connotations, we can take the term "prehension" to mean simply "holding," then the phrase "infinite, non-negative prehension" informs us only that nothing is "held negatively" -- that is, nothing is effectively excluded or "relegated to the background" -- but this still does not explain precisely how everything is positively "held together." In short, removing the element of limitation/negation is a necessary but not sufficient condition for the theorization of disjunctive synthesis.

If the concept of evaluation is, at least on the argument presented above, inadequate to the problem, are there any other viable alternatives? Christian makes use of two other terms which are themselves virtual synonyms: "entertainment" and "envisagement": incompossibles are held together simply because they are all entertained or envisaged within the primordial nature. One immediate (and seemingly intractable) problem arises: even Leibniz’s God "envisages all possible worlds" (IMW 276). But the main problem here is the more general problem of vagueness or imprecision. Once again, the only definite content registered by these concepts is that the operation involved is distinct from that of conjunctive synthesis. As Lewis Ford puts it "Since to envisage means to confront, face, what is envisaged is that which the occasion has before it to synthesize. To envisage is not to [conjunctively] synthesize, to bring into prehensive unity, but to entertain as an ingredient for such prehension" (EWM 110). Even so, in deploying the "envisage" or "entertain," nothing definite is said about the non-conjunctive mechanism involved in the primordial act of holding-together-without-bringing-into-overarching-unity. Perhaps the reason these terms remain vague, virtually empty, or at least "unpacked," is that within the system as a whole they are absolutely primitive. (All that Whitehead says in defense of the term "envisagement" is that it is better than certain other alternatives. e.g. "intuition" or "vision" [cf. PR 33-34]). It is perhaps at this point that a fundamental overhaul of the system begins to look both attractive and necessary: to begin again, addressing the same problems, but with different primitives.

IV. A Deleuzean Alternative to Deleuze’s Reading

If as I have tried to show, the Whiteheadian God is not entirely adequate to the ultimate role required of God, is this the cue for developing a wholly naturalist cosmology which excludes, in principle, all traces of the divine? Not quite, at least not so far as Deleuze is concerned. While for him, as for Whitehead, the Spinozist option remains overly monistic (in one way or another, Spinozism must be "pluralized"), it is nevertheless possible to discern, in provisional outline, what a "Deleuzean" deity would look like on a monotheistic model. To fulfil the role ascribed to God, to perform the requisite function of total affirmation, Whitehead’s God would have be profoundly schizoid, in the precise sense set out in Deleuze and Guattari’s Anti-0edipus:

Ripped out of its context, the phrase "continuous overflight" can be read as functionally equivalent to Whiteheadian "envisagement" incompossibles are held together, the affirmation is effected, "through a continuous overflight. . ." The term is, no doubt, just as vague and uninformative as its Whiteheadian counterpart; nonetheless, any attempt to construct a Deleuzean theology would have to begin by substituting the disjunctive syntheses of a divine "schizo" for the disjunctive analyses of that primordial rational Being in whose "very nature it stands to divide Good from Evil", and to establish Reason "within her dominions supreme,"’ as Whitehead so unequivocally puts it (SMW 223). Such a substitution forms the first principle of "the new critique of Reason" that Deleuze discerns in the work of Pierre Klossowski:

The same point appears in The Logic of Sense as follows: "disjunction posed as a synthesis exchanges its theological principle for a diabolic principle," ensuring that "instead of certain number of predicates being excluded from a thing in virtue of the identity of its concept, each ‘thing’ opens itself up to the infinity of predicates through which it passes, as it loses its center, that is, its identity as concept or as self" (LS 176 and 174). While these comments are clearly posed against Leibniz, the point can be restated in Whiteheadian terms simply by substituting "actual entity" for Deleuze’s "thing," and then calling upon Whitehead’s cosmological theory of propositions in which actual entities form the "logical subjects" and eternal objects the "predicates" (cf. PR 186). This puts us in a position to assess Deleuze’s specific claims concerning Whitehead’s system, namely that it theorizes "a world of captures rather than closures," a chaosmos in which "beings [actual entities] are pushed apart, kept open through divergent series and incompossible totalities that pull them outside, instead of being closed upon the compossible and convergent world that they express from within" (TF 81). To my knowledge, the best approximation to this view is once again to be found in Christian, insofar as what basis there is for Deleuze’s interpretation would have to rest on the following principle: "To say that there is a general scheme of relatedness among eternal objects is only to say that all relations are possible. If some certain eternal object were actualized [for a particular actual entity], then all other eternal objects would be relevant in some way or other [to that entity]" (IMW 274). Now to say that, in principle, and a propos of the logical subjects of the system, all relations are possible and all eternal objects relevant, is almost to say that Whiteheadian subject-units are "pulled outside," "decentered," kept open to the infinity of predicates through which they (virtually) pass. But the telling question is: what is Whitehead’s one explanation of how this is possible? "His ultimate explanation is that each factual entity] in its initial phase prehends God," as it must do, because only through the mediation of the divine nature is there an "envisagement of the entire multiplicity of eternal objects" (cf. IMW 269). But if, as I have argued at length, Whitehead’s all-envisaging God is incapable of performing the strange kind of synthesis required, then the God who appears in The Fold as "affirming incompossibles and passing them through" must be precisely Deleuze’s own: the Divine Schizophrenic. And it is this God who consistently fails to appear in Process and Reality, other than as a negative or a kind of after-image. (Except once, in a mythic aside: Whitehead cites from Milton, Paradise Lost, Book II, and then adds: "the fact of Satan’s journey through chaos helped to evolve order; for he left a permanent track, useful for the devils and the damned" [PR 96]. In Klossowski’s terms: a track left by the "prince of all modifications," first servant of the inclusive disjunction). On this basis then, I would suggest that -- on his own terms -- we must rule out Deleuze’s sketch of a specifically Whiteheadian chaosmology, and conclude that within Whitehead’s system the universe remains, in principle, semi-open and partially predictable. Of course Deleuze is correct to say that by contrast with the monads Whiteheadian subject-units are radically open. But the system as a whole remains subject to an "initial condition" which Deleuze himself consistently demands be excluded.

But what are we to make of Deleuze’s own account of how the requisite synthesis of pure potentiality comes about? Is he seriously suggesting that for the "God of religion" we substitute an equally primordial (and mythic) Divine Schizophrenic, an "Antichrist," Satan himself? No such supremely individuated Being appears in the system of Difference and Repetition; in fact, any form of monotheism is ruled out in principle by the operation referred to above as "pluralizing Spinozism." Nonetheless, as I suggested earlier, Deleuze’s anti-theism by no means leads us straight to a naturalism, for while it certainly ensures that pure potentiality is not to be identified with God, it nonetheless maintains that "the energy sweeping through it is divine. . . . Hence the sole thing that is divine is the nature of an energy of disjunctions" (AO 13). But, to put to Deleuze the question we posed to Christian: what precisely is this nature? -- what is the precise mechanism involved in this "disjunctive" synthesis? In fact, as will become all too clear, Deleuze’s response to this problem is often no less vague, obscure, at times near tautologous, than Whitehead’s own. Here is how Deleuze faces up to it:

I am not sure that it is possible to "explicate" this impenetrably dark notion of the "dark precursor." Suffice it to say, "it" is that element which functions as the agent of communication between incompossibles, as the immanent operator of disjunctive synthesis. Almost immediately, Deleuze poses the crucial problem for himself: "The question is to know in any given case how the precursor fulfils this role" (D&R 119, italics added). A few lines later, the semblance of an answer is offered:

One might, not unreasonably, object to this formulation, pointing out that in order to deal with the problem Deleuze has here reverted to a tortuous syntax that could fairly be described as Hegelian dialectic "with one term missing" -- in other words, that by making his primitive concept of difference do all the work, the inevitable result is mere vacuous repetition, empty tautology. It is indeed at this point that Deleuze, self-confessed, attempts to think something "contrary to the laws of thought" (D&R 227), and thereby risks that lapse into vacuity for which Kant condemned all of metaphysics. But the lines that immediately follow attempt to explain why -- at least within the terms of the Deleuzean chaosmos itself -- this moment of attempting to "think the unthinkable" is, at the limit, ineliminable:

Thus Deleuze presents his speculative, and distinctly Platonic, hypothesis: the visible, actual world is an effect of this invisible "reversion" of the potential, the infinitely rich sediment it leaves in its track. As the object = x, the (path of the) dark precursor is that virtually unintelligible object which corresponds to the thought of difference "in itself." Necessarily unintelligible insofar as the very conditions for the production of novelty (viz. disjunctive syntheses of incompossibles) entail that intensive (potential) differences will always already be cancelled within the novel extensities and qualities in which they are actualized -- (through the conjunctive syntheses of compossibles; in Whitehead’s terms: through a demand for "balanced complexity" -- the integration of incompatibilities into realizable contrasts, cf. PR 278). As such, the object = x is inevitably occulted by the forms of representation (categories, concepts and laws) under which the actual, extensive, contrasting "phenomena" are thinkable, and by which their behavior is explained. Thus, Deleuze concludes, "it is not surprising that, strictly speaking, difference ["in itself"] should be "inexplicable.". . For difference, to be explicated [actualized] is to be cancelled. . ." (D&R 228).

This much at least can be said about the nature of the dark precursor: in its role as agent of synthesis it is not, like the primordial nature of God, One: "given the variety among systems, this role [must be] fulfilled by quite diverse determinations" (D&R 119). It is possible to discern in this principle not only a pluralizing of Spinozism (or perhaps a modest homage to Hume: why not a whole team of gods?), but also an implicit answer to Plato when, in the Sophist, he raises the question of synthesis/analysis a propos of the Forms (or "genera"):

Now since we have agreed that the classes or genera also commingle with one another, or do not commingle, in the same way must he not possess some science and proceed by the processes of reason [he] who is to show... whether there are some elements extending through all and holding them together so that they can mingle, and again, when they separate., whether there are other universal causes of separation."⁵

In other words, as Whitehead notes, for Plato "determinations of incompatibilities and incompatibilities are the key to coherent thought" (AI 147). If Deleuze’s thought of the difference-which-relates-different-to-different is not "coherent," it is because its "objects" are precisely those elements which run through the incompossible series simultaneously effecting both a holding together (synthesis) and a holding apart (disjunction); thus it is one and the same "universal cause" in each case: "The affirmative synthetic disjunction . . . consists of the erection of a paradoxical instance, an aleatory point with two uneven faces, which traverses the divergent series as divergent and causes them to resonate through their distance and in their distance" (LS 174, italics added). "Paradoxical instances," "aleatory points," "dark precursors": these, I would suggest, are the only divine elements in the Deleuzean chaosmos, "primitives" in both a methodological and metaphysical sense: "savage concepts" apparently resonating ‘with "things in their wild and free [not yet actualized] state" (cf. D&R xx).

V. Conclusion

For Deleuze then, the sole thing that matters is the chaosmological function instantiated/exemplified by his various primitives. As such, in the Deleuzean chaosmos, many factors (many features of God and of his various roles, both traditional and Whiteheadian) putatively necessary for the production of novelty are eliminated. To deal with these in turn: first, no supreme individual or being is required to perform the function, only "individuating acts" (multiple synthesizing agents, lacking an identity, always missing) distributed within an impersonal and pre-individual field of pure potentiality. And ruled out categorically is any infinite Being "existing for its own sake" (cf. PR 88), but entrusted with the benign function of "federating" differences between finite beings and worlds. Secondly, it is no longer the case that "multiplicity requires that any unity it may have be established for it by some outside agency";⁶ it requires only a "mobile, immanent principle of auto-unification" (LS 102) through disjunctive synthesis. Thirdly, the chaosmos need not "include a stable actuality whose mutual implication with the remainder of the things secures an inevitable trend towards order" (AI 115); rather the "system, is neither stable nor unstable, but "metastable," endowed with a potential energy [the so-called divine "energy of disjunctions"] wherein the differences between series are distributed" (LS 103). Finally, no element of consciousness can enter into the initial conditions for the production of novelty. This is a factor that Whitehead himself explicitly though obscurely, recognizes: towards the end of Process and Reality the primordial nature is described in the following terms: "free, complete, eternal, actually deficient, and unconscious" (PR 345). And just as the primordial nature knows no negative prehensions, so too with the Deleuzean notion of the "virtual" as a kind of cosmic unconscious: "The phenomena of the unconscious cannot be understood in the overly simple form of opposition and conflict. . . conflicts are the result of more subtle differential mechanisms. . . . The negative expresses only within consciousness the shadow of fundamentally unconscious questions and problems" (D&R 106).

Were such consequences to be accepted, then a process metaphysics could indeed dispense with Whitehead’s God, although not with that singular function of "total affirmation" which Whitehead -- the weight of ontotheological tradition bearing down upon him -- valiantly attempts to grant Him. However, as I have tried to show, while in Deleuze’s metaphysics we find something like Whiteheadian pure potentiality reappearing in a radically decentered form, the net result is less a neo-Whiteheadian naturalism than a distinctly postmodern avatar of polytheism: a vision of multiple "little divinities" effecting random syntheses of differential elements within an immanent space of possibilities: a theory of evolution metamorphosed into Chaosmological Myth: an unqualified affirmation of the endless, goalless, production of Difference. As it was with Nietzsche, so it is with the pagan Deleuze.⁷

Notes

1. I am grateful to Isabelle Stengers and to a second, anonymous, referee for their helpful and encouraging comments on an earlier draft of this paper. Stengers rightly objects to the classification of Deleuze as a "post-structuralist," on the grounds that this heading is an American importation of no interest for the French who were reading Deleuze since before 1968, and who recognized him as a "master," meaning deserving of a heading by himself. This is undoubtedly correct. The Anglo-American label may however, be put to a legitimate, if rather specific, use -- namely, in the context of a selective reading of Deleuze’s works from the late sixties (D&R and LS), and taking the logico-mathematical model of structuralism (developed by the Bourbaki school and taken up by Piaget) as the reference point, rather than the more familiar, but rather different, model derived from Saussurean linguistics. For an attempt at such a revisionist reading, see my essay "Deleuze and Structuralism," in Deleuze and Philosophy, edited by Keith Ansell-Pearson (London: Routledge, 1997).

2. Cf. Ilya Prigogine and Isabelle Stengers, La nouvelle alliance, Paris: Gallimard, 1979. especially 387-389. See also Stengers’ paper, "Entre Deleuze et Whitehead," in Gilles Deleuze: une vie philosophique, edited by Eric Alliez (Paris: Les empecheurs de penser en rond, 1998), 325-332.

3. Donald Sherburne, "Decentering Whitehead," Process Studies 15 (1986). 83, 92.

4. Cf. George Kampis, Self-Modifying Systems in Biology and Cognitive Science (Oxford, Pergamon Press. 1991), 462.

5. Sophist 252D, 253. Cited by Whitehead (brackets and italics his), ESP 129.

6. Granville C. Henry, Forms of Concrescence (London and Toronto: Associated University Presses, 1993), 120.

7. On Deleuze’s understanding of evolution cf. D&R, Chapter V, passim e.g., page 248: "Natural selection. . . shows how differences become connected to one another and accumulate in a given direction, but also how they tend to diverge further and further in different or even opposed directions. Natural selection plays an essential role: the differentiation of difference" -- i.e., the role of a dark precursor for the actual "origin of species." On Deleuze’s Nietzschean mythologizing, cf. D&R. passim. As a representative passage: ‘The eternal return does not cause the same and the similar to return, but is... the consequence of a difference which is originary, pure, synthetic and in-itself (which Nietzsche called will to power). If difference is the in-itself then repetition in the eternal return is the for-itself of difference" (D&R 125). Finally, for a different perspective on a similar connection, I am grateful to Isabelle Stengers for drawing my attention to the quasi-Nietzschean flavor of God’s insatiable "appetition for new contrasts" -- a pathos especially noticeable when a difference arrives (as it does most days) between ‘what He cares for and my own craving for being cared for." Had I been able to pursue (amongst others) this intriguing observation, the paper would no doubt have had a different, less oppositional, and therefore, perhaps, now productive "feel."

References

AO Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari, Anti-Oedipus. Translated by Robert Hurley, Mark Seem and Helen Lane. London: The Athlone Press, 1984. French edition: L’Anti-Oedipe Paris: Minuit, 1972.

