Psychiatry and Pastoral Counseling

Book Review: Home From the War. By Robert Jay Lifton. Simon & Schuster. $8.95.

Some months ago we spotted Robert Jay Lifton’s Home from the War as a logical choice for special attention. But Don Browning, to whom we commended it for review, saw in it more than an intelligent examination of Vietnam, veterans’ subsequent experiences. He has used it as a trigger for discussion of potential trends in pastoral care and religious counseling. For that reason, we scheduled his argument for this special issue on theological education and pastoral training. Browning’s comment is significant because he shows that pastoral care people are trying to forget what psychiatrists like Lifton are trying to remember. He plunges the readers into the specialist-technical vs. wholistic-organic models. The consequences of the debate will be felt by all who are subjects of or practitioners of pastoral counseling.

The American people have been told by their leaders that the war in Vietnam is over -- though in fact it is not. Our own men have been removed from battle, but the shooting, bombing, maiming and killing continue. Robert Lifton’s new book, Home from the War, tells us with startling vividness something else that we know but, sometimes manage to push from consciousness: that the war is not over even for Americans. Echoes of it rumble on in our minds and emotions. And especially is this true for the returning veteran.

Lifton writes about the Vietnam veterans -- their guilt, their anger, their confusion, their struggles for wholeness. In this account of his experience as a counselor to a rap group of veterans affiliated with Vietnam Veterans Against the War, Lifton has given us a remarkably penetrating and sensitive psychohistorical study of these young men’s inner experience of the tenor and purposelessness of that war.

The book is painful to read: the war is behind us and we do not want to be confronted further by its horrible reality. Some readers will call the book highly biased; the author sees only one side of the Vietnam conflict -- its brutality and moral bankruptcy. Others will find the account unscientific; it deals with the experiences of only a few men.

But in my opinion Home from the War is of considerable importance. First, it provides Americans with, a primary document that portrays the inner psychological and moral landscape of this most "modern" of modern wars. Lifton has dedicated his career in psychiatric research to investigating a variety of uniquely modern confrontations with death and man’s perennial struggle to overcome it. In Life in Death, Revolutionary Immortality, and Thought Reform and the Psychology of Totalism,, he has probed the theme of death in relation to the survivors of Hiroshima, Marxist revolutionary action, and Communist China’s practices of political reeducation.

In Home from the War he investigates the themes of death, and rebirth in the context of a war that was widely experienced as being totally without moral justification and redeeming purpose. What is it like to fight such a war? What is it like to survive it? Lifton does a remarkable job of forcing us to confront these questions, and he does it before the memories of our own direct involvement in the war have become blunted by the mechanisms of denial and the passage of time.

I

But there is second and more specific reason why the book is important. Home from the War raises profound questions about the meaning of mental health and psychotherapy in our time. In addition, it raises questions about the self-definitions and purposes of the major helping professions of contemporary society -- psychiatry, psychology, social work and pastoral counseling. Lifton himself is a psychiatrist. But the psychiatry that he practices with these rap groups is vastly different from the conventional practice of psychiatry in American society. Psychiatry and its associated disciplines have taken on the aura of scientific detachment and ethical neutrality in dealing with patients and their problems. As a counselor to Vietnam veterans who opposed the war, Lifton drops all pretense of ethical neutrality.

In fact., from one perspective, Home from the War constitutes nothing less than a direct attack upon the medical model as the organizing center of the psychiatric profession. Lifton does not characterize the problems of these returning veterans as sickness, emotional disturbance or battle fatigue. Rather, he approaches their problems and the war itself from a moral standpoint. The veterans’ emotional problems -- fear, anxiety, inertia, confusion, depression, guilt -- are seen as consequences of profound moral conflicts. Lifton is not so much interested in ‘cure’ as he is in a moral and spiritual rebirth. Such a self-definition moves Lifton the psychiatrist much closer to the pastoral counselor, the ethicist and the spiritual director, and away from the "technicist" view of psychiatry so dominant at the moment.

In addition to its testimony to the mental suffering produced by the Vietnam conflict, Home from the War is a call for the renewal of the helping professions in Western society. At a time when both the pastoral counselor and the spiritual director are borrowing profusely from the psychiatrist, the social worker and the psychologist, Lifton is going in another direction and challenging the secular therapist to reclaim some of the wisdom of these more ancient traditions of the cure of souls. At least, this is what his program amounts to, although he has a sophisticated and refreshing way of building his case.

Lifton wants the helping professions to retrieve the fundamental meaning of "profession." He reminds us that the word ‘profess" is made up of the Latin prefix pro, which means "forward," "toward the front." or "into a public position," and fess, which derives from the Latin fateri or fass and means "to confess, own, acknowledge." Lifton believes that originally a profession was "a personal form of outfront public acknowledgment." In addition, "That which was acknowledged or confessed always (until the sixteenth century) had to do with religion."

But gradually the concept of profession took on a more limited meaning and came to be used primarily to refer to the knowledge and skills possessed by practitioners of specialized traditions such as law, medicine and divinity. "Thus," Lifton writes, "the poles of meaning around the image of profession shifted from the proclamation of personal dedication to transcendent principles to membership in and mastery of a specialized form of socially applicable knowledge and skill." And this, Lifton believes, is what has happened to psychiatry and other helping professions.

One might suspect that it is also happening to the pastoral counselor and the spiritual director. As pastoral counseling in both the Protestant and Catholic churches becomes more specialized, it becomes more and more divorced from the moral and ethical context that the church should provide. In the process. the work of the pastoral counselor tends more and more to function in a moral vacuum. Even if the pastoral counselor has some ethical convictions that touch on the issues that come up in counseling, the counselor is most likely to "bracket" these convictions and conceal them as long as he is in the counseling situation.

A good number of our highly trained pastoral counseling specialists refer to themselves as "pastoral psychotherapists." By this they mean that they do psychotherapy (as other professionals do psychotherapy) and that they also "happen to be" ministers. There seems to be no intrinsic relationship between the therapy one does and the minister or pastor that one is. Most of these specialists maintain their relationship to the church even though they may be functioning in specialized counseling centers or in private practice. Most of them say that the church is important, though fewer and fewer are able to articulate why -- especially for their own professional activity as pastoral psychotherapists. It is my judgment that this specialized model of pastoral care is becoming more and more influential on the practices of the local pastor. If this is true, then at the very moment Lifton is holding up the tradition of pastoral counseling as a model for psychiatry, pastoral care and counseling are gradually being stripped of their own ethical contexts and more and more functioning in the technicist framework which Lifton is repudiating.

II

Lifton gives considerable attention to describing the structure and function of the "rap group" in which he participated with members of Vietnam Veterans Against the War. We quickly learn that these were not "traditional therapy groups," even though individual psychological problems, hurts and fears were very much a part of the agenda. But Lifton believes that from the inception of the groups, it was clear to most of those who participated that the "political-ethical and psychological-therapeutic components were inseparable." Lifton called himself a "professional" rather than a "therapist." The rap groups operated within an explicit moral context. Professionals and veterans alike shared a common, opposition to the Vietnam war and the values and assumptions that made it possible. Thus Lifton indicates that one characteristic distinguishing the rap groups from traditional therapy was "that of affinity, the coming together of people who share a particular . . . historical and personal experience, along with a basic perspective on that experience, in order to make some sense of it."

Another distinguishing characteristic was presence, which Lifton defines as a "kind of being-there or full engagement and openness to mutual impact -- no one ever being simply a therapist against whom things are rebounding." This principle is related to the third unique dimension of these groups -- self -generation: the "need on the part of those seeking help, change, or insight of any kind, to initiate their own process and conduct it largely on their own terms so that, even when calling in others with expert knowledge, they retain major responsibility for the shape and direction of the enterprise."

Lifton was not the only professional who met with the rap groups. There were others, some of whom differed with Lifton on the question of how explicit to make the political-ethical commitments of the groups. Some feared that such a view could result in the prescription of "correct" political opinions as a prerequisite for admission into the groups. Lifton argued that the shared antiwar position of the professionals was inseparable from their capacity to contribute to the psychological health of the veterans, "and that, since political and ethical views inevitably affect and to some extent define therapeutic encounters, we would do better to examine these relationships openly." This open acknowledgment of the moral context of the therapeutic group enabled the group to function in relationship to the individual somewhat like a small congregation or Methodist class meeting. Value commitments were made explicit; clarification of these commitments was pursued; deepening of one’s appropriation of these commitments was sought after; and emotional conflicts, hurts and guilts were dealt with in the context of this value-explicit situation.

From these rap groups, Lifton learned a great deal about raw human reactions to participation in the Vietnam war. He brings some new perspectives to the interpretation of this material which, once again, carry him beyond the customary explanations of psychiatry.

III

Lifton defines the Vietnam war as an "atrocity-producing situation." It is this kind of situation that can produce the My Lais and the Captain Medinas and the Lieutenant Calleys of this world. In a war that has no clear moral purpose, where it is difficult to distinguish friend from foe or soldier from civilian and where it is forbidden by one’s superiors either to win or to lose -- such a war impels even fairly decent people to commit atrocities. To lower one’s anxiety level, to gain a sense that something is happening, to take revenge for the senseless death of a buddy, one is tempted to kill -- anyone or everyone in sight. And if you are not a killer yourself, you know who the killers are. But you protect them. You enter into the grand conspiracy of silence and numb yourself to the cool efficiencies of mechanized and bureaucratized extermination.

Lifton believes, however, that most veterans did not walk away from this atrocity-producing situation without paying a high price. Many veterans bear the great burden of "survivor guilt"; they condemn themselves "for having killed or helped to kill, and for having remained alive." Lifton tells us that

Much of these early meetings were taken up with the men testing one another -- and finding themselves wanting -- by virtually impossible moral choices: "If you had to kill someone again in order to survive, would you do it? If you had to kill an innocent person in order to survive, would you do that?" "It you had to kill a child in order to survive, would you do that?"

Survivor guilt is the kind of self-torture wherein these questions are asked over and over again. But this is the point at which Lifton turns the tables on traditional psychiatry, which might tend to minimize this kind of guilt. Lifton contends that it has a constructive and exquisitely human value. In fact, it is through confronting this kind of guilt directly that the surviving veteran can be restored to wholeness.

Hence, the antidote to survivor guilt is "animating guilt," which Lifton contrasts with "static guilt." "Static guilt is characterized by a dosed universe of transgression and expected punishment, in which one is unable to extricate oneself from a deathlike individual condition." This is the guilt that traditional psychiatry has rightly preached against. But in campaigning against this kind of debilitating guilt, psychiatry has often overlooked the constructive aspects of genuine guilt -- what Lifton calls "animating guilt" "Animating guilt, in contrast, is characterized by bringing oneself to life around one’s guilt":

This requires . . . active imagery of possibility beyond the guilt itself. Animating guilt and image beyond the guilt are in a continuous dialectical relationship, the one requiring the other. Thus, animating guilt propels one toward connections, integrity, and movement. But for this self-propulsion to occur, one requires prior internal images of at least the possibility of these life-affirming patterns, imagery that can in turn relate no something in the external environment. In this sense the imagery of possibility antedates the animating guilt, but it is also true that animating guilt can activate the individual to the point of virtually creating such imagery.

One can hardly find anywhere a more accurate description of the renewing function of religious symbols than that which, Lifton provides in this passage. Guilt can be a stimulus to renewal and restoration when it is counterbalanced with images of hope and rebirth. But the ideologies of our time, which have made us unmindful of the constructive functions of animating guilt, have also made us oblivious of the importance of countervailing religious symbols, which hold forth the possibility of a renewed life beyond the oppressions of guilt. In ways atypical of the profession which he represents, Lifton is calling for a new appreciation of both -- animating guilt and religious symbols of hope and rebirth.

IV

Lifton has a unique perspective upon the nature of religious symbols. His approach to religion is dictated by some rather unusual metapsychological assumptions. Lifton seems to believe that man has a need for immortality. The theme of immortality and man’s quest for rebirth has been notably persistent in his writings. His understanding of this immortalizing impulse is fundamental to his own perspective on the tragedies of the Vietnam war. Lifton describes this principle of "symbolic immortality as the need to maintain, an inner sense of continuity with what has gone on before and will go on after one’s own individual existence." It is more than the denial of death; it is a "part of compelling, life-enhancing imagery, through which each of us perceives his connection with all of human history." This thrust toward immortality can be expressed in, a variety of ways -- biologically by living on through one’s sons or daughters or one’s community or nation, theologically through resurrection or eternal life, or culturally through works and contributions which persist beyond ones death.

Lifton makes the unusual argument (unusual for a psychiatrist) that the psychological trauma of the Vietnam war can be found in the fact that it frustrated this immortalizing impulse of our soldiers. It is one thing to kill and be killed if one believes he is making a lasting contribution to the welfare of one’s community, succeeding generations, and the future of the human species. It is another thing to kill or be killed when one is convinced that one is making no contribution at all except perhaps a negative one. This latter conviction is at the foundation of the psychological problems of the returning veterans whom Lifton studied.

Hence, for Lifton’s veterans, there were no meaningful sacrifices in the Vietnam war. From the perspective of Lifton’s psychiatric anthropology, man cannot live -- in either war or peace -- without meaningful sacrifices. Man’s immortalizing impulse leads him to the need to believe that beyond the sacrifice of his own death he will in some way enjoy a connection with succeeding generations. For Lifton, religious symbols have to do with this urge for a rebirth and reunion with a larger human matrix beyond the sacrifice of one’s own death. But certain events can lead man to lose faith in this possibility. Lifton holds that the Hiroshima holocaust led many of its survivors to lose faith in the continuation of the very basis for human life. For the survivors of Hiroshima, the immortalizing impulse was threatened because humanity itself was in jeopardy. The experience of the survivors of Vietnam was not as radical; humankind may not have been in question, but the meaning of one’s own possible death and the actual death of one’s friends and enemies was in question.

In positing as part of his psychological theory of man an immortalizing impulse, Lifton comes close to the concepts of "generativity" and "care" as developed by his former teacher in the psychohistorical method, Erik Erikson. Both men believe that man has a tendency or need to contribute to the cycle of the generations beyond the confines of his own individual existence. This vision gives their theories an ethical dimension that is almost completely absent in the rest of psychiatric and psychoanalytic literature.

Against the background of such an anthropology, values and norms suddenly become relevant again to the counseling situation. The therapist is inspired to function in his professional capacity out of a moral stance. The therapy group deals with psychological problems and conflicts within an explicitly ethical context. Health becomes a footnote to the struggle to know and to do the good.

I recommend Home from the War to the religious community and especially to its pastors, rabbis, priests and counseling specialists. Its message should be taken to heart: no matter how tolerant, accepting and nonjudgmental our counseling must necessarily be, it must finally take place in a moral context. It would be a great shame for the church to forget this at the very moment when the secular counseling professions may be once again discovering that it should never be otherwise.

The Protestant Church in the People’s Republic of China

The new policy of China’s Communist Party toward religion is everywhere visible to the foreign visitor. After being closed during the Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) , Buddhist and Taoist temples are being opened and restored, and tourists are allowed -- indeed, strongly encouraged -- to visit them, especially the more spectacular ones. Monks are coming back to these temples, not only to worship but to live, work and educate their successors. Nanjing Theological Seminary, the nation’s oldest and most prestigious Protestant school of theological education, was reopened in the early 1980s. For several years it was the only Protestant seminary in the People’s Republic, but within the past two or three years, nine others have been established. In addition, both Protestant and Catholic churches have reopened. Moreover, the government is actually returning confiscated church property and paying "back rent" as a means of compensating the churches for misuse of this property.

Former members are returning to the churches -- and new people are attending. Although Protestant denominations no longer exist as such and are united in one mainline group, the Chinese Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement, it is estimated that that church has grown from around 700,000 in 1949 to 3 million members today. And this figure does not include the uncountable number of Christians who are still identified with China’s mysterious "underground church": believers who worshiped secretly during the Cultural Revolution and who still have not all surfaced. Older ministers are reassuming their pulpits, and new candidates for the ministry, both women and men, are attending the seminaries.

Last fall I was a member of a small team of scholars and health-care professionals that was sent by the Park Ridge Center, Park Ridge, Illinois (an institute that studies the interrelations of health, faith and ethics) , to look at medicine, religion and ethics in China. Our group’s understanding of the relationship of Deng Xiaoping’s government to religion began before we left the U.S., with our study of a fairly recent position paper on religion issued by China’s Communist Party. Titled "The Basic Viewpoint and Policy on the Religious Question During Our Country’s Socialist Period," it reasserts the standard Marxist view of religion as a response to the human fear of the terrors of nature -- a response manipulated by class societies to rationalize the power of the upper classes and justify the plight of workers and the poor.

