The Free-Church Tradition and Social Ministry

Such a dynamic interaction of doctrine and life is one of the chief contributions Christianity has made to civilization wherever free churches have been faithful and active. Indeed, the free-church tradition has, over the centuries, created the social space in which it is possible to be faithful while retaining intellectual integrity and socially engaged without being subservient to secular ideologies. The efforts of the free church are always criticized by the left as too moderate and by the right as too radical; nevertheless, they have been of immeasurable importance for faith, civilization and human rights.

Bushnell and Gladden articulated for their day what are still some of the most critical theological foundations of a pluralistic, democratic society which respects human rights. They drew upon the Old Testament notion of a covenant that binds pluralistic communities together in a common moral vision, opposes the absolutism of any single tribe and the monarchic tendencies of the state, and guards against the exploitation of the poor and the weak. The covenant tradition is one upon which the prophets drew, and, through the figure of John the Baptist, it connects the prophets with the New Testament message of the incarnation.

Today the covenantal-prophetic tradition is threatened from the left and right, much as it was in the days of Bushnell and Gladden. Secular humanism on the left and fundamentalism on the right have both shown renewed vigor. The one seems fixated on programmatic socialism, often ignoring or actively subverting any sense of a normative pattern for human sexuality and family life, while the other has attached itself to family issues in a patriarchal form and seems oblivious of issues of political and economic justice.

We may be in a time when it is necessary once again to be concerned with the praeparatio evangelicum, with laying the groundwork for the gospel, providing the concrete hints of compassion and fidelity that will bring people eventually to the deeper meanings of faith. Indeed, Gustavo Gutiérrez has recently suggested that the message of liberation theology is now being interpreted by some in just these terms: not as the whole gospel, but -- in some situations -- as the necessary preparation for it.

The need for a praeparatio evangelicum is especially evident in parts of Asia and South America, where the growth of heavy industries has created conditions not unlike those which Gladden confronted in the late 19th century -- economic exploitation, hostility between workers and owners, and slums of gigantic proportion. Most of the popular movements that have arisen in response to these crises suffer from the absence of a public theology that can guide their actions and provide a clear vision of human rights. Two notable exceptions to this situation are the "basic Christian communities" within the folk-Catholicism of Latin America and the Philippines, and the evangelical, sometimes pentecostal, churches of tribal and dispossessed peoples in the Third World. These groups have sparked efforts at self-help, democratic participation and engagement in both local community life and international ecumenical developments that resemble aspects of the free-church tradition.

The question that haunts us, as we ponder the problems of our own land and those of other countries, is the same one posed to John the Baptist by the multitudes, the tax collectors and the military: What then shall we do (Luke 3:10-14)? And the answer for us is much like the one given by John the Baptist. He tries to prepare the people for Christ by calling on them to do what they already know is right. To the multitudes he says: share food, clothing and other necessities with those who do not have them. Charity is not enough, but without it we have only meanness. To tax collectors, who stand for all agents of vast bureaucracies, who have status and authority, he says: do not cheat, exploit and bleed the people: you are, above all, to serve, not to dominate. To those charged with enforcing the law he says: let violence be minimized, let truth-telling before the bars of justice be the mark of duty, and let contentment with small rewards be the mark of vocational responsibility.

It cannot be said that these commandments represent a democratic capitalist or a democratic socialist program unambiguously; but they are certainly democratic in their implications and opposed to exploitation. These principles are not the whole of the Christian gospel; but they may be indispensable to it. For it is in the context of this biblically based ethical reorganization of common practice that Jesus comes to be baptized by John, is recognized as the Messiah -- as the one with whom God is well pleased -- and begins his public ministry.

God was wiser than most Christians: God put the covenantal-prophetic tradition prior to the presence of Jesus, so that Christ could be recognized in the proper context. The praeparatio evangelicum is perennially necessary, as Bushnell recognized in regard to nurture and piety and as Gladden recognized in regard to character and society. Pastors, congregations and communions who forget this fact wither and shrink.

We should note that neither John nor Jesus advises withdrawing from public life for the sake of the gospel. To be sure, both had their days in the wilderness: but when asked what to do by ordinary people they commend no enclave of monastic disengagement from social and political life. They suggest no utopian community which would remain unsullied by the requirements of the common life -- economic responsibility and even taxes, coercion and soldiers.

Neither do they claim that seizing power by mobilizing the masses is the route to salvation, as the Muslims and Marxists, in different ways, have asserted. Of course, every profound theology has a political component, but politics, in the biblical tradition, is not allowed to swallow theology and society. A monolithic reign over instruments of government in the name of an absolute revelation, or a transfer of all means of production to those who also have control over military power in the name of some ‘‘dialectic,’’ may bring temporary relief from old tyrannies; but it also establishes structures of domination which portend new tyrannies.

Nor does Scripture demand that those engaged in economic, political, military or legal affairs abandon their vocations. It does not insist chat all social institutions be dismantled, as do romantic protesters against the structures of complex civilizations. Instead, it calls for a fundamental spiritual and ethical transformation of attitude and action in the midst of life, and the formation of free communities of fidelity and ethical witness wherein people can catch the vision of something even greater. On that basis, many can come to the recognition of Christ and heed the call to discipleship. Then the foundation is at hand for a public theology and the formation of a responsible mission to the world, one that can shape persons, human relations and the structures of civilization.

The free-church traditions must also bear a special witness in deed. The free church is not only a gathered community, it is a constantly gathering community. It organizes people who have little voice and less power; it forms networks of support, mission and witness to confront oppression, corruption and pretense; and it provides a vision of faith that can stand the tests of intellectual integrity, for God does not require the distortion of the mind for the sake of belief. And in all this it stands firm for those first principles of moral life in society which, in modern vocabulary, are called human rights. By ethical action, guided by moral law, hopeful vision and human compassion, it develops, as did John the Baptist, a readiness among people to enter into the struggles of history expectantly, lovingly, discerningly. Thereby the praeparatio evangelicum is established in and for each generation, in and for each context of life.

And what are the specific issues which need attention in our context? They are legion. Racism persists: the nuclear threat continues; hunger has not yet abated. The systematic violations of human rights by regimes of the extreme left and the extreme right are a scandal before God. The distance of these issues from our little congregations is no reason to allow our people to ignore them, and thereby to enjoy passive complicity in them. Whether we want it to be true or not, our nation is militarily, politically and economically involved in situations in South Africa, Latin America and the Philippines which are unconscionable. People may justly differ on the best way to approach these complex problems, but to remain disengaged and unconcerned is not a Christian possibility.

Nor is it possible to justify our own travesties because other powers in the world and their terrorist agents are more vicious. We may, at times, in a world broken in sin, have to meet force with force; but we had better be sure that the violence we, our allies and our agents employ is governed by compassion for the people of the world and not guided by the interests of a tiny minority. Force, when it is employed, must be directed toward establishing structures of relative justice and peace in which human rights can be more actualized.

Still another critical need is to provide ethical guidance for people in their worlds of work. Extensive bureaucracy, professional privilege, dull drudgery or dependence on government contracts have too often displaced a sense of vocation. The rapid inclusion of women in the work force demands fresh attention to women’s rights, to new patterns of shared responsibility in family life, and especially to those values which can guide women’s newly discovered sense of extra-familial vocation.

We must also stress stewardship that not only involves regular support of the church, but also means care for the ecological order and the massive structures of modern political economies. One might include here the problems of unemployment, homelessness, drug abuse, wife beating and child neglect. The list could go on.

Addressing each of these issues requires us to touch people’s souls, their conceptions of morality, their sense of what faith is all about, their lifestyles and their habits. It requires the deepest recovery and recasting of the core doctrines of Christianity in terms appropriate for our day. It requires transforming the social fabric in which we live. Few of us are gifted to deal with all these issues but every minister, every baptized believer, every congregation must surely be involved in at least one of them.

Today the free-church tradition is called to reclaim and recast its heritage. In its earthen vessel, it carries a great treasure, one that will grow only by renewed commitment. By its engagements in the world, it helps prepare the world for Christ. And in Christ we not only enhance human rights; we find, finally and fully, what is truly human and what is most right. Christ has come, and we thus have, in principle, access to the vision so long anticipated. But for many it is not yet so. And even we who already believe also pray that Christ will come again. We know that our world still must live, in this in-between time, both with memory and in preparation.

The Church and Political Life: A Loss of Confidence

We face a new political regime in this country -- one that represents, in several respects, a new cluster of political moods with religious overtones.

To those who have hitched their religion to a new militant Americanism, it is a time of rejoicing. We have been saved, some say, from the brink of socialism. At the same time, those who have understood their faith in terms of the New Deal or the more recent liberation movements are plunged into despair. Some think that we are now hovering on the brink of fascism. The fact of the matter is that both of these interpretations base their understandings on a single spectrum derived from the ideologies of the French Revolution. In my opinion this spectrum is incapable of incorporating the dynamics of the present mood, the deeper structures which are decisive for American public life, or the nature of our present peril.

Behind these disputes is a substantive crisis of vast import. It could be called a failure of courage, but that does not grasp the matter at its core. The American Academy of Arts and Sciences has called it "the loss of the American consensus," but that may not quite be it either. Religiously, it is better to speak of the loss of an ecumenical, theological confidence and the possession of the body politic by a host of conflicting spirits.

Until quite recently, Americans have debated the issues of public morality in theological terms which they thought had something to do with truth claims. Our forebears believed that deep theological conviction, linked with profound thought and directed toward practical engagement, could serve as the yeast in civilization, as a check against the demonic pretenses of the principalities and powers. This conviction could shape covenanted communities of faith, and thereby influence both the character of persons and the structures of public institutions to upbuild, broaden, awaken and guide the conduct of life. It could never utterly defeat the power of sin or the multiple attacks of satanic powers -- only God could do that; but it could invite us into a deeper relationship with God, serve as a barrier against the most overt forms of inhuman exploitation and provide a vision of God’s righteousness in public affairs.

In large measure, ecumenically oriented and progressive leadership has lost that confidence. Theology has become a matter of private opinion, irrelevant to public issues. Some "conservative" religious forces recognize that something precious has been lost, although their responses to the loss are often constrictive and, in some cases, dangerous. Their relative success and public visibility in contemporary life are based in part on the fact that society, like nature, abhors a vacuum.

And a vacuum it is, as numerous scholars have recognized. Some, in recent decades, have turned to an analysis of "civil religion," which at its best is the awareness that there are universalistic moral sensitivities which have developed out of the American experience. At its worst, "civil religion" is all sail and no rudder. The moral sensitivities are grounded neither in metaphysical nor in institutional realities. The free-floating moral sensibilities can shift in the winds of change or flutter in the breeze of contradictory gusts, especially when the airwaves are filled with baptized chauvinism.

Sound or False Religion?

The ecumenically oriented churches are custodians of a more profound tradition which in principle could discern the spirits and exorcise the demonic conflicts that beset us. In principle, the ecumenical churches hold that the symbols of Scripture and doctrine grasp and convey something of the very being of God. Theology faithful to these symbols, and constantly tested by reason and experience, provides the surest guide to both belief and action -- in public as well as private matters. Further, belief is seen to have a concrete social base in the organized body of believers. It is precisely here that the doubt and lack of confidence of which I speak are often present.

Many persons are not at all sure that this religious tradition or the church itself can or does make much difference in public life today. Some are not even sure that one can tell the difference between sound and false religion. Who among us has not been touched by one or another of the following observations:

• Theology is all abstraction, having very little to do with real life.

• Our religious heritage is so tainted by racism, classism and sexism that we have nothing to learn from it for today.

• Authentic religion is a matter of a pure leap of faith which is utterly beyond reason.

• All doctrine grows out of experience. Our experience so differs from that of other groups in other times that we can only tell our own stories.

• Ethics is a product of social development. Our ethics must change as our society changes.

There are four features of note common to all these statements. First, each is partially true. Second, each casts doubt on whether we as church people have anything fundamental to say. Third, each tends to relativize the basis of all perspectives on faith and morals. Fourth, none of these beliefs leaves space for the possibility that the object of theology, God, can overcome human subjectivity or bias.

Here, I believe, is the core of the issue. Though standing behind the present shifts of mood in the country, it is of much deeper rootage than the new regime or the debates over this or that policy, and it is of much greater consequence for the longer future. The question, simply put, is this: do we have a fundamental rock on which to stand when we attempt, as church people, to address social and political questions? Or is the witness of the church merely the transcendentalized expression of the contemporary Zeitgeist, of social interest or of political-economic preference?

Much of what has preoccupied the ecumenically oriented churches in the past few decades needed immediate and practical attention: for example, the issues of civil rights, war and peace, economic justice, and outreach to less-developed nations.

In many of these efforts we drew on convictions, loyalties and insights built up among the people of God over many generations. The problem is that we seldom replenished these resources in the heat of battle. The bases were used justifiably, but we failed to see that precisely these bases were being eroded in our social and intellectual lives. We failed to see that the deep wells from which we drew were being shut down as a consequence of the shallowness of our theological digging. Unlike the wells from which we get our fossil fuels, however, the resources for theological energy are renewable. That reclamation is the first priority of the church in our day.

Christians have it on very good authority that Christ’s "kingdom is not of this world" (John 18:36). Christians also know that we are to "render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar’s, and unto God the things that are God’s" (Luke 20:25). We are to be "subject to the governing authorities" (Rom. 13:1-4); yet we are to "obey God rather than men" Acts 5:29).

Pulling Against Gravity

This cluster of teachings represents one of the most revolutionary social doctrines ever conceived. It is not a natural thing for people to draw a sharp separation between religion and politics as distinct realms, to demand responsible participation in both and simultaneously to say that the object of one (God) is the criterion for the object of the other (the exercise of power). The natural tendencies are, on the one hand, toward a world-denying spirituality that views religion and politics as absolutely irrelevant to each other, or, on the other hand, toward an accommodationist stance that uses one to "legitimize" the other.

We are always tempted by these "natural," pagan tendencies. However, the Christian view is one which, so to speak, pulls against gravity. This view affirms the reality and necessity of the world of politics, but it demythologizes, deabsolutizes and relativizes its importance. The only "Christian state" is a secular, limited state designed to serve both a specific society and all of humanity under state-transcending principles. That is why the reactionary efforts to cut governmental programs and the radical efforts to protest the power of the "military-industrial complex" can both claim theological rootage. The life of faith, hope and love cannot be established by political powers. That is also why the current distinctions between "totalitarian" and "authoritarian" regimes ring hollow when both mean absolute tyranny.

Yet Christians also know that human beings live under a sovereign reality beyond the control, of any regime. This reality, precisely because of its sovereign character, is at the same time independent of and directly pertinent to every aspect of social and political life. All who are touched by this fundamental insight have a constitutional distrust of the powers of political authority that have led to the institutional "separation of church and state," as well as a simultaneous urge to engage in the life of public policy to transform society toward justice and righteousness and mercy. This tension has led to the ethical quest for a "public theology."

In this regard, the most decisive indicators of social righteousness in society are the structural freedom of religion and the ethical dependence on an ecumenically shaped "public theology." The lived experience of the 20th century supports this contention. Is it not true that where the state has subverted and constricted religion -- as in Stalin’s Russia, Hitler’s Germany, Amin’s Uganda, Pol Pot’s Kampuchea or Park’s Korea -- questions of social righteousness have been subverted by pagan whims? And is it not true that where religion becomes the legitimizer of this or that political- economic system, as in South Africa, in most of Latin America, and, sadly, in much of the United States, the deeper claims of justice and equality are obscured?

Where religion is repressed, freedom of speech is constricted; secret arrest, torture and political imprisonment are unconstrained. Where freedom of religion is allowed but not governed by a public theology, the sharing at the communion rail has little chance of being translated into the sharing of bread and drink with the hungry and thirsty. Where religion is not independent of political alliance or control, people have no forum, no organizational base -- and no fundamental philosophy of life beyond that fed to them by those in control -- from which to challenge oppressors. Where religion is independent of the state but confined to merely "private" questions and not governed by a public theology, social morality becomes merely opportunistic.

