Baptism in the Indian Context — An Event of Separation or Human Solidarity?

Introduction

One of the ironies of virtually all religious traditions is that the power which draws and holds members together in religious community seems to be matched by an equal and opposite compulsion to exclude non-members. In the case of Christianity it is obvious that the checkered history of the universal Church has led many to understand that to be Christian is to be a people set apart, a people with a separate exclusive communal identity. In this the understanding of baptism has been crucial. Considered absolutely necessary for salvation, the Church has on the basis of baptism neatly divided human beings into categories of 'pagans` and 'believers`, 'saved` and 'damned`. This thought pattern, which has been dominant in the Church for centuries, was clearly expressed by the Council of Trent when it declared "If anyone says that baptism is optional, that is, not necessary for salvation, anathema sit." The well known principle extra Ecclesiam nulla salus, or the most notorious position of Boniface VIII, "Furthermore we declare, state, define, and pronounce that it is altogether necessary to salvation for every human creature to be subject to the Roman Pontiff," are but further indications of this exclusive attitude - dominant but by no means universal - of the Church which separates Christians from all others.

From quite a different tradition is an early Baptist confession formulated at Amsterdam in 1611 C.E. It reads:

Every church should receive all its members by baptism upon the confession of their faith and sins wrought by the preaching of the Gospel, according to the primitive institution and practice. And therefore churches constituted in any other manner or of any other person are not according to Christ's treatment.

Several assumptions clearly underlie these statements from two very different traditions within the Church.

(1) That baptism is a 'necessary` and 'required` rite due, presumably to an imperative from our Lord, and therefore, every church should be constituted solely of baptized members. Exception to this is contrary to the Christ's ordinance.

(2) The act as such is essential both for individual salvation and for membership in the Church.

Arguably some of the most ugly consequences of such an exclusive stance in the Church's missionary enterprise, and the consequent urgency to baptize, have been forced or induced 'conversions`, signed and sealed by baptism. Further compounding these consequences in India and elsewhere, has been the fact that conversion and baptism, though fundamentally consequences of the exercise of personal conscience have assumed marked social and political overtones and repercussions which have enhanced 'communalistic` tendencies both within and outside the Church. Moreover, the common perception of the "westernization" of Indian Christians has been a major factor in making baptism a divisive factor in Indian society, especially from the late 15th and early 16th centuries onwards. The observation of a Roman Catholic writer is indicative.

Baptism became the symbol of a break with the whole of one's past and marked the assimilation of the convert to European ways and customs. By impoverishing the Church's genuinely 'Catholic` image, the colonial missions have left the young Churches of Asia, Africa, South and Central America with a heavy historical burden till the present.

From another perspective the Indian Christian convert has been described "as deracinated, and as an outcaste, no longer recognizable as a functioning member of his or her former community....in terms of the loss of caste and the pronouncement of civil death by Hindu law."

It is for these reasons that numerous Indians consider Christian conversion and baptism to be effective denationalization. For many conversion to Christianity is offensive, a betrayal of India's national heritage, an alienation harmful to the life of the nation, a disturbance having undesirable political and economic implications. British colonial records "reveal with astonishing clarity how not only Hindus and Muslims but also the British regarded conversion as a disruptive act." Certainly such feelings, whether justifiable or not, produce consequences which cannot be ignored by the Church in India.

Confronted with this kind of reality, our present concern calls for a perspective on baptism which differs from the more usual biblical or theological approaches. One could, of course, usefully engage in an examination of baptism in its biblical context, attempting particularly to formulate a theological discernment of the dividing and uniting aspects of baptism - the 'sword` that the Christ brings, and the 'peace` that the Christ offers. However, we propose, in the Indian context, to look at baptism from a more explicitly socio-political perspective. This will involve a consideration of the prevalent caste ideology and the growing impact of Hindu revaunchist groups which consider the Christian enterprise as a threat to Indian national unity and integrity. We shall examine proposals made by some `Hindu-Christians' - Hindus who follow the Christ without renouncing their hindutva or "Hinduness" - where baptism does not separate but enables one to work with others for the Kingdom of God. Various implications of this kind of approach will be considered. We shall conclude with a suggestion that we learn to look at Christian identity not primarily in terms of rites and rituals, but in terms of commitment to the Kingdom of God, with all those who are committed to it in terms of opposition to sin in its personal and structural manifestations. This will involve a life of love, renewing humanity and creation, which will become obvious if we pay attention to the meaning of baptism.

THE MEANING OF BAPTISM IN ITS BIBLICAL CONTEXT

The Old Testament does not, as far as I am aware, know baptism, or a similar rite. However, phenomenologically baptism belongs both to the category of ablution rites, in which water is used as a symbol of religious purification, as well as to the rites of initiation, involving a symbolic dying to the old self and rising to a new state of existence. Such rites can be observed in many religious traditions and they are also present in the Old Testament, the Qumran community, Jewish baptismal sects and Judaism in general. These phenomena partly form the background of the New Testament understanding of baptism.

Ablution as an act of purification was an important element in the Old Testament. Perhaps it is significant that the Septuagint translates the Hebrew verb tabal -a technical term connected with the ablutions and baths for the removal of ritual impurities - with the Greek bapto ["to dip"]. The rite of the Day of Atonement involves the priest taking a ritual bath. Ablution was also required in a number of life situations, e.g. after the consumption of ritually unclean food, after emission of semen, after sexual intercourse, and after contact with ritually unclean persons or things. It is obvious that these ablutions are not solitary acts performed once for all. They are to be repeated whenever there is need for them. According to the dominant world view of the times, it was through these acts of purification the possibility of communion with God and with the members of the community is restored. However, it needs to be recognised that such purity rules contain the seeds of exclusion. They are drawn up by a social group to define the boundaries which separate times, places, persons and things which are `sacred' [set apart for God] from those that are `profane'[set apart from God]. In the Jewish religious tradition these purity rules formed a closely interlocking network which clearly marked off the sacred precincts of the Temple, the holy land of Israel, and the covenant people of God (or groups of the `separated' within the people), from the `profane' world peopled by the `demon-ruled nations' outside. Obviously such a system of purities would foster exclusive ideals and practices, particularly in groups like the sectarian Qumran community or the Pharisees who carried its separatism to extremes.

In a more `secular' vein, the prophets use the symbolism of baptism to express not so much the traditional values of ritual purity as the idea of moral purification. In other Old Testament texts the purification which is carried out by God brings into being a nation of the future and final salvation. This kind of purification is not the purification of individuals, but of Israel as a whole, an eschatological act.

It was, however, early Christian reflection which endowed baptism with a wealth of meaning and a variety of interpretations. Some of these have affinities with Jewish proselyte baptism, others with the practice of circumcision, and still others with certain aspects of the 'mystery religions`. But the immediate connection of Christian baptism is with the baptism of John.

Early Palestinian Christian tradition understood baptism as an eschatological reality binding believers to the eschatological person of the Messiah, conveying them into the end-time reality of the Kingdom, bestowing on them the eschatological gift of the Holy Spirit and the forgiveness of sin, and incorporating them into the company of those redeemed by the Christ. Baptism was experienced as an eschatological act, "eschatology put into practice", as it were. It manifests the coming of God, through the Christ, into human life. Jesus accepted and altered John's eschatology of judgement into an eschatology of forgiveness and mercy.

Hellenistic Christianity saw baptism as a sacrament of dying and rising, thus sharing in the experience and destiny of the crucified and risen Lord. From this Hellenistic theology there developed the understanding of baptism as new birth and new creation - ideas familiar to the mystery religions, but corrected by linking the interpretation with eschatology and by introducing moral obligations. Significantly, in the New Testament, `washing' and `purification' is not so much ritual cleansing as it is moral transformation. For all Christians - Palestinian and Hellenistic - baptism meant admission to the people of the Covenant and to all its blessings. The close association of proselyte baptism with circumcision, and in particular with the prophetic idea of circumcision of the heart led naturally to the view that baptism took the place of circumcision, or that it was the Christian circumcision incorporating women and men into the new people of God, made up alike of Jews and Gentiles. In this Jesus, with his radical redrawing of the purity regulations of the Jewish religious tradition had certainly led the way. With his pronouncement that "there is nothing outside a man which by going into him can defile him," but that it is "the things which come out of a man that defile him," Jesus delivers a devastating denunciation of Jewish exclusivism. This can only mean that distinctions between what is holy [set apart for God] and what is profane [set apart from God] were set at naught.

Baptism, therefore, means remission of sins, reception of the Spirit, belonging to the Messiah, entry into the new people of God, the true circumcision, sharing in the blessings of the Kingdom, dying and rising with the Christ, rebirth to become a new creation and leading a resurrection existence morally blameless. Related to these are ideas like adoption as sons and daughters of God through the gift of the Son's Spirit, restoration of the lost likeness of God, call and commitment to mission and witness, and equipment for endurance. For the early Church, then, baptism was not a thing in itself, nor merely one of many aspects of Christian existence. Baptism was for the early Christians a foundational experience, a reality which derived its meaning from the Gospel of which it was the enactment and effective representation. It was "the symbol of the kerygma, the locus where in faith and freedom people took hold of the Gospel and let the Gospel take hold of them. However, from among the various meanings of baptism, we shall explore four which seem particularly relevant to our present concern. They are i) conversion - death to sin; ii) participation in the ministry, death and resurrection of Jesus; iii) commitment to the Kingdom, and iv) entrance into Christian community.

Acceptance of the Good News and repentance cannot but imply a new pattern of life. The Good News of God's unconditional love is at the root of the movement of freedom from self and from bondage, to fellowship, justice, the Kingdom of God. Conversion is not just an individualistic change of heart but a new mode of life resulting in a new pattern of relationship in society. The by now thoroughly studied and discussed Lima Document talks of this new pattern of life in terms of "new ethical orientations". Conversion implies a rejection of the value system that exists in the 'world`, namely, of the value system based on `having': one is what one has, be it possessions, positions, success, good name, achievements. It is, therefore, the rejection of cupidity and differentiating wealth; of lust for power, pleasure and domination; it is a repudiation of racism, casteism, sexism and all values opposed to the Gospel. Conversion is that move

from individualism in religion and society to corporate existence; from spiritual and economic selfishness to the truth of the community and of the world which God loves; from rigid doctrines of private property to the original purposes for which God gave his earth to his human family; from privatization of life to Trinitarian communion; from ritual preoccupations to pursuit of justice; from law to grace and from sacrifices to mercy. Conversion in this sense is participation in Christ's and his Church's option for the oppressed and commitment to the Kingdom, both of them implied in Jesus' baptism from the river Jordan to mount Calvary.

This is the picture we get in the short description of the first Christian community in Acts 2:42ff., 4:32ff. and what is suggested in Jn.4:24. The early Christians saw conversion as a rejection of sin. Though slowly the complexities of the idea of original sin and freedom from original sin entered the scene, the clear meaning in Acts and elsewhere was the rejection of actual sins, personal and social. A sinner refuses to live by God's love, refuses to be in a relationship of obedient love to God and self-sacrificing love to others. God takes the initiative in coming to the sinner and welcomes him/her through the love and acceptance of the community. When the sinner allows him/herself to be touched by that love, to let that love be operative in her/his self, s/he there is new being [2 Cor.5:17 Jerusalem Bible]. His/her pattern of relationship is changed: relation to things - instead of appropriating for self, sharing; relation to others - instead of dominating and manipulating, self-giving service; and relation to God - instead of fearful self-serving, joyful obedience. The rejection of sin is not merely an opposition to personal sins, but also to its structural forms, namely, the unjust power structures that keep millions enslaved, hungry, and impoverished, that oppress, alienate and dehumanise God's children on earth.

In conversion the God-ward, Christ-ward movement is central and it is necessarily expressed in a renewed pattern of relationship in society. But it is not primarily a change of religious traditions, cultures, societies. "Christians... are not interested in horizontal conversions - a mere change from one's religious tradition to Christianity, leaving the person on the same level of character and way of life." The reason this issue has been dealt with at such length is precisely because of the misunderstanding that is so prevalent in India about conversions.

Conversion, rejection of sin is, therefore, the beginning of a new way of life, a new way of relating to God, people and things. This is also expressed in terms of participating in the mystery of Jesus' life, death and resurrection. Significantly enough, the Lima Document, when it talks about participation in the mystery of Jesus's life, death and resurrection, refers to Jesus' own baptism which meant solidarity with 'sinners`, immersion in the culture of the despised masses as against the culture of the priests, scribes, the rich and the pharisees. It was his stand in favour of justice and its fulfilment, which is good news to the poor, but bad news for him, as it led him to his death. Jesus spoke of his death as a baptism, because his baptism was the beginning of a life of commitment to the cause of the exploited masses, which led him, in turn to his death. Jesus' death, which sums up his entire life, is the "one baptism" we profess in the Creed. The Apostles did not receive a ritual baptism, but were totally immersed in the Christ event. The link between his baptism, ministry, passion and death on behalf of the oppressed, crippled, despised, and the like, appears clearly in Mark's Gospel.

Our baptism, then, as an immersion into the Christ event, into the life of the one who lived and died for the wholeness of people, becomes our commitment, even unto death, to human solidarity in a given historical situation. That is why becoming a follower of Jesus is not a rush for privileges and priorities, but readiness to be baptised in the same 'bath of pain` in which he was baptised. Our baptism is our "joining Jesus in the eager service of giving our life in ransom for the oppressed multitude (Mk.1:45)." It is our option to follow his path, a dedication of life in solidarity with our fellow human beings, especially those who are fettered, voiceless and kept down. This is also spoken of as putting on Christ, putting off the old man and the acceptance of the new value system. Undue mystification of the 'participation in the death and resurrection of Jesus` has caused us to lose sight of its historical, social effects and challenges.

The entrance into the life, death and resurrection of Jesus is a commitment to that to which Jesus was committed, and for which he died, the bringing about of the Kingdom of God. In other words it is doing what the Christ came to the world for: effectively to proclaim and prophetically to act out the reality of the Kingdom - foot washing, table fellowship, association with outcastes, women, 'sinners`, healings, exorcisms, etc. Paul speaks of having the mind and heart of Jesus in us, which means looking at reality through his eyes, loving as he loved, and thus being committed to work for a more just society, a society of freedom, fellowship and human solidarity. The values of Jesus, when accepted in truth, will have social consequences. They will call for a totally new pattern of relationships, as the first Christians so clearly understood. The Kingdom values of freedom, justice, harmony, spirit of sharing, respect, etc. will have to find social expressions in alternative structures.

At this point I merely refer to the matter of entrance into the faith community as it will be dealt with at greater length later. This is, in fact, a very ancient idea. "Through baptism, man becomes a part of the new humanity which is the body of Christ, and thus comes to share in the resurrection of the heat of the body, Christ the Lord," is the way a study on Iranaeus has been summed up. Following this classical tradition, virtually all branches of the Church stress the idea that baptism implies membership in the body of the Christ, the Church, an entrance into a brother/sisterhood, a communion, fellowship of all in the spirit of the Christ. People are "incorporated into the Church by baptism," baptism ,therefore, constitutes the sacramental bond of unity existing among all who through it are 'reborn`. While this is certainly an ancient tradition it does raise questions in our times, as we shall see presently.

Before we proceed to the next section of our discussion, it may be well to sum up what we have seen so far. We have seen that baptism, whether we look at it as a conversion, rejection of sin, as entrance into the paschal mystery, means 'putting on` the Christ, an acceptance of his value system, with and like him being committed to the cause of God's Kingdom. Just as Jesus brought the 'sword` that divides, separates son from father, daughter from mother (Lk.12: 51-53), the stand one takes for the Kingdom will be in opposition to the prevailing value system in the world and hence an opposition to those who dominate, exploit and 'kill`, and in that sense will be a great dividing event. But conversion is not primarily a change of religious tradition, culture, social custom, except in so far as they are opposed to the Gospel. Indeed,

"...the New Testament does not justify an interpretation of baptism which makes it a rite whereby a separated community can make exclusive claims of salvation. Only by taking texts out of context or by giving partial exegesis of passages can one derive an exclusivist, separatist or communal interpretation of baptism."

BAPTISM AND COMMUNITY

Does the acceptance of baptism mean necessarily a membership in a new sociological group? Does one give up one's native community and become a member of another community? Does being a 'new creature` affect one's social belonging? In the context of the history of the Church in India, and many other parts of the world, this point is crucially central. Beginning primarily with the missionary activities of the Portuguese in India in the late 15th and early 16th centuries, Christian converts became for all practical purposes outcastes, cut off from caste and community. There are instances where converts were forced to eat meat, drink wine and take on other "western" ways, perhaps to prevent lapses into their former religious tradition. For the dalits this change was, in a way, a release from caste oppression; for many, being like "westerners" meant having an enhanced status. Whatever the reason, Christians are considered not to belong any more to the castes to which they originally belonged. Hence, in part, the fear that becoming a Christian means ceasing to be an Indian.

It is well known that eminent Indians like Mahatma Gandhi, Keshub Chunder Sen and many others who, while admiring the teachings and person of the Christ, were opposed to baptism, as it implied a change of culture and community. For many, even today, the attitudes and practices of Christian missionaries have much to do with their opposition to conversion. Orthoprax Hindus see conversion not so much as a spiritual event, but as a social, civil, 'political` event whereby a person ceases to be a member of the Hindu community and becomes a member of the Christian community. They understand baptism as the renunciation of one's own social community and the joining of another, in this case, a "foreign anti-national group".

This supposed change of social group has also legal consequences. For example, "the Hindu law does not apply to converts to Christianity". The issue needs further examination.

No Hindu professing the Christian faith can retain himself such before the law. The convert ceases to be a member of the Hindu community. His personal matters such as property, marriage, guardianship, etc. which affect him intimately, are no longer governed by Hindu law. He is governed by laws which are of outlandish origin.... profession of the Christian faith ipso facto snaps the legal bond uniting the convert with his (joint) family and Hindu society.

Such being the case, Saldanha asks, "could Hindus professing the Christian faith have remained Hindus?" He studies carefully the term 'hindu` to see who are considered Hindu according to Indian law, and shows that the term is applied to many different groups with very different faith commitments and belief systems. So he concludes:

The converts could have remained Hindus...Hindus professing the Christian faith could have continued under the Hindu personal law. This was all the easier because there is no specifically "Christian" personal law, as is the case with Islam. We may recall that the early Church prevented, albeit after much controversy, the imposition of a foreign (Jewish) law upon Gentile converts (Acts 15; Gal.2:14). It should not be necessary for Hindus professing the Christian faith to change their personal law.

Saldanha refers to the fact that the Kerala Christians had followed the Hindu laws of succession for centuries. Even after the promulgation of the Indian Succession Act in 1865 in the rest of the land, in the states of Travancore and Cochin this law was not made effective. In this regard it is important to recall that it was these Christians who had resisted the efforts of the Diamper Synod to impose on them Portuguese customs of succession. Such precedents, which are admittedly few, suggest the possibility of pressing demands for a change in the law, to include Christians within the purview of Hindu personal law.

Indeed, one would think that, given the avowed profession of and firm constitutional foundations for secularism in India, the prospects for a uniform civil code - code of personal law for all Indians irrespective of religious affiliation - would be bright. The reality, in fact, is otherwise.

While there can be no denying that in the past acceptance of the Christian faith implied a change in community and culture, it is certainly not a necessary corollary of such an action. The teaching of the Church is clear on this point, and while one could quote ancient and traditional sources, we restrict ourselves to more contemporary guides in the persons of a number of present day missiologists. With minor variations, they hold views similar to those of Brahmabandhab Upadhyay, namely that the Hindu tradition is a samaj dharma or societal tradition which is open to a variety of sadhana dharma(s) or spiritual traditions. Indeed, it is well known that in the Hindu tradition there is no fixed belief system or cult that is obligatory for all Hindus. Membership is primarily a matter of birth.

Being a Hindu means being born into a social group which is recognized as belonging to the Hindu community and on avoiding everything that would lead to one's separation from the group into which one was born.... A Hindu can remain a genuine Hindu even if he worships none of the Hindu gods...

On the other hand, being a Christian, it is argued, is a matter of sadhana

dharma which does not demand a distinct samaj dharma. While the approach of all these authors is basically the same, a few words seem in order regarding Brahmabandhab, since he was the first to advocate such a theory, as do also some observations concerning the relation between Christianity/Christians and Hindu society in Tamilnadu. Regrettably, in both cases present time and space permit no more than a mere reference note.

Brahmabandhab Upadhyay (1861-1907) has been described by his admirers as "the greatest Hindu that ever found his way to Christ." Concerning Brahmabandhab's conversion Julius Lipner observes:

When he converted to the Roman Catholic faith in 1891....it was a sort of change of gear, of widening commitment, not a change of direction. Bringing his compatriots to Christ would accomplish spiritual svaraj [self-rule], which in turn would assist political svaraj in the broad sense. As Upadhyay perceived it, becoming a Christian was not inimical to remaining a patriotic Hindu.

Here we are primarily interested in Brahmabandhab's attempt to give content to his self-description as a 'Hindu-Catholic`. This he developed by pointing out that just as Christianity is different from European culture and European thought, so Hindu culture is different from Hindu religion. Hinduism, he held, is both samaj dharma and sadhana dharma. The former denotes social custom and a way of life, while the latter is about individual moksa or salvation, and is basically unrelated to cultural idiom. Because of this distinction Brahmabandhab asserted that an Indian can be a Christian by faith and a Hindu in social custom and belonging. As Brahmabandhab wrote in his newspaper Sophia:

We are Hindu so far as our physical and mental constitution is concerned, but in regard to our immortal souls we are Catholic. We are Hindu Catholic. That is, we are Hindu in the way we think and live, but Catholic from the viewpoint of saving belief.

This conviction grew with the advancing years, and to all appearances he lived like a Hindu. When he returned from Europe he underwent the prayascitta (lit. "penance," or "atonement") ceremony, prescribed by the Hindu tradition for all Hindus returning from abroad. Considering the goddess Sarasvati as a symbol of art and learning, he permitted his pupils to perform Sarasvati puja [a rite of divine veneration] at the time of Sarasvat Ayatam, the annual festival honoring the goddess . His insistence on remaining a Brahman till death did not weaken nor diminish his attachment to the Christ and to his Church. However, since the name 'Christian` had come to indicate one who eats meat, drinks wine, wears trousers and has become thoroughly westernized, Brahmabandhab did not like to be known as a 'Christian`. In spite of all this Animananda and other friends assure us that he remained a Catholic to his death, though he was, in accordance to his own wishes, cremated according to Hindu rites.

The type of Hindu-Christian interaction which Brahmabandhab articulated and lived out was primarily personal and individual. However, it is also important to acknowledge the larger societal dimensions of our concern, for which we refer to the very different kind of work done by an anthropologist, C.D.F. Mosse in a study of a mixed Hindu-Christian village in Ramnad District of Tamilnadu. The issue, as addressed by Mosse, involves on the one hand "the existence of structural continuities between Hindu and Christian social and supernatural worlds, and on the other the relationship of the distinctive Christian institutions and the universal ideals and values of Christianity to this cultural matrix in which the religion is embedded."

All too briefly stated, Mosse gets at this problem in several ways; first by establishing that Christians are party to the same service relations, and employ the same ritual servants for 'impurity removal` - barbers, funeral servants, etc. - as Hindus. Furthermore, while 'excluded` from the services of certain Hindu priests (brahman, pantaram), they nonetheless have Christian specialists (the kovilpillai and the Pallar pantaram) who occupy the same structural position as the Hindu priests (purohits). Interestingly enough, the Christian priest's services fall outside this structural order, which finds its logic in the opposition of purity and impurity. Simultaneously, there is also ample evidence that in the formal structure of Christian life-crisis rituals themselves (puberty, marriage, death), there is again continuity with those of the Hindus. In particular there is the same association of transition with heat and impurity, and the return to normality with coolness and purification.

However, in other contexts these associations, together with notions of purity and impurity, are abandoned, as for example when the bier is taken into the church building for the funeral service/mass. Further continuity is apparent in the structuring of the Hindu and Christian supernatural worlds; a continuity which could well and does co-exist with radical theological differences, just as caste among Christians exists with a religious ideology which denies it. Mosse suggests that "the characteristics of the Catholic saints, like the Hindu deities of the village, are in part defined in their relation with other superior and inferior forms of the divinity around the notion of the bivalent sacrifice." Here the inferior or negative aspects of divinity (represented by the blood-thirsty Hindu deities) are included as complementary to the superior and life-giving aspects of divinity. These complementarities within the divinity (between, e.g., saints and deities of the village) take the form of hierarchical relationships of service and subordination which mirror those of village society.