D&R Gilles Deleuze, Difference and Repetition. Translated by Paul Patton. London: The Athlone Press, 1994. French edition: Difference et repetition. Paris PUF, 1968.

EWD Lewis Ford, The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics 1925-1929. Albany State University of New York Press, 1984.

F Gilles Deleuze, The Fold: Leibnitz and the Baroque. Translated by Tom Conley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1993. French edition: Le Ph: Leibniz et le Baroque. Paris: Minuit, 1988.

IWM William Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.

LS Gilles Deleuze, The Logic of Sense. Translated by Mark Lester with Charles Stivale. Edited by Constantin Boundas. London: The Athlone Press, 1990. French edition: Logique du sens. Paris: Minuit, 1969.

I. An Image

I will present a simple and playful image which has been helpful in bridging the disciplines of philosophy, theology, and psychology. The image emerged in my professional office as I experienced counseling through the perspective of process thought. This essay describes the clinical implications of the image, suggests hypotheses growing from it, and compares it with several other systems of psychotherapy. While being imaginal, the intent is to conform as closely as possible to Alfred North Whitehead’s account of the actual entity, as developed in Process and Reality.

Good models exist for the creative work of taking a systematic theory and producing a practical and simple program. For example, Thomas Gordon translated the Rogerian system into Parent Effectiveness Training, and Isabel Briggs Myers constructed the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator from Jungian thought. In this same sense, I am seeking the relevance of process theology for the daily practice of counseling. To this end the image of "committee meetings" has proved fruitful.

II. Person as Committee Meetings

This image proposes that the human person is like committee meetings, a translation of the concept of "an occasion of experience" created by Alfred North Whitehead in his cosmology and enriched by many others, including John Cobb, Jr., Catherine Keller, and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki. Here the focus is upon "human" experience, although the concept was created to describe all unitary entities. Such an image had to await the "event thinking" of the twentieth century in which matter is seen as convertible to energy. Committee meetings would not speak to those classical Greeks and early moderns who believed, without ever having seen one, that the basic unit of all reality is an atom. While for them the building block of reality was pure and simple, this new image implies the opposite, that the simplest is complex.

Consider an illustration. A person approaches a cafeteria line and is immediately confronted with the desserts, among them a piece of her favorite pie. In the moments of experience which follow, the committee meetings occur. The eager eater shouts with glee, the nutritionist groans with travail, the jogger begins to calculate the time required to run off the calories, the bookkeeper considers the amount of money in her purse, and the historian reviews what was eaten at breakfast and is proposed for dinner. Will the person create herself into a disciplined dieter or a spontaneous eater out of these particular committee meetings? While the outcome is difficult to predict, we can know for certain that the person will define herself in some way before she slides her tray to the main courses.

A committee meeting is a process in which there is a beginning, stages of development, and a conclusion. The process always ends in the creation of a person with particular qualities for that particular occasion. A committee meeting is composed always of members who are present bringing proposals for who to become next. Members are technically "objective data" representing what has been and is now felt by the person. In a particular moment the person may experience diverse proposals about responding to that single piece of pie. Diversity and complexity are the highlights. Thus, the human person is a process like a committee meeting which is made up of committee members who always come to some decision regarding the agenda before them which is who he or she will become.

The image is simple. It can be grasped by a client in minutes. The image is widely known. Few persons, especially those who participate in the university or the church, have never served on a committee. Rather, most know of the repertoire of feelings which may be generated by sitting in a circle with others. The imagination necessary is to visualize the committee meetings as being within. Remembering our own experiences with inner conflict and immobilization may allow for such a translation.

However, simplicity and familiarity are not the only criteria needed to evaluate an image. The traditional criteria of coherence, consistency, and relevance have likewise guided this imaginal birthing. Equally important is that the image is helpful in daily tasks, true to the cosmology from which it arises, and useful as a prompter of new methods and techniques. Its limitations are also of great import, knowing where the image does and does not apply.

The roots of the image need to be exposed, for its indebtedness to psychosynthesis and transactional analysis may be apparent. As those who first built bridges between process thought and psychotherapy, I rely on works by John Cobb and Gordon Jackson.

III. Committee Meetings as a Creative Process

We begin with the common sense notion that meetings do begin and end -- for many of us the latter is accompanied by a sigh of relief. Nonetheless, such a notion was a major breakthrough for Whitehead in his cosmology according to Lewis S. Ford. The new revelation was the "atomicity of time," that time comes in units, leaps, or jumps rather than as a continuous flow. Continual movement does occur, and the past is felt by and influences the present, but more like a frog jumping than a stream flowing.

For the human person it is assumed that each committee meeting begins with a possibility offered by God. This possibility blends and interacts with a number of other proposals from one’s past and the encircling world, with the outcome that the person becomes someone. The one certainty we may have in each meeting is that God will be present with what Cobb calls "directivity." The purpose of every meeting is to create oneself.

Creativity as used in this discussion is not meant to be that which only artists and musicians possess. Creating is an every-person process. It is split-second, ever-present, and most often quite routine. Some meetings, however, are astounding, for example, the experience of the early scientist, dozing by the fireplace, who saw forming into his consciousness the first "benzene ring," the basic structure of all organic compounds. An awesome committee meeting!

Most are ordinary and predictable, such as deciding to take the usual jar and containers out of the refrigerator for breakfast. Routine or astounding, this process is the basic unit of our lives and the unit around which counseling may be organized. The qualities of committee meetings within may be as varied as the actual committees we have attended, which exhibit harmonious agreement, friendly compromise, tense standoff, autocratic intimidation, utter stalemate, rubber-stamp, divided house, yelling match, or mob scene. Always a conclusion is reached, even if it is to do the "same old thing" or to "put off the decision" once again.

The theory goes that we do create ourselves in each moment. It can be assumed that most times it is same hymn, sixth verse. Technically, however, there are never any two committee meetings exactly alike, for with the completion of the last meeting there is one more routine, business-as-usual, creation pushing us from the past. This image is more Hebrew-Christian than Classical Greek, although the Greek notion is more popular today according to Delwin Brown. More people talk about their great need to find or discover themselves, assuming thereby that there is something already there to find. People rarely say that the task, as described here, is to create oneself. Rather than peel the onion down to the central core and, lo, there is one’s real being, the committee meeting image assumes creating one new out of many older.

Becoming is the watchword for every committee meeting. The focus is upon the possible, the might, the could be. The present is the making of something out of the older givens and the new proposal for that moment. There is a bubbling, incubating, ruminating, reflecting quality about each meeting. It is as though the meeting is a sculptor who will shape a new form out of the clay which is given and the invisible idea which is new.

Of course, more often we meet those clients who feel tapped and imprisoned, overwhelmed by impasse, knowing little of creating. It is, in fact, this image which may allow counselors to patiently listen to the routine events of a client’s life, trusting that somewhere in the shadows are possibilities waiting to he named so that they may influence newness. The crucial feature of the person as process is that it speaks directly to the probability of change. If one is a chain-smoker, shy, stupid, insensitive, or selfish, then that’s just it. That is who he or she is. It is light years away to speak to those persons in terms of having created themselves that way many times to date, but in this moment they have the choice to create themselves in a new way.

Freedom is the issue. In Where in the World is God?, I have developed this theme in regards to how persons talk about their own smoking. Is one a smoker or has one created oneself as a smoker 4,593,210 times? The manner in which reality is defined is crucial.

Thus far I have simply taken the centerpiece of Whitehead’s cosmology, the concrescing occasion of experience, and translated it into an easily understood image. Clearly the concept represents an assumption, yet the human behaviors which result from it seem amenable to empirical research, which will be addressed later.

IV. Committee Members as Relationships

Committee members are a necessary part of any real committee meeting. Likewise, the committee image entails such members. Technically they are "objective data" in Whitehead’s language, those facets of the past actual occasions positively prehended by the becoming occasion. In the image proposed here the committee members represent potentials and proposals from the past. It follows that at any meeting a number of proposals come together, much as ordinary meetings entertain various motions. A gathering occurs.

There must be at least four sources from which the members appear: data from one’s own body, one’s own past, the world, and God. These represent only the differing sources and allow for a vast multitude of members, or data, which are present in varying degrees of awareness. The string quartet may in some complex occasions become the Boston Symphony Orchestra. The image celebrates the complexity; variety, and mystery of each moment rather than presenting a neat and tidy diagram or a spreadsheet of orderly rows and columns.

The voices of committee members are frequently heard embedded in the language of clients: "Lazy" squares off with "drill instructor"; "Just do it" opposes "try and make me"; "romantic," "mother," and "grocery-checker" vie for energy; "escape" wrestles with "being responsible"; and "marriage vow" stands in judgment of "I want out." All these are of just one of the four above types, relationships with one’s past.

But one’s personal past is not the total picture. Clients have struggled with powerful influences from their bodies and the world, the unexpected new medical diagnosis, the loss of a job, the startling car accident, the outbreak of war, the persistent call to do something new and scary. All live within a vast network of relationships imbued with clamoring proposals, referred to by Keller as a web. We are made up of relationships with our immediate past. They are the content of the process already discussed. We are composed of our relationships with our significant others, children, parents, forebears, neighbors, colleagues, church, volunteer organizations, bodies, race, ethnicity, habits, memories, beliefs, pets, home, books, ideas, music, telephones, cars, bicycles, grass, trees, mountains, rivers, clouds, earth, and sky Whitehead tells us that everything that has ever happened in our past plays some role in shaping us. But obviously, the active members of each committee meeting are a small selection from the vast world of events. Nevertheless, new members may abruptly dominate the meeting, if a headache or a cloudburst takes precedence over an intended picnic.

V. Chairing the Meeting

It is also assumed that there is not a permanent chairperson of the committee, but rather that the chair develops in the process of any given meeting. The notion is that of a member who rises to the occasion and becomes the leader. In advance, it is not known who will lead in any particular moment. Whose voice will carry the day is, in fact, part of the process occurring. Relationships, then, come together and the meeting itself requires that something be created out of those relationships.

The lack of a permanent chair is disturbing to some theorists, but to identify an enduring chairperson is to say, after all is said and done, there is a permanent essence that underlies all else, rather than posit the primacy of person as creative process and ever-changing, flowing relationships. Both change and continuity can be found in this process. The decisions of past meetings so influence the becoming meeting that continuity is highly probable, yet there is room for the possibility of change, even radical transformation. Our task in clinical theory is to explain both continuity and change.

The nature of person is to have movement from a start to a completion. This movement is built into the reality of life itself. This assumption fits the facts better than that of a permanent chairperson. My telephone rings, hunger pangs emerge, or I remember a letter I promised to write. All these members have the potential to become the chairperson for the newly emerging meeting.

VI. God as Ever-present Committee Member

Not all members make every meeting. But God does. That is the first of two unique qualities of this particular member. The second is that God offers pure potential while all other members present the actual, which may at times also embody potential. In the meetings themselves other members clamor to be repeated. God offers possibilities which may be new and radical for a particular person. "Has been" meets "might be." In this sense a unique voice is always present in every meeting.

This image differs from the interventionist view of God’s activity in the world in which God appears at certain times in certain places. The American spiritual states, "When on others you are calling, do not pass me by" Being passed by is no danger with the committee image. God is a in high school vernacular, one who is highly social, and in theological language an absolute relator, interacting with all entities everywhere all the time. Obviously the image differs from those of the behavioral sciences whose methods do not allow for such a causal agent. In the image developed here, God’s activity is central and necessary to the total cosmology. It is as basic as assuming that no committee meeting can even begin without God’s proposal for that event. God is ever-present, offering possibility.

It is also notable that God is persuasive, not commanding. God is not one who will reign within a person, as the image of king implies. The committee image proposes rather that all members present will shape the decision. The "Persuading One" stands in contrast to the Hebrew images of God which arose from the battleground, mountain, palace, and courtroom. The meeting implies that God persuades, acknowledging the freedom of persons to create themselves. The committee will decide. The image of God portrayed is grounded biblically in the characters found in the parables of Jesus who display unexpected grace -- the prodigal’s parent (Luke 15.11-32) and the vineyard owner (Matt 20.1-15).

First, the offering of a new proposal to each committee meeting occurs only following God’s empathic feeling of the last meeting. It is only from knowing the person in his or her fullness that God forms the new possibility.

Second, following each meeting, God saves whoever or whatever was created there within God’s own life everlastingly. In a sense, then, God is present before and after each meeting. While the act of proposing speaks to the issue of human freedom, the empathic act speaks of the need to be fully known, and the saving act addresses the need that our decisions and creations be ultimately meaningful.

Out of the depth of understanding, then, the "Gracious One" offers a new possibility for the next moment, the result of which is cherished forever. Truly, a unique voice is present.

The danger of viewing God as a committee member is that it sounds too familiar. Ideally it should lead not to the domestication of God but to understanding each committee meeting as an awesome and mysterious event.

VII. The Ultimate Quest of Committee Meetings

The image being developed here should offer a vision of wholeness and health. Every adequate theory of personality and psychotherapy must grapple with such a vision. What is health? How is health undermined? How may it be restored through psychotherapy? Health is found in committees with members who can get along with one another while dealing seriously with becoming more whole and beautiful. Health is the complexity of having many intense relationships, while proceeding with varying degrees of harmony toward the highest forms of beauty.

Contrary to the illustrations of committee meetings noted earlier, health involves moving on with creation rather than being stuck in an impasse, creating only by denying a host of diverse members, or following blindly a single dominant voice from the past. Nor is it that one voice wins today and another takes command and reverses the decision tomorrow. It is rather a wide diversity which blends and shapes into unity, or in Whitehead’s words "the many become one." In process terms, health means you have rich committee meetings which work. In the area of relationships, health means an abundance of intense relationships. Limits, however, need to be acknowledged. While God is relating with every entity everywhere all the time, such awesome multitudes would utterly overwhelm us. There are severe limits on the number of significant relationships persons can balance. On the one extreme there is a tedium of bleak scarcity, on the other, the frantic state of debilitating chaos. Generally the more relationships we can cope with effectively the better.

Awareness of relationships is necessary, but even more important is empathy with those relationships. Health is feeling with other persons, significant ideas, the animals, the birds, the trees, the mountains, the streams. Empathic living is healthy living. In committee meeting language, it is to feel for, honor, respect, and listen to all those committee members. This points in the same direction as Albert Schweitzer when, floating down a river in Africa, he experienced "reverence for life."

Another element in health is to be intuitive about oneself. I have come to call this knowing-2 in contrast to our usual knowing-l, which is that "one and one makes two." Knowing-2 is to be aware of what one wants and needs as well as what is good and right for oneself. Knowing as a form of inner guidance is basic to a well functioning committee. For some, this is a knowing of a divine process which moves within.

Health is the quality of passionately questing for beauty -- not just for oneself, but for all of creation. The degree of intensity, eros, and passion one experiences in some relationships, and hopefully many, may be a measure of the degree of health present. Indifference and apathy represent the opposite extreme. The extent to which one desires beauty not only for one’s body, personal surroundings, family relationships and artistic creations, but also for other people may be a measure of health. Whitehead saw beauty as the more comprehensive value, with the understanding that truth, love, and harmony are surely components of beauty. He also proposed God as the ultimate source of all beauty In light of this, a question forms which needs addressing: Is health enhanced by acknowledging God as bringer of beauty? I have struggled with this question and know that for myself the answer is a hearty "Yes."

Yet others appear to reach health as measured by the above criteria without recognizing or identifying God. Are differing degrees or differing kinds of health obtained depending upon whether one is consciously relating with God? This question deserves further exploration.

Thus, this initial effort to define health includes a picture of a person as a creative process which continuously transforms varied intense relationships into increasing beauty. Degrees of health would be related to the degree these functions were occurring.

VIII. Psychotherapy: Sitting in on Committee Meetings

In this model the counselor enters a process that is already going on. God has been a constant participant in the process. The counselor is a late-comer pulling up a chair and sitting down in the circle. The basic task in the early stages is to listen carefully, constructing mentally the network of relationships which make up the client. Functioning in this style a counselor does not raise the following questions during the initial task of listening, yet would be aware of them during and after a session: Who is there? What are they proposing? How loudly, strongly, and adamantly are proposals made? Is the proposing radically different suggestions? Thereby are there strong disagreements? Who committee member aware of others present? Are there opposing voices with Is missing? Is there variety among the voices? How long have members been there? Who is new and, perhaps, disruptive? Who is old and has seniority? Are things moving along or is there an impasse? Who is hurting? Who is being ignored? Who do they want to get rid of?

