Why Should Anyone Believe? Apologetics and Theological Education

Book Review:

Apologia: Contextualization, Globalization and Mission in Theological Education by Max L. Stackhouse and others (Eerdmans, 237 pp., $14.95 paperback).

Text:

Theological education today is characterized by genuine confusion about what should constitute the curriculum of basic degree programs at the graduate-professional level. Though debate about requirements has always me on, it was once largely accepted that the essential elements of study include Scripture, systematic theology, church story, the history of doctrine, and various combinations of practical theology. Usually tightly structured programs study were established by faculties, and the students who completed the prescribed courses were understood to be prepared for ministry. Perhaps the most remarkable aspect of this state of affairs was the confidence of the faculties, the students and the constituencies that what they were doing in theological education was correct. This confidence led to the replication of such educational programs in various cultural and geographical settings around the world. People were confident that what was appropriate for the theological curriculum in Germany, England or the United States was appropriate, necessary and good in any setting.

That confidence has disappeared. The reasons for this are many and are related to the general intellectual, social and cultural developments of the late 20th century. One can point to the emergence of a variety of critical approaches to religion in general, and to Christianity in particular, which have contributed to the breakdown of certainties: These include historical-critical and other new methods for the study of biblical texts, feminist criticism of Christian history and theology, Marxist analysis of the function of religious communities, black studies pointing to long-obscured realities, sociological and anthropological research in regard to cross-cultural religious life, and examinations of traditional teachings by non-Western scholars. Though it may be obvious, it ought to be noted specifically that the regnant confusion in theological education cannot be separated from the confusion that characterizes Christian theology. Put bluntly, theological education’s problem is a theological problem.

These conditions have spawned an interesting assortment of books and articles on theological education in the past five years. A good many of these publications have been stimulated by encouragement, both intellectual and financial, from the Lilly Endowment. In the early 1980s, Lilly asked James Gustafson to survey what had been written about theological education in the past 30 years. He reported little that was remarkable and lamented that not more of significance had been done. Lilly’s response was to encourage a wide range of consultations, research and reports which have generated some interesting and important work. Apologia: Contextualization, Globalization and Mission in Theological Education, by Max L. Stackhouse with Nantawan Boonprasat-Lewis, J. G. F. Collison, Lamin Sanneh, Leander Harding, Ilse von Loewenclau and Robert W. Pazmiño (Eerdmans, 237 pp., $14.95 paperback) , is a major contribution to this growing literature. The book is the result of a grant from the Association of Theological Schools, funded by the Lilly Endowment, to Andover Newton Theological School.

The first part of the book is a report on research and conversations by Andover Newton faculty members in response to study and dialogue about contemporary theological education. This section is a useful overview of the major issues facing theology and theological education. Though nothing new is here, the discussion of questions of context (liberal, modern, neo-orthodox; ecumenical, realist, biblical) , texts and contexts (matters of biblical interpretation) and the way in which Christian affirmations are appropriately translated into particular settings is stimulating. Certainly it is a valuable account of the way issues which affect all theological education manifest themselves in a specific institutional context.

The second part of the book attends to a wider discussion of theological education. Contemporary proposals and debates are summarized, and attention is given to ecumenical consultations and the complex issues raised by calls for "globalization," a current emphasis of the Association of Theological Schools. A chapter called "Praxis and Solidarity" explores the push of many in the church for a more direct relationship between theological education and specific contexts and "underrepresented constituencies," such as blacks, women, Hispanics, Native Americans and Third World peoples. Chapters in this section are also devoted to a consideration of recent scholarship of importance to theological education, such as that of Robert Schreiter (Constructing Local Theologies) , George Lindbeck (The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age) and Edward Farley (Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education)

The first two-thirds of Apologia offers an accurate picture of the wide array of analyses and proposals which characterize informed discussion of theological education today. The important thing about this book, however, is that it does not stop with analysis but sets forth a constructive proposal. The first two sections, while written by Max Stackhouse, are heavily dependent on the work of other faculty members at Andover Newton or consultants. The third section is clearly Stackhouse’s work and is a very significant contribution. It takes us beyond the somewhat tired proposals for theological education that seem simply to recommend implementing various interest-group agendas. Such proposals lead to what is often a blind celebration of diversity and pluralism, resulting in a do-it-yourself approach to theological education.

Stackhouse gets to the heart of the issue: he recognizes that the problem with contemporary theological education is theological. It is not that we have failed to be global, or that we have failed to take adequate account of the setting, or of the oppressed, but that we are not sure that religion is ultimately significant, that Christianity is ultimately true, and that the proclamation of the gospel is critically important for everyone everywhere. Stackhouse examines the fundamental issue raised by a careful analysis of the literature considered in the first two sections. He acknowledges that theological education is in trouble because we do not know why we are engaged in the enterprise. If we are only engaged in an academic exercise, or in training people for human enrichment or for social, political or economic renewal, then we ought to come clean and give it all up. The only thing that makes theological education significant is that it is about ultimate truth and its transforming power for individuals and communities. The moral importance of Christianity follows from its truth claims; otherwise its ethical judgments have no power. Stackhouse is convinced that "theological education must, above all, center its life on the question of what is objectively true and just in religious matters." He is not willing to let theological educators relinquish the task of making a compelling claim for the intellectual coherence and ultimate truth of Christianity.

The prime agenda for theological education, therefore, is theological. This means, in the first place, that faculties need to concentrate on the theological grounding of all that they do, and provide an account of Christian claims that is reasonable and accessible to real human beings in real settings. This new apologetic task is not unlike other apologetic tasks undertaken by Christianity in other periods, especially at the time the biblical tradition encountered the Greco-Roman world in the first centuries of the Christian era, from Paul to Augustine, and at the time of the transition from the Middle Ages to the dawn of modernity, including the great reformations of Europe and the Americas. Stackhouse sees a "third great moment" now upon us when theologians must attend specifically to the apologetic task.

"Christianity faces again the old question in the presence of new pluralism: Why should anyone believe it?"

Stackhouse offers some suggestions concerning Christian doctrine and practice. He explores four doctrines the affirmation of which define ‘boundaries" of Christian faith: sin and salvation, biblical revelation, the Trinity, Christology, and then describes the ethical outgrowth of accepting these doctrines: piety, polity, policy and program. In each case he provides theological reflection and concludes with reference to theological education. Although these chapters do not exhaust the topics, they do chart directions for future work by serious theologians.

Stackhouse states his thesis about theological education with admirable clarity: "The vocation of Christian theological education is to prepare women and men to be theologians and ethicists in residence and in mission among the peoples of God in the multiple contexts around the globe." This gets him beyond the tedious and unfruitful debates about whether theological education is in the first place theoretical or professional, academic or practical, of the school or of the church. Theological education is in the first place theological, and by this he means that it is concerned with the reality and truth of God in Jesus Christ.

This approach allows Stackhouse to deal with matters of mission, globalization and context from a Christian perspective. He is not lost in a fog of confusion about whether Christianity makes a difference and therefore whether it should be proclaimed at all. Because of this he is able to take seriously the global and the contextual issues. The irony seems to be that only if we are first clear theologically about the truth and cogency of Christianity are we able to encounter with clarity and sympathy the world’s range of peoples and contexts. To do its job, theological education must know what it is proclaiming and why.

It may be that the theologically bankrupt Western, liberal, secularized church is incapable of dealing with these matters. Indeed, it is here that global, contextual and mission sensitivity is most critical. We must not lay on the Third World our contemporary problems of faith, which emaciate our theology. It could be that Stackhouse’s "third great moment must await work on Christian doctrine by Third World theologians.

Hints of Redemption

Books Reviewed: Ghost Pain. By Sydney Lea. Sarabande Books, 99 pages paperback.

Deaths and Transfigurations. By Paul Mariani. Paraclete, 95 pp.

Poetry reviews appear in religious journals more rarely than poems, and poems are rare enough. This absence is not because poetry of interest to readers of these journals is in short supply. It is instead probably because, like the rest of the reading world, pastors, theologians and engaged laypersons rarely read poetry -- maybe because it requires a different set of skills from reading prose, maybe because these readers choose not to embrace the indirection of metaphor, and maybe also because they have read examples of bad religious poetry that make the whole endeavor seem like a waste of time.

Even some good poetry is gaining a bad reputation these days because of certain theoretical influences that have made inaccessibility a popular trait. One recent winner of a prestigious poetry award admits that the strongest influences on his work are Julia Kristeva, Slavoj Zizek, Giorgio Agamben and Jacques Lacan, none of whom write poetry themselves, but all of whom have left lasting imprints on literary theory. This phenomenon, of the poet grounded more in a tradition of philosophy or psychoanalysis or feminism than in the tradition of poetry and poets (one T. S. Eliot described in his admirable essay "Tradition and the Individual Talent") is, unfortunately, creating a class of poets speaking not even to each other.

Of the dozen volumes of verse that have come across my desk in the past few months, these two are the strongest and most appealing. That one of these poets, Sydney Lea, has appeared in the pages of the CHRISTIAN CENTURY over the past two years has been a matter of delight. The primary criterion for selecting poems for these pages is that they must be interesting. For a poem to capture our attention it must upset the usual ways of seeing or hearing and transform the ordinary so that it delights and surprises the reader. Poetry is an attempt to name experience, to create feeling and to express the otherwise inexpressible. It does so through images, metaphor, sound effects, rhythm and form. A poem must put the reader inside of an experience so that it is impossible for her to be just an observer. A poem must make the reader a participant in the experience. A poem must say to a reader, "Pay attention!"

In publishing Lea, we have invariably broken our guideline on length: a Lea poem is rarely under 20 lines. His poems are often torrents of words, creating longer lines and therefore longer poems, although he also uses short-lined quatrains in some of his verse. Heavy in images and strong on narrative, his poems require space; in fact, they often tell stories that catch you by surprise with their striking oddness and their pattern of shifting the topic from degeneracy to hints of redemption.

The second part of Ghost Pain is titled "A Man Walked Out," with an epigraph from Psalm 40: "and He hath put a new song in my mouth." But the journey from the first poems to the "new song" of the psalm is, in e. e. cummings’s words, "banged with terror." A suite of ten poems, it begins in depression and fear:

A man walked out much later into something awful

every thing

reminding him of some other thing

and this each last thing and that private last other

equally laden with freight of dread And yet the dread

was not

a common or garden type

Even amidst this alarm and dread, even in spite of the man’s "bodily deafness / and his longstanding other sorts of torpor," there is a small sign, maybe even a still voice, at any rate "a tiny bell . . . there to be heard it seemed heard in its minuscule clangor." Though the man cannot quite remember what that tiny bell is, he responds to it with lessening fear. In the next poem, called "666: Father of lies," he fights the devil, but once again at the end, a "delicate ringing in our man’s left ear. / His tinnitus? His angelus?" Each poem in the series traces this trajectory from the knowledge of total depravity to the recognition of grace. At one point he asks, "Where did hope ever come from? Knowing the facts / how might anyone ever opt for joy?"

His mother would go down into the earth with Speed

[their dog],

her liver large as a toilet seat, a bag

girt to her turgid flank to catch her waste.

His father would go with actual speed: infarction,

said someone to all his dazed children. The man child

that summer

even with nightfall, even with swimmings up

of planet, star-sprawled wet with sweat and despair.

And now again. This was the tableau Forever,

which some dull teacher made him study forever.

Stunned museum. Miasma of dust unrelenting.

There must be more to life, he thought back then.

The poem ends, if not with images of resurrection, then with at least the hint of a pleasant freshness in the air and the rustling of a spirit not yet recognized as holy.

A change seemed bound to come: not his mother risen

intact, not his father, his heart and innards quick,

but something. The passing of birds. More scent than

sound.

A part of the process of conversion is the conviction of guilt, and so halfway through the cycle of the man remembers and relives in graphic images his years of predatory behavior. All of the faces "line up on this new horizon to glare at him." Another poem describes a moment of road rage conquered, when he for the first time through the sheer act of will simply forgives and pulls over to the side of the road. In the penultimate poem of the series the man for the first time experiences grace in its fullness:

. . . in that moment, the man felt forgiven

for each unpardonable word and deed

even the worst, which he couldn’t name.

Everything out in the Yankee woods

recalled the hour of its creation,

and even dying, declared it good.

In the final poem the man walks out into the October landscape one Sunday at noon (here the familiar bells faintly chime in the distance) with the memory of the previous evening’s psalm reading in his head: "Make me to hear joy and gladness that the bones/which thou has broken may rejoice." His prayer is on his lips: "Forgive my little postures." And then he catches a scent of something he cannot define on a wind blowing softly to him, as if fanned by the wings of a passing hawk.

All easy parable was gross.