In sum then, many 19th and early 20th century Christian missionaries, both Protestant and Roman Catholic, seem, in fact, to have functioned from the model which Brahmabandhab articulated in terms of samaj dharma or religio-social identity and sadhana dharma of private subjective religious experience. They presented Christianity in a very spiritual or otherworldly form. Its concerns lay beyond the social world of caste. Salvation - appropriated by means of baptism - was a matter of totally rejecting 'pagan` religion and, through the Church (i.e. the clergy) and its sacraments, receiving the forgiveness and grace of God. At the same time a more immediate power was available for the confrontation of evil and misfortune, often conceived in indigenous terms as possession by pay-picacu (spirits), through the saints, exorcists and to some extent the clerics themselves. Mosse observes that the missionaries' accommodation of caste, and their weak political position, provided Christians with a distinctive religious tradition, but not a new social identity. Indeed, the missionaries' rejection of things Hindu, and encouragement of Christian spirituality probably further enabled the development of a complex hierarchy of Christian divine beings - in the form of the ubiquitous cult of the saints - parallel to, and to some extent structured by the same principles as, the Hindu divine hierarchy. What was important to these missionaries was not so much the form of worship but rather that the object of worship was Christian rather than Hindu. What was distinctive about Christianity was not the socio-cultural form, samaj dharma, but its religious or spiritual content, sadhana dharma.

Mosse concludes that today in Ramnad Christianity is taking a form which increasingly challenges the complementarities of its traditional relationship to Hindu society. The Church imposes an egalitarian social order in the organisation of its rituals and is increasingly involved in secular affairs, thus collapsing the complementarity of religious equality and caste hierarchy, and more generally of the sacred and the secular. At the same time the divine power both for salvation and for relief from suffering and misfortune is directly available to villagers less and less mediated by the Church hierarchy and the hierarchical order of saints, but more and more mirroring that of the Hindu pantheon.

In completing this section a few observations may be made. Even though some Hindus accept a distinction between culture and religion, the distinction between samaj dharma or religio-social identity and sadhana dharma or private subjective religious experience would not be acceptable to most Hindus, as there is no such distinction for them. In the Hindu tradition all is social and all is religious. However, in the context of the past where converts had been forcefully drawn from their community and made outcastes, this approach has much to its credit. Even though the samaj-sadhana distinction may not be accurate, what is intended by it is that the disciples of Jesus, the Isupanthis do not become a separate 'civic group`, a political identity. Here, the Christian community is a "community of faith, not a community of sociological identity." The Jesus community remains one in faith but diverse in social customs, culture and the like. Without becoming a new civic group, culturally too they retain their original jati, except for the faith dimension and the discarding of the varna ideology. One may not forget, however, that though the jati system is independent of the varna ideology, in fact, they have become identified and so may continue to function, even without the explicit support of the ideology. The main thrust of this missiological approach is valid since, from the perspective of the Christian faith, there is no reason why conversion and baptism should involve changing one's civic community. In the Indian context the retention of one's civic identity is important especially because of the accusations of 'extra territorial loyalty` of the Christians and their being 'governed` from the outside. This is even more important today given the rightist propaganda ploy that conversion and baptism are political moves to destabilize the country.

 

CHRISTIAN IDENTITY

Needless to say, terms like "religious identity" or "subjective experience" are no less open to critical scrutiny for their suggestions of a fixed referential meaning than the split between public and private realms of experience that they come to signify. However, in basic respects it is true to observe that in the conflicting messages that Christian converts receive about their religious identity - how are they to reconcile themselves to being socially Hindu when they have adopted Christianity? - ordinary Indian Christians have little recourse to anything like a language of subjectivity that offers them the means to express their relation either to doctrine or community. However, in the context of powerful forces seemingly establishing the terms of Christian self-definition to the point that it could be argued that the identify of Christian converts is externally determined rather than self-determined, the very concept of a determinative "language of religious experience" is necessarily reduced to an abstraction. We return to the ground realities of the Indian situation.

Given the pervasive nature of caste and the implications of the caste system in India it is not at all surprising that historically Christians did, in fact become a sociological group, virtually a 'Christian caste`. This is evident from the fact that, however unconstitutional, many official government forms include a space to indicate caste designation, where it is not uncommon to find 'Christian` entered. The question of whether or not there is a Christian caste is, in fact, complex and problematic as may be seen from Mosse's study. It is, moreover, important to recognize that the hierarchic ordering of religious identifications with community and caste is achieved in at least two closely related ways: first, the positing of the unstable and indefinable category of "private religious experience" as a separable, essentialized reality falling outside historical affiliations of caste or community; and, second, the isolation of belief as extraneous to determining an individual's membership in the community.

However, there can be no question that consciously or unconsciously there is an ubiquitous existential anxiety concerning the matter of preserving a Christian identity. This is commonly expressed by the use of special 'Christian` names, which are frequently viewed positively as a public confession of one's faith. Other conventional signs of Christian identity are to be found in personal dress and life styles, church architecture, forms of worship, including music, as well as a concern with numerical increase. This urge, too, is historically conditioned. We have already noted that in the past the Church has understood itself as a unique institution of salvation, which has been entrusted with the sole means of salvation -the sacraments and grace. Hence the commitment, even urgency, to ensure that as many as possible are baptized, and thus receive salvation. Indeed, given this exclusive claim to be the sole possessor and dispenser of salvation, the Church could not but be preoccupied with baptism. It could also not allow Christians to have contact with other religious traditions, which were seen as 'false` religions. In the context of this kind of self-understanding it is hardly surprising that the Church became extremely self-centered, concerned primarily with its numerical expansion, as this was the prime indicator of the success of its mission. Here Christian identity would be necessarily a sociological reality, a separate and identifiable community. However, moving away from this historical background, it seems well to turn our attention to what Jesus considered the identification of his followers.

Jesus clearly set forth characteristics by which his followers could be identified. "By this everyone will know that you are my disciples, if you have love for one another" [Jn.13:35 NRSV]. But how do we understand this love in today's world? Here one can only point the direction in which a possibly useful approach to answering this question may be found.

Agape, effective love has both a spiritual and material dimension. The spiritual dimension is described in biblical passages like 1 Cor.13, Mt.18, Rom.14, and so forth. The material dimension, effective love, 'doing love`, has regularly been practiced in the Church as almsgiving, charity. But looking at the meaning of Jesus' parables, his 'good news to the poor`, his opposition to the institutional authorities of his time, the Indian biblical scholar Soares-Prabhu contends that effective love has to go beyond almsgiving to working for a just society, working for the Kingdom of God. This interpretation of love as working for a just society, and not mere 'relief` works is, of course, based on an understanding of women and men as embodied beings in society, where society as a structure of relationships takes precedence over individuals. A change of individual hearts is not to be played down or minimized, but this alone is insufficient if we are to follow the path of Jesus. Therefore, among the central identifying characteristics of the followers of Jesus would be involvement in the struggle effectively to bring about the Kingdom of God, "on earth as it is in heaven," where freedom, fellowship, justice, responsible love reign and where people live as brothers/ sisters, equitably sharing the resources of God's creation and being accountable for their own human future and that of the created world. This immense task is possible, however, only if we join hands with all others who, whether they call on the name of Jesus or not, are committed to the struggle for a more just society, and who want to make this world a better place for all living beings. In this way Christian identity would be a non-communal identity and in itself not be a dividing factor.

Surely in being centered around the concern for the Kingdom we merely follow the practice of Jesus. Ever since the time of the prophets the Jews had been looking forward to the coming of a new age of abundance, peace and harmony, the reign of God. Jesus himself was "gripped by the vision of the human-divine community of the end time" which was "already germinating in the present". In Jesus' view this new humanity will have no center other than God, and it will be God's gift, yet not a 'cheap grace`, but gift as human task. Jesus thus enhanced the importance of human response to God's creative love. And this new way of seeing God's rule in and through human effort has called for a re-interpretation of the prevailing culture. Conversely, a radical critique of the prevailing culture involves a re-interpretation of the ultimate goal. Further, when this ultimate goal begins to appear in a concrete manner, however small it may be, it will create a "prophetic counter culture". In the light of our discussion, then, as an example, we may suggest that in a caste ridden society, when some groups begin to live as brothers/sisters, rejecting the varna ideology, which is divisive and discriminatory, a prophetic counter culture would come into being.

The interpretation of early Christianity as primarily, though not exclusively, a movement rather than a community is important for our present purpose. Increasingly students of the New Testament and the history of early Christianity are convinced that what Jesus inaugurated was more of the nature of a movement than a specific religious community.

The record of the Acts indicates that the early Christians went to the temple as all Jews did. As far as their religious life was concerned the disciples of Jesus were Jews. As Rayan perceptively points out, what seems to have distinguished them during that early period "was their meeting in the homes around four shared realities: shared faith, shared prayer, shared or broken bread....and finally shared material resources". Surely, the dynamic character of the life of these early Christians was in large part the result of the interrelationship of these four shared elements. Their shared faith involved them in shared bread, and all material resources and this made them a family of God, in which faith life and social relationships flowed into each other. Early Christianity was a movement of freedom, a movement of sister/brotherhood, of peace makers who announced the good news to the poor.

Being with Jesus was geared to being for the new humanity. The community....did not feel called to settle down around Jesus and find fulfilment in worshiping him. Its destiny was to march forward to the unknown Beyond, with Jesus at their head. Hence it would be more appropriate to call what Jesus inaugurated a movement rather than a community. As has recently been pointed by an anthropologist, the early Christian communities bear many features that are specific to millenarian movements, such as homogeneity, equality, anonymity and absence of property.

However, the prophetic subversive thrust of Jesus was not maintained by and in the community for long, and the whole message of Jesus about the Kingdom was spiritualized and the 'project of hope` was transferred to heaven. The lesson for us is clear, says Kappen.

No project of hope can survive if it is not translated into historical praxis. And it cannot be so translated unless it takes hold of the oppressed classes....The oppressed must be in a position to forge their project hope into a theoretical weapon for political action.

Hence, the challenge today to the followers of Jesus, to the Church as the Servant of the Kingdom, is not to form an exclusive sociological entity but to be a movement, which empowers the powerless and which is open to all with a similar vision. Exclusiveness is not its characteristic.

In the context of this openness a threefold dialogue is called for: the dialogue with cultures, religious traditions and the dispossessed of society. The followers of Jesus are invited to be involved with the on-going life of the people and make every effort to transform it in view of the Kingdom in the power of the Spirit. It is in doing this that the Church can escape 'archeologising` and alienating tendencies of looking into the culture of the past and of the elite.

The fact of Christians being a minority in India need not adversely affect involvement with people and political decisions. In secular states like India a religious minority community need not be a political minority. As suggested earlier, the minority faith community or movement does not necessarily become a separate civic group, political group, but remains with its own original group. It joins hands with others in working to defend human and spiritual values. While religious faith can and must find expression in political choices and activities, religion as an organization or institution must not have, strictly speaking, a political role. The growing number and influence of right-wing revaunchist communalist movements highlights the importance of this.

Certainly, working with others does not mean that the distinctive contribution of Christians is necessarily sacrificed. Whatever specific endowment there may be from a Christian point of view in any given situation, may be enhanced in the context of dialogue with others. Certainly, the community that carries the active "memory" of Jesus brings to the common struggle for the Kingdom a special light and power. Experience seems to indicate that we will be able to clarify our specificity to ourselves and to others most effectively in living dialogue with those who share a common vision and hope, however differently they may believe.

The Church in India is in a privileged position, because of its situation in the midst of other religious traditions, to work out new ecclesial structures which translate the vision of the Kingdom. In the context of the life and work of other religious traditions it is incumbent on the Church in India to evolve more open ecclesial structures that do justice to its experience of an interrelatedness and mutual inclusiveness with other religious traditions and their adherents. The Church in India today is being challenged to eschew the feudal class relations and power models that continue in the Church. This will mean greater autonomy and independence from the control of western money and power. It will also speak to accusations of 'denationalization` and 'extra-territorial` loyalties.

 

CONCLUSION

The emphasis on the Kingdom and on joining hands with all who are committed to the values of the Kingdom has rightly raised questions about the need to baptize at all. Perhaps it is sufficient to encourage discipleship and struggle for a more just society. The point needs some clarification and focus before we attempt to answer the question.

We have noted that in the present Indian context it is important to recognize that conversion and baptism are all too commonly seen as part of a movement of 'denationalization' and hence tend to strengthen the communalistic interpretation of Christianity. When the 'depressed classes` awaken to their rights and begin the struggle for social and economic equality, and when the members of the 'aboriginal` tribes, who have been peacefully secluded for centuries from the main stream of Indian nationalism, join with others in demanding their rights, fundamentalist groups and the monied classes oppose such moves. A forceful means of instigating opposition is to raise the cry of 'denationalization`. This is particularly effective when such movements for human rights are inspired by Christians, who are accused of 'extra-territorial` loyalties, and whose religion is considered 'foreign`. It is manifestly in the interests of the powerful majority to keep the marginalized on the peripheries of national life - social, economic and political. So, though the real fear is the awakening and uprising of the people, opposition is expressed in terms of religious conversion.

....if the Church leadership is taking recourse to liberation theology, it may not be out of genuine love for the poor but may be a calculated move to save its existence and prepare ground for mass evangelisation at some opportune time.

The author of this statement, a Hindu, is quite familiar with the thrust of `liberation theology'. This bogey of 'mass evangelisation` seems an obvious cover for the real motive of wanting to keep the marginalized 'in their place`. Under the title "The Church Goes Political in India," an RSS author expresses the real fears of the Hindu nationalists. In this context it is significant to listen to Nirmal Minz, himself a tribal Christian, convincingly argue that the primary objection to Christian conversion in the tribal areas is the fact that people begin to make demands for basic human rights when they are converted.

There is yet another consideration. In the model of the 'Church as an Institution of Salvation`, baptism is an absolute necessity for salvation, indeed that extra Ecclesiam nulla salus. However, when we begin to understand the Church as a servant of the Kingdom, and salvation as effective growth as God's children in freedom and love, into the likeness of the Christ, then there is a relativization of all rites, including baptism. Within this perspective, it is significant to remember that all religious traditions, peoples, rites and movements are called to a self-transcendence, to a new future. Once we are freed from the obsession to baptize, to 'save`, and our concern becomes the much wider concern of God to bring about God's Kingdom, the obvious relativization of baptism opens the way to understand the Church not as an Institution of Salvation, but as a movement of Jesus followers at the service of all God's people and God's creation. This transformed image will enable the Church more effectively and creatively to be in communion with others for the cause of the Kingdom.

Evangelisation centered on the Kingdom is dynamic, future-oriented, rooted in reality and history, integrative and holistic. It is the building up of a new humanity...the new heaven and the new earth.

Following on this kind of understanding it has been suggested that there be a "non-communal-koinonia," of all those who love Jesus and want to follow his ways without being baptized. Such a koinonia has precedents in, e.g. Kagawa's Fellowship of Friends of Jesus, whose purpose was "to promote a sense of unity and other Gospel values, yet without belonging to a community." These "confessors of Christ" would be allowed to eucharistic fellowship, if they so desired. (Christians who do not allow even other Christians to eucharistic fellowship will undoubtedly find this unacceptable.) Other suggestions include a "Christ-centered secular fellowship outside the Church."

These suggestions would be meaningful in a context where baptism necessarily implies a change of community, culture, jati, etc. But in the light of what we are suggesting, namely that baptism is not a change of culture and jati, there is no need to question or eschew baptism. One may, therefore, conclude that baptism as the acceptance of the Christ and his ways, as the celebration of one's conversion, of one's attitudinal change to form a more inclusive community with the goal of a fuller humanity is meaningful. Baptism as a new vision of reality, a changed, new pattern of relationship to God, people and creation is desirable and is not in itself a separating event. In the light of the interpretation suggested earlier in our discussion, when we welcome people to baptism in the context of the struggles for the Kingdom, it is a call to a prophetic counter culture, not a so-called "Christian" culture, which will turn traditional values up-side down, will bring down the mighty, and empower the weak, the lowly, the 'impure`, the helpless, and transform their self-image world view. It is in view of this mission that conversion and baptism become meaningful, not in view of the salvation of a few individuals. In order for the Church in India to regain its lost authority, it must abdicate its alliances with power. It must be humble enough to be baptized in the Jordan of Indian religiosity and bold enough to be baptized on the cross of Indian poverty. As Aloysius Pieris perceptively observes

"Does not the fear of losing its (Church) identity make it lean on Mammon? Does not its refusal to die keep it from living? The theology of power-domination and instrumentalization must give way to a theology of humility, immersion, and participation."

Baptism, understood in this sense, is not a matter of sociological community change and hence does not divide or separate. This is, of course, not to deny that at all times and in all places, the 'sword` brought by Jesus is a dividing factor in a world of sin. When Christians, like their Master, are committed to working for a new just socio-economic order, for the integrity of all creation they will necessarily cause divisions and so will be persecuted. While we Christians positively eschew divisions based on caste, class, race, gender, and so on, we welcome the division that comes from radical commitment to following the Christ.

 

Radha in the Erotic Play of the Universe

FORWARD

I have long been intrigued by the crossing of boundaries, which is at several points significant to this paper. Certainly the crossing of forbidden boundaries is central to an adequate understanding of Radha bhakti. This plays itself out in the transgression of moral and legal limits in the illicit relationship of Radha and Krsna, a theme accentuated by the intense yearning of viraha [love in separation]. Further, in the intimacy of the bhakti relationship the male bhakta, by experiencing himself as female partner violates his primal sexual demarcation as a male.

In this paper I have endeavoured to create an opportunity to explore these elements in Hindu bhakti and possible points of contact with elements in Christian tradition & experience. I see questions of religious language: reality, analogy and metaphor as being important.

The exploratory character of paper is evident in its lack of sharp focus. Many questions are posed and suggested answers are tentative. The reader will find many asides and references which not pursued, which may be merely suggestive and hence frustrating. One could, for instance, have included another story of longing love, of Layla & Majnun [Mad One], and with it attempted to explicate a sufi understanding of human search for divine. I have further, no more than mentioned in a note the issue of puberty rituals for women. Perhaps it would have been enlightening to have dealt the association of woman, sexuality, temptress and sin in the dominant Christian tradition. Only passing reference has been made to the role of rationality & reason in the western Enlightenment tradition and how this has displaced categories of the cosmic and of mystery. Obviously this paper is not intended as an exhaustive discussion, but more of a suggestive exploration. My purpose is not to suggest universal categories by means of which the entire divine-human inter-relationship is to be explained. Rather the paper looks at one aspect only, that of symbolising mystery, though one might want to argue that it is too much neglected. Perhaps the exercise may indicate new directions and spark interest in following them further. Finally, then, if the paper stimulates continuing wide-ranging, open discussion, full of creative insights and ideas, my purpose in writing it will have been amply satisfied.

 

 RADHA IN THE EROTIC PLAY OF THE UNIVERSE

"There is passion in the universe: the young stars, the whirling galaxies - the living, pulsing earth thrives in the passionate embrace of life itself. Our love for one another is the language of our passionate God....It is desire that spins us round, desire that sends the blood through our veins, desire that draws us into each other's arms and onward in the lifelong search for God's face". (1)

 

When religion is anthropocentric it has very little to tell us that is good news about passion and desire. When this happens culture secularises sexuality and misuses it. Pornography substitutes for mystery. (2) There is, however, mystery at the core of the Radha-Krishna tradition in this land. Here passionate love became sacralised as an expression of bhakti: the loving-woman's longing became devotion and love-making became worship.. It is the intention of this essay to begin to explore this mystery, and then to look for evidence of it in our Christian tradition also. The love of Radha, the beautiful gopi, who later became a goddess for some cults, and Krishna, the youthful dark deity, who is the object of widespread devotion, is less a story remembered than a random succession of episodes seen and heard, sung and danced. Over the centuries their love has been portrayed in thousands of exquisite miniature paintings, which depict the lovers in separation and union, longing and abandonment. The love story is heard whenever we listen to the great vocalists of Indian classical music sing the devotional songs of medieval bhaktas who in their poems sometimes observe, and at other times participate in the love play as Krishna's beloved. The story grips our imagination every time we encounter the animated expressions, flashing eyes and sinuous movements of a dancer, who - as Radha - expresses her anger at Krishna's infidelities, or - as Krishna - begs forgiveness for his impetuous dalliance. The love affair is recreated each time a Krishna bhakta participates in the communal singing of an episode from the story and especially when she or he, possessed by the spirit of one of the lovers, feels impelled to get up and ecstatically dance as the Lord or his beloved. The Radha-Krishna legend, then, is not a story in the sense of an orderly narrative whose protagonists have a shared past and are progressing towards a tragic or happy future. It is more an evocation and elaboration of the here-and-now of passionate love, an attempt to capture the exciting, fleeting moments of the senses and the baffling ways in which love's pleasures and pains are felt before retrospective recollection, trying to regain a lost control over emotional life, edits away love's inevitable confusions.

A long line of bards and balladeers, most of them indebted to the twelfth century Sanskrit poet, Jayadeva, who decisively shaped the legend's outlines, have often described the setting of this legend of love. A pious Hindu needs only close his or her eyes and `remember' in order to see Vrindavan, a Hindu garden of Eden, spring into existence. In the perpetual sunshine of the myth, distinct from the perpetual mists of history, a forest thicket on the banks of the River Jamuna awakens to life on a tropical spring day. The mustard fields at the edge of the forest, with their thick carpet of brilliant yellow flowers, stretch far into the distance. The air is redolent with the perfume of pollen shaken loose from newly blossomed Jasmine and bunches of flame coloured mimosa flowers hanging round and heavy from the trees. The ears are awash in the humming of bees, the cries of the cuckoos and the distant tinkling of cow bells. The seductive call of Krishna's flute comes floating through the forest thicket, further agitating the already unquiet senses, making for an inner uprising and an alien invasion. The legend, aiming to fix the essence of youthful love, has an amorous rather than a geographical landscape as its location; its setting is neither social nor historical, but sensuous.

In the falling dusk, Nanda, Krishna's foster father and the chief of a community of cowherds, asks Radha to escort Krishna home through the forest. On the way, in a grove, their `secret passion triumphs'. Radha's thoughts come to be absorbed by Krishna who, however, is unfaithful to her as he sports with other gopis - hugging one, kissing another and caressing yet another dark beauty.

When he quickens all things

To create bliss in the world,

His soft black sinuous lotus limbs

Begin the festival of love

And beautiful gopis wildly

Wind him in their bodies.

Friend, in spring young Hari [Krishna] plays

Like erotic mood incarnate. [I.46] (3)

Radha is jealous as she imagines the `vines of his great throbbing arms circle a thousand gopis', but more than jealousy she is infused with all the perplexing emotions of a proud, passionate woman who feels deserted by her lover.

My heart values his vulgar ways,

Refuses to admit my rage,

Feels strangely elevated,

And keeps denying his guilt.

When he steals away without me

To indulge his craving

For more young women,

My perverse heart

Only wants Krishna back.

What can I do? [II.10]

Solitary grief and images of a love betrayed and passion lost, recreated in reverie, alternate and reinforce each other:

My eyes close languidly as I feel the flesh quiver on his cheek,

My body is moist with sweat; he is shaking from the wine of lust.

Friend, bring Kesi's sublime tormentor to revel with me!

I've gone mad waiting for his fickle love to change. [II.14]

The power of Radha's yearning produces a change in Krishna. Of all the gopis, interchangeable suppliers of pleasure and feelings of conquest, Radha begins to stand out in Krishna's mind as someone special who is desired in her uniqueness. From the `heroic lover' for whom no woman is exceptional and who simply desires a variety of amatory dalliances, Krishna becomes the `romantic lover' impelled toward a singly irreplaceable mistress. The unheeding pursuit of pleasure, a bewildered Krishna discovers, has been brought to a halt by pleasure's arch-enemies - memory and attachment.

Her joyful responses to my touch,

Trembling liquid movement of her eyes,

Fragrance from her lotus mouth,

A sweet ambiguous stream of words,

Nectar from her red berry lips--

Even when the sensuous objects are gone,

My mind holds on to her in a trance.

