Fit for the Reign of God (I Kings 19:19-21; Luke 9:57-62; Gal. 5:1, 13-25)

Fit for the Reign of God

Israel’s covenant with God Stipulated that no other powers, divine or human, would rule the people’s lives. Yet the biblical story repeatedly tells of the nation’s turn away from God’s rule to other gods or to the misguided political judgments of the kings and rulers who did not heed God’s true prophets. True prophets often found themselves at odds with Israel’s leaders. God’s word opposed human social, religious and political compromises. By New Testament times the tension between prophecy and politics was expressed in the opposition between pragmatists like the Saduccees and Pharisees, who sought to adapt national life to the inevitable powers of the world, and visionaries like the Essene monks at Qumran or John the Baptist who anticipated the emergence of a new age of holiness after God judged this evil age. The question of what is required of a people that will be "fit for the reign of God" can receive very different answers in pragmatist and visionary contexts.

The tension between pragmatic adaptation and visionary reformation lies at the heart of biblical religion. Attempts to resolve the dilemma by identifying with one pole or the other inevitably miss the point. On the one hand, God’s rule is exercised in the historical lives of communities of believers. Divine reality is not confined to myths about primordial times or an anticipated heaven. Pragmatic adaptation of the tradition seeks to make sure that God’s rule over human life is still relevant. On the other hand, human beings are inherently unable to shape their lives and societies according to religious and philosophical visions of what is just and good. Visionary reformation reminds us of the radical and structural nature of evil. It rejects the claim that problems can be cured with a little human adjustment of the economy, society or religion. It keeps alive the sense that we can only be set right again by God’s vision.

In the ninth century Elijah denounced the widespread influence of the Baal cult and its prophets. Baal was a storm god worshiped by the Phoenicians and by Israelite peasants who sought to insure the fertility of the land. Eighth century prophets like Hosea continued the struggles against the Baal cult. Initially, Tyrian Baal was introduced to Israel by the royal dynasty, when Ahab married the Tyrian princess Jezebel. The cult spread from the royal center in Samaria to the provincial towns. Political pragmatism may have led the king to make an alliance with the Phoenicians. The result of this alliance was widespread idolatry.

The stories of Elijah emphasize the persecution the prophet suffered for his challenge to this royal innovation. The covenant with God is maintained only by those who have not worshiped Baal (I Kings 19:14-18) God’s rule is manifest only in the prophet who survives despite the attempts against his life. The prophet passes on the task of the divine anointing of Israel’s king as well as his own vocation as prophet. Yet the transfer of prophetic mission to Elisha suggests that the tension between the prophet and society will remain: Elisha must abandon his life as an ordinary member of society, bid farewell to his mother and father, and sacrifice the oxen with which he had made his living (I Kings 19:19-21)

Jesus’ radical discipleship sayings in Luke 9:57-62 reflect this tradition. The urgency of Jesus’ message about God’s approaching rule becomes evident when the last saying is contrasted with the Elijah-Elisha story. Elisha was permitted to say goodbye to his parents. Jesus’ disciples were not. Anyone who looks back is not "fit for the rule of God." Jesus’ disciples cannot even expect the security of the lair or nest that an animal would have, Luke adds. Nor can his disciples be distracted by such urgent filial obligations as burying a parent. The words, "Let the dead bury their dead," seem to imply that the spiritually dead, those who have not heard the call to discipleship, can bury the physically dead. Neither I Kings nor Luke assumes that most people will offer the radical devotion to God’s word required of the prophet or of Jesus and his disciples.

What is the significance of the stories and sayings in I Kings and Luke? The persecuted prophet and the homeless disciples question our presumption that our way of life has divine support. Homes, work, filial respect and affection are not denounced as evils, but they can become such dominant preoccupations that they make people unfit for the rule of God. Our private and public choices may become dominated by the desire to preserve a way of life, a pattern of social relationships and even religious rites that we find comfortable. We may be unwilling to change or challenge those securities even when the word of God invites us to do so. We do not want low-or moderate-income housing in our town, ethnic diversity in our schools or new expressions of worship in our churches.

St. Paul expresses the conflict in terms of the individual person. Christians know that they are to live as servants of others. They know that the law is fulfilled by loving their neighbor. But their lives often remain dominated by "desires of the flesh." We may think that more laws are the only way to deal with the social needs that are blocked by our "fleshly desire" to keep things as they are. The state can tell towns that they must have certain types of housing, but as St. Paul recognizes, from a Christian perspective true reformation is not accomplished by law. Law cannot create the fruits of the Spirit, which come from following Christ (Gal. 5:1, 13-25) Every Christian struggles with the tensions of pragmatism and vision. But there is no one-time solution to the dilemma, only a discipleship of those seeking to walk in the Spirit.

Works of God in Our Tongues (Acts 2:1-11)

When the day of Pentecost had come, they were all together in one place. And suddenly a sound came from heaven like the rush of a mighty wind, and it filled all the house where they were sitting. And there appeared to them tongues as of fire, distributed and resting on each one of them. And they were all filled with the Holy Spirit and began to speak in other tongues, as the Spirit gave them utterance.

Now there were dwelling in Jerusalem Jews, devout men from every nation under heaven. And at this sound the multitude came together, and they were bewildered, because each one heard them speaking in his own language. And they were amazed and wondered, saying, "Are not all these who are speaking Galileans? And how is it that we hear, each of us in his own native language? Parthians and Medes and Elamites and residents of Mesopotamia, Judea and Cappodocia, Pontus and Asia, Phrygia and Pamphylia, Egypt and the parts of Libya belonging to Cyrene, and visitors from Rome, both Jews and proselytes, Cretans and Arabians, we hear them telling in our own tongues the mighty works of God" [Acts 2:1-11].

Pentecost affirms that there is a different spirit, which God gives the churches to renew and transform human life. Renewal and transformation take place in the Christian community guided and filled with the Spirit (I Cor. 12:4-13) It is very easy to romanticize the Scripture passages which speak of the Spirit at work in the community. The Pentecost story in Acts seems a miraculous, one--time-only communication of the gospel to crowds gathered from throughout the world. The guidance of the Spirit-Paraclete, a prominent feature of life in the Johannine churches, might seem a mystic experience of union with Christ and the Father that did not survive the apostolic generation. The Fourth Gospel itself notes the passing of the apostolic leaders, Peter and the beloved disciple.

Paul’s vision of the varied gifts of Christians working together in harmony under the direction of the Spirit remains just that (I Cor. 12A-13) We pay lip service to the ideal, but face a pastoral reality in which harmony or unity is achieved only by rejecting the gifts of some. We may acknowledge that the Spirit dwells in all Christians, but we find it very difficult to demonstrate that we are the heirs of God about which Paul writes (Rom. 8:8-17) In any case, we frequently think that all experiences of spiritual transformation belong to the private, individual realm of experience. They are not open to public observation or communal participation, except in the more Pentecostal forms of Christian worship.

Romanticizing the primitive days of the church and privatizing religious experience make it difficult for most of us to grasp the public significance of Pentecost. Luke’s account in Acts highlights the public importance of the event. This dramatic manifestation of God’s presence is not oriented toward the communal practice of glossolalia. Rather, the gift of tongues becomes a gift of speaking in other languages so that people from throughout the world could hear "the mighty works of God" (2:11) Even that miraculous event remains incomplete and misunderstood until it is interpreted by the apostolic preaching. God has fulfilled a promise to bring salvation to all in the last days. The death and heavenly exaltation of Jesus as Lord has inaugurated this new age.

Luke’s table of nations takes in not only those living in Palestine or in the Roman Empire, but even those beyond its boundaries in Parthia and Mesopotamia. Exegetes trace the origins of such a list to the work of ancient geographers and astrologers. It represents a catalog of all the peoples of the earth and presents in miniature the cross-cultural challenge that still faces Christianity. One public manifestation of the Spirit is proclaiming a message of salvation. And the "mighty deeds of God," which constitute the experience of God’s power, are no longer limited to a particular people, a particular language or cultural group. Christianity gave ritual expression to this conviction in baptismal initiation. All persons became children of the one God, whom they addressed as Abba, Father, regardless of the human divisions of gender, race or status.

Luke expresses the dilemma of particularity seeking universality in the crowd’s reaction to the apostles. How can these Galileans be speaking of God to other nationalities, in their own tongues? On one level, Christian missionaries have faced this challenge by seeking to render the Bible in all the languages of the world. Such efforts required the recording and description of many languages, which would otherwise have remained the possession of local tribes. On another level, the links between Christian missionaries and the global expansion of European and North American commerce and culture have reduced Christianity to a new form of particularity. It provides the symbolic and religious underpinnings of the white, Northern European and American claim to control and dominate all the peoples of the globe.

The public message of Pentecost is a challenge to all the peoples of the earth to discover their unity as children of God. It does not support isolation in Christian sects, which claim an exclusive monopoly on the Spirit and demand conversion to the language and mores of their tribe as the price of salvation. Pentecost affirms the cultural and linguistic diversity of all the peoples of the earth. Its message of forgiveness summons all peoples to the common cause of justice and seeing that life prevails over death.

Beside the Lord (Prov. 8:22, 29-31)

The Lord created me at the

beginning of his work,

the first of his acts of old. . . .

When he assigned to the sea its limit,

so that the waters might not

transgress his command,

when he marked out the foundations

of the earth,

then I was beside him, like a

master workman;

and I was daily his delight,

rejoicing before him always,

rejoicing in his inhabited world

and delighting in the sons of men [Prov. 8:22, 29-31].

Both Jews And Muslims see the Christian doctrine of the Trinity as a blasphemous insult to the one God beside whom there can be no other. Much Christian piety is functionally monolatry, worshiping Jesus as Lord in such a way that both the source of Jesus’ being, God, and the Spirit are neglected. Christian feminists protest that the traditional trinitarian formulation, Father, Son and Spirit, should be rejected because it perpetuates the symbolic domination of males as the true image of God.

The classical language of trinitarian theology, three distinct persons of one divine nature, has been logically puzzling since the great controversies of the fourth and fifth centuries. On the one hand, it underscored the deity and the special redemptive mission of the Holy Spirit. On the other, it provided terms in which post-Nicene church fathers would argue over the relationship of divinity and humanity in Christ. Though the technical language of trinitarian theology is a foreign tongue to most Christians, the confession of God as triune provides the framework in which other Christian beliefs cohere.

Even its earliest advocates recognized that trinitarian theology did not speak the language of Scripture. But they did insist that Scripture points toward a trinitarian theology as the appropriate representation of its account of God. Church fathers often appealed to the liturgical practices of the church, its baptismal formula (Matt. 28:19) and its doxology (Rom. 11:36) as evidence that the trinitarian confession belongs to the roots of Christian faith. The link between baptism and the Trinity led St. Augustine to begin a sermon on the Trinity with Matthew’s account of Christ’s baptism.