The counselor’s role during the counseling process will vary among listener, friend, guide, proposer, and cheerleader. The primary focus is upon the quality of committee meetings which have been held to this point and the characteristics of those committee members who have been influencing those meetings. To be more specific, the basic image has led to the following strategies in counseling. Each will be stated briefly followed by an illustration of how a counselor might speak to a client.

(1) I promote awareness of the committee members who are present in a client by listening for the relationships which that person describes. If that client spends most of our hour talking about the ending of a personal relationship, I may say: "You are really hurting about the loss of your friend."

(2) As early in the counseling process as possible, my client and I paint a vision-dream-ideal of who he or she wishes to be. Painting such a picture will either offer permission to the person to walk right into it or will "flush out of the bushes" those committee members who have differing goals. The so called ambushers or saboteurs are identified and brought into the conversation with the hope that they may have an even better, though surprising, vision to offer. Either result is productive. "So, you’re saying that you want to be more honest with others instead of so pleasing."

(3)1 develop understanding of and appreciation for those committee members who are presently disliked, hated, repulsive, or alien to the client by entering their viewpoint as completely as possible. "I’m curious to know more about that sneaky part that you can’t stand."

(4) I encourage a new name for a committee member who was given a degrading label in the past, by re-entering past situations and carefully reviewing those committee meetings. "Let’s look carefully at how you decided that you were a coward after that terrible fight with your brother."

(5) I seek a harmony a unity with diversity, within present committee meetings of a client by promoting dialogue between previously divided or unknown committee members. It may well be that the qualities of a global society proposed by the World Council of Churches is just as applicable to the transactions of varied committee members within a client: just, sustainable, and participatory "I wonder what the over-eater and the scolder might say to one another."

(6) I encourage the awakening and enlivening of committee members who have been sleeping or sitting shyly and fearfully in the background, by offering a safe environment for diversity, differences, and inconsistencies. "When you said that you felt annoyed at him, I think I may have heard a new voice speaking."

(7) I facilitate the creation of a new committee member when there is need for such a voice in order that the client may be effective in today’s activities. This is done by mutually searching for models from that person’s past or by turning to history, novels, movies, TV, or imagination. "Sounds to me like you need a new, soft voice inside you."

(8) I practice planning for a day weekend, or some future event with the client by calling upon the total committee, not merely listening to those loud voices which have dominated before. "I wonder how your day might go if you listened to all parts of you."

(9) I promote an appreciation in the client for the complexity of being human by both experiencing and reflecting upon that person’s committee meetings. "Life sure isn’t simple, with all its tugs and pulls."

(10) I encourage hope in the client by offering a model in which each committee meeting is free within natural limits to create itself. The past, genetic inheritance, habits, and personality all loom large in any new meeting, but there is also freedom among the givens. Each new meeting offers the possibility of a new decision. "There’s a big difference between your saying that you have no will-power and saying you’ve overeaten most of your life."

(11) I listen for the lures of God in each committee meeting of a client by being alert to feelings, thoughts, symbols, images, and dreams which appear to persuade toward beauty, harmony, joy, intensity, complexity, and love. "Sounds like that idea just won’t go away until you do something about it."

While this list may have omitted strategies which are so obvious that they are out of awareness, it does include particular techniques drawn from the image of the committee meeting. Listening for committee members, understanding how they interact, and sensing the new potential disturbing the old patterns are central. In addition, a model of change has emerged. It involves an alternation between acceptance and celebration of the client’s actions. When both members and meetings come out in an old "business as usual" style this behavior is accepted knowing that this is the more established and powerful way for that client. Naturally they will be present and powerful in the process of counseling. When meetings reveal new voices and actions, celebration with the client is the mode, knowing that this is the new seedling just breaking though the earth with potential to grow into something strong and enduring.

IX. Past and Future in Committee Meetings

Given this image, the past is fixed and done, yet it is actually never left behind. It is, as it were, felt in the present. Like a shutter that is snapped, the picture is recorded on the film unchangeable. Thus, earlier committee meetings produced committee members. They are what is left as evidence of those primordial meetings -- or those that occurred a day ago or a split-second ago. Having been created they may speak from that moment on to emerging committee meetings. The result is that we cannot change the past. Still, the past is central to the counseling process. The counselor’s task relative to this past is to "reframe old pictures." The old pictures cannot be changed, but their meaning and significance can be. In fact, many committee meetings, which occur outside any counseling office, are devoted to seeing the old in a new light.

The client who decided in the past that she is a nobody can reinterpret her past by deciding that she was a somebody who was neglected. One who decided he was stupid may reframe that decision to state that he had dyslexia and did not know it. Delwin Brown’s concept of "contextual creativity" has been most helpful in considering a client’s past. This concept states that one is always creative within the particular context which is given. In reviewing carefully how a client made a decision or created a self-label, it is possible to appreciate that, given those particular conditions surrounding the client, the decision makes sense.

So often when clients have badly maligned themselves, the counselor’s task is to review the other choices they might have made and their likely consequences. Appreciation frequently increases as well as self respect. "I didn’t do half bad after all!" I have described this process in my own early decision that I was a coward (Brizee 93-98). The coward was a prominent committee member with a loud voice in my committee meetings for many years, and though now seated in the tenth row of most meetings can still occasionally rush to the inner circle and grab the microphone.

Whether nobody, stupid, or coward, these are committee members who live and speak in the present meetings. They will not be sent away, but be listened to, spoken to kindly, appreciated, or engaged in negotiation. They are the picture taken, the fixed past. Under earlier conditions, usually fiery and too often life-threatening, clients have created themselves in drastic ways. Yet those ways need not be how they create themselves now and in the future. Being aware of the circumstances in which the decision was made is critically important.

The future is the opposite in this model. It is pure potential. Nothing out there is fixed. Nothing is known. This conclusion is implicit in the committee meeting image. No one knows the results until the meeting is over, not even God. Great importance is attached, then, to each such meeting. The client is creating the future. Freedom is present, within a given context, to do so. The strategy of visualizing one’s future looms large in importance. This vision may become a powerful voice in ensuing committee meetings. To be effective it must. It is vital to ask clients the following question: "How will this action affect the "you" of the future?"

X. Assessment

To create an image is one thing, to present evidence of it is another. Both are acts of creativity and have their place in any system of psychotherapy. The counselor can point in directions which may offer tangible data for understanding the committee process, the members of the committee, and God’s ever-present possibilities for committee meetings. Assessment can begin with identifying the stages of the committee meeting and its conclusion. Process is not easy to measure. Carl Rogers and other early client-centered researchers used the Q-sort of self-statements as their technique for measuring changes of self during psychotherapy. As were they, we are truly dealing with most elusive data. Nonetheless, persons could be queried on the steps they go through when they face decisions. Perhaps the questions might sound something like: "How do you deal with tough choices?" "What steps do you go through when you are at an important crossroad in your life?" "How do you usually go about making big life decisions?"

There are choice-points such as deciding whom to marry, choosing a college, selecting a job, buying a car, taking a stance regarding alcohol, or developing sexual values. These events are much too momentous to be captured in the split-second occasions of which Whitehead wrote. Still, they could be a beginning until refined techniques are developed to measure the microcosm rather than this macrocosm. The resulting variety of process statements regarding life choices could be something like the following. "I just can’t ever make up my mind." "I always get into this big fight with myself" "Well, you just do what you gotta do." "I wait til the last minute and see how I feel about it. I Just know in my heart what’s right for me." "I do it and always end up having real regrets." "I simply ask what Jesus would do and do it."

"I write down the pros and cons and go with the longest list." "I follow the old saying, ‘let your conscience be your guide."’ "I go full steam ahead without thinking much, then pretty soon I trip myself." "It’s always a wrestling match between what I want to do and what I should do." "I end up asking someone else what to do." "My folks instilled in me a pretty good set of rules." Within the vernacular of these illustrations are some significantly different processes. There are important and consistent variables which could be teased out of these self-reports. There may be factors like committee meetings which are routine, closed, limited, restrictive, and narrow in contrast to those which are varied, open, expansive, complex, and broad.

Clear operational definitions are needed regarding a client’s perception of an occasion of experience, the stages she or he is aware of during this occasion, and how she or he knows that closure has been reached. There surely must be times when experience is felt to be "going with the flow" or a "leap of faith." Our folk wisdom states, "I’m glad that’s over" in contrast to "I lost track of time." Collecting data on the units and the stages has many intriguing possibilities.

There is a need, also, to assess members of the committee meeting, technically the objective data of important prehensions. We can measure actual and potential relationships. An inventory could be designed, and I have the rudimentary beginnings, which would raise the following questions with a client: (1) With whom or what has the client been relating? (2) How long has the client been relating to it-her-him? (3) To what degree is the client aware of the relationship with it-her-him? (4) Which feelings does the client usually have toward it-her-him? (5) How intensely does the client feel toward it-her-him? (6) What does the client expect will usually happen in the relationship with it-her-him?

A variety of clusters or constellations of relationships would offer us valuable information about planning the course of counseling. Simply the number of relationships a client reports would have meaning, to say nothing of the variety of relationships and their differing intensities. A person who lives with her dog, watches sitcoms on TV, and won’t buy a newspaper because of all the bad news carried in the headlines is surely markedly different from the person who relates to adult children, writes frequently to her friends, belongs to several social groups, and reads the latest bestsellers.

Great discoveries could be made in the realm of relationships by focusing upon the questions noted above. Number, varies; awareness, feelings, intensity, and expectancies of relationships could yield a multi-dimensional constellation of the personhood of a client. Problem areas as well as gaps would be helpful to both client and counselor. We would learn about "is" and "has been."

The committee meeting image might point toward instruments of assessment which would help us to gain valuable insights into our clients while also honoring who they are. An inventory might be developed which would serve us as effectively as the more traditional tools: the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, The Million Clinical Multiaxial Inventory, and The Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. A comprehensive study of a client’s relationships could offer us the diagnostic information now sought in the usual instruments and clinical assessments. Character structure or personality could be sought in the sustained, enduring, and continuous relationships and the expectations therein, while more transient states of anxiety or depression could be found in the present constellation of relationships.

The idea of assessment gained from the image is that of finding out who is there in the life space of a client. As we draw out implications, the committee member image could lead us in some new directions differing from where assessment devices have led us before. Only if an image points us toward where we should look is it of any practical value.

Assessing the activity of God in committee meetings is a major challenge. In my attempt to define God’s possibilities operationally, I have turned to the grammar book. The subjunctive mood of the verb implies condition, contingency, hypothesis, or possibility. In contrast the indicative or declarative mood tells what has been or is now. The committee meeting image guides us to listen for the "shoulds," "mights," and "coulds" in client language as clues to wishing, yearning, longing, and desiring -- the realm of God’s possibilities. There is no doubt that shoulds and wishing can come from other members of the committee, but there is a higher degree of probability that they are reflecting the divine. The tugs, nips, pulls, and lures are going to be expressed by a client in some form, and the subjunctive may be a beginning in our search.

Such lures need to meet other criteria before even qualifying as likely possibilities from God. Three questions advance the inquiry: Does the lure involve a risk to the client? Does it include some degree of intensity, harmony, diversity, joy, beauty, or love? Does it expand the empathy of the client with all of life? Content analysis might be employed to seek out the frequency of certain verb forms in client talk. Do clients live in the land of the past, imprisoned by who they have been, or do they entertain future possibilities of who they might become?

XI. Questions Inviting Research

Thus far a simple image has been teased out of a theological system and applied to psychotherapy in order to see where it makes a difference in both theory and strategy. The remainder of the essay considers several arenas which invite research.

(1) What if Carl Rogers had attended seminary at Harvard rather than Yale? If Rogers had experienced Whitehead as a mentor, would his system of client centered therapy have come out differently? Would he have stayed with theology rather than entering psychology or would he have devoted himself to integrating the two?

There are a number of similarities between process thought and his theories of psychotherapy as formulated in his basic 1951 work. For example, he employs the following words and phrases: experience, self-in-relationship, process, significance and worth of each person, respect and reliance on the person, and most intriguing, forward-moving tendencies. He writes that "experience must tell its own meaning" (98, 117). He speaks of the self-in-relationship which can be "congruent with the sensory and visceral experiences" (97). This fits well with the committee meeting model.

Further, Rogers writes that our basic hypothesis is "that the individual represents a process which is deeply worthy of respect" (45). He speaks as well of "the inevitability of the process" (117), and that "some process new to his experience is at work within him" (75). The counseling interview is "only a small fraction of what he works out between interviews" (74). Clearly, Rogers is a process thinker.

Of equal importance is Roger’s respect for persons and their capacity to change. He highlights the "significance and worth of each person" (21, 35), and his "respect for and reliance on the capacity of the person" (36, 56).

Particularly intriguing is Roger’s use of "forward moving" and "directional tendencies." Was he allowing room for some type of life force or divine creativity? His own words speak for themselves. Rogers places "basic confidence in the forward-moving tendencies in the human organism" (36). He hints of their nature in the following quotes: ‘‘the forces which make for growth" (122). "forward-moving forces of life itself" (195), "this deeper force" (195), "the observed directional force in organic life -- a force which has been regarded as basic by many scientists," "directional trend," and "directional tendency" (488-89).

Rogers may be referring only to the organic and physiological components of homo sapiens. But the phenomenon he emphasizes is fully compatible with a Whiteheadian interpretation. And the totality of his system is so caring and compassionate that it suggests possible spiritual components. On the other hand, there are no explicitly named concepts in Roger’s system which recognize committee members, sub-personalities, ego-states, or parts. His emphasis lay more in the shifting and transforming of the total constellation of self-statements. Recognition of the complexity of the self would have enriched his client-centered position.

(2) Could Cognitive and Behavior Therapy talk with Process Therapy? These two schools have achieved tremendous practicality, but why is thinking or behavior the epitome of the human endeavor? The committee meeting image, "the occasion of experience," allows many facets to be the most important component in any particular occasion -- thinking, feeling, values, or physical sensations.

Process relational psychotherapy has the potential to be both wider and deeper, with an emphasis not merely on the process of thinking, but also on the gamut of that which might he experienced in relationships at any given time. Beginning with how a person is processing the complexity of her or his relationships may lead to more sophisticated results.

A second area of concern, which follows from the first, is the degree to which cognitive and behavior therapists manage the counseling process. The therapist sets priorities with the client at the beginning of a session and likewise assigns homework to the client upon the closing of a session. Process thought, in contrast, encourages entering and becoming acquainted with a process which is already occurring, then cooperating with those aspects of that process which are luring toward health and allow the new to unfold rather than manage. Dialogue between process-oriented psychotherapists and those committed to cognitive and behavioral therapy would be fruitful.

(3) Can Diagnosis and Treatment Planning Dialogue with Allowing the Process to Unfold? This question bears similarity to the previous one in that both deal with the degree of control exercised by the counselor. The process approach favors facilitating the process. Being convinced of a divine process moving within each client, the counselor engages in increasing awareness of its emerging directions. The counselor seeks to be as totally present and fully open to the words and actions of the client as possible, thereby offering a friendly context for the new, novel, and creative to come forth.

This challenge to cognitive and behavioral therapy is a call for research. How often do clients take an unannounced right turn at the next appointment, when the counselor was ready to move along the earlier established trail? To what degree are counselors able to predict the course and outcome of psychotherapy? Are there certain situations and personality types which call counselors to manage more extensively than others?

(4) Where does process relational psychotherapy fit among other psycho-therapeutic systems? Process belongs nearby the dynamic clinical systems and farther away from the more recently created cognitive and behavioral approaches. The emphasis upon members of the committee would be shared by the ego-states of Transactional Analysis, offspring of Psychoanalysis and its tri-partite design of id, ego, and super-ego, the sub-personalities in contrast to the Self of Psychosynthesis, and the many parts of Gestalt Therapy All consider the person to be complex, constituted of a number of causal agents which influence the becoming of the self.

