From Guilt to Affirmation in the Mainline Churches

The decline of members and dollars among mainline Protestants and Roman Catholics since the mid-’60s is nowhere more graphically portrayed than at church convocations and national assemblies. Witness the graphs with their plummeting lines, the anguished presentation of statistics by the denominational hierarchy, and the curious blend of pessimism and hope communicated through such newly coined phrases as a “decrease of the decrease” to describe a “bottoming out” of the downward curves. All the while considerable guilt is being generated. The implication is that the causes of the malaise are internal; they are to be found in the structure of the church, the curriculum, the strategy for evangelism, the quality of pastoral leadership, or the general level of Christian commitment. The credibility of this diagnosis is evidenced by the intense, almost pathological navel-gazing posture the churches have assumed for the past two decades, and by their endless internal reforms: denominations have applied their energies to saving themselves through new structures, new curricula, new evangelism materials, new approaches to the role of the pastor and the people. But whatever benefits may have accrued, these efforts have apparently had little impact on the membership and dollar trends, which seem to have a life of their own.

An Astounding Boom Period

What is too often missing is the ability to see the recent church-member and dollar depression from the perspective of broader developments in the society at large and from a longer view of the life of the church in this country. I suspect that a future observer, looking back from some distance on the church in 20th century America, will not be half so impressed by the decline of the ‘60s and ‘70s as by the astounding boom period of the late ‘40s and the ‘50s. Edwin Scott Gaustad in his Historical Atlas of Religion in America (Harper & Row, 1962) takes us back to that time, citing a March 1957 Bureau of the Census survey in which persons 14 years of age and older were questioned about their religious preference.

The result gave some indication of the numerical strength of various religious bodies, but the amazing statistic from a long-term point of view is that an astounding 96 per cent of the respondents expressed a religious preference of some kind! To be sure, “religious preference’ is not the same as church membership or attendance, but it does depict a reality that is connected to church historian Kenneth Scott Latourette’s finding that in 1961 the proportion of church members to the general population in the U.S. was the highest ever in the nation’s history (Christianity in a Revolutionary Age, Vol. V [Harper & Row, 1962]). The overall proportion has not changed appreciably since then, though there has been a steady decline in mainline Protestant bodies and in the Roman Catholic Church. In terms of history and statistics, it would be much more accurate to describe this decline as a return to a more normal level of response following the unique and unprecedented heights of the churches’ bull market after World War II. And to understand this return, one would have to discover the factors contributing to the boom period -- factors no longer a part of the scene today.

The ‘American Way’

Two components of the postwar boom in the churches are unmistakable. The first is the inclusion of church affiliation in what we refer to as “the American way of life,” Franklin D. Roosevelt, the primary spokesman for the American cause in World War II, articulated the four freedoms for which Americans were fighting; one of these was freedom of religion.

All war is ambiguous, but there has been no other war in our history in which we were so convinced of our own righteousness and the evil of the enemies as we were in World War II. The country has never felt itself validated as fully as it was through that military victory and has never been more tempted by events to identify the cause of God with the world role of the United States of America. Victory ensured a preservation of our way of life with its four freedoms, and peace brought an uninhibited participation in this American way. Church membership became for a time what it has never been before or since -- an extension of citizenship. In a country where the separation of church and state is constitutionally guaranteed, the two were psychologically united. The church became for countless people a divine sanction of the American way.

A second prominent ingredient in the post -- World War II church boom was a quality of escapism and nostalgia. Several sociologists -- notably Gibson Winter in The Suburban Captivity of the Churches -- observed the connection, particularly in the mainline Protestant churches, between the creation of the suburbs and the institutional expansion of the church. It was in the suburbs that the new church buildings mushroomed. The churches became a significant part of the opportunity the suburb offered its residents to retain a bit of American rural life in an essentially urban environment. The suburb gave at least the appearance and perhaps the experience of retreat, quiet, rest and stability, so that family life could be enjoyed and traditions preserved. The church not only willingly bought into the setting, but then shaped its ministry so as to be able to provide the very benefits that people sought. If the suburb was the reverse side of the American family’s plunge into the rush, complexity and work of urban life, it was there that people were met and received by the Christian church.

Violating the Unwritten Contract

As one who was a pastor during the ‘60s and early 70s I find it relatively easy to identify the issues faced by the church in those years which generated the most controversy and which from an institutional standpoint resulted in the greatest losses. And it is not hard to trace their direct connection to the two factors above which had contributed so dramatically to the church’s boom period.

One issue was the church’s visible participation in the dominant political issues of the day notably the struggle for civil rights for minorities and the protests against the Vietnam war. Obviously there were countless levels of involvement, ranging from congregations that ignored, suppressed or resisted such issues to a few local churches that took direct action through deliberate corporate strategies. It could be argued that only a small minority of church members and congregations were participants in these issues. However, in this minority were leaders of protest movements as well as prominent national leaders of denominations, and right beside them were agents of national media. No one of the 96 per cent of all Americans expressing a religious preference in 1957 could miss the connection that Martin Luther King drew between the God of the Judeo-Christian story and the liberation of black people in our own society. No Presbyterian could bypass the arrest of then Stated Clerk Eugene Carson Blake for demonstrating against a segregated amusement park in Maryland, and no Presbyterian would be unaware of the $10,000 which the United Presbyterian Church later contributed to the legal defense of Angela Davis.