And yet the hawk was coasting now,

with assured wing was fanning

this wind that softly flew

to him, that coursed a flank of hill on which he stood

Selah

he actually stood, it seemed a miracle, or poem,

a grand ongoing one he smelt as much as felt

and touched as much as heard -- a bird retreating

and in retreating moving

the man thus quietly home.

So moves the holy spirit, his holy muse, nudging him toward miracle and poetry.

What Lea has accomplished in "A Man Walked Out" is terribly difficult to do. The Christian poet attempts one of the most challenging endeavors, revitalizing the language, the common language, which all of us have heard for years both in scripture and in the church. This is language which is often filled with cliches, with formula phrases, with theological lingo. It is language which has become so familiar that it is invisible. It is why at one point in the final poem in the series Lea writes:

. . . one hadn’t known god

(though damn the terminology)

was all he needed till god was all he had.

Language, especially familiar language, seems almost insufficient to capture the transcendent, to reflect truth in all of its complexity. But language is what the poet has to work with, and so the poet is forced to take sometimes exaggerated, sometimes extreme steps to pierce the mundane, breaking up lines, using words in odd new contexts, relying on sound effects and packing the stanzas with sensuous images and fragments from scripture, and the common language of faith suddenly takes on new meaning through these odd juxtapositions.

For Lea and for any poet who is trying to capture religious truth in language, the poem is a miracle, a journey home for all of us who, because we are human, have at some time or other been terribly lost.

One of the epigraphs in Paul Mariani’s book is from Flannery O’Connor: ". . . if the writer believes that our life is and will remain essentially mysterious, if he looks upon us as beings existing in a created order to whose laws we freely respond, then what he sees on the surface will be of interest to him only as he can go through it into an experience of mystery itself. His kind of fiction will always be pushing its own limits outward toward the limits of mystery." Mariani penetrates stunning surfaces to get at the mystery beyond, as in "Solar Ice":

Father lifted the host above his head & prayed:

A small white sun around which everything

seemed to coalesce, cohere & choir. But

as I raised my head, the thought

of some old insult likewise reared

its head, and in that instant the arctic

hatred flared, shutting out my world

& spring, along with, yes, my lovely wife & sons,

a no & no & yet another no, until I caught

myself refuse the proffered gift of Love.

At once the host diminished to a tiny o:

an empty cipher, like some solar disc

imploding on itself. Only my precious

hate remained, the self-salt taste

of some old wound rubbed raw again,

a jagged O at the center of my world.

Ah, so this is hell, or some lovely ether

foretaste of it, alone at ninety north,

with darkness everywhere, & ice & ice

& ice & more ice on the way, and this

sweet abyss between myself & You.

Mariani has said elsewhere that what he is after "is discovering the imaginative possibilities of the spirituality with which I grew up, I mean my Roman Catholicism." He goes about this through creating surfaces which intensely engage the senses and then moving beyond them to the core questions: What does it mean to be human? Who is God? How can we make sense of suffering? Why does God sometimes seem so silent? Mariani is not satisfied with pat answers. He is looking for incarnational and even sacramental connections with his subject matter. The incarnation is Spirit becoming flesh, and that’s what the best Christian poets must work at doing in their poetry -- bringing the spirit into flesh.

In another of his poems, "Making Capital," he attends Sunday mass with his wife after six weeks of "nada, zip & zero," a dry spell in his poetry, a time when he "could not make those protean shapes sit still, though / God knows I’ve tried." The sermon is uninspiring, the congregation is asleep, but suddenly the poet catches a glimpse of something beyond the ordinary, flat experience of worship in a "place [in which] the Good News . . . dropped down some black hole." The shadow he sees at the altar is of Isaac carrying the wood for his own sacrifice, and this figure is transformed in an instant into Christ on the cross: one son saved, the other sacrificed in order to rise "from the stink/ of death, promising to lift us with him."

I looked around

the church, knowing what I know of death: the death of

mother,

father, friends, the death of promise, of vision run

aground,

death of self, of all we might have been, death of that

ideal other,

the bitter end of all. Nada, zip. . . Except for that loop in

time, when

something gave: a blip of light across the mind’s dark

eye, if you

can call it that.

That flash of insight, that glimmer of hope comes to us sometimes in fragments, the poet seems to suggest, a "loop in time," when in spite of our spiritual drought and the church’s ineffective attempts to bring Christ to us, he comes anyway.

Mariani has mastered the forms of poetry. While he writes primarily in free verse, he also uses rhyme to unify his poems, he often organizes his lines into quatrains (sometimes rhymed, sometimes not), and he has a firm sense of what a poetic line can do. In short, even his free verse is disciplined; he wastes no words, and the words he chooses are appropriate and beautiful, contributing sound to sense. With "New York, Christmas Eve, 1947" he has even written a successful villanelle, a beastly difficult form because of its use of repetition of both rhymes and lines. The last three stanzas provide a glimpse:

Under the tree, in the reddish-blue glare,

a father lays train tracks in cottony snow,

while outside snow falls through the darkening air.

So much to do, the father’s hands say. So much to care

for, so much to fix. And oh cries the boy, and oh

cries the little toy train, which will soon disappear.

And oh, cries the mother, in the cold kitchen out there,

though the boy thinks, No one is crying. And the snow

goes on falling through the darkening air,

on the El and the people, who will soon disappear.

Poets are also able to provide a unique angle of vision for those whose imaginations have atrophied -- and what could be more important to believers than the imagination? How can we carry on a theological conversation if our senses have not been trained and our imagination is dead? In fact, it is in the imagination that faith begins. How could it possibly be otherwise? Believers believe in what cannot be seen. We accept the miraculous as fact. We must have imaginations to be people of faith.

In "How It All Worked Out" Mariani imagines himself in his shroud in a long, dark "procession toward the ivory gate." He describes an odd, dreamlike scene he wants to flee but cannot as he approaches the gate, unsure whether "friend or foe [is] shouting for us up there in the stands." How it all works out is with a blinding light and a flood of memory as he stands on the threshold in utter silence. Here is a poem that surely upsets the ordinary way of seeing and hearing and that drags the reader into its visceral experience of judgment and the possible absence of grace.

Paraclete Press took much care in the production and publication of Deaths and Transfigurations, including striking engravings by Barry Moser, winner of the American Book Award for design and illustration. That there are publishers like Paraclete and Sarabande, willing to commit precious resources to publish poetry -- not the most lucrative of genres -- and especially poetry that communicates truths "hidden with Christ in God" is remarkable. The poet Sherod Santos says, "It may be we’ve wandered so aimlessly, so unsure of why or where we’re going, because there’s no longer anywhere to wander to, not even the future." Contemporary writers often reflect this sad reality, and it is helpful to point to (and to publish) the writers who grapple courageously with this dilemma, writers whose imaginations collide with the grim implications of life in a culture which has forgotten the future. The imagination and its image-making, word-creating, storytelling functions now and then afford us life-giving glimpses of the transcendent.

Women, Men and the Engendering Word

Octavio Paz, Mexican author of more than 40 volumes of poetry and prose and winner of the 1990 Nobel Prize for literature, has written an extensive biography that reintroduces a long-neglected literary figure of the 17th century: Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz. One of six illegitimate children of an unusually self-reliant mother who refused marriage, Sor Juana revealed her intellectual gifts early in life, attracting the attention of the court of the vicereine. Seventeenth-century New Spain was a markedly masculine culture, affording women few opportunities to cultivate intellectual talents. Women were barred from school and university, so Sor Juana took upon herself the responsibility for her education. Her accomplishments would be in any age remarkable; in light of her particular circumstances, they are nothing short of miraculous.

Beautiful, learned and eloquent, Sor Juana was not interested in marriage, which in 17th-century Mexico would have required her to relinquish her scholarly and artistic pursuits. Instead, at the age of 20 she left the court and entered a convent where she spent the rest of her life. It was the only place her intellect could flourish. Here she had the freedom to read, amass a library, study science and perfect her musical and poetic talents.

Her astuteness in debate and her literary successes, which included winning university competitions, did not endear her to the church hierarchy, however. Jealous that a woman could so outshine them, they attempted to silence her, but for a long time she was protected by her court sponsors who continually interceded on her behalf. Finally, however, she was forced to relinquish her books, her musical and scientific instruments and her writing. Two years later, at the age of 46, she died after nursing several of the convent sisters through a plague epidemic.

What she left has been collected and translated by Alan Trueblood. The collection contains courtly poetry from her early years, elegant verse addressed to patrons and even in some cases to portraits of patrons -- proof that Sor Juana could play the witty court games as skillfully as anyone. Here also is religious verse presented side-by-side with poetry satirizing the chauvinistic poses of the time. In a poem with the headnote, "She demonstrates the inconsistency of men’s wishes in blaming women for what they themselves have caused," Sor Juana writes:

Silly, you men -- so very adept

at wrongly faulting womankind,

not seeing you’re alone to blame

for faults you plant in woman’s mind.

After you’ve won by urgent plea

the right to tarnish her good name,

you still expect her to behave --

you, that coaxed her into shame.

You batter her resistance down

and then, all righteousness, proclaim

that feminine frivolity,

not your persistence, is to blame.

Also included in this anthology is a letter, "Reply to Sor Philothea," in which Sor Juana discourses at length on the constraints placed on a woman with an active intellect. She describes the time, early in her life in the convent, when a prelate ordered her to stop studying, since it seemed "something for the Inquisition." Until the bishop interceded on Sor Juana’s behalf, she obeyed the order and did not pick up a book, but she reported that she could not keep herself from studying. "I saw nothing without reflecting on it," she writes. "I heard nothing without wondering at it -- not even the tiniest, most material thing. For, as there is no created thing, no matter how lowly, in which one cannot recognize the me facit Deus. . . there is none that does not confound the mind once it stops to consider it."

Sor Juana describes pacing her sleeping room and observing that although floor and ceiling were perfectly parallel, her eyes made the lines of ceiling and floor appear closer at the far end of the room. "And I asked myself whether this could be the reason the ancients questioned whether the world was spherical or not. . . . This type of observation would occur to me about everything and still does, without my having any say in the matter.

Even the most menial tasks contained scientific and philosophic lessons for her. "What could I not tell you, my Lady, of the secrets of Nature which I have discovered in cooking! . . . If Aristotle had been a cook, he would have written much more.

These are companion volumes, handsomely presented. The anthology prints both Spanish and English translations of the poetry -- translations that are accurate, if occasionally prosaic. While Paz’s approach seems somewhat cumbersome, he is, after all, not only presenting a picture of a 17th-century Mexican nun; he is also in a sense rewriting the history of the Counter-Reformation church in New Spain.

Louise DeSalvo’s book is a different kind of literary biography. DeSalvo, whose previous work includes an edition of an early version of one of Virginia Woolf’s novels and a collection of letters from Vita Sackville-West to Woolf, argues that other biographers of Woolf (particularly Quentin Bell) have glossed over the formative traumas of her early life, dismissing them as unimportant and in effect blaming the victim for the abuse she suffered.

From age six until she was well into her 20s Virginia Woolf was molested repeatedly by her half-brother George Duckworth. Her writings reveal that she was not the only victim in her family; her sister Vanessa and her half-sister Stella Duckworth were also victims of sexual abuse at the hands of family members. Biographers have previously portrayed this family as a reasonably stable household with a few eccentricities. According to DeSalvo, this is a false picture of a family that was actually in crisis. These traumas were not closely guarded secrets. Virginia often read portions of her memoirs in public, and in letters and conversations with many people she repeatedly revealed the facts. Biographers have, nonetheless, continued to question the truth of her allegations, or at the very least minimized them.

In April 1939 Woolf recorded in "A Sketch of the Past" her earliest memories, revealing signs that she was in her childhood profoundly depressed, that she learned early not to fight back, that she felt escape was impossible. Here were the seeds of her later despair.

In later years she studied Freud, attempting to come to terms with the sexual abuse she had experienced, but she found no help there. Whereas she was desperately trying to understand her pervasive depression as the result of childhood abuse, Freud argued that reports of incest were usually fantasies. Had she taken Freud seriously, she would have had to conclude that she was mad.

DeSalvo points out the metaphors of drowning that appear so often in Woolf’s writing -- metaphors frequently used by victims of incest. That the metaphor finally became fatally real for Woolf in her own drowning-suicide is the tragically ironic denouement.

In its thoroughness and even tone this carefully researched study of Woolf and her works makes a convincing case that the theme of sexual abuse appears and reappears in Woolf’s work -- from her earliest writing at age ten throughout her life -- and that the traumas of her childhood caused lifelong depression and led to her suicide. Almost as troubling as Woolf’s own suffering is its invisibility in the work of so many critics and biographers who have denied its importance as a cause of her psychological problems in middle age. As outrageous as it may seem, they have even suggested that she enjoyed the abuse she suffered.