Family System Theory holds in common with process thought the significance of the matrix, web, or configuration of relationships, although these theories focus more directly upon the interpersonal rather than intrapsychic. Explanations of the behavior of members within a family are sought in the role and status of those persons within the wider system. Systems theories are just as compatible with process thinking as the intrapsychic theories, since relationships are central in both and their designation as outside, interpersonal, or inside, intrapsychic, sets up a false distinction.

Cognitive and behavioral systems have already been addressed, but should be seen as results of the liberation of scientific psychology from the philosophical and theological matrix in which it had its birth. Among the theoretical systems, they represent most clearly the empiricism of twentieth century psychology.

While there are varying degrees of openness to the role of God within the person, none places the divine in the central and causal position of process thought. The Individual Psychology of Carl Jung is probably the most open to the divine and shares interest in Platonic "Forms" named "archetypes" in contrast to Whitehead’s "eternal objects."

None of the systems make a claim to be a cosmology attempting to explain every event occurring throughout the universe, but rather each is conceived as a theory describing human endeavors.

(5) Will process relational psychotherapy be part of the growing post-modern movement? Since presenting this paper, I have become aware of four postmodern statements, which were not available when I wrote (Jordan, Kvale, Wolleat, Olds). It appears that a movement is forming. For years the Stone Center colloquia have been exploring the concept of "self-in-relationship" (see Jordan), while a symposium on postmoderity in psychology was held in Denmark in 1989. Titles are suggestive. In 1992 Olds’ book, Metaphors in Interrelatedness: Toward a Systems Theory of Psychology, was published, and Wolleat’s article appeared in October 1993 entitled "Environmental Counseling: Post-modern Counseling Psychology" Process relational psychotherapy should participate in these developments.

Speaking confessionally, the committee meeting image has worked for me. It was conceived in the counseling office and has grown and changed in the years I have employed it. I find clients liking the image and the style it encourages. It has pleased me that the image has been gleaned not only from practice, but also from a cosmology which intends to explain everything everywhere. I sense this imaginal work to be only in the "Model-T" stage of development and to be calling for more reflection and research.

Process relational psychotherapy is truly the "new kid on the block" and needs significant help in growing up gracefully Recalling Whitehead’s belief that it is more important that an idea be interesting than that it be true, I hope that some interest has been generated.

Works Cited

Briggs Myers. Isabel and Mary H. McCaulley. Manual: A Guide to the Development and Use of the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. Palo Alto: Consulting Psychologists, 1985.

Brizee, Robert. Where in the World is God? Nashville: Upper Room, 1987.

Brown, Delwin. To Set at Liberty: Christian Faith and Human Freedom. Mary Knoll, NY: Orbis, 1981.

Cobb, John B. Jr. Theology and Pastoral Care. Philadelphia: Fortress, 1977.

-- "Psychotherapy in a Christian Whiteheadian Perspective." Conference paper on Process Psychotherapy. Claremont. 1984.

Ford, Lewis S. "The Emergence of Temporal Atomicity." The Emergence of Whitehead’s Metaphysics 1925-1929. Albany: State U of New York P, 1984. 51-66.

Hathaway, S. R. and J. C. McKinley. Manual Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory. New York: The Psychological Corporation, 1967.

Jackson, Gordon E. Pastoral Care and Process Theology. New York: UP of America, 1981.

Jordan, Judith et. al., Women’s Growth in Connection. New York: Guilford, 1991.

Keller, Catherine. "The Selves of Psyche." From a Broken Web: Separation, Sexism, and Self. Boston: Beacon, 1986. 155-216.

Kvale, Steiner Psychology and Postmodernism. London: Sage, 1992.

Millon, Theodore. Manual for the MCMI-II. Minneapolis: National Computer Systems, 1987.

Olds, Linda. Metaphors of Interrelatedness. Albany: State U of New York P, 1992.

Rogers, Carl R. Client-Centered Therapy. Boston: Houghton, 1951.

Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. "The Process Model." God Christ Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology. New York: Crossroad, 1982. 12-21.

Wolleat, Patricia. "Environmental Counseling: Postmodern Counseling Psychology." The Counseling Psychologist 21 (1993): 628-34.

Hartshorne’s theory of divine relativity asserts that God is thoroughly related to human experience through a process of the feeling of feeling.¹ Divine relativity means just that: "In the depths of their hearts all creatures . . . defer to God because they sense him as the one who alone is adequately moved by what moves them. He alone not only knows but feels . . . how they feel . . ." (DR: xvii). This understanding of God’s relationship to the world has been enormously influential in contemporary philosophy of religion, especially since the publication in 1948 of The Divine Relativity from which the above quotation was taken.² Although the consistency of divine relativity with the understanding of simultaneity in modem physics is a recognized point of contention, the question I wish to ask is whether the theory of divine relativity is metaphysically possible.³ How could it be possible for God to know and feel the different experiences of radically distinct subjects with equal vividness all at the same time? On the surface, this question does not seem problematical for even humans can know opposites such as pleasure and pain or good and evil within the same instant. But the theory of divine relativity assumes a finer and deeper knowledge of reality than that evidenced by human knowing with its dependence upon sense experience and abstract universals. Divine relativity asserts that God knows without deficit the reality of the world. This divine omniscience is so intertwined with actuality; and so intimate ‘with the reality of the world, that it might be called experiential or even sympathetic knowledge. God is a mirror of the world, so to speak.⁴

As seen through the lens of divine relativity, the type of knowing postulated of divinity is infinitely stronger than the kind of knowing possible for human beings. This entails that God is in possession of the inner quality of radically diverse experiences of a multitude of subjects, while at the same time being in possession of an experience of totality. Although the thesis that God’s actuality is relative to the world is commendable for providing philosophical categories with which to picture both God’s compassion for suffering individuals and God’s immanence within the world, there is considerable reason to question the consistency of a being that simultaneously feels fragmentation and infinity. I will argue that the type of divine relativity developed in Hartshorne’s writings is not consistent. Divine relativity cannot solve the problem of how an infinite being could fully sympathize with a finite and fragmentary part of reality; an issue I will call the problem of radical particularity.⁵

I. General Aspects of the Problem

However much we recognize a profound ontological difference between elements of the world, including a fundamental difference between ourselves, many philosophers of religion want to say that God knows and empathizes with human experience in a way similar to divine relativity for several reasons: omniscience, a resolution to theodicy, and ontological unity. First God is thought to be omniscient. God knows all things. However, if God does not know what my experience is really like, then God does not have accurate knowledge of my realm of existence. As Hartshorne asks, ". . . [W]hat does it mean to know what sorrow is, but never to have sorrowed, never to have felt the quality of suffering. I find nothing in my experience that gives meaning to this set of words," (DR 55). Similarly, what does it mean to know what pain is without ever having experienced pain? Furthermore, having experienced enough pain to be able to know what pain is in general does not ensure the capability to know the precise nature and extent of a particular occasion of pain. Therefore, once one begins to posit divine relativity, it is hard to stop short of stating that God, in fact, feels the totality of existence. And Hartshorne does just that: "The eminent form of sympathetic dependence can only apply to deity; for this form cannot be less than an omniscient sympathy, which depends upon and is exactly colored by every nuance of joy or sorrow anywhere in the world (DR 48). We are faced with a choice between stating: (1) God only knows in general and abstractly what the world is, or (2) God knows the world intimately and subjectively; feeling without remainder the feelings of others. An adequate account of omniscience, therefore, seems to necessitate divine relativity.

In spite of the fact that Hartshorne universally posits a strong sense of relativity to account for omniscience (as well as for other reasons), I will argue that even Hartshorne is forced in important specific cases to attenuate his claims for a strong interpretation of divine relativity; one that says God feels in exactitude the experience of others. The ability to empathize with or to mirror ignorance, for example, does not seem compatible with a being who possesses perfect knowledge of abstract universals and concrete particulars. Even if God is thought of as having slightly less than perfect knowledge, the idea of God being able to fully appreciate ignorance seems categorically impossible.⁶ There are further problems for the theory of divine relativity. Could a human experience with all its subtle mixture of contentment and worry make sense to a being who has eternally existed in perfect peace and joy? Indeed, what would the experience of the passing of time or death mean for an eternal (e-ternal being?⁷ We will deal with these problems in more detail later.

Secondly; for religious reasons many wish to believe that God empathizes with creation and that people are not alone in the crush of experience. God is the balm that heals all wounds. The problem of theodicy can be solved, or at least relativized, this way -- there is no God completely distinct from this world who looks down coldly upon this cave-like existence. God is not totaliter aliter (entirely other). Rather, God empathizes with our lives. The patient suffering of pain is a good, and God should be part of that good. As Hartshorne writes in Man’s Vision of God: "Being ethical means acting from love; but love means realization in oneself of the desires and experiences of others, so that one who loves can in so far inflict suffering only by undergoing this suffering himself; willingly and fully" (MVG 31). This is one of Hartshorne’s best arguments for divine relativity and possesses, perhaps, the most immediate appeal.

Nevertheless, another way to relativize suffering would be to place it in the context of a world linked to a transcendently blissful Being, a perfect jewel in a setting of good and evil. This Being would be a source of hope and the goal of unmitigated beatific vision toward which all seekers could, through love, direct their wills. Hartshorne’s position, too, incorporates this aspect of the divine, but, as I will argue later, at the cost of a systemic contradiction between two elements or poles of God.⁸

Thirdly; if God did not feel with us, if God were not "the fellow sufferer who understands," to use Whitehead’s phrase (PR 351), there would be an area of being distinct from God. If God is separate in existence, then there is a realm of being where God is not. Many philosophers of religion want to say that being must in some way actually be God or, at least, derive from God. The dilemma may be expressed in this way. If one focuses on the fact that the power of being (esse) of things ultimately comes from God, one can lose the being of the world in an acosmic pantheism. But if one focuses on the being that things have on their own (the being of beings), one can lose the being of God in an atheistic existentialism. If God does not mirror the world and thereby unify it, we are left with a fundamental dualism between different levels of being Contingent being would appear to possess its own arena and validity apart from God, making it independent of the Ultimate. Contrariwise, divine relativity can make sense of omnipresence, especially when seen in terms of Hartshorne’s understanding of the world being the body of God: "For God there is no external environment, the divine body just is the spatial whole; moreover, this body is vividly and distinctly perceived" (OOTM 94). However, the prima facie favoring of a monistic Whole or relative Totality must face a great deal of questioning before it negates a view of the world as a pluralistic and diverse many.

In the areas of omniscience, theodicy and omnipresence, divine relativity appears to have the potential to make significant contributions. Furthermore, the theory of divine relativity raises profound religious and philosophical issues related to the three areas in a direct and heuristically helpful manner. One could argue that one of the fundamental problems which many religions seek to address (although each with a different vocabulary) is articulated in the following questions: What kind of Being could know birth and death, ecstasy and terror, in the same instant? How can God or the Ultimate totally empathize with me in my joy and at the same time with others in their pain? How can God experience a thousand joys and a thousand sorrows in one drop of experience? Many philosophers of religion want to say that God empathizes with our deepest experiences, for otherwise people are, at their core, alone in the cosmos. Yet there are contradictory experiences within the cosmos that seem to prevent a sympathetic God.

This fundamental religious problem can also be cast in philosophical terms as the problem of radical particularity. We are radically particular and individual. How can the Infinite relate to us? How can God have empathy with a radically limited being? How can something that sees beyond all boundaries know what it is like to be something that is within boundaries and by compassion to mirror in exactitude that entity’s experience? In this essay, I will argue that a major problem with the idea of divine relativity is that it assumes both God’s exact knowledge of the whole, which is thus the One as it is a unified act of knowledge, and also precise knowledge of the fragmentary, concrete Many of experience. How can the master know the slave? How can the unbounded assume the mantle of bounded life? In other terms, the question is one regarding the precise parameters of the sameness and otherness of God and the created (or emanated) world.

There are, as far as I can tell, two areas of possible inconsistency with the idea of divine relativity. In the first, the assertion that God knows the experience of one element of the world while also knowing the experience of a second element of the world having the opposite sort of experience (for example, horror instead of ecstasy) seems inconsistent. Here, the problem is the relation between two parts of the whole. This is a problem not only if the elements are having opposite experiences but also if they are having merely different experiences. The problem of unifying otherness or difference is, even at this level, problematic.

Secondly, it seems inconsistent to say that God has knowledge of fragments of reality with their limits and finitude while also being in possession of knowledge of the entire reality of the whole. In this case, the relation between a single part, a fragment of the totality, and the entire whole is the problematic area. Ironically; Hartshorne’s position does not seem to incorporate his own insight into fragmentariness:

Could God sympathize with radical fragmentariness -- not just know what it is, but know sympathetically what it means to exist fragmentedly as we undoubtedly exist? If not, the divine cannot be fully related to the world. Because of the problem of radical particularity, any resolution to the problem of the One to the Many seems logically and metaphysically impossible working from the presupposition of divine relativity. On the other hand, it is also ironically apparent that the denial of divine relativity obstructs a solution to the problem of the One and the Many because the Many would remain isolated and there does not seem to be another way of unifying them.

If, in fact, divine relativity should prove to be inconsistent, the implications are important for theology as a discipline. Not only would a demonstration of the inconsistency of divine relativity make Hartshorne’s thesis of divine relativity and all that depends on it incoherent and also make Whitehead’s famous portrait of God as the fellow sufferer who understands inadmissible, but philosophers of religion would have to accept a different picture of the world. It would be a world of distinct subjects or atomic acts of consciousness whose knowledge of God would be separated by a subject-object distinction. Even worse, God’s knowledge of other subjects would itself be objective and not alive to the nuances of subjectivity. The goal of providing any meaning whatsoever to unity or to the One, as that which does the All together, would be futile. Radical pluralism, then, would be the only possible metaphysical position because internal relations would, in the end, be impossible.⁹ The implications go beyond whether or not a specific theory of God’s interaction with the world is possible and reach to fundamental theological and religious questions: Can God empathize with my suffering? Am I alone?

The type of philosophical theology that would result from the conclusion that God cannot feel human experience exactly or "from the inside" would, most likely, entail a transcendent God whose immanence was not empathetic but, if anything, objective. Ultimately, then, God would be conceived as Other and as Holy; perhaps as the "normative" Judeo-Christian-Islamic tradition has asserted all along in its much maligned dogmatic theology; while leaving mystical assertions of identity and oneness suspect. Shockingly, however, also suspect would be theologies like those of Jesus (as far as scholars can estimate) and the writers of the Gospels and the Psalms for whom God knew the recesses of the heart.

II. Divine Relativity and Internal Cognitive Relations

Part of the impetus for the idea of divine relativity comes from Hartshorne’s interpretation of the Thomistic theory of knowledge in which the knower is in an internal cognitive relation to the known. The thing known is in an external relation to the known -- the knowing does not constitute the essence of the object. The knower must be related to the object, not the other way around. In the Thomistic doctrine, this applied to all knowers except the Supreme Knower: "It was indeed the Thomistic doctrine that in knowledge, apart from God, it is the knower who is really related to the known, not the known to the knower. . . . In knowing, we enjoy relation to things that are what they are without regard to the fact that we know them" (DR 7). Hartshorne, however, extends human epistemology to God, meaning that in order for God to know everything, God must be related internally to all. An "absolute" mind, Hartshorne concludes, would be unrelated to known things and hence not a mind at all. Hartshorne is counter-intuitive, saving that, not only is God relative to the known, but more related to the known than are human knowers. God’s knowledge of the world is relative. Hartshorne thus disagrees with the Thomistic notion of divine thought:

But God’s knowledge is different: ". . . it is precisely the ideal case of knowledge, knowledge absolute in certainty and complete adequacy to the known, that must in some other aspects be literally and unrestrictedly relative" (DR 9). The tradition had often conceived of God as omniscient while at the same time internally distant from what is known. For Hartshorne, God is in fact literally relative (absolutely relative) to all that can be known. We are merely relatively relative in the sense that we know only a small portion of what can be known.