The separate representation of the Son, who comes for baptism; the Dove descending from heaven; and the divine Voice makes the distinct persons of the Trinity clear to our imagination. Yet all three are inseparable in the divine works of creation and redemption. Thus St. Augustine would have theological difficulties with some feminists’ proposal to replace traditional trinitarian language with the functional categories of creator, redeemer and sanctifier. The Trinity is not an organizational chart for getting the divine jobs done. The church fathers all note that Scripture is often very fluid in attributing manifestations of the Spirit as divine power to the Father, the Son or the Spirit.

Turning from the patristic tradition to the readings of the lectionaries for Trinity Sunday, we find a somewhat different focus on the meaning of Trinity in Christian life. Taking a clue from St. Augustine, we may ask ourselves what these readings suggest to the imagination about the Triune God. Many of the lectionary texts evoke images of angelic beings who surround God in the heavens (Isa. 6:1-8; Rev. 4:1-11) The threefold "holy, holy, holy" in the heavenly praise to the Lord’s glory (Isa. 6:3; Rev. 4:8) has often been read by Christians as a trinitarian formula. Modern scholars treat the prophet’s vision in Isaiah 6 as a scene from the divine council. Yahweh and the angels have replaced the older images of the high god and his court.

Both Isaiah and Revelation commission prophets to speak words of judgment in the divine court. We see that God is not alone in heaven, isolated from other beings and the world of humans. Instead, we find a vast array of creatures beside God. Worship and praise for the creator bind the heavenly world together in holiness. Some churches read Proverbs 8:22-31 as a poem that takes us to the beginning of God’s creation. The female figure of God’s Wisdom comes forth before anything else in the universe. She witnesses the order of creation, working beside the Lord like a skilled laborer. The Lord rejoices in her as she rejoices in all of creation, including the human race. This image of creation is very different from the mechanical putting-it-together activity that we might regard as part of making something. Creation is shared. It is an object of beauty, order and delight.

These visions of God in the heavenly court and God’s assistant Wisdom challenge the modern technological and power-oriented images of creation. God’s creative rule forms the focal point of the heavenly community of praise, beauty and joy. It is not primarily the expression of domination or an isolated will to power. Trinitarian theology affirms that the communal elements of these visions describe more than a heavenly court. They point to the deepest nature of God as an us, not an isolated I.

The readings from Romans 5:1-5 and John 16:12-15 point to Christian experiences of salvation that reflect the distinction of persons in God. Christ has brought us peace with God as well as the hope of sharing the heavenly community envisaged in the images of God’s glory (Rom. 5:1-2). St. Paul begins the passage with faith and concludes with hope and love. Love, a gift of the Spirit, provides the certainty of Christian hope. Present experiences of suffering and endurance contribute to Christian hope; they do not undermine faith. Romans 8:31-39 picks up the theme of separation from God. There the crucified Christ, now risen with God, is affirmed as the source of the love which overcomes all human or cosmic threats to unity with God.

The dangers of separation appear in John 16:12-15 in the context of Jesus’ departure. The Spirit’s work in the community will continue Jesus’ words to the community. Just as Jesus had received everything from God, so the Spirit’s activity represents that of Jesus. Trinitarian images ground Christian faith, love and hope by providing for the experiences of separation and distance in Christian life, while insisting on a unity with God that transcends all temporal and spatial boundaries.

The Catholic Experience at Taming Pluralism

For American Catholics, 1989 is a year crowded with anniversaries, including the centennial of the founding of the Catholic University of America and the bicentennial of both the establishment of Georgetown University (and, by extension, of Jesuit education) and the erection of the American hierarchy. While these various milestones will be celebrated with assemblies both festive and solemn, they also invite the church to reflect on its American experience, and especially on its experience of American pluralism.

No church benefited more from American religious liberty than the Roman Catholic. In evaluating the American religious settlement, however, Catholics have had to weigh the practical advantages of pluralism against its challenges and ideological difficulties. The benefits impressed pragmatic American Catholics far more than the ideological complexities. In spite of Rome’s misgivings, American Catholics fervently supported a religio-political arrangement that had no theological justification until the Second Vatican Council. They weren’t unaware of the problem of pluralism, however. On the contrary, they have had a lively sense of the issues involved, and -- at least until quite recently -- have dealt with the challenge of pluralism with sophistication, ingenuity and great success.

In describing the situation in America, John Carroll, the first bishop of Baltimore, the bicentennial of whose episcopal election and consecration is also observed this year, told Rome that "our Religious system has undergone a revolution . . . more extraordinary, than our political one." A shrewd and patriotic man, Carroll supported the religious revolution as fervently as he did the political one. His status as the leader of a previously persecuted church at least partially explains his enthusiasm for the American religious experiment. To his mind, the First Amendment freed Catholics from the stigma of second-class citizenship and offered the church not only equal status with other churches but protection from enemies and freedom to govern its own affairs. He believed that the American church would thrive when freed from the threat of persecution and enlivened by that spirit of voluntarism made necessary by pluralism. Impressed by both its immediate benefits and its promise for the future, he praised the American system and advised European churches and nations to adopt it as their own.

But Carroll also saw that pluralism was a mixed blessing. The legal and political judgment that all churches are equal could lead to a similar theological judgment. Such indifferentism could in turn result in defection. The church’s survival in America would therefore depend on its ability to capitalize on the legal benefits of pluralism while protecting itself from the corrosion of indifferentism.

Carroll formulated an ingenious solution to the Catholic dilemma. Perceiving that a pluralistic environment demanded both civil tolerance and theological intolerance, he was convinced that any church that lacked a lively sense of its uniqueness and its necessary role in securing human salvation would fail in the religious marketplace. On the other hand, he realized that competition among religious groups of strong conviction could have disastrous consequences for civic life. Unless the nation was firmly committed to protecting the legal equality of all churches and all believers’ freedom of conscience, it would suffer the fate of the Old World, where the civic order was disrupted by persecutions and the natural rights of religious minorities were abridged. Therefore Carroll cautioned against religious convictions that were fanatical, civilly disruptive or politically imperialistic. He concluded that the church could maximize the practical advantages of pluralism and minimize its dangers by resisting all attempts to erect an established church (whether de lege or de facto) and also by cultivating a somewhat tribalistic spirit among its members.

Catholics soon discovered the wisdom of Carroll’s vision. After a brief irenic period, American denominations began to cultivate a degree of self-preserving theological intolerance among their members. Moreover, as the 19th century progressed, evangelical Protestants availed themselves of the wide freedom accorded them under the First Amendment to form voluntary associations, the goal of whose activities was the erection of a de facto religious establishment in America.

Protestant animosity heightened the Catholic community’s sense of uniqueness and invited its members to retreat behind a stance of reciprocal theological intolerance, effectively defusing the danger of indifferentism. On the other hand, conscious of their minority status in an overwhelmingly Protestant nation, Catholics naturally feared the restrictions which the hostile minority could impose on them if they translated cultural leverage into political power. Demanding that the nation be true to its pledge of civil tolerance for all (and buttressing their demands by citing their record of patriotism) , they dedicated themselves to keeping the gap between Protestant culture and American politics as wide as possible, following Carroll’s prescription.

The church was able to meet immigrant needs, however, in a way that left it nearly immune to indifferentism. Under siege by a hostile and intolerant host culture, the immigrants clung all the more tenaciously to one another and to the church, an institution that offered security in a strange and forbidding new world. As one bishop observed, the Nativists made the church’s job of retaining the immigrants’ loyalty much easier. The defections that did occur in the American environment convinced the church to do even more to strengthen its ties with the immigrants.

This meant catering to the specific needs of each ethnic group and providing a refuge for them where Old World languages and customs could be preserved. As a result, in the 19th century the church pursued an exhausting policy of seemingly endless diversification. Although the strategy taxed its resources, the immigrants came to look upon the church as a legally protected repository of national or ethnic identity, and upon the faith as a taken-for-granted -- even a necessary -- part of life. Precisely because it thus multiplied the bases on which a Catholic sense of differentiation was built, the church further insulated itself from the danger of indifferentism.

At the same time that the church was dodging the potentially corrosive effect of freedom, it continued to demand the freedoms that the First Amendment promised. In the process it seriously tested the nation’s resolve to be truly pluralistic and tolerant.

During the 19th and early 20th centuries the church both invoked the law against unwarranted government interference in internal church matters and demanded that the nation reject any activity that seemed to move it closer to erecting an established church. Nowhere was its insistence that the nation observe the proper separation of church and state more apparent than in the area of education.

In the first half of the 19th century, when it became more clear that the public schools of New York and Philadelphia were really thinly veiled proselytizing institutions whose curricula were strongly sectarian, Bishops Hughes and Kenrick raised a protest: they demanded that either the schools display a greater sensitivity to religious diversity or Catholics be given a fair share of tax money to run schools that would not endanger the faith of their children. The bishops forced the nation to face the embarrassing fact that its commitment to religious neutrality in public life had been seriously compromised. (Ironically, the bishops’ protests were at least partially responsible for inaugurating the trend toward fully secularizing public education.)

Convinced that the common schools represented a threat to the future of the faith in America, the church determined to erect its own comprehensive educational system. The third plenary council of Baltimore mandated the erection of a Catholic school in every parish in the country. When states attempted to step in and limit the freedom of the church to operate these schools, the church was quick to cry foul and repair to the courts. Correctly presenting itself as the guardian of the First Amendment’s non-abridgment clause, the church fought Illinois, Oregon and Wisconsin statutes that would have given the government a foothold in church-related schools.

In the latter part of the 19th and the early part of the 20th century, Catholics developed additional responses to America’s pluralistic environment. The church did not abandon the old strategies overnight. But an accommodationist camp reasoned that the long-term interests of the church would be far better served if the church wore a more American face. It advised the church and its members to assimilate themselves into American society. While Rome rebuked parts of the Americanizers’ program, the fact that American Catholics could even contemplate a change in strategy indicated that they were beginning to reassess their involvement in public life. The church began to display a bold new understanding of one of the freedoms offered by pluralism. At the dawn of the 20th century, Catholics finally learned -- as evangelical Christians had a century earlier -- that the First Amendment gave the churches wide latitude to influence public policy. Catholics determined to use a central organization to trumpet their achievements, amplify their demands and protect their interests. The American Federation of Catholic Societies was formed in 1901 for this purpose. It was disorganized and timid, but a subsequent organization met with much greater results.

A growing Catholic sense of security and a desire to erase some of the barriers that separated Catholics from other Americans spurred the NCWC to issue policy statements and position papers directed to the nation as a whole. In order to win a wider hearing, the church developed a moral bilingualism. It used overtly religious language when addressing the faithful, but when it addressed the nation it employed the religiously neutral language of natural law, a language suited to the Enlightenment-rooted American political arena.

Meanwhile, the Catholic desire for assimilation gave birth to the NCWC-sponsored Americanization drive which used Catholic schools and agencies to teach English and civics to the church’s diverse ethnic flock. The very institutions founded to insulate the church from contact with American society now dedicated themselves to suppressing ethnicity and smoothing the path to full Catholic incorporation in American life.