Jeanne Murray Walker, professor of English at the University of Delaware, offers in her most recent book of poetry, Coming Into History, some of the finest poems I have read in recent years. This is strongly feminine poetry, in the sense that it is about creation, nurture and connection. Her images are of pregnancy, labor and delivery; she writes about mothering both the infant and her daughter from a previous marriage, about taking a sick child to the doctor. Her titles are "Nursing," "I Won’t Read the Alphabet Book Once More," "Talking to the Baby after Teaching a Poetry Workshop," "Talking to the Baby about Taking the Bus," "Studying Physics with my Daughter."

This is not, however, a simple collection of parenting poems, for in the center, like Blake’s invisible worm that flies in the night, is another presence. These are poems that take as their beginning point headlines from the National Enquirer: "Beauty Queen Has Monster Child," "Woman Picked up by UFO, Flown into Black Hole," "Sweethearts Vanish in Tunnel of Love," "Human Boy Found in Indian Jungle Among Wolf Pack." My favorite is "Man’s Thumb Bleeds for Three Years," in which a man who installs auto glass finds unbearable the silence of the "millions of car windows/resting on their sides" in the shop.

I started to hate Manny, the guy

who brought them in.

I’d see him unloading used ones from the

truck

and I’d want to kill him for saving them

from

the wrecker, like keeping their music

locked

inside this thin shiny sheet. Sot got a

hammer,

cut the wire fence, and started smashing.

The night I let the music out

the sky was all bright riffs and chords

and now my head is clear, if only I

could do something about this bleeding

thumb of mine.

This thumb is the sign he must hide from everyone, the proof of his guilt. Hungry for music, he cannot afford to buy a real keyboard, so he must practice on the one he draws on cardboard, and, as he says, "it gets bloody."

This volume of poems is about coming into the story that we all must step out of someday. It is about fragility, danger and inevitable death. It is filled with the fears, the myths, the fairy tales of every day, the transcendence in the ordinary. In "Dancing in Early Evening" the baby’s father drives home:

Two feet’s mistake

in any direction,

death. He stays on

track, bound down,

so far, so good.

He approaches the house, enters and sweeps up the baby.

You lay your bald head on

his worsted shoulder,

woo him with contralto

toots and drooling.

Then the two of you step out

together, polishing

the floor, your diaper

bagging, pooching, your

fuzzy blue socks flashing, as

night descends, the two

of you untying

obsolete routines, unloosening

gravity’s old malice,

holding one another in

the lamplight, shooby,

romping, dancing, rising,

floating clear of death.

Yeah. Oh yeah.

Walker has created a circle of poems. She is not concerned with the linear progression of thought; instead she shows how cycle more accurately defines womanhood. She is concerned with those things passed from woman to woman, those connections with life and death which often come perilously close. Walker dedicates the book to her grandmother who never met Walker’s son, but whose role in creating him was just as great as Walker’s own.

The poems by Malcolm Glass, author of two previous books of poetry, have a tactile quality unusual in contemporary poetry. Whether describing a man constructing and then climbing into a coffin to try out the feel of it or someone swimming into a whale’s mouth, Glass is concerned with making experience immediate and tangible. He also explores the connections between generations of men -- the Harris Tweed that keeps reappearing over the years, the rituals of fishing, the importance of the penknife willed to him by a friend.

I sliced cheese, cut rope,

spread meat on bread

with the knife you used

to clean fish and fidget

with antique clock-works,

the knife willed to me,

mine these three months

you have fallen in the grave.

When I realized it had slipped

from my pocket, gone in the sea

of mountain top grass, I searched

the campsite. I would not

have it seem to mean so little.

Yet I knew all along

how right my losses always are.

Glass reimagines the biblical stories of Jonah, Daniel, Abraham and Isaac, providing new endings occasionally, but always presenting the convincing voice, turning an old story to the light in a new way. In the title poem "In the Shadow of the Gourd," a character very much like Jonah is swallowed by a whale.

I scraped along

coral and rocks, as black currents

dragged me into a cave, narrow

and slimy with eels. When I could

no longer hold my breath, my heart

jumped staccato as my lungs filled

with . . . air! unbearably hot!

My hands and face were burning

as though my skin would shed

all trace of human features.

The whalers finally rescue him:

Someone had seen

movement deep in the stripped carcass.

We hoisted the sagging stomach

on deck and slit it open to find

a man, twisting fitfully in sleep.

We slid him onto the deck

and bathed him in sea water

to revive him.

This mythic re-enactment of Jonah’s adventure and rebirth finds its fulfillment in the man’s ravings for the next few weeks as he seems to relive all history, including Christ’s life and death. Finally, he says, he returns to life, feeling very good "and never quite so human."

Glass’s most pervasive theme is humanity’s eternal attempt to communicate. In "Books" he shows the books themselves -- the making, the binding, the paper and our handling of them, our attempts to read and understand what is written on the page and what is written between the lines, our desire to decipher the hieroglyphs that books are, our hopes to find the meaning in the silences. In "Witnessing" he presents three characters who have witnessed death and then spend their lives trying to understand what they have seen. One is Deborah Lopez, who on a spring walk discovers the skull of "Jennifer Stinson, abductee," leading to Deborah’s own "clueless wandering in search/of language to carry her beyond mere/narrative, beyond logic, beyond fear." The only way for these three witnesses to communicate, the poet says, would be to find each other, but it will never happen.

It never occurs to this small and scattered

band to gather for Witness Anonymous

meetings, to huddle Tuesday nights

in a Fellowship Room or a Lutheran

basement to spill the words again,

to straighten the account once and

always, to know their listeners feel

the same shiver and twist of the spine,

to know they are sure of nothing else.

Hugh Cook works with this theme throughout The Homecoming Man. A major concern of Cook’s is the lack of communication between an aging father and his adult son -- due in part to the father’s inability to come to terms with his past. Pushed into the cowardly betrayal of his friends to the Nazis, he has spent most of his life muffling his guilt. In this novel Cook, author of Cracked Wheat and Other Stories, is once again writing of Canadian Dutch Calvinists. Paul Bloehm returns home after his divorce to work on a translation of 17th-century Dutch verse. He and his father, Gerrit, who is haunted by the secret he has kept for many years, share the same house but live separately.

The novel is about men imprisoned, men who live together yet apart, who must learn the lessons women seem to know already because they are lessons about living in community, about nurturing and about accepting pain and humiliation as part of life. In the preface L. de Jong briefly explores the difference between the male and female experience of Nazi imprisonment. He regrets that for several reasons the bond between men in the camps was not as strong as that between women. The novel attempts to provide a corrective, to show a father and a son learning to share their mourning, learning to reveal their secret selves to each other and finally coming to manhood.

This is a masterful novel by a writer who does not yet seem to have a large American audience, perhaps because of the Dutch Calvinist world he writes about and out of. One hopes readers will see that lying in the particular world Cook describes is the universal. This is a novel about life and faith, about the intersection of Christ’s sacrifice with our own human longings. It is, in short, about all that is important.

The Meaning Is in You: Flannery O’Connor in Her Letters

Three weeks before her death at the age of 39, Flannery O’Connor copied out a prayer to St. Raphael and sent it to a woman she had never met, but who in the short year and a half of their correspondence had become a close friend. This prayer, which O’Connor said she prayed every day, ends with an image of heaven as a home "beyond the region of thunder, in a land that is always peaceful, always serene and bright with the resplendent glory of God." It was also to this woman, Janet McKane, that O’Connor wrote of receiving communion and the sacrament of the sick (formerly known as extreme unction). Flannery O’Connor knew she was dying. In fact, she had lived with this knowledge for 13 years, ever since she had been diagnosed as having lupus erythematosus, the disease that had killed her father.

It is tempting to speculate about what O’Connor could have accomplished had she lived longer. Fifteen months before her death she wrote: "I appreciate and need your prayers. I’ve been writing eighteen years and I’ve reached the point where I can’t do again what I know I can do well, and the larger things that I need to do now, I doubt my capacity for doing." Here O’Connor showed uncertainty about what lay ahead for her as a writer, but she also revealed a sense of artistic completion. That she would ask for prayers also indicates a certain measure of anxiety as she approached the unknown. She was, after all, besides an artist and a woman of profound faith, human in her reluctance to leave what she loved so well. In one of her final letters to Janet McKane, O’Connor quoted Gerard Manley Hopkins’s lines: "Márgarét, áre you gríeving/Over Goldengrove unleaving?" She was not complaining, but she did feel a natural human grief. As she wrote in an earlier letter, "You have to cherish the world at the same time you struggle to endure it."

For O’Connor, writing and faith were tightly bound together. She identified "conversion" -- that is, a "character’s changing" -- as the only real subject of good literature. What created story for her, what created the necessary conflict, was a character’s resistance to God’s grace, which often led violently to sudden revelation. She once wrote that loss is frequently a precondition to conversion. Perhaps the loss of her father, and her own debilitating illness, helped keep her faith strong and her writing persistent. "In a sense sickness is a place, more instructive than a long trip to Europe, and it’s always a place where there’s no company, where nobody can follow. Sickness before death is a very appropriate thing and I think those who don’t have it miss one of God’s mercies," she wrote in 1956.

O’Connor’s letters, collected by her friend Sally Fitzgerald in The Habit of Being (Vintage, 1979) , bring into clearer focus the human being behind the art. The collection was an invaluable contribution to scholarship, and has, since its publication, offered readers information that is indispensable in understanding the author. The O’Connors did not install a telephone at their farm until late in Flannery’s life, so to communicate with her friends she had to write to them. These letters form a diary beginning in 1948, after her graduation from the University of Iowa’s School for Writers, until her death in 1964.

They allow the occasional reader to dip in and out quickly but they reward the cover-to-cover reader with a strong sense of immediacy. The O’Connor farm, the Georgia characters O’Connor lived with every day, the animals she raised, the visitors who were often invited to stay for dinner live as vividly in her letters as they do in her fiction. One is able to see connections between inhabitants of her daily life and characters in her stories. One can also watch the genesis and development of her work as she related its progress to her friends, who included not only her literary agent and editors, but also people whom she never met face-to-face. Her humor reveals itself in her anecdotes and punch lines, and in the turns of phrase she used to berate a friend’s slip into Freudian terminology or answer a professor of English who asked what she considered unreasonable questions.

Above all, O’Connor’s letters reveal a strong, committed artist, Christian, daughter and friend. She answered the most difficult questions posed to her by friends who did not understand her Catholicism. She shared with fellow Catholics and non-Catholics alike her love for her church and her Lord. She corrected correspondents -- sometimes quite firmly -- when she felt they were wrong, and she often apologized later for her bluntness. But she also encouraged them, sustained them and nourished them with her wit and insight.

Women journal writing has become a genre of its own in the 20th century, but I cannot imagine that O’Connor speaking to herself in diary form could give a reader any more insight into her character than O’Connor in dialogue, which is, essentially, what these letters present.

Like so many writers early in their careers, O’Connor felt she had to leave home to gain a broader perspective than the one afforded her by rural Georgia life. What she was to discover was that for the artist, the entire universe exists in the gesture of the individual, and the individual she knew best was southern. When she finished her studies in Iowa, she moved to Yaddo, a retreat for writers in New York, spent a few months in New York City and then, after returning home for awhile, moved into the Connecticut home of Robert and Sally Fitzgerald. When she became ill late in 1950 she returned to Milledgeville and gradually began to realize that Georgia was where she belonged. For the rest of her life she remained close to home with only occasional forays north for speaking engagements and visits. Due to a deteriorating hip joint, she was on crutches for many of these years, and travel was an excruciating ordeal for her.

She and her mother did, however, manage a pilgrimage to Rome and Lourdes, where, as Flannery reported, Sally Fitzgerald made her take the healing baths. She wrote in her only letter from Rome: "Lourdes was not as bad as I expected. I took the bath. For a selection of bad motives, such as to prevent any bad conscience for not having done it, and because it seemed at the time that it must be what was wanted of me. I went early in the morning. Only about 40 ahead of me so the water looked pretty clean. They pass around the water for ‘les malades’ to drink & everybody drinks out of the same cup. As somebody said, the miracle is that the place don’t bring on epidemics. Well, I did it all and with very bad grace" (p. 280) Much to her chagrin and the delight of her elderly cousin who had financed the trip, O’Connor’s hip improved a few months later. But she was determined not to undertake such a trip again. For most of the trip’s 17 days she suffered from a violent cold and later wrote, "We went to Europe and I lived through it but my capacity for staying at home has now been perfected & is going to last me the rest of my life" (p. 285)

The chief animal-keeper at the farm, however, was Regina, her mother. Her influence on her daughter is inestimable, but it is certain that both the colloquial and the Christian in Flannery’s character were gifts from Regina O’Connor. The letters are filled with anecdotes about Regina, whom Flannery affectionately calls "my parent." To Cecil Dawkins, a gifted young writer and regular correspondent, O’Connor wrote in 1959: "The current ordeal is that my mother is now in the process of reading [The Violent Bear It Away]. She reads about two pages, gets up and goes to the back door for a conference with Shot, comes back, reads two more pages, gets up and goes to the barn. Yesterday she read a whole chapter. There are twelve chapters. All the time she is reading, I know she would like to be in the yard digging. I think the reason I am a short-story writer is so my mother can read my work in one sitting" (p. 340).