After these familiar-sounding preliminaries, however, the tone of the document quickly changes. Although it maintains that religion will gradually disappear as China’s socialist economy more and more meets the material needs of its people, it concedes that this process will take a very long time. In the meantime, the paper asserts, the Communist Party must have a sensitive and informed policy toward religion, and must acknowledge that many religious individuals are good people with much to contribute to China’s development. The party must not try to abolish religion by decree; instead, it should attempt to guide religious people and institutions so that they will "center all their will and strength on the common goal of building a modernized, powerful socialist state." In short, if religions support the drive toward modernization, they can be tolerated, encouraged and even actively supported.

On the other hand, the document says, if religions seek to obstruct the modernizing process, then they are to be discouraged or even punished. It seems particularly concerned to condemn superstitious or magical forms of religion; for example, it prohibits "sorcerers and witches" and recommends the re-education of those who practice "phrenology, fortune telling and geomancy." Such limits to toleration indicate that although the present government is repenting of the repression that characterized the Cultural Revolution, its more lenient attitude is limited to religious expressions that can mesh with the regime’s goals for modernization.

One can, of course, take a cynical attitude toward the party’s new policy on religion. The government is well aware that it needs the country’s Buddhist and Taoist temples and Islamic mosques in order to attract large numbers of tourists whose money it desperately wants, and this is clearly part of the motivation underlying the new attitude. Behind the scenes in all the religious institutions -- as in every Chinese institution -- are party supervisors who set down the basic rules. If a religious edifice has value as a tourist attraction, its party supervisor formulates guidelines as to when it is to be open to the public for sightseeing and when it can be used for religious purposes. But this rather manipulative use of religious institutions scarcely applies to the Protestant churches since they are plainer and less exotic than other houses of worship and on the whole have minimal allure for the Western tourist.

Much of the government policy change follows from the position on social philosophy adopted by the Chinese Protestant Three-Self Patriotic Movement when it was founded in the early 1950s. From the beginning it asserted independence for Chinese Protestants from the foreign missionaries and the Western imperialism with which they had been associated. Arguing that it was theologically justifiable to have a patriotic love for China, and for Christians to be loyal citizens of the emerging socialist state, the movement declared that the Chinese Protestant church should be self-governing, self-supporting and self-propagating -- hence the term "Three-Self." For some time the Three-Self Movement has been anticipating and adjusting to the Communist Party’s emerging religion policy. In so doing it has differed in many respects from the Catholic Church in China, which is deeply divided between those who continue to voice allegiance to the Vatican and those who are willing to align themselves with a patriotic movement similar to the Protestant one. Tensions between Catholicism and the government have been more serious than those between the government and mainline Protestantism.

All this became quite clear when our group met with the leaders of two pivotal Protestant institutions in China -- Bishop K. H. Ting, president of Nanjing Theological Seminary, and Han Wenzao, general secretary of the Amity Foundation. Speaking in flawless English, Wenzao and Ting described the work of their respective institutions and how they are compatible with China’s focus on modernization. But they also conveyed the idea that Chinese Protestant Christianity has goals that transcend the government’s more mundane ones. Only gradually, however, did we learn just what these broader goals unique to the church actually are.

Obviously the central figure in Chinese Protestant Christianity, Bishop Ting is not only president of Nanjing Seminary but also of the Amity Foundation, the Three-Self Movement and the China Christian Council. Furthermore, he appears to have considerable rapport with officials in the Communist Party. They in turn have chosen him to serve on various citizen advisory committees, even at the national level. He is also the Protestants’ chief theoretician, theologian and policy formulator.

During a dinner at Nanjing Seminary, Bishop Ting spoke about the Protestant church’s support for the goals of modernization. It is important, he said, for both the people and the government to know that the church is interested in the welfare of the entire Chinese society. Han Wenzao pointed out that such a stance requires a broader and more social theology of salvation than the church espoused prior to the 1949 liberation. In discussing his own persecution during the Cultural Revolution, Ting told us about the seminary’s closing, the destruction of most of its library, and his forced attendance at the Red Guard’s political-education classes. During this difficult period he was determined to show the government that Christians could be helpful in achieving modernization. For a while, this former seminary professor kept the financial books for a fertilizer factory. Then he helped edit a new Chinese-English dictionary. Later he became a translator of United Nations documents and communications for various government offices.

The Amity Foundation was started both to carry out the social-ministry responsibilities of the Protestant church and to demonstrate the church’s support for China’s modernization. Although begun by representatives of the Three-Self Movement, the Amity Foundation is officially separate from the Protestant church and even has Marxists on its board. Nonetheless, it continues to receive support from the church (as well as from other sources) and is seen as a secular and autonomous form of the church’s social ministry.

Health care and medicine are the foundation’s most prominent areas of endeavor. Although it does have a vital program for bringing to China English and American educators to teach English as a second language, it also supports a children’s mental-health research institute, a child nutrition research project, and a factory that specializes in the manufacture and fitting of artificial limbs. Wenzao was quite candid in saying that the foundation tries to fill the holes and gaps in Chinese society that the government’s welfare program overlooks. Most of its programs are in the field of scientifically informed medical research and service; of all the areas of technology, medicine has the most immediate public visibility. It is the medical field in which the Protestant church can be heard most decisively by the society as a whole when it claims that its ministries complement China’s drive for scientific and technical advancement.

Ting and Wenzao are doing everything they can to absorb China’s underground house churches into the mainstream of the Three-Self Movement. In the process they hope to cleanse these groups of the magical and superstitious elements which often take root in secret religious societies deprived of an educated leadership. To them, magic and superstition have little place in the Christian faith. Moreover, it is precisely groups that practice magical healing, divination and other such rites that the government believes will constitute an obstacle to scientific progress. (Seasoned China observers in Hong Kong describe reports of faith healings and even "resurrections" in the underground churches.)

Understandably, Ting, Wenzao and the institutions they lead want to avoid the government’s confusing them with the underground churches. And in fact, individuals from these churches are gradually joining the new, more public churches. Nonetheless, says Ting, there is much to be done to deepen the maturity of the Chinese Christians’ faith, and this is why theological seminaries for the education of professional ministerial leadership are so important. The seminaries are also under pressure to educate a new generation of ministers in time to replace the rapidly aging older generation. Ting himself, for example, is said to be in his early 70s.

The social sciences are quite prominent in the curriculum of Nanjing Theological Seminary, a fact that is understandable in light of the significant debates in China over the question of religion’s definition. In Beijing a representative of the Division of World Religions of the Chinese National Academy of the Social Sciences admitted that the standard Marxist definition of religion as the "opiate of the people" is no longer the only view informing the academy’s research. Such developments within academic disciplines are highly significant in a society in which the social sciences are viewed as instruments for the clarification, support and advancement of the government’s philosophy and policies.

Very much aware of these movements within the National Academy, Bishop Ting told us of a recent academy document that was even more broad-minded than the "Basic Viewpoint and Policy" paper -- one that goes even further in acknowledging religion’s potential creativity for the good of society. Ting stresses the need for ministers who are sophisticated enough to make a contribution to the national debates over the role of religion. Such an intellectual capacity on the part of ministers may be crucial to the survival and expansion of Chinese churches. Little is being done at Nanjing Seminary to teach such favorite American subjects as psychology or psychotherapy, but much is being done to expose students to sociology, social theory and social-science methodology. By the same token, education at Nanjing strongly emphasizes a historical-critical approach to the Scriptures. One’s impression is that the seminary seems to be educating the hearts of its students to be evangelical while educating their minds to be rational and critical. In a society in which a rational approach to social theory and the social sciences in general is increasingly dominant, the church must be able to take part in these discussions.

Ting’s capacity to contribute to these social-science dialogues partially explains his ability to deal both with the leaders of the Communist Party and with Protestant clergy and laity. Similarly, the capacity of the Nanjing Seminary faculty to take simultaneously a confessional and a critical approach to its educational task may explain the fact that this same group of professors doubles as the department of religion at Nanjing University.

It is difficult to keep from wondering whether Ting, Wenzao and other Protestant leaders are walking a tightrope between the still religiously skeptical communist government and the fundamentalists both in the underground church and among intrusive foreign Christian observers who deeply resent any hint of accommodation with Chinese communism. Certainly, Deng Xiaoping’s government is enjoying no small amount of implicit affirmation from religious leaders such as Ting. Furthermore, Ting is placing significant portions of the Protestant church’s energies into helping achieve the government’s modernizing goals. In the present atmosphere of the regime’s open-door policies and more liberal attitudes toward religion, Ting’s strategy seems sensible. But if these policies change -- as they may after the recent student demonstrations -- Ting and other Protestants may have to oppose the government in order to maintain their integrity.

Their strategy is designed to influence the Chinese government as much as it is to accommodate to it. Ting, Wenzao and others are convinced that the regime is open to suggestions, insights and thoughtful arguments from religious communities as long as they are delivered in a spirit of reasonableness and patriotism. Ting hopes that this new spirit of dialogue will extend even to the point of fundamentally affecting the government’s operative definition of religion so that it will no longer be viewed as simply a transient ideology but rather as a necessary expression of the human spirit.

I came to see Bishop Ting not as a dupe or pawn of China’s Marxist government, but as an extremely subtle and astute observer who has a good chance to establish between Protestantism and the regime a dialogue which will lead to a mutual transformation. The Protestant church may end up with a stronger social conscience than it had in preliberation days; and the government may arrive at a more profound understanding of the possibilities of religion in the modern world.

Ting also develops an intriguing doctrine of the Holy Spirit which sees it as leading faithful Christians to the truth -- to all truth, be it religious, scientific, medical, ethical or political. Affirming the goodness of human beings as found in traditional Chinese mythology, his theology states that Christians must applaud the quest for the infinite wherever they find it, even in such expressions as the Way of China’s ancient Taoism.

Despite this ecumenicity and inclusivity, Ting avers that Christianity can offer some important distinctive insights -- insights that he is even willing to recommend to what he calls his "revolutionary humanist friends." Central among these is the Christian doctrine of sin. As set forth by Ting, it has the ring of Reinhold Niebuhr. One wonders if it isn’t a direct legacy from the days that Ting spent at Union Theological Seminary in New York between 1947 and 1949. Addressing his humanist friends, he contends that

between the actual moral state of humanity as it is and the vision of the highest state humanity aspires to attain, there is a distance which humanity, by its own ability, certainly cannot bridge. Many conscientious revolutionaries, in all their serious self-examination, would readily feel at home in Paul’s predicament about his failure to do what he knew he ought to do and his inclination to do the very thing that he hated [Rom. 7:15].

This disparity between our ideal and our real moral condition Ting calls sin. He goes on to say: "True, as far as China is concerned, the change from feudalism-capitalism to socialism is all-important for the restoration of human dignity, but the change has not done away with this state of human spiritual poverty." In effect, Ting is telling his hoped-for Marxist reader that the imperfections of the human spirit will produce imperfections in socialism. And if the reports of corruption within the Chinese Communist Party are true, the imperfections of Marxism may become a spiritual problem that the government will have to face quite soon.

Not only does Ting offer the perspective of Christianity to explain ‘the inevitable imperfections of all human projects -- even socialist ones -- he also criticizes liberation theology for its idealization of the poor. After acknowledging an affinity between liberation theology and the emerging theology of Chinese Protestant Christianity, he takes exception to the former’s tendency to "absolutize liberation and make it the theme or content of Christian theology." Ting grants that the poor have an "epistemological advantage" in being able to perceive issues of injustice and domination. But he does not believe that all truth is necessarily in their hands. In fact, he argues that the Cultural Revolution was precisely a consequence of this idealized view of the poor. It pitted them against not only the rich but also against intellectuals, veteran revolutionaries, and all aspects of enlightened culture. Writes Ting in his Theological Review essay:

The poor deserve justice. But poverty is not virtue, unless voluntary, and it does not always bring with it wisdom. To make a messiah of the poor just because they are poor, and to pit the poor against the rich without the guidance provided by correct theory is neither Marxist nor Christian. We saw its harm all the more clearly during the Cultural Revolution, which turned out to be very anti-cultural and not in any sense a revolution either.

The quality of the essays in this volume, the range of issues that the church is facing in China, and the theological methodologies that it is devising to handle them suggest that in the near future a new kind of theology may come from this part of the world. It will be a theology that has made a certain measure of peace with Marxist socialism as it is developing in China. It will not sound like liberation theology because it will come from a post-liberation and post-revolutionary society. It will be not so much a theology of liberation as a theology of how to build a modern society after liberation. Quite likely it will be a theology mature enough and comprehensive enough to command the attention of the entire Christian world.

Rethinking Homosexuality

BOOK REPORT: The Construction of Homosexuality. By David Greenberg. University of Chicago Press, 635 pp, $29.95.

 

This is the most extensive and thorough world history of homosexuality ever written. Yet it is more accurate to call it a work of sociology than a work of history, for it develops a specific and arresting sociological thesis. David Greenberg argues, against popular opinion, that homosexuality is not a static condition; it is not like being black or white or left-handed. It is not, for the most part, even a deep-seated psychological "orientation."

Greenberg contends that the terms "homosexual," "gay" or "lesbian," are, "strictly speaking, anachronistic." People who continue to use these terms "hold that homosexual behavior is a manifestation of some inner essence, perhaps biological or psychological, is relatively stable over time, and characteristic of a distinct minority of the population." But according to Greenberg's "social constructivist" view, homosexuality is a behavior produced and interpreted in different ways by different societies at different times. Homosexuality is not an essence or condition that some people have and others do not. It is not a minority orientation that, perhaps, 10 percent of the population have and, when they discover their condition, become liberated to conform to their true natures. Applying the sociological theories of Durkheim and Mary Douglas to sexuality, Greenberg argues that homosexual identity is a social label. Social classification both creates the homosexual phenomenon and contains the evaluative frameworks by which it is judged, whether as deviant, tolerable, approvable or admirable.

In evaluating Greenberg's thesis it is important to know that he is a professor of sociology at New York University who specializes in criminology, law and the theory of deviance. He writes this book as a contribution to a more humane understanding of the gay and lesbian phenomenon. Although he is fully aware that the thesis of his book is at odds with the self-interpretation gays and lesbians generally present, he believes his alternative portrait will in the long run be useful to the homosexual movement.

How does Greenberg attempt to prove his thesis? By trotting before the reader a staggering assemblage of examples of how different societies, ancient and modern, have unconsciously encouraged or discouraged various forms and interpretations of homosexual behavior. In the early chapters, Greenberg develops a typology of homosexual relations. The first three types can be found in primitive societies where kinship is central to the social structure. The fourth is found primarily in archaic civilizations.

Transgenerational homosexuality is found in primitive societies where homosexual relations occur between a young male and an older teacher or tribal holy man. Here homosexuality is transitional, part of the initiation into adulthood of the younger male; it comes to an end when the boy is inducted into marriage. Transgender homosexuality occurs in some primitive societies where certain men dress up as women and sometimes provide sexual services. Greenberg believes this form tends to occur in matrilineal societies where women hold considerable power. Egalitarian homosexuality occurs between peers who are relatively equal in age and social power. This occurs among children, to some degree, in most societies. In primitive societies, however, it was a transitional and not lifelong phenomenon--not an exclusive mode of sexual behavior. Greenberg believes that homosexual behavior for many people in primitive societies was a kind of sideline, coexisting more or less freely in people who were predominantly heterosexual as adults.

Transclass homosexuality occurred in more differentiated and hierarchically organized archaic civilizations. Here homosexuality took the form of older, free or wealthy males relating to the young, the weak, the poor or the unfree. Ancient Greek and, to a lesser degree, Roman societies serve as the best examples. In ancient Greece, free men almost universally developed pederastic relations with young boys who were passive and submissive until they matured, got married, and then probably themselves demonstrated their freedom and assertiveness by finding younger, passive sexual partners of the same sex. Greenberg believes these arrangements lasted in ancient Greece until women developed more power, wealth and independence and gradually demanded an end to their husbands' extracurricular sexual activities.

Greenberg suggests that the idea of a stable, lifelong homosexual identity is an invention of modern Western societies. He agrees with the French theorist Michael Foucault that "it was the production and dissemination of a medical discourse in the recent past that gave birth not just to the concept of a homosexual person, but also to homosexuals themselves, and at the same time, to their antitwins, heterosexual persons. In the beginning was the word!"