How does the wound of her desertion deepen? [III.14]

Having been the Lord who strove to please himself alone, Krishna has become a man for whom his partner's well-being assumes an importance which easily equals his own. He discovers that he would rather serve and adore than vanquish and demand. As a tale of love, this transformative moment from desire's sensations to love's adoration, gives the story of Radha and Krishna its singular impact. (4)

To continue the tale, hearing of Krishna's remorse and of his attachment to her, Radha, dressed and ornamented for love, awaits Krishna at their trysting place in the forest. She lingers in vain, for Krishna does not come. Radha is consumed with jealousy as she imagines him engaged in an amourous encounter with a rival. When Krishna finally does appear, Radha spurns him angrily:

Dark from kissing her kohl-blackened eyes

At dawn your lips match your body's colour, Krishna.

Damn you Madhava! Go! Kesava leave me!

Don't plead your eyes with me!

Go after her, Krishna!

She will ease your despair. [VIII.3]

But, in separation, Radha and Krishna long for one another with a mounting sense of desolation. Eventually, Radha's friend persuades her to abandon her modesty and pride and go to her lover.

Your full hips and breasts are heavy to bear.

Approach with anklets ringing!

Their sound inspires lingering feet.

Run with the gait of a wild goose!

Madhu's tormentor

Is faithful to you, fool.

Follow him, Radhika! [XI.3]

In the full throes of a sexual excitement when even her `modesty left in shame,' Radha rushes to meet an equally ardent (and repentant) lover. Krishna sings:

Throbbing breasts aching for loving embrace are hard to touch.

Rest these vessels on my chest! Quench love's burning fire!

Narayana [Krishna] is faithful now. Love me, Radhika! [XII.5]

Offer your lips' nectar to revive a dying slave, Radha!

His obsessed mind and listless body burn in love's desolation.

Narayana is faithful now. Love me Radhika. [XII.6]

Once the ecstatic love-making subsides momentarily in orgasmic release, a playful Radha asks Krishna to rearrange her clothes and her tousled hair, and

also:

"Paint a leaf on my breasts!

Put colour on my cheeks!

Lay a girdle on my hips!

Twine my heavy braid with flowers!

Fix rows of bangles on my hands,

And jewelled anklets on my feet!"

Her yellow-robed lover

Did what Radha said. [XII.20]

Jayadeva, legend has it, hesitant to commit sacrilege by having deity touch Radha's feet, was unable to pen the last lines, and went out to bathe. When he returned he found Krishna himself had completed the verse in his absence.

The legend of Radha and Krishna as it has come down to us today, differs from Jayadeva's version in only one significant respect. Jayadeva merely hints at the illicit nature of their love when he mentions that an older Radha changes from young Krishna's protective escort to become his lover, thereby defying the authority and instructions of the chief of cowherds.

"Clouds thicken the sky.

Tamala trees darken the forest.

The night frightens him.

Radha, you take him home!"

They leave at Nanda's order,

Passing trees in thickets on the way,

Until secret passions of Radha and Madhava

Triumph on the Jamuna riverbank. [I.1]

Later poets (notably Vidyapati in the fifteenth century), who tend to focus more on Radha and her love than on Krishna, (5) gave the illicit element in the story a more concrete cast and specific content. Radha is parakiya, another-man's woman, (6) and her liaison with Krishna, whatever its powerful meaning in mystical allegory, is plainly adulterous (7) in human terms. Radha is certainly no paragon of the womanly virtues detailed in Hindu texts; nor does she come close to any of the `good' or `bad' mother-goddesses of Indian mythology and religion. In her passionate craving for her lover and in her desperate suffering in his absence. Radha is simply the personification of mahabhava, that `great emotional state' that is heedless of social proprieties and unbounded by conventions. As various scholars have pointed out, (8) many different Indian traditions - religious and erotic, classical literary and folk - have converged and coalesced in the poetical renditions of the myth, especially Jayadeva's Gitagovinda, to give that particular work an allure that extends over large parts of the sub-continent. About this, more anon.

But Radha and Krishna, although linked to the heroine and hero of classical Sanskrit love poetry in many ways, are primarily products of the bhakti movement, whose principal mood has always been erotic. (9) In contrast to much of Western poetry of sexual mysticism, though, Radha and Krishna are not figures of erotic allegory. Bhakti extols possessing and being possessed by God. For it sexual love is where the fullest possession, the `closest touch of all,' takes place. With this the creators and audiences of bhakti poetry seek to project themselves into Radha's love for Krishna through poems that recount all its passionate phases. For bhakti is preeminently feminine in its orientation, and the erotic love for Krishna (or Siva, as the case may be) is envisioned entirely from the woman's viewpoint. Male devotees, saints, and poets must all adopt a feminine posture and persona to recreate Radha's responses in themselves. We shall have more to say about this. Radha's passionate love of Krishna, raised to its highest intensity, is not an allegory for religious passion; it is religious passion. (10) Jayadeva, thus does not need to make a distinction, or choose between the religious and the erotic when he introduces the subject matter of his poem by saying:

If remembering Hari (Krishna) enriches your heart,

If his arts of seduction arouse you,

Listen to Jayadeva's speech

In these sweet soft lyrical songs. [I.4]

The adi-guru of the Radha-Krishna cults, Jayadeva knows that the enrichment of the heart and the arousal of senses belong together.

Not only this, there is a powerful sense of eros as the underlying force motivating all attractions.

Eros is seen as pervading the universe, binding all things together, infusing life with creativity and exuberance, drawing beings to one another in love, and the love between man and woman is viewed as an intense participation in this ongoing erotic play of the universe. (11)

A major source of this erotic excitement in the treatment of Radha and Krishna is the forbidden crossing of boundaries. First, in the pervasive presence of the adulterous in the narrative, there is an illicit transgression of moral and legal limits. Accentuating this is the intense yearning of love-in-separation (viraha). Second, in a striving to entertain the erotic feelings and sensations of the other sex, a lover would violate his primal sexual demarcation as a male. Arousal is provoked, preserved and brought to a pitch by the stealth and secrecy in which the crossing of such bounds takes place. As much has been written on these elements, singly and together, (12) we shall only briefly refer to them.

The most obvious manifestation of the illicit, involving the crossing of boundaries set by social mores and norms, is found in the persistent adulterous character of the narrative. But even the later accounts which saddle Radha with a husband, throwing in a mother-in-law for good measure, persistently underline the adulterous nature of her love for Krishna. There was, of course, much theological uneasiness regarding this circumstance. Some commentators went to great lengths to explain why, since Krishna is divine, he could have not actually coveted the wife of another. Others went to even greater lengths to prove the contrary, explaining that precisely because Krishna is divine he is not bound by normal human restrictions. In the end, and perhaps inevitably, the community's quest for pleasure triumphed over its theological scruples in firmly demanding that the mythical lovers be accepted as unambiguously adulterous. (13)

The fifth century Tamil epic Shilappadikaram is perhaps the earliest illustration of the contrasting attractions of the adulterous and the conjugal for the Indian man. (14) The sensuality and abandon in the description of Kovalana's relationship with his mistress Madhavi in this epic, provide a strong counterpoint to the tenderness and uxorious dependability of his wife, Kannaki.

Significantly, the bhakti cults gave more exalted reasons for making Radha an adulterous parakiya. For them the adulterous was symbolic of the sacred, the overwhelming moment that denies world and society, transcending the profanity of everyday convention, as it forges an unconventional (and unruly) relationship with God as the lover.

Not surprisingly, viraha was idealised as the necessary condition of the intense yearning which characterises the adulterous relationship.

As the clouds scatter, her tears flow,

as night deepens, her sighs increase;

Like a bird in flight, her laughter vanishes,

lightning strikes and robs her of her sleep.

Like a cataka, she cries out "Piu, piu!"(15)

waves of fierce heat rise up within her.

Listen, says Kesav, this is her condition:

there is no fire, but her limbs are burning. (16)

It is a complex relationship, for the devotee is the `same as and yet different from' the Lord, and so even in the joy of union there is the pain of separation. Indeed, the highest form of devotion, according to Yamunacarya, comes not in union but after the union, in the `fear of new separation'. (17) Thus the passionate Radha became the prototype of the passionate devotee. The entire life of the bhakta was to consist of a `holy yearning', the intense desire caused by separation. More on this, too, anon.

The crossing of individual sexual boundaries is another major source of erotic excitement in the treatment of Radha and Krishna. In painting, the depiction of this crossing ranges from the portrayal of the lovers in the traditional Orissa school, where they appear as one androgynous entity, to some of the paintings from the Himalayan foothills where Radha and Krishna are dressed in each other's clothes, or Radha is seen taking the more active `masculine' role. In poetry, Sur Das would speak in Radha's voice.

You become Radha and I will become Madhava, truly Madhava; this is the reversal which I shall produce. I shall braid your hair and will put (your) crown on my head. Sur Das says: Thus the Lord becomes Radha and Radha the son of Nanda. (18)

The inversion of sexual roles is even more striking in Jayadeva's depiction of what are usually regarded as `feminine masochistic' sexual wishes. Krishna, not Radha, sings.

Punish me, lovely fool!

Bite me with your cruel teeth!

Chain me with your creeper arms!

Crush me with your hard breasts!

Angry goddess, don't weaken with joy!

Let Love's despised arrows

Pierce me to sap my life's power! [X.11]

It was only under the influence of nineteenth century Western androcentricity, one of the more dubious `blessings' of British colonial rule, that many educated Indians would become uneasy with this accentuation of femininity in a culture hero. The prominent Bengali writer, Bankim Chandra Chatterji, the proponent of a virile nationalism, found in Krishna the perfect embodiment of the ideal culture-hero, and when he contrasts the representation of the life of Krishna in the Mahabharata, the Bhagavata Purana, and the Gitagovinda, he regretted that the obvious allegory of the relation of purusa (spirit) to prakrti (matter) represented by Krishna's love with the gopis had vanished in the Gitagovinda. (19) In the Radha-Krishna cults, where the devotee must create an erotic relationship with Krishna, the transcendence of the boundaries of gender becomes imperative for the male devotee, who endeavours to behave like a woman in relation to the Lord. Here, Krishna not only demands such a reversal from his male devotees, but he has himself set the compelling exemplar. Consequently, tales of Hindu saints who have succeeded in feminising themselves are legion. In support, we may cite only a couple of illustrations. The fifteenth century Gujarati bhakta Narsi Mehta writes.

I took the hand of that lover of gopis [Krishna] in loving converse....I forgot all else. Even my manhood left me. I began to sing and dance like a woman. My body seemed to change and I became one of the gopis. I acted as a go-between like a woman, and began to lecture Radha for being too proud....At such time I experienced moments of incomparable sweetness and joy. (20)

A.K. Ramanujan tells us that the voice of the Tamil saint-poet Nammalvar, who composed 370 poems on the theme of love, was always that of a woman, Krishna's beloved, the girlfriend who consoles and counsels, or the mother who restrains her and despairs over her daughter's lovesick fantasies. Nammalvar's love poems alternated with other kinds of poems and a thirteenth century commentary explained these shifts: "In knowledge, his own words; in love a woman's words." (21) A legend has it that Amaru, one of the earliest and greatest Sanskrit poets of love, was the hundred and first incarnation of a soul which had previously resided in the bodies of a hundred women.

Narsi Mehta, Nammalvar and countless other, unknown devotees of the Radha-Krishna cults perhaps bear testimony to the primal yearning of men, ensheathed and isolated by their masculinity, to yield their heroic trappings and delight in womanliness, woman's and their own. The mother has figured early on as the omnipotent force of a parental universe, making things, including fathers and other males, materialise as if at will. It is she whose breast and magic touch had long ago soothed the savage instinctual imperatives, she whose fecund womb seemed the very fount of life. Such maternal and feminine powers are earthly yet mysterious and transcendent, undiminished by the utter sensuousness in which they are manifest. Indeed, Krishna's erotic homage to Radha conveys something of the aching quality of the man's fantasy of surrender at the height of sexual excitement.

The profusion of the imagery of darkness and night in the meetings of Radha-Krishna underscores the secret nature of these fantasies. The paintings which depict Radha and Krishna surrounded by darkness while they themselves are lit by a sullen glare from the sky, or portray the lovers enclosed in a triangle of night while the inhabitants of Vrindavan unconcernedly go about the day's tasks, are visual metaphors for a sensualism which is simultaneously hidden from the world and from the lovers' awareness. For Radha, night and darkness are excitement's protectors as are the silence and secrecy of friends.

Leave your noisy anklets! They clang like traitors in love's play.

Go to the darkened thicket, friend! Hide in a cloak of night! [XI.11]

In a Basholi painting from Rasmanjari the text describes the seated lovers

thus:

Fear of detection does not permit the eager lovers' gaze to meet.

Scared of the jingling sound of armlets, they desist from embracing.

They kiss each other's lips without the contact of teeth.

Their union, too, is hushed . (22)

Many other portraits of Radha reveal that it is not only other people who must be unaware of her sexual arousal. Radha, too, when in a state where "love's deep fantasies/struggle with her modesty," [XII.1] would feign ignorance of her true condition, as if it were a secret another part of her self must not admit knowing. It is given to the poet to perceive correctly her struggle.

Words of protest filled with passion,

Gestures of resistance lacking force,

Frowns transmuted into smiles,

Crying dry of tears - friend,

Though Radha seeks to hide her feelings,

Each attempt betrays her heart's

Deep love for demon Mura's slayer. (23)

Identifying with Radha's pounding breasts as she steals out at night to meet Krishna, other poets graphically describe her fear while merely hinting at the suppressed thrill of her sortie, the arousal sharpened by the threat of discovery. They give us images of storm, writhing snakes, scratched and burning feet.

We imagine that on hearing Radha's plaint, Krishna, whose gaze into the recesses of the human heart is as penetrating as it is compassionate, smiled to himself in the dark. He would surely have known that the strains of his flute are the perennial and irresistible call of the human senses caught up in the throes of love.

And what do darkness and night mean to Krishna as he passively offers himself to Radha's embraces? Here, too, only under the cloak of night does the Lord reveal what may be the deepest `secret of man' - that he, too, would be a woman. In the night, in the jungle, visual and discrete modes of perception are replaced by the tactile, the visceral, and the more synesthetic forms of cognizance. Representations of the self and beloved fade and innermost sensate experience comes to the fore. As the illusions of bodies fused, androgynously, the fantasies around womanliness and sexual excitement feed each other and Krishna "knows" Radha not with the eye but with the flesh.

If it has not become so already, surely it is now obvious that our consideration of Radha's and Krishna's relationship has brought us to encounter the issue of eroticism and sexuality in the human-divine love relationship. And we Christians are forced to face the question why it is that dominant Christian traditions have shunned the slightest suggestion of passionate desire in Christian faith.

When I reflect on what dominant Christian traditions teach us about sexuality, two things come to mind. The first, paradoxically, is silence - no puberty rites, no effective rites of passage for our young to celebrate the incredible experience that they are now fit and able to pass on the mystery of human life. (24) A pat on the head or tap on the cheek at confirmation does not make up for this cosmic silence. A second response to sexuality from various religious traditions, including our own, is moralising. But telling us about all the sins we are capable of with our sexual organs does not enlighten us about our sexuality. I believe it is the French philosopher Gabriel Marcel who has observed that those who reduce mystery to a problem are guilty of a grave perversion. There certainly has been a great deal of perversion performed by religion; in the name of moralising, the mystery of sexuality has been all too often reduced to moralistic problems.

Why must Christian love be totally gratuitous, disinterested, and passionless? Indeed, why, given its importance to and power in human life has passionate relationship not been central in the Christian tradition? Surely, as many in our day are suggesting, relationship and interdependence, change and transformation, not substance, changelessness, and perfection, are the categories within which an adequate theology for our day must function. Indeed, should not important personal relationships be prime candidates for expressing the Christian gospel as a relational, inclusive, nonhierarchical vision of fulfillment?

As the most intimate of all human relationships, as the one that to the majority of people is the most central and precious, the one giving the most joy - as well as the most pain - does it not contain enormous theological potential? Could a relationship be of such crucial importance in our existence and be irrelevant in our relationship with God? Does this not suggest dualistic thinking, that the divine and human, the spiritual and the physical have no intrinsic relationship? Are we not saying that the most intimate and important kind of human love is inappropriate for expressing some aspects of the God-human relationship? The love of parents to children and perhaps friend to friend is allowed but not lover to beloved. But why not? What is wrong with desire, with passion? More appropriately, what is good, appropriate and right about desire, about passion as a means of talking about the God-human relationship? In these brief comments we are by no means attempting a full or systematic answer to the question, but are only trying to dispel some of the incredibility surrounding the metaphor.

We shall consider, very briefly and tentatively a few ways in which desire or passion, though not exhaustive of the love between lovers, is an important dimension both of the relationship between human beings as well as the relationship between God and humans. We begin with the simple reminder that the Song of Songs is part of our scriptural tradition. Many have ignored the poem or found it an embarrassment, but it has served to check those who would argue that the Christian tradition has no place for passion, except for the sake of procreation. Significantly, biblical exegete Phyllis Trible begins her analysis of the Song of Songs in a way that further counters this tendency of the tradition to ignore passion.

Love is bone of bone and flesh of flesh. Thus I hear the Song of Songs. It speaks from lover to lover with whispers of intimacy, shouts of ecstasy, and silences of consummation. At the same time, its unnamed voices reach out to include the world in their symphony of eroticism. (25)

Although the Song of Songs praises human love, and nowhere mentions deity, some, especially medieval mystics, have not hesitated to use it as an analogy for the relationship between the soul and God. (26) Whatever one may think of such mystical theology, the imagery powerfully expresses divine passion for human beings as well as extraordinary intimacy between God and human beings. Indeed, the Judeo-Christian tradition has often turned to the love relationship in order to express closeness, concern, and longing between God and human beings. There are, for instance, the image of God as the faithful husband in Hosea, and the New Testament metaphors of the soul as the bride of Christ. Some of these images are, of course, sexist in subordinating the female to the male, especially the bridal ones, and some are individualistic, especially the mystical ones, yet they serve as a reminder that the Judeo-Christian tradition, however wary of the lover image, and preferring to keep it well within the safe boundaries of marriage, has nonetheless not been able to eliminate it entirely.

This is in spite of the fact that while we Christians speak of God as love, we are afraid to call God beloved/lover. However, a God who relates to all that is, not distantly and bloodlessly, but intimately and passionately, is appropriately called beloved/lover. God is the one who loves not with the fingertips but totally and passionately. God is the one who deigns to wrestle with Jacob, to debate with the stricken Job. God is not jealous of human creative passion, but rather is supportive of all human attempts to love God. Nor is the Good News of Jesus the Christ a call to passively await God's action in history. To be passionate is not to coopt God's love; to be creative is not to coopt God's creativity. Augustine's `holy yearning', then, is no mere trivial petty piety. Truly, "our hearts are restless till they rest in thee, O Lord", as we have seen Radha painfully agitated until she is united with Krishna, and even beyond. Indeed, God is the moving power of love in the universe, the desire for unity with all beloved, the passionate embrace that spins the living, pulsing earth around, sends blood surging through our bodies, and draws us into one another's arms.

This is a poetic way of saying what others have said of eros: from Plato - love is the "everlasting possession of the good," (27) to Tillich - love is the desire for union with the valuable. (28) This is the love that finds goodness and beauty in the other and desires to be united with it. (29) By itself, unqualified by other types of love, eros can become aesthetic and elitist, but its importance is that it expresses better than any other kind of love the valuableness of the beloved. In a time such as ours, when the intrinsic value of persons and the world must be stressed, eros as the love of the valuable is a necessary aspect of both divine and human love. Here we come to understand salvation to be the making whole or uniting with what is attractive and valuable, rather than the rescuing of what is sinful and worthless. (30)

The assumption that eros is the desire for union with, or possession of, the valuable suggests, however, that it lacks what it would have. It assumes a situation of separation, a situation of alienation, in contrast to a situation of original unity. And it is this lack or need - what Tillich calls the "urge toward the reunion of the separated" - that is the point of identity in all forms of love, from epithymia (desire, including sexual desire), to agape, eros, and philia.(31) In fact, one sees it most clearly in sexual desire. Indeed, the act that both brings new life into being and gives the most intense pleasure to all living creatures is a powerful symbol of the desire for unity with others that is shared by all forms of life. Or as Tillich has it, "The appetitus of every being to fulfil itself through union with other beings is universal..." (32) Agape, the love that gives with no thought of return; eros, the love that finds the beloved valuable, and philia, the love that shares and works for the vision of the good - none of these can be reduced to sexual desire, but all of them in different ways attest to the oneness of love, so evident in sexual union, as "that which drives everything that is towards everything else that is." (33) Love cannot be reduced to sexuality, but it cannot escape it either, for if it tries, it becomes bloodless, cold and sterile, no longer the embrace that spins our pulsing earth, sending blood surging through our bodies and drawing us into each other's arms.

However, bhakti is no mere attachment to any attractive object or entrancing personality, whether natural or superhuman. In both Vaisnava and Saiva traditions, bhakti is attachment to Ultimate Reality. But how can there be attachment or connection between the finite and the Infinite? And, if a loving relationship is difficult between a superior and an inferior on the human level, how much more difficult must such a relationship be between the infinitely superior One and such creaturely beings as ourselves? The scriptures to which the bhakti poets so frequently refer affirm the hierarchy, yet they also recount efforts of God to cut through the hierarchy and sometimes even to reverse human and divine roles. How to make sense of such reversal?

Surely, without the emphatic affirmation that bhakti is a one-sided relationship - God's supremacy and fidelity outdistancing anything humans can imagine - the devotee's confidence in resting on the ultimate ground of his or her own being would have no basis. On the other hand, without the dramatic and poetic expression of the reversal in God's love play, when Krishna is conquered by Radha and the divine bows to the human, the full reality that the devotee experiences would not be expressed. The Gitagovinda thus points to the crux of this vision of reality, the heart of its philosophical difficulties but also the source of its remarkable power - indeed, "amazing grace."

Certainly, human sexuality is God's gracious gift, a fundamental dimension of our created and our intended humanness. We need to recognise our alienation from our sexuality and to lay bold claim to the gospel's promise of reconciliation to our embodiment, and then to explore some of the ways in which sexuality enters into our experience of Christian faith. Do we not have the promise? The Word became - becomes - flesh. The embodied Word dwells among us, full of grace and truth [John 1:14]. The embodiment of God is, in faith's perception, God's decisive and crucial self-disclosure. Our human sexuality is a language, and we are both called and given permission to become `body-words' of love. Indeed, human sexuality - in its fullest sense - is both the physiological and psychological grounding of the human capacity to love. (34)

From another perspective, Christine E. Gudorf, in a chapter on "Regrounding Spirituality in Embodiment", (35) observes that contemporary Christians are creating new forms of spirituality based in reflection on embodied human experience. She notes that until the twentieth century, Christianity, indeed, much of the Western world, has demonstrated for nearly 2000 years an otherworldly, ascetic spirituality in which materiality, and especially sexuality, were suspect, if not actually sinful. Now, Gudorf contends, present inroads on this tradition insist that: "1) bodily experience can reveal the divine, 2) affectivity is as essential as rationality to true Christian love, 3) Christian love exists not to bind autonomous selves, but as the proper form of connection between beings who become human persons in relation, and 4) the experience of bodily pleasure is important in creating the ability to trust and love others, including God." (36)

Finally, returning to our paean of love, we find the lovers emerging "out of the wild, up from the desert....leaning and holding" [Song of Songs 8:5] onto one another. To make love is to enter the cosmological wilderness, to go beyond the human artifacts of city and civilisation, to return to the depths of darkness where spirit embraces matter and the Cosmic Christ (37) is realised as earthy and untamed. The sexual experience for these lovers is an encounter with the wild, with the wilderness within and among them, with that part of divinity and the Christ that is wild, not soft or tamed. The Jewish people first encountered Yahweh "in the wilderness" and the prophets spoke of going into the wilderness where God will speak "heart to heart". Jesus, too, wrestled in the wilderness with the cosmic forces of angels and demons in coming to grips with the Cosmic Christ in him - an invasion of grace. And so it is that the ancient Hebrew love poet reminds us that, even in the midst of an often unjust and violent world invasions of grace yet occur, the passionate Cosmic Lover still meets us in the flesh of our days. We are given a vision that the winter shall be past, the flowers shall appear on the earth, the time of singing shall come, and the voice of the turtle dove shall be heard in the land [Song of Songs 2:11-12].