The church’s new-found boldness did not endear it to all Americans. Cultural hostility toward Catholicism continued to appear from time to time, most noticeably during the presidential campaign in 1928. Such hostility fanned a sense of difference that insulated Catholics from indifferentism while they experimented with pluralism’s political freedom.

For most of 200 years, then, the American church managed to enjoy the blessings of pluralism while escaping its major problems. To the amazement of its European confreres and overseers, the contagion of indifferentism never carried away large numbers of the faithful. Indeed, as a result of the perfect freedom and the voluntarism born of pluralism, the American church boasted a vital, generous membership served by a necessarily vigilant and attentive body of priests and religious. In the light of the church’s remarkable growth, Carroll’s prediction that with a little care the church could thrive in a pluralistic environment seemed correct.

In the past 40, and especially the last 20, years, however, the church has finally had to face the corrosive effects of pluralism. Many of the barriers that once differentiated Catholics from other Americans have simply disappeared. The schools initially founded to insulate Catholic students from the lure of the outside world and other religions have become instruments of social mobility. The postwar suburbanization of American has been doubly destructive of the protective Catholic sense of uniqueness. It has lured Catholics out of the cities and away from their institutional empires, frustrating bishops and pastors who have attempted to duplicate the networks that made urban Catholicism a way of life and a world apart. Meanwhile, in the homogenizing suburbs, ethnicity has evaporated or diminished to mere sentimentality or nostalgic attachment to folk customs.

Finally, the fortuitous rise of ecumenism (aided by the elections of John F. Kennedy and the pontificate of John XXIII, and given theological justification by the decrees of Vatican II) undercut the motive for theological intolerance toward other religious Americans. The breakdown of these old bases of differentiation both signaled and facilitated the almost complete assimilation of the Catholic community into the American mainstream.

The loss of so many protective barriers would make the church’s task of coping with pluralism difficult in any age. But Catholics became assimilated to American culture at a time when the culture itself was being secularized. Both the nature of assimilation and the character of the secular world complicate the church’s attempts to retain members’ loyalty.

This is precisely where problems arise for the church. Catholics have claimed the values and worldview of secular society. They revere material success, progress, and personal and intellectual freedom and, more ominously, they have rather uncritically adopted a secularized view of the role of religion. Specifically, they are prone to see religious tribalism as a threat to the orderly progress of civil society, and to see religion itself as a force that should govern a small -- and it is hoped private -- area of human activity. Catholics are now prey to the most seductive and dangerous challenge secularism poses, the challenge to exercise the ultimate freedom that a pluralistic environment offers: the freedom not to believe. In the present age then, pluralism does not so much lead to indifferentism as to complete indifference to religion.

As quixotic as it may sound, I think that if the church wishes to remain a vital institution, it must follow a similar strategy in the future. Of course, its teaching mission is now complicated by the fact that secularism’s invitation to non-belief is both subtle and seductive. It seems to argue that religious fervor is a hindrance to human freedom and progress (if not a positive threat to civility and public order) , and it convinces people that non-belief is a civic duty. Moreover, the social and economic success that Catholics have achieved in the secular world has seduced them into adopting wholesale the values and strategies of that world.

The church must argue for its superiority on precisely those points on which secularism bases its claims. Specifically, it has to prove that its program leads more surely to personal happiness and social peace than does that of secularism. Thus it must smoke out the false presuppositions upon which secularism grounds its program. In order to do so the church must continue to engage in the ministry of social analysis that has so distinguished the United States Catholic Conference of late, a ministry that seeks to reveal the ways in which the materialism, excessive competition and amoral economics of the secular world have not led to progress for the entire human family but rather to a serious imbalance in economic life.

In addition, the church must convince its members that personal happiness consists of more than material possessions. This essentially negative activity, however, must be complemented by more positive action. Concretely, the church must exhort its more committed members -- the gathered remnant -- to ever more strenuous work in the service of social justice, work which will reveal to both the world and its wavering members the fact that religious fervor is conducive to true social progress. Through the use of these complementary strategies, the church will be able to do once again what it has always done to tame pluralism: by building a case for itself and discrediting the stance of its competitors, it will undercut any motive which Catholics may have to make use of the freedom not to believe offered them by a pluralistic, and now secularist, environment.

Finally, to trigger that protective tribalist reflex that Carroll saw as a bulwark against defection, the church must make its members aware of secularism’s intolerance of belief. That attitude may spark a burst of reciprocal intolerance among the faithful, an intolerance which must (as Carroll would advise) be protective but never civilly disruptive.

Recovering the Covenant

The Covenant Tradition in Politics, by Daniel J. Elazar; Translation Publishers. Vol 1.; Covenant and Polity in Biblical Israel, 459 pp. $29.95 paperback. Vol. 2; Covenant and Commonwealth, 362 pp. $54.95. Vol. 3; Covenant and Constitutionalism, 271 pp. $54.95. Vol. 4; Covenant and Civil Sociey, 382 pp.paperback, $29.95, $54.95.

The past 40 years have been times of liberation from oppressive orders, whether colonial, totalitarian, racist or sexist. The next 40 years must be times of founding and refounding orders of covenantal relationship. In terms of religious symbols, it is time to move from Exodus to Sinai, Shechem and Shiloh.

This is the message of Daniel J. Elazar's four-volume study of "The Covenant Tradition in Politics." The recovery and refashioning of this tradition challenges Jews and Christians, who have both heralded and hidden this treasure.

Elazar is professor of political science at Temple University, Philadelphia, and Bar-Ilan University, Jerusalem. His experiences as an American and a religious Jew have called him to fathom the dynamics of federalism, which have deeply shaped American life, and those of covenant, which constitute the core of historic Judaism.

Elazar's first task is to reintroduce us to the Bible as a source- -book for political theory and practice. The Bible can be seen as a series of case studies in Israel's struggle to be a Holy Commonwealth. The political wisdom we find in the Bible seeks to hold together the dynamics of power with the requirements of justice. Both are necessary ingredients in the struggle for proper relationships under the human conditions of frailty and aspiration. The Bible, with its high moral call as well as its honest recognition of human faults, as with King David, illuminates ways to do this.

The struggle for a just order of power must also hold together the bonds of kinship with the freedom of consent. The moral and emotional bonds of family, tribe, ethnic group, and race are powerful determinants of behavior. Yet kinship and ethnicity are finally unable to order our relations with strangers, foreigners, and people who don't look or act like us. An order of justice between truly different people can emerge only through pacts, treaties, agreements, contracts, covenants and constitutions based on our active consent. A politics of justice, to be effective, has to take into account both kinds of claims. Again, the Bible, with its rich genealogies as well as its universal ethic, does both.

Finally, biblical political wisdom, Elazar claims, seeks to hold together the human demand for personal freedom with the fundamental need for trustworthy relationships. The freedom that we seek, however, is not the "natural liberty" that serves only our immediate needs and interests. Such a liberty, widespread in America today, ultimately leads to the war of all against all, as Thomas Hobbes pointed out over three centuries ago. The freedom which also serves our human need for trustworthy relationship is "federal liberty." Federal liberty arises when we covenant with one another to maintain certain dependable relationships with each other. "Federalism," indeed, is simply the English rendering of the Latin word for covenant, foedus.

Federal relations are negotiated among people who can give free consent to promises that bind their future behavior toward one another. The Israelites needed to shake off not only the hand of Pharaoh but the enslavement of their minds before they could enter into voluntary covenant at Sinai. This living together in covenantal bonds makes possible a life that is relatively orderly and predictable while at the same time recognizing our appropriate human need for autonomy. Without such autonomy we are no longer moral and spiritual beings.

Federal order for human relationships stands as a third classic alternative alongside organic development and hierarchical command. Organic theories liken political order to the growth of an animal, with its necessary stages and functional requirements. Appeals to the "nature" of a social order demand that we conform to its requirements for survival. In our time, the economy, with its stock market for a temperature gauge, drives our life like a ceaseless and relentless heart. In their more demonic form, organic theories have led to the racist politics of fascism, which appeals to the insatiable demands of the race or people as a living organism.

The politics of command, known most recently in the communist "command economies" as well as in military dictatorships, tries to order human relationships as automatic mechanical reactions to forces at the "top" or "center." Like organic approaches, this kind of politics seeks to reduce personal freedom in the service of a larger whole. Instead of the larger whole being "natural," it is explicitly the product of the will of the commander. Both political models have found theological sources of support -- the organic in appeals. to nature and creation, the hierarchical in appeals to a God who commands and humans who are to obey. The covenantal approach seeks to hold together human freedom among equals with the need for coordination, cooperation and mutual relationships.

In covenantal relationships, people are seen as potential partners, not only in marriage and family, but in the widest possible scope of human affairs. Indeed, God is also seen as a covenantal partner (haver), as are other creatures and the creation itself. Citing William James, Elazar speaks of our existence in a "federal universe." These federal relationships are not sheer acts of obedience. Hebrew does not have the concept of "obey," but only of "hearken and observe." The Decalogue, literally the "Ten Words," is not a set of "commandments" but descriptions of the path Israel is called to take. Even these terms, as the Book of Exodus points out, were products of artful negotiation between Moses and YHWH.

This idea of partnership extends to the way the ancient Hebrews spoke of God as "governing" like a president among equals rather than "ruling" like a despot or king. Indeed, as 1 Samuel sets it out, Israel's choice of a king was an accommodation to military necessity, and even the monarchy at its height was bound up in covenantal constraints. Elazar is at pains to point out that Samuel himself, like succeeding prophets, calls the king nagid (high commissioner) to denote his subordinate status to God. Only the people, obsessed with collective power, call Saul "king" (melekh). Indeed, later prophetic references to a messianic "king" refer to him only as nagid (magistrate), not "prince" as English Bibles usually translate the term.

Israel's messianic vision, rather than longing for a "king," as Christians usually have proclaimed, always involved a return to the confederation of tribes characteristic of its earlier years. In our own time, this utopian longing has been reconstituted, Elazar thinks, as the struggle for a world federation of republics, something only faintly anticipated by the United Nations (which is flawed by allegiance to the idea of state sovereignty a thoroughly unbiblical conception).

Many pastors and theologians were introduced to covenant through George Mendenhall's description of covenant as a treaty between conquering kings and vassals. Such a model tended to reinforce patriarchal hierarchies of command as privileged paradigms of divine-human and human-human relationships. Elazar's research, like that of other recent scholars, points out the rich variety of covenants in biblical life, all of which contain a strain of negotiation and consent. Covenant, with its emphasis on consensus and mutuality, is the seedbed of democratic citizenship and constitutionalism.

The path of covenantal agreement does not depend only on observance of the law, which can lead to a legalism that misses the point of living faithfulness. It depends even more fundamentally on hesed, which Elazar translates as "loving covenant faithfulness." The English word love is sorely inadequate here, for it tends to omit the structure of covenantal obligation. Even agape, the favorite Greek term for God's self-giving love, fails to indicate this context of covenant and complex political relationship. By failing to grasp the idea of hesed, Christians fall into false dualisms of love versus law or law versus grace.