The vigorous defense of the separation of church and state at the institutional level must be matched by a quest for an integrated view of life at a deeper level. At this second level, we must always work out for each generation, as best we can, a unified ethical perspective which gives cohesion and vision to the whole. This is true for at least two reasons. First, all profound theologies hold that God is the Lord over societal, economic and political systems and not only over churches and the hearts of persons. Indeed, a theology that does not make clear how the life of faith pertains to the structures of civilization -- including even those coercive ones of political power -- is truncated. A religious ethic that speaks of interpersonal love but never of social justice is unbalanced. A spirituality that speaks of uplifted souls but never of institutional righteousness is lopsided. Thus we are faithful only if we use the freedom resulting from institutional separation of church and state in order to develop, preach and teach an integrated, theologically rooted perspective concerned at each point about "truth." The fact that we have not done so leaves the door open to the presumed integrated perspectives of Eastern spirituality, to fundamentalist absolutisms of multiple stripes, to worldly syncretisms in which every soul worships its own idol, or to the sprinkling of holy water over Leninist slogans. These movements are constitutionally incapable of providing a holistic perspective.

A second reason for pressing in this direction is closely related. Freedom of religion at the institutional level protects nonsense as well as profound moral and spiritual insight. All profoundly religions people are gripped by a vision of reality which is not only beyond the state but beyond the difficult lessons of experience, beyond the realistic analysis of social forces and societal needs, beyond the prudential calculations of common sense, and beyond the fragmented bits of data we get from daily life. That vision of the beyond is the glory of religion; it is also its peril. A touch of madness is often shielded by this transcendent effect as well as by institutional freedom -- a madness which, if not checked, discredits the fundamental insight of faith and destroys community in fanaticism. For this reason, too, we are in desperate need of a public theology.

Behind the Propaganda

The term public theology is not my own but Martin Marty’s. I use the term with several specific things in mind. A public theology is one that takes seriously the importance of systematic reflection on God. It is a disciplined mode of thinking that works, as the older generations used to say, with the "body of divinity." It is less inclined toward the psychology of religion or the sociology of religion than toward the theology of personhood and the theology of society. This way of thinking seeks behind the propaganda of rationalized religiosity or transcendentalized politics for valid efforts to understand the law of God, the purposes of God and the love of God. A public theology is thus focused on what is truly holy as a life-and-death-orienting question that links mind and heart, personal life style and community-building.

A public theology is not only God-centered; it is "logos"-centered, For Christians, this has specific meaning within the church; but it has a meaning beyond the faith community as well. Among other things, it entails an appreciation of logic, knowledge and science. A public "theos-logos" can make its way in the world, for it makes fundamental sense. The "confessionalist" bias of much modern theology ill equips us for this ecumenically open, apologetic task. Yet the only God worth worshiping does not require that we lie, sacrifice critical thinking, or believe nonsense to find salvation for selves or civilizations. We are to have a due respect for reason and for evidence. We are to engage the arguments of the worldly-wise. At this point we have to make a very fundamental choice which can be stated historically. The early church utilized, embraced and transformed Greek and Roman philosophy, the best science (natural and social) of the day. Was that the "fall" of a truly biblical faith, or the providential consolidation of a perspective that preserved Christianity from being merely another cult? A public theology holds to the latter view.

This observation leads to a further point: a public theology is historically alert. This is an extremely difficult principle for Protestants to understand. We have so often thought that we could draw on the Bible and our immediate experiences as our only sources of authority that we have neglected tradition. Most Protestants have a parochial sense of the communion of saints; yet we are unwittingly shaped by what we neglect. In fact we have some 2,000 years of experience by faithful peoples who attempted to apply theological principles to a vast variety of pastoral, social, historical, economic, political and intellectual environments. Awareness of this history firms our, contemporary resolve, makes us aware of the cumulative impact of modest gains, prevents us from making the same blunders as the tradition sometimes made and provides us with undreamed-of resources for addressing problems in the present and the future.

Finally, a public theology will set forth the first principles of social ethics. A public theology will, of course, be engaged in responding to this or that particular issue which preoccupies the body politic. But it will not do so as if it were another interest group, opposition caucus or government in exile. Instead it will focus on cultivating those basic orientations, those touchstones of normative principle, which can edify the people. In my judgment, the "Social Principles" of the United Methodists, the "Statement on Economic Justice" of the Lutheran Church in America, the "Statement on Human Rights" of the United Church of Christ, and the World Council of Churches’ themes of "Justice, Sustainability and Participation" are models of such efforts.

In this regard, a public theology is not "orthopraxis "-oriented; it tells no one how he or she must act on this or that issue. Rather, it informs all as to the basic principles that ought to be taken into account in coming to specific judgments, in interpreting the particularities of human situations and in guiding concerted action. By working at this basic level we equip people to carry out their own ministries in the world and free them to use their consciences in an informed way. A public theology, therefore, must be accessible to the people and filtered through their convictions. It trusts the people of God and the power of the word spoken in truth and love.

Those called to speak of the church and political life in these ways will have to be prepared to swim against the stream. Many within the churches will want to forget all ‘this abstract stuff and get on with the immediate tasks of doing pastoral care or confronting the system. What I propose, however, will provide such folk with both the institutional space and the theoretical grounding to do so discerningly.

I am haunted by the Old Testament statement that "without a vision, the people perish," and by the early Christian contention that "the church is the soul of civilization." I think we are in for a longer and more arduous struggle than we have yet recognized, for our vision is tarnished and the message of the ecumenical church unsure. Without these mainstays, people make decisions according to their own interests -- and the interests of the powerful generally prevail. In view of these facts, the short-term gains and losses scarcely count. It is for these reasons that I believe the ecumenically oriented churches must face the nature of the crisis at its deeper levels and must gird up their minds and souls for the slow, long-term hard work of reconstructing a public theology while vigorously preserving the institutional separation of church and state. Both our mission under Christ and the wellbeing of the body politic require nothing less.

Revisiting The Church In Socialism

A recent visit to the heavily guarded border between South and North Korea reminded me of going through Checkpoint Charlie at the Wall between East and West Berlin in the 1970s and 80s. The stiff efficiency of soldiers working the gates, the hard eyes of security people, the sound of heavy boots on stone roads, the guards sudden disappearance with one's passport, the zigzag traffic around the tank traps, all this came hack to me. I remembered the blaring martial music, red flags, banners emblazoned with slogans, and heroic proletarian statuary that greeted me as I entered East Berlin. Only a few places still mark the divide between pluralistic societies and those forms of socialism that seek to liberate humanity through a state monopoly of ideology, politics and economics.

Countries that have been divided the way Germany and Korea have are of special interest to political analysts, since such key factors as religion, cultural history, geography, ethnicity and technological capacity are relatively constant in both regimes. The issues that arise with the reunification of such countries are equally revealing. Hong Kong has been reabsorbed into the Peoples Republic of China, but tensions between the raw forms of capitalism of the one and the raw forms of socialist statism of the other suggest that many issues remain unsettled. Taiwan is among the countries watching closely.

North and South Vietnam were united by a victorious socialist state, but they are now divided between factions reluctantly adopting the capitalism they had defeated and those exploiting what they now control. North and South Yemen tried to join and have split again. North Korea seems to be collapsing, while South Korea undergoes readjustments brought on by the wider East Asian crisis.

Only the experience of East and West Germany provides a useful model of reunification, though it is fraught with ambiguities. The Wall is gone and the massive cleanup of ecological and social damage in the East is under way, but many of the older generation are still wandering in the wilderness, with little taste for manna or hope of glimpsing any promised land. Many in the East are nostalgic about the socialist days when they willingly made sacrifices for the promised new society. No one easily forgets causes for which a great price has been paid.

Many former "Ossies" (former East Germans) resent the "Wessies" for thinking that they know better about everything, and many East German youth are contemptuous of their elders for supporting or tolerating the old system and not preparing them for the new. People sneer at the former communist true believers who have now become capitalist managers, and they make snide comments about foreigners who migrate from Eastern Europe and are willing to work for less money than Germans are. A certain cynicism makes people unwilling to trust any program, institution or belief system. Marxist anti-idealism and atheism succeeded too well.

The German case is significant not only for Asians who face the problems of reunification but for Christians everywhere. In East Germany, the Protestant church had a chance to be the church in socialism. Though few church leaders and public intellectuals would still argue that Stalinism, Leninism or Maoism is the way of the future, a belief in socialist values and a Marxist understanding of capitalism remain pervasive.

John P. Burgess, recently on the staff of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.) and now professor of theology at Pittsburgh Theological Seminary, has artfully woven together a series of essays on East Germany written between 1984 and 1996. He begins with an account of the limits imposed on the church by the state, the difficulty of a serious dialogue between the church and the Communist Party, and the churches' decision nevertheless to become the church in socialism. In- some ways, this was the only option for the East German church. It would have lost its identity entirely if it had simply been for socialism. No firm consensus about being against socialism could have been marshaled among its theologians and pastors. And the conviction that the old two-kingdoms theory had contributed to the rise of fascism in Germany made the church deeply ambivalent about being simply beside socialism.

Burgess traces the churches role in the movement toward democracy. An early chapter treats the roots and operative definitions of the idea of liberation. In official party and state rhetoric liberation meant both freedom from capitalism and militarism (and thus from fascism and imperialism, since the first two were presumed to lead by the logic of history to the second two) and freedom for socialism and communism (the one seen as a stage in the transition to the other).

In spite of the tendency to view religion as an ally of capitalism, militarism, fascism and imperialism, East Germany granted the church a position of marginal but decisive privilege as a result of the states legal guarantee of freedom of religion (which often meant freedom for personal belief, expressed in private only). Since the Communist Party assumed that religion would fade away with the increased socialization of society, it saw no reason to alienate older workers who still had religious illusions.

Thus, unlike all other organizations, the church was guaranteed the right to hold certain meetings and to publish some materials. This gave it a distinctive social space a term Burgess uses often, though he does not cite the literature that developed this idea of the churches place in society generally or in East Germany specifically.

Pluralist societies tend to view persons as individuated selves with rights and duties, who may form or leave independent political, social, business or religious associations; but socialist societies incorporate the self into an organic whole that guides each self and controls independent groups and associations. If the first often leads to an abstracted, voluntarist self, the second leads to an enforced collective solidarity. In one, the church becomes a source of fellowship, participation and institution-building; in the other, the church becomes the locus of an alternative worldview and, possibly, increased individuation and pluralism.

Focusing on church decisions in the late 1980s and on key theological leaders, Burgess documents how the church moved from offering a cautious, even veiled statement of an alternative worldview to advocating alternative institution building. For instance, while the state celebrated the heroic struggle of the socialist workers standing in solidarity with the Soviet Union against Hitler fascism, several theologians in the mid 80s suggested that Germans needed to confess their collective guilt for their participation in the Nazi atrocities. While the state portrayed itself as a peace society that had exterminated the causes of war, capitalism and fascism and opposed NATO armaments, the church spoke of the priority of peace in personal and interpersonal life because God has reconciled the world through Jesus Christ.

Burgess points out that theologians almost never commented on the radical militarization of East German (and Soviet) society, although paramilitary training was a part of every school program. Nevertheless, because the church provided an alternative rhetoric and organization its social space attracted political dissidents (and misfits) as well as convinced believers and eager seekers. As a result, many semi-underground groups developed within the churches. They were particularly attractive to young intellectuals, just as semi-illegal pubs for rock and punk music (and much too much beer) attracted young workers. These workers were deeply alienated from both the church and the dull training, boring work and slogan-filled patriotic clubs provided for work groups.

Burgess argues that a set of specific theological developments were most important in increasing the churches influence. These included openness to the world, concern for the suffering and marginalized, and commitment to personal and social liberation. These concerns generated the impulses toward a democratic, political ethic in opposition to the old Lutheran two-kingdoms ethic and allied the church with various attempts to turn the state toward a more authentic, humane democratic socialism. Such hopes increased when Mikhail Gorbachev began to advocate glasnost.

In this context Burgess discusses the ideas of church leader Heino Falcke, a former assistant to Karl Barth. Falcke offered one of the most sensitive treatments of the underground groups, arguing that modern societies were falling apart due to the triumph of instrumental reason. He claimed that only a theology rooted in Christology, a sense of confession in the tradition of the Barman Declaration, and a renewed ecclesial practice could preserve humanity.

Though Falcke did not propose an alternative social philosophy, the idea that something (not capitalism) outside socialism could improve socialism challenged many and threatened some party leaders. But other participants in the oppositional groups agreed more with sociologist Ehrhart Neubert, who maintained that dehumanizing forms of socialism were themselves generating and perpetuating marginal forms of religious life. These people wanted to move more quickly into direct forms of public discourse, demonstration and political formation.

Some church leaders took important stands between these two views. Wolfgang Ullmann, a church historian, saw in the dissident groups a chance for people to cultivate a trust whereby they could speak their minds without fear and find the courage to demand human rights and ecological responsibility. After the Wall fell, he formed one of the first nonsocialist parties, which later merged with the Greens. Richard Schrieder, a pastor with a high regard for the ancient Greeks and for Hannah Arendt, joined the Social Democrats. He was elected to the transitional parliament and helped shape the stance toward reunification. Ullmann and Schrieder took some of the first steps toward a public theology able to shape civil society and set the framework for the formation of persons and the reformation of the common life.

Burgess also discusses Heinrich Fink and Wolf KrØ tke. Fink was the rector of Humbolt University and an active leader in the Christian Peace Conference (which was closely tied to the U.S.S.R.) in the 1980s. He was later dismissed from his university post for complicity with the secret police. Kribtke was a theologian at an independent seminary and is now chair of the theological faculty at Humbolt. Burgess rightly compares KrØ tke's work to that of Stanley Hauerwas and John Howard Yoder. He had a kind of ecclesiologically based antipolitical theology that was the antithesis of Finks militantly political theology. Fink and. KrØ tke represented the extremes of a two-kingdoms theory in that situation, though neither was influential in the transition.

Burgess's careful, even guarded, treatment of people and themes is shaped by his sense of a struggle between progressive and conservative stances. For him, progressive means good, and mildly socialist but not too radical, and conservative means perhaps rooted in classic traditions, but not fully in tune with current liberal thought. Though this liberal-conservative spectrum preoccupies many Americans, it is not the decisive issue for churches, societies or theology generally.

Gregory Baum covers some of this same ground but offers a different interpretation. A Canadian, Baum is well known for his work on theology and society and his sympathy for a liberationist perspective. As a Catholic, he is attentive to the statements of bishops (especially Albrecht SchØ nherr and Verner Krusche). And he explores a version of contextual theology that is formed by a community of faith that does not try to be a universal church which is both a notable contrast with developments in the Roman Catholic Church and an affirmation of accents from liberation theology. Baum also pays more attention that Burgess does to economic developments, to official statements by socialist parties, and to those church Leaders who quote from Marxist sources or speak of learning from Marxist insights. Clearly, he is seeking resources to resist the tide of capitalism that is now shaping the world.

But Baums chief contribution is his emphasis on the fact that many leaders of the East German churches identified with the spirit of the confessing church and were deeply indebted to Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Baum wants to study this tradition. He acknowledges that Barmen had actually been a weak document, lacking courage: it only opposed Hitler's violation of the Church's autonomy and had nothing to say regarding his violation of human rights, the persecution of the Jews, the philosophy of German superiority and the preparation for a world war. Baum notes an ambiguity in Barmen's assertion that there are no areas of life in which we do not belong to Christ: Who is the the "we"? Only Christians, or everyone in society?