The entire poem, so ecstatic about the discovery of the Christic mystery in another, and indeed in the relationship that two lovers forge, ends with an urgent invitation when the woman sings: Come! Be swift my lover! Be like a gazelle, or a wild young stag! Come! Play on the spicy mountain! [Song of Songs 8:14]

 

FOOTNOTES

1. From a drama on the subject of God as lover, by Sandra Ward-Angell, quoted in Sallie McFague, Models of God (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987), 130.

2. The very concept of mystery is suspect in our time, of course. If Newton is correct and our universe is essentially a machine, who needs mystery? There is no mystery in a machine-universe. Indeed, in an anthropocentric era of culture, education and religion, there is no need of mystery. The very concept of "mystery" itself is reduced to an "unsolved problem". Mystery as the dark silence behind all being and the deep unfathomable presence that grounds all being is banished. The Enlightenment banished mystery and mysticism, relegating the latter to extraordinary states of consciousness on the periphery of things.

3. The critically edited Sanskrit text of the Gitagovinda prepared by Barbara Stoler Miller serves as the basis for my translations in this essay. See Barbara Stoler Miller, Jayadeva's Gitagovinda, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978). Without sacrificing basic meaning, I have attempted to convey the intensely lyrical character of the original. The references are to this edition.

4. In a remarkable coincidence, three of the world's best-known works of romantic love which occupy pivotal positions in their respective cultures - Beroul's Tristan and Isolde in Europe, Nizami's Layla and Majnun in the Islamic world, and Jayadeva's Gitagovinda in India - were all produced at roughly the same time, in the twelfth century CE. Whether this represents happenstance, coincidence, or springs from sociohistorical trends coalescing across the globe is beyond our present scope. However, it is striking that the poetry of passion should predate and possibly prefigure important cultural-historical changes in Europe, India and West Asia. It is as if the unfolding discovery of each other portrayed in the love story sheds light on what is fundamental to the human spirit.

5. In the nineteenth century there was a reverse turn in the fortunes of Radha veneration. Later in this paper we note Bankim Chandra Chatterji's disdain for all the Radha represents. In contrast to Mahatma Gandhi's profound love for Krishna, his silence about Radha is eloquent. There is also a rejection of Radha in modern Hindi poetry. Indeed, the adoration of Radha during the last hundred years seems to have been once more to a religious subculture.

6. The rhetorical texts classified the heroine in terms of her relationship with the hero as svakiya or one's own woman, parakiya or another man's woman, and sadharanastri or the prostitute, who was not depicted except in farces. The parakiya nayika was subclassified further into parodha or another-man's wife and kanyaka or the maiden, who is another-man's daughter.

7. If Radha is parodha parakiya, which she is in some sections of the later cult, then her relationship with Krishna is adulterous. However, if she is kanyaka parakiya, technically she cannot be called adulterous. However, here we use the term adulterous in the general sense of an illicit relationship of two persons not married to one another.

8. For example, S.K. De, Ancient Indian Erotics and Erotic Literature, (Calcutta: K.L. Mukhopadhyay, 1959), 82; Norvin Hein, "Radha and Erotic Community," in The Divine Consort: Radha and the Goddesses of India, John Stratton Hawley and Donna Marie Wulff, eds. (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), 121; Barbara Stoller Miller, Fantasies of a Love-Thief, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1971), 125-26; Lee Siegel, Sacred and Profane Dimensions of Love in Indian Traditions, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1978), 233.

9. Krishna in the north become the objects of bhakti's impassioned devotion, and bhakti poetry, brimming with love for the Lord flowers in the vernacular languages which, to some extent, take over from the language of `high' culture, Sanskrit. Drawing on the conventions of the classical literature of love and using an existing pan-Indian stock of symbols and figures of speech, the bhakti poets nevertheless strive for spontaneous, direct, personal expression of feeling rather than a rarified cultivation of aesthetic effect and the `emotion recollected', preferred by the Sanskrit poets. See A.K. Ramanujan, Hymns for Drowning, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1981), 127-33.

10. It is perhaps the obvious thematic similarities between the Gitagovinda and the Song of Songs which predisposed the first Europeans who read Jayadeva's poem to consider it an allegory. For further discussions see Edward C. Dimock, Jr., "On Religious and Ertoic Experience," The Sound of Silent Guns, Edward C. Dimmock, Jr. ed., (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1989), 11-20; Norvin Hein, "Radha and Erotic Community," in The Divine Consort, Hawley and Wulff, eds. 116-124; Lee Siegel. Sacred and Profane Dimensions of Love, 178-84; A.K. Ramanujan, Hymns for the Drowning, 152-57.

11. Karine Schomer, "Where Have All the Radhas Gone?" in The Divine Consort, Hawley and Wulff, eds., 108.

12.See for example, W.G. Archer, The Loves of Krishna, (New York: Grove Press, n.d.); Roy C. Armore & Larry D. Shinn, Lustful Maidens and Ascetic Kings, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1981); Edward C. Dimmock, Jr. & Denise Levertov, In Praise of Krishna (Garden City, NY: Anchor Books, 1967), Sudhir Kakar & John M. Ross, Tales of Love, Sex and Danger, (Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1986) M.H. Klaiman, ed., Singing the Glory of Lord Krishna, (Chico, CA: Scholars Press, 1984); Lee Siegel, Sacred and Profane Dimensions of Love in Indian Traditions; Milton Singer, ed., Krishna: Myths, Rites, and Attitudes, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966).

13. The question of whether Radha was svakiya or parakiya became an important doctrinal issue for the medieval Vaisnava theologians, an issue which ultimately separated the orthodox from the Sahajiya Vaisnavas and marked a distinction between the Krishna-bhakti poets writing in Hindi and those writing in Bengali. Indeed, a formal debate to decide whether Radha was svakiya or parakiya was held in 1717 at the Court of Nabak Jafara Khana, and those advocating the parakiya position won. The prevailing argument was that bhakti must be passionate and that the parakiya relationship creates greater passion than the svakiya one. See Edward C. Dimmock, Jr., The Place of the Hidden Moon, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), 201-15.

14. Ilankovatikal, Shilappadikaram (The Ankle Bracelet) by Prince Ilango Adigal, A. Danielou, tr., (New York: New Directions, 1965).

15. The cataka is a bird that drinks only raindrops, and whose poignant cry, "piu, piu" is heard from springtime to the coming of the monsoon rains.

16. Visvanath Prasad Misra, ed., Kesav-granthavali, 3 vols., (Allahabad: Hindustani Academy, 1954). I.146-47.

17. Charlotte Vaudeville, "Evolution of Love Symbolism in Bhagavatism", Journal of the American Oriental Society LXXXII (1962), 39.

18. W.G. Archer, The Loves of Krishna, 84

19. See Jogeshcandra Bagal, ed., Bankim-racnavali, (Calcutta: Sahitya Sansad, 1969), 3:98, quoted in Barbara Stoler Miller. "The Divine Duality of Radha and Krishna", in The Divine Consort, Hawley and Wulff, eds., 25.

20. A.J. Alston, The Devotional Poems of Mirabai, (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1980), 24-25.

21. Acaryahrdayam, "The Master's Heart," by Alakiyamanavala Nayanar cited in A.K. Ramanujan. Hymns for the Drowning, 154.

22. M.S. Randhawa and S.D. Bambri, "Basholi Paintings of Bhanudatta's Rasamanjari," in M.H. Klaiman, ed. Singing the Glory of Lord Krishna, 23-47.

23. Vidagdhamadhava VII.38. Quoted by Donna Marie Wulff, "A Sanskrit Portrait: Radha in the Plays of Rupa Goswami," in The Divine Consort, Hawley and Wulff, eds., 39.

24. The custom of families and close friends celebrating the menarche of a young woman has, as far as I know, virtually disappeared. Traditionally, of course, the onset of womanhood brought a number of social restrictions on the young woman which are not liberative, and so are not to be celebrated.

25. Phyllis Trible, God and the Rhetoric of Sexuality, (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1978), 144.

26. For example, Bernard of Clairvaux takes a line by the woman to her lover, "O that he would kiss me with the kisses of his mouth"(1:2) as an analogy for the incarnation: Jesus is God's "kiss"! "Happy kiss in which God is united to Man...," writes Bernard in On the Love of God, (London: A.R. Mowbray & Co., 1950) cited in Phyllis Trible, op. cit., 146. 2

7. From Plato's Symposium, as quoted by David L. Norton & Mary F. Kille in Philosophies of Love, (London: Rowman & Allanhead, 1983), 91.

28. Paul Tillich, Love, Power and Justice: Ontological Analyses and Ethical Applications, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1954), 30-31.

29. Though frequently equated, eros is very different from lust, which can best be described as the desire to sexually possess or dominate another person. Sexual feelings should not be equated with lust. For further elaboration of this distinction see Marie M. Fortune, Love Does No Harm, (New York: Continuum Publishing Co., 1995), 47-49.

30. Prominent expositions of this understanding of salvation are to be found in the works of Matthew Fox, especially Original Blessing, (Santa Fe, NM: Bear & Company, 1984) and The Coming of the Cosmic Christ, (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988).

31. The entire passage reads, "In spite of the many kinds of love, which in Greek are designated as philia (friendship), eros (aspiration toward value), and epithymia (desire), in addition to agape, which is the creation of the Spirit, there is one point of identity in all these qualities of love, which justifies the translation of them all by "love"; and that identity is the `urge toward the reunion of the separated,' which is the inner dynamics of life. Love in this sense is one and indivisible." Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology, vol.3, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1963), 137.

32. Tillich, Love, Power and Justice, 33.

33. Ibid. 25

34. For a fuller exploration of these themes see James B. Nelson, Embodiment: An Approach to Sexuality and Christian Theology, (Minneapolis: Augsburg Publishing House, 1978).

35. Christine E. Gudorf, Body, Sex and Pleasure: Reconstructing Christian Sexual Ethics, (Cleveland: Pilgrim Press, 1994), 205-219.

36. Ibid. 217-18.

37. Lutheran scholar of the history of Christianity, Jaroslav Pelikan believes all too little reflection on the Cosmic Christ is going on in our Protestant theological colleges and churches. This, he suggests, is a result of the Enlightenment. "The Enlightenment's quest for the historical Jesus was made possible, and made necessary, when Enlightenment philosophy deposed the Cosmic Christ." Certainly, the Cosmic Christ is not a doctrine to be believed in and lived out at the expense of the historical Jesus. Rather, "a dialectic is in order, a dance between time (Jesus) and space (Christ); between the social/personal and the cosmic; between the prophetic and the mystical. This dance is a dance away from anthropocentrism." Quoted in Mathew Fox, The Coming of the Cosmic Christ, 77-78.

An Indian Advent Meditation

Text: "The true light which enlightens everyone was coming into the world." John 1:9

While the first Sunday in Advent is not until November 30th, many Christians in India begin to think about and prepare for Christmas in October. That is when a majority of Indians (who are Hindus) observe two significant festivals, Dussera and Diwali. Dussera celebrates the victory of the power of God over evil in our world. Diwali is the festival of lights, welcoming the Light into our dark world, which cannot overcome it (Jn.1:5). The symbolism of this festival is the more powerful because of its immensely charming beauty. On two successive moonless nights every Hindu family decorates its house and court- yard with hundreds of little clay oil lamps, much like those used in Jesus' Palestine. Following local custom, we have adapted the traditional Western Advent wreath by using little clay lamps arranged on a large brass tray, all of which are available in the nearby bazar.

Here is one of the wonderful things about living in this incredible Indian culture, with its rich variety of religious traditions - one of the many gifts God gives to God's people. Can it be that through the festivals of others, we Christians are prepared by God to worship and adore the true Light which enllightens everyone, the Light which shines in the darkness, which the darkness cannot overcome? Are we not constrained to affirm that wherever we find light shining in the darkness, this is the Light which enlightens everyone?

Too long have we Christians called the things of others unclean, ungodly. Perhaps God is giving us a vision, similar to the one the apostle Peter experienced while praying on the Joppan rooftop. Before Peter was ready to share his faith with others, God had to teach the self-righteous disciple that he must not call unclean or common what God counts clean (Acts 10:9-16).

What a marvelous Indian Advent, preparing for Emmanuel -- Christ with us -- in India, the Light of the world which enlightens everyone!

The Evangelical Groundswell in Latin America

BOOK REVIEWS:

Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. By David Martin. Blackwell, 352 pp., $29.95.

Is Latin America Turning Protestant? The Politics of Evangelical Growth. By David Stoll. University of California Press, 399 pp., $24.95.

Crisis in Latin America: An Evangelical Perspective. By Emilio A. Núñez C. and William D. Taylor. Moody Press, 439 pp., $19.95.

 

These three books share a common interest in Latin American Protestantism. The first two analyze its recent explosive growth, though from quite different perspectives. David Martin, the British author of A General Theory of Secularization, sets out to demonstrate grand patterns in religious movements, with a functionalist’s passion for social equilibrium. David Stoll, a graduate student in anthropology and the author of a critical study of the Wycliffe Bible Translators, focuses more specifically on grass-roots religious phenomena and presents a structuralist’s critique. Martin devotes less space to Central America—a principal focus of Stoll’s study—than to the larger nations in the region. While Martin centers more specifically on Pentecostalism, Stoll’s concern is the entire evangelical movement. Martin’s main sources are the enormous pool of available research on Latin American religious phenomena, while Stoll’s study relies to a great extent on his own field research and on unpublished documents. Martin’s approach is deductive, Stoll’s more inductive. Yet despite their different approaches, their conclusions come close at one key point (a point further explored by Emilio Núñez and William Taylor): the latent capacity for critical social awareness that resides in Latin American Protestantism.

For Martin, the growth of Pentecostalism in Latin America is a logical extension of the centuries-old clash of two imperial visions, the result of which are the Hispanic and English civilizations. Today’s heirs of the Roman hierarchical tradition are confronted again—successfully, Martin believes—by Anglo-style voluntarism with its legacy of popular dissent. Meanwhile, an authoritarian Catholic Church finds it increasingly difficult to compete with egalitarian social ideals and with the wide variety of choices Protestantism offers. It has attempted three defensive strategies with ambiguous results: 1) church-state alignment and religious intolerance, 2) political alignments and indoctrination (Catholic Action and Christian Democracy), and 3) liberation theology and the base communities.

In his introductory chapters Martin traces through Northern Europe and North and South America the three over lapping waves of Protestant cultural revolution—Puritanism, Methodism (the Evangelical Revival) and Pentecostalism. These movements have arisen more or less at the periphery of the establishment. Surveying Latin America in four brief chapters, Martin argues for the role of early Methodism as a paradigm for understanding the social function of Pentecostalism as it takes root in Latin countries. He then discusses the social and religious implications of Pentecostal "reformations": spiritual communications (tongues and healings—vehicles of liberation within an oral tradition), conversions (personal and familial), and evolving attitudes toward economic and political involvement.

In Europe voluntarism stagnated and died, but it flowered in North America. The growth of Protestantism in Latin America is in part a function of the powerful and religiously motivated presence of the United States, Britain’s imperial successor. The author calls this the "Americanization of Latin American religion"—a fact which, he rightly points out, is resented by many Latin Americans. The other side of the coin is the creative "Latinamericanization of American religion." The role and potential of Pentecostalism is a function of both its past and present roots. Its origins lie in a differentiated society, where religion operated primarily at the level of culture. As it became rooted in a nondifferentiated world where voluntarism threatens the entire social order, Pentecostalism has had to adapt. While it allows for a variety of options ad intra, it guards itself from a hostile environment by a non-Methodist passivity and acceptance of the status quo.

Yet, says Martin, the transformational potential of the Pentecostal "social strike from society" (vs. the Marxist "strike against society") should not be underestimated. As they increase in numbers and maturity Pentecostals will become more secure and perhaps more aware of their social responsibilities. The author points out (as does Stoll) that while "sophisticated" Protestants may be more concerned about the poor, grass-roots Pentecostals are more successful with the poor. He reminds us that many of the ideals—women’s rights, world peace, rejection of capital punishment—that "radical" groups espouse today were incubated within the closed confines of religious sects" like the Bohemian Brethren, Mennonites, Quakers, and Swedenborgians. These observations merit serious consideration.

Nonetheless there is a serious flaw in Martin’s methodology. Broadly generalized models of history, à la Spengler or Toynbee, inevitably run into contradictions. Such is the case here. To paint the English and Iberian worldviews in such black-and-white colors smacks of the same sort of cultural imperialism the author decries. And as Martin himself admits, "voluntarism" has also been coercive, as has been the case with U.S. dealings with oppressed peoples in Latin America and even within its own borders. Further, his model is too pat. Voluntarism is not an Anglo monopoly. The underside of Roman Catholic history is peppered with seditious sects that appeared long before the Protestant Reformation. The most recent instance of Hispanic voluntarism is the Catholic base communities—which the author mentions only once, and in a patronizing way. To dismiss them, as he does, as "incipiently Protestant . . . instruments" of the Catholic Church which also "threaten its structure" is to miss the point entirely. The base communities also present a serious challenge to Protestant authoritarianism and are a threat to U.S. hegemony. At times Martin gives the impression of trying to shoehorn diverse religious experiences—and the complexity of Latin America, the English Caribbean, South Korea and South Africa—into one neat package.

Martin’s approach to social conflict is typical of a functionalist analysis: systemic ills are seen more as dysfunctions to be decried and restored to proper balance than as fundamental ills to be redressed. This may explain why a pivotal event such as the 1932 peasant insurgency in El Salvador is mentioned only as it affected the Pentecostal churches’ "prosperity." He takes a similar approach to the "electronic church." In like manner, in discussing Protestant growth in Guatemala, he makes only passing reference to Protestant political polarization and to the endemic violence there. Again, in describing socioeconomic changes affecting Ecuadoran Quechuas as a result of Protestant missions, Martin barely alludes to Catholic Bishop Leonidas Proaño’s hardwon agrarian reform which made the changes possible. Neither does he mention the ambiguous role of North American missions and relief agencies such as World Vision, which Stoll discusses in some detail.

Martin’s overreliance on the research of others and on interviews with North American personnel has left him open to glaring factual errors and unfortunate omissions. The Latin American Mission, to which he attributes certain actions in Guatemala, does not even operate in that country. His information on dissident religious movements is incomplete and on occasion incorrect and simplistic. For example, he falsely ties the Confraternidad Evangélica of Guatemala to the guerrillas. To claim such a relationship is irresponsible, because it imperils lives. And at least at one point his logic fails him: the reversal from the highly mediated hierarchical church to a nonmediated Pentecostal "cell" requires, he says, the "unequivocal leadership" of a pastor, of "folds and safe enclosures." Are pastors and folds not mediations? Throughout Latin America, certain Protestant ministries are becoming, to quote a Spanish saying, "more popish that the pope." All of this notwithstanding, I suspect that Martin’s basic conclusion regarding the transformational potential in Pentecostalism may turn out to be entirely valid.

David Stoll challenges the fundamentalist stereotypes of both the left and the right. Though an avowed nonbeliever, he has a keen understanding of the Protestant evangelical ethos. A longtime supporter of justice causes, he can be as critical of liberation theology and of liberal stereotypes as of the shibboleths of the religious right. And lest conservatives take too much comfort in his predictions about Protestant ascendancy in Latin America, he suggests that the evangelicalism that is on the horizon may become more socially involved than its present image would indicate. He handles his topic with a good ear for the apt statement and with tongue-in-cheek irony, though at times he lapses into glibness.

Stoll has two objectives. First, he says, "for readers alarmed by evangelical growth, I want to provide a sense of its open-ended nature." Evangelicalism, he insists, "is a generator of social change whose direction is not predestined." To blame this growth on right-wing religious groups and U.S. imperialism—as many do—implies, he says, a profound distrust of the poor and of their ability to "turn an imported religion to their own purposes."

When he began his research, Stoll suspected that the conspiracy theory as the explanation of Protestant growth was exaggerated. The Iran-contra scandal disabused him. His second objective speaks to this issue. "For evangelicals, I wish to dramatize the danger of allowing their missions to be harnessed to United States militarism by the religious right." Accordingly, the initial chapters of Stoll’s work deal with the invasion of the sects and with the Catholic Church’s approaches to the various threats to its ancient hegemony—the Protestant onslaught in particular.

Stoll devotes almost half the book to a carefully nuanced discussion of the ideology, activities and historical context of the Protestant movements that have settled in Latin America, right up to the coming of the religious right. His typologies are helpful in untangling a complex maze of interrelationships. In three of his chapters he presents case studies of Protestantism in Central America (Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala and Nicaragua) and Ecuador (the role of World Vision). His conclusion—a reinterpretation of "the invasion of the sects as an Evangelical Awakening"—is bound to raise hackles on both sides of the issue. It is here that Stoll states the questions that have dogged him throughout his research: "Why should a religion which appears to work against the interests of the people help them in their struggle for survival?" Why is conservative Protestantism more successful at attracting the masses than a theology that is so explicitly concerned for the liberation of the masses?

Stoll argues that the impressive Protestant growth, with allowances made for the "revolving door effect," cannot be ascribed entirely to the right-wing sects. The reasons are more complex. He hints strongly that the growing conservatism of Rome may be partly to blame, as Catholics find less and less room in their church for freedom of the spirit. Stoll further insists that "evangelicals provided an ideology, not just of political resignation, as so often noted, but of personal improvement." Indeed, evangelical conversion may have become for the masses a more peaceful outlet for revolutionary fervor than the political message of liberation. While liberation theology has raised people’s consciousness, it has also raised expectations beyond its proponents’ capacity to deliver. Meanwhile, Pentecostal churches and Protestant relief agencies are delivering more immediate material results without setting off unmanageable class and ethnic confrontations. Tactical errors by the insurgents in Guatemala during José Efraín Ríos Montt’s rule drove into the arms of right-wing churches entire Mayan villages that had first sought guerrilla protection from the army.

Stoll’s analysis is given more weight by a study recently issued by CEDI, a Brazilian ecumenical documentation and information center, which found that Catholic base community members in that country are joining Pentecostal churches in large numbers. Pentecostalism, the refuge of the masses? Perhaps, but Stoll hints that these new converts may not have entirely forsaken their radical awareness—and as Protestant growth collides with increasing impoverishment, more opportunities for radicalization arise. The gospel, defined "in terms of social justice as well as personal salvation, has the potential to appeal to the millions of evangelicals whose economic position is deteriorating." Indeed, grassroots Protestant congregations, says Stoll, may be going through the same process of awareness-raising as did the Catholic base communities in the ‘50s.

There are things to quarrel with in Stoll’s book. In dealing with Nicaragua, for example, he gives the same weight to all his sources, apparently without exercising "ideological suspicion." He strives to achieve objectivity by balancing off the consistent brutality of the right with the occasional excesses of the left. Moreover, his faith in the power of "enlightened self-interest" to transform individualistic autocrats into democrats has little substance. To his credit, Stoll acknowledges that he has spent less time studying radical Christian movements than he has conservative Christianity. His case for the existence of a more "open-ended" evangelicalism would have been stronger had he studied the scores of struggling grass-roots agencies that model themselves on the Radical Reformation. While he devotes more space to the Catholic base communities than does Martin, he is seemingly unaware of their influence on grass-roots Protestantism; nor does he understand their symbiotic relationship to liberation theology. As a telling instance of his misinformation, he calls the Catholic base communities "ecclesiastical"—i.e., institutional—rather than ecclesial—i.e., churchly in nature despite contrary ecclesiastical strictures.

Stoll’s comment that "liberation theology may be better at filling faculties, bookshelves, and graves than churches" no doubt will be celebrated by the enemies of that movement. But it is both callow and unfair, implying that this theology is primarily academic and elitist (though he may be partly right if he is referring primarily to a handful of dilettantish Protestants). If liberation theology were merely a classroom exercise, it would be no threat to the powers of church and state. Graves have been filled wherever downtrodden people have cried "Enough!" Liberation theology is more a product of this outcry than its cause. And because "the blood of the martyrs is the seed of the church," there is also an underground evangelical church that is growing quantitatively. Neither Stoll nor Martin seems to be aware of this fact. To be sure, the numerical growth of Latin American Protestantism also builds upon the sacrifice of some early martyrs at the hands of Roman Catholics—an ugly chapter in Latin American history which could repeat itself in some fanatical enclaves.