At the same time, covenant, with its affirmation of human freedom, assumes the reality of broken promises, failed commitments, and "turning away" from the path. Thus, life becomes a continual task of return, repair and reform. This is different, Elazar maintains, from the usual Protestant concept of unilateral divine redemption, for it focuses not only on God's call but on our "hearkening" and our return, like the Prodigal Son, to right relations with God and each other. The Bible offers us a series of "prismatic" stories to give us insight into this dynamic of covenant, hesed and return. Elazar's exposition of the story of Joseph (in volume one) illuminates this dynamic in a vivid and arresting way. Hesed and return can help Christians rethink their understanding of redemption in relational ways that construe grace as return from chaotic violence and aimlessness.

These core concepts and practices were first developed in ancient Israel. Jesus' own ministry was an effort to recover and reground a proper covenantal relationship between God and humanity. Diaspora Jews and itinerant Christian bearers of the Bible carried these ideas westward. In three successive volumes Elazar excavates the continual reemergence of the covenant tradition from its submergence in Roman imperium and transalpine kingship. The Reformed Protestantism of the Rhineland redisdiscovered biblical covenant as a principle of political and religious organization, transmitting it to Scotland, England and the Netherlands, from which it spread over the globe. Federalist principles and practices, even when people are not aware of their biblical roots, now inspire innumerable efforts to reconstitute nations and states in ways that honor democratic participation and republican order.

It is Elazar's mission to make us conscious of the rich basis of this federal struggle, both to inspire and to guide it. Without an awareness of these deep religious and moral roots, the constitutionalism based in covenant will disintegrate into self-interested factionalism, legalism and self-absorbed nationalism. Because of federalism's deep roots in a theological heritage, Christians and Jews have a special call to nourish the conditions for its renewal.

Christians and Jews, with their internal divisions, will approach this task of nurture in differing ways. Elazar has in a sense tried to provide a common biblical ground for this task and a concept of how covenantalism has worked itself forward through the centuries. We can learn not only from the case studies of its biblical origins but from those of its history as well. Indeed, he provides a whole volume on the Reformed Protestant development of covenant before turning to the American and then the contemporary global experience.

Let me conclude this brief introduction by identifying a couple of key points of entrée to this history -- points that deal with the conception of rights, the distortions of covenant, and the moral basis of covenant.

A covenantal perspective understands rights as expressions of covenantal obligation. In some sense we all have the "right" to enter into covenantal relationships as humans created in the image of God, the primordial covenant partner. This covenant not only liberates us from a world of arbitrary rule but also obligates us to faithful relations with the other covenant partners. This is "federal liberty." We therefore begin not with our inalienable "right" to be treated in a certain way, but from the fact that we are all obligated to treat others in terms of the covenant. The reference point for a theory of rights is not our own needs, interests, passions or self-image but the terms of the covenant that binds us with others. A covenantal theory of rights points us in the direction of the primacy of the public, the commonwealth and the common good -- a very different starting point and trajectory of thinking than is generally presupposed in contemporary debates.

Covenant, as a form of thought and action, is not immune to the prevailing sins and weaknesses of human beings. It too can slide into distortions, some of which Elazar alludes to. First of all, covenantal societies can fall into a legalism that forgets the fundamental purpose of the covenant. This is why the preambles and historical review that begin most covenants are essential. These are the elements lost in simple contracts and pacts, but are vital if constitutions and agreements are to keep sight of their rationale and purpose.

Second, covenantal peoples can become too closed. In biblical terms, they can focus only on the covenant b'nai brit -- the singular people with a mission -- and lose site of the crucial baalei brit -- the covenants among nations. The covenant of God with Abraham can overwhelm the more general covenant with Noah. While this elevation of singularity has been a besetting distortion in America, and by some accounts South Africa, nowhere is this more wrenching than in contemporary Israel, where the descendants of the original bearers of covenantalism seem to be caught in a tragic failure to reach appropriate covenants with the other inhabitants of the land.

The real limits of covenant exist where the potential partners do not share the same goal -- that is, the same ultimate sense of obligation that makes their mutual promises binding. This need for a common, theological and moral basis for covenant led ancient Israel to continual internal purges of all vestiges of foreign gods and any practice of intermarriage with other peoples. The voluntary binding of covenant can occur only within some kind of common faith that can give rise to mutual trust.

Our own institutional separation of religion from political compact makes it difficult to understand this. However, the problem emerges in our own time with the realization that without a common public morality, legitimate government cannot function. Government ends up being reduced to a simple effort to harmonize individual passions and interests or to an authoritarian demand for conformity. At the present, because of America's enormous affluence, we are relying on a sense of "automatic governance" through the market. Elazar persistently probes the limits of such an individualistic ethic as a basis for a public life that can sustain humans in their search for meaning and goodness as well as freedom.

In the face of our persistent reduction of covenant thought to a personal relation to a saving God, we have largely lost the wider importance of covenantalism as the basis for our common life within the fullness of God's creation. Elazar's challenging presentation is an invitation to recover that wider vision.

Sunday Monarchists and Monday Citizens?

On Sunday morning Christians across America sing praises to their ‘king," ascribe all glory and power to Him, pray for His "enthronement" and speak of a God whose Son has inherited the divine "kingdom." During the week, however, they engage in political campaigns, vote in elections, decry the emergence of hereditary dynasties and resist the centralization of power. They are monarchists in worship and democratic republicans in daily life.

I used to find this incongruous. Now I find it painful and even dangerous. How can we celebrate kingship in church and still function as committed citizens in a republic? There are very few genuine monarchies left, but there are federal republics, democratic republics and socialist republics. How has this fervent Christian anomaly survived two centuries of republican and democratic development? Isn’t it past time that we reconstructed our Christian thought and worship in order to engage the world in which we actually live? Though the visions of worship cannot coincide with the patterns of politics, we need to worship and live in some kind of common language if we are to shape a coherent life of faith.

We can’t set aside the language of monarchy without replacing it, however, for governance language is intrinsic to Hebrew and Christian faith. It affirms that we are struggling toward God’s perfect order where we will be related to each other in justice. But if we are to be faithful to a biblical perspective, we need to re-examine the language of worship when it no longer speaks our language of governance. Moreover, we need to critique models of governance in the light of Jesus’ ministry and the work of the Holy Spirit. The question of governance language is one of authenticity as well as relevance.

Feminists have begun to dismantle the exclusively male language of worship. Their effort to show how our religious language can reinforce injustice has led to far-ranging changes in music, prayer and Scripture reading. However, the move to inclusive language can merely reinforce the domestic language of mother and father, householder and parent, sister and brother. If we simply eliminate governance language, we may reinforce the restriction of religion to the private sphere where women have been confined in the past. Inclusive language doesn’t help us negotiate the second step: reconstructing the language of political governance itself. The issue here is not maleness but monarchy.

We face the challenge of being not only an inclusive church but also a public church -- a church that is a public, an ecclesia, a genuine republic of Christ. I call this the task of covenant publicity, for which we can draw on the ancient traditions of covenant that underlie modern federalism as well as on the ideas of council, republic and ecclesia.

Israel itself was not always a kingdom, and it struggled mightily with the introduction of kingship. As a confederation of tribes living under the law, it governed through assemblies rather than monarchs. Covenant meant first of all banding together under God’s published orders, the Torah. With David and his court singers, worship as kingship adoration arose. Covenant and worship focused no longer on the tribal assembly but on God’s relationship with the king. By painting God as a great king, the Psalms provided Israel’s monarch with a crucial though subordinate legitimation. Conversely, the language of earthly rule became the language of divine governance.

The kingship tradition persisted, intertwined with the confederal traditions of ancient Israel, through the rest of Israel’s history. And while the echoes of confederation, covenant and council can be heard in the background of the Gospels, it is the fanfare of Davidic monarchy that greeted Jesus. He was received as king rather than as prophet, priest, elder or president. Though the church drew its primary name from the ecclesia of Greek public assemblies, this theme was gradually submerged under the monarchy of Christ, of the Father, of the bishop and later of the pope.

When this close alliance of throne and altar was broken in the revolutions of the modern world, the churches generally held onto their kingship forms by taking them into the home, safe from the emergent public square. The churches could survive the revolution from monarchical to republican government if they kept their worship private. The monarchy of Christ invoked in Christian liturgies retreated from the governmental sphere to the heart and hearth. Thus emerging republics were spared the conflicts of old religious differences while the church was spared the loss of its monarchical worship forms.

Similarly, the ideal 19th-century Christian home was a castle where the man was king, the woman queen, and the children silent subjects. Gothic homes and Gothic churches joined to praise a divine monarchy of the heart. The feudal kingdom was translated into the hierarchy of marriage and parenthood, where women and children were subject to the domestic king. The ensemble of marriage, family, home and church preserved Christian kingship in a world of democratic republics.

This relocation of kingship is nowhere more evident than in the monarchical language of Christmas. At Christmas we turn Matthew’s wise men into kings and celebrate the birth of Jesus as the only begotten heir of David’s throne -- a throne residing solely in our hearts. Later in the church year, on Christ the King Sunday, we pray that Christ will reign as king in our hearts -- since we can hardly pray for a return to monarchy in our republic. The struggle over public order is reduced to a struggle over the inner conflicts of the heart. Only a divine monarchy in our psyches can ultimately create peace for the world. In fact, Sigmund Freud developed a similar analysis of a little kingdom of superego, ego and id warring for possession of our psychic throne.

Yet a proposal to reconstruct worship practices raises two critical questions. First, doesn’t kingship symbolism attest to God’s transcendence over any and all forms of government? Isn’t God’s sovereignty actually enhanced if we speak of it in a language no longer spoken by the people of our world?

To respond to these questions, we must first distinguish transcendence from irrelevance. The issue is not mere transcendence but critical engagement. Our task is not only to relativize the powers of this world but to transform them in accord with a faithful vision. it is not enough to overthrow an oppressive monarchy if we do not revolutionize the images of governance that legitimated it. We must choose the gods that will illumine our conceptions of right order.

The language of biblical worship must be both incarnational and transcendent. Just as kingship symbolism functioned for 1,500 years both as a language of cultural engagement and as a critical tool against all earthly kings, so republican symbolism can provide us with a language of transcendence as well as immanence for our own time. Not only does it pick up our actual memories of public testimony, election, and governance by law, but it draws us toward the perfection of our governance, helping us judge our present efforts. Jesus’ exercise of his presidency through persuasion and open argument can be a plumbline for judging all presidents, and God’s republic can be the ideal for our efforts at participation and public debate.