The Church'ss resolve to be a church in socialism allowed church leaders to acknowledge a claim of the state on their lives as Christians, and implicitly allowed them to believe that, though their society was atheistic, it was not really against God. Barmen helped the church seek to be a faithful community of witness and service, but it did not require it to develop a prophetic, watchman or public theological role, shaping the moral and spiritual architecture of civilization. Indeed, in its attempt to keep the church from identifying itself with the Nazis it distanced itself equally from all social theories and political systems. In asserting that the gospel stands far beyond all forms of human wisdom, Barmen limited the Church's capacity to develop modes of discourse and social convictions necessary for creative participation in society.

Baum recognizes Bonhoeffer's impact in this context. Bonhoeffer argued that the attempts to preserve the church often reflected a too-high veneration of the state, a de facto support of traditional social values, and an unduly weak view of human nature. Thus, the church itself was in need of a true conversion, a new solidarity with the excluded, the poor and the persecuted all that was entailed in taking the risk to be a church for others.

However, Bonhoeffer also saw that society's leaders had reached a certain maturity thanks to science, technology and management methods which were universal in implication in ways that the traditional church claims no longer could be. He wanted the church to recognize the positive aspects of this: people no longer needed the old props and were open to new ways of thinking about God, humanity and creation. But this view makes for a certain ambiguity. We are to oppose, even have contempt for, the bourgeoisie but believe according to the fruits of the bourgeois world.

While Baum states his admiration for Bonhoeffer, and compares him to such Catholic thinkers as Maurice Blondel, Karl Rahner, Johann-Baptist Metz and several Latin liberation theologians, he is puzzled by Bonhoeffer's repudiation of metaphysics. Though Baum understands the rejection of an other worldliness so that refuses to encounter the realities of this world, he is aware that metaphysics does not require such otherworldliness. He is puzzled that Bonhoeffer and his disciples make all sorts of metaphysical statements (e.g., The world is God's creation"; "Christ was incarnated") that contradict their rejection of metaphysics. His most telling point is that denying metaphysics in principle has been interpreted as saying that God, Christ, and salvation constitute a healing and liberating discourse without any reference to a transempirical order. Speaking of Jesus Christ is here only a way of saying that there is hope for the human project of building a world of freedom and love. There are theologians who hold this view: it is sometimes called Christological atheism.

Baum turns to examine three metaphysical theological claims that have dominated much of Germany's (and Protestantism's) larger tradition: Lutheran two kingdoms theory, Calvinist sovereignty-of-Christ theory, and modern ecumenical developments. He traces the conflict in Germany between Lutheran and Calvinist conceptions of the relationship of theology to society, and shows the problems of each when faced with socialism.

The two-kingdoms theory allowed too much disengagement on one side and too much acceptance of state authority on the other. The Calvinist theory was powerful in the thought of Falcke and Gunther Jacob; but in the hands of some it became only a Marxist revisionism, inviting the church to improve Marxism in the name of Christ. It finally could not, or at least did not, fundamentally challenge the Marxist interpretation of democracy, constitutional government, human rights or economic life.

This view, however, comported well with themes developing in ecumenical circles during this period. The Dutch missiologist J. C. Hoekendijk had argued that the mission of the church was less to expand the church than to help all see that God, through Christ and the Spirit, was engaged in history. The church had a role in this activity of reconciliation, but other historical forces, including non-Christian or even atheistic ones, were servants of this mission and instruments of liberation, justice and peace.

This view never became official, but it fit well the needs of the East German church. It helped its members understand how to be good citizens in a socialist land without forsaking their faith. But it also contributed to their blindness about the fact that socialism was falling apart at home and around the world. It too easily identified every effort claiming to be on behalf of liberation, justice and peace as part of the mission idea. Young members of the underground groups began to ask, "What good is the church if we are liberated and have achieved more justice, and the cold war is over?" When the Wall was breached, Baum writes, the church ceased to play an important role in the common life.

William J. Everett takes up the East German case in the context of a wider study of the relationship of covenantal theology to social life, with comparative analyses of India and America.

His wider-angle lens and larger historical interests allow him to see dynamics Burgess and Baum did not capture. For instance, Everett, a professor of ethics at Andover-Newton Theological School, notes that the confederations that eventually led to self-governance in some German cities and to democratic efforts such as the Weimar Republic after World War I had been deeply embedded in hierarchical and royal structures, with a high degree of centralized control. Further, the formation of synods and federations in the churches, which conducted their affairs on parliamentary and electoral principles, took place under the guardianship of the princes who had supported the Reformation against Rome. Thus, authoritarian polities and the churches’ adjustment to them in 20th-century Germany, East and West, was not new.

Still, Everett argues, German history included a governing federal order within which protodemocratic and voluntary associations could exist. These gave rise to "public corporations," such as churches, with distinctive rights and privileges. These precedents made it difficult for the socialist state to close the church entirely. Everett is surely right that the church’s historic place in society is what made it host to the dissident groups, although the church did not know how to treat them. Deep theo-historical realities have powerful, unintended consequences.

Most interesting in Everett’s account of the events traced also by Burgess and Baum is his analysis of changing relations between church, society and state. He gives special attention to the relation of religion and law, of theology and jurisprudence, and thus of ecclesiology and federal polity. He shows that religion always plays a role in legitimating, critiquing or delegitimating the governmental project. The question is what kind of religion is available to shape the larger society and what its basic "metaphysical-moral" or "theo-social" convictions are. He makes a strong case that the idea of covenant, drawn from scripture and developed variously in different cultures and societies, is particularly suited to support public, just, pluralistic, federalist structures within the church and in the government.

The East German churches did develop this possibility more fully than had ever happened before in German society or in East German socialism. They nurtured a relative independence from the state that has been too quickly swallowed by the established church after reunification, and too quickly forgotten by theologians and ethicists elsewhere. Its promise was not fully developed in the sense that it did not generate a genuinely public theology, a social ethic able to withstand the change, or a philosophy or religion that allows dialogue between both Christianity and other religions and Christianity and jurisprudence.

But Everett agrees with Burgess and Baum that the church in socialism did not betray the faith, that in many ways it did show the way toward a vital, nonestablished church in a secular environment. Other reuniting countries can learn from this experience. As we enter the emerging global society and are all drawn into new unities in a postsocialist world, we all can learn from this history. Not only the confessional legacies of Barth, Barmen and Bonhoeffer but also the Catholic metaphysical and the Protestant covenantal public theologies will surely be necessary if churches are to offer a faithful and effective witness.

Pietists and Contextualists: The Indian Situation

Contextuality issues are prominent among Indian theologians today, as I found out some months ago at an intense, weeklong seminar hosted by the United Theological College in Bangalore. Several international participants joined Indian scholars in assessing the Indian situation and comparing it with Western traditions.

In some ways the West continues to influence Indian Christianity, though it has provoked a deep anticolonialist reaction. India's language of protest, drawn largely from Marxism, is changing, however, mostly because of the failures of socialism around the world, as several speakers mentioned. This is an especially difficult development for India, since it had almost become a client state of the U.S.S.R. and a leader in the quest for a "third way." Christian as well as other intellectuals have become deeply attached to socialist views.

This attachment was evident in what one participant called the 'hijacking" of the conference by members of the Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians (EATWOT), who tried to turn it into forum for liberation theology. That judgment may be too strong, but considerable respect was accorded Russell Chandran, previous principal of UTC and a longtime active member of the Christian Peace Conference, who delivered a vintage"radical social change" paper with characteristic vigor.

Also honored were James Cone, who offered impassioned reflections on praxis and the experience of the oppressed, and Chung Hyun Kyung, the Korean professor who had caused such a stir at the Canberra meeting of the World Council of Churches, who again called for the fusing of liberation thought with indigenous shamanism and a large dose of romantic naturalism. Tissa Balsuriya from Sri Lanka mounted an attack on the doctrine of the Trinity as an example of Western imperialistic theology. Others pointed to more "universalistic" ways of construing the Indian context and seeing it in continuity with classic Christian traditions.

Two of the most fascinating features of the conversation for me were first, the references to "Dalit Theology," and second, the participants' ambivalence toward interreligious dialogue. "Dalit" is the self-chosen name for what others call untouchables, outcasts or Harijans. Dalit theology has obviously borrowed from recent Latin American liberation and Korean minjung theologies, although there were warnings from the podium and from the floor that more nuanced modes of analysis should be cultivated.

Given the emphasis on Dalit theology, I decided to join a demonstration by the Dalit Christian Movement on Dalit Justice Sunday. None of the demonstrators were interested in liberation thought. They were basically pietists, singing hymns, traditional lyrics and Christianized bajans (Hindu devotional songs) as they demonstrated. Their conversations, speeches and tracts focused on human rights, constitutional liberties and traditional issues of development. They were most vexed by religious discrimination on the part of the state against those who, were they not Christian, would be eligible for the Indian versions of equal opportunity" and "affirmative action." They were eager to get their sons and daughters into schools and colleges and thereby into the jobs being created by "privatization," "deregulation" and 'liberalization."

Nor were they particularly interested in dialogue with the non-Christian religions, although some of the leaders expressed high regard for theologians Stanley Samartha and M. M. Thomas, both now retired, who have written carefully and spoken widely on these questions as well as on Dalit rights. Although many of the demonstrators share oppressive living conditions with Hindus and Muslims, the dramatic rise of militant Hindu movements (especially the Rama Sewak Sangh) and the Islamic counterpart (the ISS) makes interreligious dialogue difficult at the grass roots. Hindu nationalist and Islamic fundamentalist groups are refurbishing temples and mosques and developing study groups and "shock troops" (as the Indian Express calls them) that threaten non-Hindus (or, in other areas, non-Muslims) in ways not far removed from KKK tactics.

In any event the pietistic Christian Dalits that I met, both the Catholics and the evangelicals, were interested more in conversion than conversation. Although they want to preserve a "secular state" in the face of Hindu nationalism and Islamic separatism (or Sikh independence), they only halfheartedly support those parties that most energetically promote secularism.

At the UTC seminar, Dayanchand Carr, a teacher at Tamil Nadu Theological College who has investigated beatings and murders of Dalit Christians, expressed grave suspicion of those who are eager to engage in dialogue with Hindus and Muslims without studying the social implications of these faiths. His several forceful interventions suggested that the impetus to dialogue and the impetus to justice may conflict with one another in many cases. The more prophetic forms of Christianity that press toward human rights and social justice are precisely those most under attack by non-Christian militants at local levels, and many activists want to bring judgment against these religions.

Social and ethical theories that deal with such phenomena (and that go beyond the rather tired and crude tools of class and power analysis) are not easy to find in India. The modes of analysis that dominated the period of decolonization played down the importance of religion, for it seemed to be the key source of conflict. It turns out, however, that conflicts based on the mobilization of economic interests or political power are at least as divisive. Further, they not infrequently use religion as a weapon to inflame communal passions.

That fact should give us pause. The use of and appeal to religious communalism is effective (at least in the short run) precisely because increasingly more people are finding a greater sense of common purpose in traditional religions than in political parties or secular ideologies. The nonreligious or antireligious social analysis assumed by Indian "modernists" at least since Nehru failed to recognize the continuing power of ancient traditions and faiths.

Contrary to the expectations of a number of modernization theories, the traditional religions may prove more capable of capturing the people's real interests and of offering a convincing interpretation of life than the secular alternatives. Not only Hindu nationalism, Islamic fundamentalism and Buddhist militancy but other new "spiritual" movements are attracting followers. ISKCON (Krishna Consciousness), for example, is planning to build in Bangalore a massive ten-story temple with an amphitheater for 10,000, an adjoining library, lecture hall and TV production studio, all surrounded by an elaborate park.

While much is traditional and ancient in India, change is striking and dramatic. The most remarkable feature is the blossoming of a new middle class. There is a new three-story commercial building in Bangalore that houses shops selling hundreds of new household conveniences from blenders to hot water heaters to microwave ovens. It hums with the chatter of salesmen and crowds of eager young couples who have left most traces of the traditional "joint-family" behind. People are discovering new needs and wants as well as new practical skills in user-friendly technologies.

Apartment buildings, hotels, office and industrial centers and shopping centers as well as acres and acres of middle-class homes are emerging in sprawling neighborhoods. India's gross national product has grown over the past two years at the rate of about 7.5 percent, which compares favorably with the Pacific Rim countries and surpasses the West. I heard the son of an Indian scholar speak with pride of how his new firm had just beaten a Japanese subsidiary in getting a contract for export to Southeast Asia. A young man who is about to marry the daughter of a friend explained to me how advertising is beginning to penetrate the villages and spark development of a kind that surpasses a quarter century of Five Year Plans. A young Catholic soap manufacturer who had left the priesthood told of his success at making high quality products that can undersell Western imports. All are Christians who wanted to discuss how faith relates to modern life.

The book stores reveal several innovations as well. The volumes on Indian culture and identity that dominated stores in the 1970s were pushed aside in the 1980s to make room for manuals on technology and management. Both genres are still there, but they have been edged out by rows of greeting cards and stacks of books on human relationships. That there is a market for these items suggests not only increased discretionary income for at least a portion of the population, but an intense desire to establish and preserve new forms of friendship.

New developments are noticeable in other places. Restaurants and shops are flooded with middle-class young adults, who discuss traditional Indian topics -- family, politics and the state of one's intestines (a persistent problem in India for much of the population and most visitors)-as well as auto parts, marketing possibilities, supplier contracts and the new religious groups that they have joined.

Change has affected not only the upper and middle classes. Of the several slums I have visited periodically since 1973, one is gone, replaced by two-decker row houses, and another is being transformed into a lower-middle-class manufacturing neighborhood. Previously the only visible businesses were bicycle repair shops; paper, rag and tin recycling enterprises; tiny tea and cigarette stalls; and water and vegetable vendors. Now the area has electricity and standpipe plumbing; auto and scooter repair shops using power tools; small factories making cardboard and sheet-metal containers; and cheap restaurants and phone booths. The area also has four computer shops. To be sure, many places are not developing so rapidly, and areas of squalor and grinding poverty remain.

These material and social transformations that I observed-and that are almost entirely ignored by the most prominent articulators of "contextual" theologies-are matched by and perhaps partially prompted by religious transformations. At the inauguration of a new program on theology and art at Dharmaram College, a Catholic school, I learned that Catholicism is growing among some tribal peoples, and that evangelicalism and Pentecostalism are attracting low-caste Hindus, who constitute about half the Indian population. These movements use a wide variety of musical and dramatic presentations to spread their message. At Madras Christian College, students and faculty spoke of the explosion of independent Bible study and prayer groups that coexist in tension with the traditional churches. Several students spoke with great enthusiasm about these groups.

Christianity in India seems to be following the pattern found in Latin America, Korea and Taiwan: a new indigenous piety emerges, prompted in part by Western missionaries but quickly developing its own leadership and theology. This contextualization of Christianity was completely unanticipated and frequently opposed by the older churches and ecumenical leaders. These groups show little direct interest in the social questions that have concerned the contextual theologians of the last generation. Nevertheless, these groups are having a major social and economic impact in several respects. They seem to be caste-inclusive-a posture that all Christian churches officially aspire to but seldom attain. They also provide friendships for those who have left the womb of their extended family or village for education or work. This community is also a safe setting for meeting potential partners in "love marriages" (in contrast to arranged marriages)-a pattern that both gives greater freedom of choice to women and forces men to act in ways that commend them to more independent women. Further, these congregations offer informal but effective networks for those seeking jobs -- which is terribly important for the thousands of bright young people who flock to the cities. And these churches help members develop leadership skills in a nontraditional and nonhierarchical setting, teaching them how to build and maintain voluntary groups. These skills, incidentally, transfer into the business realm, especially for the hundreds who are starting the small firms that are appearing at every level of Indian society.

Of course, these benefits are byproducts, not the core purposes of these groups. Their chief focus is on helping people develop a personal and saving relationship to Jesus Christ and to live in peace with their neighbors by cultivating an obedience to universal principles of moral law. While no Christian disagrees with these efforts, some Catholic, Orthodox, liberationist and ecumenical Christians tend to reject these emphases because they fail to evoke direct social action in the more usual sense.