In O’Connor’s characters, and running throughout her letters, is a streak of humor which is indigenous to the southern cracker. A combination of mild self-deprecation, irony, vivid phrasing and flawless timing, this is the humor that initially turns a reader’s head. She says to one of her correspondents, "I certainly am glad you like the stories because now I feel it’s not bad that I like them so much. The truth is I like them better than anybody and I read them over and laugh and laugh, then get embarrassed when I remember I was the one wrote them" (pp. 80-81).

Toward the end of her life, O’Connor asked a friend to try to find a picture of a statue she had seen of the Madonna and child laughing -- not merely smiling, but laughing heartily. Humor was, for O’Connor, a necessity, so her attraction to the laughing babe who was also to be the suffering Christ is appropriate. For her and for all Christians, sorrow and triumph can be contained in the same image.

It was not her propensity to laughter, however, that provoked so many young writers to ask O’Connor for advice -- both specific advice about individual stories and more general recommendations about the writing process itself. She wrote to these literary newcomers with great seriousness. To Dawkins, who was experiencing a dry spell, she wrote: "You ought to set aside three hours every morning in which you write or do nothing else; no reading, no talking, no cooking, no nothing, but you sit there. If you write all right and if you don’t all right, but you do not read; whether you start something different every day and finish nothing makes no difference; you sit there. It’s the only way, I’m telling you. If inspiration comes you are there to receive it, you are not reading" (p. 417). O’Connor’s regimen was to sit at her manual typewriter for two or three hours and follow her characters around. She did not write from an outline, insisting that her characters could carry the stories by themselves. "Remember," she wrote to her friend, "that you don’t write a story because you hive an idea but because you have a believable character (p. 219). She also advised writers to forget about plot when beginning a novel or story. "When you have a character he will create his own situation and his situation will suggest some kind of resolution as you get into it. Wouldn’t it be better for you to discover a meaning in what you write than to impose one? Nothing you write will lack meaning because the meaning is in you" (p. 188). (In one of the books in her personal library [Jacques Maritain, Art and Scholasticism: With Other Essays], O’Connor underlined the following passage: "Do not make the absurd attempt to sever in yourself the artist and the Christian. They are one, if you really are a Christian, and if your art is not isolated from your soul by some aesthetic system. But apply only the artist in you to the work in hand; precisely because they are one, the work will be as wholly of the one as of the other". [Arthur Kinney, Flannery O’Connor’s Library: Resources of Being (University of Georgia Press, 1985) , p. 94].)

O’Connor spoke of "self-abandonment" in writing, a lack of self-consciousness, and compared this experience with "Christian self-abandonment" (p. 458) , suggesting that in both her faith life and her artistic life, the self could become a vehicle for the Other. When this occurred, she was so entirely caught up in the creative process that she forgot completely about her physical situation. Only then could she become a channel for God’s grace and the Holy Spirit’s breath.

As a Catholic, O’Connor possessed a sacramental understanding that gave her art its solid base. She wrote to a professor, "You said something about my stories dipping into life -- as if this were commendable but a trifle unusual; from which I get the notion that you may dip largely into your head. This would be in line with the Protestant temper -- approaching the spiritual directly instead of through matter" (p. 304). Because O’Connor accepted sacrament as truth, she found it easy to view the natural things of this world as vehicles or instruments for God’s grace. The concrete, the hearable, sayable, seeable object or event always possessed the potential to be used sacramentally. In her stories the world of matter is always a handle for one of God’s mysteries, making it accessible, if not completely understandable.

By today’s standards O’Connor was a conservative Catholic. She accepted without question, for example, the pope’s dictum on birth control, writing, rather tersely, "Either practice restraint or be prepared for crowding" (p. 338). She requested official permission to read books on the Catholic Index, but probably would not have read them if she had been denied that permission. She was not comfortable with the spoken English mass, and she was, as might be expected, a lover of the liturgy. "many prayer books are awful," she wrote in 1956, if you stick with the liturgy, you are safe" (p. 160). Liturgy was for O’Connor the careful arrangement of worship so that human weariness or inattentiveness or laziness did not intrude upon the worship of an entire congregation. A priest’s feelings on a particular day did not change the liturgy, which was consistent, operative and effective in spite of human weakness.

Living in the South, a region fraught with tritely emotional religious expression, O’Connor distrusted feelings as an indicator of faith. She wrote at length about this and other Christian issues to a woman identified in Fitzgerald’s collection only as "A." "There is a question whether faith can or is supposed to be emotionally satisfying. I must say that the thought of everyone lolling about in an emotionally satisfying faith is repugnant to me. I believe that we are ultimately directed Godward but that this journey is often impeded by emotion" (p. 100). As she wrote later, "We [Catholics] don’t believe grace is something you have to feel. The Catholic always distrusts his emotional reaction to the sacraments" (pp. 346-47).

O’Connor was often critical of what she considered Protestant shortcomings. "A Protestant habit is to condemn the Church for being authoritarian and then blame her for not being authoritarian enough" (p. 347). She had a healthy respect for fundamentalist Protestants, and she was alarmed at the liberal theology she heard coming from some Protestant camps. "One of the effects of modern liberal Protestantism has been gradually to turn religion into poetry and therapy, to make truth vaguer and vaguer and more and more relative, to banish intellectual distinctions, to depend on feeling instead of thought, and gradually to come to believe that God has no power, that he cannot communicate with us, cannot reveal himself to us, indeed has not done so and that religion is our own sweet invention" (p. 479). She understood the difference between cheap grace and costly grace. "What people don’t realize," she wrote to Louise Abbot, "is how much religion costs. They think faith is a big electric blanket, when of course it is the cross" (p. 354).

O’Connor felt that fundamentalist Protestant churches were closer to Rome than they realized, even though many still considered the Roman Catholic Church the archenemy. The grand equalizer was the universal experience of unbelief, which O’Connor considered the necessary starting point of faith. Though she misidentified the biblical figures, she reminded one correspondent of the plea issued by the father of an epileptic boy whom Jesus heals (in Mark 9:24) : "1 believe. Help my unbelief" (p. 476). She pointed out that Peter, the founder of the church, was the same man "who denied Christ three times and couldn’t walk on the water by himself" (p. 307).

O’Connor was realistic about human nature and its ability to resist grace (p. 307), and she understood the ebbs and flows of faith. Perhaps because she felt that conversion was a continual process, she was troubled but not burdened when her friends experienced momentary setbacks in their faith lives. She wrote to "A," who had converted to Catholicism and was now filled with doubts:

Some people when they lose their faith in Christ, substitute a swollen faith in themselves. I think you are too honest for that, that you never had much faith in yourself in the first place and that now that you don’t believe in Christ, you will believe even less in yourself which itself is regrettable, but let me tell you this: faith comes and goes (p. 452).

O’Connor’s conviction that our age is deaf and blind to truth appears in all her writings. How to reach a handicapped generation is her constant concern. She does it by shouting or drawing very large pictures, and recommends pushing "as hard as the age that pushes against you" (p. 229).

The violence that shocks so many first-time readers of her fiction initially seems so unpalatable because it is so personal. We usually encounter violence at a distance, but O’Connor forces it upon us in a form we cannot escape. Whether it is the drowning of a child in a river or the murder of an old man in the stairwell of his apartment building or the massacre of an entire family on a deserted Georgia road, O’Connor pushes readers to the brink over and over again. "The kingdom of heaven," she writes, "has to be taken by violence or not at all" (p. 229). Her stories are particularly difficult for the secular "good man," who will not find in them many examples of the godly life, but who will be continually challenged to define and redefine his conception of goodness. "It’s not a matter in these stories of Do Unto Others. That can be found in any ethical culture series. It is the fact of the Word made flesh" (p. 227). She goes on to identify this as both a Roman Catholic and an orthodox Protestant belief.

In O’Connor’s works one is always pushed back to the agonizing scandal of the cross. That scandal has at its heart the recognition that humanity is fallen and needs redemption. Perhaps because the South still smarts from its own fall in the War Between the States, redemption has a special meaning there. With defeat comes the realization that humanity cannot save itself or perfect itself alone, that humanity is vulnerable and weak. In 1958 O’Connor wrote that "the Liberal approach is that man has never fallen, never incurred guilt. and is ultimately perfectable by his own efforts. Therefore, evil in this light is a problem of better housing, sanitation, health, etc. and all the mysteries will eventually be cleared up" (p. 302).

Of course, for the Christian the mysteries, finally remain mysterious. Perhaps this recognition that not all human motivation and behavior can be completely explained accounts for O’Connor’s strong feelings against the social sciences (ironic because she was a social-science major in college) Freudians particularly irritated her. She wrote William Sessions: "I do hope . . that you will get over the kind of thinking that sees in every door handle a phallic symbol. . . . The Freudian technique can be applied to anything at all with equally ridiculous results. My Lord, Billy, recover your simplicity. You ain’t in Manhattan. Don’t inflict that stuff on the poor students there: they deserve better" (p. 407).

In many letters O’Connor referred in a deprecating tone to academics in general and English teachers in particular. She answered one professor’s questions about her story, "Greenleaf": "Thank you for your note. I’m sorry I can’t answer it more fully but I am in the hospital and not up to literary questions. . . . As for Mrs. May, I must have named her that because I knew some English teacher would write and ask me why. I think you folks sometime strain the soup too thin" (p. 582). She threw up her hands at one well-known literary critic, wondering, "Can it be possible that a man with this much learning knows so little about Christianity?" (p. 411). That was the problem she faced every time she published. She was writing for an audience to whom the incarnation had little meaning, and yet her fiction repeatedly showed common people encountering the terror, mystery and beauty of the Word made flesh. She might have predicted that many of her readers would be mildly puzzled, if not completely confounded.

That fiction contained truth was the conviction she lived with every day. The fact that this truth was sometimes odd or uncomfortable or violent, that it led often to the grotesque, O’ Connor faced unflinchingly. Quoting Robert Fitzgerald, she wrote, "It is the business of the artist to uncover the strangeness of truth" (p. 343). What could be stranger than a God who decides to suffer with us? What could be more uncomfortable or more violent than the cross? What could be more comically grotesque than an individual trying to escape his own identity as God’s child and in his rush out the temple door smacking straight into the incarnation?

One experiences a depressing sense of inevitability as one nears the end of the letters. The temptation is simply to stop reading -- as if that would somehow prevent the end from coming. Her final letter, written on July 29, 1964, was found on her nightstand after her death. In referring to an anonymous phone call her friend had received, she was playful but serious. "Be properly scared," O’Connor advised, "and go on doing what you have to do, but take the necessary precautions . . . Cheers, Tarfunk" (p. 596).

Such proper scaring is what many of O’Connor’s characters and readers required and experience. We must go on doing what we have to do, but with better eyes and more sensitive ears, having run into truth along the way.

Brain, Mind and God

Aldous Huxley once observed that there ought to be a way to talk about mystical experience in terms of biochemistry, psychology and theology. Even more, we ought to be able to talk about all human experience in such a cross-disciplinary way. What might a conversation about the brain, mind and God be like? In what follows I suggest how knowledge of brain processes and patterns of belief might converge, and then how that constellation might enhance an understanding of Byzantine and medieval architecture as tangible expressions of those beliefs.

Controversy has characterized the history of understanding the brain-mind relationship. One position reduces mind to biochemistry, holding that mind is nothing but the brain. Accordingly, all activity can he explained by lower processes. Another position claims that mind is independent of brain, hence lower processes are irrelevant to higher purposes. Between these extremes lies a more supportable position: there is no mine without brain, but brain does not determine the meaning of mind.

Instead of being determined solely by its biological base, mind is an emerging phenomenon. It shapes its features in accord with the universe of influences in which it participates. This is an interactional position. While not an independent entity, mind reflects and transforms the emerging realities of human experience. In other words, mind is the human meaning of the brain.