Symbols of monarchy make the church a nursery of reaction to republican life altogether. Monarchical kingship treats us like members of a household represented solely by its head, while republican order assumes the equal head-ship of all, each professing her or his own conviction about the common good in an arena of debate. That is, our new life in Christ is a longing for "publicity" in our lives, not for the comforting subordination of children. Moreover, we are searching for a "covenant publicity," one which prompts us to listen to others and enter into new bonds of relationships with them. We are drawn to form covenants that go beyond conditions of our birth, gender, race or nationality to a wider republic of justice.

We still face another key question. Doesn’t real worship have to be embedded in archaic memories and language? Isn’t worship essentially born of tradition and required to carry it on? Isn’t it an illusion to think we can make radical changes in it? Won’t the dew of mystery dissipate under the hot glare of analysis and manipulation?

Christian worship must honor not only our memories but our anticipation, the work of the Spirit as well as the divine founder of creation and the church.

Moreover, kingship is only one tradition in the history of Israel and the church. Even more archaic is that of covenant, torah, council and ecclesia. These traditions actually claim our fullest loyalties. They reflect increasing numbers of people -- in the U.S., the Soviet Union, India or South Africa -- who long for a more perfect republic of participation and genuine debate. The language of election, federation, congress and council has also become the language of our operative faith. This is now the nature which needs perfection by God’s grace. This is the nature to be purified in the worship where Christ presides.

What might this new language look like in worship? Our first challenge is to become more aware of the way our present worship is shaped by kingship symbolism. King, lord, son, throne, kingdom, court, crown and glory only begin the list of terms we need to reconsider. We need to see the way the patriarchal formula for the Trinity -- Father, Son and Holy Ghost -- was rooted in the transfer of royal rule through household inheritance. We also need to see how the architecture of sanctuary and church shapes our images of divine governance. Do we worship in a throne room of the king or in an assembly of the people? In prayer and communion do we kneel before a feudal lord or do we share as equals around the table of Christ?

Second, we need to become conscious of the themes, language and gestures of governance that have emerged in the past 200 years in the savagery of extinguished publics and broken covenants, whether in Nazi Germany, Chile, Czechoslovakia or the Trail of Tears. We can also explore stories of personal efforts to find a more expansive covenant with others, such as in biographies of alcoholics, homosexuals, divorcees or victims of abuse. In short, we need to lift up our public and private stories of longing for covenant publicity, for a transformed life in God’s republic.

We then must reclaim the biblical narratives that can shape these memories into a language of devotion articulated in the light of Jesus, whose presidency was powered by listening, whose republic was founded in covenant bonding, and whose election was rooted in self-sacrifice. The giving of Torah to Israel can reshape our grasp of constitutions. The theme of the wanderer or exile so central to the biblical story can amplify the cry for global citizenship by today’s refugee. The demand to preach the gospel under any regime can sharpen our support of publicity for all peoples. Synagogue and ecclesia can become places where the rehearsal of covenant-making and public witness prepares us to confront a world of secrecy, lies and coercion.

More practically, this transformation of worship will require changes in architecture, music, ritual movement, dress, language and the shape of the church year. For instance, many churches have already moved the focus of attention away from throne, pulpit and altar to the people assembled in response to God. Rather than subjecting people to the tyranny of one voice, every voice in worship could be amplified by the microphone. Many of our hymns are still deeply infused with the monarchical language of King George’s England. The best of them need adaptation, the worst must be replaced.

Similarly, we need to assess the costumes of our worship leaders. Do they create a separate world of mysterious nostalgia or do they orient us to a new engagement with ‘the powers and authorities of our world? Perhaps it is time to reassess the role of the business suit as an appropriate symbol for presidency in worship.

Even the language of the church year must be re-examined. Christ the King Sunday is an obvious relic of monarchy. Should it be lifted higher than an annual recognition of Human Rights or of the United Nations? Should the language of ascension be used after Easter? Or should we speak the language of inauguration, with our own covenantal swearing in to God’s emerging republic?

These questions are only preludes to creating a worship that reformulates the way we address God, ally ourselves with Jesus and invoke the Holy Spirit -- not merely for the sake of being good citizens, but because of our responses to the nature of a divinely inspired assembly. This reconstruction is a matter not only of the integrity of our faith, but of our action in and toward God’s world.

The Battle for the Catholic Church

Even liberal or radical Catholics generally shy away from taking on the pope. In 1979, about 30 theologians gathered on the margins of the Latin American Bishops’ Conference (CELAM) meeting in Puebla, Mexico; they had been expressly excluded by the CELAM administration but were informally invited by some bishops. One of their first decisions was what to do about some of the statements of newly elected Pope John Paul II, which journalists were interpreting as condemnations of liberation theology. In principle, the theologians could have refuted the pope’s arguments. Instead, they carefully went through his many speeches and culled out certain lines of thought, such as his strong words on behalf of the poor, which they used as best they could in the short essays they hurriedly typed up and sent into the meeting through friendly bishops.

Again, in 1984, when Cardinal Joseph Ratzinger, with the pope’s approval, issued his critique of liberation theology, most Latin American theologians sidestepped it by saying that what Ratzinger was describing was not liberation theology but a caricature, and hence his criticisms did not apply to them or their colleagues. The only exception was the independent-minded and idiosyncratic Uruguayan Jesuit Juan Luis Segundo, who wrote a short book critiquing the Ratzinger document. Segundo accused Ratzinger of either not having understood Vatican II or wanting to turn back the clock. He said, in effect: If Ratzinger’s right I’m wrong and I’ve been wrong for 25 years, and so have a lot of bishops. His book stood alone, however.

The papacy as an institution is another matter. Few Catholic biblical scholars would argue today that Jesus instituted the papacy with particular words to Peter. Writers as diverse as Karl Rahner and Andrew Greeley have daydreamed in print of popes taking a very different stance toward the church and the world.

In the meantime, Vatican positions and disciplinary actions continue to generate controversy, as any reader of the religious press, or even Time, is quite aware. In addition to clashes over liberation theology, Vatican authorities have continued to uphold official teaching on sexual ethics in general (as in a 1986 statement on homosexuality by Cardinal Ratzinger) and have withstood calls even for an open discussion of women’s ordination or of ending celibacy as a requirement for the priesthood. Despite the pope’s statements on the dignity of women, many see his attitude as overtly patriarchal. The Vatican has subjected Archbishop Raymond Hunthausen of Seattle to a humiliating investigation and at one point took away most of his authority. The firing of moral theologian Charles Curran from the Catholic University of America and the recent announcement of a loyalty oath to be administered to those who teach Catholic theology threaten the academic integrity of Catholic universities and theologians.

Ecumenism, at least on the formal level, also seems stalemated despite earlier advances made by various working parties and the theological community. Some church people criticized the episcopal ordination of Barbara Harris for complicating relations between the Anglican Communion and Rome. Couldn’t one just as logically argue that the Vatican’s refusal to permit even discussion of changes in church order -- despite a quasi-consensus among Catholic biblical scholars, historians and theologians for perhaps 15 years -- is the more basic complicating factor?

Cardinal Ratzinger, head of the Congregation for the Doctrine of the Faith, has used the word "restoration" to describe his and the pope’s program for the church. The ostensible aim is not to reverse the Vatican II process but to correct abuses and bring back to the church the discipline and order supposedly lost in postconciliar excesses and enthusiasms. Others, of course, see "restoration" as a code word for undoing the deeper thrust of the postconciliar renewal.

Lernoux’s treatment of what she calls the "religious international" shows the results of several years of investigative reporting on three continents. She profiles the Knights of Malta, Opus Dei, Communion and Liberation, and Tradition, Family and Property. Each organization is different in national origin and methodology, but all combine religious conservatism and right-wing politics.

The Knights of Malta arose as a medieval chivalric order. All its members are of the Catholic elite, either through blood or wealth. In this century Knights have been involved in such unsavory activities as helping Nazis escape justice at the end of World War II and participating in a secret Mafia-connected terrorist lodge in Italy called P-2. American Knights have included the late CIA director William Casey, Alexander Haig, William Buckley, Claire Booth Luce and William Simon, to mention some recognizable names. Lernoux describes in some detail the numerous pursuits of Knight J. Peter Grace, the millionaire heir and executive of W. R. Grace and Company. In 1984 while visiting New York’s Cardinal O’Connor, Cardinal Miguel Obando y Bravo of Managua made contact with a Grace representative and would have obtained $30,000 had revelation of the funding not proved too embarrassing. According to Lernoux, Grace used Knights of Malta privileges and contacts to send the contras in Honduras supplies worth millions of dollars. While activities such as Grace’s are relatively independent of Vatican policies -- and hence this section could be seen as a digression from the author’s theme -- the Knights are headquartered in the Vatican and have connections with powerful members of the hierarchy like O’Connor and Cardinal Bernard Law of Boston.

At a deeper level Lernoux notes the parallels between John Paul II’s papacy and Ronald Reagan’s presidency: both men are right-wing populists whose few powerful ideas derive from experiences of three or four decades ago. Hence it is not surprising that for different reasons their visceral anti-communism has led to similar stances, especially toward Nicaragua.

Opus Dei is a highly secretive organization founded in 1928 by Josemaría Escriváde Balaguer, a Spanish priest. The organization seeks to attract young professionals and give them an intense formation so that they may influence society. The highest members of the organization take vows of poverty, chastity and obedience. Descriptions given by those who leave Opus Dei make it sound rather like a religious cult whose members lose personal autonomy. In keeping with its origins in traditionalist Spain, Opus Dei is quite rigidly classist and sexist; thus, university-trained people are segregated from others and men are segregated from women, who are given essentially housekeeping jobs. The organization is so secret that its constitution is known only to a small circle.

Communion and Liberation is not secretive, but like Opus Dei it targets young people and is obviously not at home in a pluralist society but intends to remake society to fit its ideals. Lernoux tells in some detail how under John Paul II, Communion and Liberation has sought to take over Catholic Action, the major lay organization of the Catholic Church in Italy.

While Opus Dei and Communion and Liberation have few adherents in the U. S., they are strong in certain countries of Europe and Latin America. Moreover, they enjoy the esteem of John Paul II. The Vatican’s press secretary: Joaquin Navarro-Valls, is a member of Opus Dei. At the 1987 Synod of Bishops, which focused on the laity, a major topic of discussion was the "new movements" -- meaning primarily Communion and Liberation and Opus Dei -- even though many of the bishops would have preferred to deal with other questions.

What the pope seems to find appealing in such movements is that they act like disciplined troops that manifest no sign of doubt or hesitation. Many Catholics are disturbed not that such movements exist in the church, but that they should be singled out and proposed as models.

Similar tendencies are evident in Brazil, Chile and elsewhere. Lernoux points out that Rome’s insistence on appointing bishops is relatively recent, a product of the centralization that followed Vatican Council I (1870) Traditionally, bishops were chosen locally and approved by Rome. Lernoux neglects to mention the positive side of such centralization -- that it made hierarchies more independent of monarchs and governments.