In any case, it is interesting that many of the contextual thinkers of the past several decades do not seem to be interested in the social impact of these developments. Some Indian contextualists probably don't acknowledge them because they have abandoned religion as a central category of social analysis, just as they have abandoned the church as a center of institutional interest. But religion does continue to chart the deep course of culture, even if not in the directions the older generation of contextualists wanted.

 

What Tillich Meant to Me

By the time I started to study with Paul Tillich, I had been told for several years that pietas and intellectus could not join. In fact, I had tried to convince everyone, including myself, of this. My experience confirmed it. My father, a generous, liberal, loving pastor who fought both fundamentalism and rationalism in his attempt to hold faith and reason together, died of cancer shortly before I started college. That was absurd. It reduced my mother, a schoolteacher and a pillar of integrity and good sense, to pious blubbering. Family friends, mostly clergy families, visited regularly and spoke soothing nonsense. They could not explain the justice or injustice of life. I have always believed since then that pastoralia is often a studied way of obscuring the big questions. In any case, the evidence was clear: one could be either a believer or intellectually honest. One could not be both.

My undergraduate years at De Pauw University reinforced this view. The best professors were ex-believers, still fighting in the classroom the phantoms of their former faith. Though they were not always persuasive, they were passionate teachers. Their conviction that one’s beliefs mattered contrasted with the attitude of many of the sharper students, who were contemptuous of religion if not merely bored by it. My best friends were pre-med and pre-law students, and in our liveliest bull sessions we discussed what is today called sociobiology, politics (it was the McCarthy days) or religion. Though some very good students and natural leaders were in pre-theological studies, one never sensed that basic questions of meaning or justice drove their lives.

Such questions did fuel the philosophy of religion department, but a great conflict was under way in those years. The generation of elder personalists -- pacifists and Fabian socialists, students of Bowne and Brightman at Boston University -- was nearing retirement. New professors from Yale and Chicago -- political Niebuhrians -- were joining the faculty. The battles of the Titans confirmed my fear that faith and reason pressed in contrary directions. Nor could one simply observe the battle. The destiny of souls and of civilizations hung on the choice.

Two serious options faced those who wanted to go to graduate school. Believers were encouraged to go to Yale, where Wittgenstein, hermeneutics and Barth were on the rise; scholars to Chicago, where Otto, sociology and Whitehead were ascending. No friend who took either part of this advice, by the way, is in a theological field today.

But the tension between fideism and scientism didn’t make sense to me; somehow, the whole cake had to be cut a different way. Either choice plunged us into a metaphysical, moral, epistemological and religious relativism. When I later learned of the deconstructive postmodernists, dada in art, Nietzsche in philosophy and emotivism in ethics, I experienced the shock of familiarity.

I spent a summer in the 1950s working on the railroad by day and reading Sartre and Marx by night. My small group of friends and I felt positively subversive. The next fall, I began writing a column for the school paper, "The Ax by Max." As the campus advocate of existentialist socialism, I used mostly the blunt end of the ax. I knew that there was some adolescent posturing in this, and I partly overcame it by helping found a somewhat gentler literary magazine.

That year I read a very impressive essay by Tillich, whom one professor presented as the most important new thinker. I was convinced. Hearing that Tillich was going to teach at Harvard, I applied there, telling them I wanted to work with Tillich. I was admitted. But a professor who approved of my politics and wanted to wean me away from such foggy idealism arranged for me to get a scholarship to a Dutch institute that trained people going into politics, international affairs and diplomacy. He wanted me to learn more about what I was always talking about -- and to become more diplomatic.

So I went to Holland. In this program everyone had to choose a special topic for independent research in addition to the usual courses in political economics, international trade, European military history and that new science imported from America, "management." I selected Heidegger, and began to plow through esoteric German -- which became only partly confused with the bar-room Dutch I picked up in Amsterdam on the weekends. Halfway through my project, I became convinced that Heidegger had no grasp of either the basic problem of injustice (since he had no vision of normative order) or of the social issues that had attracted me to Marx. I suspected that Heidegger would lead philosophy eventually to ethical and social irrelevance -- something that Sartre discovered when he agreed to sign the Algerian Manifesto two years later. On Heidegger’s or Sartre’s grounds, there could be no call for such an abstract thing as ‘justice," certainly not in the name of "all that is holy."

About that time, the institute accepted several refugees from the Hungarian uprising of 1956. I was asked to tutor them in English, since many textbooks were American. In those tutorials, my Hungarian students, Marxists themselves, began to question my alleged socialism. They exposed to me the fact that I was, like most Marxists they had known at home, merely against something --something conveniently labeled conventional, bourgeois, capitalist, unhistorical or idealistic thinking -- but that neither I nor the communists had yet fully confronted the implications of trying to organize personal or social life on a Marxist basis. It can’t be done, they said. That is why the way was open to Lenin and Stalin. Marxism was a powerful tool of destruction, but it had no resources for reconstruction. It was the turning of the Marxist critique against itself that had given them courage to face the tanks. Now that was existential! That was socialistic! That was religious in a nontheistic sense! It sounds almost au courant to recall this today.

I discussed these things with my research supervisor. who advised me to study with Paul Tillich in America. He told me Tillich had one of the most creative minds in the world dealing with the interaction of existentialism. Marxism, Heideggerian thought and Christianity. This was my second nudge toward Tillich. I reactivated my application to Harvard. making sure they now understood that I came as an atheist. It was a major admission. When I told my girlfriend about this she said she didn’t think she could marry me. How could she trust an atheist just back from Amsterdam? Besides, what kind of future is there for an atheist going to divinity school? At Harvard, of course, that was not a problem. They presumed that I was a Unitarian and assigned me to James Luther Adams. He became a father figure in several ways, healing my grief. But regarding the intellectual and faith issues, he guided me once more to Tillich.

To study with Tillich, I soon learned, did not mean small seminars or tutorials. It meant that one arrived early to get one of the 500 seats. However, I had one advantage: having just returned from Europe, I had some sense of how Germanic people spoke English words. Unlike my peers, I could understand his pronunciation. That made me popular among the novices, for I could at least take fairly reliable notes.

In a larger sense, it was not misleading to try to encounter Tillich through the problem of language. It was one of his most important projects, as thinkers as divergent as Adams and Sally McFague have stressed, to find a new vocabulary, a new mode of symbolic expression, a new metaphorical language to deal with the most fundamental questions. I was not surprised to read Hanna Tillich’s recollection that it was Hitler’s vocabulary and expressions that turned them against him before they had come to a full political awareness of what he was saying or a full theological assessment of its implications.

Tillich attended to words. He knew, with John, that the logos was at the beginning. But he wanted the word also incarnate, in the midst of vitality. He thus deliberately expressed himself in existential and nontraditional ways, as is well known. In his lectures he also used the vocabularies of psychology, cultural and philosophical history, sociology, anthropology, art and politics. Yet the terms did not function the way they did in courses on these topics. One could almost hear the words’ religious dimension -- one could discern the Germanic construction in the English vocabulary and grammar.

At least, that is the way I heard him. But my new friends were hearing other things. Being from rather conservative Christian backgrounds -- Southern Baptist, German Lutheran, Mennonite, Nazarene and rigorously orthodox Presbyterian -- they were suspicious of my fascination with Sartre, Marx, Heidegger and Unitarianism. Besides, I smoked and drank beer like a Dutchman, and could not remember ever believing in miracles or virgin births or the literalist interpretation of Scripture. But I shared their alliance against Barth, who sounded to them too much like what they were fleeing. To me he sounded like a brilliant celebrant of the split between faith and reason. That, I thought, was the crisis of the church, academia and society.

What my companions heard in Tillich was what we might today call "liberation." Tillich was their path from pietistic or heteronomous Christian doctrine to a revealing encounter with Greek and German philosophy, with exotic realms of cosmos, mythos, kairos and even eros -- not to mention Angst, Kunst, Socialismus and das Unbedingt. From the biblicistic worlds of their youth my friends found their way into the wider and deeper ranges of Kultur. He was, for the bright who were ready to hear, a classic gymnasium and German university education wrapped in pithy paragraphs.

My friends were often preoccupied with how the "unconditioned," as Tillich spoke of "it" (although all my friends knew he meant God) , could erupt and reveal "itself" in the midst of life -- beyond the church, outside of religion, without anything resembling worship and in terms one could not read in the Bible or hear from the pulpit. Tillich gave a kind of moral and spiritual permission to raise the question of Christ and culture, and not only to live in Christ, against culture, although some returned to that stance later. He gave others the courage to face the Abyss, which they knew was there but which they dared not peer into, lest they fall into that bottomless pit. Some did, and lost faith. He enticed others to face the historicity and conditioned character of belief. Whether they knew it or not, he was making Nietzsche tolerable. For he had seen that no existing form, no empirical reality, no manifestation of personality or society is unambiguous in time, and that we, to be authentic, have to admit doubt and relativity into our consciousness -- and then marshal the courage to be on the other side of doubt about being and worth. Tillich seemed to have faced the pit and the doubt and survived to tell of it. Indeed, he sometimes suggested that these were also the occasions for, if not quite the source of, creativity. Of course, some Tillichians seemed to enjoy wallowing on the brink of the Abyss and doubt, hoping for creativity yet never doing anything creative.

I never quite believed this part of Tillich’s message -- or what I believed about it was its obverse. What most fascinated me was that he could talk about these things. He could speak of emptiness and change and, by turning them over and inside out, find that the whirl had a structure and the void had a heart. That demonstrated to me that it was possible to develop categories that could comprehend and embrace these realities without being swallowed by them. It was enough to make one a Neoplatonist if not yet a believer.

Unlike my friends, I had already left the faith. I had decided that culture, in the forms of philosophy and social analysis, was, for all its problems, more reliable than Christ. I was persuaded that the bottomless pit was exactly how things were, although I didn’t think it was just that it should be so. Thus, I believed it noble to fight the purposelessness of fate. I was further convinced that the historicity of everything was obvious and that we were doomed to an arbitrary voluntarism in which the only choices were risk and life or caution and death. Hence, I was much taken also by Tillich’s teacher, Ernst Troeltsch, as well as by Tillich’s friend and translator, James Luther Adams, both of whom also wrestled with questions that have fascinated me for a third of a century.

Also striking to me about Tillich was that he saw these things as ambiguous. He taught that these views of life, as well as religious doctrines, scientific theories and works of art, obscured as well as revealed that of which it was an eruption from the depths of being. These matters were much debated among the students I knew. Many fastened on the fact that things religious obscured as well as revealed the Unconditioned, and they began to see the lack of difference between the things of faith and the things of reason. But some of us latched onto the fact that religion revealed as well as obscured the Ultimate, and began to find reasons to think of God again. From their positions in a heteronomous world, some found a pathway to autonomy. Those of us already psychologically in an autonomous world saw a path toward theonomy open before our eyes. In the terms of the method of correlation, those who had been trapped in essence found themselves catapulted by Tillich into existence, while we who thought existence was all found hints of the possibility of knowing something essential. Slowly but increasingly over the years, I became preoccupied with the prospects of knowing something of an onto-theological reality by which issues of truth and justice in church and civilization might be addressed.

Some found it possible to test their faith by reason; we found it possible to find faith because the deepest truth of faith is not contrary to reason -- it may be reason in ecstasy. Some found it possible to examine their religion in the terms of critical philosophy; we found it possible to see and evaluate transcendent religious dimensions of presumably secular thought. Many found it possible to leave the church and enter the academy with a good conscience; I personally found it possible -- indeed, personally necessary -- to enter that branch of the academy that stands within the church and to attempt to reconstruct what Troeltsch called a Christian social philosophy, and what today some of us call a public theology.

Tillich is not responsible for how I have applied his thought. While admitting my full responsibility I must add that Tillich did not speak in a vacuum. He has not influenced me -- or, I suspect, anyone else -- strictly on the basis of the power of his own thought. Nor is the extent to which his thought influenced us proportional to the intensity of the dialogues or disputes he had with others. Young scholars experienced Tillich at a time when we were building an intellectual nest out of his and others’ intellectual influences.

In my own case, it was not only Tillich plus Troeltsch with his sometime roommate Max Weber and Adams with his colleague George H. Williams who were influential, but also Walter Rauschenbusch’s use of the social analysis of his day to restate biblical themes; Reinhold Niebuhr’s refutation in The Nature and Destiny of Man of Marx’s, Kant’s, Nietzsche’s and Freud’s understanding of human nature; Talcott Parsons’s systematic study of the role of religious values in The Structure of Social Action; George Ernest Wright’s exposition of the Prophets; and Masatoshi Nagatomi’s gentle introduction to Asian modes of thought. Martin Luther King, Jr., also influenced us with his insistent activism that appealed to a higher moral law. These and others created the matrix of discussion within which Tillich was received; each student, of course, heard him within the context of his or her own personal story.

This also means that we did not accept Tillich on every point. For instance, I have never shared his views of technology, which I think reflect the kind of Romanticism evident also in Heidegger. Parsons is surely more correct. Second, he remained too much a situationalist in his ethics. He could never bring himself to embrace deontological modes of moral reasoning that speak of normative duties. He seemed to be too much the Lutheran antinomian, too fearful that Kant’s categorical imperatives were merely bourgeois, and too protective (for less than theological reasons) of Dionysian excess without fret about Apollonian constraint or long-range consequences. He could have learned from Wright about the prophetic tradition on this point.

Third, like nearly every great theologian of that generation, Tillich was too unambiguous in his embrace of Marxism. Here I tread on the one canon of orthodoxy that has remained sacrosanct among those who have relinquished nearly every other canon. My critique of the wholehearted acceptance of quasi-Marxist presuppositions among colleagues at Harvard Divinity School during the Vietnam war alienated me from a number of my Tillichian, pacifist and liberationist friends. But the later Niebuhr probably had a better reading of Marx, and his mature sense of Marxism’s limited utility and its grave dangers may be easier to see now than either I or my friends saw then.

Finally, Tillich’s greatest weakness was his relative inability to discern in classic religious symbols the fresh complexity of meaning that he found (with ease, insight and fluidity) in symbols from ancient Greek and modern secular culture. Apparently he credited this to the symbols’ inadequacy or the pretension of the religious groups that used them. He thus left too much to the Swiss theologians of his day who claimed to have cornered the meanings of classical biblical and dogmatic traditions. On this point Tillich probably erred. Today, an unwillingness by liberal and progressive thinkers to use and wrestle directly with classic Christian symbols may well lead to a neo-pagan refusal to assume the responsibilities entailed by those symbols, or even be an abdication in the face of the philistines. In these areas, we must turn to others.

Regardless of these shortcomings, I still feel a deep gratitude to Tillich. He made it possible for me to become a Christian as no other figure before or since has (although I can today find similar inspiration from Hans Kung and David Tracy among the Catholics, and Alvin Plantinga and Nicholas Wolterstorff among Reformed Christians) More, he made the quest for an apologetic, cosmopolitan Christian social ethic imaginable. He helped me join pietas and intellectus as a basis for veritas and justitia in a way I once doubted was possible.

Rauschenbusch Today: The Legacy of a Loving Prophet

Modern American Protestantism has not, for the most part, focused on the lives of the saints. The psychic energy of contemporary pastors, theologians and church leaders has more often centered on the kerygmatic Word as it encounters "the problem of history," on struggles against the idolatries of fascism and Stalinism abroad and racism, classism and sexism at home, or on the development of the professional skills of ministry.

But what has been ignored at the front door has entered by the side. Both psychohistory and narrative theology have evoked a rebirth of what our grandparents called "testimony" -- the stories of personal pilgrimage. People do need models; we like to tell our own tales; and we like to get the scoop on everyone else.