Not all growth, however, should be celebrated. Nor is numerical success, as both Martin and Stoll seem to imply, the only criterion for assessing the impact of Protestantism on Latin American society. Ecclesiastical "poaching," the "revolving door effect," raises questions about the extent of that growth. There are also theological grounds for questioning numerical increase which is built upon a distorted understanding of the kingdom of God. The alarming growth of heretical "sects" (a term I use cautiously) also concerns responsible evangelicals. Indeed, rapid, superficial growth may backfire. In Costa Rica there is reliable evidence of recent retrenchment following a period of growth, with defections even to Catholicism.

My objections notwithstanding, I find a number of Stoll’s conclusions to be substantially correct. Let me mention a few. Liberal institutions, stuck in their ivory towers, largely overlook the fact that the churches they lionize in Latin America—Protestant congregations that express their solidarity with the poor—are mainly evangelical in theology. It is not without significance that Stoll has found most of his cases of evangelical participation in social transformation in regions such as Central America, the Andean republics, Brazil and Chile, where conservative churches are strong, and not in those countries where liberal denominations are active.

Stoll makes reference to "the immense social power in those praying masses of believers." As early as 1980, Brazilian Marxist sociologist Carlos Rodrigues-Brandao, after in-depth field research,

pointed out (in Os Deuses do Povoß, or "The Gods of the People") the latent revolutionary potential in "small sect" Pentecostalism. This movement of "the poor of the earth," he suggested, was perhaps better prepared than the Catholic base communities to confront the evils of society because Pentecostals see themselves as engaged in a holy war, and are buoyed by a hope of "a final struggle that will recreate a social order." When Pentecostals become more politically aware, they can become a potent force for change. "Their active belief in supernatural forces is not escapism, but a source of hope in their struggle to change their environment." Brandao argues cogently that popular religion, of whatever kind, is not an apolitical phenomenon. "In its own way, it is a grassroots struggle to regain a degree of freedom from the domination of more structured religious forms."

On the basis of both firsthand observation and reputable sociological studies, Stoll, along with Martin, has found little evidence of upward social mobility among the rank and file of grass-roots evangelicalism. Whatever upward pull there may have been in the past is being canceled out by Protestant inroads among the impoverished masses. Quoting Lalive d’Epinay’s groundbreaking study of Chilean Pentecostalism, Stoll notes that the locus of Protestant growth and social involvement is the family, whereas Marxism focuses on the workplace. To the extent that the base communities fit into the latter model, this insight may explain a fact that has long troubled me: the short "shelf-life" of the base communities, compared to the continuity and numerical growth of Protestant congregations. When they seem to achieve the goals of their struggle, or when the issues become fuzzy during periods of political "distention" and "democratization," the base communities often experience a crisis of identity. On the other hand, the family orientation of evangelical churches makes for long-term stability and provides linkages for growth throughout extended family networks. I have written elsewhere on the Catholic base communities as the hope of the church. What I could not foresee is that the major beneficiaries of their vision of social transformation may turn out to be grass-roots Protestant churches and a new breed of ecumenical base communities. Their apologists have always insisted that the base communities were expendable: they should die and be resurrected as a new church of the poor. Is it conceivable that Pentecostal congregations will become a part of this new church, working toward the transformation of Latin America? Stoll asks, "Could the surprising evangelical groundswell affect the course of events in Latin America?" It is too early to make a definitive judgment.

Both Stoll and Martin are fairly bullish on evangelicalism/Pentecostalism. But the movement’s potential for social transformation will be achieved to the degree in which it allows itself to be leavened by base-church values. There are faint signs of hope throughout evangelicalism. A recent consultation convened by an institution hostile to liberation theology produced a document that expressed appreciation for the challenge of this movement to the evangelical faith.

The third book of our list is further evidence that evangelicals cannot be neatly labeled. Emilio Núñez, a Salvadoran theologian and the author of a book on liberation theology, and William Taylor, the son of missionaries, moved in conservative evangelical circles. Read with these facts in mind, their work may come as a surprise. It has already merited them criticism from the ultraconservative wing of their own constituency because of their irenic approach to liberation theology and their concern for justice issues. The book is, in fact, two treatises with an introduction and a conclusion. The authors evidence a degree of difference in their perspectives, perhaps because of their different national origins.

Part one is a mildly analytical description by Taylor of the social religious dimensions of the crisis in Latin America. Núñez devotes part two to a discussion of crucial issues that Latin American evangelicals must face. After a brief look at the "Hispano-American" religious ethos, he deals critically and sympathetically with postconciliar Catholicism’s search for renewal—liberation theology and the charismatic movement—and its resistance to change. He further addresses, theologically and historically, the growing evangelical search for gospel contextualization and the movement’s gradual awakening to social responsibility.

In a concluding essay, Taylor pleads for "a complete and integrated gospel that deals with the fundamental alienation of man from God, an alienation that splinters all the relationships man sustains: those to God, to himself and to others." Within the Latin American Theological Fraternity, to which Núñez, Taylor and I belong, most members would probably agree with the substance of this book. Others could wish that the authors had been more daring in their analysis. But that is just the point. Evangelicalism spans a wide spectrum. We are united primarily by our unswerving belief in the authority and transforming power of Scripture. Despite our differences, it is this fact that makes evangelicalism a social and religious force to be reckoned with in Latin America.

 

 

 

Creating an Indigenous African Church

A two-week tour makes a northerner an expert on Africa. Sometimes these northerners know more about Africa and our needs than we ourselves. That's how Africans chide European and American visitors. Despite this warning, I will risk outlining the major issues confronting churches in Africa, on the basis of my stay at the Mindolo Ecumenical Foundation in Kitwe, Zambia.

Mindolo (named for the Mindolo River, which flows near the campus) is a major pan-African ecumenical center of theological education. It offers study programs that last as long as two years, as well as one-week conferences. I spoke with Christians from 20 nations, from Ghana to the Republic of South Africa, representing the relatively new national union churches (such as the United Church of Zambia), the Presbyterians, Baptists, Methodists, Roman Catholics, Pentecostal Assemblies of God and the Salvation Army. From their remarks I discerned seven concerns that face their churches.

One is the Africanization of theology. For the past 25 years, African theologians and church leaders have argued persuasively that the missionaries brought to Africa a very European and North American' Christianity. They insisted that African converts abandon their traditional religious heritage and many cultural practices.

As a result, even today some Africa congregations sing European hymns in English (though increasingly in the local languages). Sunday worship may follow an order of service from Calvin's Geneva and feature a sermon that could be preached almost word for word in Amsterdam, London or St. Louis.

Many African Christians have found it difficult to break so completely from their heritage. A few historians of Christianity in Africa claim that some Africans from the colonial era to the present, professed Christianity in order to gain access to the benefits (such as education and health care) that accompanied the colonists and their religion. And even the many who have wholeheartedly converted have been reluctant to relinquish all their traditional beliefs and practices. Folk wisdom has it that such converts come to the priest on Sunday and to the traditional African religious leader on Monday.

At best, their hesitation to scrap their African identity may be an intuitive attempt to join Christian faith and traditional African religious life. At worst, people may be using Christianity for personal gain. Either way leaves Christians in a quandary: Must they renounce their own heritage in order to be Christian? Must they live a double life, essentially taking up the claims of the church on Sunday and then denying them on Monday?

Independent African churches were among the first to challenge this Europeanized Christianity. These churches sought to find similarities between Christianity and traditional African religious and social values. More recently, theologians and church leaders from denominations that have historic ties with churches in the north have encouraged African Christian expressions that are free of northern acculturation, are faithful to the gospel and draw upon traditional African

culture. These thinkers propose that Christian and African thought can often be mutually interpreting. For instance, J. N. K. Mugambi in African Heritage and Contemporary Christianity (Longman Kenya, 1989) says that Christian understanding and traditional African thought can be harmonized in such matters as views of God, spirits and angels, ancestors and saints, rites of passage and eternal life.

This raises a question that confronts the church in every society. Where is the boundary between the gospel and the culture? How much can the church adapt itself to the prevailing world view and still remain recognizably Christian?

The African experience poses a distinct challenge to the American theological community. Reacting against the past easy identification of the gospel and U.S. cultural values, today's church leaders are quick to differentiate between them. But Americans have been so concerned to maintain the purity of the gospel that few contemporary U.S. theologians are attempting to find points of positive intersection between Christianity and our cultural mythos. We might well take a cue from the African church.

A second concern of African theologians is Christianity's relationships with other religions. Like North America, Africa is a place of religious pluralism. Many different religions open shops alongside one another. These groups are often rivals.

The tension between Christianity and Islam is a case study of such rivalry. Both Christians and Muslims claim to have the exclusive interpretation of divine revelation. Islam is reportedly even more aggressively evangelistic than Christianity and recruits Christians even as Christians try to recruit Muslims. When mixed with the drive for economic, political and social power, the competition between the two groups has contributed to open conflict, as in Nigeria and Sudan.

At Mindolo–and by report at other places as well--dialogue is replacing confrontation. Christians are exploring how much they can witness to their faith without being imperialistic. They seek to maintain the integrity and vitality of their faith while acknowledging the inherent worth of the adherents of other religions. Is it possible, they ask, for Christianity to stand on common ground with other religions and even to be instructed by them? Can such a vision be translated into social reality on a continent where sectarian passion and conflict are as old as humankind?

African Christians are also examining the relationship between church and state. When I arrived in Africa, my image of the relationship between church and state was fired by headlines about Desmond Tutu and Allan Boesak. I had read about the church's central role in helping end a totalitarian government in Benin and in promoting a new humanitarian approach to government. Here, I thought, is a continent where the church exercises the prophetic role of monitoring justice and courageously calling for change.

Of course, it is impossible to speak about the relationship between church and state in Africa. The relationship differs from nation to nation and from church to church. While the church is a powerful witness in the political arena in many places, Mindolo participants insisted that my view of the prophetic African church was too rosy.

In some regions, authoritarian and repressive regimes keep the church under their thumbs.

While an occasional Desmond Tutu speaks out, most clergy walk the line of trying to keep out of jail without losing their integrity. In such settings, the church often criticizes the state in indirect language that only sensitive ears can hear. Some churches, of course, simply assimilate into the prevailing milieu without attempting to be prophetic. Even in countries that protect freedom of speech, clergy worry about government informers who visit their congregations and then report to the national intelligence officers.

To my surprise, some African churches (particularly those connected with reform movements) face a danger common to U.S. churches: they can so identify with their cause that they lose critical distance. It is difficult--though not impossible--for a church that helped create a government later to criticize it. With the same lack of perspective with which Jerry Falwell can sing "America the Beautiful," a revolutionary group can effectively sing "God bless our bullets and gun sights." It is one thing to be driven penitently to violence as the only possible means to end injustice. It is quite another to glorify killing. Can the church participate appropriately in the state without being co-opted by it?

Pastoral leadership poses another problem for many African denominations that suffer a shortage of ordained, formally educated clergy. Several ministers serve more than one congregation. In the United Church of Zambia, a pastor may serve as many as eight or ten congregations. (One pastor who is responsible for seven congregations reports that the lowest average Sunday worship attendance for any one of these congregations is 300.) Because of poor roads, unreliable transportation and the distances between congregations, a pastor can usually visit only one or two congregations on a given Sunday.

Not surprisingly, many clergy are overworked and weary. Some report that they are spread so thin and so flooded by responsibilities that they lose their sense of vision. And most are underpaid: a first year pastor in Zambia makes 600 kwacha a month. A month's supply of the national staple food (called mealie meal) costs 500 kwacha. Love for God does not put school uniforms (which are required) on children.

The shortfall of pastors does have an advantage. Lay leaders do most of the preaching, teaching, pastoral counseling and general oversight of congregational life. Ordained clergy preside at the sacraments and teach the lay leaders in order to equip the laity for their ministries. In this respect, the pastor's role is clearly defined in a way that many U.S. clergy would welcome. Further, many national churches offer comprehensive and sophisticated programs of theological education by extension for lay leaders.

Many denominations seek to attract more people to the ministry. Can the churches enlarge the ranks of the clergy while maintaining the present high level of lay leadership? Or will African churches in the next generations become as clergy-dependent as their cousins in the U.S.?

African Christians are also pondering their relationship with partner churches. Christianity came to bud in Africa when European nations colonized the continent. The Euro-American churches assumed a dominant, colonial attitude toward the African churches.

In the generation after World War II, one African nation after another became independent. In like manner (though more slowly), African churches achieved legal independence from their northern sponsors. Churches in the north and the south began to regard one another as partners. The church from the developed country may provide money as its share of the partnership; the church from the developing country may offer personnel and a locale for witness. Their mission boards work together to assign money, personnel and equipment for mutual projects.

However, the partnership ideal is not always fulfilled. African governments sometimes claim that they shed colonialism only to find, 30 years later, that they were enslaved by economic neocolonialism. Something similar can happen to the churches. The wealthier church can tie so many strings to its share of the partnership that the African church operates like a puppet.

African churches must sometimes choose between buckling under pressure from the Euro-American church and standing on their rights as partners and pushing against the hands that tie the strings. On the other hand, African churches sometimes exercise their part of the partnership in ways disappointing to their partners. Will the churches regard one another with suspicion? Or will they acknowledge the uncertainties and ambiguities of this period and trust that, fumbling and faltering, they can walk together into a new era of genuinely cooperative witness?

Theological education poses another concern. The faculties of many African theological colleges comprise mainly Europeans and North Americans. Many of these colleges want to bring more Africans to their faculties. Though many European and North American theological educators support this goal, it is frustrated by two factors.

For one, most theological colleges require their teachers to have completed at least a master's degree. Very few Africans hold this degree. The education of ministers in Africa is slightly different from that in the U.S. After completing the equivalent of high school, the ministerial student next attends theological college without attaining a university level bachelor's degree. After three years of a theological program, which basically corresponds to the seminary curriculum in the U.S., the student receives the equivalent of the A.B. Few schools in Africa offer a master's in theology. Financial limitations prevent many African students from studying in North America or Europe. Thus there is a shortage of qualified candidates for faculty positions.

Another problem is that faculty service is not especially attractive even to those who possess the necessary qualifications. Salaries are as low as those for clergy. The average faculty is very small and the teaching and administrative load is very heavy. Support services and research opportunities are minimal.

A bright, thoughtful, articulate, theologically alert person who is an ideal candidate for a, teaching position will often prefer to work in the upper judicatory levels of the church or for a council of churches. These positions pay higher salaries and present opportunities for world travel. Travel means not only exposure to new and different places but also the opportunity to purchase things that are not available in Africa. Furthermore, the position of church leader is more prestigious than that of seminary professor.

Europeans and North Americans labor heroically in the classroom to make African theological education as African as possible. But as one of them said to me, "No matter how precise I am, when I explain African traditional religion to an African, something is lost." Africa is

ready to begin training its own theology teachers. In the meantime, the churches need to make it financially possible for more African students to pursue advanced theological degrees outside of Africa.

Like the American churches, African churches struggle with developing positions on contemporary concerns. The issues that seem to draw the strongest interest are neocolonialism, racism, economic justice, human rights and polygamy. Indeed, these are matters of daily survival. Not surprisingly, Africans of all denominational and theological stripes agree on the importance of ending neocolonialism and racism, establishing economic justice and guaranteeing human rights to all.

On polygamy, Africans are divided. Some think that the church must take an unequivocal stand against it. Others think that the church should teach monogamy as the preferred form of marriage relationship but should accept those who practice polygamy. Still others think that the church should bless monogamy and polygamy equally.

Many African denominations ordain women, oppose sexism and generally support equal opportunities for women in all arenas. If the Mindolo community is a representative group, African church leaders' views on women's issues are much like those in the U.S. 20 years ago. A large body of women (and a small group of men) is committed to equality. A good number of men are sympathetic to this concern, but still make jokes about women moving into areas formerly populated almost exclusively by males. A handful of men and women oppose women's leaving their traditional home roles.

Until recently, the inclusive language movement in the U.S. has focused largely on expressions related to gender. Some Africans of both genders are concerned about exclusive, hierarchical language, but most seem content to continue with these patterns. The temperature of a discussion rises rapidly on the language of color, however. One student said in a class session, "What is so great about 'white' that it is always good, clean and pure? Why are angels always white? And what is so bad about 'black' that it is bad, dirty and wrong? Every time people talk about a 'black devil' they're associating you and me with that devil." The room reverberated with thunderous applause.

On the issue of population control, many African clerics find themselves in a dilemma. On the one hand, many African societies deeply value large families. Large families provide social security and are a part of the African soul. On the other hand, in some areas burgeoning population already threatens the quality of life. More and more Christian leaders are calling for structures of social security that don't require eight, ten or 12 children. Still others argue that the church must help its members appreciate smaller families.

Environmental consciousness, so high on the agenda of American middle-class religious communities, is at a nascent stage in Africa. Africans seemed knowledgeable and concerned about the rapid disappearance of their continent's animals, but less aware of the dangers of environmental abuse. In Kitwe, a city of 500,000, it is customary to peel a banana and to drop the peel on the sidewalk. This is a small but typical gesture. A columnist in a newspaper outside of Zambia even proposed that, as a matter of justice, developing nations deserve to engage in a few generations' worth of wanton polluting.

Few in the world are more aware of the need for peace than the residents of this continent where violence is woven into the fabric of daily life in several countries. But few Africans share the same concerns of the peace movement in the Euro-American community. I talked with one participant from a rural area who knew nothing about nuclear weaponry. Few of our African acquaintances see a connection between military spending in the developed nations and oppressive social conditions in the developing world.

I was surprised by an anomaly with regard to sanctions against South Africa. The participants from South Africa emphatically told us that sanctions from the U.S. were a major reason for progress in the talks between the government of South Africa and the African National Congress. Having supported sanctions for many years, I was startled to see Mindolo participants in local stores buying goods from South Africa. What about sanctions? Several people pointed out that in this region, South Africa is simply the only supplier of some necessities. If you want them, you buy South African. Ethical purity is a lot easier in a church convention hall in Indianapolis than in a store whose shelves are only one-third stocked.

As the church in Africa faces these and other significant issues, it does so as a robust community. Indeed, the recent record of church growth in Africa is a direct contrast to that of the old-line churches in the U.S., whose membership rolls are ailing and whose real dollars for mission are diminishing. Mindolo participants claim that by and large the church is growing in most parts of Africa. African independent churches and Pentecostal congregations are said to be increasing the fastest. The denominations with historic ties to European and North American churches are reported to be growing, though more slowly. Even the communions most closely identified with colonial powers--such as the Anglican--have full sanctuaries.

Growth is sometimes phenomenal. We worshiped in a congregation in a Kitwe township that was established in 1985 with a handful of people. With characteristic African Christian optimism, they built a simple, open, airy, light house of worship that seats 1,000. The Sunday we worshiped there the attendance was about 3,000. Many people could not get into the sanctuary and stood under the sun outside the open windows for the two-and-a-half-hour service. The previous week, at the congregation's monthly baptism service, 173 were baptized. That congregation has a half-time pastor. Worship is led almost completely by lay people; the pastor preaches only once a month. We were told that this is not unusual in Zambia or in other parts of the continent.

Unless the church slips beneath the surface of history, it will contend with perplexities. Much of African Christianity struggles with problems that are, at the same time, signs of life. Given the importance of the issues confronting the church in Africa, it is a blessing that it faces them in vitality and strength.

 

Christian Missions and the Western Guilt Complex

When at the age of 18 I approached a Methodist church in the Gambia with a request for baptism, thus signaling my conversion to Christianity from Islam, the resident senior minister, an English missionary, responded by inviting me to reconsider my decision. And, while I was at it, he said, I should also consider joining the Catholic Church. My conversion obviously caused him acute embarrassment, and I was mortified on account of it.

However, his imaginative solution of my linking up with the Catholic Church did not work out; after a year of vain attempts I returned to the English missionary. After assuring me that the baptism of the Methodists was recognized by the Catholics, he agreed in principle to receive me into the church.

At that stage of my life I would have joined the church on almost any condition, for I had this absurd idea that the gospel had marked me out for something, whether for reward, rebuke or ridicule I did not know; whatever it was, I felt inexorably driven toward it. On the night of my baptism I was overcome with emotion, finding it hard to believe that my wish was being fulfilled. Not even the thousand tongues of Methodist hymnody could have given utterance to the avalanche of thoughts and feelings that erupted in me

I make this extended autobiographical introduction to indicate how in the liberal Methodist tradition I first encountered the guilt complex about missions which I have since come to know so well after living more than two decades in the West. I have found Western Christians to be very embarrassed about meeting converts from Asia or Africa, but when I have repeated for them my personal obstacles in joining the church, making it clear that I was in no way pressured into doing so, they have seemed gratefully unburdened of a sense of guilt. Furthermore, when I have pointed out that missionaries actually made comparatively few converts, my Western friends have reacted with obvious relief, though with another part of their minds, they insist that missionaries have regularly used their superior cultural advantage to instill a sense of inferiority in natives.

It seems that for my Western Christian friends, if missionaries did not justify by their field labors the guilt the West carries about the mischief of the white race in the rest of the world, then other missionaries would have to be invented to justify that guilt.

It should provide food for thought that the church has succeeded in importing this guilt complex into Africa. I found the church there to be self-conscious about matters religious—especially matters involving God, death, judgment, the virgin birth and miracles—which presumably the Enlightenment banished from rational debate. Consequently, the church was wary of embracing members tainted with the brush of conversion, for such new members would not have acquired the reservation deemed appropriate to religious subjects.

The church took further precautions against religious enthusiasm: for my catechism I was introduced to New Testament form criticism and to Reinhold Niebuhr, Paul Tillich, John Macmurray. John A. T. Robinson, Vincent Taylor, Oliver Chase Quick and other "sensible" writers. On my own initiative I discovered the works of C. S. Lewis, whose brand of commonsense Christianity encouraged me no end. Nevertheless. the liberal strand was the dominant theme in my formation, hallowed with the refined ministration of writers like Bertrand Russell and Harold Nicolson.

The church’s hesitant attitude about religious conversion in turn surprised, frustrated, dismayed, saddened and confused me. Also, given the prominent place religion occupies in Africa, I was baffled by the apparent determination of my church superiors to keep religious subjects from all "decent" and "cultured" conversation. I realize now that this attitude is deep-rooted in Western liberal culture. However, before I left Africa for Europe I had no way of understanding it, for it had no analogue in my society, and, more important for me, it appeared to skirt the declared aims of a missionary church.

My business in this piece is not to linger on Memory Lane but to confront directly the guilt complex about missions that so often prevails in liberal counsels. I believe that the liberal claim to, openmindedness about missions would be strengthened by a closer examination of what actually happened—and may still be happening—in the encounter between Western missionaries and non-Christian peoples.

Much of the standard Western scholarship on Christian missions proceeds by looking at the motives of individual missionaries and concludes by faulting the entire missionary enterprise as being part of the machinery of Western cultural imperialism. But missions in the modern era has been far more, and far less, than the argument about motives customarily portrays.

Missionaries of course went out with all sorts of motives, and some of them were clearly unwholesome. Yet if we were to try to separate good from bad motives, I daresay we would not, after a mountain of labor, advance the subject much beyond the molehill of stalemate. We might, for example, take a little out of the cultural imperialism bag and put it into the social-service category, and ascribe both phenomena to Western cultural conditioning. But that exercise would do little to further our understanding of the nature and consequences of cross-cultural missions.

Instead of examining motives, I propose that we focus on the field setting of missions, where local feed-back exerted an influence all its own. And what stands out in particular about the field setting is the emphasis missionaries gave to translating Scripture into vernacular languages. Most Protestant missionary agencies embarked on the immense enterprise of vernacular translation with the enthusiasm, urgency and commitment of first-timers, and they expended uncommon resources to make the vernacular dream come true. Today more than 1,800 languages have been involved in the worldwide translation movement. In Africa alone, the Bible has been translated into 522 vernacular languages, with texts in over 200 additional languages now under development. Catholic missions has been similarly committed to the transposition of the catechism into vernacular terms, with language study a crucial part of the enterprise. The importance of vernacular translation was that it brought the missionary into contact with the most intimate and intricate aspects of culture, yielding wide-ranging consequences for both missionary and native alike.