Just as mind is the human meaning of the brain, so God is the theological meaning of mind. That is, all that people have meant by the term "God" -- experientially, conceptually, institutionally -- constitutes the criterion that determines what matters most to human beings. My argument, then, involves two assumptive leaps: (1) from brain to mind -- that is, from physical processes to human significance; and (2) from mind to God -- that is, from historically derived values to transcendent values. God represents that for which we have been created and that which we seek in our longing to be and become who we truly are.

In the loose interface between physical data and vivid personal experience -- that "space" identified as mind (Gordon Rattrey Taylor, The Natural History of the Mind [Dutton, 19791) -- we find clues to the human meaning of human presence. Mind points downward into the organized regularities of the brain and outward toward the emergent qualities of human purposes. To focus on that interface, then, is a new form of empirical natural theology. It is empirical in that it draws on behavioral evidence. It is natural in that it identifies cognitive structuring. Because of this Januslike feature, brain focuses the meaning of mind even as mind enlarges the significance of brain.

In this cross-disciplinary conversation I turn first to what is known about the brain, then to what we understand about belief, and finally, on the basis of that convergence of ideas, to an examination of the cultural symbol-images of Byzantine and medieval architecture, which express both cognitive and cosmic ways of understanding human life.

Both halves are extensions of subcortical, sensory relay centers; the neocortex or new brain is an outgrowth of the old brain. Higher functions have lower connections, though only modest correspondence exists between cognitive activity and specific brain locations. These connections are so intricate that all complex activity draws on every part of the brain. Quite simply, mind is more than brain.

This development of differentiated activity in the neocortex gives evidence of the interaction between people and the emerging universes of influence (e.g., family, society, value commitments) of which they are a part. The mind-set or the world as perceived and conceived by the double brain influences everything that happens. With each hemisphere taking the lead over the other in different ways of processing information -- as Marcel Kinsbourne points out ("Hemisphere Specialization and the Growth of Human Understanding," American Psychologist, April 1982, pp. 411-420) -- an active organism interacts with an active environment.

The brain’s left half proceeds item-by-item and step-by-step. This narrow logical style, says Kinsbourne, admits only "a few members to any one category" and attends "to detail in small differences." It observes, organizes and explains things systematically. It is always "on alert," constantly vigilant, isolating and mastering what needs to be taken into account in accomplishing conscious purposes. In short, it explains what it observes in a rational way.

In contrast, the right half of the brain functions all-at-once and by leaps of imagination. This broad integrative style groups "a wide variety of similar objects or concepts together, paying little attention to detail or difference" (Kinsbourne) It creates a web of connected-ness which blurs differences and emphasizes similarities. It constantly interacts with the environment, responding without labeling. In short, it expresses the felt meaning of what is happening.

In summary, the left mind engages in rational-explanatory processing. The right mind discloses relational-experiential processing. This makes the left vigilant and the right responsive. Neither functions alone. Each depends on what the other contributes. Together they make for unified consciousness and integrated behavior.

But mind points us to features that transcend mind itself. As Augustine put it, "I do not myself grasp all that I am. Thus the mind is too narrow to contain itself. But where can that part be which it does not contain?" Mind is neither its own origin nor its own destiny. There are social, cultural and cosmic contextualizations or universes of influence in which mind participates and which mind shapes. The semiautonomous mind transforms the brain’s regularities into patternings of what is real and right. The way we are made reflects and suggests the way we are meant to become.

Proclamation interprets what has been experienced in historical events, such as Exodus and Easter, in ways that make explicit the significance of human life. This reflects the rational-vigilant strategy of the left mind. To make right what is real requires deliberate intentional processing. Proclamation is word-oriented in that people hear the truth and are to act on the basis of it. "Hear, O Israel. . ." and "You have heard it said . . but I say unto you . . ." This is a redemption-oriented theology with instructions and imperatives. People are to be obedient to what is urgently right.

Manifestation, in contrast, expresses the rhythmic processes of the natural order, eliciting wonder and participation apart from formal language. This suggests the relational-responsiveness of right-mind strategy. People experience the wholeness of God in immediate ways -- that is, without mediation of language. Manifestation is object-oriented, and thereby incapable of being articulated, and more experienced than expressed. "The heavens declare the glory of God, and the firmament showeth God’s handiwork" (Ps. 19:1) Here is a creation-oriented theology with numinosity and natural symbolism. The world of appearances is celebrated by affirming God’s presence everywhere and in everything. People trust that which is ultimately real.

By analogy, the ways mind works suggest ways in which people have perceived God working: step-by-step in making right the way life is to be and all-at-once in showing forth what is real. The pattern of proclamation -- theologies of redemption -- makes explicit what is right, articulated and explained, whereas the pattern of manifestation -- theologies of creation -- keeps vivid what is real, immediately and experientially.

Here is the interpretive leap. The reality of mind connects the brain and the realm of transcendent meaning. The brain does not -- and cannot -- contain the cosmos. No physiological process adequately accounts for human purposing. Belief patterns, however, do articulate a cosmos; they do order and organize what matters in and to human life. Together, cognitive processes and belief patterns provide a convergence of salient features with which to understand human activity.

How might this convergence of vigilant-rational proclamation and responsive-relational manifestation help us understand the faith and practice of different historical periods, particularly the Byzantine and medieval?

Two forms represent the mind-sets of all-at-once responsiveness and step-by-step vigilance: the imaginative dome of the basilica of Hagia Sophia in Istanbul and the thrusting spires of the cathedral at Chartres in France. These physical images reveal spiritual perceptions. They re-present where God is and how to get to God. Beyond their historical significance each offer a glimpse of universal meaning. In that sense they are archetypal patterns of what matters in human experience.

Hagia Sophia’s rough exterior belies its exquisite interior. The great dome hovers over the landscape like a vehicle from outer space. Inside, space seems to expand and embrace simultaneously. This symbol-image of the dome presents a unifying vision of reality, including all, affirming all, lifting all up into the light of God.

The vision is simple: one citizenry obeying one law, on the basis of everyone’s believing one creed. Everything emanated from the triumphant Christ, the Pantocrator, the Ruler of the Universe. One dome expressed one reality. The earthly and heavenly realms mirrored each other. The Christian universe and the Greco-Roman world shared common boundaries.

People entered Holy Wisdom basilica through multiple entrances. The many ways reflected their belief in the open quality of human nature and societal roles. Life was process, an ascending to God and a communing with God. People were encouraged to enter in, to be part of the reality which the building represented.

Since everything belonged together, the locus of the holy was "tantalizingly always ambiguous," as scholar Peter Brown put it. God could be manifested in a physician in Alexandria as likely as in a St. Anthony in the desert or a farmer in a rural village. Whether in the natural order, the communal order or the cosmic order, the really real disclosed itself in varied and surprising ways.

Just as no line sharply divides the piers, columns and stoa of the building, so no boundary sharply divided person from person or group from group. The throne stood open regardless of one’s rank, fortune or ancestry. Open space meant open rules. Anyone could play a big part in the divine drama. All flowed together, creating one magnificent mosaic. The wondrous and diffuse light of the basilica radiated a sense of the pervasive presence of Holy Wisdom.

In contrast, in the West, precision came to full articulation. Chartres Cathedral epitomizes Gothic splendor. For Latin Christianity, the locus of the holy was known. God came down and met humanity in Christ’s sacrifice on the altar.

The cathedral’s two towers reflected two powers: papal and imperial. Both powers derived their authority from God. However, despite the empire’s insistence that papal and imperial power were parallel, the papacy claimed a hierarchical order. Thus the towers of Chartres are unequal, one stretching 27 feet higher than the other. With its closer connection to God the papacy insisted on imperial obedience.

In his book On the Trinity, Augustine had contemplated the mystery of the redeeming mind of God. In pondering the correspondence between Christ’s one death for humanity’s twofold death of body and of soul, through sin, it dawned on him that the musical experience of harmony most properly described that reconciliation. For Augustine, the consonance of the octave -- i.e., the musical expression of the ratio of 1:2 -- conveys to human ears the meaning of the mystery) of redemption. Musical harmony, for aim, echoed theological truth. That harmony eventually found expression in Gothic proportion -- its visual equivalent. As exemplified by Chartres Cathedral, medieval architecture, like Latin Christendom’s belief structure, disclosed the clarity of three-in-one: two towers, one main entrance; two aisles, one nave; nave, chancel, apse; pier arch, triforium, clerestory; triple windows -- all were variations of the trinitarian motif. Three articles of faith proved the existence of God. Accordingly, people could enter the cathedral through three façades. Each has three entrances; each entrance has three rising bands of figures surrounding a central tympanum of recessed space. The trinitarian conceptualization of reality, the place where God could be found, fixed every form in a precise way.

The building presents a clear order harmonizing sharp contrasts. Flying buttresses hold together the thrust of the upward and outward directions. These complex opposing forces re-presented the ambiguity of finitude: time versus eternity, matter versus spirit, expanding curiosity versus centered faith. Two powers: one eternal, spiritual and true; the other temporal, material and limited.

Architecturally, then, Chartres shows us one rationale, two powers and clear order. The outside anticipates the inside. The world was set, the forces definite, the way known. The cathedral made visible the invisible mind of God. The locus of the holy was fixed.

Inside the building we are dazzled by its majesty. The 130 feet of receding nave pull our eyes away from the 122 feet of soaring vault. Unlike the impressionistic mosaic of Hagia Sophia’s dome, the two towers and flying buttresses articulate the trajectories of upward and forward. Every part contributes to a breathtaking crescendo of exalted space with clear direction. We are drawn toward the altar with a sense of confidence, harmony and peace.

There are no surprises. Once we see the towers we know the plan. The inside re-presents the outside. Since the nave is more than twice as high as it is wide, and taut by virtue of its being twice the size of the aisles, we are led irresistibly forward. The intensified atmosphere defined the one "right" way to the holy.

What had originated in Augustinian experience now ended in scholastic explanation. Method had mastered mystery -- spatially and symbolically. The Yes and No of inquiry paralleled the thrust and counterthrust of the building: the Anselmian "I believe in order to understand" and the Abelardian "I understand in order to believe." The rational balance of asymmetrical forces determined the direction and destination of methodical faith. It resolved the opposition of spirit and matter: theologically in doctrine, politically in papal supremacy, architecturally in the Gothic cathedral.

Few questioned whether the method corresponded to reality. The method was the reality: three-into-one concentrated and controlled space. The dialectics of experience solidified into a dominating explanation. The spirelike mind identified what was urgently right in the only way and the only place in which it could be known.

The Byzantine mind-set had lived in a world of its own mystical imagination, seldom modified by empirical observation or rational critique. Constantinople was plated with gold because it was the New Jerusalem. Realistic and rational processes failed to crystallize. It lived with myopic optimism. In terms of what we know of damage in the brain’s right hemisphere, this can be called "polishing" (Arnold J. Mandell, "Toward a Psychobiology of Transcendence: God in the Brain," in Psychobiology of Consciousness [Plenum, 1980], 417) Things are seen as better than they are. Difficulties and disturbances are minimized.

Optimistic euphoria was basic to Byzantium. It lived with a sense of the triumphant Christ and little sense of sin, fallenness or a redeeming God. Because no procedure guided the transfer of political power, violence marked every transition. Even when Constantinople fell in 1453, the political reality of Byzantium became the universal state of Orthodoxy. "True" reality continued in the Orthodox Church of Eastern Christianity. From what is known about how the mind works, I infer that Byzantium was deficient in the vigilance of left-mind processing.

In contrast, the medieval mind-set exhibited patterns characteristic of damage in the brain’s left hemisphere -- specifically. "tarnishing." With tarnishing, people view life pessimistically. Things are worse than they appear to others. And the medieval world suffered from an oppressive pessimism. Christ as the terrible judge confronted humanity with its finitude and fallenness. This disturbed processing, embedded as it became in the dialectical method of inquiry (thesis, antithesis, synthesis) , generated polarized and competing forces: rival powers (such as popes versus emperors) , competing orders (such as the simple Franciscans versus the sophisticated Dominicans) , competing pieties (such as natural realism versus Gothic symbolism) , and competing inquiries (such as nominalism’s empiricism versus realism’s idealism) The dialectic between spirit and matter was pressed beyond its limits, resulting in both collapse and rigidification.

Despite these limitations, each mind-set exhibited its own grandeur. The dome hovered in brilliance for a thousand years. And the domelike quality of God manifesting God unpredictably still quickens the imaginative eye of faith. It reminds us of the expansiveness of relational process. It inspires us by its all-at-once responsiveness. Similarly, the spire pointed to the altar as the locus of the holy for a thousand years. And the spirelike quality of God intentionally redeeming humanity still calls to the faithful. It directs us to the intensity of rational articulation. It informs us by its step-by-step vigilance.