In any case, the present pattern is one of appointing bishops whose qualifications are primarily their loyalty to a Vatican-set agenda rather than their ability to communicate the gospel in terms relevant to their own people. Lernoux is concerned that such a pattern may undermine the most promising developments of 20th-century Catholicism, especially the base ecclesial communities of Latin America. To take but one example: Archbishop José Cardoso Sobrinho, who succeeded popular Archbishop Hélder Câmara in Recife in northeast Brazil, has dismantled much of his predecessor’s work and forbidden him to speak in the archdiocese.

Lernoux’ s anguish stems from the fact that people are being hurt and will continue to be hurt. Throughout the book she provides anecdotes that illustrate the impact of new pastoral approaches among the poor. She begins by telling of the "church of the catacombs" in the Quiche region of Guatemala, where after the bishops, priests and sisters were driven out by threats and murder in 1980, Indian catechists hid the eucharistic bread inside tortillas and smuggled it in. In one especially dramatic example, military authorities told villagers to kill five catechists as subversives or the whole area would be razed and the people killed. When told of this, the catechists themselves insisted that the villagers carry out the order because it was better that a few die than thousands. And so before the sun rose the villagers dug graves, killed the five men with machetes and buried them. The army’s purpose was ultimately defeated, however, because the witness of the martyred catechists continues to inspire the people in their struggle.

By picking this rather awesome example to introduce her book, Lernoux emphasizes that what is at stake in "the battle for world Catholicism" is not simply whether the church is in tune with the times or whether theologians will enjoy full academic freedom, but the life and death of people. If the restorationists have their way, the kinds of pastoral renewal manifested in base communities and new approaches to spirituality will be stifled.

Others have raised similar points, of course. Hans Küng and Leonard Swidler brought together some 25 essays in The Church in Anguish: Has the Vatican Betrayed Vatican II? Their collection was more focused on European and North American theologians, and the only article expressly on Latin America was written by a German. Interestingly, in The Silencing of Leonardo Boff, Harvey Cox, while leaving no doubt about his sympathies, makes greater efforts than Lernoux to help readers understand Ratzinger’s viewpoint.

Penny Lernoux wrote People of God because she cares about the Catholic Church. Part of her motivation came from the appeals of other Catholics, especially bishops, who, feeling that they could not publicly challenge the Vatican, urged her to write the book. Although for some years I have been following the issues and controversies she reports on, I have tended to take a somewhat laissez-faire attitude, noting that many Catholics have found their own solutions to authoritarian impositions (e.g., deciding on contraception for themselves).

That may be too individualistic a solution. By presenting the issues comprehensively, Lernoux is demanding at least that they be discussed openly in the church. What kind of action can be taken is a more difficult matter -- one that Lernoux doesn’t really address. Certainly some bishops’ conferences, notably those of Brazil and the United States, have done what they can while treading close to the edge of hierarchical protocol. Perhaps there will be greater efforts to forge a transnational consciousness of the issues.

If ecumenical dialogue has led many to consider that a "Petrine ministry" -- even one not of "divine inspiration" -- can serve a useful purpose in today’s oikoumene, non-Catholic Christians also may have a stake in the "struggle for world Catholicism."

Brainwashed or Converted?

Both superior and appellate courts earlier granted summary judgment for the church. Neither wanted to have to distinguish between religious conversion and brainwashing. Molko and Leal appealed, and in October 1988 the California Supreme Court ruled six to one that the two have the right to a jury trial.

The California decision was appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court, which, in denying the appeal, chose to ignore the, amicus brief filed on behalf of the Unification Church by the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion, the American Sociological Association and 50 major theologians, church historians, sociologists and psychologists of religion, and other scholars. An additional amicus brief in support of the church was filed by the National Council of Churches, the American Baptist Churches in the U.S.A., the Catholic League for Religious and Civil Rights, and the stated clerk of the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church (U.S.A.)

Why are these major organizations and scholars, many of whom have been critical of the methods of the Unification Church, defending the "Moonies"?

Because for the first time a major court has accepted the argument that religious indoctrination can cause potential converts to lose the free exercise of their will, and that persons so influenced can sue for damages. In its ruling in favor of Molko and Leal’s right to sue, the California Supreme Court uncritically endorsed the brainwashing theory of psychologist Margaret Singer and psychiatrist Samuel Benson -- even though this theory has virtually no support outside the American anticult movement. The court’s ruling undermines the freedom of religion, restricts the freedom of association, contradicts the clear facts of the case and espouses radical notions of the nature of religious conversion.

Molko and Leal contend that members of the Unification Church knowingly misrepresented the church’s identity with the intent to induce them to associate with and ultimately become members of the church. They further contend that they justifiably relied on those representations in unwittingly agreeing to participate in church activities by means of which they were brainwashed into becoming members of the church, and that they suffered psychological and financial damage.

In support of their theory, Molko and Leal introduced as witnesses Singer and Benson, who contended that Molko and Leal had been subjected to a sophisticated program of coercive persuasion which had rendered them incapable of freely joining the church. Singer has offered the theory of "systematic manipulation of social influences" or "thought reform" in numerous other cases brought against the Unification Church as well as the Church of Scientology, Transcendental Meditation, the Local Church, the International Society for Krishna Consciousness, various awareness training groups, and even the Snap-On Tool Corporation.

Earlier the superior and appellate courts rejected Singer’s and Benson’s testimony on constitutional grounds, evidentiary grounds (it conflicted with the plaintiffs’ own testimony) and logical grounds. In the words of the superior court, Singer and Benson "seem to have reasoned backward" from their disapproval of the church’s methods of conversion "to the conclusion that plaintiffs were not thinking freely because they were persuaded by them."

But the California Supreme Court has taken the position that the misrepresentations claimed by the plaintiffs did induce them to participate in activities designed to win their adherence to and involvement in the church. The heart of the Molko-Leal claim is that by the time the church disclosed its true identity, it had rendered them incapable of deciding not to join. Paradoxically, the court has ruled that although the concept of brainwashing in the absence of coercion is highly controversial, the factual question remains: were Molko and Leal, who were not subjected to actual coercion, brainwashed?

The original trial court and the court of appeals ruled the Singer-Benson testimony inadmissible on the grounds that their testimony conflicted with that of Molko and Leal (Molko and Leal said they had joined the church because it satisfied their personal concerns and anxieties; Singer and Benson said it was because they had been deceived) The California Supreme Court saw no conflict here. After all, it reasoned, brainwashing amplifies an individual’s concerns and then provides the means of satisfying them. The court’s argument seems to be that if you do something you want to do because someone urges you to do it, you have not acted freely.

There is no question as to the religious zeal that guided the recruiters. They believed they were doing the will of God and benefiting Molko and Leal by giving them the opportunity to hear the church’s teachings. While one may find their means morally objectionable, their actions were sincere and religiously motivated. If we ask a jury to decide if these actions were right or wrong, are we not asking them to pass judgment on the validity of the recruiters’ faith? The California Supreme Court says No -- the issue is the church’s conduct, its "practice of misrepresenting or concealing its identity in order to bring unsuspecting outsiders into its highly structured environment."

Does holding the church liable for fraudulent recruiting practices impose any burden on the free exercise of the Unification Church’s religion? Yes, says the court, but the burdens, "while real, are not substantial." The court says that the Unification Church may do anything it wants to do, but it may not step on the truth while seeking recruits. While I agree with the court on moral grounds -- it is always wrong to mislead potential recruits about the religious nature or identity of the recruiters’ group -- I cannot follow their legal argument.

For it is one thing when a person knowingly and voluntarily submits to a process involving coercive influence, as a novice does on entering a monastery or a seminary. . . But it is quite another when a person is subjected to coercive persuasion without his knowledge or consent. While some individuals who experience coercive persuasion emerge unscathed, many others develop serious and sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia, self-mutilation, and suicide.

According to this statement, there are two kinds of influence: good (informed) and evil (deceptive) But the very language of the court’s declaration is loaded with a host of unsubstantial assumptions. What is the difference between coercive persuasion and coercive influence? Can there be "coercive influence" when there is no coercion? Doesn’t even good coercive influence yield its share of atrocities, including "serious and sometimes irreversible physical and psychiatric disorders, up to and including schizophrenia, self-mutilation, and suicide"? Graduate programs in law, medicine and religion yield such casualties. Cloistered monks and nuns are not immune to psychological emergencies. Conversely, haven’t the conversions of thousands (some would say millions) to religious groups, even when such conversions were based in part on the deceptive practices of the recruiters, produced positive results? Again and again, I have witnessed, even in groups whose recruitment techniques I cannot sanction, evidence of character development, impulse control and self-respect. To overlook the positive aspects of conversion, as the court has done, is misleading.

The major problem with labeling Molko and Leal’s conversion as "coercive persuasion," thought reform or brainwashing is that once such pejorative labels have been affixed to conversion, this church or any other is fair game for claims of damages. Indeed, says Justice Carl West Anderson, the lone dissenter in the California opinion, it is not the business of the court to scrutinize religious conversion, regardless of the methods used. He is convinced that it is impossible to examine conversion without questioning religious faith -- an area of scrutiny forbidden by the First Amendment. Further, Anderson argues, brainwashing can occur only if there is physical force or threat. The techniques used on Molko and Leal -- songs, prayers, lectures and demonstrations of affection -- are legitimate means of indoctrination, commonly used by religious and other groups. While they may be objected to on grounds of personal taste, they constitute no threat to society.

In their zeal to convert others, adherents of many religions -- mainstream faiths as well as new sects -- have resorted to "exaggeration, vilification, and even to false statements." That, Anderson suggests, is the price we pay for our essential liberties. By creating this new tort liability, the court seems to be creating a new social policy restricting religious freedom. By his sharp dissent, Anderson indicates he would be happier if the court would merely interpret existing statutes and leave it to the legislature to codify social policy into law.

As to Molko’s gift of $6,000, Anderson argues that this was a freely made donation, motivated by a then-held religious belief. Molko’s own testimony makes clear that he made the gift "after careful consideration and consultation." To declare that the gift was improperly motivated is to question the validity of his former religious convictions, and thus to make the court stand in judgment of his beliefs.

A second problem besetting the brainwashing-versus-conversion issue is that the court has given tacit approval to deprogramming. In the hands of deconversion agents and the expert witnesses who support their cause, there is, by definition, only one "free" choice that converts can make -- they can choose to do what their parents want them to do. They can "freely" abandon their newfound faith and bring lawsuits for damages that are so vague and private that they cannot be detected by any normal psychological testing or psychiatric determinations.

In the Molko and Leal case, the court maintained that the state had "a compelling interest in protecting the family institution." The cult and sect conversions of the 1970s and ‘80s have occurred as the traditional family of prior decades was on the verge of becoming an endangered species. Destructive cultism has become a scapegoat. Much of the attack on cults is merely a reaction to all that is novel and unconventional, particularly as it pertains to family life. Such family-threatening developments as the high divorce rate, the influx of mothers in the workplace, geographic mobility, ding and alcohol abuse and child abuse cannot readily be combated directly; conversion to an unacceptable religion or cause can be.