The translation enterprise had two major steps. One was the creation of a vernacular alphabet for societies that lacked a literary tradition. The other step was to shake the existing literary tradition free of its esoteric, elitist predilection by recasting it as a popular medium. Both steps stimulated an indigenous response and encouraged the discovery of local resources for the appropriation of Christianity. Local believers acquired a new interest not only in the vernacular but also in recording their history and collecting accounts of indigenous wisdom. One missionary whose work sparked such response was J. G. Christaller, who came from Basel to the Gold Coast (now Ghana). Between 1871 and 1881 he produced a Bible translation, a dictionary and a grammar of the Twi language, crowning his labors with a compilation of 3,600 Twi proverbs and axioms. He also helped found the Christian Messenger in 1883, a paper devoted to the promotion of Akan life and culture. His Twi Dictionary has been acclaimed as an "encyclopaedia of Akan civilization" by the modern generation of Ghanaian scholars.

Often the outcome of vernacular translation was that the missionary lost the position of being the expert. But the significance of translation went beyond that. Armed with a written vernacular Scripture, converts to Christianity invariably called into question the legitimacy of all schemes of foreign domination—cultural, political and religious. Here was an acute paradox: the vernacular Scriptures and the wider cultural and linguistic enterprise on which translation rested provided the means and occasion for arousing a sense of national pride, yet it was the missionaries—foreign agents—who were the creators of that entire process. I am convinced that this paradox decisively undercuts the alleged connection often drawn between missions and colonialism. Colonial rule was irreparably damaged by the consequences of vernacular translation—and often by other activities of missionaries.

Because of its concern for translations that employ the speech of the common workaday world, Christian proclamation has had a populist element. In many traditional societies, religious language has tended to be confined to a small elite of professionals. In extreme cases, this language is shrouded under the forbidding sanctions of secret societies and shrines, access to which is through induced trances or a magical formula. The Christian approach to translatability strikes at the heart of such gnostic tendencies, first by contending that the greatest and most profound religious truths are compatible with everyday language, and second, by targeting ordinary men and women as worthy bearers of the religious message. This approach introduced a true democratic spirit into hitherto closed and elitist societies, with women in particular discovering an expanded role.

For example. after George Pilkington, the English lay missionary, translated the Bible in Uganda, some 2,000 men and 400 women acted as colporteurs operating as far as the forests of the Congo. Pilkington’s translated Bible sold 1,100 copies in the first year of publication, with an additional 4,000 New Testaments, 13,500 single Gospels and 40,000 readers. Theodore Roosevelt, who visited Uganda in 1910, witnessed the scene and said it was nothing short of astounding.

The project of translation contains implications about the nature of culture itself. Translation destigmatizes culture—it denies that culture is "profane"—and asserts that the sacred message may legitimately be entrusted to the forms of everyday life. Translation also relativizes culture by denying that there is only one normative expression of the gospel; it results in a pluralism in which God is the relativizing center. The Christian insight into this phenomenon carries with it a profound ethical notion, for it opens culture up to the demand and need for change. A divinized, absolutized culture precludes the possibility of change.

The impact of the translation process is, indeed, incalculable. Suddenly hitherto illiterate populations were equipped with a written Scripture for the first time, and from the wonder and pride of possessing something new that is also strangely familiar, they burst upon the scene with confidence in the whos and whys of their existence. For example, the Luo tribesman Matthew Ajuoga was helping missionaries translate the Bible into his native language. He discovered that the missionaries translated the Greek word philadelphia, "brotherly love," into Luo as hera, and this experience caused him to protest, saying that "love" as the Bible explained it was absent from the missionaries’ treatment of Africans. He subsequently founded an independent church, the Church of Christ in Africa, in 1957, which gained a considerable following across tribal divisions. Another example is the Zulu Bible, which enabled Zulu converts to respond to missionary criticism of the Zulu way of dressing. The Zulus said that they found in Genesis 27:16 sanction for their custom of dressing in skins, a practice the missionaries had attacked. In the eyes of the Zulus, it was the missionaries who were flouting the dress code. Thus it was that, confronted with the bewildering fact of Western intrusion, local populations used the vernacular to avert ultimate disenchantment, in this way utilizing the gains of mission to offset the losses to colonialism.

The evidence of the importance of translation in Christian missions is remarkably consistent. From the 16th century when Francis Xavier decided to cast his lot with the East against his own Western culture, to the 19th century when Christaller singlehandedly promoted Akan culture, to the 20th when Frank Laubach inveighed against the encroachments of American power in the Philippines, missionaries in the field have helped to promote indigenous self-awareness as a counterforce to Western cultural importation. Obviously missionaries wanted to proclaim the gospel because they believed it to be superior to any message others might offer. But it is really not consistent to blame missionaries for believing in what they preach. And we must note this salient, consistent feature of their work—namely, that they confidently adopted the language and culture of others as the irreplaceable vehicle for the transmission of the message. Whatever judgment missionaries brought with them, it certainly was not about the fitness of the vernacular to be the hallowed channel for communicating with God.

Besides the paradox of foreign missionaries establishing the indigenous process by which foreign domination was questioned, there is a theological paradox to this story: missionaries entered the missionary field to convert others, yet in the translation process it was they who first made the move to "convert" to a new language, with all its presuppositions and ramifications. Thus we have the example of Robert de Nobili (1577-1656), an Italian nobleman who went to India as a Jesuit missionary, arriving there in 1605. He passed for a guru, an Indian saintly figure, and even for a sannyasi, a wild, holy man, adopting a Hindu customs and religious terminology to define his own personal piety. Two other examples were Matteo Ricci (1552-1610), who adopted the opposite path to de Nobili by assimilating into upper-class Chinese society during the Ming dynasty, coming to China in 1580, eventually undergoing a profound cultural transformation as a Confucian scholar; and Charles de Foucauld, who served in the French army in the Algerian war where he witnessed moving scenes of Muslim personal piety, leading him to regain his own Christian faith, and becoming in everything a Tuareg Bedouin nomad. Whether missionaries converted anybody else, there is no doubt that they were their own first converts.

It is also apparent that at least in Africa, Christian missions expanded and deepened pluralism—in language, social encounter and ethnic participation in the Christian movement. Missions helped to preserve languages that were threatened by a rising linguafranca, extended the influence of the vernacular through careful methodical and systematic investigations in the field, and helped to establish connections within the wider family of languages. In their grammars, dictionaries, primers, readers and systematic compilations of proverbs, axioms, customs and other ethnographic materials, missionaries furnished the scientific documentation by means of which the. modern study of cultures could begin. Whether missionaries translated well or badly—and there are masterpieces as well as outrageous parodies—they made field criteria rather than the values of empire-building their operative standard.

Indeed, if there is any aspect of missionaries’ motives I would want to pursue, it would be their desire to excel in whatever they undertook. They scrutinized their work in the hard and somber light of giving an account before God. Thus we find in their meticulous record-keeping, in the minutiae of account ledgers, in faithful official and family correspondence and in the assembling of petitions, an extraordinary concern for accuracy.

In examining missionary archives I am struck constantly by the missionaries’ painstaking attention to detail. Inventiveness was a rather rare vice in that stern, austere world of missionary self-accounting. Thus, unwittingly, was laid the firm foundation of modern historiography in Africa and elsewhere. Even the nationalist point of view that came to dominate much historical writing about the new Africa was to a large extent molded by the missionary exploration of indigenous societies.

When they succeeded in translation, missionaries inadvertently vindicated indigenous claims, and when they failed they called forth the criticism of local people. Furthermore, their success in translation merely hastened the day of their departure, while failure called into question their continuing presence. Words have impact, especially in the abundant surplus of their unintended consequences. Translation is no respecter of motives—which is why it should be detached from the question of motives and examined in its own right.

Missionary statesmen in the 19th century saw quite clearly where the vernacular principle was leading, and they welcomed it as the supreme reward of Christian discipleship. For example, Henry Venn of the Anglican Church Missionary Society said that "the marked national characteristics" that the vernacular principle fosters in the expression of the gospel, "in the overruling grace of God, will tend to its perfection and glory." He spoke vividly of "a euthanasia of mission" once the vernacular principle exerted its full force. He said the business of mission was "not to supply an European pastorate, but to prepare native pastors ... and to fix the spiritual standard in such churches by securing for them a supply of Vernacular Scriptures" (To Apply the Gospel: Selections from the Writings of Henry Venn [Eerdmans, 1971)]. Such an aim, he counseled, differed sharply from the goals of colonialism in perpetuating overseas dependencies.

The modern religious map of Africa reveals in a striking way the close connection between the growth of Christianity and the widespread employment of the vernacular. The converse also seems to hold: Christian growth has been slightest in areas where vernacular languages are weak—that is, where a lingua franca such as English, French, Portuguese, Arabic or Swahili has succeeded in suppressing mother tongues.

To make the contrast even starker, we can point out that the reverse phenomenon appears in Islam, also a missionary religion, but one that does not translate its Scriptures for its canonical rites. Islam is strongest in societies where a lingua franca exists and weakest in places of vernacular preponderance. For example, Islamic gains in north Nigeria occurred at the hands of the Fulani reformers in the 19th century. In the process, the Fulani assimilated to an Islamized Hausa culture and lost their own Fulfulde language.

Islamic reform has nowhere to my knowledge made the perpetuation of the vernacular a concomitant of orthodox rectitude, and I know of no Muslim language institutes dedicated to the systematic study of the vernacular. Islam has succeeded brilliantly in its missionary enterprise, promoting at the same time a universal devotion to the sacred Arabic. In Africa, we see evidence of its considerable gains in spite of what we might regard as insuperable odds against a nontranslatable Scripture. For this reason the implications of Muslim success for pluralism are quite serious.

I will conclude, as I began, with a personal story, this one about the unexpected dynamics of translation. After completing my Islamic studies in the Middle East in 1969 1 went to Yorubaland in Nigeria as a lay worker with the Methodist Church. I was immediately taken to the local market to purchase some bare essentials for my flat. My companion was a senior English missionary who had spent many years in Ibadan and knew his way around. He translated for me as we did the round of market stalls, with the stallkeepers’ curiosity naturally aroused by the missionary, in their eyes a stranger from beyond the stars.

Before we had picked our way through the market, a small crowd had gathered to marvel at the sight of a white man translating for an African in an African language. It was as if we had got our arrangement wrong and put the Western cart before the African horse. The image of "total stranger" the stallkeepers had of the Western missionary was completely belied by this exposure.

Of the several lessons one can draw from this incident, one is particularly relevant to the Western guilt complex about missions. There is a widespread tendency in the West to see missions as destroyers of indigenous cultures or else as alien cultural agents from the West. Yet in the incident at the local market, my missionary companion came to be acknowledged by the stallkeepers as an accomplished "native," one of themselves, on the basis of the vernacular rule that they normally used to determine the boundary between insiders and outsiders. In the act of translating, my missionary friend demonstrated that he had as much claim to being in Africa as he had to identifying with the West. His own Western cultural differences were no longer a barrier, nor even a useful evaluative standard, but an opportunity for cross-cultural interchange. This example suggests that Christian missions are better seen as a translation movement, with consequences for vernacular revitalization, religious change and social transformation. than as a vehicle for Western cultural domination. Such an assurance should help alleviate some of the Western guilt complex about missions.

 

 

Particularity, Pluralism and Commitment

While by no means the last word on the subject, Lesslie Newbigin has made a bold and major step forward in the debate on Christianity, pluralism and Western self-understanding. This work should be welcomed as a precise formulation of problems that continue to perplex and trouble the West.

The book is divided into two parts. In the first, Newbigin examines the intellectual roots of Western society, paying special attention to epistemology and phenomenology. Here the focus is on the dichotomy between "knowledge" of so-called objective facts and "belief’ in so-called subjective values—a dichotomy, Newbigin maintains, that is rationally indefensible. Having been founded on the distinction between knowledge and belief, fact and value, object and subject; public and private, Western culture is unable to take Christianity seriously.

The second part deals with the constructive project of defending religious belief, Christianity in particular, as a cogent "plausibility structure" in its own right. Religious claims, in this regard, are a series of propositions which are coherent in their own terms and which generate a historical tradition in which believers struggle to reconcile their understanding of truth-claims with the pressures of life and experience.

This constructive side of the book commands Newbigin’s major interest and is, consequently, not split off from the first stage in any formal way but pervades the entire book.

Newbigin borrows the idea of "plausibility structures" from sociologist Peter Berger, and links it to the idea of knowledge as personal commitment A la Michael Polanyi. Berger and Polanyi thus are the two sides of the sandwich between which Newbigin attempts to insert the stuff of Christianity. This approach has both merit and drawbacks, although, for his purposes, Newbigin can insist that any project in communication has to begin with a particular standpoint rather than in some abstraction. In fact, it may turn out to be one of the great merits of the book that it calls us to a rigorous understanding of the nature of epistemological particularity, especially where it carries with it "universal intent"—that is, the intention to commend faith and knowledge to the reasonable consideration and acceptance of others.

Newbigin is concerned to establish the particularity of modern Western epistemology, a procedure that would confirm that the notion of objective factualness in scientific inquiry is itself rooted in a particular plausibility structure. The danger that particularity might lead to unmitigated subjectivism is met by Newbigin’s view that scientific knowledge as a particular worldview is legitimized by "universal intent," namely, the enterprise of making public a claim and demonstrating its right to command credence. Thus when we have stripped scientific knowledge to its essentials we are left with both its particularity and its universal intent, a step that would require us to modify any rigid distinction between the objective and subjective poles, or between knowledge and belief.

This step is critical to Newbigin’s argument; the rest of the book follows from it. Newbigin’s contention, with which I wholeheartedly agree, is that "a standpoint outside the real human situation of knowing subjects" is not available to us, and consequently Christianity is always received and transmitted within existing particular structures of life and thought, as is also the case with the tradition of scientific rationality. Yet, in both religion and science, we find that claims initially refracted through a particular culture also have universal intent. On the basis of this similarity, Newbigin treats science and religion as identical in form, so much so that we may, he argues, speak of the purpose in machines and the purpose in eschatological faith as ultimately the same.

Such a bold idea, however, needs qualifying, which Newbigin does by reminding us of a God who acts in history to reveal and effect the higher purpose, although such acting conforms to the structure of rational norms. The qualification thus qualified identifies the source of my unease with Newbigin’s approach. I wonder whether the rational analogy has not assumed too large a role in Newbigin’s apologetics, so large as to become the rule by which faith acquits itself. If Christianity proceeds by the path laid for it by reason, turning into a look-alike or surrogate rationality, then it is more or less a coincidence that it had its origins in the higher elevations of Sinai and Calvary—a point with which Newbigin would not seriously disagree.

Newbigin does not proceed by way of an inflexible rationalism, however. He begins, for example, by trying to extract from reason a concession to religious faith and commitment. He argues that scientific knowledge is not objective or factual enough to dispense with personal commitment. In the very act of testing a hypothesis or gathering evidence, it is not possible to doubt or distrust the enterprise itself. This leads to the view that there is no knowing without believing, and that believing is the way of knowing. The converse of this is equally true: one can doubt only because there are things one takes as true without doubting. It is, he maintains, impossible to doubt all one’s beliefs. "It is impossible at the same time to doubt both the statement, and the beliefs on the basis of which the statement is doubted."

If this is true—and on one level I am sure it is—then Newbigin has nevertheless left us with an acute dilemma about the way he sets out his case for Christianity. Citing the story of the empty tomb, for example, Newbigin says that the reigning plausibility structures of the West turn around the account by explaining it as visions created in the minds of the disciples because of their predisposition to believe, whereas the Christian tradition would prefer to see it as "a boundary event" that brought the disciples to a new way of seeing and thinking. Yet Newbigin’s own premise would force the conclusion that the disciples could not have known the empty tomb existed without a disposition to belief, since there is, according to him, no knowing without believing, and believing itself is a way of knowing. There is a hint here that the sandwich may substitute for the meat, with presumably troubling implications for Newbigin’s apologetic task.

Newbigin is absolutely right that Christianity, or at any rate Christian mission and apologetics, is always involved in a pluralist tension—the tension between confidence in God and uncertainty about living out that truth in the world, between faith as God’s gift and understanding as a form of growing discovery, between knowing who God is and seeking to bring that knowledge into situations of despair or resistance, not to say anything about the diversity and conflict of views among self-avowed Christians. Beyond this formulation is the highly significant though still flickering frontier of world Christianity now emerging like a new universe bathed in dawn. There we find plausibility structures so inconceivable from our Western stand-point that we would be inclined to regard them as extraterrestrial creations were it not for the fact that Jesus Christ is also their theme and burden.

Can Western Christianity, in its Protestant, Orthodox and Catholic forms, as it emerges from its deep assimilation of the heritage of the Enlightenment, join hands with a world Christianity framed by radically different plausibility structures? Newbigin’s own searching critique of Descartes and Kant suggests severe limitations in exporting that legacy to the rest of the world. Consequently, other peoples and cultures are likely to come to their knowledge and understanding of Christianity outside the mediating scheme of the Western Enlightenment, though it would be rash to exclude the possibility of contact altogether.

The way forward lies through a radical shaking down of the reigning plausibility structures in the West, combined with growing awareness of new regions of Christianity. That shaking down has to affect certain basic cultural attitudes about science, philosophy and society, and about faith in national identity as a substitute for religion. The second of these is perhaps the most obdurate force we have to contend with, though the first is also a pervasive issue.

It could, in fact, be argued that one of the most significant paradigm shifts of the past several centuries has been the move from a religious metaphysic to a political metaphysic and the messianic state it fosters. All of us in the past two centuries or so have been conditioned to believe that historical and social events will bring about the ultimacy of the national state which can then afford to allow religion to wither on the vine. Certainly in the West the transition has been accompanied by an emphatic ethical transformation: to die for one’s religion is considered a fanatical act, whereas to die for one’s country is considered an act of heroism. Thus the pledge before the flag becomes more potent than any religious mantra, though the henotheist faith it relies on competes in the same arena as religious faith. We continue to uphold the sanctity of life, but it is a notion now derived from the idea of the sacredness of citizenship rather than of religion.

A similar imaginative leap is necessary to rethink notions of cause and effect to which the West has committed itself. When we are presented with evidence that challenges that plausibility structure we respond that "accidents" or "unknown causes" do occur, and leave the matter at that. It would be difficult to practice our kind of science and medicine without the stable boundaries given us by cause and effect. The larger question, as to whether our kind of science and medicine deals adequately enough with the intricate fabric of phenomena and persons, can be raised only when we confront a society and culture radically different from ours. From the standpoint of another culture, Descartes’s confident assertion that "I think, therefore I am" (Cogito ergo sum) might sound like utter folly. From such a standpoint a more secure foundation for knowledge might instead be, "I am related, therefore I am" (Cognatus ergo sum). After all, why should Descartes make his declaration unless there are others of whom he is conscious and whom he wishes to persuade? From the relational perspective, then, even the most abstract theory presumes a social reality, and great science is grounded in relational truth.

"Plausibility structures" as a concept may not, however, address the deeper aspects of religious claims, including this relational dimension. Something may sound entirely plausible without its demanding a searching openness, and I could go on conceding a structure or many structures as having a plausibility while never quite trusting them in certain critical situations where instinct, practice or simple trust takes over. We all can recall occasions when an "accidental" wrong turn in the road, a delayed or early arrival at the airport, or a gut-level reaction in an emergency saved the day. And then, in retrospect, the pieces fall into place and we "see" a purpose, and a bigger picture, in it all.

The cumulative effect of instances of such "seeing" might add up to faith and trust in a power wiser, greater and nobler than any we know, or, at any rate, it might commence that son of awakening, causing us to ask for a transcendent selfdisclosure that is unlike anything remotely resembling self-aggrandizement. Its outcome would be the recognition of a new relationship. Mere might be a plausibility factor in that self-disclosure and the relationship it creates, but if so it would be like a trickle beside the mighty Zambezi.

At this stage it would be appropriate to invoke the idea of "universal intent" Newbigin talks about, for religious encounters of the kind I have just described will require commitment to truth and to the task of witness. As the river exists for nothing if it does not flow toward the sea, faith points beyond itself.

Thus reasoning of the analytic kind has a subordinate role in religion. On the one hand, reason is not alien to the nature of the universe, which responds in more or less precise and predictable ways to reason’s probes. On the other hand, reason is not a product of nature but is rather a superior principle that orders and understands nature. The snow-capped Kilimanjaro is an awesome if anomalous sight in the tropical setting of East Africa, but it does not produce a logical scale of its own elevation. It is left to humans to subdue the mountain’s pride and offer it as an homage to Ngai, the god of the mountain.

The task of unmasking the assumptions and presuppositions in such projects of heart and mind is beyond most of us, for it is difficult to disengage from the idiom of our own operative procedures. Yet it is clear that if we are going to question the idioms of the omnicompetent state and the chain of causation we have to take serious stock of movements and ideas breaking out beyond our own borders.

Christian mission has long engaged in such rethinking, although given the stern perspective of the critics, we have failed to understand the movement in its non-Western setting. It has not been easy to appreciate how missionaries had their reigning plausibility structures dismantled at the hinges as they appropriated indigenous idioms for their work. But that it happened, and on an astonishing scale, is indubitable.

Hence the irony today that mainstream churches have taken the sideline on mission, and instead turned to development projects as an expiatory offering for past sins. In that sense, mission as the spread of the gospel has given way to mission as an instrument of national policy, with diplomatic missions overseeing the implementation of foreign policy. Both official and voluntary organizations are prominent in promoting national and cultural values, with people encouraged to indicate their approval of affirmations rooted in the national purpose. There is probably more pietistic fervor in civil ceremonies than at a typical Protestant Sunday morning service, and people are more likely to feel solidarity with fellow nationals of a different religion than with co-religionists of a different nationality. The willingness of the churches, then, to offer development projects as a substitute for witness reinforces the shift from religion to national identity and obligation as forms of ultimate loyalty. Since development projects also rightly respond to searing need abroad, they may unwittingly conceal from us cultural and national values that unavoidably accompany them. Thus the churches become the religious equivalent of good citizenship.

The West is perplexed and troubled most about the cross-cultural ramifications of religious witness. How do we know others are not satisfied with their own religions? From a mixture of powerful motives, including genuine conviction or remorse, guilt, uncertainty, agnosticism, cultural exclusiveness, fear of criticism and disenchantment, mission has acquired a bad reputation in church and society. The paradox, of course, is that through mission the West came upon some of the most searching and sustained critiques of its reigning plausibility structures. Says Newbigin: "It is only when we are exposed to a totally different culture and a different language, shaped by a widely different history, that we can turn back and see that what we always took for granted is only one way of seeing things."

By undertaking to learn the languages of others and to communicate in their idioms, missionaries became their own first converts, providing an example of what might be involved when prospective believers saw their idioms had also become the idioms of outsiders. It is a remarkable fact that mission as the historical searching out of God’s universal purpose became distinguished by its scrupulous development of vernacular particularity. That is to say, in their vernacular work, missions appropriated numerous plausibility structures with which to express the gospel. This action pluralized while simultaneously relativizing the notion of plausibility structures vis-à-vis the single theme of God’s redemptive purpose in history.

Newbigin speaks of "the scandal of particularity," as when out of all the nations of the world the Jews are chosen to represent God’s purposes in history, whenceforth God came among us in Jesus Christ. Traditional Western theology treats particularity as a problem in divine providence, or even as an issue in divine election: why should God’s knowledge and mission be restricted to particular segments of human history? There is, needless to say, much in that approach to instruct and restrain, but I wonder whether another approach might help shed further light on the subject. We could say that when missionaries adopted the specificity of vernacular languages and cultures as vehicles for the gospel, they were extending the principle of Jewish particularity, the paradigm by which God has chosen to instruct the world in righteousness.

It goes without saying that missions have produced many changes, both intended and unintended, though I remain unsure of the usefulness of judging missions by whether or not they extended the influence of the West in the societies affected. That way of looking at the history of missions adopts a Eurocentric view of Christianity, accounting for everything in terms of how it squares with the Western worldview. Perhaps it is this Eurocentric view that leads Newbigin to claim that Christian missions have created a revolution of expectations in the relevant societies, giving the people for the first time a sense of history. In view of that, "mission is a historymaking force."