Implicit in the hierarchy of knowers is Hartshorne’s scale of being in which at the bottom there is minimal relation to others. His example is the oyster which is not related to much of the world. In the middle are humans who are related to a greater range and type of experience. And at the top is the "eminent individual" (DR 48) who is related to and therefore can know all. As Hartshorne states, the idea of sympathetic knowing has much in common with Whitehead’s account of knowing and causation as prehension or as a "feeling of feeling" (DR 29). Hartshorne connects the ideas of relative and absolute in the act of knowing: "Unrestricted or literal relativity; so far from being the mere de facto character of our inferior human knowledge, is rather the precise ideal of knowledge in its most absolute meaning" (DR 10). The single case of absolute knowledge that the tradition sought is found only in the case of absolute relativity. Only by remaining faithful to the requirements of relativity can we conceptualize God as the absolute knower, as omniscient.

An analogy with John Searle’s Chinese Box (MBS) might prove helpful. In his attempt to combat computational, algorithmic views of artificial intelligence, Searle concocted the idea of the Chinese Box, a machine that knows how to communicate in Chinese. It would operate like a computer. Inputs of conversational Chinese are entered and processed, resulting in outputs of conversational Chinese. These results are so authentic that one could not tell the difference between what the Box says and what a native speaker would say; that is, the Box can pass the Turing test. Inside the Box is a person who does not know a word of Chinese. He or she is able to respond to inputs by using hundreds of volumes of dictionaries, grammars, etc., for responding to various characters that are seeing input before them. Thus, if the Box could work (and Searle says it could not), it would produce conversational Chinese, that is, the Box would "know" Chinese.

Searle’s coup de grace is that the person inside the Box, although producing Chinese, would not really know what the conversation is all about. Those who attack the Chinese Box idea, however, respond by saying that the Box as a whole does understand Chinese. Searle responds that the person in the Box can be thought of as the correlate of the CPU, the Central Processing Unit of the computer (in this case the Box), and it does not understand, really, what is being said, which it should. Searle’s opponents might then say that the understanding of Chinese is in the rules and dictionaries given in the Box and the functioning of the whole. Searle would respond by saying that this contradicts the ordinary language meaning of "knowing a language," but nevertheless, the point here is one about the type of knowledge in the person operating the Box. Does the person really know Chinese? We would say no, for the person can give no meanings to the words. He or she is just following rules.

In a similar manner, Hartshorne is asking about the kind of knowledge that God has of the world. Is it merely a factual report about what has happened in the world, or does God’s knowledge participate in the actuality of the world? Just as we would say that the person in the Chinese Box has no real knowledge of Chinese, Hartshorne would say that God does not have real knowledge of the world unless God is a sympathetic knower. As we saw, Hartshorne asks whether we or God could know what sorrow was without having ever felt that tinge of melancholic sadness (DR 56). Many linguists and computer programmers would say that the knowledge of a natural language can never be reduced to dictionaries and grammars. On analogy; Hartshorne would say that God’s knowledge of the world is never abstract but always concrete and participatory. As a result of his understanding of what it means to possess knowledge, Hartshorne concludes God not only knows but feels. Divine knowledge of the world presumes that God feels what everything else feels, so much so that, to use words Hartshorne does not, we are rivulets poured into the ocean of God’s encompassing feeling.

III. Divine Relativity and the Soul-Body Analogy

Hartshorne uses the analogy of a human being feeling the experiences of its cells for God’s participatory knowledge of the world. This is an further extrapolation of the idea of divine relativity; and it is found perhaps most fully developed in Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes. Referring to Plato’s depiction of a "world soul" in the Timaeus, Hartshorne posits that just as people have a mutual relationship of response and reaction between the cells of their body and themselves, there is a similar mutual relationship of feeling between God and cell-like elements within the world: atoms, cells, people. Hartshorne describes the soul-body analogy for the relationship of God and world as follows:

Inclusive hierarchies of sentient beings are possible. An animal, for example, is composed of cells, which are further composed of atoms, all of which can feel. All of these -- animals, cells and atoms -- are thus called "organisms" by Whitehead, one of Hartshorne’s main sources for his psychicalism. "Aggregates" of cell-like organisms such as stones or trees are unfeeling collections of entities which can feel. Of course, the analogy breaks down at several points as Hartshorne acknowledges (OOTM 134), but the important aspect of this psychicalism is that there is a mutuality of feeling between God and elements of the world.

Basically, the soul-body analogy is the familiar theory of divine relativity explained by a helpful picture. In that theory, God has a supreme and even transcendent power to know and feel the experiences of others, In the soul-body analogy; this is also evident. The relation between the divine soul of the world and cellular organisms is closer than that between human beings and their cells: "There can therefore be no special part of the cosmos recognizable as a nervous system. The whole cosmos must everywhere directly communicate with God, each member furnishing its own psychical content its feelings or thoughts) to the Soul" (OOTM 135). In the soul-body analogy; God’s knowledge of the world is transcendent in that it transcends human knowledge of bodily events because God is attuned to all while we are attuned to only our nervous system (and even that knowledge is imperfect). There is a "two-way bridge of sympathy" between the soul of the world (God) and the elements within the world. As Hartshorne asserts: "Infallibly and with unrivaled adequacy aware of all others, God includes others -- not, as we do, in a mostly indistinct or largely unconscious manner, but with full clarity and consciousness" (DR 110).

God’s complete knowledge of the world is required for an important aspect of God’s relationship to the world. This aspect is the provision of a goal or a "subjective aim" for individuals within the cosmos. In order for God to be the principle of limitation which limits chaos by providing ordered patterns, God must have two sources of information: knowledge of the empirical situation (what is actual and knowledge of the best way it can be directed to the Good (what is possible). The better the information, the better the goal or "lure" that can be provided. Since the goal defines the Good for individuals within the world, it must be based upon perfect, or at least the best possible, data.

Regarding knowledge of possibility, we can, for present purposes, avoid discussing the well-known difference between Whitehead and Hartshorne as to whether God has a primordial vision of all eternal objects (possibility), as Whitehead asserts, or whether God derives eternal objects from the world, as Hartshorne does. In either case, God would have knowledge of all the possibility that was knowable and hence God could provide the best goal for the individual. Thus, the second field of knowledge required by God in order to provide an optimal lure for actual entities, that of possibility; is not problematic for our present concern.

In order to provide a lure for the Good, God must have knowledge of what is actually occurring in the world. Hartshorne mentions why this field of knowledge is necessary: "Does not ethical or practical infallibility belong with cognitive infallibility?" (DR 127). It is hard to imagine God providing a subjective aim (or goal) to individuals if God had no sense for the exact amount of pain, for example, the individual could bear without breaking down. Hartshorne’s theory of divine relativity allows God to know in exactitude the experience of the individual whereas a denial of divine relativity does not. In order to provide an "infallible" guide for actuality; a "divine lure," God requires cognitive infallibility; an in-depth knowledge of the world, precisely what only divine relativity and the assertion that the world is the body of God can fully explain, or so it is claimed.

The rationale for divine relativity is clearly found in all the aspects of Hartshorne’s thought we have discussed. Specifically; it is found in the assertion of the internal relation of the knower to the known, the soul-body analogy, and the knowledge of actuality required by God to provide a lure to the Good. For these reasons, the idea of divine relativity is usually accepted by Hartshorne without dwelling on the contradictions of the theory which we identified earlier and will now expand upon. The thesis that Hartshorne has maintained through many decades is forcefully and clearly articulated from his early work in The Divine Relativity to later books such as Creative Synthesis and Philosophic Method where he writes: "God cannot face his own death, whether nobly or ignobly; but he can face any and every real death threat "with full participation in the sufferings of those whose death is in question" (CSPM 263). Using Berdyaev and Whitehead as support, he castigates a "mere spectator God" who surveys human suffering while remaining in a state of happiness.

Interestingly, however, Hartshorne himself balks at the absoluteness of his own principle of relativity: "God knows fully and feels fully . . . what our unhappy fears are like for us, and this without being afraid for himself"(CSPM 263, original italics). What does it mean to fully experience fear or the suffering inherent in dying while not being afraid or mortal? Could a being fully appreciate the terror of murder, for example, while confident of continued existence and the metaphysical impossibility of death? And could such a being commiserate with fear while safely cognizant of its inability to be harmed? Hartshorne, I think, cannot answer such questions and admits as much in a statement, which, though parenthetical to the prior statements I have cited, indicates just how far we are from an analytically clear understanding of divine knowledge: "If this [knowing fear without being afraid] is a paradox so is any idea of adequate knowledge" (CSPM 263). Although Hartshorne has not articulated the inconsistencies of the idea of divine relativity as openly as we did earlier, it seems that he is willing to take recourse in something like a spectator God who remains in "mere happiness" (not fearing) just as much as Plato denied existence to forms of negative elements of the world such as mud. If Hartshorne’s position could be interpreted as a middle position between full divine participation and mere observation, divine sympathy could be seen as true sympathy without a mirroring of particular existence.

IV. Contradictory Elements of Divine Relativity

We can now look in more detail at some of the problems with the theory of divine relativity by starting with inconsistencies which are evident, though not prominent, in several of Hartshorne’s own writings. In Man’s Vision of God Hartshorne discusses the idea of dipolarity: "Any changing enduring thing, indeed, has two aspects: the aspect of identity; or what is common to the thing in its earlier and later stages, and the aspect of novelty" (MVG 109). Applying this to God, Hartshorne is comfortable saying that there is an immutable element in God, namely God’s righteousness and wisdom. Yet God is also changing as the world changes and sympathetically reacting to the world. For Hartshorne, dipolarity does not divide the divine into two natures. Rather, God’s unity is preserved:

In this context Hartshorne begins to ask whether his idea of divine relativity, which presupposes a dipolar aspect of God containing absolute and relative natures, can unify itself. It can, he says. In the Thomistic tradition, this question was raised in terms of the simplicity of God (MVG 111). Hartshorne agrees that he must give up divine simplicity (in the Medieval sense), but he is more than willing to do that because, for him, simplicity was directed against relativity from the beginning.

Nevertheless, Hartshorne’s response seems inadequate. He has not shown how dipolarity is consistent with the unity of God when faced with the problem of radical particularity. This failure also applies when he tries to base dipolarity on temporal differentiation, because using time to distinguish moments of divine experience would require a fundamental reworking of the notion of eternity, which Hartshorne has not done. The eternal and temporal aspects of God remain as distinct as the immutable and changing poles as a result of stress fractures caused by problems with divine relativity. Thus, although Hartshorne argues for divine unity, his arguments, I will seek to show, are vitiated by problems surrounding the inclusion and exclusion of elements of the world from within God.

Hartshorne’s understanding of love as relation is the foundation for his conception of divine relativity. Whether love must be conceived this way seems open to debate, but the power of his concept of God remains. This theology of love develops into an uncannily powerful theory, but a theory whose contradictions are obliquely beginning to become revealed:

When the thesis of divine relativity is reset in terms of divine love, a love which seems to require sympathy, the thesis, which at first seemed counter-intuitive (for many are accustomed to thinking of God as transcendent and impassible), becomes transparently benign. Yet even in this passage, there is a duality between the relative nature of God and the abstract nature of God. Holding the two aspects of God, relative and absolute, together involves a major contradiction, even with Hartshorne’s reworking of the ideas of actuality and immutability. A further contradiction is within the relative pole. If God experiences the suffering and the joy of the world, does God also experience personal sin or ethical failure? Hartshorne is forced to ask if God knows and must experience the quality of evil:

Therefore, it does not seem possible for God to "be" evil. In more traditional terms, God cannot experience the evil inherent in sinful action.

In later writings, such as Omnipotence and Other Theological Mistakes, there is a similar ambivalence, this time about the experience of inferior emotions:

". . . God is losing in the sense of feeling, with unique adequacy, the feelings of all others, entirely free from inferior emotions (except as vicariously participated in or sympathetically objectified . . ." (DR 39, original italics). Even human beings, according to Hartshorne, do not feel the feelings of all of their cells. Yet God must know the processes within each cell because, as he says here, God feels the feeling of all others. If anything, God should feel the pain and anxiety of a human body and brain more than the actual person, for God feels the feelings of the person as a whole as well as feeling with "unique adequacy" all of the body’s cells. God, then, par excellence, should feel more deeply the pains and inferior emotions of the world.

In an attempt to cover these kind of cases, Hartshorne makes a distinction between different senses of inclusion. God experiences the act of doing evil in the sense of discord, but not the ignorance of the concerns and needs of others. But then the problem is that God does not know, empathize or relate to human ignorance, one of the most important conditions which we experience because it constantly restricts our ability to cope with the demands of life. If God cannot relate to our situation of ineradicable ignorance, in what manner can we say that God truly knows us? This problem is in fact the same question we discussed earlier; namel~ whether God can understand radical individuality and particularity. Here this problem is applied to the specific cases of ignorance and evil. The answer Hartshorne offers is that God is qualified by aesthetic not moral or cognitive evil. But human beings an qualified by moral and cognitive evil. How does God know and empathize with humans in their lived existential situation? Hartshorne can only answer in terms of aesthetic evil, that is, under a different umbrella. I find this contradicts divine relativity

It is clear that Hartshorne would say minimally that God is affected by our experience to a great extent. But does this level of compassion imply that God also feels exactly as we feel so that there exists an identical moment of the contingent within Divinity? Is God a mirror to the world? How far is Hartshorne willing to take the relativity thesis? As we have seen, because God is supremely relative, affected by others in the best possible way, and feels the experiences of others better than any other, God does mirror the experience of the world. But since there are mutually contradictory elements of experience in the world, it would seem impossible for God to feel one person’s pain and someone else’s happiness simultaneously. It would also seem absurd to say that God experiences my fragmentariness, my radical limitation, and at the same time experiences something more, for experiencing something more is precisely what my fragmentariness cannot accomplish. Divine relativity, as delineated by Hartshorne, cannot overcome the problem of radical particularity.

V. Contradictions in Dipolarity and Dual Transcendence

Partly to provide a way of conceptualizing God’s transcendence over evil, and in part for other systemic reasons which we need not cover now, Hartshorne is forced to introduce a dualistic account of the divine nature. He, like Whitehead, will have a "dipolar" God, but in a different way.¹⁰ For Hartshorne, the dialectic is between the abstract and the concrete: "The supreme in its total concrete reality will be the supereminent case of relativity, the Surrelative, just as, in its abstract character, it will be the supereminent case of nonrelativity -- not only absolute, but the absolute" (DR 76).¹¹ These two poles are not said to be separate entities but are, rather, aspects of a unified divine essence. Hartshorne has tried to find a moment of transcendence in the absolute pole of the divine essence. Whether the level of transcendence achieved is adequate is problematical, for this allegedly transcendent pole remains relative to the world. Since there are no eternal objects or pre-existing forms in Hartshorne’s view, the function of the abstract pole of God cannot be solely one of the valuation of such entities as it is for Whitehead. This is perhaps the reason why God must always have a world for Hartshorne, otherwise the mind of God would be empty. The fact that Hartshorne can give little meaning to the "absolute Absolute’s" functioning apart from contingency indicates strongly that there may be a failure in his theology to account completely for what many theologians have thought of as the transcendence or holiness of God.

The dipolarity of God can be described in terms of causation, Hartshorne conceives of God, not only as the cause of the world, the first cause, but as the "effect of all" (DR 80). This a clear similarity to Whitehead’s consequent nature of God which prehends the entirety of the universe. Just as Hartshorne claimed that God is not only the knower of all, but known by all, he now claims that God not only causes all (in a supreme but non-determinative sense), but is the supreme effect of all. By being the effect of all, God prehends or feels all that is and in this way has perfect knowledge. God is all-inclusively omniscient. As supreme effect God does seem to mirror the world.

In his idea of "dual transcendence," which is later terminology for dipolarity, Hartshorne attempts to hold together the two aspects of his thought about the divine nature. One aspect of God "exists" in perfection. This is the abstract nature of God which can be known to exist by the second form of Anselm’s ontological proof. The second aspect of God is the concrete, self-surpassing God fully related to the world. This is God’s "actuality," never fully perfected, for that is a meaningless idea, but always fully inclusive. How do they relate and form a single entity? They are unified by using the principle that the concrete includes the abstract: "[B]y the old Aristotelian principle, the abstract or general is real in the concrete or particular, not separately. Hence transcendent or universal relativity includes all that is positive in transcendent absoluteness or independence" (CSPM 233; also DR 46). As Aristotle thought concerning forms and individuals, the general is real only in the particular. This seems coherent enough: "No rule of logic forbids saying that a thing has a property and also its negative, provided the positive and the negative properties are referred to the thing in diverse aspects. The same reality may in one aspect be universally open to influence, and in another aspect universally closed to influence" (CSPM 233). The sheer existence of God is the absolutely transcendent, for only it can be known a priori. The actuality of God is the relatively transcendent which means that God is related to each individual in a way that transcends the capacity of any other to relate to beings different from itself.