Some of this is little more than pious gossip, and is pernicious. When it becomes the primary focus of attention, faith is endangered: We slide easily into the conviction that theology is basically a reflection of a quest for identity, or is poetry projected onto the cosmos rather than a fundamental claim about what is true or just or holy -- just what the greatest skeptics about religion have claimed for several centuries.

The best preachers and teachers do not talk too much about the self and do not concentrate on personal experience alone. They know that psychobabble can easily become a substitute for good news, and that temptations to avoid theological insight and social responsibility in favor of self-preoccupation are all too frequent.

Nevertheless, the current burst of interest in biography may be a corrective for lopsidedness in other directions. For Christians, the divine revelation, the historic redefinition of meaning, the cosmopolitan insight -- all those things that are deeper and wider than the self and. that can reshape the self -- have, finally, also to come to fruition in the life of persons. Even the long-expected idea of the messianic kingdom had to have a particular personal locus to be fully compelling. A testament with all the discursive writings of Paul, John and the pastorals but without the Gospels would be incomplete.

Biographical interest can be seen in the continuing fascination with the lives of modern martyrs such as Dietrich Bonhoeffer and Martin Luther King, Jr., and in the way some feminist and Third World thinkers use stories to evoke fresh modes of reflection. Consider, for example, how often Alice Walker’s The Color Purple is used in seminary teaching, or how C. S. Song, Kosuke Koyama and Lamin Sanneh draw on personal cross-cultural encounters to bring new perceptions to scriptural and theological themes. The pervasiveness of this emphasis can now be seen even in Christian social ethics, the field born out of the Social Gospel movement and one which in the name of prophetic spirit and social analysis has been critical of Protestantism’s tendency to focus on personal piety.

A refreshing effort to reflect on the intimate connection of prophecy, piety and social insight is Paul Minus’s biography of the father of the Social Gospel, Walter Rauschenbusch: American Reformer (Macmillan, 1988, 243 pp., $19.95) As much as any other single figure, Rauschenbusch brought 19th-century pietism into the 20th-century world of cities, factories, immigrants, clashing classes and subcultures, and problems of housing, transportation and employment. For many, the path that led from the historic patterns of Protestant pietism to ecumenically engaged, socially involved and intellectually critical evangelicalism, and away from constrictive fundamentalism, forked at Rauschenbusch.

No one can read him deeply, or read about him, without thinking that they know him personally. Everyone is inclined to call him, as did his friends, "Rauschy." Yet, like John the Baptist, he always points beyond himself to something greater. Perhaps that is why many of those indebted to him do not take him as their final master.

The outline of his story is simply rehearsed. His father was a German Lutheran pastor who immigrated to this country and converted to the Baptist faith and the democratic polity as a young man. Born in 1861, Walter Rauschenbusch imbibed from his family a profound personal piety, a love of learning, a sympathy for the oppressed and a sense of mission. His studies both in the United States and in Germany cultivated his many gifts and reinforced his sense of having been called to a great task for God. It also gave him an abiding love of both German and American cultures.

He became a pastor in a German Baptist church in a raw section of New York City. In the course of a very successful ministry -- informed by piety (he wrote wonderful prayers) , pastoral experience (he cared for his flock) and learning (he regularly wrote reviews and articles for journals) -- he became increasingly critical of the economic system of the late 19th century. That system seemed to undercut the democratic gains that were being made in law, politics, education ‘and family life; it tended rather toward a new feudalism, dominated by robber barons and served by a new class of. industrial peasants.

The prophetic emphases in his thought developed roughly during the same time he discovered his love for Pauline Rother, who later became his wife, the mother of his children and a beloved companion in hard work and tender play. Previously unpublished quotations from letters between the two reveal how intense their spiritual and physical intimacy was, and how they discovered qualities of marriage that were not present in their parents’.

Such matters are significant in part because they reveal to a contemporary generation that a prophetic spirit and a passion for social justice need not be born out of suspicion, alienation or victimization. They can be, and they have been, born of an amplitude of love, in which case righteous anger can be directed against manipulators of distrust and hate, and not against those who are not "like us."

With a number of fellow pastors who became lifelong friends, Rauschenbusch studied, read, talked, debated and plumbed the new social theories of the day, especially those of the non-Marxist socialists whom John C. Cort has recently traced in Christian Socialism (Orbis, 1988) The pastors wove these theories together with biblical themes to form "‘Christian Sociology," a hermeneutic of social history that allowed them to see the power of God’s kingdom being actualized through the democratization of the economic system (see James T. Johnson, editor, The Bible in American Law, Politics and Rhetoric [Scholars Press, 1985]) They pledged themselves to new efforts to make the spirit of Christianity the core of social renewal at a time when agricultural-village life was breaking down and urban-cosmopolitan patterns were not yet fully formed.

When Rauschenbusch became ill and lost some of his hearing, he accepted an invitation to become a professor on the German faculty, and later the English faculty, of what became Colgate Rochester Divinity School. From that position he became one of the most famous speakers on Christianity and social problems of his day, as well as a beloved teacher and honored author of several books. Until his death in 1918, in the midst of what was for him a tragic war between Germany and America, he helped develop one of the most important theological-ethical positions of modern Protestantism.

Minus’s work and its subject matter are sure to be compared with Richard Fox’s recent biography of Reinhold Niebuhr, the neoorthodox proponent of Christian realism, and with the autobiography of James Luther Adams, a "liberal" with certain affinities to contemporary liberation thought, now under preparation with the help of Linda Barns. These three figures are arguably among the most influential Protestant social ethicists of 20th-century America, and in any case offer a representative spectrum of opinion.

Minus clearly has a different agenda from Fox’s. In Reinhold Niebuhr: A Biography (Pantheon, 1985) , Fox is interested in which of his teachers, Robert McAfee Brown or Michael Novak, is closer to their teacher’s (Niebuhr’ s) legacy, and in how Niebuhr’ s Christian realism might influence the future of civilization. Sadly, Fox seems to lose interest in the issue along the way, perhaps because Novak seems to have the best case and Fox does not want him to. He ends up not liking Niebuhr very much and not quite caring about the fate of Christian realism. Nevertheless, his work confirms that Niebuhr stands on Rauschenbusch’s shoulders and surpasses him. Rauschy’s Theology for the Social Gospel is simply no match for Reinie’s Nature and Destiny of Man.

Minus’s concern is for recovering and recasting a creative link between populist theology and active social witness. He ends up liking Rauschenbusch very much, so much that he has to guard against hyperbole. Still, he appears to be less concerned than Rauschenbusch was with the more expansiye questions of how faith and doctrine shape civilizations and how doctrines might shape human destiny. The wider scope of history and the role of ecclesiology in it are not in his immediate horizon. This Methodist biographer is, in this respect, more Baptist than his subject.

Nevertheless, we can see that Rauschenbusch had a better sense of how grass-roots social institutions work than did Niebuhr. Furthermore, like the two-volume Adams autobiography (volume one is nearly done) , Rauschenbusch’s biography is studded with stories of people from every level of society. Workers and seminarians always came to hear both men speak; but they were also friends of those who did not work with their hands -- like John D. Rockefeller, in Rauschenbusch’s case.

Rauschenbusch remained more self-consciously rooted in Scripture than did Adams, however, and he maintained closer ties to church circles than to academic ones. While the two share a pronounced sense of the importance of the Holy Spirit, just below the surface, of Rauschenbusch’s thought is a trinitarian framework and a preference for an organic society over a voluntaristic one. In comparing Rauschenbusch to Adams, the differences between a religious liberalism (Adams left the Baptists to become a Unitarian Universalist) and a progressive evangelicalism become clear; indeed, we can see how conservative Rauschenbusch really was.

A bigger difference remains in the telling of the individual story. In the Minus biography, characters do not always come alive; points are sometimes only summarized in a quotable aphorism. Of course, Adams is a constitutional raconteur. He teaches by parable, which he seems to be able to connect to systematic thought -- whether it be in the philosophical-theological traditions of Whitehead and Tillich or the sociohistprical traditions of Troeltsch and Weber. Those who use Minus’s book to teach the next generation how Rauschenbusch brought many in a previous generation, most of a denomination and much of ecumenical Protestantism to embrace "Social Christianity" may ,want to translate his material into that kind of revealing art Which simultaneously embraces evocative parable and systematic clarification. The deeper promise of Minus’s effort would then be fulfilled.

What does Rauschenbusch’s Social Gospel mean for today and tomorrow? Is it the American form of liberation theology, belatedly discovered by Latin American Catholics, Third World Protestants and others who had not previously been led beyond their distinctive forms of pietism by historicism and sociology? Or is it a blip on the screen of history, born of the Progressive era among minorities in a strange land, institutionalized in the New Deal, and now left in the dust by the neoconservative revolution?

If by "liberation" people mean that Christian thought and life are to be socially engaged, committed to those forms of systemic change necessary for the greater actualization of social justice, and open to the dynamic movements of the Spirit among the people, then there is little doubt: the Social Gospel is America’s indigenous form of liberation theology. It forms base communities, it overcomes resignation with greatness of soul, it ministers to those with greatest need, it empowers the voiceless. Indeed, the more one reads of Rauschenbusch, the more one sees of the Social Gospel in Martin Luther King, Jr., and even Dorothy Day.

But if by liberation theology one means other things, then differences emerge. If one means, for instance, an epistemological privilege of the oppressed, in the sense that the poor, the suffering and the dispossessed have some intuitive knowledge of God, righteousness and social reality not available to others; if one means that victims know best how to overcome their condition and build new institutions; and if one means that knowledge based on "experience" makes academic excellence unnecessary, then liberation thought and the Social Gospel diverge.

The reason for working among the dispossessed, and the reason for training teachers, preachers and missionaries to do so, while insisting on the highest standards, and the reason for fighting to get disadvantaged people access to educational and leadership resources is to equip them with epistemological possibilities not already available to them.

A similar distinction would have to be made if one means by liberation what Dorothy Sölle, for instance, means when she writes that "Political Theology is a theological hermeneutic which, in distinction from a theology that interprets reality from an onotlogical or existentialist point of view, holds open an horizon of interpretation in which politics is understood as the comprehensive and decisive sphere in which Christian truth should become praxis" (Political Theology [Fortress Press, 1974], p. 59). The legacy of the Social Gospel might challenge the notion that theology has the capacity to transcend ontological and existential questions; but it would certainly repudiate the social presuppositions of Sölle’s statement. Her view, it would say, reflects a heritage rooted in religious establishment, even if today it wants to establish a radical theology instead of a conservative one.

Rauschenbusch, like most in the Social Gospel movement, believed in the free church. He thought that Christ not only taught us how society works if we read the Scriptures deeply enough, but that Christ demanded of his followers a social theory of politics, not a political theory of society. That is, Rauschenbusch would have denied that politics, or for that matter a political economy that put production and distribution in the hands of the state, could be "the comprehensive and decisive sphere for Christian truth or praxis" without bringing tyranny with it.

Indeed, he would say that both theology and sociology require us to recognize that the church is the more decisive, and society the more comprehensive, category of the common life. Society is also more shaped by the church than modern -- thinkers -- including a number of church leaders, when they think about such questions -- acknowledge. Thus, church and society are the chief areas of Christian concern; politics and political economics are, and must be, their servants, else they will follow Mammon entirely, trailing along, often generations behind; only appearing to be innovators., That is why the church can and must speak about "social salvation," and do so wisely. On this point, Adams and Niebuhr would join with Rauschenbusch.

What most separates contemporary theology and ethics from Rauschenbusch is his emphasis on the kingdom of God. He was one of the last great American leaders to take the kingdom of God as his governing symbol. H. Richard Niebuhr taught us in The Kingdom of God in America that the triune themes of the sovereignty of God over the whole world, the reign of Christ in the heart and the expectation of a Coming Kingdom in and beyond time were all embedded in the term "kingdom of God," and that these themes were decisive in the way Christian theology and ethics provided -- with differing accents in different periods -- a spiritual and moral rudder for American civilization, from its founding through the industrial era.

Such themes have faded. Few speak of the kingdom of God that way today. If, for the sake of biography and narrative, or for reasons of liberation or political solidarity, we leave this symbol behind, we must ask what the organizing principles of our public theology will be in the 21st century. What will become the inner guidance system for this superpower in a postindustrial era?

Those who leave the legacy of the Social Gospel behind must be sure they have something better to put in its place. Many worse options, and few better ones, stand in the wings of history.

Teaching Values in South India: An Experiment in Education

In 1986 India’s department of education issued a remarkable document that acknowledged, among other things, that "India’s political and social life is passing through a phase which poses the danger of erosion [of] long-accepted values. Not only are the young ignorant of, and often contemptuous of, ancient Hindu visions of life, but the ‘modern’ values of secularism, socialism, democracy and professional ethics are coming under increasing strain."

That statement is from the "Draft National Policy on Education," an attempt to chart directions for the 5,200-some institutions of higher learning that have arisen in India during the past century. The document speaks explicitly of "values education." It calls for the fostering of values that "have a universal appeal" and that could help to "eliminate obscurantism, religious fanaticism, violence, superstition, and fatalism."

As in others parts of Asia, what happens in Indian colleges and universities is decisive for the future. The median age in Asia is about 17 and going down; in the West it is about 35 and going up. With well over half the globe’s population in Asia, it can be regarded as the world’s kindergarten, with the West being the world’s old-folks home.

This call for more attention to "values" takes place in the context of a general structural revision in Indian higher education. Colleges may, under certain conditions, be granted a new degree of independence from prescribed curricula. Education is gaining independence from the governmental control brought to India by the British and reinforced by the first generation of national leaders who used socialist ideas (mostly Fabian, some Marxist) about centralized planning in a secular state in their effort to establish a modern nation and to keep militant Hindus and Muslims from each other’s throats.

These developments arise from the simultaneous failure and success of Indian education. On the one hand, recent Indian educational policy has made Indian doctors, managers and engineers competitive on the world job market. It has also brought education to such a level of strength that scholars, programs and institutions are able and willing to take more responsibility and be more autonomous in shaping what gets taught.

On the other hand, the educational system has not provided a vision that can inspire the younger generation to a common moral commitment. The editor of The Hindu, a widely circulated English-language newspaper, claims that 80 per cent of India’s college graduates want to leave the country for one of the Commonwealth nations, one of the Gulf states or the United States to make money. No nation can survive when such a large percentage of its more gifted and trained people want to leave.

Among those most eager to respond to the new freedom and the emphasis on values are some of the leaders of the All India Association for Christian Higher Education, which represents some 2,000 Christian colleges. Under the umbrella of this organization, Christian professors are beginning to develop new courses, new syllabi and new collections of case studies for discussions of ethics. All of these developments are new in several senses. In most places such efforts simply did not exist previously. Elsewhere, they represent a major step beyond the required religion courses which were mostly catechism, only slightly removed from compulsory chapel.

Values education has taken place in India from time immemorial, but often by means of those informal structures of learning by which everyone everywhere is nurtured into specific cultural attitudes about right and wrong, good and evil. And to be sure, in the deep background of these structures were the great scriptures and epics as interpreted by the Brahmins, which have shaped the fabric of the whole culture. More immediately, morality was mediated through the extended family (with all its connections to caste) , which remains very powerful in India; sometimes in those temples where pundits gave discourses about the perennial struggles of good and evil; and most frequently by the practical decisions of the panchiat, the intercaste village council of the five leading elders. In recent centuries, law, which is everywhere a bearer of morality, was-under the control of the Muslims. then the British and then the secular government. But none of these structures seems to have effectively generated a moral code for a society in transition.

The new courses are being developed as a kind of unofficial substitute for what is often done by theologians, ethicists and social theorists. In India, theology, ethics and social theory as critical sciences are not widely developed, and topics treated by these fields appear in local communities primarily as confessional commentary, caste practice or expressions of communal interests. There are outstanding Indian intellectual leaders in these fields -- one thinks of such figures as M. M. Thomas, Russell Chandran, C. T. Kurien, M. N. Srinivas and a dozen or so younger scholars also likely to become known around the world -- but in the colleges the concerns for values these names represent scarcely appear.