It is true that missions were a historical force of great importance, but we have to reckon within that fact that the changes included a radical critique of Western political and cultural imperialism. Indeed, the force of those historical changes derived from the strength of the nationalist sentiment which the vernacular translations of missions did far more to excite and guide than any other single factor. It is to that source rather than in acquiescence to Western norms that we have to trace the roots of historical consciousness, for history does not rise from acquiescence. By not pursuing that historical theme to the field setting of missions, Newbigin unwittingly plays into the hands of his critics who see in missions proof of Western cultural insensitivity.

Contemporary theology is marked by a lively debate about the call to abandon any claim to Christian uniqueness, a claim viewed as offensive and outmoded in a religiously pluralist world. Newbigin notes that the debate is inclined to be vitiated by what he calls cultural collapse in the West, a collapse eloquently described by Robert Bellah et al. The arguments in this debate tend to be rather repetitive, but they come down to one issue: the contention that the claims of Muslims, Hindus, Buddhists and others require a dissolution of the historic claims of Christianity. It is a one-sidedness in which the particularity of others is mobilized to block that of Christianity. This situation comes pretty close to Tolstoy’s description of historians of his generation: they were like deaf men answering questions which no one had put to them. It by no means follows that unilaterally abandoning historic Christian claims would lead others to do like-wise, and even if they did, it would be no less damaging to the prospects of pluralism.

It may turn out to be the Achilles’ heel of Western liberalism that its proposal to strip Christianity of its particular claims would alienate it from religions that reject the advice of the West. Among the internal logical difficulties of relativism is the fact that if religions, and our thoughts about them, are culturally conditioned phenomena, then our formulations of relativism are themselves culturally conditioned. In any case, the problem with historic Christian claims turns out to be itself culturally induced, and therefore as valid or invalid as anything else. Extreme relativism leads to complete nonsense.

In the final analysis, both pluralism and the integrity of religious faith are damaged by the adoption of a soap-and-water Christianity that liberal defensiveness seems to prescribe for us. Newbigin’s answer, in trying to clarify the grounds for a reasonable Christianity, should help recover the initiative, thus advancing through Christian particularity the frontiers of authentic pluralism.

 

 

Between East and West: Confrontation and Encounter

Debating Muslims: Cultural Dialogues in Postmodernity and Tradition by Michael M. J. Fischer and Mehdi Abedi. University of Wisconsin Press, 600 pp., $49.75; paperback, $23.50.

Striving Together: A Way Forward in Christian-Muslim Relations by Charles Kimball. Orbis, 140 pp., $10.95 paperback.

Guidelines for Dialogue Between Christians and Muslims, by the Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue. Paulist, 144 pp., $12.95 paperback.

Letter to Christendom, by Rana Kabbani. Virago Press, 80 pp., 13.99.

These books may be considered variations on a theme, that of the Muslim response to the ascendancy of the West and the West's attempt to annex or assimilate the Muslim worldview. Muslims might be seen as the exotic tusk on which Western academics cut their teeth, mastering Islamic culture and language in order to assimilate these things into pre-established social-science categories. On another level, the Muslim heritage offers a second wind for the West, as challenge or opportunity. In either case the Muslim phenomenon usually calls attention primarily to what the West might or might not do in response rather than to what Muslims themselves think and do. This is a version of the phenomenon Edward Said describes as "orientalism." Nevertheless, a strong body of literature is emerging in which Muslims are speaking for themselves, and resisting heavy-handed categories of self-reproach or self-assurance.

Debating Muslims is a puzzling book whose ambiguous title compounds the problem of understanding. It is difficult to know if "debating" is a participle or an adjective, whether debating is something we do with Muslims or something they do among themselves. The book's use of abstruse terminology seems unnecessary given that the volume is otherwise so competent on the subject matter. The rare exception to this style is the first chapter, an autobiographical piece by Mehdi Abedi that is strong on detail, evocation, historical context, political change, religious motivation and the meeting (and confrontation) of East and West. It provides precious insight into the moral springs of the Iranian revolution and a charmingly self-deprecating introduction to Muslim society and culture in the throes of momentous change. It deserves to stand by itself, but even here its brilliance shines through.

The reader is caught up in the dilemmas and traumas Abedi describes with artless candor and fidelity: his Muslim education at the hands of a female mullah and others; his attempts to obtain. a modern education; his uncertainties and ambitions; his report of his dreams in times of personal struggle; the antigovernment sentiments and activities in which he became involved on the eve of the shah's overthrow; his search for a moral purpose in life and for a cause to live and die for -- all this is described with conviction and facility. In one place he writes: "One Friday, I tried to write out all my confusions, in an effort to judge myself. I had studied enough philosophy to be thoroughly confused by all the conflicting theories; my faith had been eroded; I felt I had not achieved anything in life, and that my life had no direction. I concluded that a confused and worthless life contributes negatively to society, and that such a person should kill himself." When Abedi met someone who persuaded him to share the stranger's sorrows, thoughts of suicide got pushed aside.

He writes also of an Anglican priest in England whose account of a debate between Charles Darwin and a bishop impressed him with its nonpartisan honesty. "I asked who won the debate, fully expecting him to say the bishop. To my surprise, he answered that he thought they had not really understood one another and that each was talking about different aspects of man, the one about biological man, and the other about spiritual man. Asked a similar question, at the time, I never would have admitted a Muslim could have not won a debate....I began to think to myself, how could such a man be condemned to hell [for not being a Muslim]...I began to think of Bishop Dehgani-Tafti, the [Iranian] convert to Christianity...and for the first time felt a glimmer of understanding of how someone might come to convert to Christianity." (Dehgani-Tafti miraculously escaped assassination during the Iranian revolution, though his son, with a promising career ahead of him, was, killed.)

Moving from the first chapter to the rest of the book I felt considerably jarred, for I found I was moving from autobiographical reporting to abstract discourse about modernity and postmodernity. The authors tend to equate the 20th century with innocence, virtue and tolerance, and to define the failure or success of religious protagonists in terms of refusing or accepting to live in the "20th century." This approach conflicts, however, with considerable evidence to the contrary in the book itself, which suggests that Muslims, or their wretched Baha'i victims, might well see the 20th century as the antithesis of moral innocence, virtue and tolerance for religion..

For example, one of the most important figures in the events preceding the Iranian revolution was 'Ali Shari'ati, a French-educated modernist Iranian Muslim, a man who, though he led the opposition to the shah (in which cause he is believed to have lost his life), remained. suspect to Ayatollah Khomeini and his cohorts because of his articulate anticlerical views. An alleged victim of Savak, the nefarious secret police of the shah, Shari'ati has become something of a symbol for secular ideologues: he is a nationalist who stood up to imperialists -- and a modernist who took on the medieval obscurantism of the mullahs. His untimely death was a setback to his cause -- which indicates a flaw in the secular antagonism to religion. Once Shari'ati was removed from the scene, his cause faltered, while that of the mullahs he despised prospered beyond bounds. Modernism as an organized movement seemed in that instance caught in a bind between wishing to distance itself from the wrongs and failures that modernization itself brought on and believing in a future dispensation that would not be a continuation of existing conditions.

One of the chapters shifts geographically to Houston, Texas, and conceptually to postmodernism to indicate how the world of the Middle East has entered our own. In Houston the lives of Muslim and in particular Iranian exiles are examined in their American setting. The chapter looks at films and cartoons depicting Iranian life and the impact of the Iranian revolution. A good deal of screen material is produced in the U.S., mostly in Los Angeles, in the form of videos and TV films. Places where Iranians congregate are also pointed out -- restaurants, shops (particularly carpet shops) and neighborhood clubs. Iranians appear successful in maintaining community and social bonds through the observance of rituals connected with the Muslim calendar as well as with rites of birth, marriage and death. Religion continues to dominate Iranians' self-image in America, as is symbolized structurally by plans to build a mosque in Houston estimated to cost over $5 million, and ideologically by the Iranians' strict and elaborate adherence to the fast code of Ramadan. All of which suggests Iranian Muslims have placed on the "20th century" the bridle of tradition.

The chapter titled "Concluding Notes," with one more to follow, returns to the wordiness of the preface. The Iranian revolution is presented as "graphics" and "operatics" or as "hypertexts," a computer term, with themes and ideas pursued as sight and sound. Here the historian must demur: the ephemeral and glib quality of many of the popular images exists not simply to excite curious attention but to direct conviction on behalf of the truth of Islam. In this effort the U.S. and its alleged cronies bear the brunt of the attacks, with fire, smoke and death-chokes consuming the evil America represents. We need more than the stylistic sense of the art historian to appreciate why Muslims should feel so agitated about the U.S., a country that, whether in denunciation or admiration, Muslims appear unable to leave alone. Why are Hindus or Buddhists much less enraged, though no less exposed to American and its ways?

This issue burst violently into the open with the U.S. publication of Salman Rushdie's novel The Satanic Verses, though its publication in London several months earlier provoked no similar outburst. Rushdie is in fact the subject of the final chapter, which offers an extended review of Satanic Verses.

I must. offer a mixed verdict on the Fischer-Abedi book. Used selectively and judiciously, it contains much to instruct the general reader. If one is able to rise above the unexamined but pervasive ideology that "tradition" and "postmodernity" are antithetical, then one would find strong evidence in the book that modernity, while by no means an unmixed blessing, has been a tonic for religious reinvigoration, affording the Ayatollah Khomeinis of .Islam an opportunity to retrieve the youthful, if at times, reckless, confidence of a bygone age.

The book cries out for sensitive Western response, for re-examination of the reigning paradigms of the academy and the idioms of our materialist consumer culture, and for a measure, of religious seriousness which Abedi alludes to as something Muslims would welcome in the West. Many Muslims see our secular indifference to religion, our own as will as that of others, as incompatible with the scale of the achievement that science, technology and instrumental politics have brought us (a point much emphasized by the Enlightenment founders of modern science, such as Bacon and Boyle). Our habit of reducing religion to a function of market forces, separating it from the state only to exploit it in self-interest, places a deep gulf between us.and other traditions. Consequently our differences from them assume negative connotations.

Charles Kimball attempts to summarize past relations with Muslims and outline future prospects. He speaks with passion about the neglect or worse that Muslims and Arabs have suffered in our society. (We might go on to ask why that should occur at a time when the Western academic study of the Middle East has grown vigorous.) Kimball recounts the history of Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle Ages before turning to the theology of pluralism and dialogue, in particular the writings of Wesley Ariarajah of the World Council of Churches and Kenneth Cracknell, formerly of the British Council of Churches. Next he looks at the Catholic (including the Vatican) understanding of and contribution to dialogue with Muslims and others. He concludes by stating his case for dialogue.

Kimball's work presents me with a problem whose source lies outside his book in that species of Protestant skepticism which says our own religion does not matter while that of others does. Kimball adopts a disarming version of this, saying that his personal involvement in dialogue has helped to deepen his own faith. No doubt that is true, as I can testify from my own experience. But is self-improvement the dividend that dialogue must yield to render it commendable? Furthermore, what are the hidden costs when the theology of dialogue requires a Copernican "shift from the dogma that Christianity is at the centre to the realization that it is God who is at the centre, and that all religions...serve and revolve around him"? The issue is an acute one since collective dialogue under these new Copernican skies is expected to increase our grasp of the Reality of which we have only partial, imperfect glimpses in our own religion. If that is how the Copernican formula works, then we are left with a melting-pot solution to religious differences.

The philosophical problem for those who promote dialogue on this basis is: what is the need for dialogue when we have discounted beforehand the distinctive claims of Muslims, Christians, Hindus, Buddhists,. Jews and others? Have we in fact abandoned the onesidedness we condemn in others when we proceed to make our own formulations -- or those of Muslims or others -- normative for all religions? If we use Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist objections to rescind Christian particularity, how is that better or worse than using Christian objections to wreak similar havoc. with Muslim or Hindu or Buddhist particularity? Whatever else may distinguish or separate us, we have in common at least the fact that we make distinctive claims, enough so that the names we bear mean something personally and historically. I laud and commend Kimball's journey in dialogue, but I have reservations about whether, beyond a sense of guilt or personal vocation, it leaves anything on the Christian side worth dialoguing about, let alone standing up for.

The Pontifical Council for Interreligious Dialogue has produced Guidelines for Dialogue Between Christians and Muslims. Although it was prepared by Maurice Bormans, a former Catholic missionary in North Africa, the document is in the nature of an official statement by the Roman Catholic Church and hence it carries far more weight than an individual statement. The document also breathes a confidence derived from a sense of historical continuity in church, Scripture and tradition, and it is not beset by the self-reproach that has become the Protestant litmus test of self-understanding. The document suggests a willingness to look at the world not as something we once owned and now relate to in the role of confessor, but as one in which Christian responsibility is greater than the West's racial and national criteria. Consequently, the document is not constrained by the need or desire to idealize Islam or Muslims, being quite willing, for example, to point out differences of emphases and interpretation alongside genuine Muslim aspirations and moral ideals.

I found myself deeply moved by the document's language of faith, hope and generosity, a language that spares neither our complacency nor skimps on our capacity for mutual esteem and responsibility. It is an extremely significant document, one that not only describes but achieves interreligious encounter. We should commend Marston Speight for his splendid translation from the French.

These reflections bring to mind a curious but glaring paradox in the history of encounter between Christians and Muslims: the periods of the most fertile theological and intellectual conversation also appear to be the periods of the most truculent and intransigent resistance. The contemporary period is no exception. Just at the time when the liberal West is prepared, rightly or wrongly, to abandon all matters of religious offense to Muslims -- from objectionable points of Christology such as incarnation, the cross and resurrection to issues of practice like colonialism, mission and separate claims for Christian education -- just at this time. Muslims hold tenaciously to a view of the perfidious West. In an age when we have witnessed the greatest recession of religion in the West and when the echo from the crash of a failed Christendom is all but faint in our ears, we are confronted with a deafening Muslim chorus proclaiming the West as a religious antagonist, and an equally deafening call in the West for dialogue and rejection of Christian uniqueness. This skeptical mood has clamped itself on people in the West, with divinity schools deeply scarred by it. God as the working hypothesis, as Bonhoeffer put it, remains true only for a dwindling remnant, with the majority prepared to settle for religion below cost,, so to speak -- that is to say, for religion as choice and option. What might be chosen or opted for remains an individual matter.

In effect the Muslim complaint against the West as a serious religious competitor is at least a hundred years out of date, and Western writers who respond to that complaint in literal terms risk being just as anachronistic. Either the Muslim religious instinct is sounder than the opposition it imagines exists in the West, or the Western secular option conceals a formidable alternative faith which, if unchallenged, might as export commodity intrude upon Islam. There might be something to both perceptions.

Let us begin with where the West is in its religious development. A casualty of the Enlightenment was the idea of Christendom, an idea. that gave religion a territorial expression and a cultural compatibility. The Holy Roman Empire ceased to be "holy" in the sense that territory carried any religious meaning or analogue. It was the shattering of the territorial shell that paradoxically allowed the organizing of the modern Christian missionary movement as a voluntary effort, influential certainly on numerous details of imperial policy, but organically independent enough of imperialism to conflict with it on the ground. The Christian missionary movement is in one sense the funeral of the great myth of Christendom, and in another the extension abroad of the successful separation of religion and territory. The missionary movement proved that religion can be detached from territorial identity and succeed, with colonialism reinforcing the same point by showing how colonial officials need not share the religion of their subjects to rule over them.

 

An important consequence of this revolution is that the term "Christian" itself has become detached from "Christendom," so that in practice one may carry the Christian name without the slightest suggestion or indication of one's territorial affiliation and, by extension, without any hint of political solidarity. Yet Western writers in the interreligious field continue to assume habits of religion that the old notion of Christendom enshrined, speaking, for example, of undogmatic solidarity as suitable penance for Christendom's conspiracy. When increasingly the vast majority of people calling themselves Christian live outside Europe and North America and, what is more, live in societies largely untainted by the offenses of Christendom, it seems obdurate to presume in all of them the territorial guilt complex.

All this complicates our relations with Muslims. The very barriers that Muslims insist must come down have never gone up, at least not in living memory or not for the vast majority of those calling themselves Christian. The acts of penitence that liberal ecumenists insist on as a precondition for dialogue leave us seeking forgiveness for sins we have no power to commit even if we wanted to. Anyone calling himself or herself a Christian in the West today has to swallow a large dose of defensive or relativistic pride to do so, and what remains scarcely warrants leaving home for, in contrast, say, to those who might call themselves Muslim in Karachi or Kano. It is no longer the same thing being religious in the two traditions, and we give Muslims a taste of that when we surprise them with our unacceptance of Islam as valid for them or anybody else. It is not that we are singling out Islam for unfair treatment, but that we as religious Westerners have in the main conceded the untenability of having territory define faith, ours or anyone else's. The exception of Israel proves the rule, though in Muslim eyes it might prove something else.

In her eloquent essay Rana Kabbani describes how the Salman Rushdie affair transformed her from being a closet and cultural Muslim to being a confessioning and even a confrontational one. She was caught between the outrage of Ayatollah Khomeini's death sentence on Rushdie and the equal outrage of the West's condemnation of Islam and Muslim culture. To remain silent as a Muslim would be to commit cultural treason. Her essay is an important statement on cross-cultural understanding and misunderstanding and on the usefulness of interreligious conversation.

There is no doubt that many intemperate things were said of Islam and Muslims in the wake of the Rushdie affair. The question is whether what was said was representative of how the West politically, economically and militarily might mobilize against Muslims. In her book Sacred Cows, Fay Weldon, for example, attacks the Qur'an as being "food for no-thought," and a manual for the thought police "who are easily set marching, and they frighten." Conor Cruise O'Brien in an article in the Times of London wrote that "Muslim society is profoundly repulsive." The tabloids had a frenzy reporting delirious scenes at the funeral of Ayatollah Khomeini, all evidence, they alleged, of Islamic fanaticism. Thus, for many people like Kabbani, the West poses a challenge: assimilation or confrontation, as Rushdie so poignantly expresses it in The Satanic Verses. Kabbani's choice of confrontation, she says, is the only way not to self-destruct.

Kabbani examines her childhood in Damascus; the architecture of her Muslim home, which was situated in the ancient quarter of the city; her father's traditional Muslim ways; Muslim feminine pride; the advantages of traditional upbringing, including arranged marriages, the veil, divorce, funeral customs, inheritance and property; the regrettable rush of an earlier generation to toss out tradition and adopt Western culture, and the predictable reversal of that movement in our day. Such reversal is usually a symptom of an anti-Western backlash, with educated Arab women donning the veil to stress their repudiation of the very West in which they were educated.

Kabbani herself is Western-educated. She went to an American Christian missionary school in Jakarta, Indonesia, where her father was posted in the Syrian diplomatic service. Her parents observed a strict code of Muslim ethics which placed numerous restrictions on young Rana: she was not allowed to date or to take part in many school activities. In a salutary comment on the ethos of the missionary school, Kabbani writes that Jakarta's humidity "seemed to release the libido of the teenagers, who were only loosely disciplined by the motley collection of Western eccentrics, touched in one way or another by the confusions of the 1960s' who made up the teaching staff...The mathematics teacher was an ex-Bronx taxi driver who had done a stint on a kibbutz and had married a sexy black woman who taught us physical education." This permissive school environment, Kabbani points out, was not an isolated oriental outpost, but a symptom of the West as Muslims and others encountered it in Europe and North America.

The conflict of cultural mores could occur over the most innocuous of details. When Kabbani was chosen by her music teacher, Miss Murray -- herself the daughter of a missionary from Kansas -- to star in the school's production of The Music Man, her father would not allow her to take the role because the final scene requires the heroine and her traveling salesman lover to sing a duet ending. in a kiss. On another occasion Kabbani was invited to a party given by Miss Murray who had recently married the school's English teacher, originally from England. When the chauffeur-driven car arrived at her door carrying her escort, a Malaysian boy who was the son of the Malaysian Muslim ambassador, her father came out to ensure that the boy shared the front seat with the driver, leaving Kabbani alone in the back. When they arrived at the party they discovered that they were the only guests and that they had been invited because they were Muslims. Kabbani was further surprised to find that while she had gone out of her way to put on a miniskirt to suit the taste of Miss Murray, Miss Murray had herself recently converted to Islam and was consequently dressed in an ankle-length garment -- a dissonant note on Kabbani's assimilationist theme.

Following the Arab-Israeli war of 1973, Kabbani's father was posted to Washington, D.C. "The paradox about Washington was that here, in the American capital, I learned to hate America.... In Washington I became politicized.... I learned much of this on the Georgetown [University] campus," where she enrolled as an undergraduate. The anti-Arab, anti-Syrian atmosphere of the city eroded any confidence she might have in Western understanding and policy toward the Middle East. "Is the Western conscience not selective? ... It is not surprising that an extremist political Islam has taken root all over the Muslim world, fueled by historical grievance, by poverty, by an overriding sense of powerlessness. The West bears more than a measure of responsibility for this phenomenon. For by interfering so forcefully in Muslim affairs, by overthrowing nationalist rulers (as was done in Iran, for example, in 1953) and setting up puppets in their place, by uncritical support for Israeli excesses, by milking Muslim resources and conspiring to keep the Muslim world economically, culturally and politically enthralled, the West has made us what we are: enraged and unforgiving."

This is hard reading for many people in the West, but it is a sentiment widely shared among Muslims, and any dialogue that ignores it will get nowhere. Yet how does one come to grips with such a deep sense of injury? Or, more to the point, what is a possible Christian response to an issue requiring resources that only a privileged Christendom might be assumed to possess? Does Kabbani tip her hand by addressing her essay "to Christendom," thus hinting that such an entity would have to exist to answer Islam's "territorial" grievances?

The sentiments of Christendom have long since ceased to galvanize the West, though the habits might survive in an eccentric or nationalistic flavor (as is chillingly evident in Eastern Europe). However regrettable the unflattering comments of a Conor Cruise O'Brien or a Fay Weldon, they carry no legal, political, territorial or economic weight, as they would in a reconstituted Christendom. We thus have to reappraise whether personal prejudice, even if offensive, is a price worth paying for having legal protections against religious coercion and political repression. Such was the challenge Christians once faced and more or less survived, and is one that Muslims now face. If they can-meet it without making the unending compromises Christians committed, they might reveal to us fresh ways of being religious.

Muslim-Christian Encounters: Governments under God

Islam has always conceived a political role for religion, a fact that has increasingly become apparent to Westerners faced with Muslims in their midst. Westerners are caught in a bind in the face of Muslim demands: the logic of religious toleration, not to say of hospitality, requires making concessions to Muslims, while the logic of privatizing Christianity, of taking religion out of the public arena, disqualifies Westerners from dealing effectively with Muslim theocratic demands. Is a meeting between these two positions possible and if so, on what grounds and to what end? The answer depends in part on what led Westerners to reject a territorial and theocratic role for religion, and whether those reasons are valid and relevant to Muslim demands.

The church was never more involved in politics than during the era of the Holy Roman Empire when faith and territory were joined as a principle of membership in church and state. Under the empire Christianity became "Christendom," and the political ruler was seen as God’s appointed agent, the earthly counterpart to the heavenly sovereign. In that scheme political affairs and religious matters were two aspects of one and the same reality. Church and state were united for the same purpose, even though as institutions they represented different functions. While the church held custody of the absolute moral law, the state was concerned with enforcing the rules that gave practical expression to the higher spiritual law. Conformity rather than personal persuasion was the chief end of religious activity.

Such an arrangement would work only if there was a more or less homogenous, cohesive society apportioned into more or less stable social classes. Cohesion became increasingly difficult to maintain in the face of growing pluralism and social mobility. Finally, with the rise of national ethnic consciousness fueled by the drive for religious freedom, the formal structures of the religious empire collapsed and Christendom dissolved.

Leading Christian thinkers of the time devoutly wished for such a demise, because it allowed religion to become a matter of personal experience rather than of membership in a divinely designated race or church. The church was transformed from territoriality to voluntarism. As John Locke forcefully and perhaps excessively expressed it in his Letter Concerning Toleration (1689), Christians as members of a "voluntary society" were those who came together for "the public worshipping of God in such a manner as they judge acceptable to Him, and effectual to the. salvation of their souls." The overriding concerns of such a society, he felt, ought to be spiritual and moral, "and nothing ought nor can be transacted in this society relating to the possession of civil and worldly goods."