But the height of homosexual persecution, Greenberg believes, came much earlier, during the Middle Ages -- in part the unintended consequence of the requirement of celibacy for the priesthood of the Catholic Church. With the elimination of heterosexual outlets, same-sex expression was bound to develop. The Catholic Church reacted to homosexuality in both the priesthood and the laity by imposing stricter and stricter penalties. Eventually churches fought for civil punishment of homosexuality, including the death penalty.

In the modern world, such repressive measures gradually weakened. Several forces in modern societies worked not only to liberalize attitudes but to develop the social logics that created both modern homosexual identity and more tolerant attitudes toward it. To grasp how these forces worked, one must understand that Greenberg accepts the anthropological insight, shared by Freudians and most sexologists, that human sexuality is extremely plastic and innately nonspecific with regard to sexual objects. All of us, according to Greenberg, have the capacity

to be sexually attracted to members of the same sex. Whether or not these feelings are labeled as such and organized into overt behaviors and lifelong identities is a result of a wide combination of social and cultural dynamics.

What are some of these social forces and social logics? Urbanization, science, medicine and bureaucracy are among the ones Greenberg discusses most thoroughly. Urbanization erodes the communal guidance of rural and village life and throws young people of the same sex into specialized contacts. Their diffuse sexual feelings may be excited by same-sex contacts, and they may gradually come to label their sexual feelings, and finally even themselves, as homosexual rather than heterosexual.

Science contributes to the development of the modern homosexual identity by inviting people to think in deterministic ways about their feelings: if people sense within themselves homosexual feelings, they are more likely to interpret these feelings as inevitable and as determined by some necessary biological or psychological force. Not only science in general, but the rise of the specialized disciplines of sexology, Darwinist biology, medical psychology and psychoanalysis, have contributed to the development of the homosexual identity. Greenberg's chapter on "The Medicalization of Homosexuality" is a brilliant catalog of the various theories--inheritance, degeneracy, childhood deprivations, masturbation, biological determination--advanced during the 19th and 20th centuries as scientific explanations of homosexuality. Greenberg's point, which others have made as well, is that these specialized disciplines have helped provide the categories, explanations and social attitudes that have contributed to the creation of modern enduring gay and lesbian identities. How many young people today grow up trying to label their subjective sexual feelings somewhere along the continuum of Kinsey's homosexual-bisexual-heterosexual scale? Here, says Greenberg, social science functions as a source of social identity.

Bureaucratization has made its own contribution. It has depersonalized social controls based on family and community ties and has contributed to the continuing negative attitudes that society holds toward homosexuality -- the rationalistic and efficiency-oriented character of modern bureaucracies is thought by most of society to be inconsistent with more diffuse forms of sexual expression that homosexuality suggests to many people.

Greenberg admits that Judaism and early Christianity took a negative view of homosexuality. This view had its roots in the desert God Yahweh's antagonism to sacred male prostitution, which was prevalent in the pagan nature religions that competed with Israel. These attitudes were deepened, Greenberg argues, during the Babylonian exile when Israel was influenced by the extreme antipathy to homosexuality found in Zoroastrianism. It was during this time that the priestly Leviticus codes were formulated. Nowhere in his discussion of ancient Israel or early Christianity does Greenberg deal with theological interpretations of scripture in those traditions.

Greek and Roman societies gradually lost their earlier enthusiasm for homosexuality. Political disappointments in Greek societies led to a new pessimism in Epicurean and Stoic philosophy. A new skepticism about passion arose, a skepticism that eventually culminated in more negative attitudes toward homosexual passion. Later still, as mentioned above, women began to assert their objections to male homosexual practices. One of the disappointments of the book is that this intriguing point about the role of women is emphasized but not sufficiently elaborated. It is also a deficiency that Greenberg tells the story of male homosexuality with little attention to lesbianism

Greenberg is aware that his constructivist perspective may be used against the homosexual movement, but he believes that his first obligation is to the truth. From his perspective, the idea of a static homosexual orientation or essence simply does not hold up against the huge variety of homosexual, bisexual and heterosexual patterns. Not only does Greenberg cover Western societies, but he is constantly making excursions to China, Japan and South America as well. Everywhere he finds significant variations in the prevalence of homosexuality, depending on the social logics of different societies. At one point he indulges in a thought-experiment with reference to certain New Guinea tribes where ritual homosexual practices with young boys are normative.

It is reasonable to suppose that if a bunch of Melanesian infants were to be transported in infancy to the United States and adopted few would seek out the pederastic relationships into which they are inducted in New Guinea, or take younger homosexual partners when they reach maturity. Similarly, American children raised in New Guinea would accommodate themselves to the Melanesian practices.

Greenberg is aware of the comfort that essentialist theories of homosexuality have given the gay and lesbian movements

When heterosexual chauvinists have told homosexuals to change, essentialist theories have provided a ready response: I can't. When parents have sought to bar homosexual teachers from the classroom lest their children (horror of horrors) become homosexual, essentialist theories have provided a seemingly authoritative basis for denying the possibility.

In response to these concerns, Greenberg says,

The present study is concerned only with scientific concerns and cannot make concessions to such opportunistic considerations. It should be pointed out, though, that nothing in the social-constructivist position legitimates the denial of rights . . . Assertive gay liberationists have argued that it may be strategically wiser to concede the possibility that a few students might be influenced to become gay by having an openly gay teacher as a role model, and to say, "So what?"

It is clear that this is a stance that Greenberg endorses. In the nooks and crannies of Greenberg's huge study one can discern this outlook: homosexual and bisexual behavior probably is spreading to larger portions of the society, and this constitutes no basic threat. This horizon of values surrounding and animating Greenberg's book may evoke even deeper controversy than his central thesis.

Greenberg's work challenges the presuppositions of nearly all recent discussions of homosexuality in both Protestant and Catholic churches. Nearly all official statements on homosexuality by these churches in recent years have adopted some version of the essentialist view of homosexuality. It is interesting to think how this has happened in view of the fact that there are articulate intellectuals in both the gay and lesbian communities who have published views similar to Greenberg's. Gay author Dennis Altman has denied the essentialist view and declared that the homosexual movement is a direct continuation of the counterculture's move toward a freer and more inclusive bisexuality (a position similar to the one held by Foucault). This is true, he argues, whether or not individual gays and lesbians recognize it in their own experience. And for some years, certain feminist lesbians have characterized their lesbianism as a political act rather than an orientation. In spite of these testimonies, the churches have for the most part bought variations of the essentialist view put forth by the modern medical and mental health disciplines.

It is difficult to anticipate how the debate will proceed if the churches take seriously Greenberg's argument. His thesis about the social construction of homosexuality can be placed within a variety of ethical and theological frameworks. Some evangelicals will doubtless say that Greenberg's work confirms their deepest fears: homosexuality can grow, and the church's stance against it is essential if the homosexual movement is to be contained. Mainline denominations will be thrown into a state of confusion possibly more profound than the one that now besets them. Accepting Greenberg's thesis might suggest that the new tolerance of these churches, especially the move toward the ordination of homosexuals, is one more way modern societies help create, not just liberate, individuals with gay and lesbian identities. And then there will be those who will argue that the church has no special theological stake in heterosexuality and should open itself to all possible loving sexual combinations, however they may be evolving in modern societies. Regardless of how these debates may develop, it is clear that Greenberg's work challenges assumptions on all sides. The terms of the discussion may never be the same.

The Family Debate: A Middle Way

A great debate is taking place over the condition and prospects of the American family. This debate reflects the fact that Americans are worried about the family. Republicans had hard evidence during the 1992 presidential campaign on the extent of this concern. The Wirthlin Group, which does most of the national polling for the Republicans, published an article in the Reader's Digest (May 1992) which in effect outlined the Republican campaign strategy. It demonstrated that one of the largest and most cohesive voting blocs is married couples with children. According to this article, they are "a political powerhouse, a voting block of about 92 million people, 57 percent of all Americans over 25." They are surprisingly conservative on cultural values and family issues, more conservative than either singles or older couples whose children have left the nest—a point which the church should note.

The Republicans tried to win the election by appealing to this group, but they overplayed their hand. They used the family issue to single out scapegoats (single mothers and inner-city residents), and they avoided talking about the economy and failed to develop meaningful and practical family programs.

Although the Republicans were wrong in how they used the family issue, they were right in recognizing that it is vitally important. The family debate is far from over. Note the countless articles and op-ed pieces on single parenthood, the pros and cons of professional day care, the state of children's health, family—friendly industry, parental leaves, and the sins of absent fathers. Consider the tremendous response to the Atlantic article (April 1993) in which Barbara Dafoe Whitehead argued that the two-parent family is better on the whole for child-rearing than are single parents and stepfamilies. This was followed by sociologist James Q Wilson’s almost identical argument in his Commentary (April 1993) article, "The Family-Values Debate."

Voices from the mainline Protestant churches have been strangely absent from this debate. As James Davison Hunter suggests in Culture Wars, churches have been paralyzed by a division between orthodox and progressive parties that see the family issue—as they see abortion, homosexuality, education and popular culture—in vastly different ways. Mainline churches need to say something relevant to the family debate. Before speaking up, however, they need to face squarely the disturbing trends in family life that are fueling the debate.

1. Families are in crises. The central evidence is the deterioration of the physical and emotional well-being of children. Economists Victors Fuchs and Diane Reklis say bluntly, "American children are in trouble. Not all children, to be sure, but many observers consider today's children to be worse off than their parents' generation in several important dimensions of physical, mental, and emotional well-being." From 1960 to 1988 standardized test scores fell significantly, teenage suicide and homicide rates more than doubled and obesity increased by 50 percent. In 1970, 15 percent of children were in poverty, but by the late 1980s nearly 20 percent were on or below the poverty fine. An authoritative report prepared for the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services by Nicholas Zill and Charlotte Schoenborn provides more discouraging statistics. Twenty percent of children ages 3 to 17 have a developmental, learning or behavioral disorder. By ages 12 to 17, one in four adolescents suffers from at least one of these disorders. One in three teenage boys has one of these problems.

2. Changes in cultural values as well as changes in the economy have contributed to the crisis in families. Changes in values may even be the key factor. Fuchs and Reklis demonstrate that children's well-being began to worsen before the economy turned sour.

Between 1960 and 1970 the fall in test scores, the doubling of teenage suicide and homicide rates, and the doubling share of births to unwed mothers cannot be attributed to economic adversity. During that decade purchases of goods and services for children by government rose very rapidly, as did real household income per child, and the poverty rate of children plummeted. Thus, we must seek explanations for the rising problems of that period in the cultural realm.

The cultural changes that Fuchs and Reklis have in mind are increasing individualism, growing preoccupation with individual fulfillment, wider tolerance for divorce as a solution to marital problems, and more general acceptance at all social levels of the high rates of out-of-wedlock births and single parenthood. These shifts in values preceded and now interact with worsening economic conditions.

3. Changing values have interacted with worsening economic conditions to create increasing numbers of poor women and children. Much of this poverty is associated with single parents, most of whom are women, and is produced by divorce and out-of-wedlock births. The divorce rate has been increasing for a century. It rose from 7 percent in 1860 to over 50 percent today. Furthermore, demographer Larry Bumpass says that "life table estimates suggest that 17 percent of white women and 70 percent of black women will have a child while unmarried if recent levels persist." According to the Census Bureau, the proportion of children born to unmarried women has doubled since 1970 to 28 percent in 1990. Bumpass estimates that 44 percent of all children born between 1970 and 1984 will spend some of their youth in a single-parent home. Frank Furstenberg and Andrew Cherlin say in Divided Families (1991) that if present trends continue, that "figure could reach 60 percent."

It is now more frequently admitted that single parenthood, on the whole, is a disadvantage for raising children. This is true even when single-parent families are not poor, although they frequently are. We have been slow to acknowledge this because we do not want to stigmatize single mothers who are often heroic, frequently quite successful as parents, and may be single for a wide variety of reasons. But in avoiding moralism we should not neglect the truth of the situation. Whitehead and Wilson, in the articles mentioned, summarize well the social science data on this point. Children of single-parent families are far more likely even when they are not poor to do badly in school, get in trouble with the law, have poor mental and physical health, and have marital difficulties later in life.

4. The single most important trend in American families today is the increasing absence of fathers and the feminization of kinship. By feminization of kinship we mean that the families of children are increasingly composed of women—the mothers, grandmothers and aunts who do the child care. Men are increasingly absent from families and their children. Social scientists report that fathers of out-of-wedlock children and divorced fathers give surprising little economic or emotional support to their biological children. There are exceptions. There are the good fathers who do everything they can to give financial and relational support to their children born from former unions. But a large number of these fathers gradually give less and less of either. Furstenberg and Cherlin report that a recent national survey found that after divorce "only one child in six saw his or her father as often as once a week on average. Close to half had not visited with their fathers in the 12 months preceding the survey. Another sixth had seen them less often than once a month." Monetary payments by divorced fathers to their children are low. Fathers of children born out of wedlock visit and pay even less.

5. Families in our society are simultaneously undergoing both deinstitutionalization and coercive reinstitutionalization. Marriage is losing its normative status. By deinstitutionalization we mean not only that fewer couples ask the church to bless their unions, but that many are not even asking the state to make their families official. The proportion of first marriages that were preceded by cohabitation increased from 8 percent in the late 1960s to 49 percent by the mid-’80s. The average duration of cohabitation is short-a median of 1.5 years. Forty percent of these unions split before marriage. Our point is not to moralize about cohabitation but to raise a more complex issue. The deinstitutionalization of marriage and family has led to a new brand of coercive, state-enforced regulation of the family. For example, the state of California requires fathers of out-of-wedlock births to pay the same rate of support as divorced fathers. But such a requirement tremendously expands government control over private lives. Most young men have not awakened to this. One thoughtless sexual adventure can lead to a lifetime responsibility—enforced by the strong arm of the state. A man can avoid marriage, but he is less likely to avoid the courts and their collection agencies. Even the newly developing category of "domestic partnerships" invites coercive state intrusion. Determining the validity of domestic partnerships will entail some investigation by employers and the state into the private lives of couples. Nothing comes free; red tape and public declarations of one kind or another may be required for all those who want government protections and benefits.

6. Family law is diverging sharply from the inherited traditions of the church. For centuries family law in Western industrial societies either reflected or was highly consistent with church teachings. Historian James Brundage and legal historian John Witte have described how Catholic canon law of the Middle Ages was used to a significant extent by both the Protestant Reformation and much of secular family law in Western society. This is why the law until the 1960s resisted or delayed divorce, gave a privileged status to monogamous marriage and upheld the need for public commitments of a mutually consenting man and woman as the ground for the formation of legal families. Now most if not all of these traditional commitments of secular family law are up for grabs. We are likely to hear talk soon of legalizing polygamy, extending marriage privileges to the unmarried, and possibly even abolishing marriage, as the moderator of a conference on "Law and Nature" at Brown University recently proposed.

Family issues will be the dominant ones facing the churches in the 1990s and possibly into the next century. They will be hotter than issues of race, or of investment in South Africa, or of involvement in Central America. Family issues hit people in their innermost beings.

After several decades of ignoring or neglecting families, mainline churches will have to decide which of three pro-family strategies to adopt. The first strategy, the most popular in many liberal churches and denominations, will be simply to accept the new pluralism of the family. According to this view, churches must accept openly and without prejudice the full range of single families, stepfamilies, cohabiting families and same-sex families that modern societies are evolving. This position believes that churches also should pressure the government to extend the range of economic and social supports so that these changing families and their children will not become poor. The church in this view should aim in its ministry to provide the psychological and communal supports that help families maintain their dignity and self-esteem.

The second pro-family strategy is that of the Christian Right. Some of the mainline churches will move in this direction for want of a better strategy. They will resist family pluralism. In emphasizing the centrality of the intact two-parent family, the conservative reaction probably will continue to emphasize traditional gender roles (even if gently) and to advocate aggressive antihomosexual policies. This approach regards the problems of families as primarily cultural, the result of a decline of values. This strategy distrusts most governmental and legal intrusions. It would cure the problems of families with a triumphalist spread of Christian values into the lives of Christians and non-Christians alike and into all corners of public policy.