The new courses and materials are being created mostly by educators in the nontheological sciences -- Christian mathematicians, linguists, physicists, biologists and economists who use theologians, ethicists and social theorists as occasional consultants. The class outlines include religion (often based in Bible study) , morality (frequently centered in Victorian virtues) and social problems (heavily laced with metaphysical views of Indian cultural history) These topics are being woven into a new mix which includes a dedication to an interfaith sense of the urgent need to reconstruct the spiritual and moral values of the nation.

What was striking to the outside observer in these events was that the inevitable interdisciplinary conversations dealt primarily with the transformations of traditional patterns of life -- transformations that seem to some so glacially slow that everything should be done to speed them up, and to others so incredibly rapid that people and morality were getting lost in the swirl of change. Of particular concern to many was the shift from a "joint family" structure, with arranged marriages, to a more nuclear family constituted by "love marriages." This shift reflects some increased emancipation of women as well as the transition from a "communal," subsistence-agrarian economy to an increasingly "societal," exchange-urban one. The change has produced enormous anxiety, conflict between the generations, and a fear that India will go the way of the West with its high divorce rates, broken families, loss of extended support systems, and commercialized libertinism.

Much concern was also expressed about the apparent increase of religious and communal fanaticism in India, as the generation that marched with Gandhi for a tolerant, nonviolent, independent and national spirit fades into history. Several of the teachers of values education believe that only a Christian perspective can renew the foundations of public morality -- even in a Hindu context -- just as it was the encounter with Christianity that prompted Gandhi (and many of his generation) to revise the dominant understanding of Hinduism. (How Christianity is to relate, as a minority faith, to pluralistic environments is one of the key topics to be taken up at this month’s celebration of the 50th anniversary of Tambaram -- the meeting in that city near Madras of the International Missionary Council which included the Third World in a way that anticipated the current influence of the "newer churches" in the World Council of Churches.)

The educators are also alert to the continuing problems of poverty, although Indian college students frequently have to be taught to perceive directly what is simply part of the peripheral background of their daily lives. Depending on which figures one adopts, some 40 per cent of the population is below the poverty line (defined here as the inability to get access to 2,200 calories per day) Once the facts are acknowledged, teachers say, the appropriate value responses must still be discussed. Many students see the poverty of some as the natural structure of existence -- as the result of inevitable karma or as kismet. Of course, these ideas are challenged by Christians and Marxists, but neither has yet successfully challenged the facts of mass poverty.

As is the case elsewhere around the world, Marxist parties and institutes try to offer an alternative to fatalism, but party leaders appear to be little interested in serious social change. For the most part, the Marxist parties seem to reflect the effort by competing communal groups to form majorities that can keep Hindu and Muslim militancy at bay while taking some modest strides toward a welfare state. Christians are frequently involved in these efforts. Among some academics also, Marxism has provided the common terms of discourse. It supplies not only the slogans of student organizations but also the vocabulary for much analysis of the political-economic situation, especially in Christian circles. However, very few policies in Christian institutions or in public life are actually decided on these bases, in part because class analysis simply does not and cannot take account of the cultural factors that shape much of what is decided.

Teachers say that college students are bored by the analysis of political-economic problems anyway. They want to get jobs with transnational corporations in a big city or, preferably, abroad, and join the middle class. They are the "new class" in Indian society. They want to be independent of traditional values, they are suspicious of Marxist parties (even if they vote for them) and of too much piety in church (even if they attend services) Yet they experience a crisis of moral drift. They would like to be inspired, but traditional forms of inspiration simply don’t work in the economic, political and social world they are being trained to enter.

What shall guide their lives? Teachers say that many non-Christians think a Christian education better prepares them for the world of urban life, international economics, love marriages and democratic political life than the available alternatives, even if they do not want to convert. (Depending on the college, 60 to 80 per cent of the student bodies and 40 to 60 per cent of the faculties are non-Christian.) "Values education" thus becomes a way of presenting a Christian ethical universalism in nondogmatic terms. The most important points, it is often said, might also be found in Muslim and Hindu thought. even if they are not accented by the traditional representatives of these religions.

The Christian teachers who are taking up these problems read and use the Bible without a sense of the hermeneutical crisis which has preoccupied academics in the West. They then link their interpretations to the sciences they teach, to the culture in which they live, to the expressed needs of their students, and (often preconsciously) to the metaphysical questions that the religious traditions of India have posed for centuries. The results echo faintly the stances taken by Puritans, Pietists and Wesleyans, who, in their own ways, were also in controversy with feudal societies and mystical speculations, and were simultaneously open to the dialogue between religion and science in an attempt to shape a new future. It would not be surprising if a new "Indian Social Gospel" were to come from these developments. Already slated to be established this year in Tambaran is an institute for research on Christianity and contemporary thought for educating and training leaders in Indian church and society.

No one knows where all this will lead. Only a few examples of the attempt to link values with the arts and sciences have been published (see, for example, A Vision for India Tomorrow: Explorations in Social Ethics, edited by J. Daniel and R. Gopalan [Madras Christian College, 1984]) But already evident is a sense of social conscience linked to economic development; a theology of vocation that replaces the ascriptive caste definitions of occupation; a theistically based universalism conducive to science and human rights; and a modernizing, cosmopolitan outlook in a land where the sacredness of the cow signals both the power of tradition and a preference for the agrarian life.

These developments raise a substantive question about the role of the middle classes, a question with implications beyond India. Here, as in other places of the world, the educational fruits of the 19th-century missionary movement produced an energetic middle class that was new to traditional societies. It did this by challenging the religious authority by which elites legitimated their domination, and by introducing new religious possibilities that could legitimate new behaviors by those under domination.

Today, modern scholarship is translating and writing commentaries on the great texts of the world’s religions at an unparalleled pace. The views of world history’s greats are at hand. At the same time, the world church has become alert to the poor and the oppressed who have no voice, and many are being given one as we properly offer our prayers, our resources and our time to aid the dispossessed.

How are we to deal with the new and rising middle classes of the Third World, represented by these Indian teachers and college students? They are at the cutting edge of modernization in their culture. What shall Christianity around the world say to those who are neither part of the elite nor in poverty but on the way to new kinds. of leadership?

Part of the answer to this question will depend on what role we think the educated middle classes will play in the church and in the future of civilizations, and what part we think religion plays in shaping social morality. I suspect that religion deeply shapes social morality, and that Christianity implies both a social duty to care for the poor and the oppressed and an intellectual duty to understand the great philosophies of the elites that have shaped cultures for centuries. But the more difficult and ultimately more fateful question is whether Christians can define and refine those basic ethical principles that can support, sustain and guide tomorrow’s middle classes (which we want the poor to rise into and the elites to heed)

It may be as much of a sociological law of history as we can presently establish that it is the middle classes who determine the destiny of modern civilizations. When they are strong, democracy, human rights and economic productivity tend to prevail. When they are not strong, the result is the polarization of the rich and poor and a fluctuation between the tyrannies of the right and those of the left.

In their own unassuming ways, simply by trying to be good teachers for their students, Christian teachers in the Christian colleges of India are taking up questions that are the most crucial for Asia’s future. They are embarking on a historical experiment -- which will surely last more than a lifetime -- that tests this question: Does Christianity provide universal values that can be transposed into a new idiom for a new class and thereby influence the reconstruction of a great Asian civilization? Or does Asian change have to pass through the Maoism of China, the "killing fields" of Indochina, the tyrannies of a Pakistan or a Korea, or the robotics of Japan? On these matters, the still quite modest efforts in the Indian colleges just might be worth following.

Tensions Beset Church of South India

When the Church of South India was formed shortly after World War II out of the various mainline denominational churches established by Western missionaries in the previous century, the entire ecclesiastical world celebrated. Here, quite possibly, was the beginning of the reunification of the fragmented body of Christ. The Western Protestant experience, which included church splits and the formation of new denominations on the basis of national, ethnic and class differences -- as well as differences of doctrine, sacramental practice and biblical interpretation -- had been exported to the mission fields, where many of these differences seemed to be of even less enduring significance than they were at home. This splitting the CSI planned to overcome, along with any residues of cultural imperialism brought by European and American advocates of the gospel.

But not everything has worked out as planned. As the CSI approaches its 40th birthday, it appears to the outside observer to be less integrated, less vigorous and less independent than its founders had wished.

By all estimates a higher percentage of members of Indian Christian churches attend services on a given Sunday than do Christians anywhere in the West. And even though Christians constitute only about 2.5 per cent of India’s population, that is an enormous number of people in a nation of at least 750 million. Further, the leadership of the CSI is almost entirely Indian, and a growing number of good seminaries are supplying a trained and committed clergy. Recent decisions have allowed for the ordination of women in the CSI, although only a few have been ordained as of yet.

Perils, however, beset the church. A second wave of missionary efforts is now under way, bringing dissension and competition from several quarters. And internally, ecclesiological problems remain to be solved.

The second wave consists of two parts, each of which contains further divisions. The first and most noticeable of the new-wave movements derives from the explosion of evangelistic, fundamentalist and pentecostal activity in the West, giving rise to new missionary efforts in India. In the Indian city slums, the towns and some villages, revivals, tracts and English-speaking Christian schools (for which there is a great demand in any case) are popping up everywhere. Minor Western denominations each have their missionary outposts, economically dependent on their benefactors. They report, of course, great success stories with so-and-so-many new converts. But many of the latter are in fact from CSI churches.

In addition, both those churches that were founded by Western denominations in the past century but which did not join the CSI -- some Baptists, Methodists and Lutherans -- and Indian denominations with a deep and long history, such as the Syrian Orthodox and Mar Thoma churches, are increasingly using the literature from Western evangelistic and fundamentalistic sources in their religious education programs. Many of the young people who are students in the ecumenically oriented Christian colleges are as influenced by the Evangelical Union as they are by the Student Christian Movement. Lay leaders responding to these new developments pummel their pastors with questions about creationism, faith healing and the verbal inspiration of Scripture, and are overtly suspicious of the historical and critical interpretations of biblical texts.

The second part of the new wave consists of those who have been captivated by Marxist or quasi-Marxist forms of liberation thought. These groups have such names as "Social Action," "Institutes for Social Analysis" and "Christian Dalit Movement." ("Dalit" is the indigenous vernacular term for outcastes -- otherwise called "harijans and girijans" or "scheduled castes and tribes." Its advocates want to develop an Indian theology something like "Minjung theology" among the Koreans, and think that the future lies in the encounter of Christianity with the "little traditions" of the oppressed, rather than with the "great traditions" of Hinduism and Islam.) These groups are also funded largely by Western sources, mostly German or American. Some others, usually working under the title "Peace and Justice," are said to be funded by the Eastern European Christian Peace Conference. The fact that funding comes from abroad continues to be an embarrassment to these bodies, since they desire to be based entirely in local contexts. A few notable ones are, or largely are; but it is clear when one sees them up close that most would collapse without international support.

These groups, which often have sharp disagreements with one another over leadership, tactics and basic theoretical orientation, are united only in that they have lost confidence in the leading churches -- and never had it in the more "evangelistic" missions. Sadly, the feeling is often mutual, and those few faithful members of the CSI who do believe strongly that social engagement and transformation constitute one very important dimension of the church’s mission have to struggle to get a hearing.

One of the problems is that, in spite of efforts by such ecumenical leaders as M. M. Thomas (the Reinhold Niebuhr of Asian Christianity) , who has been closely associated with the activist groups, most have not been able to, or have not been interested in, clarifying the theological bases of their action. At other times, their actions have been directed against the more established church leadership -- not always to reform it but sometimes to undercut and discredit it.

These sectarian as well as para- and extra- and occasionally anti-ecclesiastical developments have put a severe strain on a number of local congregations and church bodies. One could, of course, make the case that the more evangelical and enthusiastic wing of the new wave is reaching the less-educated portions of the population, within and beyond the church, which the CSI is not serving or not serving well. There is something to this argument, for those attracted to the more evangelistic movements frequently find the sermons in the CSI churches dull, the liturgy stodgy and the call to Christian commitment blown on an uncertain trumpet. They are not alone in their feelings. This same awareness among some segments of the clergy has begun to spark renewal movements within the church as well as reexaminations of Christian education, preaching style and liturgy.

One of the symptoms of the church’s internal strains is the enormous number of cases referred to the secular courts. Disputes are perhaps frequent in any organization that does not operate by means of coercion, provide pay for services or have a clear system of rewards and punishments in this life for actions taken. But the contentiousness here is compounded by forms of pietism and communitarianism that are incredibly complex and pervasive.

Several long-term observers have suggested that one of the key problems is constitutional. When the various mission churches came together, the governing polity was episcopal -- in a society that did not nave much experience in democracy at the congregational level, in presbyterial collegiality at the regional level, or in diaconal services to the neighbor anywhere. Hence, the episcopal system simply reinforced the deep cultural traditions of hierarchy in which each person who gains some prominence or influence is expected to drag everyone in his family and subcaste with him or be judged irresponsible and useless. It does appear that the Roman Catholics, whose orders carry out much of the evangelism and social action, and whose pastors and bishops are also celibate (breaking thereby some of the extraordinary power of kinship connections) , have fewer difficulties on these fronts.

Others attribute the CSI’s major difficulties to the intensification of communal consciousness now taking place in many regions of India, the case most familiar to the West being that of the Sikhs. Still others assign many of the difficulties to the Christians’ minority status, pointing out that minority groups everywhere tend to create internal elites who are not immune to wheeling and dealing with the powers that be -- for, of course, the good of the community (and "incidentally" the advancement of one’s family and supporters)

Whatever the causes of the problems, more and more church leaders are beginning to grapple with them. If they are successful, it is likely that internal changes will take place in the next decade with some rapidity. Next year’s celebrations of the CSI’s 40th anniversary may be somewhat muted, for good reason. But it may be that in the near future the church will find ways to include a new emphasis on both church growth and significant social engagement. It may also reinvigorate preaching and principled leadership, find ways to modulate the influence of caste, extend democratic participation and balance it with judicious episcopal oversight, while reducing the temptation to submit every intrachurch disagreement to the secular courts. The jubilee celebration could serve as a hopeful symbol for such a future.

Can “Sustainability” Be Sustained?

A Review Essay of John B. Cobb, Jr., Sustainability: Economics, Ecology and Justice (Maryknowl: Orbis Books, 1992).

There is little doubt about it: ecological/environmental awareness is one the three great entrees into cross-cultural thinking today. Along with human rights and the emergence of a pervasive matrix of global economic interdependence, the issue of the future of the biophysical planet in relationship to the future of civilization poses a basic theological-ethical question as to whether there are common problems that demand concerted human attention beyond the particularities of culture, class, ethnicity, nationality, and gender.

Contemporary humanity faces, in such issues, the question of whether we, as a species, have enough access to universalistic principles not only to confront and constrain recalcitrant abusers of the cosmos and the neighbor, but to guide and shape the whole of what appears to be an emerging, single cosmopolitan civilization—although it is likely to be the most diverse and culturally pluralistic civilization that ever existed. All who hold that the whole of reality is rooted in, guided by, and accountable to a God who alone is truly universal and fully just will be interested in how theological ethics treats these issues.

To be sure, these are not the only issues that press us toward global thinking. Other pervasive motifs intrude into our local preoccupations in spite of the recent fascination with contextual differences and the often dogmatic suspicion that we are all so trapped in our own social or cultural, linguistic or sexual identities that we cannot understand each other, let alone make any sort of "objective" claims about morality or the human condition.