Locke drew a neat distinction between religion and state. He gave civil government the responsibility for ordering our material well-being, including "life, liberty, health, and indolence of body," as well as "possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like." Just as the church should not amass wealth or material possessions, so the government should not try to save souls.

Locke recognized that this was not entirely a satisfactory distinction either in detail or in principle, however, as is clear from his further observation that government should not be given authority over religion because "it appears not that God has ever given any such authority to one man over another as to compel anyone to his religion." For Locke, as for many Puritan divines, religion was incompatible with state coercion not simply because the state was too blunt and oppressive an instrument to use in delicate matters of faith, but because "though the rigor of laws and the force of penalties were capable to convince and change men’s minds, yet would not that help at all to the salvation of their souls." Locke reasoned that a soul that was compelled was a soul that had lost its religious worth and was therefore unfit for spiritual regeneration. Similarly, the political commonwealth would be a tyranny if nothing beyond compulsion held it together. Such a religious conception of the moral integrity of individuals was integral to Locke’s conceptions of the tool-making character of civil government. In other words, religion as a voluntary society made possible the theory of limited state authority. In this complementarity of church and state we find the "good life" wherein "lies the safety both of men’s souls and of the commonwealth." Religion and civil government have an overlapping legitimate interest in "moral actions" that belong "to the jurisdiction both of the outward and the inward court."

The Muslim challenge was not far from Locke’s mind, and he considered how Muslims and others might be integrated into a society where religion was not enforced or enforceable. That form of Islam, he said, that departed from the tradition of voluntarism would be difficult if not impossible to assimilate. Atheism would present a no less troubling challenge. "Those that by their atheism undermine and destroy all religion, can have no pretense of religion whereupon to challenge the privilege of toleration." Locke was aware that the argument for religious toleration itself rests on a religious idea, and that it is contradictory for people to repudiate religion while supporting tolerance and inclusiveness. That is why he insisted that neither atheist nor Muslim or any other "ought to be excluded from the civil rights of the commonwealth because of his religion."

Countless other Western religious thinkers have given similar attention to the proper relation of religion and politics. They have separated the two by repudiating territoriality without jettisoning the religious ground of the repudiation. One 17th-century theologian insisted that religious persons of conscience cannot allow "a secular sword [to] cut in sunder those knots in religion which [it] cannot untie by a theological resolution." The reason for this is that "to employ the [civil] magistrate in this kind of compulsion is a prejudice to the Lord Jesus, and the provision he has made of the propagation of the Church and truth." Such teachings are the foundation on which we have built the modern ideas of democratic pluralism and religious freedom. They also explain why religious territoriality became unacceptable to Christian thinkers, and why many Westerners who grapple with Islam’s claims of territoriality nevertheless are encouraged by Islam’s witness to divine sovereignty in human affairs.

The late Ayâtullâh Khumaynî of Iran once complained that Muslims have been robbed of their heritage through Western connivance. Western agents, he charged, "have completely separated [Islam] from politics. They cut off its head and gave the rest to us." The reference is to the creation in Muslim countries of the secular national state as the successor to the transnational Islamic caliphate. A similar complaint was made by Sâdiq al-Mahdî, the Sudanese political leader who pilloried the secular national state by declaring: "The concepts of secularism, humanism, nationalism, materialism and rationalism, which are all based on partial truths, became deities in their own right: one-eyed superbeings. They are responsible for the present Euro-American spiritual crisis. The partial truths in all these powerful ideas can be satisfied by Islam." It was in respect to such sentiments that Kenneth Cragg wrote: "The renewed and effective politicization of Islam is the most important single fact of the new [Islamic] century [which opened in 1979]."

All these views have their roots in the Prophet’s own personal legacy in Medina and Mecca where he established territoriality, dâr al-Islâm, as the handmaid of religious faith. It was not long before the early Muslims were rallying round the political standard "no government except under God." The words have echoed down to our day, mediated by the medieval theologian Ibn Taymiyya (d. 1328), as a stringent theocratic credo. It is from Ibn Taymiyya, among others, that modernist Muslim reformers in the last 200 years have received their marching orders, from Jalâl al-Dîn Afghânî to Sayyid Qutb and Ayâtullâh Khumaynî.

Ibn Taymiyya spoke about the indispensability of God and the Prophet in political affairs, what he calls "divine government and prophetic viceregency." He contended:

To govern the affairs of men is one of the most important requirements of religion, nay, without it religion cannot endure ... The duty of commanding the good and forbidding the evil cannot be completely discharged without power and authority. The same applies to all religious duties (holy war, pilgrimage, prayer, fast, almsgiving), to helping those who are wronged, and to meting out punishment in accordance with the legal penalties ... The purpose of public office is to further the religion and the worldly affairs of men ... When the pastor exerts himself in proportion to his ability to further both, he is one of the most excellent fighters on the path of God.

"The exercise of authority," he concluded, "is a religious function and a good work which brings [one] near to God, and drawing near to God means obeying God and his Prophet."

These are uncompromising words that impute territoriality to religious orthodoxy, words that would make Muslims dissatisfied with a merely utilitarian political ethic. Yet they are words that also make it difficult to coexist in a pluralist society. One way out of the confines of Ibn Taymiyya’s thought is to make "the duty of commanding the good and forbidding the evil" a condition of the religious interest in politics rather than the justification for a theocracy, especially when a theocratic state may itself flout the divine law.

A similar consideration has led many Muslims to question whether even under Islamic territoriality it is wise to employ force and coercion to propagate religion. Caliph al-Ma’mûn, for example, agonized over the safety of religious truth when upheld by the instruments of the state. He declared in a public meeting in 830 that although many under his rule had converted to Islam for purely religious reasons, many others had done so from less honorable motives. "They belong to a class who embrace Islam, not from any love for this our religion, but thinking thereby to gain access to my Court, and share in the honour, wealth, and power of the Realm; they have no inward persuasion of that which they outwardly profess." His words are forerunners of Locke’s notion of the jurisdiction of the outward and inward, and his sense that territoriality is as repugnant to conscience as it is inimical to democratic pluralism. When religion looks to political power for its ultimate defense, it will soon find in the same source its sole vindication and reward. We would, like the agonized caliph, be unable to distinguish the true from the spurious, sincerity from self-interest, or commitment from opportunism.

Identical issues surface in a debate between two Muslim scholars on the need for a theocratic state. Muhammad al-Kanemî (d. 1838), the ruler of Kanem-Bornu in West Africa, challenged the jihâd leader ‘Uthmân dan Fodio (d. 1817) with regard to the use of the sword for religious ends. Al-Kanemî said the sword is too rough-and-ready a weapon to use in settling religious questions, especially questions between Muslims themselves. It represents an attempt to resolve by force what might be substantial matters of theology, or even only differences of opinion. He insisted that Muslims either settle for tolerance and mutual acceptance or else unleash a permanent war that would exempt, in his words, not even "Egypt, Syria and all the cities of Islam ... in which acts of disobedience without number have long been committed." "No age and country," al-Kanemi’ cautioned, "is free from its share of heresy and sin," and any rigid notion of Muslim territoriality that flies in the face of this reality would reduce to ashes all sincere but inadequate attempts at truth and obedience. We cannot find revealed truth in the blinding flames of fanaticism.

A whole religious vocation has developed among certain groups of Muslim West Africans around rejecting political and military means for spreading and maintaining religious faith and institutions. The people, the Jakhanké, have clean roots in medieval Africa through a cleric called al-Hâjj Sâlim Suwaré (hence the appellation "Suwarians" in some sources). Al-Hâjj Sâlim handed down teachings that represent a scrupulous disavowal of political and military coercion in religious matters and that repudiated secular political office for the professional cleric—an astonishing position given the unambiguous rulings of the Qur’ân and the jurists. Equally astonishing is the durability of this pacific strain in Muslim West Africa, whose antiquity and dispersed, mobile character have led scholars to devise a Semitic hypothesis for its origin. Indeed, Jakhanké chronicles identify them as Banî Isrâ’ila ("children of Israel"), which appears to lend at least a conjectural credence to the Semitic theory. At any rate, as professional clerics the Jakhanké established education centers as cells of influence among diverse ethnic groups. So distinctive was their tradition that religious militants who defied it found themselves opposed on principle by the community for whom a theocratic dispensation was more disconcerting than the prospects of continuing pluralism.

This clerical pacifism gradually undermined the extreme program of a corporate theocratic state. Every attempt to create a theocratic government in Muslim West Africa failed. Even European colonial efforts to co-opt clerics by giving them chieftaincies foundered on the same pacific rock. The clerics offered their sympathy and even cooperation but stopped short of becoming collaborators. In the era of total political mobilization that some colonial regimes preferred, such clerical independence was deemed an affront, and it brought on the collision it was designed to avert, forcing the clerics to reassess their heritage in the light of new realities.

An example of one such stocktaking in 1911 involved a clerical leader who, along with his followers, was arrested, exiled and imprisoned. This man spoke eloquently of clerical pacifism not simply in terms of personal survival but in terms of a vocation. French scholar Paul Marty, who saw the relevant document, was impressed by the argument. Marty said the cleric "formulated conclusions, stamped with the indelible mark of loyalty, and remarked that his fidelity, had it not been born of natural sympathy, would have been for him a necessity of the logic of history." Marty described the attack on the pacific clerics as akin to the St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre. Such conflicts were clearly painful personal setbacks, but scarcely a fatal loss for pacific credibility or mobility since the clerics conducted themselves with dignified restraint under violent provocation and then subsequently emigrated as haven-seekers.

I myself was present when the Mâlikî muftî of the Republic of Senegal, a seasoned child of the Jakhanké peripatetic tradition, was invited by the president to travel from his country retreat in Casamance to the capital to meet the king of Saudia. He refused because he had in principle avoided political sponsorship and was unwilling to place himself at secular disposal. When he finally yielded it was as a courtesy to the royal visitor rather than as a collaboration with political office. He and clerics like him are happy to make their peace with political territoriality, but are less willing to collapse religion into such territoriality. Admittedly religious withdrawal, even with the clerical pacific principle at its heart, may not deal well enough with the problem of the doctrinaire ideological secular state, but it does sustain the moderate pacific counsels by which Muslim Africans have extended and deepened the tradition of pluralism.

There is thus a large body of material in both Muslim and Christian sources that supports a public role for religion without making territoriality a condition of faith. Sufyân Thaurî, a classical Muslim writer, once wrote, "The best of the rulers is he who keeps company with men of [religious] learning, and the worst of the learned men is he who keeps the society of the king." That is to say, religion and worldly affairs prosper together when political rules are qualified by moral principles, and they suffer when moral principles are qualified by political expedience.

This Muslim tradition challenges us to examine how the Western understanding of the limits of territoriality may complement or alter demands of political immunity for religious groups that have entered the West. It is important, therefore, to recognize the new context in which Muslims have encountered the West, not as a subjugated people of a colonial empire but as immigrants looking for opportunities. Westerners must keep abreast of moderate Muslim counsels concerning the dangers of territoriality, and both sides need to come to an agreement about freedom of religion. Westerners cannot preserve religious toleration by conceding the extreme Muslim case for territoriality; a house constructed on that foundation would have no room in it for the pluralist principle that has made the West hospitable to Muslims and others in the first place. The fact that these religious groups have grown and thrived in the West at a time when religious minorities in Islamic societies have continued to suffer civil disabilities reveals the unevenness of the two traditions.

We risk perpetuating such a split-level structure in our relationship unless we take moral responsibility for the West’s heritage, including religious tolerance. Such tolerance must rest not on the arguments of public utility but rather on the firm religious rock of the absolute moral law with which our Creator and Judge has fashioned us. Ibn Taymiyya is right that "the exercise of authority is a religious function" in the sense of accountability and subordination to the higher moral law, but mistaken when he makes this the territorial principle of orthodox rectitude. Similarly, Locke is right when he argues for the "outward" and "inward" jurisdiction, with religion at the center, but mistaken if his separation removes religion from the political economy. A theocratic state is no better than an ideological secular state, for in both God and obedience to him are reduced to tools of authority. In view of mounting Muslim pressure for religious territoriality (not to mention the sterile utilitarian ethic of the secular national state), Westerners must recover responsibility for the gospel as public truth, and reconstitute by it the original foundations on which the West built its ample view of the world.

Global Christianity and the Re-education of the West

Church History has generally been defined by a Western perspective. What European Christians have thought and done has been considered superior to what Christians elsewhere have thought and done. Chronology has generally been subservient to biography, and biography has been subservient to dogma and theory, especially when the dogma and theory confirm the idea of Western ascendancy. Attention has been paid, of course, to such issues as demography, economics, social status and political forces. But in the main, the human spirit has been stripped of local color, tone and sound in order to become a fit subject for reflection. The emphasis has been either, on the development of doctrine or on religion as an aspect of general human nature.

The tendency to feel awkward about the historical character of the faith has left us in a poor position to appreciate Christianity as a global reality. It's striking how few of my esteemed colleagues at Yale Divinity School make regular professional use of the resources in the Day Missions Library, which contains a treasure of information about the worldwide expansion of Christianity. This indifference contrasts sharply with the flowering of interest in the Western missionary movement shown by departments of history, political science and anthropology. It's ironic that a divinity school can carry out its mission largely uninterested in Christianity's unprecedented expansion around the world. How do we understand this irony? Perhaps it's a measure of how much we have turned our back on the historical dimension of Christianity and on non-Western societies. Perhaps it also indicates how absorbed we are in our immediate context, which causes us to think in terms of decline and uncertainty rather than growth.

In any case, I wonder what the study of church history would look like if it had a global perspective -- if it viewed world Christianity not with a sense of decline and uncertainty but with a sense of expansion and promise. Indeed, might not the entire structure of theological education change if it began to respond to the realities of world Christianity?

Edinburgh scholar Andrew Walls has argued that the shift of the numerical bulk of Christians from Europe and North America to Asia, Africa, Latin America and other areas outside the Northern Hemisphere has had more than demographic significance. Says Walls:

Within a very short period of time the conditions which have produced the phenomena characteristic of Christianity for almost a millennium have largely disappeared. After centuries in which the norms by which Christian expression have been tested have arisen from the history and conditions of the Mediterranean world and of the lands north and east of it, the process has been transferred into a new and infinitely more varied theatre of activity. The conditions of African and Melanesian life, the intellectual climate of India, the .political battlegrounds of Latin America, increasingly provide the context within which the Christian mind is being formed. The process is already beginning to produce changes in Christian of edited by Frank Whaling).

Before 1945, Christianity was conceived essentially in terms of the threefold division of Orthodox, Catholic and Protestant. After 1945 such a view became increasingly untenable. "In practice, seminal Christian thinkers [today] exercise an influence no longer bounded by their own confessions. The central affirmations and emphases of each tradition now often find echoes in the others.

Missionaries had a lot to do with the emerging ecumenical consciousness. On the mission field, Protestantism's antisacramental stance was softened because of the need to provide new converts with local forms and idioms with which to express their new faith. Roman Catholicism, long before Vatican II, began to stress catechism, preaching and the translation of scripture into the vernacular. My own first encounter with the Gospels in an African language occurred when I saw copies of Bishop Maloney's Catholic translation of Matthew into Fula -- a translation made, I believe, in the 1940s or 1950s. And eventually the Orthodox too discovered mission frontiers beyond the boundaries of the Byzantine heritage.

The mission field demanded that Christians respond to local feedback about the meaning and potential of the gospel. Missionaries had to pay attention to the faith as it was transmitted to and appropriated by new believers rather than rely on scruples that stemmed from the doctrinal disputes of Europe. And how different those disputes appeared when seen through the eyes of new converts.

New converts were able to scrutinize Western imperialism in the light of what they learned in the gospel about God's unalloyed love and favor toward the oppressed, the lowly and the outcast. For the subject races who counted for little in the scales of Western colonialism, Christianity was a mass transit movement toward a new consciousness. The faith was conveyed to people in the ample yet hallowed idiom of their mother tongues. And so in hinterland gatherings, celebrations took place in churches, mission-founded and independent, long before political independence arrived or was imagined.

Local Christian preachers, prophets and healers were convulsed, and their societies with them, by the force of the new dispensation. In confession, testimony, prayer and invocation the new prophets emerged as the epitome of their age, infecting virtually all the major Christian denominations with their ebullient, celebratory mood, a joyful seasoning that drew the sting of race, culture, language, creed, status and personal biography.

The new forms of Christian life and practice that were emerging would provide the ecumenical movement with a concrete credibility well before ecclesiastical formulations would attempt to rise to the occasion. It may be instructive for us to ponder how the cause of the mainline ecumenical movement was closely tied to mission, and how its reported decline today appears to coincide with the decline of mainline mission. With the loss of the missionary impulse, the ecumenical movement has suffered to the same extent.

In surveying the history of Christian mission, Walls sees a distinctive pattern:

The history of the great religions of the world displays different types of expansion. In India religious expansion has been unifocal, absorbing and reformulating influences from many quarters but maintaining one geographical focus for its great religious activity. Iranian religion has been catalytic, profoundly influencing other religious traditions but leaving only small communities to embody its own. Islamic expansion has been progressive, steadily spreading out from its original center (which retains a cosmic significance), claiming the allegiance of the whole world and, with few exceptions, maintaining the gains it has made. By contrast, Christian expansion has been serial. It has not maintained a single cultural or geographical center; it has always retained a substantial separate identity; it recedes as well as advances, declines or dies out in the areas of its greatest strength and reappears, often transformed, in totally different areas of quite distinct culture. Christian history is a series of cross-cultural movements, which result in a succession of different Christian "heartlands" as the geographical and cultural center of Christianity has changed. Changing patterns of world order are thus integrally linked to religious history ("World Christianity, the Missionary Movement and the Ugly American," in World Order and Religion, edited by Wade Clark Roof).

One could dwell on the demise of the original geographical and cultural center of Christianity and how that left the religion open to adoption and assimilation in as many cultures as it encountered. More than one historian has commented on how in this respect the Christian movement was responsible for producing for the first time a truly global, ecumenical version of world history, with the meaning and significance of history to be found where the spirit moves and blows, typically among those considered outcasts, the lowly, the oppressed or socially insignificant. Correspondingly, the typical pattern of Christian history is as a movement of the periphery, of the relentless and radical circumvention of the establishment in obedience to a God whose central design leaves earthly arrangements provisional and dispensable.

Walls has sketched for us the shape of what confronts us in contemporary Christianity. He observes that "on any reading of history the missionary movement must have at least something to do with the most striking change in the religious map of the world for several centuries."

One part of the globe has seen the most substantial accession to the Christian faith since the conversion of the northern barbarians; another, the most considerable recession from it since the rise of Islam. The most obvious center of accession is tropical Africa, which even a century ago was statistically marginal to Christianity; the most obvious center of recession is Western Europe, which a century and a half ago would certainly have been identified as the most dynamic and significant Christian center.

There must be some connection," Walls suggests, "between these events and the missionary movement; and the modern missionary movement, though affected in important ways by earlier influences, took shape as recently as the 19th century. Yet how is the contemporary student of Christianity to understand this important motor of modern Christianity?" ("Structural Problems in Mission Studies,." International Bulletin of Missionary Research, vol. 15, no. 4, October 1991).

In looking to theology for help with this question, Walls has uncovered a surprising lack of interest. Surprising, because in the 19th century theology responded with energy and deepening insight to the changes afoot in several branches of learning -- in archaeology, in the discovery of papyri and the text criticism it fostered, in the historical sciences and in the natural sciences, and in changes in society.

. In calling attention to the failure of Western theology to respond meaningfully and in a timely fashion to non-Western Christianity, I do not mean, nor does Walls mean, to imply that Western theology must incorporate Asian and African Christianity into its ascendant framework, but that standard theological sources and methods have failed to show any awareness of the Copernican shift that has taken place in the religious map of the world. And the meager evidence there might be of the glimmerings of an awareness that the entire landscape has shifted is shot through with fear and a sense of threat, or with a corrosive sense of guilt. Yet the "global transformation of Christianity requires nothing less than the complete rethinking of the church history syllabus."

New discoveries take time to sink in. The discovery of the New World was not immediately reflected in European cartography, let alone allowed to replace the old maps and the intellectual assumptions they enshrined. "In fact, the new discoveries were intellectually threatening, requiring the abandonment of too many certainties, the acquisition of too many new ideas and skills, the modification of too many maxims, the sudden irrelevance of too many accepted authorities. It was easier to ignore them and carry on with the old intellectual maps (and often the old geographical maps too), even while accepting the fact of the discovery and profiting from the economic effects." This explains why the innovative intellectual leadership required for revamping church history and reconceiving the teaching of history across the entire academic syllabus, both secular and theological, has been painfully slow in emerging.

Walls has called our attention to the potentially subversive character of mission studies on what happens elsewhere in the curriculum. "Old texts may often be illuminated from the experience of Christian en counter today. The responses to Christianity amid the old religions of Europe that we meet in Patrick or Bede or Gregory of Tours are worth taking side by side with the Christian interaction with the primal religions of Africa. Biblical studies could receive an infusion of new research tasks; and only through mission studies are Western biblical scholars and theologians likely to learn the work done in their own fields by their African, Asian, and Latin American colleagues." It is in fact in mission studies that the West is likely to encounter a compelling and eloquent case for reeducating itself in a way that is the most radical since Columbus. If it does not seem that radical today, that is be- cause old assurances have deceptively long shadows in the twilight, and because change of such magnitude and significance comes to us in hidden and open ways, in the accumulation of scarcely discernible shifts of habit and attention as well as in dramatic breaks.

Christianity has become a genuinely multicultural world religion, thriving profusely in the idioms of other languages and cultures, marked by a lively cross-cultural and interreligious sensibility, unburdened by the heavy artillery of doctors and councils, and otherwise undaunted by the scandalous paucity of money, trained leadership, infrastructure and resources. Nothing better demonstrates the newness of world Christianity than the fact that it has ceased, or is ceasing, to be weighed down by its missionary past. In the churches and congregations we find fresh energy and intelligence being devoted to the production of new hymns, music, artistic and liturgical materials, to the creation of fresh categories for doing theology, to the retrieval of threatened cultural resources, to the application of faith to public issues, and to the promotion of ecumenical sharing and partnership.

We sense in all of this the dawn of a new dispensation, a fresh, if sometimes uneven, point of departure for the apostolic heritage, a galvanizing hope, born of proven confidence that we can move beyond Day One of the missionary landing to enter new fields and spheres with our hearts and minds fixed on the right things. In the meantime, many research centers (concentrated at present in the West, but happily more and more available through new information and communication systems) are laying the groundwork for tangible, sustainable growth and development. Once that infrastructure is in place, there is little doubt that the subject of world Christianity as the unique legacy of the modern missionary movement will make its long-overdue impact and channel back some of its revitalized energy into the necessary transformation of our preCopernican historical universe.

Not too long after the beginning of the modem Western missionary movement, while John Tyler was president of the United States and Sir Robert Peel (best known for founding the Metropolitan Police when he was home secretary) was for the second time British prime minister, James Legge stood in 1843 on the frontiers of the Middle Kingdom, as China regarded itself. As he drew in his breath, Legge felt a palpable sense of excitement at the intellectual greatness of China, a greatness that contrasted sadly with Western ignorance of it. So he set about the immense task of rendering the Chinese classics into English for a Western readership then in the deep embrace of an all-absorbing heroic Romanticism. His aim was to revitalize the world of learning and to expand the abstract intellectual horizons of his European contemporaries.

It took him 30 years and five volumes to accomplish his task, and still he was not done. In 1873, when Japan suppressed feudalism and was turning Westward and the Remington typewriter was invented, Legge returned from China to become professor of Chinese at Oxford. He was a different man from what he was when he left. He had been "subverted" by things Chinese, and this had determined his lifelong calling.

The example of Legge can be repeated for countless others, men and women, then and now, who as missionary pioneers stumbled on priceless pearls which subsequently they gathered and consecrated, recirculating them as humanity's common heritage. It has resulted in a qualitative change in the Western academic syllabus, and thus of the West's self-understanding.

In spite of all that, Western theology still would not be "subverted," preferring instead to look the other way and to exclude from its canon those great jewels of the human spirit, once exotic and alien but now no longer remote. Theology has thus exulted in its domestication, refusing to be transformed globally. The situation cannot go on like that without serious long-term repercussions -- without Western theology, in its splendid isolation, risking those vital connections through which old forms are renewed and fresh vitality released.