The third pro-family strategy, the one we advocate, is to try to reconstruct the church's ethics of families while advocating selected governmental and market supports for families. This approach recognizes that the family crisis is caused both by cultural changes and by social-systemic developments in areas of work, economics, child care and gender inequality. This view recognizes, along with the conservative voices, that unfettered individualism and its drive for adult fulfillment at the expense of children presents a real threat to the family. But this third strategy sees the drive toward individualism as partially good. It supports, for example, the push toward more equality for women. Aspects of individualism can be included with integrity in those interpretations of Christian love which see it as commanding a strenuous equal regard for both self and other. This view tries to hold individual fulfillment and regard for the other, be it spouse or children or both, in rigorous balance. Although the Jesus movement and Pauline Christianity never completely freed themselves from the patriarchy of the ancient world, they went far in replacing Greco-Roman male honor-shame patterns and related aristocratic forms of masculine dominance with servanthood models of male responsibility. Furthermore, they pushed the rule of neighbor love and the egalitarianism of the Galatian 3:28 baptismal formula ("there is neither male nor female; for you are all one in Christ Jesus") to the point of threatening patriarchal patterns both within and outside the early Christian ecclesia. This third pro-family approach affirms gender equality even as it both affirms and criticizes aspects of modern individualism.

Mainline churches must recapture their interest in children. For 30 years mainline denominations have tended to see the problems of children and families as privatistic issues. They have held that if the church could help society establish economic and racial justice, the welfare of families and children would automatically follow. The above analysis shows how inadequate this view has proved to be. It failed to anticipate the tremendous shifts in cultural values that have preoccupied adults and undermined the well-being of children and youth. Today, support for family programs, for developing family theory and family theology, and for local initiatives on behalf of families should be top denominational priorities.

Churches should be skeptical, however, of programs that treat children as if they were not a part of families, thereby undermining family solidarity and parental responsibility. Furthermore, they should resist becoming a tool or agent of government programs that have no interest in the unique values and mission of the church. Churches should attempt to find their own voice, their own style, their own message and their own programs, making all other necessary collaborations, even with the state, fit with integrity into their unique identities.

To put children first, mainline churches need to resist easy talk about the new family pluralism. Without becoming moralistic or harsh, they need to recognize that not all family forms are equal for the task of raising children. Intact families have, on the whole, more emotional and material resources for this task. We need to recognize that family pluralism has too often meant exempting men from their responsibilities in raising children, leaving women to do the job. Some people do not believe that fathers are very important for families. For instance, judge Richard Posner in Sex and Reason (1991) argues that there is no convincing evidence, other things being equal, that outside of their procreative functions fathers are necessary for the well-being of their children. In contrast to this view, we believe that the Christian tradition, common sense and the recent social-science evidence summarized by Whitehead, Wilson and others make a strong case for the importance of the educative and moral role of fathers with children, in addition to their procreative and financial contributions. Even if it were possible to replace fathers with government supports, better-paying jobs for single mothers, day care and elaborate social and extended-family networks, it would be unhealthy for both men and society to have increasing numbers of single men adrift without connections to families.

While the churches should promote the egalitarian, intact mother-father partnership as the center of its family ethic, it also must recognize that a pluralism of family forms is a part of modern life, including church life. There is much that churches can do to ease the burden of single parents and stepfamilies and help them do better jobs of raising children. Some churches—mainly large evangelical and some black churches—have outstanding programs for a wide range of family types. They give special emphasis to the two-parent family and at the same time deal realistically, nonjudgmentally and helpfully with all families. Some of these churches have strong programs in marriage preparation and marriage and family enrichment, as well as strong support groups for single parents, divorced people and stepfamilies. They preach and teach regularly about family issues. Some run day-care programs, after-school programs, parental training groups, and sometimes even home visitation programs which assist families with their daily interactions. Some have special programs for men and young boys. Many black churches have programs designed to prepare young men for responsible marriage and parenting. Many conservative churches are able to maintain the tension between their ideals about families and realistic support for where families actually are. But many otherwise excellent programs in conservative and fundamentalist churches are marred by rigid gender distinctions and oppressive male authority. The liberal, mainline churches would do well to imitate the energy of some of the conservative churches on family matters, while finding a new language and new ethic to guide their programs.

If liberal churches are to help reverse the trends toward family decline, their youth programs should emphasize preparation for life in the egalitarian, postmodern family. This family will be "postmodern" because it will not idealize the rigid distinctions between public and private, work and home, breadwinner father and domestic mother that characterized the family that adapted to early industrial society. Since one of the major trends of family life in America is the absence of fathers and the feminization of kinship, boys and young men should be a major target for the church's family programs. If all family forms were equal for raising children, then young men could be ignored. They would not be needed. But if intact mother-father teams are generally better for children, then serious work with young men about parenting ideals and skills should be part of the church's mission.

With regard to trends in family law, mainline churches must live with ambivalence. They must realize that family law may continue to diverge from inherited Christian morality on family matters. The law may grant legal status to more forms of domestic partnership. It may continue to ease divorce proceedings through no-fault settlements. It may protect the rights of youth to make moral decisions about abortion and contraception without the knowledge, and against the moral guidance, of their parents.

But mainline churches would be wise not to adopt these legal developments as their basic morality. Churches should forge their own unique position on family and sexual ethics and help their members live by it. At the same time, churches must realize that some of the new trends in family law may make some sense; it is the primary function of law to regulate behavior, not necessarily to project the moral ideal. Projecting the ideal is the task of culture-making institutions such as the church. This does not mean that churches should be entirely passive before the law. They have the right to influence the law, just like any other group in our society. One part of the law worth influencing, for instance, is divorce laws. Here the task may not be to make divorce more difficult to obtain; rather, the task may be to require divorcing parents to make better long-term financial plans for their children, plans which the courts could enforce.

Finally, the church must understand that there is a place for government family supports in complex postindustrial societies. But they should not petition government to solve those problems that only churches and other voluntary organizations can successfully address. Since the days of their successes in the civil rights movement, mainline churches have tended to think they are fulfilling their mission when they lobby government for worthwhile programs. The first obligation of the churches is to discern their own message, their own values, their own programs; only after these are established should they work to influence government policy.

Nevertheless, government policies are important. Some government programs build families; others tear them down. Some undermine family authority and put control in the hands of experts outside the family. Others build family coherence and deliver real assistance. One such proposal, which has gained support from political right and left, is to increase personal federal income tax exemptions for dependent children. It was first proposed by the Progressive Policy Institute. It recommends increasing the exemption that parents can claim for dependent children from $2,300 to $6,000 or $7,000 for each child. This would make exemptions for dependents equal in value to the original $600 per child that families received in 1948, the year the IRS first allowed the exemptions. The Rockefeller Report titled Beyond Rhetoric (1991) went in a slightly different direction; it recommended a $ 1,000 tax credit for each child. These kinds of legislation help families without causing dependency and without putting family functions into the hands of government. They expand the income of parents and make it possible, for instance, to purchase day care or provide the child care themselves.

Our aim has not been to offer a comprehensive-pro family strategy, but to suggest what a coherent strategy might look like. If nothing more, we have tried to show that a middle road exists and that in the long run it may offer the best course to follow both for the church and for society.

Interpreting What the Bible Says about Homosexuals

Let's begin with a story, a folk tale from Central Asia.

A man, having looted a city, was trying to sell an exquisite rug, one of the spoils. "Who will give 100 pieces of gold for this rug?" he cried throughout the town.

After a buyer was found and the sale completed, a comrade approached the seller and asked, "Why did you not ask more for that priceless rug?"

Perplexed, the seller asked in return, "Is there any number higher than 100?" 

This is a story of limits. It is also a story of opportunities. Does the seller really hear what his comrade is asking? What difference would it make if he could think a number higher than 100?

This story reminds me that there's more than one way to think about the Bible. If we listen carefully, we might discover new and different ways of understanding what the Bible says, what it meant in its own context and what it means to us today.

Likewise, is there only one way to think about homosexuals as persons? Are we willing to explore new and different skills for interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuality?

In this brochure, I share information and raise questions from interpretations which come out of my relationship with the Bible. In turn, I encourage you to formulate your own interpretations. I hope you will consider this a dialogue rather than a one-way conversation. Together, we can try hearing what the Bible says with new ears and maybe "think a number higher than 100."

 We Are All Interpreters

In the gospels, Jesus often begins a parable with the question: What do you think? He was inviting his hearers to think along with him -- in other words, to be interpreters.

Each one of us has ears to hear. We engage in the process of interpretation every day as we try to make sense out of all the different aspects of our lives. Interpretation involves simple things such as reading a newspaper, looking at a sunset, watching TV or talking with a friend. Interpretation also involves complex matters such as the way we think about our lives, our families, the environment, God and reality.

Laypeople often think of themselves as only the recipients of Biblical interpretation from teachers, scholars and pastors. Interpreting the Bible is something other people do by virtue of their education or expertise. But you can and should think of yourselves as Biblical interpreters in your own right. Whenever you tell a Bible story to a child in response to an urgent question, or recite a verse to yourself during a time of crisis or thankfulness -- whenever you incorporate the meanings of the Biblical texts in your daily life -- you are being an interpreter.

 The Process of Interpretation

What do you do when you try to understand someone or something other than yourself? Usually you listen and observe before you form an opinion or make a response. For example, when trying to understand a friend's problem, you listen carefully in order to understand what your friend thinks and feels in order to appropriate faithfully your friend's meaning.

Biblical interpretation works the same way. However, when interpreting the Bible, we often emphasize APPROPRIATING over LISTENING. But we limit our understanding of God's word if we quickly jump to conclusions about what a text means to us now before carefully listening to what the text itself says and what it meant in its own life context. To be faithful interpreters, we need to practice LISTENING as much as APPROPRIATING.

The following diagram illustrates the basic questions that can help us develop our interpreting skills.

  LISTENING

What does it say? What did it mean?

  Life Life

BIBLE UNDERSTANDING YOU

Context Context

  What does it mean now (to me/to us)?

APPROPRIATING

 

Who you are as an interpreter

We all interpret out of our own particular and unique life contexts which in turn shape the way we listen to the Bible. Our contexts include elements such as age, gender, race, ethnicity, education, class, nationality, cultural identity, and other related characteristics. Biblical scholars think of this as their "social location" and are careful to be aware of how it affects their interpretation. "Social location" -- your own life context -- is not something to be denied or eliminated, but rather to be acknowledged and consciously brought into the interpretation process.

 

* What are the main characteristics describing your "social location"? Include some of the elements listed above. You might also include a formative experience or significant life transition that has affected the way you think about things.

* Describe your feelings about your most favorite or least favorite television show or movie. How do these feelings reflect or grow out of your life context?

* Recall a decision that you've recently made. How did that decision reflect or grow out of your life context?

* Think of your favorite Biblical text, image or story. In what ways does it reflect or grow out of your life context?

* What are your present thoughts and feelings about homosexuals? How might these thoughts and feelings be related to your life context?

 What you know about the Bible, sexuality, and homosexuals as persons

  Before exploring your way of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuality, let's first consider what knowledge you bring to your interpretation.

Here is a list of terms and definitions to help you clarify your present understandings. In what ways do you agree or disagree with these statements?

 What is sexuality?

Every person is a sexual person. Our sexuality involves both the psychological and the physical. It includes instincts, drives, and behavior; the way in which we view our bodies; the emotional and physical feelings we have about others (male and female).

Who is a homosexual person?

The basis for deciding whether one is a homosexual person is the erotic preference for partners of the same sex.

Who is a transvestite person?

Transvestites are persons (often homosexuals, but also heterosexuals) who prefer clothing of the opposite sex.

Who is a transsexual person?

A transsexual is a person who feels trapped in the body of the wrong sex, therefore seeking surgery. The transsexual person usually has a psychological make-up quite different from that of most homosexuals.

What is homophobia?

Homophobia is the fear and hatred of homosexuality.

Now let's look at what you may or may not know about what the Bible says about sexuality and homosexuality in general. Note which statements surprise you and which ones do not. Which statements do you agree or disagree with?

Sexuality

1) In general, Biblical texts assume that the difference between male and female is constituted by God. Some texts portray the original being, Adam, as an androgynous being, that is, incorporating both male and female characteristics into one (Genesis 1:26f.;5:1). Some scholars think that Genesis 1 doesn't command heterosexual behavior, but only explains it.

2) Although Biblical texts in general depict human sexual activity as heterosexual and marital (although not always monogamous), these are not always presupposed as the norm. For Jesus, sexuality and marriage are irrelevant in the sphere of resurrection existence (Matthew 22:23-28; Luke 20:34). Paul considered the male-female distinction removed for those "in Christ" (Galatians 3:28). He also considered marriage and human sexual activity not obligatory in the end time (1 Corinthians 7).

3) In some texts the main purpose of marriage is procreation (Genesis 1:28) or containment of sexual impulses (1 Corinthians 7:9). In others, marriage is a provision for companionship (Genesis 2) or the structure for relationships characterized by order and love (Ephesians 5:21f.; Titus 2:4; 1 Peter 3:1f.). Marriage is sometimes used as an image for faithfulness in humanity's relationship to God (Hosea; Ephesians).

4) Throughout Biblical texts, there is a definite patriarchal emphasis. For example, household codes establish the relationship of superior husbands, fathers, and masters over subordinate wives, children, and slaves (Colossians 3:18-4:1; Ephesians 5:21-6:9; 1 Peter 2:18-3:7).

5) Human sexuality in Biblical texts is also portrayed in terms of qualities of relationship such as faithfulness, love, obligation, and justice. Sexuality is not simply how these relationships are acted out in genital sexual activity. In this understanding, what we refer to as same-gender relationships are affirmatively reported, such as those between David and Jonathan, Jesus and the disciples (especially the beloved disciple in John's gospel), Ruth and Naomi, and Mary and Martha.

Homosexuality

1) There is no single word in Hebrew or Greek which lends itself to a simple word-for-word translation of "homosexual." The word appeared in English for the first time in 1912 and in the Bible for the first time in the 1946 RSV in 1 Corinthians 6:9.

2) Biblical texts do not deal with homosexuality as a psycho-sexual orientation determined at birth or developed as a relationship between consenting adults.

3) No Biblical text presents an extensive discussion of same-gender behavior or same-gender relationships.

4) No Biblical text deals with the issue of homosexuality and ministry.

5) There is no reference to homosexuality in the four gospels.

6) Arguments from "silence" are inconclusive and should be weighed carefully. Some interpreters will state, for example, that Jesus had the opportunity to speak on behalf of homosexuals but did not. Others will claim that Jesus' silence meant he did not condemn homosexuality.

Your way of thinking about the Bible, sexuality, and homosexuals as persons

In addition to what we know, how we think will also affect our process of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuality. As you consider the following ways of thinking about people, pick which one you most prefer and which one you least prefer. Give reasons for your choice. You may write your own statement which is different from these or combines elements from them.

1) I tend to approve or disapprove of people based on my values and the values of my friends or my group. For instance, I may think that gays and lesbians are bad because they don't follow what I believe is God's law for human sexuality. Or I may think that gays and lesbians are okay because they cannot help the way God created them.

2) I believe that people should be evaluated on the basis of how they do or do not contribute to society. For instance, I don't think that gays and lesbians should have special laws to protect their rights because they threaten social stability by undercutting family values. Or I may think that the rights of gays and lesbians should be protected because they make significant contributions to society and have been oppressed in the past.

3) I think that people should be seen as individuals with intrinsic worth, as ends in themselves rather than as means to other ends. For instance, I think we should distinguish between responsible and irresponsible homosexuals as we do heterosexuals and treat them accordingly. Or I don't think we should label persons as homosexuals or heterosexuals at all, but treat all people with respect and love.

Your image of the Bible and how you understand its authority will also affect your way of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuals as persons. As you consider the following ways of thinking about the Bible, pick which one you most prefer and which one you least prefer. Give reasons for your choice. You may write your own statement which is different from these or combines elements from them.

1) I image the Bible as a set of guidelines or rules or instructions for the Christian life. It contains truths which have absolute authority for what we believe and how we should live. Therefore, as an interpreter, I tend to look for the one true meaning or lesson that will be useful for me and others.

2) I image the Bible as a source of symbols and ideas -- like forgiveness and grace and faithfulness -- which can help people who find them meaningful and useful. While I believe the Bible contains truths, I also believe that truths can be different for different people, so I don't assume that my interpretation is the only legitimate one. Therefore, as an interpreter, I study the Bible to determine which concepts, verses, and symbols are valid for me and then apply them in my daily life.

3) I image the Bible as a dialogue partner which makes possible my personal encounter with God within my community of faith. The Bible has authority for me because it challenges me to evaluate my life in relation to myself, to others and to God. However, my understanding of what is "true" may change because of changes in my life situation. Therefore, as an interpreter, I try to converse with the messages, people and traditions of the Bible and let the meanings I discover affect my personal commitments and life vision.