Anticult parents see their offspring’s conversion as a repudiation of blood ties, career expectations, parental sacrifices and family values. It is hard enough for parents when an adult son or daughter goes off to college or the armed forces. When that son or daughter chooses to be the disciple of a media-maligned "brainwashing" cult, the parent often responds with confusion, heartbreak and rage. The anticult movement’s perception of converts as mindless robots who have been deprived of their free will through powerful techniques of mind control makes someone other than the recruits and their parents responsible.

When differences of opinion and lifestyle set parent and adult offspring against one another, there is usually nothing parents can do but shake their heads, communicate their complaints to one another and wait. (Since the attrition rate from new religious movements is about 75 percent in the two years following conversions, this would seem an intelligent response.) But deprogrammers present a quicker method of restoring the wayward son or daughter. Further, the anticult movement’s position, like that of the witch-hunters of the 1690s or McCarthy in the 1950s, is supported by powerful negative images -- the Manson family murders on 1969, Patty Hearst’s conversion to the SLA in 1974, and the mass murder-suicide of nearly 1,000 men, women and children in Jonestown in 1978. Not only does the anticult movement give parents a point of view that makes them totally right and their wayward children completely wrong, but it provides an ideology which explains why their children are wrong, excuses their children of culpability and offers a form of intervention to restore the children to their right minds.

The few expert witnesses of the anticult movement are well outside the mainstream of their professions, and their theories about thought reform in the absence of physical coercion find no support in the scientific community. The alleged "sophisticated techniques of thought reform" about which they warn us are, in fact, the ordinary means of persuasion and social influence which are freely used by established religions, civic organizations, political parties, salespeople, the media and advertisers. If it were as easy to deprive individuals of their free will and retain them as zealous participants as the anticult movement’s experts suggest, every man, woman or child would long since have succumbed to the siren call of the so-called cults.

In the words of psychiatrist Thomas Szasz, "A person can no more wash another’s brain with . . . conversation than he can make him bleed with a cutting remark." "Brainwashing" is a metaphor which stands, says Szasz, for "one of the most universal human experiences, namely for one-person influencing another." Why do we not call all "forms of influence by this name? Szasz says, "We reserve this term for influences of which we disapprove."

Not everything done by new religious movements is honorable and not every criticism of them is ill-founded. On the basis of my work as a counselor of more than 2,000 families disturbed by the conversion of loved ones to cults, sects and other forms of passionate devotion, I could recount numerous stories of unethical behavior, manipulation, neglect, abuse and outright chicanery. Personal liberty is dangerous. But the alternative to freedom of speech, freedom of association and freedom of religion is the enforced conformity of the totalitarian state.

I would rather risk the consequences of autonomy -- as painful as they may be -- than sanction the courts or mental health professionals to protect me from my own enthusiasms. And I do not want jury to tell me whether my religious experience is based on conversion or brainwashing any more than I want my plumber to determine whether "holy week" is really holy. In its zeal to guard society against the controversial methods of a maligned church, the California Supreme Court has endangered our basic freedoms.

On Honesty and Self-deception: ‘You Are the Man’

Once when Frederick II, an 18th-century king of Prussia, went on an inspection tour of a Berlin prison, he was greeted with the cries of prisoners, who fell on their knees and protested their unjust imprisonment. While listening to these pleas of innocence, Frederick’s eye was caught by a solitary figure in the corner, a prisoner seemingly unconcerned with all the commotion.

"Why are you here?" Frederick asked him.

"Armed robbery, Your Majesty."

"Were you guilty?" the king asked.

"Oh yes, indeed, Your Majesty. I entirely deserve my punishment." At that Frederick summoned the jailer. "Release this guilty man at once," he said. "I will not have him kept in this prison where he will corrupt all the fine innocent people who occupy it."

Why is this story amusing? Perhaps because it is deliciously ironic? Or is it because we have become dreadfully cynical? For many of us, the idea that an imprisoned person would concede the justice of his punishment seems highly unlikely. That explains our amusement. But the story can, if we think about it, disturb us as well, for it is about a value all of us would admit is important -- honesty -- and it portrays that fundamental constituent of the moral life as something uncommon. We understand why the king reacts as he does. We, too, know how infrequently honesty is found in the common life, how rare it is to meet a person whom we would spontaneously characterize as, above all else, "honest." To meet such a person might bewilder and amaze us, too.

Honesty is not praised much these days. We pay it some lip service, of course, and we tell our children to be honest in their dealings and with their feelings. But many of us would rather have our children be shrewd than honest. We want them to learn how to be suspicious, how to protect themselves, how to ward off fast-talking people and nicely packaged, well-advertised distortions of reality. "Chumps," as I once heard the term defined, are "people who go out of their way to be taken advantage of" -- and we don’t want ourselves or our children to be chumps. Therefore we hesitate to praise honesty too much, or to encourage it at the expense of common sense, or expediency or the pressures of practicality and the "real world." Even experts in interpersonal relations tell us that too much honesty can destroy a relationship. Honesty now looks like a dubious virtue if not an actual vice. It is studied and examined as a stratagem rather than as a hallmark of character.

Despite our contemporary discomfort with too much honesty, the quality remains central to our moral codes and counsels. Deceptions subvert the moral life, and destroy the foundations of our social arrangements. Whatever basis for humane communion is to be found in either principles of respect for persons or faith in God is eroded by our failures to treat each other as persons worthy of being told the truth.

Yet honesty is not a problem only in the sphere of our social engagements. Honesty is also important psychologically, as regards our feelings about ourselves. Here the important question is: Can I be honest with myself?

We exhibit an amazing agility in avoiding the truth about who we are and what we do. Our failures in being honest with ourselves are instances of self-deception. And all of us are, have been, or could be self-deceivers. We are prone to it, capable of it, and never more likely to be in its grip than in those moments when we are sure we are not. As people of faith, we are called to be honest in our dealings with God, with others and with ourselves. Self-deception can disrupt all of those relations. It is therefore appropriate to consider what self-deception is and how our faith tradition has attempted to edify us, to "build us up," so that we might be able to respond to its threat.

Self-deception occurs when people who are committed to certain values act against those values while convincing themselves that what they are doing does not in fact violate those values. The disciple Peter, for example, told himself (and others) that he was strong and would never desert his master. He desired to be a person faithful unto death. Yet he was not that person. He valued something else more: his own skin. Until his moment of truth, until he faced the fact that not only could he not live up to his ideal of faithfulness but that he did not want to, he was self-deceived. Self-deception is thus like a narrative that finally fails to do justice to the facts.

We notice instances of self-deception when the gap between behavior and interpretation is clear. We detect instances of self-deception when people interpret to us the meaning of their behavior in ways that seem farfetched or skewed. Self-deception lurks in denials, double-mindedness, rationalizations, cover-ups and cover stories, elaborate and almost convincing justifications, excuses, attributions of blame and evasions of responsibility. We observe it in the person who exhibits an eating disorder and denies that there is a problem; in the person who exhibits a dependency on alcohol yet says drinking is just a way of relaxing from the stresses of the office; in the minister who continually blames his congregation, not his preaching, when members doze in the pews; in the person who refuses to acknowledge a potentially life-threatening illness.

Samuel Johnson once noted the kinds of moves self-deceivers make: they congratulate themselves on a single act of generosity, telling themselves that they are generous people; or they dwell on the faults of others; or they avoid people who know what they are like, preferring the company of those who will not expose them to themselves. Self-deceivers, Johnson said, avoid "self-communion." If the loss of honesty undermines communal life, the loss of self-honesty undermines the inner life -- after awhile one cannot trust oneself.

Scripture recognizes the danger that self-deception poses for the life of faith, and no biblical story illustrates the phenomenon of self-deception better than that of King David and Nathan the prophet.

As the story is recorded in II Samuel 11, David is strolling on his terrace when he happens to spy a beautiful woman, Bathesheba, bathing. He arranges a romantic tryst with her, as a result of which she becomes pregnant. Bathsheba’s husband, Uriah, is a loyal soldier in David’s army, and is off fighting David’s battles. Not delighted at the prospect of being identified as the father of Bathsheba’s baby, David plots to avert any suspicion

that the child is his. He orders Uriah to return home in the hope that his reunion with Bathsheba will so transpire that Uriah will assume he is the father of the child.

But Uriah fails to cooperate. Ever the loyal servant, wishing to be pure in his service to the king, he sleeps at David’s door rather than returning to his own bed. David finally decides that more serious measures will have to be taken: he orders Uriah to the front lines, where he is killed. As soon as Bathsheba’s period of mourning is over, David takes her as his wife and she gives birth to a son. The story rivals any contemporary soap opera.

At this point Nathan, the trusted prophet, appears on the scene and tells David a story about two men, one a poor man who loves a special ewe -- it ate with the man’s children and was "unto him as a daughter" -- and the other a rich man with many flocks and herds. A traveler visits the rich man, and when the dinner hour approaches, rather than using one of his own lambs, the rich man kills the poor man’s lamb for the feast. Nathan waits for David’s reaction. David, outraged at the rich man’s arrogance and abusiveness, responds that the man who has done this wickedness deserves to die. Nathan then delivers his wonderfully brief message to David: "You are the man."

A rabbi once told me that this story about David was included in the Scriptures to make the point that even the most moral of persons can fall, the most powerful people have weaknesses, and no one, not even David, is perfect. It is, indeed, a story about a great and powerful king’s wrongdoing and weak will. But it is also a story about a good man’s self-deception. We know that David has acted abominably, but do we know that David is self-deceived? We do, for one simple reason: David does not feel guilty about what he has done.

The nature of David’s dishonesty can be made clearer if we imagine him making the moves that self-deceivers make. Perhaps, in order to persist in thinking of himself as a good and decent man, an upright king and an honorable servant of God, he told himself that as king he had special privileges regarding affairs of the heart. Or maybe he used some modern rationalizations: "I love Bathsheba so much that it doesn’t matter what the rules say"; or "Our love is different, holy and pure in itself"; or "My love for Bathsheba hasn’t violated her marriage because the marriage was already dead. Why else would she have consented to the affair?" Perhaps he persuaded himself that as king he had every right to send any soldier to any place to do anything he bids. "This is not a democracy after all, but a monarchy, and I am engaged in battle; and soldiers -- all of my soldiers -- are at my disposal. How could ordering Uriah to the front lines be murder?" A few moves like these and David could appear to himself as a good man, whom a few might criticize, but only because they do not have David’s version of the facts.

Scripture records that David does what all self-deceivers who would be free of self-deception must do -- he confesses his wrongdoing: "I have sinned against the Lord," he says. Once the self-deception is overcome, remorse sets in, and broken relations are mended. David can once again enter the common life. We should suspect, however, that David’s self-understanding has changed; he now knows about his weaknesses and about his capacity for arrogance, abusiveness and self-deception.