The relational strategy of the domelike makes for diversity and the affirmation of everything that is, which means belief in an indicative mode of what already is -- or manifestation. The rational strategy of the spirelike contributes to clarity and the insistence on what ought to be, which means belief in an imperative mode of what is yet to be -- or proclamation. Whether we enter the realm of reality, the heavenly city, the New Jerusalem, through the gate of the rational-explanatory process or the gate of the relational-experiential process, once there we need all that we are in order to be who we are.

The regularities of the brain and the emergent features of human purposes enable us to connect brain, mind and God in an understandable and fruitful way. Even though brain and belief will never finally converge -- in principle -- we can discern suggestive constellations such as the one I have sketched. Mind represents the human significance of the brain as well as the theological concepts used to speak about and be faithful to the God who is God of all.

Critics have questioned these sweeping generalizations. While acknowledging these central tendencies, they insist that exceptions are the rule. Because of the ambiguity of the evidence, they rightly urge caution.

A close analysis of patterns of belief does disclose variations. Both theologies of proclamation and of manifestation present diversity within their critical tendencies. So too empirical evidence about the brain is more complex than the simple distinction about left and right processing (Sally P. Springer and Georg Deutsch, Left Brain, Right Brain [W. H. Freeman, 1981]) Take, as a prime example, the location of speech dominance in the left hemisphere. That appears in 95 per cent of right-handers suffering from damage in that area, but it appears in only about 61 per cent of left-handers. When gender is added to the qualification that handedness requires, the generalization about left and right brain-mind becomes less certain. As a rule, verbal and spatial processing are more sharply divided between the two halves for men, whereas verbal and visual processing tend to be distributed more equally in female brains. Even though we cannot speak of gender-specific differences, we still can identify gender-related differences. Such caution in generalizing about both the brain and belief makes cross-disciplinary talk more valuable as suggestive speculations about loose associations than as firmly established causal connections.

The correlates of brain and belief are too varied for summary. Lists of left- and right-mind processes make the data more orderly than they are. Descriptions of proclamation and manifestation can portray God as a split-mind deity. The dialectic between created world (nature and history) and redeeming power (transcending purposes and God) comes together in the human mind. As William James insisted: "Where you have purpose, there you have mind." And where we have mind, there we have meaning -- a continuing calling forth and calling to that which is genuinely human.

Ways of Knowing God: Gender and the Brain

Neuroscience research has established that the two hemispheres in the brain make different contributions to what we know and how we act, although complex activity requires the entire brain. Left-half cognition involves formal logic; it uses language to interpret what it observes in consistent ways. The left hemisphere’s analytic processing -- item by item, step by step -- conveys the appearance of an objective reality.

In contrast, right-half cognition works according to a situational logic. Its information combines bodily perception and active imagination. It creates patterns or mosaics of meaning by a leap of imagination. The left brain specializes in an explanatory way of knowing, the right in an experiential way. Each is necessary; neither is sufficient by itself.

While these generalizations apply to male and female brains alike, brains may also vary according to gender. "Essentialist" gender theory maintains that men and women are essentially different, and that these differences are related to the brain much more than to culture. Because girls’ capacity for language (located primarily in the left brain) matures earlier than boys’, they rely more on verbal skills in solving problems, including nonverbal problems such as spatial tasks. In boys, however, the right hemisphere, which specializes in spatial-perceptual processes, matures earlier than it does in girls. Boys rely more on physical movement and spatial perception in engaging the world than on language skills.

The earlier development of the left hemisphere in girls enables both hemispheres to handle information in similar ways. The left brain processes nonverbal information as well as verbal; the right brain uses verbal strategies as well as nonverbal strategies. There is less division of labor, less specialization between the contribution of each half.

People with greater symmetry -- usually but not always female -- are more dependent on the situation in which they find themselves and more sensitive to the context, especially its interpersonal nuances. These individuals respond to subtle experiential clues which interfere with the process of abstraction. Perhaps that explains, in part, why a right-brain quality like intuition is more prevalent in women than men. Their interpretive capacity more easily senses and voices what is appernng with both hemispheres. Information is more integrated than discrete. At the same time, a more equal distribution of functions creates a liability: the person is less able to hone in on a few details which are relevant to a pattern.

Those children (usually male) who start talking at a later age show an extreme separation between their verbal skills and their nonverbal abilities. Instead of each hemisphere being a generalist, as is true of early maturers, each hemisphere specializes either in an analytic or integrative strategy. The right half handles perceptual information, the left conceptual information. In a male-dominated society, the male role is reinforced by the time of puberty.

The late-maturing male, growing into the male-dominant social world, can succeed or conquer with his narrowed left-brain view of the world. He is in the right place at the right time. Regardless of the fact that he may be working with a specialized half brain, the world is his and he made it.

The problem, then, is the woman’s. How can she be female (using her more generalized processing pattern) and still function in a social world shaped by a male-related way of specialized processing? Some females learn to adapt their processing skills accordingly. (On the other hand, men today may feel a demand to change their particular style of processing to include women’s distinctive participatory style.)

Men and women also, of course, share perceptions of the world -- here is a street; this is a Bible; there are the stars. Both sexes adjust to cognitive differences, and with age, women and men become more androgynous. But because the brains of women and men may differ in the basic features I have described, they often construct different worlds and have different understandings of God.

For example, many men have minimized the importance of "women’s intuition." They claim that an experiential approach to knowledge easily falls into subjective bias. In contrast, feminist thinkers tend to view with suspicion anything which claims objectivity. They value personal experience as an important source of knowledge, and believe we distort what we know when we don’t acknowledge our personal experience and histories.

This clash reflects different perceptions of what "experience" is. Perceptual origins also affect knowledge. In the physical and human sciences, according to Evelyn Fox Keller, a professor of mathematics and humanities, knowledge has come from "distinctive and often perverse masculine understandings of only masculine social experience."

Keller claims that "processes which involve a blurring of the boundary between subject and object" have come to be associated with the feminine, and the posture of "objectification" associated with the masculine. Thus, "truth itself has become genderized." As a system of beliefs, science has also acquired a gender, affirming the masculine value of objectivity, rather than a more broadly human value like participation.

In a similar way, Western Christian theology has acquired a gender. Theology often expresses what Rosemary Radford Ruether calls masculine values, like the concept of a sinful world, rather than the goodness of creation. The "masculine" typically sets up differences, while the "feminine" emphasizes connections. Women’s brains are predisposed to perceive life -- and God -- according to a pattern of connection and ordinariness, while men perceive life -- and God -- according to a pattern of polarities and otherness.

I. David Pierce, in his doctoral dissertation on cognition and theology, found that a sample of theologically liberal women were less inclined to use polar dimensions -- such as "human effort" versus "divine power" or "instrumental" versus "relational’ ‘ -- than either a sample of men or a sample of theologically moderate or conservative women. The theologically conservative women may have been socialized into the dominant male-oriented culture. The data support the feminist criticism of a masculinized science and a masculinized theology. Polar contrasts -- such as human effort versus God’s acting, "doing" versus "being," a redeeming God versus a creating God -- do not necessarily reflect "women’s ways of knowing" God.

Women’s experience seemed to be one of "continuity" with their social and biological realities. In their quest for God, they became what they already symbolized, "the fleshly, the nurturing, the suffering, the human." Instead of inverting what they were (most likely they didn’t have that choice) , they deepened what they were. Their symbols disclose less contradiction and more "synthesis and paradox."

Women gave the concept of "human" a meaning beyond the dichotomy of male and female. Because of their sense of continuity with life, a concept of "other" played little part. They drew on symbolic aspects of life closer to their ordinary experience -- eating, lactating, suffering.

Women appropriated the dominant view of the cosmos in a way different from men, and with different implications for both. Because men were high and lifted up, they needed to be brought low, "to renounce their dominance." Women, however, deepened their ordinary experience "when God impinged upon it." Their bodies not only served as "a symbol of the humanness of both genders but also a symbol of -- and a means of approach to -- the humanity of God."

A similar contrast in religiosity is evident today. Women’s experience of God tends to deepen their own humanity, making the everyday sacred, while many men experience a longing to overcome their humanity. An awareness of these differences can enrich "our understanding of both symbol and humanity," of both God and creation.

Brain research shows the brains of men and women are organized differently, and these gender-related but not always gender-specific differences could be construed as suggesting new stereotypes, another "dichotomy." That is not my intent. Neither sex alone bears "the image and likeness of God," only the species does (Gen. 1:26-27) Godlike "knowing" takes into account the experiences of both women and men.

In studying the subtleties of male and female differences, future brain researchers may eventually assist us in creating a model of behavior we can call fully "human" and truly "godlike" -- the male personality balancing the female in his being and the female balancing the male in her being -- one image, of equal parts, representing one humanity.

V. S. Naipaul and the Plight of the Dispossessed



By his own admission, V. S. Naipaul’s situation is odd and suspicious. A novelist and journalist of Indian heritage, he grew up on Trinidad and became a resident of England. He appears “unlikely and exotic,” a colonial seeking to depict larger reality, yet threatened with being seen as a regional, West Indian writer; his writings seemingly lack a natural audience beyond his home island. But because he himself has been cut off, dispossessed of a coherent habitat by birth and circumstances, he has developed a distinctive sensibility. Naipaul’s writing highlights the experiences of non-Western peoples who have been uprooted by historical currents. Given the formlessness of their lives, such people seek to find order. How their struggles unfold becomes not merely a regional or racial saga, but a human one.

Many people have heard of Naipaul, but few know much about him. His writings have proven arresting, though for reasons few commentators have articulated. This failure of insight has become more acute as Naipaul’s stature has grown. With the publication of Among the Believers: An Islamic Journey (Knopf) in 1981, Naipaul reached the pages of the Atlantic and the cover of Newsweek.

Naipaul presents a consistent image of social reality in the non-Western world, where dispossessed people search for order in their lives. His own search for rootedness bespeaks the search of many colonial peoples. Vidiadhar Surajprasad Naipaul was born on Trinidad in 1932. He world was bounded by Indian descent and the racial mix of a colonial island. Wanting to transcend his boundaries, Naipaul entered Oxford on an island scholarship at 17. Following graduation and a period of employment with the British Broadcasting Corporation, he began writing full-time. He became a resident of England, married an English woman, and in 1957 published his first book, The Mystic Masseur (A. Deutsch), a novel about a failed Trinidadian masseur turned Hindu guru. Sixteen books, from novels about the Caribbean to journalistic accounts of Third World travels, have followed.

Naipaul gives us a broad sense of human experience -- so broad, in fact, that critics from the social science realms may encounter questionable assumptions or generalizations. He sometimes appears to define historical or political facts carelessly. But that in itself does not gainsay the reality he represents. Writing as a dispossessed person, one who has been culturally uprooted and forced to create his own world, Naipaul presents not objective reality but subjective perceptions. He finds personal resonance with the world views of the dispossessed, the former colonial subjects now cast on their own resources and in search of distinctive identity. Both empathic and critical, Naipaul catalogues the failures of developing societies. The quest for autonomy and form, inherently admirable, reveals opportunities for self-deception, for seizing the image of a coherent self or the illusion of a just society rather than grasping their essence. Worse than formless existence is the chaos of an imagined order imposed on reality. In Naipaul’s novels, as in his own life, there are certain givens. The most elusive one is the West. Naipaul has expended little ink on the circumstances of the West’s expansion, on the motives for colonialism or the lineaments of Western culture itself. The West, as Naipaul depicts it, is vaguely English and American, an inchoate cluster of culture and technology. Jet planes and Coca-Cola cross the lives of his characters. Democratic ideals and bureaucratic realities circumscribe images of freedom. Marxism, the most convenient ideology of rebellion, represents yet another Western legacy, as though one were obliged to rebel against the West in a prescribed, Western way. The Loss of El Dorado (A. Deutsch, 1969), a historical essay, presents Western fascination with virgin, non-Western land. But otherwise Naipaul says little about the West’s assertion of its dominance.

This is not a crippling omission. Naipaul, of course, depicts a subjective sense of reality. Rootless non-Westerners perceive Western influence as an inheritance. Dispossession is a state into which one is born, a fact not of one’s own choosing. Naipaul’s perspective begins with the non-Western person’s realization of this state, of the sense of having boundaries drawn around his or her life by the West. Having sensed this dispossession, the former colonial begins to fantasize, to dream of greater reality, and seeks to create the conditions of liberation.

The restive person first pursues liberation through conformity. Reality drawn from Western example prompts mimicry. Having failed as a masseur and author, Ganesh Ramsumair, protagonist of The Mystic Masseur, discovers Hollywood’s image of the Hindu sage. Donning a turban and dhoti (loincloth) and burning incense, Pundit Ganesh attracts a following lured more by his airs than by his ersatz wisdom. Success enables him to build a career in politics and spurs him to change his name to G. Ramsay Muir.