For example, issues of "international law" have been under debate since at least the Council of Constance in 1415 and have taken on more and more importance with the emergence of the World Court, the United Nations, and enormous webs of contract, patent, criminal, and multilateral trade agreements; the "new world order," a phrase coined by Cicero as I recall, has been revived episodically in political debates since the fall of feudalism

and has received fresh attention in the last decade as we move beyond a bipolar world of superpowers; and while no one doubts the culturally embedded origins of modern science, questions as to whether science is too "Western" to be universal are only (debated by those who ignore how rapidly and eagerly computer technology is adopted and adapted into every culture given access to it. Indeed, even the worldwide demand for movies, tapes, and videos suggests at least the high permeability and at most the pervasive character of some levels of human sensibilities in what some want to see as radically (distinct and encapsulated. [1] These areas too raise the question of whether there are, and whether modern humanity can reliably know whether there are, general norms and principles that do, or should, or could guide the common life.

However, for many, the commonalities exemplified in law, politics, science, technology, and culture seem artificial and subject to distortion by greed and imperial impulse. Ecology, on the other hand, seems to have a prima facie priority, even a kind of moral purity about it, for it is to "nature" that many appeal if they want to show that some aspect of life is "really real" or truly normative. Indeed, if it turns out that if this or that philosophy (or theology) evokes, promotes, or reinforces a human tendency to violate what is natural, many suspect that the matter is settled. To call something "natural" is, for many today, to enter the court of final appeal. It is striking that "earth day" is the chief contribution of our generation to the liturgical calendar.

Among contemporary theologians, John B. Cobb, Jr., Professor Emeritus at the School of Theology at Claremont and the founding director of the Center for Process Studies, has contemplated the place of nature in theology as much as any other major thinker. As is widely recognized, he is a philosophical theologian willing to ask basic metaphysical and moral questions and to engage in a close dialogue with the natural and social sciences just as many seem to be retreating from these conversations.

He established himself with a flurry of publications in the 1960s celebrating process theology—Varieties of Protestantism (1960), Living Options in Protestant Theology (1962), A Christian Natural Theology (1965), The Structure oJ Christian Existence (1967), and God and the World (1969), all from Westmminster Press.

But near the end of the 1960s Cobb underwent a conversion. [3] It is not that he departed from process thought, but that he seemed to confront a crisis in the world that challenged at least his previous understanding of it, a crisis that he could not easily digest without altering his trajectory of theory. Process thought, as he has helped me to understand it, is centered in the effort to think through all the basic metaphysical, moral, epistemological, and theological issues from the standpoint of evolutionary developmentalism. With Aristotle’s opposition to Plato standing in the distant background, and deeply influenced by Hegel and Darwin as well as by the bustling energy of earlier American optimism, all is conceived of in terms of a dynamic flow as interacting parts rise into existence and dissolve by their inevitable organic and aesthetic responsiveness to one another and to the emerging and progressive whole that they constitute. Ultimately, it is the becoming of God.

But, as Cobb recounts on the first page of Sustainability, he was prompted by his son, Cliff, to read Paul Ehrlich’s The Population Bomb, and was shaken by it. he admits that it is "a potboiler," filled with "exaggerations and errors," yet it appears to have prompted a doubt that the whole historical, organic, interactive, aesthetic dynamic of progress was benign, that it would survive, or even that it could lead to a wider human flourishing. Indeed, Ehrlich predicts catastrophe. The dynamic, emerging process was leading to death and destruction.

What Cobb confronted seems to be more than another American jeremiad and more than another Mailthusian meditation. It was at least the reality of sin, traditionally a weak point of process optimism—a defect under continued discussion by, for example, Marjorie Suchocki, in many ways Cobb’s heir as a leader of process thought. [3] Closely related, it is also possible that he also began to suspect that apocalyptic thought had some validity, a suspicion that process thought was designed to overcome, for apocalyptic thought held to a dualism—although civilizations shall be shattered and the earth shall fall to pieces and life shall come to an end, another, truer, more real reality remains.

We leave to one side, for this review, extended reflections on the relationship of apocalyptic thinking to modern liberal theology generally, but it is an issue worthy of some attention. Certainly the United States has been well supplied with catastrophic texts, many of which are couched in scientific language, yet seem to attract the attention of major theologians. Any decent list would surely have to include Rachel L. Carson’s Silent Spring, Meadows and Meadows’ Limits to Growth, Robert Heilbroner’s An Inquiry into the Human Prospect, Jeremy Rifkin’s Entropy, Jonathan Shell’s Nuclear Winter, and perhaps Gibson Winter’s Nuclearism. It is at least intriguing that theologians and pastors who would not be caught dead referring to The Late, Great Planet Earth seem impelled to believe that the more (Dramatically we portray the gaping jaws of hell environmentally the more likely a return to the righteousness of yesterday.

And how fascinating that so many see the source of the ills in those social, economic, legal, and technological developments that have roots in the transcendental, even dualist, thought that God is other than the world, and that in our obedience to God we may be called upon to change the world. It is indeed a crisis if those theologians who press toward monism discover that they have no place to go when the material world begins to look unreliable.

The little book under review here contains an account of Cobb’s encounter with the limits of nature and history, and of his pilgrimage into a new activist, pro-ecological stance. The argument is, in outline, simple: Nature and history and divinity are bound together in one seamless web, they are under threat, they must be saved, we must save them, and we can do so by returning to a premodern world! The fuller argument is subtle, careful, and complex.

He presents in Sustainability a narrative version of the argument that is more systematically developed in his joint work with Herman E. Daly and his son Cliff: For The Common Good: Redirecting the Economy toward Community, the Environment, and a Sustainable Future.[4] It now appears that this work is his masterwork, the main message that he wants to leave to the church, the public, and the next generation of scholars. And it is more than intriguing that he wrote it with Daly, the long-term ecologist-economist who is known for a quarter century of intense criticism of mainstream economic theory. Sustainability, based on various lectures and talks, is the short, popular version of this massive effort.

What is theologically interesting is that, in spite of a number of nods to other issues, the governing motif of these works is the structural threat to the biosphere, and thus about how to re-integrate humanity into the "natural" order. Although not fully sympathetic with everything that some of the "deep ecologists" or "Gaia theorists" advocate, these works stand, more than any other works I know, as theological manifestos for an American Green Movement—one book is in a more academic form for the university and seminary, the other in a more confessional mode for the church and community study group. Various parts or implications of this position are also finding their way into a variety of pastor-oriented journals, as can be seen in Cobb’s arguments against free trade in Theology and Public Policy, [5] his exchanges with Dennis P. McCann in The Christian Century over NAFTA, [6] and his debates with Robin Klay in Perspectives over GATT. [7]

Of central concern throughout are problems of resource depletion, of the disappearing ozone layer, and of the greenhouse effect; but these broaden to include agriculture, population, and tax and land-use policies. As these are presently structured, they are all seen as obviously threatening to the human future in the long run and to the quality of life in the short run. And the chief cause of this evil is the pressure for economic growth, an evil fomented by mainline economics, the dominant political parties, the multinational corporations, and international trade agreements, all of which are dominated by false philosophies.

Cobb is a true intellectual. Indeed, it is refreshing to find a social critic who takes ideas seriously. He thinks they make a difference and are not simply the by-products of social location. Thus, failures in economic, political, and ecological life are due to failures of a philosophical, ethical, and theological sort. Especially culpable here are abstract modes of thought (accusations of the "fallacy of misplaced concreteness" appear frequently) that are rooted in dualistic metaphysics that separate history from nature, self from society, God from the world, or theory from practice. In these arguments, Cobb’s views overlap with the democratic-socialist views that have dominated most religious interpretations of contemporary economic life for a generation. [8]

Other preoccupations of the church over the last couple of decades have focused on development policies, poverty, the changing roles of women, and the merits of socialism. Most attempt to include the neglected and impoverished peoples of the world and to find a just pattern for life in the midst of growing international interdependence. Whether one bends toward the liberationist options of mainline Protestant leaders such as Walter L. Owensby or Audrey R. Chapman, with their contempt for contemporary directions, [9] or toward the democratic-capitalist options of Catholic Michael Novak or evangelical Amy Sherman, who suggest that ecumenical Protestantism has abandoned (or failed to ground deeply enough) its own best legacies in economic thought, [10] most economists and theological commentators seek wider economic development for the sake of justice, inclusiveness, and human well-being. These imply growth. Certainly no politician can argue against these today and hope to be elected in any democratic procedure.

Cobb focuses the discussion elsewhere and, without being overtly confrontive about it, challenges them all. The question, thus, is whether he or they are on the right track. He clearly opposes the present steps toward the globalization of the economy, for he believes that it will damage the poor in developing countries, reduce the political will to upgrade welfare in the United States, make it more and more difficult for political power to control the corporations, and most particularly exacerbate those pressures for growth that will degrade the environment. [11] His views are shared among some social activists who are close to the North American unions, in spite of the fact that many economists, by far the majority, have argued that the analyses to which Cobb and the unions appeal are questionable. Indeed, that is the substance of a very carefully documented critique of Daly and Cobb’s work by the noted ethicist-economist, Daniel Finn, delivered at the Annual Meeting of the Society of Christian Ethics in January of 1994. [12]

The core issues, however, are not only those of getting the data straight or about the best ways to calculate the probable consequences of this or that development or policy. These are important, but they are not ordinarily the dimensions of economic or ecological analysis in which theologians or pastors make their greatest contributions. In fact, the bulk of that debate is often best left to the professional economists, from whom clergy can learn a good deal if they pay close enough attention to learn the difference between sound and shaky arguments.

The core issues that properly concern theologians and pastors, as Cobb knows, have to do with the kind of theological-ethical glasses one wears as one attempts to discern the moral and spiritual meanings of the data, to see in what respects they comport with our deepest understanding of how God wants us to live in the world. And Cobb has been in the process of regrinding his glasses for some time. If he is to be challenged in theological-ethical circles, this is the area that will have to be taken into consideration.

He has obviously been influenced much by Lynn White’s "The Historical Roots of the Environmental Crisis." This often-reprinted essay attributed the greater part of the environmental crisis to the triumph of technology in the "Christian West." This development was itself generated by a culture infused with the notion of a transcendent, sovereign God who commands humanity to till the garden and to name the beasts. In other words, "having dominion" is the source of the crises we face. Against this tradition, White advocates a recovery of the ethic of St. Francis, a new communion with the birds and beasts (although the idea that Francis preaches to the animals in part because he wants to convert them is lost on White).

Such writings brought Cobb to reject ever the more firmly the "dualism of history and nature, of mind and matter" that, he believes, led to "the most fundamental distortion contributed by Christianity"—anthropocentrism, the idea that God was and we should be primarily concerned with humanity’s salvation. And it allowed him to see more clearly the implications of ecological thinking that had been present in his teachers, Alfred North Whitehead and Bernard Meland, but that he had not previously seen.

Still more, he found a number of conversation companions, themselves also widely recognized scholars who have played a continuing role in his thought. Of special importance has been David Griffin who has attempted to join process thought to contemporary liberation and postmodernist critiques of enlightenment rationality; Paulo Solieri, the "archologist" or philosophical visionary of architectural design who has attempted in both theoretical and practical terms to use contemporary technology to construct human habitats friendly to ecology; and the Australian biologist Charles Birch, with whom he wrote The Liberation of Life From the Cell to the Community. [13] Charles Birch became one of the leading figures in framing and gui(ling the World Council of Churches Conference on Faith, Science and the Future that was held at MIT in 1979, which focused on the quest for a "just peace and sustainable" society—one now replaced by the title "justice, peace and the integrity of creation." Cobb’s renewed accent on "sustainability," rather than on the highly ambiguous "integrity of creation," is significant. (Is the integrity actual, ideal, eschatological, or what?)

It is under the influence of these conversations that Cobb has come to believe that we stand on the brink of disaster.

We now see that in much of the world efforts to improve the quality of life have done as much harm as good. Improved medical care, new agricultural methods, and humanitarian aid in times of crisis have greatly increased population without enabling the masses of people to rise above the subsistence level. Education has raised expectations and heightened dissatisfaction without improving the capacity of people to deal with their real problems. Technology combined with increased population has speeded up the processes of environmental deterioration so that the capacity of the land to support people in the long run has diminished. Global trade has made survival dependent on increasingly precarious arrangements.

Thus, he speaks of an urgent need for a drastic change in how we live. We need to face the fact, he says, that we live in a world of limits; we need to form a society that is both "in balance with other species and [based] primarily on the renewable resources of the planet." Therefore, we need to undertake a "disengagement from the system of acquiring and maintaining property and from all the values and involvements associated with it." We also need to exercise a new rigorous frugality. This means, among other things, the designation of local "bio-regions," areas where self-sufficient eco-economic systems can develop on their own, in harmony with their natural environment. This notion itself, however, is very difficult, for it is not at all clear what a self-sufficient bio-region would look like in a day of complex communications and technology, or in a day when Europe, Southeast Asia, southern Africa and the Americas are moving toward greater eco-economic interdependence.

Cobb’s purpose is to evoke a commitment to a new lifestyle and a new society. He wants the church to become a part of a new communitarianism, a kind of localism that is willing to drop out of, even resist, the wider global developments that are today widely evident but that in his judgment are provoking disaster. At the same time, he wants to abandon the supernaturalist dimensions of Christianity so that we can more easily resonate to the naturalist impulses present in our material life and engage in a closer dialogue with the world religions such as Buddhism that do not have a focus on a transcendent God.

One can almost hear him say, "Come home, come home to the simple life, to the gentler days of villages, farming, and front porch swings." One hears echoes of Ruskin’s nostalgia for the harmony of the medieval manor in contrast to the din of modern factories, or of James’ preference for the Virgin over the dynamo as the central symbol of power in society, or of Schumacher’s "small is beautiful" against the "great industrial city." At its best, Cobb has made a powerful case for the "Prairie Home Companion"; at its most frightening worse, he touches on themes that led Pol Pot to his violent deconstruction of every tendency toward modernization. Throughout, one feels the mandate: "Forward to the nineteenth century!"

How fascinating that, on many points, Cobb joins a number of leading thinkers who have pressed for what can only be called an increased disengagement from the dominant institutions of contemporary life, as if we live already in a new "dark ages." Yet, he and many others simultaneously if disjunctively call for a new drive to control people by political means. Should we seek a post-communist command economy to control technological development, to make the corporations subject to the nation-state, to prevent globalization from disrupting local cultures, to stop, even to deconstruct all that presses toward cosmopolitan growth?

One can agree that new levels of stewardship are required in regard to the biophysical universe. Our increased capacity to alter our environment demands a corresponding level of accountability. Surely it is true that we need at least as many specialized farms and controlled environments to protect endangered species as we need facilities to develop new species through bioengineering. There is, no longer, any way of ducking the responsibility for taking care of our world. And one can appreciate the massive effort that Cobb has made, with his colleagues and companions, to grasp a sense of the whole. They are thoughtful and without a discernible trace of malicious intent.

It is also possible to see how those who thought, over the last generation, that something like liberation economics would be the wave of the future and who remain hostile to or puzzled by current developments, would be attracted to a vision such as this one. Few have tried anything like this in regard to theology, economy, and ecology. He deserves to be read and studied. As one student remarked in a class discussing his work, "this is worth a whole semester."

But in the final analysis, I think we should not follow this direction. And I do not think we should follow it for two related reasons. One is theological, the other is social-ethical. I think that Cobb, like many today, is confused theologically about the nature of nature. It is not necessary to reject everything that comes from the Enlightenment to point out that it conflated the terms "creation" and "nature." Since then, when we speak of nature, we ordinarily mean the biophysical universe, with the implicit understanding that its patterns and dynamics are the ultimate frame of reference, the way God wants things to be. In the attempt to avoid a transcendence that becomes dualistic, Cobb is tempted to a naturalistic, geocentric monism that loses theological and thus also human amplitude. Both the height and the depth are obscured.