 

LISTENING AND APPROPRIATING PROCESS

  This process is designed to help you practice your listening and appropriating skills in interpreting Biblical texts. Try to listen with new ears to what the texts say and what they meant in their own context and then what they mean in your life context.

1) Read the text aloud.

2) Make notes of your initial impressions. How do you feel about the text? What do you like or dislike? Understand or don't understand?

3) Concentrate on listening to what the text says and what it meant in its own life context. Here are some questions that might guide your listening.

* How does it begin?

* How does it move to its conclusion?

* What are the key words and ideas?

* How does it relate to the verses which come immediately before and after?

* What life context does it address?

* What is its purpose in response to that life context?

4) After praying or meditating or reflecting on what the text says and meant in its own life context, make notes of what you might find meaningful to your life context. Identify insights, new information, images of God and human responsibility, personal feelings, guidelines, concepts, struggles, and so forth. Be free to use your imagination. But stay in dialogue with what the text says and what it meant in its own life context.

5) In conclusion you might write your appropriation of the text in a prayer, poem, drawing, paragraph or sentence. Or you might want to imagine how you could put the meanings of the text into some sort of concrete action.

Your way of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuals as persons

What does the Bible say about homosexuals as persons? We now see that this question presupposes both what we know and ways we think about the Bible, homosexual persons, and ourselves as interpreters.

Let's work on interpreting the actual texts. There are only six Biblical passages (perhaps eleven, if you count parallel stories) which refer to homosexuality -- that is, same-gender genital activity, predominantly between males. These passages are located in contexts which deal with other, in some cases much broader topics.

Whether in a group or by yourself, begin your interpretation of each text by using the LISTENING AND APPROPRIATING PROCESS. Once you've done this, turn to the SUGGESTIONS FOR LISTENING. Use them along with the Biblical Tools which follow and the information presented earlier on what the Bible says about sexuality and homosexuality in general. Consider these your "dialogue partners." Remember, though, you are your own interpreter and, in a sense, your own expert.

Texts

Genesis 19:1-11 in the context of God's promise to Abraham (Genesis 18-19) and the parallel story in Judges 19:22-30).

Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13 in the context of other laws in Leviticus 18-20.

Deuteronomy 23:17-18.

Romans 1:26-27 in the context of the letter's introduction (Romans 1-3).

1 Corinthians 6:9-11 in the context of Paul's instructions (1 Corinthians 5-6).

1 Timothy 1:8-11.

Biblical Tools

If possible, have some of the following recommended sources available for your study. It is also important to compare different translations of the texts.

HarperCollins Study Bible. New Revised Version. With the Apocryphal/Deuterocanonical Books. General Editor Wayne A. Meeks. New York: HarperCollins Publisher, 1993.

Harper's Bible Commentary. General Editor James L. Mays. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1988.

Harper's Bible Dictionary. General Editor Paul J. Achtemeier. San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1985.

The Interpreter's One-Volume Commentary on the Bible: Introduction and Commentary for Each Book of the Bible Including the Apocrypha, With General Articles. Editor Charles M. Laymon. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1971.

The New Jerome Biblical Commentary. Editors Raymond E. Brown, S.S., Joseph A. Fitzmyer, S.J. (emeritus), and Roland E. Murphy, O. Carm. (emeritus). Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1990.

Peake's Commentary on the Bible. Editors Matthew Black and H. H. Rowley. New York: Thomas Nelson and Sons Ltd., 1962.

KJV = King James Version

RSV (46) = Revised Standard Version (1946)

RSV (72) = Revised Standard Version (1972)

NRSV = New Revised Standard Version

NIV = New International Version

TEV = Today's English Version

JB = Jerusalem Bible

NEB = New English Bible

 

SUGGESTIONS FOR LISTENING

 Genesis 19: 1-11

  *Identify what was considered offensive in this story.

*Compare the NEB with the RSV (72) for information about the intended behavior of the "men of Sodom."

*What do you think was the purpose of that behavior?

*If possible, read the article on "hospitality" in Harper's Bible Dictionary, pp. 408-409.

*What was the sin of Sodom for which "the outcry against its people has become great before the Lord" (19:13 NRSV)? See how that sin was understood in Isaiah 1:10; Ezekiel 16:48-49; Jeremiah 23:14; Matthew 10:14-15; Luke 10:10-12; Jude 5-7; 2 Peter 2:4-11.

Judges 19:22-30

*Identify what was considered offensive in this story.

*List the differences from and similarities to Genesis 19:1-11.

*Read the larger context in Judges 19-21. How did the various acts of violence relate to the abomination of the men of Gibeah (20:6) and to Israel's reprisal (20:12f.)?

 Deuteronomy 23:17-18

(see also 1 Kings 14:24; 15:12; 22:46; 2 Kings 23:7)

*It is important to read these texts in several different translations, if possible. Start with KJV and then contrast that version with the RSV (72), NRSV and NEB.

*What life situation is suggested by the more recent translations for the texts?

*If possible, read notes on these texts in one of the study Bibles or commentaries. What information do they supply? What are your conclusions?

 Leviticus 18:22 and 20:13

*What does the text say?

*To whom is the law addressed?

*What kind of behavior is indicated and prohibited? What reasons are given for this behavior to be labeled "an abomination?"

*If possible, read the article "abomination" in Harper's Bible Dictionary, p. 6. How do these texts relate to what is described in the article?

*The "holiness laws" in Leviticus 17-26 deal with lists of "unmixable classes or categories." Note the introductions to various lists in 17:1; 18:1-5; 19:1-2; 20:1 and so forth. What were the purposes of these lists for Israel?

*What other behaviors are listed in the immediate context of 18:22 and 20:13? Are the prohibited behaviors similar or different? What do you think was the purpose of listing these kinds of behaviors?

Romans 1:26-27

*What kind of behavior is attributed to "their women" and "the men?" Compare the NRSV with the RSV (72) to see how some translators understand the word "natural."

*When Paul refers to "them" (1:26), let me suggest that he refers to Greeks or Gentiles. Here it is necessary to read the context beginning at 1:16. In 1:16-17, Paul states the letter's thesis about God's salvation and righteousness. In 1:18-3:20 Paul presents an extensive discussion about the "wrath of God" for Gentile sin (1:18-32) and Jewish sin (2:1-3:8), and concludes that "all, both Jews and Greeks, are under the power of sin" (3:9-20). This is his long prelude to a lengthy discussion about God's righteousness and salvation "for all who believe" (3:21-8:39).

*What is "this reason" why "God gave them up to degrading passions?" See 1:18-25 for Paul's discussion of the "sin" or "error."

*Are the "unnatural" sexual relationships the only result of this sin? See 1:28-32.

*How does Paul characterize or describe the unnatural relations in 1:26-27? Why do you think he would refer to these as not "natural"?

*What do you think was Paul's purpose in emphasizing that "God gave them up" (1:24, 26, 28) to these various behaviors?

 1 Corinthians 6:9-11

  *Begin this study by reading KJV and RSV (46). The word "homosexuals" first appeared in the Bible with this RSV (46) translation.

*Contrast how these verses are translated in RSV (72), NEB, JB and TEV. Consult the chart on the facing page for these translations, including the translation by Edgar Goodspeed.

*The translations differ because the translators were seeking to identify Paul's intended meaning of two Greek words: malakoi and arsenokoitai. The former meant "soft" with derivative meanings of "effeminate" or "passive" or a male who plays the part of a woman, hence "catamite." The latter was a compound word of "male" and "bed" which had the connotation of a male who lies with a male, hence "sodomite." This is the earliest known occurrence of arsenokoitai.

*What other behaviors are listed in 6:9-10? What was Paul's conclusion in 6:11?

*What was Paul's purpose for this list and its conclusion in relation to his discussions in 6:1-8 and in 6:12-20?

 1 Timothy 1:8-11

  *Begin this study by comparing different translations. For example, the NRSV translates the beginning of the list in 1:10 with "fornicators, sodomites." The word "sodomite" is arsenokoitai found in 1 Corinthians 6:9. Other translations of 1 Timothy 1:10 include "for them that defile themselves with mankind" (KJV) and "perverts" (NEB and NIV).

*What other behaviors are listed in 1:9-10? *What topic does the author introduce in 1:8? What does the author say about this topic?

*How does the author relate the list in 1:9-10 to this topic? What seems to be the author's purpose?

  

SUGGESTIONS FOR APPROPRIATING

  Here are some possible ways to appropriate what the Bible says about homosexuals as persons. These correspond to the three ways of imaging the Bible discussed earlier: as offering rules for behavior, concepts for belief, and images of faith.

 Rules for Behavior

  Interpreters have drawn various conclusions about the implications of these texts for rules of behavior. Usually the implications are negative, such as do not practice homosexual behavior or do not treat homosexuals as equal.

There may be other Biblical rules which have a bearing on our interpretation of the behavioral implications of these texts. For instance, consider the commandment to "Love your neighbor as yourself" in Matthew 19:19 and Matthew 22:39 - Mark 12:31 - Luke 10:27. Or "Do not judge, so that you may not be judged" in Matthew 7:1 - Luke 6:37.

 Concepts for belief

  Some interpreters think that all the texts about homosexuality point to the same concept, namely that homosexuality is an abomination.

There are other concepts you may hear from these texts. For instance, the general invocation for covenant fidelity in Leviticus 18-20 and Deuteronomy 23. Or the portrayal of the human condition as sinful and the potential for transformation because of God's grace in Romans 1-3. Or the emphasis on communal solidarity in 1 Corinthians 6 and 1 Timothy 1.

 

Images of faith

In Romans 1, Paul appeals to the image of God as Creator. He says that the appropriate behavior for humans as creatures is to worship and honor only God. As we reflect on that image, we might consider how we make our images of sexuality, heterosexuality, or homosexuality into idols.

Christians also have the opportunity to interpret the Bible in light of their image of Christ. You might use a brief creedal summary to see how that would shape the way you interpret the texts. For instance:

Christ died for our sins (1 Corinthians 15:3; Romans 6:10f.). We all need and receive God's forgiving and liberating grace portrayed through Christ's death on the cross.

Christ is risen from the dead for our new life (1 Corinthians 15:4; Romans 12:2; John 11:25). We all have access to the transforming power of Christ.

Christ will come again to collect us all into one (1 Thessalonians 4:17; Ephesians 1:10). We believe that Christ's coming will complete his work of unification already begun (Galatians 3:28). Therefore we seek to live out that image of being one in Christ.

 

Think about these Suggestions for Appropriating the meaning of the Biblical texts in relation to your way of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuality.

* In what ways do you find the rules for behavior suggested above helpful or not helpful in this situation? What about the concepts for belief? Images of faith?

*What other rules for behavior do you find in the Bible which might apply here? Other concepts for belief? Images of faith?

Perhaps you feel better equipped now to evaluate and respond to the various arguments or information concerning homosexuality you encounter in church, the media, and the political arena. You might try summarizing your way of interpreting what the Bible says about homosexuals as persons using your new LISTENING and APPROPRIATING skills. Your understanding may have changed since beginning the process of study and reflection in this brochure.

You also now have some Biblical interpretation skills that you can apply to other Biblical texts -- those that are your favorites or those that have proven difficult to understand. You might even try using these LISTENING and APPROPRIATING skills during the many times in your daily life when you're called on to be an interpreter. In any case, I hope you've found this process helpful -- trying together to "think a number higher than 100."

 

(The story which begins this essay is found in Robert Ornstein's essay on The Psychology of Consciousness in a book by Thomas Roberts and Frances Clark called Transpersonal Psychology in Education (Bloomington, IN: The Phi Delta Kappa Educational Foundation, 1975, 33).

Giving to Religion: How Generous Are We?

There is good reason to believe that Americans are receiving an overly optimistic picture of charitable giving in the U.S. As a result, church members do not have accurate information to help assess their own giving or to evaluate broader trends. Solid information about giving is also crucial in light of current discussion about the private sector's ability to take on social service programs that governments are relinquishing. As Arthur Hays Sulzberger, former publisher of the New York Times, said, "A man's judgment cannot he better than the information on which he has based it."

The main source for data on annual giving is Giving USA, a publication of the American Association of Fund-Raising Counsel, Inc. Trust for Philanthropy, which is an association of professional fund raisers. The association's multidecade series of reports on philanthropy began in the 1950s. The Giving USA series is considered the authoritative source. It is cited under "Philanthropy" in the government's Statistical Abstract Of the United States. AAFRC data also holds a definitive place in print media ranging from the Chronicle of Philanthropy and the NonProfit Times to the Associated Press, Newsweek, Time, U. S. News & World Report, Forbes, New York Times, Chicago Tribune and Washington Post. In 1992, for example, when George Will argued that "in the greed-soggy 1980s charitable giving by individuals and corporations increased dramatically," he was using an analysis of AAFRC data.

The problem is that AAFRC's interpretation of the level of charitable giving in this country is almost certainly inflated. We reach this conclusion for three reasons.

• AAFRC's estimate of religious giving is too high, which, by extension, signals a too high estimate in overall giving.

• By presenting certain data only in aggregate form, AAFRC's reports do not take into account significant changes in population and individual taxes. What can be presented as a rise in giving in aggregate form may actually appear as a decline in giving when presented, for example, on a per capita basis.

• AAFRC's figure for individual contributions for the most recent years is a projection based on recent changes in personal income and the stock market - though AAFRC presents this as though it were actual giving data.

Before exploring the problems with the data, it's important to outline AAFRCs approach.

Each year AAFRC develops two independent estimates of charitable giving. One is for total charitable giving by "source" - that is, giving coming from individuals, corporations, foundations and bequests. The other estimate appears under the heading of "use," by which they mean donations categorized by type of recipient institution, such as religion, education, health or human services. By surveying data from selected agencies that fall under that rubric, AAFRC extrapolates a total income figure for a specific "use" category. Any difference between the sum of "source" giving estimates and the sum of "use" giving estimates is assigned to a category labeled "unclassified." Through this practice AAFRC reconciles the two overall totals.

A second decisive aspect of AAFRC's approach is the way it treats contributions to religion. Beginning in some unstated year up through 1986, AAFRC regarded religion as what it termed a "residual" category. That meant, as the editor explained in Giving USA 1988, that "each year's [religion] figure is the amount that remains of total giving after all other recipient estimates have been devised." In other words, through 1986 religious giving was an estimate based on a number that remained after other giving data had been accounted for. In1986 that residual sum was $41.7 billion.

For the years 1987 through 1995, according to the methodology used in Giving USA 1997, AAFRC updated its figure for religious giving by using denominational data to show the change in giving (by percentage) from year to year. Essentially, AAFRC used the 1986 "residual" figure for religious giving as a base point, then superimposed denominational statistics to build estimates for future years on that figure. The accuracy of the 1986 figure, of course, is crucially important. For 1996 AAFRC explained that, since denominational data were not yet published, an unspecified "relationship between personal income and giving to religion was used to estimate giving to religion." It's important to stress that, despite the incorporation of denominational data in these more recent years, these subsequent estimates, including AAFRC's estimate that $66.26 billion was given to religion in 1995, still build on the earlier years when religion was treated as a "residual" category.

This brings us to our first major reason for questioning the accuracy of AAFRC's account of charitable giving: its estimate of religious giving is too high. The accuracy of the $66.26 billion figure for 1995 can be tested by making use of another data source -- one that, intriguingly, AAFRC itself uses in categories other than religion. AAFRC now keys its 1960-1972 figures for charitable giving in the areas of education and health -- the second and third largest areas of charitable giving, religion being the first -- to figures developed by the Commission on Private Philanthropy and Public Needs, commonly referred to as the Filer Commission after its chair, John H. Filer. Begun as a private initiative by John D. Rockefeller III with support from other national figures, including then Secretary of the Treasury William Simon, the commission's landmark reports were published by the Department of the Treasury in the 1970s.

Of special note for the present discussion is that the Filer Commission estimated that in 1974 contributions to religion totaled $11.7 billion. As it turns out, this estimate was close to AAFRC's 1974 estimate of religious giving -- $11.84 billion.

Using the 1974 Filer Commission religion estimate of $11.7 billion as a base point, and then using available denominational data on giving, a series of annual figures for the years 1968 through 1973 and 1975 through 1995 can be calculated. (A set of 29 denominations that published data in the Yearbook of American and Canadian Churches provides the basis for calculating such an annual rate of change.) These revised numbers can be compared to the AAFRC figures.