There are many lessons to be learned from this story about Nathan and David, but let us not overlook the obvious one: if a person as good and decent as David is can succumb to evil and fall prey to self-deception, we can as well. And we do. But where are our Nathans? Where are the friends of truth who will not allow us to enjoy our little illusions? Where are the Nathans who will speak to us, even at personal risk, about our failures to be honest with ourselves? Nathan risked his life in approaching the king as he did. Where are the people who love truth so much that they are willing to risk losing a friendship -- to risk hearing the words, "No friend of mine would talk to me that way"?

The more important question, however, is, Could I be a Nathan? Could I care so much for another’s welfare that I would risk what Nathan risked? Could I serve the truth as faithfully as he did? Could I muster the courage to get involved in helping to straighten the tangles of confusion, denial and rationalization that cast out happiness from those who fall victim to self-deception? Nathan penetrated a great king’s self-deception, and is remembered as the one who provoked David into being honest with himself. If David is great, it is because he listened to Nathan.

As a people of faith, we believe that before God there can be no illusion, no pretense, no lies. God, as Karl Barth once said, cannot be lied to. Our self deception is, theologically speaking, an attempt to deceive God. Whenever we believe that we are something we are not, whenever we convince ourselves that we have done all that God requires, we settle for a comfortable self-image at the expense of that deeper self-communion in which the presence of God resides with the voice of conscience.

Nathan reminds us of who we are before God. He demonstrates how a friend of truth approaches the self-deceived. He speaks as if the dignity of the person were of more consequence than the honor due a king. He urges the self-deceiver to reconsider the meaning of his deeds. He assumes an attitude of humility rather than of arrogance, for it is God who is in a position to point the finger. Nathan shows us what it means to value honesty with oneself, and he does more than demonstrate a technique for confronting self-deceivers; he shows us what we ought to be as servants of truth and friends of God.

Rethinking Drinking: The Moral Context

The memorable discourses on love recorded in Plato’s Symposium were offered at a banquet where much wine flowed. According to the Greek tradition, such banquets always ended with libations of unmixed wines dedicated to the "good genius," Zeus Olympus, the heroes and Zeus Soter. We are told in this dialogue -- -- which has sometimes been called "The Drinking Party" -- that because there had been so much drinking the day before at Agathon’s victory celebration, the revelers are concerned with drinking expectations. They ask whether the host, Agathon, "is set on heavy drinking." Agathon claims not to have the strength for more wine, at which point Eryximachus, offering his wisdom as one trained in the medical arts, comments that given people’s reluctance to drink beyond their limits he will explain the truth about drunkenness. "Drunkenness," he says, "is a difficult thing for human beings; and as far as it is in my power, I should neither be willing to go on drinking nor to advise another to do so, particularly if he still has a headache from yesterday’s debauch." They agree that "each is to drink as much as he wants and there is to be no compulsion about it."

Plato’s Symposium is about love, not drinking; but how interesting it is that the participants at Agathon’s drinking party insist on ground rules for the evening’s drinking. Foreseeing the destructive consequences of heavy drinking, they pause as responsible adults to consider drinking expectations. They do not want to forbid drink; rather, they want permission to moderate their drinking, and they seek to relieve themselves of any pressure to drink excessively which the setting might otherwise impose. They understand drinking as a voluntary activity for which rules are necessary. They desire to establish a noncoercive setting in which the participants agree to accept responsibility for their drinking. These are people who, by their own admission, fulfill expectations to get drunk when coming together in a social situation. Yet they also pause to think about drinking. The revelers in Plato’s Symposium insist on placing their drinking squarely in a moral framework; they regard drinking as a personal decision made with regard for physical, moral and spiritual welfare.

In the culture of The Symposium, morally sensitive and reflective people thought about drinking differently than we do, especially concerning problem or heavy drinking. Athenians in the fifth century B.C. evaluated problem drinking in a clearly defined social and moral context. They traced excessive drinking to a character flaw; they held the drunk morally accountable. To them, drunkenness was unvirtuous conduct that violated the ideal of moderation. In Plato’s day, problem drinking was a behavioral problem to be understood through the resources of moral thought.

Plato’s prize student, Aristotle, likewise saw the problem of drinking as a moral one. In his Nichomachean Ethics Aristotle reiterates that problem drinking is a voluntary activity. When considering the person who has committed a crime under the influence of alcohol, Aristotle does not allow a "diminished capacity" defense. "We punish those who are ignorant of anything in the laws that they ought to know and is not difficult to know . . . we assume that it is in their power not to be ignorant since they have the power of taking care." I read this to mean that the drunken offender is doubly culpable, first for the offense committed while ignorant due to drunkenness, and second for placing himself in a state where such ignorance obtains, that is, for being drunk. Taking a hardheaded view of moral accountability, Aristotle assumes that people can "take care." Losing self-control through drink is itself the result of an exercise of control; the behavior reflects the values and commitments embodied in the problem drinker’s character.

Although we have cracked down on drunken driving and in general want to hold people who commit crimes while under the influence of alcohol culpable, we are not accustomed to holding such persons culpable for their ignorance beyond the particular offense. I suggest that this stems from our refusal to view problem drinking as a moral problem. We think that considering alcohol abuse to be a moral problem invites judgmentalism and moral insensitivity. Furthermore, referring to problem drinking as a moral issue seems to many to fly in the face of scientific thinking. Medical science, they believe, regards heavy drinking as a disease called alcoholism. According to this point of view, the problem drinker’s behavior is quite involuntary; it is caused by conditions over which she or he has no control.

"Why on earth did you put up with him?"

"He’s my brother."

"You could kick him out."

"Would you?"

She didn’t answer. When it came to the point, one couldn’t.

I thought of him lying there in his acute self-made misery, a lonely defeated man in a private hell. He’d had girl friends once, but not any more. There was no one except me between him and the gutter, and I knew he relied on me as if I’d been a solid wall.

"Isn’t there any cure?" Sophie said.

"Oh, yes, one certain cure. The only one."

"What is it?"

"Wanting to be cured."

She looked at me dubiously. "Does that make sense?" "He would automatically be cured if his urge to be cured was stronger than his urge to drink."

"I thought it was a disease," she said.

"An addiction. Like football."

"You’ve been at the non-sense again."

"Under the influence of football," I said, "you can tear railway carriages apart and stampede people to death."

"I thought there was a drug that could cure it," she said.

"You mean antabuse?"

"What’s that?"

"Some stuff that makes alcohol taste disgusting. Sure, it works. But you’ve got to want to stop drinking in the first place; otherwise you don’t take it."

"How about Alcoholics Anonymous?" she asked.

"Same thing," I said. "If you want to stop drinking,

they’re marvelous. If you don’t, you keep away from

them."

"I never thought about it like that."

The protagonist understands alcohol abuse as a moral problem, having to do with desires and wants, rather than a scientific one, having to do with disease and cures. Locating problem drinking in the moral universe neither legitimates simplistic judgmentalism nor authorizes a lack of compassion; rather, it asks that a sober look be taken at a self-destructive behavior so that the desires giving rise to it can be squarely and honestly addressed.

Herbert Fingarette, in his book Heavy Drinking: The Myth of Alcoholism as a Disease (University of California Press, 1988) , does not make the particular case I do here, but I believe he would support it. Having carefully examined medical and social science research, he argues that "heavy drinking" is not a disease. The idea that alcoholism is a disease -- first proposed in the 1930s -- is a myth, Fingarette says. The disease concept, according to Fingarette, has usually been thought to mean -- that those afflicted with the disease of alcoholism inevitably progress to uncontrolled drinking because of the distinctive disability produced -- loss of control, loss of choice in the matter of drinking. Says Fingarette: "No leading research authorities accept the classic disease concept." He is concerned that believing one is unable to control one’s drinking may in fact discourage a heavy drinker from trying to stop. Heavy drinkers may deceive themselves into thinking they are powerless to deal with their problem, as if they lacked that "power of taking care" to which Aristotle refers.

Fingarette cites statistics that suggest that 20 percent of people in the U.S. drink enough to qualify as heavy drinkers. Yet their consumption of alcohol does not affect their families, jobs, finances, health and public behavior as it does in traditional diagnoses of alcoholics. As a college chaplain, I have known college students who were, heavy drinkers but who matured into adults who drink only moderately -- because, I believe, they avoided the stigma of being diagnosed as "alcoholics." Fingarette presents convincing evidence that heavy drinkers can moderate their behavior and resume drinking even after it is clearly established that they are, in fact, problem drinkers.

That some people may be biologically vulnerable to alcohol addiction has not been proven; in fact, there is no evidence that heredity places a person at greater risk of becoming a heavy drinker than family environment, character, beliefs and conduct. Fingarette says that "even if genetic factors play a role in some social drinking, it does not necessarily follow that they play a role in generating the problem behaviors associated with heavy drinking."

No one causal formula explains why people become heavy drinkers, Fingarette says, and he pleads for a new approach to treating problem drinking. He believes Americans have devoted enormous financial and social resources to explaining a disease that does not exist. Fingarette argues that some people drink excessively to blunt anxieties or to attempt to meet certain personal needs in certain circumstances. Such behavior needs responses tailored to individual cases. Indeed, Fingarette goes on to point out that although treatment centers use medical terminology to describe what they do, their approaches are not medically based but consist of "practical advice and personal support." He isolated the treatment paradox: "If the alcoholic’s ailment is a disease that causes an inability to abstain from drinking how can a program insist on voluntary abstention as a condition for treatment?" This approach invokes the moral cure before treatment begins and challenges the whole notion that heavy drinkers are out of control or lose control because of a disease.

Moral issues are at stake. Young people today are under great stress, and a social environment has been created to deal with that stress. Because excessive drinking has become a social expectation, our social environment has, in my opinion, become increasingly coercive. The Symposium agreement that "each is to drink as much as he wants and there is to be no compulsion about it" does not emerge when students, feeling the compulsion of peer pressure, surrender their freedom to moderate their drinking or abstain. The nature of the problem in such situations is essentially moral. It does not cry out for a solution from science, no matter how attractive we find impersonal, objective assessment. Rather, the problem lies in behavioral practices and social expectations that demand ethical elucidation and moral clarity.

Moral maturity, as I understand it, requires people to assume responsibility not only for Wow they behave but for how they think. Mature thinking about drinking requires that people assume responsibility for how they think about drinking.

Because the scientific paradigm directs and alters understanding, the issue at stake is freedom of thought itself. And when freedom is the issue, the spiritual is at stake. When excess and abstention dominate our thinking, we eliminate the possibility of moderation and not only deny certain pleasures of life but surrender our freedom of thought to what seem to be the impersonal and uncontrollable forces of nature that cause disease. By ignoring the very personal issues of character, desire and decision, all of which create the individual life histories in which problems like alcohol abuse arise, we abuse the concept of freedom and become spiritually misdirected.

That some people suffer from problem drinking is a fact; but medical science does not explain all its implications. The meaning of problem drinking must, in the end, be decided in the moral and finally the spiritual realm of individual anxieties, hopes, attitudes and beliefs.