As the unified personal Deity combining absolute and relative transcendence (the relative is the locus of the personal concrete pole), God is "unsurpassably inclusive and also unsurpassably integrated or unified. He is the all as an individual being" (CSPM 236). Certainly, it seems possible, in general, to attain systematic unity by positing two aspects of the Ultimate which are connected by a principle able to relate those two aspects. Nevertheless, in the form in which it is presently articulated, it does not work. We may grant that since Plotinus, God has been thought of as a unity, as the One. But Plotinus also postulated a level of Nous, the Divine Mind, in which multiplicity was known. This division between the One and the Divine Mind, however, remains difficult to make systematically consistent. In Hartshorne’s theology, which excludes some particulars such as inferior emotions or ignorance from divine experience, it is particularly difficult to see how the All could be "an individual being." The claim that the concrete contains the abstract cannot overcome the problem of radical particularity. In part, this is because the contradiction resides at the level of the concrete -- there are incompatible concrete experiences. And in part, this is because the inclusion of the abstract is the inclusion of an aspect of God that is not consistent with those emotions and experiences that are contained in the concrete aspect of God.

This leaves Hartshorne with the contradiction (a mystery of the sort he railed against in The Divine Reality) that God is "utterly independent of this All," yet internally related to all (DR 88-89). In both dipolarity and dual transcendence, God’s experience is not merely the experience of the world. God possesses not just our limited experiences of joy; but has a divine bliss, a real and existing joy independent of the world. By utter independence, Hartshorne is providing a conceptual apparatus that could describe God’s transcendence, just as relationality offers us a framework for understanding immanence. But for reasons that we have touched upon, this conceptual framework is not adequate in portraying God’s relationship to the world. Hartshorne does not often comment on the dialectical and almost contradictory nature of his di-polar God even when clearly evident as in the following: "God, on the other hand, in his actual or relative aspect, unqualifiedly or with full effectiveness has or contains us; while in his absolute aspect he is the least inclusive of all individuals" (DR 92). What holds together the relative, which is radically inclusive, to the absolute, which is radically Other, the least inclusive?¹² Hartshorne’s understanding of transcendence and immanence thus continues to be tenuous at best. Ultimately, Hartshorne’s view of God as absolute and relative has an unresolved problematic How can both sides of the dipolarity of God be held together?

This is similar to the question we asked earlier: How can God know the fragmentariness of a human person while simultaneously knowing the totality of unfragmented being? It could be that no explanation of these questions is possible, that this is just the essential nature of reality. Supporters of divine relativity might use the example of parental love to show how this could be. We observe that a parent can feel a simultaneity of conflicting emotions when one child dies while another is saved in a single tragic accident. Here the parent feels the emotion of joy for the safety of one child and sorrow for the loss of the other. How could one person feel both at the same time? It seems impossible, yet to deny that it happens involves a denial of our basic, indubitable, ordinary world. By analogy, God knows our experience yet is in complete bliss simultaneously.¹³

The analogy with the parent breaks down, however, because only God can fully sympathize with others. Parents, however much they love and sorrow for a child, are separated from their offspring by an ontological abyss. But God, according to Hartshorne, feels fully even contradictory emotions. Yet even if we were to grant to human beings the capacity for full empathy of emotion, it would still be impossible for a single human being to feel contradictory emotions. A human being could not be in a state of ecstatic joy and a state of existential boredom at the same time. Perhaps, however, we should not read human emotional limitations into an infinite being. Perhaps it would be possible for God to contain more than a single person could. But what would it mean for God to experience the extremes of all emotions simultaneously? Considering that emotions are exclusionary (joy excludes sorrow, boredom excludes excitement), is it metaphysically possible for any being to contain such radically different experiences? We can conclude that there are contradictory aspects of Hartshorne’s dipolar God and the theory of dual transcendence.

We are left with several telling questions. Do apparent contradictions in the concept of an absolute-relative God imply that it is a self-contradictory idea? And we are still left with a question of singular importance for religious life. Does God mirror the world? After all that has been said, it is still possible to claim that the concept of divine relationality is powerful and reflects important religious sentiments.¹⁴ It certainly dulls the edge of the theodicy problem by removing the sense of injustice immediately apparent in the idea of a blissful God creating suffering humans. However, the idea of a Wholly Other God immersed in total bliss also has mythic and mystical support. Just as there are ways to support a conception of an empathetic God, there are ways that a conception of a blissful God can relativize the problem of evil. In conclusion, even though Hartshorne himself questions divine relativity in the case of inferior emotions and ignorance, we have seen that, for any particular experience, the assertion that the relative nature of God knows that experience by feeling it in exactitude is unwarranted.

VI. Conclusion

Perhaps the way to resolve the contradictions inherent in the theory of divine relativity would be to give up the suggestion that God feels the feelings of the world in exactitude. This is, of course, one of the pillars of Hartshorne’s complex, admirable and justly influential theology. Nevertheless, such drastic surgery may be necessary to save the whole.

As a result of the problem of radical particularity, we are forced then to consider the possibility that God does not know our experience as it is. That would seem to be the most basic sort of knowledge that a worshipful God should have, since God’s knowledge is not sympathetic, then perhaps in some fundamental way we are alone. John McDermott suggests, in an extreme way, such a state of human existence when he writes: "In short, I believe that the being of being is to be disconnected, ontologically adrift, casting a net here, a hook there and all the while confusing a strategy with a solution" (PAPA 11). While I would not go that far, I think McDermott’s statement accurately describes what is at stake in deciding whether or not God has participatory knowledge of the world. The impossibility of divine relativity, should it in the end be shown to be inconsistent, would, I think, be theologically disconcerting.

On the other hand, finding a unitary principle for the manifold of discreet entities, which includes human experience, is made problematic by a denial of divine relativity because the relative nature of God did at least that unify the world into an ordered and organic whole. However, a failure at identifying a metaphysically coherent concept of unity does not entail that there is no principle of goodness above or within the cosmos. What I have shown is that how the relative nature of God is presented in neoclassical theism may have to change, not that there is no God, nor that all conceptions of God are impossible or meaningless.

More specifically, how do we reconceptualize the three concerns of traditional theology which seemed to call for divine relativity if, in fact, the thesis that God feels the world is not acceptable? My results regarding divine relativity are tentative, but there are already ramifications for the attributes of omniscience and omnipresence as well as for the problem of theodicy. Omniscience may have to be conceived as objective knowledge, at least to some extent. By removing the requirement of divine relativity we would be free to develop a conception of God that could have objective knowledge of the world. This is precisely what I believe Whitehead’s position entails, at least in the details of the system but perhaps not in the more general observations of Part V, the conclusion of Process and Reality. William Christian’s interpretation of Whitehead agrees that divine knowledge of the world is of the objective type (IWM).

It is questionable whether theodicy depends upon a God who suffers. On the contrary, as long as this world can be shown to be, or is consistent with being the best possible world, theodicies can be rationally maintained even if God is thought to exist in perfect bliss. Omnipresence, however, would have to be interpreted differently than implying that God was a mirror of the world or that the world was God’s body. However, God could be thought of as Creator, Source or Being-itself without God having to mirror the activity and passions of the manifold of being.

Must God be thought of as transcendent and holy? It would seem that theologies which support divine relativity’⁵ have the burden of proof in showing that the immanental or sympathetic aspect of their theologies can make metaphysical sense. Otherwise, God’s relationship to the world must be primarily one of transcendence. However, making a claim that God is related to the world solely by being holy or transcendent, which means something like "separate," has its problems too. It is not clear what a relationship based on absolute otherness or separation would mean especially in the relationship between God and the believer, which many describe as a relationship of love, worship and intimacy. It would, therefore, be premature to characterize God as the Wholly Other just for the reason that there are metaphysical problems with the theory of divine relativity.

Notes

1. For further definition of "the problem of radical particularity," the position from which Hartshorne is criticized later in this article, and for more detailed discussion of Hartshorne’s theory of divine relativity, please see my "Omniscience and the Problem of Radical Particularity: Does God Know How to Ride a Bike," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 42(1997), 1-22, and "Divine Passibility and the Problem of Radical Particularity: Does God Feel Your Pain?," Religious Studies 33 (1997), 327-347.

2. To take just two examples, John Russell (JRPP) uses Hartshorne’s theology to stress psychicalism’s societal and psychological aspects. He also notes the unification of the cosmos that occurs as a result of complete inclusion "Within deity, then, we encounter the inclusive, unifying source of reality" (130). Russell also stresses the full mutuality of feeling and sentience between God and the universe. William Hill responds to Hartshorne’s theology more critically, stating that relativity implies a God "who needs the world as much as the world needs him" (GT57). In place of a universally relative God, a more Thomistic, transcendent picture of God is offered.

3. Bowman Clarke, for example, notes a problem with "an absolute notion of simultaneity" as well as with the Law of the Conservation of Energy, "as God inherits physical energy from the world through prehension" (IJPR 40), 61-74

4. The image of "mirroring" (and later "reflecting in exactitude" is not Hartshorne’s but my own. The image helps identify the specific nature of the claims included within the theory of divine relativity. It also aids in locating some problems.

5. I find it quite surprising not to have found in the literature even a tangential analysis of this metaphysical problem with Hartshorne’s philosophy of religion, especially because it relates to the very possibility or impossibility of divine relativity.

6. We will discuss the case of ignorance towards the end of the section, "Contradictory Elements of Divine Relativity?"

7. The case of death will be discussed in the section "Divine Relativity and the Soul-Body Analogy."

8. See the section entitled "Contradictions in Dipolarity and Dual Transcendence."

9.1 am here assuming that materialistic attempts to unify the cosmos fell because the problems faced by the hypothesis of divine relativity apply a fortiori to a physical attempt to conceptualize unity.

10. Whitehead’s division of the divine essence into a primordial nature that values eternal objects and a consequent nature that prehends the world is different, but it is similar in that there is an element unrelated to the world and one that is related to the world.

11. In addition to the absolute-relative dipolarity in Hartshorne, there is a dualism that operates on the side of the relative level: the God of joy and the God who suffers. Most theologians would say there may be an infinite of joy (Hindu ananda) but not of suffering (which could perhaps be merely the privation of being.

12. We might pause to ask whether the distinction between absolute and relative poles in God is a formal or material distinction. That is, is it just how we (formally) look at God or does God really (materially) contain these two poles or moments? In either case, Hartshorne’s system has a contradiction, which, although attempting to create a balance of transcendence and immanence, remains unresolved.

13. A problem with Hartshorne’s position regarding God’s experience of anandic bliss is that the abstract non-relative side of God, at some points, is not allowed a separate level of transcendent experience. It cannot experience if it is merely an abstraction. In other places Hartshorne lets the abstract side have its "radically higher bliss," its own level of experience.

14. There is an aspect of Tillich’s theology similar to Hartshorne’s relativity thesis. Tillich briefly discusses the idea of divine relativity as God’s participation in human experience. He notes the mystical and christological aspects that support the idea, as well as its powerful use in response to the theodicy question (ST 270). He notes that there is an aspect of God that does not suffer, that transcends the realm of creaturely, determinate existence, and this is God as being-itself. Thus, Tillich concurs that the idea of patripassianism was rightly rejected by the church at the time of the Christological debates. Tillich, however, also states that as "creative life" God does include the finite realm and even nonbeing (although earlier he said that, "being-itself transcends nonbeing absolutely". Tillich, like Hartshorne, does not realize the dialectical, contradictory nature of what is being said. As being-itself, God transcends contingent being, but as "divine life" God experiences the realm of contingency in a panentheistic manner.

15. See Cedric I. Hepler, SLJT, John Stacer, TS. and Paul Fiddes, CSG, among others. Stacer, for example, argues for an all-knowing, all-present, all-loving" God who "knows our human evil and the suffering it brings" (SLJT 447).

References

CSG Paul Fiddes, The Creative Suffering of God Oxford: Clarendon, 1988.

GT William J. Hill, "Does Divine Love Entail Suffering in God?" in God and Temporality. edited by Bowman L. Clarke and Eugene T. Long. New York: Paragon, 1984.

IJPR 40 Bowman L. Clarke, "Two Process Views of God," International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 40(1995), 61-74.

IJPR 42 Henry Simoni-Wastila, "Omniscience and the Problem of Radical Particularity: Does God Know How to Ride a Bike?" International Journal for Philosophy of Religion 42 (1997) 1-22.

IWF William Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics, New Haven: Yale University, 1959.

JRPR John M. Russell, "Spirit, Sympathy, and God: Hartshorne on Psychicalism," Journal of Religion and Psychical Research. 1994: 123-131.

MBS John Searle, Minds, Brains and Science. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press, 1984.

PAPA John McDermott, "Ill-at-Ease: The Natural Travail of Ontological Disconnectedness," Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 67 (1994).

RS Henry Simoni-Wastila, "Divine Passibility and the Problem of Radical Particularity: Does God Feel Your Pain?" Religious Studies 33 (1997) 327-347.

SLJT Cedric L. Hepler, "The Death of Classical Theism: Divine Relativity," Saint Luke’s Journal of Theology 1968, 4-20.

ST Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology. Vol. I. Chicago University Press, 1951.

TS John Stacer, "Divine Reverence for Us" Theological Studies (1983),438-455.

I. Introduction

Charles Hartshorne introduced me to process philosophy as a graduate student at Emory University in 1960. Not until asking William A. Christian some years later why in his book (IWM) he hadn’t considered Whitehead might be thinking of God as a personal series did I realize how deeply Hartshorne had influenced my interpretation of Whitehead. Christian replied, (8/8/69), "I do not know of any passage in which Whitehead characterized God as a nexus of actual entities." Since my own search concurred (except for one suggestive passage (PR 350), I was encouraged to continue re-evaluating Whitehead’s Categoreal Obligations begun by noting Transmutation is problematic since divinity could not exemplify it.

Trying to conceive of God’ as one actual entity is likely impossible despite several attempts to clarify Whitehead’s statements on the subject,² but neither has Hartshorne’s societal view of God as a personal nexus been clearly conceived. William Reese quotes Hartshorne himself saying a foremost problem with his theistic metaphysic is

David Griffin, who outlines the history of this issue, and some of Hartshorne’s responses to the problems and attempted solutions, also concludes Hartshorne "cannot reconcile his doctrine of God with relativity physics . . . ," and that this "constitutes a serious difficulty for process theism" (PS 21 85).

How an all-inclusive cosmic series can interact with the world is a problem inherent in a process metaphysic for which a metaphysical solution must be found apart from any problems that arise in reconciling special relativity theory with a process metaphysic. Philosophy owes a debt to relativity and quantum physics for developing concepts with metaphysical dimensions, but a metaphysic must ultimately stand on its own intrinsic rationality and provide the final interpretation for scientific concepts.

Many interpreters of relativity physics appear to have overstated its applicability when they denied the possibility of a cosmic present.³ Reconciling relativity physics with process metaphysics should be a less formidable task if one avoids the unwarranted assumption that every experience of simultaneity is restrictive. The restrictive definition of "simultaneity" is only true of experiences within the universe. Quantum moments are less inclusive than cellular processes (assuming they are units); just as animal experiences seem to be more inclusive than their cells. God’s experience, if meaningful, would be the unrestrictive case of simultaneous inclusion, in other words, experience from no perspective.

In the attempt to conceive of cosmic unity and influence as a series of all-inclusive prehensions "which loses nothing that can be saved" (PR 346),⁴ and then returns to the world what was saved for the world to prehend, close consideration must be given to

(1) the nature of potentiality, including

(2) the difference between

(3) the further difference between

(a) direct prehensions of the members of God’s series, and

(b) direct prehensions of nondivine actual entities.

II. Prehending and Prehended

A prehension is a grasping of another. More precisely, it is a grasping of what another has accomplished and now is, since the acting of the moment of actuality ceases once it is satisfied. From then on it is a determinate being available for others to prehend. One cannot embrace nor prehend another’s embracing; one can only embrace the result of another’s embracing.