Our Filer-based calculations yield a figure for giving to religion in 1995 of $44.47 billion. AAFRC's 1995 estimate of $66.26 billion given to religion is 49 percent larger -- a discrepancy of over $20 billion. For comparison, total giving to education, the second largest "use" category, was $17.61 billion in 1995. Figure 1 presents both the AAFRC and Filer-based religion series in aggregate current dollars. The uncertainty of AAFRC's figures on giving to religion points to what may be another significant problem. AAFRC suggests that more than half of all individual giving is directed to religion, and that individual giving represents 80 percent of all charitable activity. An overly high AAFRC estimate of giving to religion, therefore, raises the question of whether AAFRC's estimate of total charitable giving is significantly above the actual mark.

The second reason we question AAFRC's estimates on charitable giving has to do with the way it presents its numbers. When AAFRC announces charitable giving according to its "use" categories, it does so in aggregate form, without acknowledging changes in population or the amount of taxes paid. To be sure, for each "use" subcategory, such as education or health, AAFRC's Giving USA report provides both a current dollar and an inflation-adjusted figure. However, this adjustment does not address other important factors.

Consider how Philip Meyer in The New Precision Journalism analyzes newspaper circulation for the period from 1960 to 1988. While circulation slowly increased, Meyer informs us, the population and the number of households increased faster. Therefore, while the aggregate number of newspapers sold may have increased, Meyer believes that the more telling figure reveals that the number of papers circulated per household steadily declined. The comparison to giving is obvious. While the aggregate figure for charitable giving may have risen, giving on a per capita basis may be declining.

We need, then, to analyze per-capita giving. And by considering giving as a portion of per capita disposable (after-tax) income, we can develop a picture of giving over time that takes into account both population and variation in the amount of taxes paid.

According to AAFRC's Giving USA 1997 data, $8.42 billion was given to religion in 1968 and $66.26 billion in 1995. By taking into consideration taxes and population changes we can calculate from AAFRC data that Americans gave 1.35 percent of income to religion in 1968, and 1.25 percent in 1995 -- a decline of 8 percent between 1968 and 1995.

Compare these findings to our Filer-based estimate that $8 billion was given to religion in 1968 and $44.5 billion in 1995. On the basis of these figures, when population and taxes are taken into consideration, giving to religion as a percentage of income declined over these years from 1.29 percent to 0.84 percent -- a decline of 35 percent from the 1968 base. Figure 2 presents per capita religion giving as a percent of disposable personal income for both the AAFRC and Filer-based numbers.

The accuracy and helpfulness of estimates on charitable giving, therefore, is closely connected to how the calculations are finally reported.

Those who acknowledge a decline in religious giving often ask whether donors are redirecting money from churches to helping agencies. AAFRC reports that giving to human services was $2.31 billion in 1968 and $11.70 in 1995. If those figures are related to population figures and analyzed in terms of per capita disposable personal income, giving to human services declined from 0.37 percent in 1968 to 0.22 percent in 1995 -- down 41 percent from the 1968 base. That compares to an 8 percent drop in AAFRC's own estimate of income given to religion, or the 35 percent decline in the Filer-based series, which suggests that giving as a portion of income to both churches and helping agencies has declined. (A caveat must be added here: since AAFRC does not generally provide a breakdown of how much individuals give to various "use" categories, including human services, these comparisons are only approximate.)

The third reason we question AAFRC's estimates for charitable giving concerns the way it develops its estimate for individual giving. AAFRC's estimate of the most recent year of individual giving is a projection -- one based on changes in "total personal income, the factor given the most weight," and "the Standard and Poors 500 Stock Index for the months of November and December." The explanation of the methodology for Giving USA 1997 (available on request from AAFRC) indicates that the data for both 1995 and 1996 are projections. The projections, which are generally presented as though they were actual giving data, are consistently too high.

The public, then, has a difficult time evaluating a major publication such as U. S. News & World Report (December 22, 1997) when it makes the announcement -- for which no source is given -- that charitable activity was "up 9.5 percent in two years," a figure that corresponds to AAFRC figures for that time period. Yet for the past six years AAFRC has routinely revised its previous year's total charitable giving figure downward. Its market and income-based model

for estimating giving is not matching reality. How much credence, then, should be placed in AAFRC's widely reported projection about current charitable activity?

All those working in philanthropy, including AAFRC, want to provide accurate figures. Philanthropy has gained increased visibility in recent years, and we hope that the added interest can provide an impetus to continually correct and refine the information base.

To that end, we propose that AAFRC publish both the raw data and the formulae and procedures it uses to produce and update its estimates. Another important piece of information would be a table that breaks down, within each of the "use" categories, the amounts from each source category, such as individuals or corporate grants, over the time span for which AAFRC publishes data.

In the meantime, we return to some very live questions. Can the private sector absorb discontinued government programs? And how much should people give?

A guest writer in the NonProfit Times has estimated that the private sector would have to provide an additional $15.7 billion a year to make up for government cuts. If church members gave 10 percent -- rather than the current 2.5 percent -- of their incomes, an additional $114 billion per year could be available. If $23 billion were directed to domestic programs, there would be an additional $68 billion for international word and deed ministry available, all while maintaining current church activity.

While many people endorse the classic tithe, the data suggest that most people are not interested in giving more. On the contrary, giving has been declining as a portion of income for almost 30 years. Giving patterns will have to change dramatically for members to fulfill more of their potential to share God's love with a hurting world. As Christians try to make intelligent decisions about these important matters, accurate information is indispensable.

 

Did You Really Go To Church This Week? Behind the Poll Data

Church attendance in the U.S. is, apparently, stable and strong. Year after year 40 percent of Americans tell pollsters that they attended church or synagogue in the last seven days. From this evidence, American religion seems quite hardy, especially compared to the statistics from European nations. If the poll data can be believed, three decades of otherwise corrosive social and cultural change has left American church attendance virtually untouched.

Public opinion polls, which measure everything from church attendance to confidence in the president, provide many of the "hard facts" that social scientists (and the general public) use to understand the social world. But how much trust should we put in the polls, particularly in the accounts people give of their own behavior?

Numerous studies show that people do not accurately report their behavior to pollsters. Americans misreport how often they vote, how much they give to charity and how frequently they use illegal drugs. Their misreporting is in the expected direction: people report higher than actual figures for voting and charitable giving, lower for illegal drug use. People are not entirely accurate in their self-reports about other areas as well. Males exaggerate their number of sexual partners; university workers are not very honest about reporting how many photocopies they make. Actual attendance at museums, symphonies and operas does not match survey results.

We should not expect religious behavior to he immune to such misreporting. Several years ago we teamed up with sociologist Mark Chaves to test the 40 percent figure for church attendance. Our initial study, based on attendance counts in Protestant churches in one Ohio county and Catholic churches in 18 dioceses, indicated a much lower rate of religious participation than the polls report. Instead of 40 percent of Protestants attending church, we found 20 percent. Instead of 50 percent of Catholics attending church, we found 28 percent. In other words, actual church attendance was about half the rate indicated by national public opinion polls.

Gerald Marwell, then editor of American Sociological Review, said our research raised questions about "stylized facts" that are passed around "as if they were the truth." Of course, much depends on whose experience does or does not match the presumed "truth" about American church attendance.

Many people, and particularly local church pastors, did not seem surprised by our findings. In fact, a story in the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that "plenty of religious leaders express private doubts about polls that find almost half of American adults say they worship God each week." Less congratulatory, although still confirming, were the reactions of some of our colleagues, friends and family which tended to go something like, "So you discovered what everybody else already knew," or "Well, I could have told you that church attendance wasn’t that high without doing a study about it."

Others saw the truth about American church attendance quite differently. While very few laypersons or clergy seemed troubled by our findings, one active laywoman did call to protest that her suburban church was "packed" at every service.

The greatest outcry, however, came from survey organizations who produce the polls, social scientists who utilize poll findings to bolster arguments about the vitality of American religion, and a number of Roman Catholic researchers who argued that we exaggerated the overreporting in their constituency. One prominent sociologist, who represents all three groups, said our research was "a sloppy piece of work" and added, "I doubt if the subject was anything but religion that a serious science journal would publish it."

Rather than attack the research directly, the Gallup Organization tried to explain the positive (and, in its eyes, erroneous) response to it. In Emerging Trends Gallup suggested that those who doubt the validity of the 40 percent figure may be reacting to their own experience in places (such as large cities) where attendance is likely to be low.

We did not begin our research with the assumption that the Gallup figures were "wrong." Like other social scientists who use survey data, we trusted Gallup poll results because we knew they employed sound sampling methods. Doubts emerged, however, when we compared statistics on church membership from American denominations to Gallup’s reports on church attendance. If the percentage of Americans attending church is stable, aggregate church membership should have increased as the American population grew. But after adding together denominational membership statistics (including estimates of membership for independent congregations) we found that the aggregate membership total has been virtually static since the late 1960s. This contradiction led us to wonder if Americans were reporting the same level of attendance to pollsters while their actual church participation was dropping. Our first study provided an initial test of this dynamic. Subsequent research confirmed it in important ways.

We returned to Ashtabula County, Ohio, to add a Roman Catholic attendance count to our previous count of Protestants. Because Catholic parishes did not regularly record attendance, we counted Catholic mass attendance ourselves by attending each scheduled mass at every Catholic parish in the county. We attended a total of 38 masses in 13 parishes over several months, counting attendance at each mass. Our counts showed that 24 percent of Catholics attended mass during an average week. In a poll of Ashtabula county residents, however, 51 percent of Roman Catholic respondents said they attended church during the past week. The gap between what people say and do in this rural county is roughly the same as that found in the original study among Catholics in 18 metropolitan dioceses.

We also conducted a study of church attendance in a county in Canada (Oxford County in southern Ontario) using the same methods employed in Ashtabula (using a survey of county residents, attendance reports from Protestant churches and personal counts of Catholic attendance). The results confirm that a large church attendance gap also exists north of the border. The same is true for Great Britain. In the U.S., Canada and Great Britain, the number of people who say they attend church is much higher than the number who actually attend. The proportion of residents who say they attend church is lower in Canada and Britain, of course, but the proportionate size of the discrepancy is remarkably similar.

These studies increased our confidence that church attendance is overreported and that it is not a uniquely American phenomenon. But we also wanted to know why people overreport. Although some colleagues have (somewhat) jokingly accused us of calling decent Americans "liars," we have never argued that people "lie" about their church attendance. Follow-up questions about what people meant by "attending church" revealed that a few were counting things other than attending worship—such as going to weddings, funerals, committee meetings, Sunday school and choir practice. One individual in Ashtabula County even said his attendance consisted of mowing the church lawn on the previous Saturday. Being at church for reasons other than worship "counts" as church attendance for some people who answer poll questions. But these cases represent less than 2 percent of all persons polled, and a large attendance gap remains when they are removed. Why do other people misreport attendance?

A few years ago a longtime staff member of the National Council of Churches and an active church member responded to our findings by admitting that if Gallup called her to inquire about her attendance in the last seven days, she would say she attended even if she had not done so, and she would not consider her response to be a lie. Her reasoning? Saying yes was an affirmation of her involvement in and support of the church. Not attending was atypical, so to count her as a "nonattender" would be inaccurate and misleading.

Most overreporting occurs among those who consider themselves to be regular church attenders. In another study, conducted among members of a large evangelical church in the South, we were able to determine exactly who misreported their attendance. Most of those who said they attended and who, in fact, did not were people who report that they normally attend church "every week." People who attend less often—particularly those who say they normally attend once a month or less—accurately reported that they did not attend church in the previous week.

Researchers who study how people answer survey questions have long known that responses to behavioral questions represent more (or less) than "just the facts." When asked how many times they ate out last week, how frequently they have sex, and whether or not they voted in the last election, most people report what they usually do, what they would like to do or what they think someone like them ought to do. The question that Gallup asks, "Did you, yourself, happen to attend church or synagogue in the last seven days?" provokes similar, often less than factual responses.

Active church members who did not happen to attend church last Saturday or Sunday are expected to say no in response to Gallup’s question. But this creates problems for people who see themselves as committed church members and "weekly attenders." Many have an internal rule that says, "I am a person who attends church every week." Saying "No, I did not attend church" violates that internal rule and identifies them, symbolically, as nonchurchgoers. On the other hand, saying, "Yes, I went" is consistent with their internal rule, counts them on the side of active churchgoers, is in line with their usual behavior (including what they hope to do next week) and affirms their support of the church.

It is possible to reduce the gap between poll-based estimates of church attendance and actual attendance by using questions that do not make the respondent symbolically choose between being churched and unchurched. This is illustrated by the different rates of church attendance produced by different kinds of questions. In Great Britain, for instance, Gallup asks people what they did the previous weekend and presents a list of likely possibilities. Going to church is listed alongside watching television, taking a walk, reading a newspaper and a number of other options. This question produces a weekly attendance rate of about 14 percent.

When the U.S. version of the question is asked in Great Britain, the weekly attendance rate rises to 21 percent. How many people in Great Britain really attend church in a typical week? Peter Brierley’s figures from the 1989 English Church Census and additional attendance data from the 1996-97 UK Christian Handbook indicate that only around 10 percent attend worship services each week. Typically, these lower figures are used when religious activity in Britain is compared to the U.S., which means that churchgoing in America appears to be three or four times greater than in Britain. When the same poll question is used in both countries, however, attendance in the U.S. is only twice as high as it is in Great Britain.

An Australian wording of the church attendance question also produces a lower rate. When asked, "How long is it since you last went to church, apart from weddings, funerals and similar occasions?" 15 percent of Australians said they attended church in the previous week. But when the U.S. version of the question was asked on a national poll in Australia, attendance claims rose to slightly over 20 percent.

Clearly, poll data should not be taken at face value. Moreover, it appears that poll results are not equal: different wording produces significantly different results. Why does it matter? Because the image of religion in America as exceptionally strong and stable has been at least partially supported by poll data. Our research raises doubts about that image.

If the portrait of American religion painted by poll data is not as strong as once thought, does it necessarily follow that it is less stable? Has a large gap always existed between what people say about attendance and what they actually do, or have consistent responses to the polls masked declines in actual church attendance?

The San Francisco Bay area provides the ingredients for testing the possibility of a changing attendance gap. We have accurate attendance counts along with poll-based estimates of church attendance in the region for several decades. Although the Bay area may seem atypical, it does reflect clear trends in the western region of the U.S. and, to a lesser degree, the rest of the country. Mainline Protestants have declined, whereas nontraditional groups, including once-marginal Protestant churches, smaller sects and non-Western religions, have increased. At the same time, a growing number of people have shed their particular religious affiliations, saying they are just "religious, spiritual" or have no religion at all.

The Archdiocese of San Francisco has collected attendance data from all its parishes since 1961. In the subsequent 35 years mass attendance fell by almost half, dropping from 205,000 to 107,000. Yet two surveys of community residents in the three-county archdiocese area (one in 1972 and one in 1996) reveal a very stable Roman Catholic population and a stable proportion of Catholics who say they attended church. The net result is an increasing gap between saying and doing. Actual mass attendance dropped while self-reported attendance remained the same.

An increasing attendance gap also was found in Great Britain. When identical survey questions are compared, poll-based rates of church and synagogue attendance are static from 1970 to the mid-1990s. At the same time, actual attendance counts in churches and synagogues dropped by more than a third.

What does a growing gap between saying and doing mean? The issue is one of self-identity at a couple of levels. First, a "churched" identity, once established, seems remarkably resilient and long-lasting. Second, whereas "churched" behavior might be important for establishing such an identity, continued frequent attendance does not seem necessary for people to maintain it.

A middle-aged woman we interviewed in Connecticut—let’s call her Carol—is typical of many people who continue to see themselves as "regular" churchgoers despite increasingly irregular attendance. She was raised in the 1950s and 1960s by parents who were United Church of Christ members and active churchgoers. Carol went to church or church-related youth events almost weekly through her teens but dropped out during college and the early years of marriage, childbearing and raising children. In their early 30s Carol and her husband returned "for the sake of the children" to a Presbyterian church (a compromise between his Episcopal background and her own Congregational one).

Before long, however, Carol’s kids lost interest in church school and the youth group to which few of their best friends belonged. Neither she nor her husband was inclined to fight their children’s (or their own) competing interests. Carol, however, retains a lingering commitment to the church and likes to see herself as a "regular" member. She continues to go when she can, and she has managed to stay connected by donating her silk-screening services for youth retreats and other church events. Now the family attends church together only at Christmas or Easter or for other special services, and even then they may opt for the local Methodist or Episcopal church, depending on service times, the preacher, the music or which family members are going.