In contrast, when one speaks of "creation," one signals that the biophysical universe is not the whole or the norm, but a temporal artifact that is subject to norms and ends that are beyond it. Indeed, the notion of "fallen nature" suggests that, while traces of God’s law and purposes are inevitably scripted into the deep character of all that is, the natural things of the world are out of order or confused of direction in one or another respect. It is not that finitude is by itself evil but, rather, that finite reality has betrayed its original design and goal. To gear ourselves only into nature, thus, is to degenerate further. This is how we know that the status quo is not as it should be, and why reverting to the status quo ante is no solution. Nature, including human nature, can only be rightly ordered and fulfilled by being transformed through a conversion, a sanctification, marked by crucifixion and resurrection, a "creative destruction" that brings a new kind and quality of existence.

This classic theological insight has been obscured or rejected by many current developments in theology, but the costs may be extremely high, for its implications may well be true not only of personal moral and spiritual life, but of the entire biophysical cosmos as well. The scriptural tradition states this in revealing images. There is no return to the simpler garden. That path is cut off by unassailable powers of destruction. Instead, the future is toward the universal city for all peoples, to which and for which the creatures, plants, and even the river of life are to be redesigned. Nature, in other words, has to be transformed to be what God intended it to be, to accord with standards that are not complete in nature itself.

Cobb wants to overcome all unnecessary tensions between culture and nature, and to see both theologically. With this, I am in full accord. But his theological program tends to make economy into local culture, press culture toward nature, and identify nature’s becoming with the divine. It simply is not clear how this immanentalization of God could prove to be capable of facing the central demand of our time—to use the technology that is now on the horizon to transform nature in ways that enhance the global structures of a graceful, cosmopolitan civilization able to serve the whole of humanity. This would demand a loving, just, and stewardly dominion of nature, for the sake of humanity and in service of God. It is doubtful that the tendency to a monistic naturalism implicit in process thought or in biospheric thinking, or in them in combination, can prompt us to accept this vocation or to discern how that ought to be done.

This theological point would, to be heard in our world, have to defend itself against the charge that it is the source of all our ills. But that case becomes easier to make on simply empirical grounds as data about the ecologically devastating conditions in both traditional, pretechnological societies and in the antitheological socialist societies of the former Eastern European countries becomes available. It is still not quite acceptable to say so, but the accusation that transcendental and conversionary theism generally and Christianity particularly are the primary source of our environmental ills (as well as of colonialism, imperialism, militarism, poverty, and the oppression of minorities and women), as many are saying today, is an argument of escalating rhetorical influence, but of declining credibility. The damage to ecology anti to populations wreaked by the most anti— Christian regimes of Eastern Europe and the non—Christian regions is inestimable. [14] Indeed, the European press has more widely reported than the U.S. press the World Health Organization’s finding that "nowhere in the history of humanity have the air, the land, the water and the people been more systematically poisoned" than in Eastern Europe, and the deepest ecological/economic crisis areas of Africa, Latin America, and Asia—or for that matter, of Europe and America—can hardly be said to be those most influenced by a pervasive commitment to a transcendent God. It appears to be the case, indeed, that monistic, naturalist, and humanistic worldviews are the ones that most dramatically degrade both the biosphere and humanity.

Finally, let me draw attention to a frightening although unintended social—ethical implication of this work. It is doubtful whether Cobb has yet tried to imagine what it would take to actualize his vision. Most conscientious, committed, concerned, thoughtful people do not believe his and Daly’s analysis of how things are or how they ought to be. But, for the moment, let us presume that it is, say, 6o percent correct—too high in my judgment, but not a bad percentage for a theological ethic trying to work with vast themes and complex data and adequate to our thought experiment. How will people be persuaded to live in the ways he suggests? One can imagine anabaptist-like subcultures or kibbutzim, perhaps neo-monastic experiments, or a new burst of 1960s-like communes as experimental efforts. And these perhaps ought to be tried. They certainly have had an effect in the past, and perhaps over several generations, these could shape some new directions.

But one would expect that for the most part they would be grandly ignored. Yet, if the situation is as dire as Cobb says it is, action must be taken now. And this is the problem: the measures he proposes would and could only be enforced at the cost of massive violations of human rights, and by dismantling the fragile but promising structures of technological know-how, international law, trade, and communication by which we are building up a still-feeble sense of what it means to be a single humanity on a single globe, under God and responsible for a common world. The ethical task of our generation may well be to engage in the formation of a cosmopolitan civilization on a more genuinely reformed and genuinely catholic basis. It may be true that our religious traditions are part of the problem, but the problem may lie less in an overweening zeal for transcendence than in the localistic immanentalism of American religion, the fissiparous sectarian impulses in much of Protestantism, and the anti-institutional instincts of today’s residual romanticism.

Suppose at the very least that people do not want to become communitarians or return to the farm or trade only in their assigned bioregions. Suppose some become convinced of their obligation to advocate free trade, and to nurture the formation of corporations that reach around the globe in order to supply goods and services in the quantity and quality that they believe best serve others and generate capital to meet future challenges. Suppose people do not want to stay in their valleys or in their villages, and think that it is their calling to find a place in the global city. What would it take to stop this, as Cobb wishes? It is only a slight exaggeration to say that, as some would have put Quakers in charge of the Pentagon to solve the arms race a generation ago, Cobb’s proposals prompt us to try to imagine the Amish in charge of the globe’s economic future—although he wants less to arrest the development of technology than to use technology to arrest development.

Nevertheless, we at least face a big problem if people do not believe that this analysis of the situation is correct, and do not think that the conceptual framework on which the analysis is based is faithful religiously, accurate socioeconomically correct ecologically, or justifiable ethically. A key problein in the latter regard is that to enforce these provisions would lead us in the direction of a massive exercise of coercive authority. Other scholars who have similar views to Cobb’s have begun to speak quite openly about the necessity of a new tyranny, even to speak favorably of the issue of the Chinese cultural revolution. [15] The failure to face this prospect is one of the most critical failures of the volume, a fatal exercise of misplaced concreteness if there ever was one.

In the final analysis, the processes of this world must be seen in the context of a wider and deeper ecology, for ethical, practical, and especially soteriological reasons. Transformation is required. Sustainability in this model is not likely to be sustainable.

 

NOTES

1. See the skeptical treatment of these developments by Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanaush, Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order (New York; Simon & Shuster, 1994).

2. See a parallel account in Cobb's "Intellectual Autobiography," Religious Studies Review 19 (1993):9-11; and the reviews of his contributions by Delwin Brown and Linell Cady in Religious Studies Review 19 (1993):11-17.

3. See Marjorie Suchocki, The End of Evilo: Process Eschatalogy in Historical Perspective (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1988).

4. Herman E Daly and John B. Cobb, Jr., with Clifford W. Cobb, For the Common Good: Redirecting the Economhy toward Community the Environment, and a Sustainable Future (Boston: Beacon Press, 1989)

5. John B. Cobb, , "Against Free Trade," Theology and Public Policy 4, no. 2 (Fall 1992): 4-16..

6. Dennis P. McCann and John B. Cobb, Jr., "Serenity, Courage and Wisdom in the Global Market: An Exchange on NAFTA," The Christian Century 110 (November 10, 1993): 1129-1141.

7. John B. Cobb, Jr. "Ethics, Economics and Free Trade," Perspectives 6 no. 2 (February 1991).

8. See Mark Ellingsen, The Cutting Edge: How churches Speak on Social and Ethical Issues (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., (1993); Ronald H. Preston, Religion and the Ambiguities of Capitalism (London: SCM Press, 1991) and Robert L. Stivers, ed., Reformed Faith and Economics (Lanhain: University Press of America, by arrangement with the Advisory Council on Church and Society of the Presbyterian Church U.S.A. 1989).

9. See Walter L. Owenshy, Economics for Prophets: A Primer on concepts, Realities, and Values in Our Economic System (Grand Rapids: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988); and Audrey R. Chapman, Faith, Power and Politics: Political Ministry in Mainline churches (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1991).

 10. See Michael Novak, The Catholic Ethic and the New Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Free Press, 1993; and Amy Sherman, Preferential Options A Christiain and Neoliheral Strategyfor Latin America’s Poor (Grand Rapids: Win. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., (1992).

11. See the summary of these arguments in Cobb, "Against Free Trade," 4-16.

12. Daniel Finn, "International Trade and Sustainable Community: On the Bioregional Critique of Mainstream Economics," Journal of Religious Ethics (forthcoming).

13. Charles Birch and John B. Cobb, Jr., The Liberation of Life: From the Cell to the Community (London and New York: Cambridge University Press, 1982).

14. See, e.g., Paul Kennedy, Preparing for the Twenty-First century (New York: Random House, 1993).

15. See, e.g., Garrett Hardin, Living within Limits: Ecology, Economics and Population Taboos (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994 and Donald Worster, The Wealth of Nature: Enviromnental History and the Ecological Imagination (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994). Worster argues, incidentally, that the causes of our modern crisis are not transcendental religion or dualism, but "secularism" with its peculiar definitions of and relation to "progress and reason."

Edwards for Us

The Puritans were earnest folk They had little patience with those who had no depth, no deep conviction, no profound concern with what God was doing in their lives. They wanted everyone to become a believer of course -- to assent to the reality of God and God’s providence, justice and compassion, and thus find a confidence for living in this precarious world. Those in drift could not do that; they were like a bug on a leaf in a river during a storm. They had no sense of where they were or where they were going.

Jonathan Edwards was, to put it mildly, religiously serious, and he was so from an early age. He is so interesting for contemporary theologians because developed a balance of brilliant intellectual honesty, fidelity to the biblical traditions, and an openness to new insight brought by personal experience.

He reports that it was some verses in Paul’s Letters to Timothy that helped him sort his faith out. Paul writes about how as a young man he himself had been something of a holy terror, but when he received God’s mercy he learned of the "love that issues from a pure heart and a good conscience and sincere faith." He was so grateful that he could write: "To the King of ages, immortal, invisible, the only wise God, be honor and glory for ever and ever." That text, Edwards said, changed his life.

Three themes are embedded in this story about Edwards’s development that are pertinent to the work he did the rest of his life and to a serious faith. Those themes are free will, love and glory.

When we are drifting through life, or being cynical, the question arises: Can we simply will to change our ways? When we feel far from God, can we just decide to reestablish a relationship? Of course, in daily life, we often have real choices -- whether I should go out with this person, whether I should accept this job, whether I should use what money I have this way or that. But do we have the will to alter the basic course of our lives?

Many people, when they look back on the choices they have made, see that many "free" decisions were in fact in the cards before the decisions were made. Often we just have to sort out what is really going on in life. And that is the issue: How deeply embedded in the conditions of our lives is the freedom of our wills?

We need to honor and protect our political freedoms, and hold people morally and in some cases legally accountable for their decisions; but we ought not overestimate the will’s powers. The will needs guidance and support from the mind and the heart, and, even more, from a power beyond ourselves. AA knows this, as do all the effective self-help groups. It is not all self-help! All the great religions also point to a power beyond our own will. And the believer comes to know that support and power can come to us, by God’s grace.

Edwards knew how complicated this, simple fact can be. One of his most famous works is The Freedom of the Will, in which he argues that the will is truly free when it is in accord with what God intends for us; otherwise it loses itself in drift or cynical arrogance. This approach puts the issue in a theological framework. Many today fear profound religious commitment as loss of autonomy, and others fear that it breeds terror. But that is not what Edwards thought profound religion is about. True religion, he thought, energizes the will. And he thought true religion always involves love and beauty.

No one is against love, I take it. But there is a good bit of confusion about what the Puritans thought about love. Essentially, love is the inner power that draws persons together and bonds them to each other and to the right and the good. It shows up in many forms. It appears in acts of charity when we give to those in need. It draws us to particular persons whom we recognize as a gift to us from God. Most important, it takes shape when we discern the love of God for us and respond in love of God. In all these forms, love gives shape to the moral life, in that we become bound into appropriate covenants of mutual obligation and fidelity under God. True love penetrates the heart and reorients the will.

It is sometimes said that the Puritans were prudes about sexual love and had a repressive view of sexuality. This is simply not so. Some people, reacting against the prudery of the Victorian era and the moralistic legalism into which some churches had devolved, blamed the Puritans, and tried to liberate sexuality from all religious constraint. It is as if they set aside a zone of life and said, "No religious ethics allowed here." Some have tried this in other areas also. Well, they have been successful in many respects, but the liberation has gone in unanticipated directions. It has brought us record numbers of divorces, absentee dads, troubled kids and the scourge of AIDS. Do we really want to liberate ourselves from all religious constraints?

Puritans had a dim view of extramarital relations, but that was because they had a very high view of sexuality In marriage. Love, like the will, needs boundaries and channels it needs a trusting and trustworthy context. The scholar Edmund Leites has studied hundreds of Puritan sermons about love and sex (there are many), and he has documented how much they preached about the duties to desire and how they saw the marriage bed as the "other altar of love." (The communion altar, of course, is the first.) But they also knew that love, if it is to be sacred, needs a deep set of moral rudders. It needs to be modeled on the way God loves us. For nurturing awareness of the love of God, a vibrant community of faith is needed. For nurturing the love between persons, a faithful marriage is the context.

If and when love becomes unfocused or distorted, it takes moral and spiritual renewal to correct its course. It may sometimes even need legal limits. Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen, a feminist Christian scholar has reported that, according to court records, one of the major causes of being put in the stocks in the Puritan era was violence toward one’s family or otherwise irresponsible behavior with regard to one’s family.

The Puritans believed that a marriage needs constant grace and repeated renewal. Without it, both religion and sex can become like the human will without God: they can fall into the powerlessness of drift or become hardened into cynicism. They can show up as half-way commitments, or be locked into purely opportunistic behaviors. Could it be that a little dose of Puritanism could be a corrective to the licentiousness of our times? Not too much, but a little? Is this area of life not a holy passion, in which the radiance of God’s purposes and design of life can shine through? Edwards thought so, and he thought it was a beautiful thing.

This brings us to our last point -- beauty. The text from Timothy that touched Edwards refers to the "honor and glory" of God, and these terms are related to beauty. It is interesting that the Hebrew of the Bible has no single word for "beauty" The word kabôd is often translated as "glory" or "radiance." Our hymns have used "splendor," but the word can also mean "weighty," in the sense of something being really important, and thus being worthy of "honor." And the Greek of the New Testament uses kalos, which also means "comely," "charming" or "attractive." Edwards knew his biblical languages, and thought that God’s way of relating to the world and to our lives involved an aesthetic as well as a willing and a loving aspect.

Edwards believed that everyone could, at some level, understand this. We might say today that this is why, In one sense or another, everyone is "spiritual" even if not all are "religious." The natural person can recognize the glory of nature in spite of natural disasters, pests and disease; the splendor of the cultivated arts, especially music, in spite of art’s occasional pomp and pretense; and the radiance of virtuous persons in spite of the flaws we can find in the best of them. He could see these beautiful qualities in the Indians. These qualities are magnificent, and are to be honored wherever they occur in God’s world.

Edwards lived in an agricultural era, and he knew that nature had to be tended to manifest its best. Humans had to be stewards of creation -- and that meant cultivating its possibilities to make its potential splendor manifest. Nothing so captures Edwards’s message as his sense of the beauty of God. It is the beauty of God, he said, "that will melt and humble the hearts of men . . . draw them to God, and effectually change them." Moreover:

A sight of the awesome greatness of God may overpower our strength and be more than we can endure; but if the moral beauty of God be hid, the enmity of the heart will remain in its full strength, no love can be enkindled, [our will] will not be effectual . . . but will remain inflexible; whereas the first glimpse of the moral and spiritual glory of God shining into the heart produces all these affects, as it were with omnipotent power, which nothing can withstand.

Edwards knew the holiness of beauty and the beauty of holiness. If you do not already know this, you may want to find out more about Edwards. It could even be that you will be grasped by what he saw. You could change your will, your loves, your sense of God. You could find the source, the norm, the power that allows our promises to be fulfilled and our covenants to be complete.