Politics provides a clue to understanding mimicry. At its core, in Naipaul’s vision, status devolves from political power. But the celebrity finds that he retains power only so long as he embodies popular aspirations. Ralph Singh, an exiled colonial minister in the novel The Mimic Men (Macmillan, 1967), experiences the fate of being a retired symbol. Useful no more, Singh loses power. Similarly, Eva Peron became Peronism’s madonna. She emerged from Argentina’s poor and clawed her way to status. She sanctified the Peronist ideology of wealth for all. Her tragic death, writes Naipaul in The Return of Eva Peron (Knopf, 1980), was the “public passion play of the dictatorship.”

The Western legacy is democracy with material comfort. But in the developing world, events rush out of control. Behind the sense of order conveyed by Western political models stands chaos. Western culture remains as ~.a veneer, an illusion which obscures a confused, tumultuous search for recognition and security. In The Suffrage of Elvira (A. Deutsch, 1958), a fictional account of a district election on Trinidad, the process of campaigning becomes a carnival, a ritual of aspirations and fears in the guise of democracy. The British political model when transplanted retains its form but sheds its original meaning in favor of local alternatives. A multiracial, colonial society seizes upon such rites as elections as legitimation of its quest for an indigenous order.

Naipaul’s ability to depict the aspirations of individuals surpasses his social sensitivity. His corpus is a montage of individual portraits, glimpses of ordinary people who exemplify extraordinary reality. Miguel Street (A. Deutsch, 1959) is a series of brief portrayals of characters who inhabit a section of Port of Spain. Here all are poor and all fantasize about a better life. Fantasy turns to mimicry. The reader meets Bogart, who called himself Patience until the film Casablanca reached Trinidad. Bogart cultivates an American accent and gives chocolates to children. There is also Man-man, failed politician turned evangelist, and B. Wordsworth, the poet who dreams lines but never writes poetry.



The power of mimicry proves formidable. Mimicry allows the non-Western person to grasp at his or her aspirations. It also represents an attempt to adapt to a powerful, external reality while preserving something of oneself. India, more than any other non-Western nation, possesses the ability to mimic. India is both an outer and an inner world; The outer world seems chaotic, vaguely Eastern, vaguely Western. But the inner world, the realm of consciousness, demonstrates the persistence of habit. India reveals itself to be tightly defined, highly prescribed by ancient social definitions and codes. No Indian is far from his origins, Naipaul asserts in An Area of Darkness (Random House, 1981), a study of his visit to his ancestral homeland. Indians have a powerful sense of fate, of being determined by a relentless culture. Outsiders can be aped without being absorbed. The land can be remade often without losing itself, for its inner world remains coherent.

Yet “the eternal Indian attempt to incorporate and nullify” has created a destructive psychology. Ancient cultural forms persist, shorn of their original rationale. The fulfillment of function, the blind allegiance to memory, renders India subservient to symbolic gestures rather than alert to social realities; thus Indians have been reduced to mimicry of themselves in the name of resisting pollution by alien cultures. Naipaul argues that Indians must realize that they can never go forward until they cease trying to go back to the past.

Other societies, less culturally malleable than India, cannot retreat into an inner world. Either they are artificial creations of Western expansion -- thus wildly heterogeneous -- or their indigenous cultural forms allow no easy acceptance of the West. One of the pillars of Naipaul’s vision is his sensitivity to the power of the past. Traditional cultural forms relentlessly reassert themselves; social habit takes over where mimicry fails. The past, in Naipaul’s scheme, asserts itself in a fascination with things medieval and an appreciation for traditional religions. In An Area of Darkness, Naipaul presents Srinagar as a medieval spectacle, offering festivals and wonders such as holy men. Religion passes on forms without regard for history. The past can be selectively appropriated, romanticized, shorn of evidence of pa1lution from the outside. Religion records memories of human aspirations and threatens to impose its forms whole on changed realities. A traditional pilgrimage to a cave where an ice formation symbolic of Shiva has appeared in years past reveals hundreds of devotees but no ice formation: the act of making pilgrimage itself proves sufficient.

The past’s appeal is an underlying theme of Among the Believers. Qom, the Iranian holy city, functions as a medieval center of learning. As did medieval Spain or medieval Arabia, Qom symbolizes the integration of faith and life. Pakistan, too, represents the search for a pure Islamic nation. People who feel dispossessed, Naipaul writes, find kinship with a resurgent Islam. Fundamentalist Islam glorifies a time that never existed, an imagined past when triumphant Arabs unified faith and life and forged an ideology of conquest. Thus the achievement of purity -- symbolized by throwing off the West’s pollution -- becomes an obsession, representing salvation. In the process, however, history serves theology. The present mimics the past, for the past cannot be reconstituted. But the past lingers, though in forms that thwart a purist’s vision: ancient Malaysian village society persists; traditional Indonesian pluralism dilutes Islam with Hindu and Buddhist residues; Pakistan finds that it has nothing that can effectively replace the British system of law. Escape proves difficult from the more recent, as from the more distant, past; pure recovery is an illusion.

Fear of losing one’s remembered culture breeds frustration. The West becomes an unwelcome interloper which one cannot escape but to which one cannot adapt. Historical and social realities blur in a sense of dispossession; of being cut off from an imagined glorious past. Frustration mounts and engenders anger. Western pollution must be stripped away. Indigenous forms of life must be reanimated. But still, Naipaul injects, holy men travel by jet, Iranians go to America for education, and phonograph records by the Carpenters are popular in Pakistan. The West is too massive and too convenient to be excised whole. It becomes an easy target for rage.



A sense of rage figures prominently in Naipaul’s more recent writings. Rage demonstrates the conviction that the West has polluted the world. Only in throwing off Western influence can a nation, or a person, become genuine. Rage derives from the failure of mimicry, from disenchantment with the West and loss of a sense of cultural integrity. In the novel Guerrillas (Knopf, 1975), Naipaul’s setting is a racially mixed Caribbean island where people sense that they are lost. Cut off from the land, given independence by Britain, people feel overwhelmed by outside forces. Among the trapped and uncertain, a mania to do something, to escape, predominates. Jimmy Abmed, self-proclaimed revolutionary, seeks to father a new order. But he is a creation of the media; he symbolizes aspirations but he cannot fulfill them.

Rage also figures prominently in Among the Believers. The Iranian revolution seizes upon religion as a vehicle for social purgation. The West has proven empty. Social self-esteem can be appropriated from the past, from a pure reanimation of a cultural heritage. The enraged assume that something or someone can bequeath social wholeness. But history proves awkward; it must be treated selectively with a cultivated blindness to truth. Therein lies the dilemma of revolution. It falls prey to fantasy, much as the West did in its search for El Dorado, the mythical city of gold. Naipaul’s most searing question emerges in his study of Pakistan.

Wouldn’t it have been better for Muslims to trust less to the saving faith and to sit down hard-headedly to work out institutions? Wasn’t that an essential part of the history of civilization, after all: the conversion of ethical ideals into institutions?

Despite his pessimism, Naipaul affirms a human capacity for genuine change. The quest for freedom, despite aberrant turns, is innate. Therein lies the source of human wholeness and social integrity. Bobby and Linda, traveling across Africa in the novel In a Free State (A. Deutsch, 1971), find themselves separated from the influences of traditions and societies. Their sense of self derives from the land’s immediacy. A powerful sense of the self in relation to history emerges.

People seek to impose forms on the land. In itself this is good, for it demonstrates the human zeal for freedom from fate, from imprisonment by the past. In A House for Mr. Biswas (A. Deutsch, 1961), a novel suggestive of his father’s life, Naipaul presents Mohun Biswas, who, despite all that augurs against him, determines to be different, to have his own house and to make himself unique. Failures multiply; he receives scorn at every turn. But he persists: he reads, works, aspires.. Eventually, Biswas becomes a journalist and acquires a house. Like his life, the house is a hodgepodge, a poorly assimilated assortment of ill-coordinated elements. Nevertheless, his spirit has reached out and impressed itself on the land.

As Naipaul discovered for himself in India, the human spirit must know itself in relation to the land; the land desolates fantasy. Culture, including religion, serves to symbolize the history of human reliance on land. Among India’s mountains Naipaul absorbed a sense of genuine heritage. Thus, for all the dispossessed, a realization of the self’s aspirations can derive only from the inherent sense of order found in nature. Here a transcendent reality prevails. Here freedom becomes possible.

Institutional Ties

Loose Connections: Joining Together in America's Fragmented Communities, by Robert Wuthnow. Harvard University Press, 336 pp. $35.00.

Has the fabric of community broken down in America? That question, implicit Robert Wuthnow's earlier books, is explicit here. At first, Wuthnow's answer seems to be yes. Compared to the close-'knit world of his parents, Wuthnow writes, "my own ties have been more long distance and ephemeral. Some observers would argue that these changes are symptomatic of a large-'scale breakdown" in our ability to be cohesive and to generate effective civic commitment.

But Wuthnow does not endorse that thesis. "My own view is that our involvement in our communities is changing rather than simply declining," he states. "But this raises important questions of how and why it is changing."

Wuthnow examines shifts in community groups and service organizations since the 1950s. Then people considered it important to belong to a chapter of a national organization. They wanted to feel involved in something larger and more important than their local community, though they were committed to that community. Now loyalty to elaborate organizations has given way to fluid ties based on personal need and interpersonal affect. Wuthnow views this as a process of social adaptation. Institutions may give way, but their purposes adapt to changing realities. Today's connections may be loose, but they are real.

How do these changes affection social institutions? Do today's looser connections allow the nonprofit sector to become significantly involved in civic affairs? What sorts of adaptive strategies will permit service groups both to be effective in their new environment and authentic in expressing their his-'tone sense of purpose? Wuthnow realizes that such questions are important for religious groups. His chapter on religion in the inner city suggests that when social forces sweep other groups aside, churches continue to play a key role in their communities. Though not immune to change, they find creative new ways to express their mission.

Churches face intractable social problems with depleted reservoirs of institutional purpose. The fragility of community accentuates the difficulty of nurturing civic commitment. But religion's public role is not declining. Wuthnow is not optimistic about preserving institutional form, but he believes that social purposes endure. The forms of community and of civic involvement may vary, but their intentions survive.

Wuthnow measures community and commitment by the trust they generate. He worries that "loose connections make it hard to establish trust even when people take part in community organizations." Yet he affirms that people can build trust even with those who differ significantly from them. Today's loose connections still link people "in a community of interest."

The implications of Loose Connections for religious life, though not explicated, loom large. Wuthnow suggests why mainline religion's elaborate, historic institutions are declining. But the new initiatives in congregations and in forms of spirituality seem more significant. It remains to be seen whether religious groups can sustain their sense of tradition and civic influence while preserving their ability to generate community. That will he a true measure of the process of social adaptation Wuthnow describes.

Willimon’s Project: Does It make Sense?

William H. Willimon seems to be everywhere. When he is not preaching or teaching at Duke University, he is publishing books and articles on preaching, exegesis, ministry and the church, and he regularly gives lectures and leads conferences.

I encountered Willimon at a workshop for Episcopal clergy on preaching. In an opening homily, Willimon cited Luke 17, the account of the unworthy servant, as a prelude to a discussion of ministry as duty. Ministers should not expect to be affirmed by their congregations and are often obliged to do what is not pleasing, he contended. Ministry is not derived from notions of sensitivity or rationality, but is grounded in service. The significance of the servant comes from a relationship to the master. Willimon spiced his message with anecdotes from parish life that any minister would recognize, and he modulated the presentation with a husky Piedmont twang.

As the day progressed Willimon’s message unfolded: modern culture has distanced itself from the church, which can no longer rely on the culture to do religion’s work. The church was meant to be not an inclusive or accommodating community, but an exclusive story-formed community. Luke-Acts illustrates the subversion of, not the accommodation to, Roman culture. Alluding to the problem of clergy burnout, Willimon claimed clergy have been ground down by trivialities and have lost sight of what is important. Often their contribution is not valued and their distinctive role is not acknowledged. But ministers must understand that life is a combat. Ministry means facing harsh truths and allowing the Bible to reveal the difference between true and false community.

The assembled clergy responded enthusiastically. One bishop said that Willimon is "recovering the integrity of the church and its message." "Integrity" and "freshness" are words a number of the clergy chose. One minister added that Willimon "engages the questions we all have, especially questions of evil and suffering. He’s one of us." Another priest liked Willimon’ s unabashed southern accent. "He’s not afraid of being distinctive. He talks our language; he’s been there. He gives me a way to make the gospel, not the culture, central.’’

Clearly, Willimon taps profound clergy sensibilities. But what exactly is he saying? And does it make sense?