Carol and her family don’t know the current minister or many active church members very well. There is less and less pressure to attend. Still, the church seems welcoming and familiar whenever they do go. And if a pollster calls? Well, depending on the time, circumstances or the question, Carol will either say she’s Congregationalist or Presbyterian. And if asked about her church attendance? Considering her volunteer work, her own solo attendance and participation with family members for special observances, she may easily reason that she’s pretty active. She may even, if pushed, say she went "last Sunday." After all, she went the week before and made quite an effort to do so—and there was that memorial service at mid-week at the Episcopal church, and she was expecting her daughter to visit this weekend and certainly they would try to go together...

Regular church attendance is increasingly difficult, even for those committed to it. Sunday morning is no longer "sacred" time: job responsibilities, sports leagues, family outings, housework and many other things get in the way of traveling to a church building for worship at a scheduled time. And if you happen to miss church next weekend, will anyone know if you slept in, comforted a sick child, left town on business, or decided to have brunch at the Hyatt? Church attendance is increasingly a private matter, and it is correspondingly easier for each of us to maintain an idealized image of ourselves as regular attenders when in fact we may only manage to attend church two or three times a month at the most.

As long as the proportion of Americans who see themselves as regular, fairly active churchgoers is stable, the proportion of Americans who say they attend church each week will remain about the same—regardless of the actual level of attendance. Change in self-reported attendance will occur only when it becomes less important for Americans to see themselves as regular churchgoers or when the definition of "regular churchgoer" changes.

An identity transformation of this type occurred among many Roman Catholics in the U.S. following Vatican II, and it may happen to the next generation of Protestants if lower levels of childhood involvement in the church result in a different interpretation of what it means to be a Christian and an "active church member." Similar changes are happening now in Australia, where an increasing number of people are shedding their nominal church identities and saying they have "no religion."

Too much trust in survey data has produced a distorted image of religion in America by masking declines in church participation. Church attendance is less strong and stable than poll data show. Still, many Americans continue to hold the church in great esteem and define themselves in traditional religious terms. The increasing gap between doing and saying reflects these countertrends.

But we do not think that this pattern can continue indefinitely. Enduring church-related identities are a legacy of involvement in the church. When experience is diminished over many years, church identity is likely to erode, and with it the need to say you went to church when you did not. The challenge for American churches is to help reconnect the doing and the saying, before all is said and done.

A Small Church Redefines its Mission

What is a great church? For many Americans, great is synonymous with large, volume equals vitality quantity means quality. But a countertradition is quietly emerging. As more churches grow to stadium proportions, small congregations are coming to see their diminutive size as an asset for mission.

I had to learn this from experience in serving as part-time pastor of St. Andrew Lutheran Church on Chicago’s southwest side. With 167 members and 98 in worship on a typical Sunday, St. Andrew is a small congregation. But then so are the majority of Protestant churches. Of the approximately 400,000 congregations in the U.S., between 51 and 60 percent average 75 in weekly attendance, a percentage that holds true across racial and class boundaries. Small churches are often defined as those with fewer than 100 in worship on any given Sunday.

Whereas the average Protestant congregation is small, the average Protestant goes to a large church. Half of American Protestants are members of the largest 15 percent of churches. One school of prophets continually warns us that the small church has little future. One church official put into words what many silently believe: "A small church can be defined as one in which the number of active members and the total annual budget are inadequate relative to organizational needs and expenses. It is a church struggling to pay its minister, heat its building, and find enough people to assume leadership responsibilities."

Yet small churches are not dinosaurs destined to lose the struggle for survival. And it is not true that small churches don’t have the resources to do effective mission. As Carl Dudley writes, "When church size is measured by human relationships, the small church is the largest expression of the Christian faith," And David Ray reminds us that "small churches are the norm, primarily because many, many people still find them to be the right size In which to love God and neighbor. I expect they will continue to be the norm."

St. Andrew shares an all-too-common narrative about church growth and decline, and about how good Christians can build bad congregations. It is also a story of hope and renewal.

St. Andrew was founded in 1984 by a synodical out-reach team. The area was growing fast and the future looked bright. The common wisdom of church developers at the time was simple: where there is a pool of white, middle-class, home-owning families with children, mainline churches are likely to grow, no matter what their theological orientation. If you build it, white middle-class folk will come.

According to this model, each congregation took a specific neighborhood as its designated mission area and built its facilities deep within housing developments, not on major streets or intersections. The result was that the church was hidden from the wider community. People were expected to walk to their neighborhood church (or drive a short distance), just as they had done when they lived in the city. But since that era mobility has rapidly increased. Surveys show that most Protestants will travel up to 30 minutes by car to attend church services.

In the 1970s five Lutheran denominations were in competition with each other. The church planters’ goal was to place their particular "franchise" in growing suburbs. Within ten years of St. Andrew’s founding there were eight Lutheran churches representing three different Lutheran church bodies within a five-mile radius. Today there are 40 Lutheran churches within a ten-mile radius, 28 of which are, like St. Andrew, members of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in America. When the ELCA was created out of a series of mergers in 1989, people were free to attend any Lutheran church they desired. Many moved from small congregations to larger ones. Small churches like St. Andrew were vulnerable.

Statistics tell part of the story: In 1979 church attendance had reached 160 at two services, A hundred children were coming to Sunday school. Ten years later only eight children were enrolled, five of them from the same family.

A devastating lack of mission also afflicted St. Andrew. Members understood their mission as, in the words of a church official, "providing a church home to Lutherans." "Find the Lutherans in the neighborhood and invite them to church," was the evangelistic cry. The church had little sense of ministry to the unchurched, the marginal, the poor, or to those who were not of northern European ancestry. The neighborhood changed, but St. Andrew didn’t keep pace. Survival became the church’s bottom line, its mission,

When I arrived in 1991 the congregation had 35 members in worship. I soon heard a laundry list of complaints: there was no choir, the council was exhausted, no one could remember the last "successful" stewardship program, all our neighbors were Catholic, bigger churches next door had better programs, and both the church building and the congregation were aging. To survive, St. Andrew needed to discover a vision suitable to its context.

Recent decades have given rise to many highly influential "teaching" churches which promise to help churches develop a vision. Chicago is a wonderful treasure chest of such congregations from all across the spectrum -- Catholic, nondenominational, mainline and Pentecostal. But no matter how beneficial these churches are as models of mission, they are both a blessing and a curse for pastors of small congregations.

Pastors studying these churches often succumb to the myth that large, dynamic, growing churches are the healthy churches. Not only is bigger better, "growth" is obligatory. The myth of size assumes that small churches are de facto struggling, parochial, maintenance-oriented, at risk, and not able to compete in today’s church marketplace. "How do churches grow?" is the question that dominates the literature of church renewal, not "How are churches to be the church?"

Breaking the myth of size means realizing that small churches are not necessarily premature, illegitimate, malnourished or incomplete versions of "real" churches. Small congregations are the right size to be all that God calls a church to be.

Karl Rahner wrote that "the present situation of Christians can be characterized as that of a diaspora" (Mission and Grace, 1960). My experience is that smaller churches can more easily act as diaspora churches than bigger ones can. They are not, of course, always beacons of faithfulness. St Andrew in 1991 was proof of that. Our church council used to joke that anyone who did not like organized religion would love our congregation. Besides being disorganized, St. Andrew was not especially faithful, effective, friendly or relevant. The greatest difficulty was admitting this to ourselves.

But my time at St. Andrew has taught me that small congregations can more easily go through processes of spiritual transformation than larger ones and can be made "free for real missionary adventure and apostolic self-confidence," in Rahner’s words.

Bigger congregations are almost always adept at tapping into significant cultural norms, values, movements and technology. This is their strength, but it is also their weakness. At least one reason for their growth is that they are culturally sensitive. They work hard to know their constituency, their area, their "target audience." Some of the most popular workshops at any megachurch conference today are about how churches can offer culturally relevant worship, engage in culturally sensitive outreach or use culturally sensitive media. Bill Easum, a consultant to many growing churches, goes further than most in emphasizing the relationship between growing churches and culture when he advises, "Study more sociology than theology. Learn how people think and feel and how systems operate." Few churches grow large by being countercultural or living on the margins.

Small churches are usually somewhat out of step with culture. They are, so to speak, sociologically challenged. This can be its own blessing. The small church tends to be shaped more by the dynamics of its own small Christian community than by the dominant culture. While this can separate some churches too much from society, it can also assist the small church in living on the margins of society, where opportunity for mission knocks. A small church can incarnate a particular way of living in the world learned from the margins. It can go places and risk ministries that larger churches would find undesirable or impossible.

If North America is now a mission field, this fact has tremendous implications for small congregations. Being on the margins can provide fresh opportunities for offering bold witness. It is often a better position for discovering mission than is the center. In scripture, faithfulness seldom comes from, or results in, large numbers or success. God often elects the small for extraordinary missionary service.

To become a church in mission St. Andrew had to let go of clericalism and convert the members into ministers; let go of the myth of size and develop a vision of what a small church can do; move beyond "coffee fellowship" in its conception of worship and food; and leave behind traditional notions of church in order to focus on the congregation’s mission on the margins.

St. Andrew had a bad case of clericalism. It placed its hope for renewal on the pastor. "We need a charismatic leader to turn this thing around" was the rallying cry. But it discovered that small churches can turn things around only if the people take complete ownership of the church’s administration and ministry.

"Since we can no longer afford a pastor, are we willing to do the ministry ourselves?" The congregational president asked. St. Andrew answered yes, and decided on a bi-vocational pastoral model for leadership. I took a part-time call to be the pastor (working between 15 and 20 hours a week). The people would do most of the work and ministry themselves.

I later discovered that a growing number of congregations have been using this model of the worker-priest -- not only those that have only 35 to 60 at worship, but even those averaging an attendance of 75 to 125. Some churches have even abandoned the idea of having a full-time resident pastor in favor of having specialized leadership teams. These congregations are served by teams of three to five bi-vocational ministers. One carries the responsibility for preaching, another for the teaching ministry, a third for pastoral care and a fourth for administration, with perhaps a fifth responsible for evangelism and missions. The combined compensation for the team, including reimbursement for expenses, is usually less than the amount required to pay a full-time resident pastor.

This worker-priest or bi-vocational model soon became accepted at St. Andrew. No staff person works more than l5to2ohoursperweek The question now is: How far is it possible to grow a church without full-time clergy? A second question follows: Will the congregation ever want to be "normal" again, with a full-time professional pastor, like the bigger congregations next door?

Since a shortage of pastors hovers over the future of many churches, small congregations will have to wait in line for full-time pastors, even if they possess the resources to support them. The bi-vocational pastorate may serve as a better model for congregational mission than the "two-point parish model" by which one pastor serves two congregations.

The fact that St. Andrew’s turnaround began with a structural change rather than theological insight is typical of small churches. Solving a practical problem often fosters spiritual energy. This fermentation of spiritual activity at St. Andrew led to a second critical step, developing a vision for mission.

The congregation defined its mission within six months. Its members expected that I had the skills to articulate and carry it out. And I had to promise to stay for at least three years before they would accept the risks of working toward their vision.

When I evaluate St. Andrew’s turnaround, two factors stand out. They are the same two factors that Nancy Ammerman, in her study of congregations and change, identifies as critical to congregational vibrancy: worshiping and eating. Whatever else church members do as they cope with change, they must worship well and eat together.

The goal of "worship and food" is, of course, to create genuine Christian community centered on the triune God. That requires meaningful worship, worship in which people sense God’s presence and grace-filled activity Similarly, rather than just supplying good food in the fellowship hall, one must provide meaningful opportunities for building and practicing Christian fellowship. We must create what has traditionally been called a "eucharistic community" -- a Christian community that meets together around the supper, around bread and wine, around Christ’s very presence in the community and that becomes a sacramental presence of God’s love and grace within the larger community.

To create an environment for genuine worship and fellowship, St. Andrew had to admit that "coffee fellowship" after worship, a grand old Lutheran tradition, was not sufficient to bring about genuine Christian fellowship. We discovered that Sunday mornings were completely insufficient to create anything close to what the Bible describes as koinonia. We began to nurture fellowship through various meaningful meals.

Now almost no activity takes place at St. Andrew without a significant stress on fellowship around food. "Don’t let any opportunity for a meal slip by" has become our unwritten rule. These meals, at evening or small group gatherings, at council meetings and before and after worship services, are meaningful because they involve four critical dimensions: prayer, personal witness, Bible study and attending to tasks -- all while eating.

Meaningful worship and meaningful meals are critical to any attempts at renewal, and one doesn’t work well without the other. Never trust a Christian fellowship where Christians regularly worship together but don’t like to eat together, or where they eat together but neglect worship.

St. Andrew has developed the following mission statement: "We are sent as a community of disciples and apostles to share God’s love." Because we are "sent," we are a missional community, not a church focused on our own survival. Because we are a community, not a collection of individuals, we work to promote fellowship. We explore together what it means to be disciples, followers of Jesus, the people of God. As apostles, we are sent and equipped to do God’s mission, and our commitment is to a ministry of love.

This specific identity didn’t emerge from a retreat, a seminar with a consultant, or even a very long council meeting. The process was messy We made mistakes. But finally three specific areas of ministry emerged. We discovered each at the margins of our community, where other area congregations had done little or no work. Being a small congregation has made each of these ministries easier for us.

The first major emphasis was mission to seniors. As we studied our neighborhood we began to notice the high percentage of seniors living in their own homes but still in need of assistance. So we began our Senior Outreach Ministry. Today we help 70 seniors with everything from rides to the doctor’s office to telephone reassurance. Twenty-two members of the congregation have been trained for this weekly ministry.

This ministry taught us that our call is to the neighborhood, not just to the church. Almost none of "our" seniors are members of the congregation. We also found that having people carry out the ministry was more rewarding than paying a pastor to do it. The strong community response to the ministry made the church known and respected.

Our second mission focus was to become an inclusive community of faith where whites, African-Americans, Asians, Hispanics and Native Americans can live out Christian community together. In 1991 St. Andrew was almost entirely white. Today about 20 percent of the congregation is made up of people of color from almost every ethnic tradition, Our goal is to increase that number to 35 percent within the next three years, a number that better reflects the community at large. This would be no small achievement for any church in Chicago’s south suburbs, especially for a Lutheran one -- a denomination not known for creating inclusive communities.

We have learned that building a multicultural community is as difficult as learning a new language. It is not for the faint of heart. It may, however, prove to be our congregation’s best witness to a community where almost all other churches are ethnically or racially "pure."

Finally, our focus has turned toward outreach to the unchurched. In some ways, we cannot compete with the many big, dynamic, well-run churches in our area for the church shoppers. They would almost never choose us. So we decided to try to attract unchurched people. Our goal was to establish an atmosphere of hospitality for the unchurched. A special second service and an Alpha Bible study program became the cornerstones of this emphasis. Our mission focuses have changed our very identity as church. A new ethos about what it means to be church has emerged.

Barring a miracle, St. Andrew will never become a leading congregation numerically or financially. Having 160 in worship may be as far as it can go in numerical growth. St. Andrew will always be a neighborhood church increasingly surrounded by larger and larger congregations. That is the trend.

But I am convinced that the churches that will be most effective in recapturing their life as missional communities will discover their identities at the margins. And the communities that can best serve from the margins will almost always initially be small groups or small Christian churches like St. Andrew.

Communities that Change, Congregations that Adapt

Church growth studies, Nancy Ammerman notes, have often followed "success stories" that correlate with key demographic changes. In this respect, church growth is almost predictable. "Where there is a pool of white, middle-class, home-owning families-with-children on which to draw, mainline churches are likely to grow, no matter what their theological orientation."

Ammerman prefers, however, to look at congregations in which growth is not likely—not, that is, if social context alone is the predictor. The 23 congregations surveyed for this study were chosen not according to standards of growth or decline but because they were struggling with social changes. In other words, these are congregations in which people knew both that their immediate environment had changed and that these changes had a major impact on the life of the congregation. Some of the congregations were dying, others were being reborn. It is exactly this struggle to adapt to community change that fascinates Ammerman. A more appropriate title might have been Congregations in Changing Communities.

Ammerman begins by introducing the nine communities in which the 18 focus congregations were selected. (She admits that small mainline churches are overrepresented and evangelical groups underrepresented.) In addition, five mini-studies were conducted within these same nine communities on congregations that were in danger of dying.