The act of prehending is not completed in a instant, nor is it composed of several changes. An act of prehension is one continuous, indivisible act, though often very complex. It begins somewhere and ends a finite moment later with the prehender’s creative addition. It has a finite duration. All this is familiar to process thinkers.

But since not even God, as the series of all-inclusive moments, can prehend what has not yet been created by the comings-to-be of the world’s moments, God must gather them up after they reach their satisfactions -- and not just sometime after, but immediately, just as they complete their creative activity.

Griffin’s proposal (PS21 97) that the moments of the cosmic series occur less rapidly than those of the world is untenable because an actual entity’s satisfaction/superject cannot sit around on its own. The being of a satisfaction only survives as a conditioning of some process. Either

In either case, only a cosmic series of all-inclusive processes occurring as quickly as any others can assure complete retention of every being created and also assure that the series is always all-inclusive, or knowledgeable, of all there is for the following reasons:

If God must wait to prehend what the world creates, the actual entities of the world would have to include what they inherit, without loss, and not die, in order to pass on all they actualized to God. Even so, the slower concrescences of God would not be all-inclusive during the rime the world’s changes were prehended and sustained only by other occasions in the world.

If a being were surviving as a cause in only one personal nexus, and if that series were to die, as it eventually must (or even to forget some of its past, if "negative prehending" makes sense), and did so during a divine concrescence, some of the being in the last actual occasion(s) of the series would become, contradictorily, "nonbeing" before it could be prehended or saved by divinity.

But how can the cosmic series prehend all the actual entities of the world, if each actual occasion of the world may end at a different time? Are God’s moments of creative duration so quick that one would always begin just as any one in the world arbitrarily ends? Hartshorne’s suggestion that the moments of the cosmic series are as short as any other seems reasonable, but if the actual entities of the world are not somewhat in step, the divine creative efforts must be unbelievably quick, their durations unbelievably "thin."

Since every actual entity must not only end by being prehended by an-other, but must also begin by prehending or embracing others, no actuality can begin ‘with "nothingness." For theism to be a necessary condition of existence, each actual entity in God’s series must not only prehend every superject created by another immediately when it is created, but God (that is, the last divine satisfaction/superject) must be one of the actualizations prehended by every actual entity as it begins.

Again, to assure every being is in some process or other, every actual entity (divine and worldly) must end just as some moment of the divine series begins⁶ (though nondivine actual occasions may begin at any time, even during the concrescence of a divine actual entity, as explained below in Section 7).

III. Direct and Mediated Prehensions

There are two classes of unmediated prehensions:

(1) The direct prehension of the last ubiquitous satisfaction/superject in the divine’s cosmic series. These immediate prehensions of divine subject/ superjects will include others’ satisfactions as mediated b₃; that is, as aspects of; the immediately prehended superject, and

(2) Direct prehensions of satisfactions other than those presented by God’s superject, that is, direct prehensions of those who reach satisfaction in unison with the last divine actuality. These immediate prehensions may also include distant others as mediated parts.

As for the first type, every actual entity (not just those of God) must prehend all the determination made by God just prior to the initiation of that moment of experience: All influences are causal, either as pure physical or hybrid physical feelings (see Section 6). For God this must include

Even though actual entities of the world must end as some moment of the divine series begins, actual entities are still free to exhibit different temporal extensions, since actual occasions are not required by any metaphysical conditions to start at any particular time nor last for any particular duration. Only those of the divine series must begin just as the previous one ends and have concrescent durations as short as, or shorter than, any others. If these conditions are satisfied, no created determination will be lost, or lapse into "nonbeing."

IV. Satisfied Process as Potentiality

Determinations (that is, beings) made by actual entities, including those of the all-inclusive, divine series, are the source of potentiality for superseding others. Nothing is more fundamental in the process metaphysic than the process of creating a being: This acting is the fullness of actuality. The other pole of the actual/potential distinction, potentiality, is the actualized, that is, the being created. The satisfaction of an actual entity’s creating is potentiality for those who find the created determination in their actual world and embrace it as they begin their concrescent life.⁷

The Whiteheadian process metaphysic recognizes the absolute unalterable-ness of being; The actualized is and will forever be as it is. Parmenides is at least half right. But this changeless, nonrational surd must reside in some process or other, causally conditioning the process it is in. This is a theory of dipolarity where one pole includes the other, not the incoherent attempt of dualism.

Every created being is a source of potentiality for every actuality; for every process. These tenants, the changelessness of being and its universal influence, are as important as the irreducibility of creative process, but are less rigorously asserted by process thinkers. Anaxagoras believed something of everything is found in everything. As formulated in process philosophy: Every being is a potential in every becoming ". . . No two actual entities can be torn apart: each is all in all" (PR 34a).⁸

Even assuming Whitehead did not intend to imply present actualizations are causes in past actualities,⁹ still, there is one important exception to the truth that a satisfied actuality is in all superseding actualities: Beings created by contemporaries are not in every successive process. Some being, say B, can only be in a process, P, when it is spatio-temporally prior and contiguous to the process it is in. This can happen even if being, B, is spatially distant in the world from actuality; P, as long as B is part of the satisfaction of a moment of God’s series that ends before the process, P, begins. God’s satisfaction is spatially ubiquitous and, therefore, contiguous to all superseding others.

But when a satisfied actualization, C, is prehended by God, but not by a creaturely process. P (because P begins its process before the moment of God that prehends C has reached its satisfaction, and C is not contiguous to P), then P is completely unaffected by C, even though C is a determinate being and can be found in God’s coming-to-be (and in other moments contiguous to C).

Recognizing this qualification of the nearly unqualified truth that "all is in all" (if even for the minuscule moment required to accomplish a divine creation), is extremely important There are not just past and future actual entities to a divine, all-inclusive actuality; there are also contemporaries. This means that instantaneous transmission throughout the universe is not possible, even though some degree of influence of everything is felt everywhere as quickly as God’s concrescences occur. This is very quick, but not "infinitely" (instantaneously) fast.

Assuming Hartshorne is right and potentiality is a continuum (not a set of discrete objects), it follows that a prehension of any part of a being (another’s satisfaction as superject) is really a prehension of the whole continuum of being created by that previous moment. To experience part of what an actual entity has done (including God is to prehend it all. Though parts of a whole process (or aspects of the whole satisfaction of a process) may be distinguishable, they are not capable of being separated nor isolated from the whole of which they are a part.¹⁰ Coordinate division, like genetic division, is a conceptual process that focuses on aspects of an indivisible satisfaction as superject If Whitehead did believe one can prehend only a part of a previous satisfaction as a moment’s "actual world" is established, while completely dismissing the rest by way of "negative prehensions," it likely stemmed from his inadequate view of potentiality as discrete objects.

Of course, creatures are not all-knowing nor all-inclusive, even though they prehend the totality of God’s creation, for two reasons:

(1) Awareness (which arises in later stages of a coming-to-be) occurs with degrees of clarity and obviousness, and only God is assured of unsurpassable clarity and complete, conscious retention,¹¹ and

(2) Inclusiveness is always compromised because there are always others in the universe, as noted above, whose results are immediately prehended by God that are only prehended by a few others (until they are prehended as parts of the next cosmic result). Only by mediation of God do others experience all the others there are, but by then it is too late to be all-inclusive, since new others have already been created, namely, those whose creative durations were contemporaneous ‘with the last moment(s) of the divine series.

V. Direct Prehensions of NonDivine Creations

Every actual entity must not only directly prehend the most recent cosmic satisfaction/superject, it also must prehend satisfaction/superjects of immediately contiguous actual entities other than the cosmically extensive subject! superject. Prehending others, in addition to one’s prehension of God, is a metaphysical necessity because no actuality can begin to create without a novel standpoint Novelty is only possible if an actuality begins with an actual world different from any accomplishment already in being. To experience only what God has done, or only what any one actual entity has done, provides no novelty -- no novelty, no new process of actualization.¹²

So, though it is true that every actual entity must be initiated by what has already been done, each must also experience a unique combination of others’ superjects in its "actual world." The unique standpoint of its actual world so conditions its real potentiality that a novel outcome must be achieved (if death does not intervene). Its real potentiality, or subjective aim, is a continuum based on the actual entity’s prehension of

(1) the cosmic unity; which offers the widest range of innumerable possible outcomes, and

(2) a multiplicity of nondivine and contiguous subject/superjects, which condition or limit one’s range of possibility to what is most relevant to those nondivine prehensions. Supplementing the influence of the divine potency with that of one’s nondivine neighbors turns the widest or "pure potentiality"¹³ into the "real potentiality" of the actual entity’s subjective aim.

So, too, must God prehend more than what God has just accomplished. Prehending at each moment the new actualizations created by the world is necessary in order to establish a novel subjective aim for God. What makes God’s experience unique is the scope of God’s inclusion. Where nondivine actual entities experience some others’ results (and always a different selection from anyone else’s), each moment of the unsurpassable series includes all others. This difference between the logical contradictions "some" and "all" is at the heart of understanding theism as Hartshorne often states; not the contraries, "all" and "none."

VI. Perspective and Causation

In addition to the unavoidable prehension of the most recent satisfaction/ superject of God’s personal series, all actual occasions must prehend some others. Prehending some, rather than all, others is what gives every nondivine moment a perspective. "Perspective" is failure to experience all the results in existence because all the results are not contiguous to the incipient, prehending moment. Perspective enhances a limited range of possibility leaving most of the welter of being contained in one’s prehension of the divine’s satisfaction in relative obscurity. Perspective is enhancement of some of the cosmically presented background of potentiality rather than a "negative prehension" of most of the continuum of being

Action at a distance has always been problematic. Interpreting Whitehead to say all causation is from contiguous others around which the present grows seems correct. Only by prehending the result of another, can that other be a cause, and ever)’ prehension of another’s satisfaction must be spatio-temporally prior and contiguous to the prehended. This is true whether the prehensions be "pure" or "hybrid."¹⁴ Since all acts of prehension have a finite duration, it follows that a cause, A, in someone else, B, cannot be a cause in another, C, who is not contiguous to A, until it has been transmitted by mediation to where it is contiguous to C. There can be no instantaneous transmission of A to C, even though B is in a moment of God.¹⁵

This is true because each moment of God not only has a cosmic past and future, it must also have contemporaries. There are always mutually contemporary divine and nondivine durations." This does not mean the world’s moments must begin or end with each cycle of the cosmic rhythm (see Figure I, Synchronization of God and the World, Most will be much longer than any one moment of the unsurpassable series.

VII. Synchronization of God and the World

Every actual entity must begin (1) contiguous to the last divine subject! superject, since God is not only all-inclusive, God is everywhere, ubiquitous. Every actual entity must also begin (2) contiguous to some others in addition to God.

Every actual entity prehends all that the last moment of the divine contains: all the spatial (external) relations and the primordial past (internal relations). In this sense, action at a distance is not only meaningful, but inevitable. Everything affects everything else that supersedes it, but only after it has been incorporated into the satisfaction (body) of the divine, where it must be prehended (consumed) by all future others." Until something, B, has been ingested and returned to the world by God, B only affects God and those actual occasions (those Cs) that are immediately successive and contiguous to B. All others are contemporaneous with that moment of God and with those B is causally conditioning, so B could not be part of their actual world to prehend.

Actual entities not contiguous to B are completely ineffectual in B, even though they are satisfied and exist as beings, as potentials, for others. They are only causes in God and any others contiguous to their satisfaction/superjects. Since all others are contemporaneous with that moment of God, they are nor capable of being influenced by distant, noncontiguous creations nor by God’s contemporaneous concrescence. This indifference to some actualizations already in being, is what sets all others apart from God who is contiguous to all, indifferent to none.

Since the divine prehension of God’s own past is flawless, a nondivine actual entity has the luxury of beginning at any time, not just as a divine moment ends and another begins. This is so because a being is capable of being inherited at any time as long as (1) it is held in existence by some process or other, as it must, and (2) it is spatio-temporally prior and contiguous to the incipient actuality.

No being, or satisfaction, can exist on its own, since being is only the result of, and a conditioning of, creative process. There is no Unmoved Mover prehending the act of prehending, though there will always be a prehending of what other actual entities prehended and what their concrescing processes of prehending create. However, just because a being is prehended by (that is, conditioning) some process does not imply that the being cannot be prehended by others.

Beings are not only available to all incipient actual entities contiguous to them, they are unavoidable causes in those actual entities.

Speculation, and perhaps factual evidence also, suggests that a moment of a nondivine personal series may not be always follow immediately upon a previous member of the series, as experienced from the point of view of another series, especially that of God. Temporary death of a personal series is possible, if not likely (see Figure 1). The satisfactions of the dead personal series can be retained by others, and always by God, until the next moment of the series is established with memory of its own past which, for it. will still be spatio-temporally prior and contiguous, though this moment must also prehend the most recent determinations made by God and its nondivine neighbors who are mediating the temporarily forgotten personal nexus.

However, God must immediately prehend others once they have come to be, because no others are capable of being all-inclusive or immune from death. Therefore, to assure that all the created determinations of being are retained, each and every satisfaction must be prehended and made part of the determination of the divine process immediately upon its creation.

God cannot be a reality that "simply knows" the truth about cosmic relationships (PS 21:106); God’s experience (I) establishes the overall contrasts or relationships not found in creatures, and (2) it retains forever the relationships that the world creates but will eventually lose since every moment and series in the world will forget or die. Being is not capable of alteration, corruption or loss. Being, of course, must be forever added to by newly created specifications. These metaphysical requirements have yet to have much impact on the discussion of cosmological entropy.

VIII. Graphic Presentation

Figure 2, Cosmically Mediated Influence, should be helpful in summarizing how God and the world interact. At each section between two moments of the divine series there exists a multiplicity of subject/superjects, or satisfied actual entities. All these beings are immediately prehended by God, say, G2. A selection of some of them are prehended by each actual entity in the world, perhaps as a member of a series, say a, Series b, and c also represent unique selections.

Every actual entity, including those of the world, prehends all the previous moments of God, that is, G1 I, as mediated by G2. There is a simplifying assumption in the diagram that all four actual entities, G2, a2, b2 and c2 end at the same divine subject/superject juncture. At this juncture another multiplicity of beings exists to be prehended. God as G3 must again prehend the total multiplicity while a3, b3 and c3 only have to prehend all of G2 and some others contiguous to itself; including some of its own past if it is to continue as a personal series.

The initial aim, or real potentiality for each moment. is a function of what superjects (beings) are prehended, which must always be more than a superject

of just one other. Each moment must experience a multiplicity of results, and each moment’s multiplicity must be unique: God’s because only God’s subjective aim is conditioned by all that has been done, and every other’s because the selection of others it includes and excludes is not that of any other actuality. Actualities may include some of the same superjects (this is what gives us a common world to live and communicate in), but the total selection must be somewhat different from all others.

The subjective aim, or feeling of a relevant range of possible outcomes,¹⁸ is conditioned by all the members of the multiplicity prehended. Not only is every aim unique, so is every satisfaction of that aim. The satisfied aim is then available for others to prehend, but only after the effort of the moment is exhausted, which takes a finite temporal duration.¹⁹

Since this effort is not instantaneous, transmission must exhibit a finite ratio of temporal extension to spatial size, such as that exhibited by the perspectival spatial shortening and temporal slowing in special relativity, with the smallest quantum "volume" in our epoch being expressed by, h, the famous Planck Constant.²⁰ For any moment, a perspective that prehends something with less spatiality than another, must prehend it ‘with more temporal duration. Zero or infinite size, just as instantaneous or infinite temporal duration, is impossible, which means there must always be a finite quantum of actuality. This quantum is always a quantity of some quality; and any qualitative continuum, no matter how small or restricted, is still a quantum which is capable of being endlessly specifiable by the freedom of the moment. though possibly with only trivial variations.

IX. Summary

A series of cosmically inclusive actual entities not only can, but must interact with all the innumerable actual occasions of the world. Though relativity physics establishes that temporal ordering of causally independent events (contemporaries) depends on one’s perspective within the universe, special relativity theory cannot rule out universally inclusive experiences of simultaneity (the very meaning of "uni-verse"²¹) because the necessity of such a cosmic ordering also implies the necessity for relative orderings within the universe.