Willimon frequently writes in collaboration with Duke colleague Stanley Hauerwas, joining his pastoral project to Hauerwas’s theological one. The two share a mood, if not a position. They both use George Lindbeck’ s Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age as a manual of arms. Christianity, they believe, is a unique language and must not be expressed in terms of the world. The gospel projects a counterculture, an alternative way of life. Their message, Willimon and Hauerwas caution, is not another form of neo-orthodoxy stressing personal belief rather than congregational life. Nor do they assume the neoconservative stance of Richard John Neuhaus and Michael Novak, which is more optimistic about the culture and less assertive about the church. For Willimon and Hauerwas, the loci of Christian faith are the church, not the world, and the Christian story, not individual self-understanding and life in a pluralistic culture.

"Salvation is the tough social formation of a colony, a holy nation, a people, a family, a congregation that is able to stand against the pretensions and the illusions of the world," Willimon writes. The Christian faith concerns a story that draws the believer into a new, alternative world. The gospel does not intend to accept all religions as true, nor does it endorse forms of religion grounded in public life. The church must assert its distinctiveness through an emphasis upon liturgy and upon formation, using the Christian story to create a sense of peoplehood and to incorporate others into the church. The church has sacrificed its integrity in an attempt to permeate American culture with Christian belief. That effort and its underlying assumptions must be abandoned. Willimon has characterized liberalism as the belief in a "universal human experience" transcending particular expressions. Liberals dismiss particularity as unreasonable, preferring a general theory of religion governed by cultural norms of truth and goodness. Religious experience, not doctrine, serves as liberalism’s universal category, Willimon says, citing Lindbeck. The experiential approach hallows the inner self and diminishes the importance of traditional, corporate embodiments of faith.

Willimon thus far has not modified the Lindbeck and Hanerwas critique appreciably. His contribution is to apply it to pastoral style and church life. Clergy are more receptive on these points than when he lampoons theological giants. They laugh when he scorns pop psychology, balloon and butterfly liturgies, and rootless social action. Willimon’s altar call to recover the distinctiveness of the ministry and of the church brings vigorous assent. He strikes a deep resonance within mainstream clergy, many of whom seek a new vision of church life. He taps a longing for assurance in ordained ministry, which could be a significant force.

But how theologically and pastorally sound is Willimon’s project? Does he effectively counter clergy discontent, even if he touches on its sources? One of Willimon’s strengths, and the source of much of his appeal, is his realism. He is familiar with tedious church committees, quarrelsome parishioners and lean budgets. He knows that people suffer from cancer, commit adultery, and use drugs. Willimon is not tempted by warm-fuzzy piety; part of his agenda is to demolish such a trivialization of the church. Clergy pay attention to Willimon because he struggles with the issues that confront them.

Willimon also dignifies the church and its task in several ways. With Hauerwas, he says that theology should help congregations "appreciate the significance of their common acts" and "understand the common but no less theologically significant activities that constitute their lives." Seminaries and congregations can discover a new appreciation of the Christian story and of liturgy as foundations of "a visible people who has listened to a different story from that of the world."

In other words, Willimon finds meaning in the routines of parish life. He scorns the reductionism that sees liturgy as subsidiary, and that reads ulterior purposes into biblical narrative. Whereas some forms of liberalism have tended to disdain church structure and middle-class life, Willimon refuses to apologize for them; he sees the church’s ordinary life as important. He thinks the congregation ought to instruct seminaries and theologians rather than the other way around.

His perspective also dignifies the Bible and elevates the significance of preaching and teaching. This emphasis invigorates clergy and enlivens the Sunday chores. It is praxis at its best. Willimon’s repeated use of the term "story" has powerful appeal, and suggests renewed attention to liturgy as the environment for preaching. Here the relation between symbolic and common acts in congregational life becomes clear.

Formation is another strength of Willimon’s program. Willimon emphasizes that "Christians are made, not born." The story has to be heard; it is not innately our own. Being Christian "is much like learning a language. . . . The enculturation that this language provides gives us a new perspective on life and forms us into a particular person." The church’s primary task is to devise forms of apprenticeship by which new believers "model their lives upon those of developed believers."

Willimon’s Christianity appears tribal or sectarian. He is sensitive to these categories, but not afraid of them; he considers them liberalism’s defensive gestures. Indeed, such accusations are futile, for they play into his polemic.

Yet Willimon’s eagerness to deflate liberalism in this regard is excessive. His criticisms of the liberal tradition are labored, repetitive and often snide. Moreover, whose liberalism he is attacking is not entirely clear. The liberalism of the political order and the academy? Of clergy and laity? Of seminary faculty and students? Or, as seems the case, is he attacking a Zeitgeist that has pervaded the mainstream churches? For all the ink Willimon spills on liberalism, it is not clear who bears the stain.

His work also raises questions of context. It would be helpful if Willimon analyzed how churches got into the dilemma he perceives. It could be argued that mainstream Christianity has produced strongly countercultural impulses for a generation -- the civil rights and antiwar movements, charismatic renewal and the new interest in spirituality, for example. Also, Willimon needs better to understand the context of his own particularity. He opposes a cluster of historic assumptions about mainstream Christianity and its public role, assumptions which the diminishing status of the mainstream has rendered problematic anyway. He may be kicking an already comatose form of Christianity.

Questions of context arise in another way, for Willimon has oversimplified the distinction between church and culture. He notes that every person inherits a culture and becomes socialized in some way or another. In his scheme the church offers an alternative form of socialization. But to incorporate a person into the church is not to remove that person from the snares of secularity. People continue to have jobs and families, and live in neighborhoods where Christian community is one alternative among many. Even the most skilled means of community formation must address the social schizophrenia that Christians experience. The church has to offer alternative ways to be public, not images of separation. The church must engage its social environment constructively.

Despite Willimon’s avoidance of the truth issue, that question bedevils many people. Incorporation does not erase the manifold doubts that assail the believer. Belonging and believing do not necessarily advance in tandem. Mainstream Christianity has been able to tolerate divergent personal quests, to blend people at different stages of nurture into forms of common prayer. Even a militant ecclesiastical posture will not dissolve questions of faith, just as it cannot assuage personal doubt and confusion. The future strength of the historically mainstream church depends upon confidently proclaiming the faith while ministering to individuals whose personal convictions are inchoate. How can high moral, doctrinal and liturgical standards be upheld for people who live in the secular world, who seek transcendent reality in the midst of mundane experience? Boundaries alone cannot suffice.

Willimon’s work needs to make a stronger connection between personal faith and participation in religious community. Alluding to Ananias and Sapphira, Willimon told the Episcopal clergy that the community is more important than any individual. While this position might be an admirable ideal for the Christian community, it is not realistic. The people to whom the church ministers think neither in collective nor in exclusive terms. The church must teach an understanding of personal faith that prepares people to participate in community. The church must also acknowledge that belonging to the church occurs at different levels of commitment, and that people belong to many forms of community. In other words, the church’s responsibility is to devise programs which teach the meaning of life in community and lead people toward significant forms of commitment to Christian community. Surely, formation, as Willimon intends it, entails a process of incorporation through various stages of faith.

Also, in focusing on the distinctiveness of ministry, Willimon might emphasize more the acts of confession and absolution. The church should articulate high moral standards, but it must not hold people to them dictatorially. The church’s role is to teach and, in teaching, to encourage contrition and opportunities for new beginning. If the church taught that each believer is simul iustus et peccator, it would both guard its distinctiveness and proclaim its pastoral nature. This posture would extend the meaning of formation by acknowledging the humanity of the believer and the fact that life’s ambiguities do not evaporate by participation in Christian community.

Lurking in Willimon’s writings are suggestions of a new kind of mainstream church and hints of how it might be realized. But he needs to move with greater clarity from polemic to program. Otherwise he will remain a prophet of the old kingdom rather than an evangel of a new one.

Israel’s Covenant

O Jerusalem! The Contested Future of the Jewish Covenant, by Marc H. Ellis, Augsburg Fortress, l86pp. $20.00

Marc Ellis is a proponent of Jewish liberation theology. Ellis is a critic of the national theology of Israel, which asserts that post-Holocaust Jews have a right to a homeland in Israel. Because that national theology ignores the Palestinians and has remained deaf to their suffering, it has become an ideology of oppression. "Most Jews take a collective pride in Israel; there is also a collective culpability. The return of the Jews to power has mostly been seen as a miracle in light of the Holocaust. Today it may also be recognized as a disaster." According to Ellis, for the sake both of the human dignity of the Palestinians and the moral integrity of the Jews, something new must replace that national theology. A new understanding of the covenant is needed, he argues.

Ellis, who teaches American and Jewish studies at Baylor University, wrote this book between the 1996 election of Benjamin Netanyahu and the 1998 Wye accords. The book's message transcends these events, but its references unavoidably reflect the atmosphere of that period. As Ellis looks ahead, he fears that Israel will pursue peace without revising either its view of the Palestinians or its picture of its own past. A lasting peace, he says, must be built on a deeper foundation of self-assessment and justice. He recommends that the Palestinians be included in the Jewish sense of covenant.

In part this is a political proposal, arguing that the truth about Israel's past needs to be acknowledged -- the truth, for example, that in 1948 the Palestinian residents of the village of Deir Yassin were killed by the Irgun. In part it is an ethical proposal, arguing that peace is possible only if people cross boundaries and get to know "the other" as real human beings deserving of moral respect. In part it is a theological proposal, arguing that the covenant cannot endure if it is not revitalized by the inclusion of the Palestinians.

Ellis's multilayered discussion circles around a few basic points and must be assessed on at least three different levels. Many others have made much the same political critique he offers. Recently within Israel itself, for example, considerable attention has been given to revising the long-accepted Israeli version of the struggle for independence. Despite controversy, even Israeli schoolbooks have been changed to acknowledge that Palestinians were in fact forced to leave their villages. They did not all leave -- as Israel claimed for 50 years -- merely because pamphlets from neighboring Arab countries urged them to do so and promised their speedy return. Those involved in revising Israel's understanding of its past share Ellis's belief that this is an important step on the way to a lasting peace.

Similarly, a variety of Jewish voices within the U.S. have challenged a narrow preoccupation with the Holocaust. They have questioned any view that neglects the rich resources of the Jewish tradition and constructs Jewish identity around only the Holocaust and Israel. (See, for example, Michael Goldberg's Why Should Jews Survive? Looking Past the Holocaust Toward a Jewish Future, Oxford University Press, 1995.) However radical Ellis's critique may once have sounded to Jewish ears, it is no longer so unusual.

The same can he said for Ellis's moral argument. Many others, including Abba Eban, have warned the Jewish community that Israel cannot have moral integrity until it stops making Palestinians second-class citizens. These voices have come not only from Israel but, especially since 1996, also from the American Jewish community.

On a theological level, Ellis frequently refers to the covenant, which "brings together ethics and justice, repentance and forgiveness." His book is a sustained plea for greater attention to "the covenantal grounding that lends depth to Jewish life." This is an important proposal, in part because it challenges both the usual tendency to invoke the covenant in order to undergird Jewish distinctiveness, and to separate Jewish theological deliberations from ethical-political discussions.

But though Ellis calls for a theological reconstruction, his book does not go very far toward developing or even outlining such a revised theology. The reader is unsure, for example, what is implied by his proposal to include Palestinians in the covenant. Is it akin to the post-Holocaust Jewish-Christian dialogue in the U.S., within which people find their own religious identity strengthened as they abandon a negative portrait of the other religion? Or does Ellis expect that including Palestinians will alter the distinctive, traditional identity of Jews and subsume it under a more inclusive pan-religious umbrella? One does not know what direction Ellis hopes the theological reconstruction will take.

Ellis is not optimistic that Jews either within or outside of Israel will reconsider the covenant, but he does see some signs of hope. He acknowledges that "there are Jews who have and continue to place ethics and morality at the center of Jewish life" and that "more and more Jews include Palestinians as part of their vision."

This book contains valuable insights into the responsibility of any powerful group toward a weaker one that it regards as an enemy. The issues Ellis discusses and the principles he formulates could inform our own need to come to terms, for example, with our mistreatment of Native Americans or our complicity in the oppression of Latin Americans.

But readers need to be cautious about the book jacket's claim that Ellis is "one of today's foremost Jewish theologians." My informal survey of congregational and academic rabbis revealed that many Jewish leaders regard him with indifference or suspicion. Although political and ethical proposals similar to his are being discussed, it is not clear that his is an influential voice in the debate. Because of the stridency with which he has criticized Israel in the past and the uncertainty about what he is proposing, he speaks for a small minority within a somewhat larger minority of Jews calling for a revised self-understanding of Israel's role.