The social and spiritual processes of a community’s response to change drive Ammerman to use the biological metaphor of ecology." In any ecosystem, new life forms are constantly emerging as old ones fade from the scene. As resources within the environment change, some species find that they already have the adaptive mechanisms needed for survival. Others evolve new ways of garnering necessary resources for adaptation.

The first hurdle for this study is to determine whether "change" is simply a code word for "race." The answer is yes and no. Ammerman sees her own study as a sequel to the pioneering work done by H. Paul Douglass in 1925. Church in the Changing City. That work led to a host of other studies in the 1960s and ‘70s in which the topic of racial transition is paramount.

Ammerman acknowledges that her 11-year experience with a congregation in Atlanta that successfully stayed in a changing neighborhood and integrated led to her interest in the interaction of congregations and community change. Nevertheless, whereas many earlier studies attended almost exclusively to the issue of racial change, Ammerman concentrates on other transitions as well. Race plays an important role in almost all the communities described in this book, but the problem of "white flight" was not, according to Ammerman, the immediate problem facing any of the congregations under study.

Another notable hurdle for this project was how to measure change. Change is ubiquitous, ongoing, multifaceted and resistant to clean categories. Some changes are welcome, others are to be avoided. Hence the variables of "congregational change" are difficult to quantify or qualify. Ammerman tackles the problem by analyzing three broad dimensions of change: resources, structures of authority, and culture.

Resources are the material and human resources with which congregations have to work (e.g., the building, money, programs, endowments, clergy, network of organizations, and the personal gifts and impulses—"personpower"—of the membership). Resources are the building blocks out of which congregations construct their lives. Changing environments mean changing resources, and paying attention to a congregation’s access to various kinds of resources is essential to understanding its response to change.

Structures of authority determine how congregations are able to make decisions about how to use the resources they have. Ammerman’s book reviews three traditional structures (congregational, presbyterian-federalist and hierarchical), but it also shows that structures can be both formal and informal. The key is to determine how power within the congregation is actually exercised.

The way a congregation uses power to adapt its resources is shaped by its culture, its characteristic ways of acting, speaking and socializing. Each congregation develops a complex network of rituals and symbols, habits and conventions that build everyday patterns of action and interaction. This congregational culture is the mortar that holds the resources and structure of authority together.

By observing the religious ecology of congregations through these categories, Ammerman draws out certain patterns and tendencies in how congregations have adapted to their changing environments.

The clearest pattern is one that pastors and congregational leaders have recognized for years: achieving change depends on trying to change. Ammerman observes that some congregations experiencing serious declines in membership actively resist change or continue with existing patterns of ministry apparently unable to envision how things might be different. She concludes that "congregations that do not try new programs and new forms of outreach when they are faced with environmental change are not likely to survive past the life spans of their current members." Some congregations can indeed survive neighborhood changes by stubbornly sustaining a long-term identity, transferring that identity to a new place, or transforming the church into a regional magnet or "nichechurch." But the bulk of Ammerman’s insights concern more dynamic forms of adaptation, beyond mere institutional survival.

She summarizes various patterns of adaptation under her three analytic categories.

Resources: Ammerman lists a host of resources that assist congregations in adapting to their changing environments, including new programs, denominational partnership with local congregations, strong pastoral leadership, an energetic laity, education and imagination. The one obvious resource not listed is money. This is not an oversight. Ammerman contends that money, though at times of great assistance, is not the key resource congregations need for adaptation.

Structure of Authority: Ammerman observes that "in almost every instance, the congregations that have been newly born, reborn, or significantly changed have also had to work hard at creating and recreating their decision-making structures." She points to a pattern of conflict which "stands in remarkable contrast to the peacefulness of the declining, moving, and niche congregations. This pattern makes absolutely clear that attempting significant changes will involve conflict, and congregations unwilling to engage in conflict will not change."

Culture: Worship and eating, two of the activities most common to all congregations, are key to adaptation. For congregations that have incorporated new populations, these activities are crucial. Ammerman reminds congregations that inclusive eating is as important as inclusive worship experiences. "What adapting congregations seem to do well is to create opportunities for different constituencies to eat together."

Ammerman’s book is rich in detail and scope. With such an abundance of information, many readers might want to skip from the six chapters of survey data to the final two summary chapters on "How Congregations Change" and "Conclusions." But the quality of the concluding chapters will draw the curious reader back to the previous "survey" chapters. How did the Episcopal Church of the Incarnation in southwest Atlanta, a neighborhood with a growing African-American population, re-invent itself by establishing a communitywide "niche" ministry? How did East Lynn Christian Church, a Disciples of Christ congregation in Anderson, Indiana, alter not only its building site but its programs, worship and leadership to adapt to the new site? How did a Lutheran congregation in the Chicago suburb of Oak Park, an integrated neighborhood known for its outstanding community services and progressive politics, work in partnership with its denomination (a rare event) to rekindle a dying parish? How did St. Matthew’s Catholic Parish in Long Beach, California, despite having lost much of its traditional constituency, succeed in reaching out to two new population groups—Hispanics and gays?

Such detailed accounts of congregations responding to their changing contexts can serve as marvelous case studies for further reflection. They should serve as useful resources for congregational leaders facing similar challenges or for pastoral students interested in issues of mission leadership. Teachers who enjoy a "case-study" approach to conducting their classes will find here a treasure chest of materials.

With no governmental regulation or subsidy to keep outmoded religious institutions in place in the U.S., the social processes of congregational adaptation are critical to study and understand. Furthermore, the metaphor of "religious ecology" is a cogent and instructive framework within which to conduct such a study.

At the same time, one wonders if there are unwanted theological implications involved in treating American congregations merely from the viewpoint of religious ecology and social change. Shouldn’t an analysis of congregations and social change take seriously a congregation’s own theological identity and self-understanding as "the people of God," the "body of Christ," or as a "sacramental community of God’s grace to the world"? I suggest it must.

Whereas it may be true that theological identity does not help one predict a congregational response to change, it is insufficient to conclude that "congregational adaptation is not well explained by theological and ideological factors." For Ammerman, what counts is not which theological ideas congregations draw on but whether congregations "engage in the work of reshaping those ideas for their new situation." Such a "survival of the fittest" model may not take a congregation’s theological identity seriously enough.

To move beyond mere theories of church growth or models of social change, one will need to supplement this fine study with additional materials. Ammerman’s excellent book attempts to say how congregations adapt to social change, but it does not ask how they try to do so "faithfully." Such a question needs another study.

The Reconstructionist Movement on the New Christian Right

Just last year at a Republican state convention in Arizona, new Christian rightists managed to pass a floor resolution declaring that the U.S. is "a Christian nation" and that the U.S. Constitution created "a republic based upon the absolute laws of the Bible, not a democracy." Elsewhere, Joseph Morecraft, pastor of Chalcedon Presbyterian Church just outside Atlanta, has been trying to convince Georgia’s Republican Party to declare the Bible the source of all civil law. And at the 1988 convention of the Texas Republican Party, Christian delegates helped pass a party platform severely conservative on social and moral issues, amid a debate punctuated, as one journalist put it, with more amens and hallelujahs than a revivalist tent meeting.

All three instances represent sightings of a relatively new creature on the right wing of Christianity: a movement variously known as dominion theology, kingdom theology, theonomy and Christian Reconstructionism. Reconstructionists have been politically active and visible in a variety of states, most recently backing Pat Robertson’s bid for the Republican presidential nomination. They have also mobilized at the local level: Pastor Morecraft, an admitted theonomist, received one-third of the vote in his unsuccessful run for Congress in 1986.

Just what is Christian Reconstruction-ism? Actually it is a movement within a movement, a splinter group in the uneasy alliance of charismatics, fundamentalists and miscellaneous evangelicals who make up the Christian right. Like most in that larger movement, Reconstructionists are fed up with what they perceive to be humanistic values eroding politics, public schools and the economy. They are angry at the Supreme Court, big liberal government, and permissive morality with its drugs, venereal diseases and violence.

Christian Reconstructionists are unabashedly postmillennial. They believe the millennium will occur before Christ’s Second Advent. The movement aims at nothing less than total world transformation. Its basic creed can be summarized in six points:

l Christ’s kingdom was ushered in almost 2,000 years ago and will culminate at his Second Coming, a far-off event.

l Meanwhile, every institution of every nation—starting with the U.S.—needs to be reclaimed for Christ from the grip of Satan and his humanist minions.

l The Bible—particularly Mosaic Law—offers a perfect blueprint for the shape such a "reconstructed" society must take. Reconstructionists believe that an absolute God creates consistent ethical principles for all time, not just for one people.

l Christian Reconstructionism is a grassroots movement emphasizing conversion and self-regeneration rather than a top-down revolution imposed by an ecclesiocracy. Thus the transformation will be a majoritarian, nonviolent effort, and will likely require centuries to complete. Followers are prepared for the long haul.

l Politics is one important—but only one—mechanism of reconstructing society. Christians have a duty to engage in and reform the political process. "Christians should be involved in politics even if it is dirty," writes a Reconstructionist author. "Who else has the means to clean up politics?"

l God has entered into a covenant with America and will shower blessings on it only so long as some unknown remnant of Americans honors the covenant by obedience to the Law. Disregard the covenant, and America’s blessings will be given to others as God renders his judgment. As Gary North writes in Liberating Planet Earth, "The United States is only one of several ‘authorized distributors’ of Christianity, and if its people cease to be faithful, this ‘distributorship’ will pass to others entirely."

Reconstructionism’s scope of time and change is vast. A society so reconstructed is not merely amended but rather razed and rebuilt. For example, Reconstructionist books and newsletters reveal that in a Reconstructed America minimum-wage laws and Social Security for younger workers would be eliminated; most old-age security would be covered by personal retirement plans or by care from adult children; and the federal government would play absolutely no part in regulating businesses, public education or welfare. In this brave new world of radical libertarian economics, all inheritance and gift taxes would be abolished, while income taxes would be no more than 10 percent of gross income (and then only until government was shrunk further). Gleaning for the poor on private farms after harvesting would be encouraged. All banks would be required to hold 100 percent reserves, and America would return to a gold and silver standard. Because of biblical injunctions against usury, no loans—including home mortgages—would be given for longer than seven years.

Various social customs would change under the appropriated Law of the ancient Israelites. Strict patriarchy would return to the family, and the practice of indentured servitude would turn prisons into temporary holding places, end unemployment and keep problem teenagers busy. Following Old Testament law, the criminal-justice system would get tougher on homosexuals, blasphemers, career criminals, Sabbath-breakers, adulterers, incorrigibly misbehaving older children and nonbelievers.

Since Reconstructionists maintain that God’s blessings flow to a nation that honors its covenant, they foresee practical benefits to a Reconstructed America. People would enjoy longevity (a foretaste of eternal life), sustained population growth over many generations (Reconstructionists believe that world overpopulation is a myth), and material prosperity under their dominion. To be fair, Reconstructionist authors do not posit a guaranteed cause-and-effect relationship between obedience and prosperity, but it is easy to see in their writings an easy slide into the health-and-wealth gospel.

As radical as the Reconstruction vision is, most liberal and mainstream Christians are unaware of Christian Reconstructionism unless they keep their fingers close to the pulse of evangelicalism. And even among evangelicals many would not recognize the movement’s name, though most likely they have heard terms like "dominion" thrown around. But many others will be familiar with the hundred-plus Reconstructionist books written by Gary North, Gary DeMar, David Chilton, Greg Bahnsen and others available in Christian bookstores across America.

The Reconstructionist movement began in the 1960s under the influence of Cornelius Van Til, the Dutch-American Calvinist philosopher now retired from Westminster Theological Seminary in Philadelphia. North refers to Van Til as the "patron philosopher" of Christian Reconstructionism. (Van Til himself has always denied that he is a Reconstructionist.)

However, the movement gained no intellectual foothold until the 1973 publication of Rousas John Rushdoony’s Institutes of Biblical Law, a 900-page two-volume tome expounding the implications of the Bible for every sphere of life. Rushdoony (of Armenian heritage) studied at the University of California at Berkeley during the 1940s where he was influenced by the great medievalist Ernst Kantorowicz. He received his doctorate in educational philosophy and subsequently developed rather grandiose expectations about his contributions to Christian theology. An avowed Calvinist (though he reportedly considers Calvin a minor intellect), Rushdoony transparently patterned the title of his seminal work after Calvin’s Institutes of the Christian Religion.

Rushdoony, now in his 70s, has written more than 30 books on such topics as education, law and population while serving as director of the Chalcedon Foundation in Vallecito, California. He has influenced a generation of Reconstructionist authors now entering middle age, such as North, his son-in-law and president of the Institute for Christian Economics in Tyler, Texas, and DeMar, president of American Vision in Atlanta. There are currently five think-tank ministries for Christian Reconstructionism in Texas, Georgia and California. Along with Dominion Press in Fort Worth, Texas, they churn out newsletters, special reports and monographs that spell out the details of the biblical outline of society.

Needless to say, Christian Reconstructionism upsets many premillennialist and dispensationalist Christians with its eschatology. The movement assumes an optimistic reading of history more characteristic of 19th-century Christianity. One common idea among its promoters, for example, is that of social sanctification or "the leavening influences on the entire culture" spilling over from personal regeneration along Reconstructionist lines. Reconstructionists leave little doubt that they are consciously imitating the Puritans of the early 17th century in establishing "a city on a hill" and calling on the New Testament (e.g., Matt. 5:14; 28:18) for justification.

Many premillennialists condemn this notion. In March the Assemblies of God, the largest Pentecostal denomination, responding in large part to the spread of Reconstructionism, denounced postmillennialism as heresy. Evangelical speaker Dave Hunt, coauthor of the evangelical potboiler The Seduction of Christianity, has even tried to link the movement to New Age phenomena. For their part, Reconstructionists accuse the premillennialists of "leaving the battlefield" and abandoning society to the humanists.

Mainline Christians who follow the movement are no less disturbed. Not only would Reconstructionists roll back painfully won civil and political reforms, but religious liberty itself would be at risk. Rushdoony, for example, sees no place in a Reconstructed society for the panoply of Jews, Buddhists, Muslims, Hindus, Baha’is, humanists, atheists and non- Reconstructionist Christians that make up American religious pluralism. Were it to be otherwise, he maintains, "in the name of toleration, the believer is asked to associate on a common level of total acceptance with the atheist, the pervert, the criminal and the adherents of other religions." The Reconstructionist call is not for a republic neutral toward religion. The First Amendment’s establishment clause would be an early casualty.

Rushdoony has made the rather absurd claim that there are currently 20 million Reconstructionists in America. More cautious, North estimates that between 25,000 and 40,000 names are on subscription lists for various movement materials. But the spread of Christian Reconstructionism is not limited to mailing lists, the shelves of religious bookstores or small discussion sessions in evangelical churches. There is reason to suspect that Christian Reconstructionists influenced Pat Robertson to consider throwing off the fatalism of his former premillennialism and run for president. At Robertson’s CBN University, Joseph Kickasola, a faculty member in the School of Public Policy, and Herbert Titus, dean of its School of Law, are both Reconstructionist writers. Robertson’s best-selling 1982 book The Secret Kingdom, written after the first Washington for Jesus rally and while he was beginning seriously to consider running for public office, could qualify as a primer on dominion theology.

However, a major tactical problem of Christian Reconstructionism is the quality of its intellectual fruits. Rushdoony’s prose is ponderous; probably even most Reconstructionists have never read Institutes of Biblical Law. North’s Biblical Blueprint series is easy to read, but North, DeMar and other writers are often redundant, and they dance around the specifics of actualizing Reconstruction by appealing to simplistic Manichaean thinking. Assertions such as "The humanists have brainwashed Christians when it comes to the Biblical meaning of theocracy" or "Men will be ruled by God, or else they will be ruled by men who imitate God" (from the foreward to DeMar’s Ruler of the Nations) remind one of the caricatures of the good-guy Christians versus bad-guy secular humanists found in pop-evangelical books such as Tim LaHaye’s Battle for the Mind.

Christian Reconstructionism offers a formula for reinstituting moral authority and control in a society supposedly faced with chaos and lawlessness. Therein doubtlessly lies part of its appeal. And the history of American religion demonstrates that a segment of Christianity has always wished to equate America with the epicenter of the millennium. But increasing numbers of evangelical as well as liberal Christians realize that the price required to build Reconstructionism’s "city on a hill" is too high: it would mean the scrapping of their own hard-won religious and civil freedoms.