Although there is no instantaneous action at a distance, influence is felt quickly everywhere because metaphysical theory requires not only that every actuality be influenced by (1) others spatio-temporally prior and contiguous to it (all others, in the cosmically unique case of God), but also by (2) the totality of the universe as unified by God just prior to that actual occasion’s inception.

God’s cosmic presence establishes an influence (from all the satisfied actualities that have ever occurred) in every new actuality. The totality of the infinitely distant past and the farthest reaches of spatial distance have their part in constituting every new moment once they are part of God’s satisfaction/superject. This cosmic, supraluminal influence on worldly events may be finding empirical supports in addition to its metaphysical necessity.

The unity of the universe is not spaces: Space is a result of the world’s multiplicity simultaneously prehended. Each unity exhibits spatiality, namely, its simultaneous inclusion of some or all objectified others. Reality is a multiverse of creatings that offer their creations to their unifying neighbors, including the all-inclusive cosmic unifier. These offerings, whenever they begin and however long it takes to make them, must be objectified in some cosmic moment or other, lust as that cosmic process begins, in order to assure nothing is lost.

Notes

1. The failure of our language to have a gender-neutral way of referring to a person is a difficult problem when it comes to divinity, but ignoring it is not acceptable. I am reluctant to use "God," even if one avoids all pronouns, since it is still strongly masculine. The avoidance of this gender bias is something that concerns Hartshorne also. In 1994, I sent Hartshorne a draft of my Introduction to Philosophy text, Change and the Unsurpassable, which evaluates philosophical issues from a process position but also contains material on prepatriarchal worldviews and uses gender-neutral expressions. He responded, "Your understanding of Whitehead’s philosophy and of mine seems excellent. . . . Your fascinating speculative views about the cosmic mother are a welcome plus. They make sense to me, I have never cared for the idea of God as a father, although (and I am aware of no good reason for this) during most of my career I have unthinkingly, like nearly all the other men, used the male gender in referring to God or to our species; but about two decades ago I did begin to think about, and began avoiding, this practice. Women are too important to be treated as secondary."

In attempting to find a better way of referring to divinity, I have often used "The Unsurpassable" as shorthand for Anselm’s "That than which nothing greater can be conceived" or in place of the long list of positive expressions like, The Fully Worshipful, Lovable, Loving, All-Inclusive, Supremely Free, All-Knowing, Relative of AJI; The Infinite, Flexible and Influencer of All and so forth.

A reviewer of this article objected to using "God/dess," "s/he and "his/er" saying they "either suggest that God is feminine [I don’t see why this follows] or hermaphrodite, not that God transcends gender. . . God/dess also suggests polytheism." Conceiving of God/ dess as a self-impregnating hermaphrodite may be a good halfway transition to a concept of a personal and nongendered divinity Perhaps thinking of God/dess as all-gendered, rather than nongendered would resonate ritually with more people.

Using "God" and no pronouns can make for a heavy, artificial style, but until a convention emerges that is not overly distracting, perhaps this is the best recourse, supplemented with euphemisms like "divinity." and "cosmic process." However, if a choice must be made between using "God" or "Goddess," I’m inclined to think the attributes of Hartshorne’s theism are more in line with the traditionally conceived female characteristics of love, inclusiveness and giving birth than the male ones of power, hierarchy and noble death.

2. For example, Lewis Ford, PS11 169-179; and more recently (PS 27134) has said Palmyre Oomen’s attempt ("The Prehensibility of God’s Consequent Nature," PS27 108 -133) seems to solve the problem of how God’s one actual entity can prehend new worldly creations. However, I am far from convinced she solves this problem. As Oomen herself points out on page 116, point 2, the problem is how the same subject can change and remain the same subject. "Subject" here for her does not mean a personal nexus of actual entities, but rather one actual entity, one whole. But a whole is what it is because of just the parts it contains: A new part implies a new whole.

To say "that concrescence is possible for God without phases of indeterminateness, and satisfaction is possible without (temporal) completeness," is to declare God such an exception to the most basic metaphysical categories as to be unintelligible.

Further, to allow new worldly creations to be continually added to God’s satisfaction, implies God is never satisfied, not that God is always satisfied. The Actual Entity, God, would have to be one as it is, and somehow still the same one with new additions. Either this is the case or the new "additions" are not real, not created and added successively. This latter view would have all the problems of the classical attempt to define omniscience.

Also, is Oomen saying God has one satisfaction, a "growing satisfaction," that grows continually, that is, not in flake increments? Continuity is a characteristic of potentiality only, not actuality. An actual addition must occur with somewhat different content and somewhat after the former such that an infinity of other possible (but forever unactualized) additions would be logically possible between the two. The attempted notion of an infinitely dense continuum of actualities is meaningless. An infinitely dense continuum of specified potentialities (eternal objects?) fails because all potentialities are generic, this is why God cannot know "all future contingents beforehand" (PS 27 139), since they have not yet been created, or specified. Not even God can know what is meaningless to know; or create something before it is created.

3. Though I have never been able to see why special relativity is considered incompatible with cosmic simultaneity, it’s reassuring to see others agree whose mathematical skills surpass mine. See Henry Stapp’s letter in the 11th note of David Griffin’s article, "Hartshorne, God and Physics," PS21 108. "Simultaneity" has to do with items that are causally effective in the same moment, which also means effective at the same time, since one moment is also only one moment of time. Every actual entity is constituted by a unique set of objects different from all others. Those in the world are unique because they are spatially restrictive, that is, a selection of all the satisfaction/superjects that exist. Being restrictive is not a requirement for simultaneity, even though it is a requirement for all of us who exist as fragments within the present whole. Just because there can only be one all-inclusive experience of simultaneity at each moment is insufficient grounds for ruling it out a priori.

4. This must be every being, otherwise being becomes, contradictorily, as Parmenides noted, "nonbeing." Whitehead’s reservation is likely directed toward process which is not a being to save. It is the saver of what was done and maker of a new being. Process saves by creating more than what has been done; "more" ultimately means "at least as much as before plus. . . ." The process of the moment can’t continue beyond what it accomplishes. If it never accomplished anything definite, nothing at all would be salvageable, which is the dilemma of a Heraclitian/Bergsonian flux.

5. See note 18.

6.My proposal requires every actual occasion reach a satisfaction in step with the subject/superject of some moment or other of the cosmic series in order for its determination of being to be immediately accessible to the next cosmically inclusive prehension which also must follow immediately upon the completion of the previous cosmic moment. Though I think this proposal is sound, I would much prefer not making this requirement, or at least finding further reasons to reduce its apparent arbitrariness. The explanation of the initiation of nondivine moments seems more elegant, since they are able to start at any point during the divine concrescence.

Lewis Ford has suggested to me that the initial stage of an actual entity might be able to accept data for a short duration before beginning its creative process towards its satisfaction. Once this initial phase is over, it would then not be further influenced by others as freedom requires. This would remove some of the arbitrariness, but I have other concerns about the nature of process and the "cut-off" point of the dative phase that need to be thought through before I could adopt this approach.

7. The only exceptions, to created determinations being the locus of potentiality, are the eternal, metaphysical characteristics of reality, that is, those characteristics necessarily exhibited by all possible subject/superjects, including those that are actualized.

Since every actual entity is required to include all the determination presented by the last satisfaction/superject of the cosmic series, and since this determinate being includes all that has been created except what was created contemporaneously (that is, in unison) with that cosmic moment, the only being that would be ‘lost" if a creature, C, reached a satisfaction which was not carried forward into a new moment, D, would be the unique determination made by C itself.

If C were the last member of a personal series, the previous members of the series would be in being (at least in God) and would not violate any metaphysical principles. So though I would like to allow an actual occasion in the world to end at any time during a cosmic concrescence, just as such a moment may begin at any time during a cosmic process, still I see no way to assure complete retention of all the determinations of being in existence, without requiring every one to end just as some new moment or other of the cosmic series begins. Only when the end of one process is contiguous to the beginning of another, it is possible for the being in the first concrescence to be available for conditioning the concrescence of the second.

8. That each actual entity is "all in all" can only be true temporally asymmetrically; it can only be true of objectified actualities (that is, of beings). It cannot be true of the full actuality of process which is the subjectivity Aristotle correctly asserted could not be in another’s subjectivity. Thus asymmetry is a necessary condition of reality. It simply is a necessary condition for any change. Joseph Rosen confirms asymmetry is the basic notion in physics (PS 26 318-323). Symmetry as identity can only be found when one abstracts a part of a present whole and compares it to a previous whole now found as that part in the present.

9. Those philosophers who do allow symmetrical interpretation, end up with a static view of reality. The spatialization of time (with fantasies of time travel is a familiar way this mistake is found in the philosophy of science as well as popular culture.

10. The assumption that parts are what they are apart from their interaction with others in the whole they are in is a persistent philosophical mistake. Hume is an archetypical example, but Whitehead is not immune as his theory of eternal object attests. Perhaps this mistake should be called the Aesthetic Fallacy since artists know that much of what colors or words do and mean come from the context they are in.

11. If my proposal that prehensions of others is all or none is meaningful, then there are no "negative prehensions," unless the failure to prehend one who is not contiguous can be called a negative prehension. Whether or not an actual occasion can eliminate part of a prehension from feeling during its creative concrescence is debatable. If not, as I suspect, then the notion of "negative prehension" is only a matter of its degree of effect.

Transmutation, also, cannot be elimination; it can only be the addition of a feeling that substitutes in one’s awareness for the multiplicity still felt preconsciously. How God and Transmutation are related is another question. God could not substitute the one so-called transmuted feeling for the many felt initially, but perhaps God could create the feeling of the region as one and still have in full awareness the feeling of the many. If not, then divinity depends on creatures to create transmuted feelings for the cosmic series to experience, which is one way I can make some sense of Ford’s suggestion that only actualities in the world create concrete unities (PS 11, 172ff).

12. Novelty of standpoint is a necessary condition for a new creative process. However, not all "possible" novel standpoints are actualized due to insufficient presented order. The creative effort required to unify some "possible" standpoints seems to be more than any actuality can muster in that region.

13. The attempt to define "pure potentiality," as an ultimate range of possibility that has no restrictions (where anything at all is possible), rather than defining it as the supreme range of possibility presented by the cosmically complex and inclusive determinations of the divine series, will always fail. The so-called Primordial Nature of God is meaningless in abstraction from the Consequent Nature. Both are, and always have been, aspects of each moment of the never-beginning and everlasting divine personal series.

14. The distinction between pure and hybrid physical prehensions reduces to the difference between what the previous moment inherited and what it added to its inheritance.

15. Here again the metaphysical requirement that an "actual entity" have a finite temporal duration is not always acknowledged.

16. Griffin, if I follow his many proposals, seems to be saying this also, but dismisses it "as a matter of taste," because he thinks it is "preferable to think of God as simply knowing the truth about the cosmic ‘nows’ rather than having these ‘nows’ dependent for their very existence upon the divine experiences" (PS21,105-106). I, too, find it distasteful to bring in God to prop up a metaphysical position. But the relationship between God and the world must be one of metaphysical necessity. Each must be necessary for the other, remembering Hartshorne’s qualification that the world requires the one and only possible God, but God only requires some world or other.

17. Griffin discusses what some think is necessary to constitute a subjective aim in the members of a series: ". . . For God to be prehendable for each occasion of experience in a personally ordered society, such as an electron, there would have to be a divine occasion that occurred after one electronic occasion (call it A) had achieved satisfaction and before the next occasion (B) in the series] began. God would prehend A and then, on the basis of knowledge of A, provide an initial aim for B" (PS21, 96-97).

This, of course, is not what happens, as Griffin also says. (unless there is temporary death of the electronic series -- see Section 7), but I cannot accept Griffin’s suggestion that the way around the problems this interpretation presents is to allow the durations of divine moments to be longer than those of the world.

God experiences A at the same time that B experiences A, just as B experiences God (as containing all that came before A) at the same time as God experiences God’s own complete past as containing all that came before A. God (as experiencing A) and B (as experiencing A) are contemporaries. God (as containing and responding to A) cannot contribute A to B’s subjective aim. But since A is, by hypothesis, contiguous to B, B is influenced by A anyway. Only when C begins does God (as containing A) affect that series, or any actual entity in the world, and then A affects every new actual entity in the world, everywhere from then on.

18. As Hartshorne’s theory of potentiality as a continuum requires. Whitehead’s theory of eternal object presents a dilemma here: The aim must be one or the process has no unity; yet if the aim is one (albeit complex) eternal object, there is no room for creative "decision." The unity of process is a proposition which has the physical prehensions as its complex subject and the subjective aim as its unifying predicate (PR 24). However, Whitehead also says, "This indetermination, rendered determinate in the real concrescence, is the meaning of ‘potentiality.’ It is conditioned indetermination, and is therefore called a ‘real potentiality"’(PR 23). Whitehead seems to have two incompatible theories. Creativity must make some determination that has been (since the primordial past) unspecified and indeterminate until then.

19. Perhaps the creative effort is not enough to make a result, and the moment dies, and with it, perhaps, a series it was supporting. Whitehead seems to say that once a process has been established with its prehensions and subjective aim, it must reach a satisfaction.

20. Leon Lederman, the well-know physicist in his book on the history of particle physics, The God Particle, (GP 175) expresses the unavoidable finitude as a limit of knowledge expressed by what Max Planck called the "quantum of action," now known as Planck’s Constant: "Heisenberg announced that our simultaneous knowledge of a particle’s location and its motion is limited and the combined uncertainty of these two properties must exceed . . . nothing other than Planck’s constant, b. . .Our measurements of the particle’s location and its motion (actually, its momentum) are reciprocally land inversely] related to each other The more we know about one, the less we know about the other,"

Since every actual occasion must prehend God as supremely large or inclusive, perhaps there exists an argument here for saying every occasion must prehend God as occurring supremely fast. The largest prehendable must occur the fastest. I don’t want to push this suggestion too far because occasions in the world that seem to occur relatively slowly, like human experiences, also seem to be more inclusive than rapidly occurring events at the atomic level. Still, I can’t help wondering whether the rapidity of atomic events might mean they do have broad inclusiveness.

Such a view might help interpret the "smeared-out" character of atomic and subatomic events and explain some supraluminal relationships even better than suggestions made here that the)’ may result from God’s mediation. Perhaps humans are not more inclusive than atomic events. They both must prehend all the universe as mediated by God, and the rapidly occurring atomic occasions would be affected by more changes. Then, too, humans maybe influenced by fewer, but more complex others -- though complexity seems in some sense to imply a larger quantity. There are many issues here that are not yet clearly thought through, including the function of Transmutation.

21. Only this creative unification provides a unifying locus for the oneness of all there is. Space is not a unifying container that bends to accommodate different perspectives within it. Space is a function of simultaneous inclusion. It is not absolute but is somewhat unique to each actual occasion, just as time is not something which flows independently and apart from successive inclusions. A temporal nexus curves under the influence of gravity because of the effect of mutual attractiveness, not because the one container (space) of reality is curved.

22. Bell’s Theorem establishes a provocative, and experimentally verified relationship, such as, polarization, between two particles that exists even though signals between them at the speed of light are not possible.

References

GP Leon Lederman with Dick Teresi. The God Particle: If the Universe is the Answer, What is the Question? Houghton Muffin Co., 1993.

IWM William A. Christian. An Interpretation Whitehead’s Metaphysics. Yale, 1959.

JR Lewis S. Ford. "Is Process Theism Compatible with Relativity Theory?" Journal of Religion (1968), 124-135

PCH The Philosophy of Charles Hartshorne. Edited by Lewis Hahn. The Library of Living Philosophers, Vol. XX. La Salle: Open Court, 1991.

PS11 Lewis S. Ford. "The Divine Activity of the Future," Process Studies 11 (1981), 169-179.

PS21 David Ray Griffin. "Hartshorne, God, and Physics," Process Studies 21 (1992), 85-112.

PS26 Joseph Rosen. "Response to Hartshorne Concerning Symmetry and Asymmetry in Physics," Process Studies 26 (1997), 318-323.

PS27 Palmyre M.F. Oomen. "The Prehensibility of God’s Consequent Nature," Process Studies 27 (1998), 108-133; and Lewis S. Ford. "The Consequences of Prehending the Consequent Nature," 134-146.