Whatever the individual’s own point of view and whatever the degree of involvement evident in a particular congregation, the church member belonged to a movement that was related, if not directly connected, to a Martin Luther King, a Eugene Carson Blake and, however remotely, an Angela Davis. The church which he or she joined to receive sanction for a way of life, to be assured that all was well with the country and that God’s blessing continued with us -- this same church was now confronting the country with its national fears and distortions and acting out not God’s favor but God’s judgment. One of the basic tenets of the unwritten contract between countless individuals and the church was thus violated by the church itself.

A second volatile issue of that period was raised by the changes occurring in worship. The most dramatic change was the Catholic transition from Latin to English, but there was a sense in which almost every denomination’s “Latin” was being translated into “English,” at the point of music, liturgy, symbol, color and style. These changes signaled not so much a rejection of tradition as an attempt to renew the tradition by placing it in the contemporary language of the world. People reacted simply because the symbols were changing, and there is no kind of change more difficult to bear. But the reaction was intensified as another basic presupposition of membership was contradicted: the experience of church, rather than providing a way out of this world, was increasingly being set in the context and language of a very disturbing and complex “now.” The new liturgy was encouraging people to come to terms with their world in the strength of the gospel. However legitimate from the standpoint of the gospel itself, such a movement was a denial of the church’s location in suburban retreat, at cross-purposes with the national definition of Sunday, and a repudiation of the member’s participation on the basis of the church’s ability to provide yet another route out of the world. Pulling crabgrass in the backyard, weekending at a cabin in the mountains, watching televised NFL football games -- these offered themselves as activities more harmonious with the established rhythm of life than attending church.

Thus those who had ridden the ‘50s treadmill into the church had the rug pulled out from under them in the ‘60s by the church itself. The crowd departed, a few of the leave-takers making a noisy exit, but most just slipping away, to be recognized in later years only as names on the long list which the discouraged governing board removed from the membership roll.

Yielding to Temptations

The point, of course, is that the church should not be discouraged. Historically the church has never been able to accommodate itself to a mass movement without surrendering much of its identity, and our history since World War II has given us yet another example. Surely the church is overextended in providing sanction for any nationally based life style, and betrays its own world-affirming faith by submitting to a movement of retreat and escape. The church does much better when it functions as its founder envisioned -- as salt or leaven -- rather than when it attempts to be the whole loaf. So set in the context of the church’s postwar boom, during which many people became members for the wrong reasons, our present decline is actually a growth, our slackening of institutional strength a recovery of identity, and our loss of members a renewal of integrity. Away with guilt and remorse!

For many the temptation now is, instead of serving faithfully and patiently out of this new strength, to submit to a panic strategy for recovering the lost institutional power. Were it not for the gospel’s continually checking the church’s gross inclinations, such a strategy would not be hard to devise. Given a blank check to build the church institutionally, one could still reap an impressive dividend by sustaining the forces and themes that were the attraction of the ‘50s -- that is, by offering a blend of the gospel, the American way, and nostalgic escape to an earlier era. Some other sure-fire ingredients of contemporary institutional success continue to make their appeal.

There is, for instance, the theory that one should treat church members as consumers, just as they are treated throughout the rest of the society. The ministry would then be confined to a professional elite, clearly identified and permanently detached, of those who see themselves as dispensers of the church’s goods to the members. The gospel, however, summons the whole church to ministry, both within and beyond the congregation.

Closely related is the temptation to package the gospel as an available component for individual personal growth. If the church’s ministry could become one building block in each person’s quest for fulfillment, it would find itself with a very salable item in a popular contemporary market. But the gospel calls us to a responsible and sustained participation in a community of persons and declares that we will come to ourselves only as we are willing to give ourselves away -- a course of action that has never sold well.

To have people involved in the institution at all, some response must be solicited, but the temptation is to suggest that it be sought only at carefully specified points. For instance, the response should be directed toward the support of the institution itself -- giving money, ushering, church administration, the kinds of roles that provide the advantage of available handles and the measurable satisfaction in being able to make some obvious contribution. Any ministry out in the society should preserve the distinction we have come to know between social service, which is okay, and social action, which creates controversy and disaffection. Those denominations that have been institutionally burned lately are now in the mood to guard that distinction with diligent caution. But the gospel addresses the total person and calls for an application to the whole life of the world.

A final temptation -- now that we have learned that the medium is the message -- is to make our appeal slick, glamorous and attractively packaged. This approach has application to all the communication that occurs in the church but particularly to its public displays: music, preaching, the performance of the liturgy. To keep the people in the posture of spectators while at the same time affording them the vicarious experience of participation via professionals enables the church to reap the benefit of one of the most powerful dynamics of our time. The gospel, however, describes the Christian community as a gathering of persons, each one of whom is particularly gifted by the grace of God, and it defines the church as the place where these individual gifts are to be discovered and expressed. This understanding militates against an attitude of professionalism and commits the church to an ongoing volunteerism and a permanent amateur standing -- hardly the ingredients for a slick operation.

Resisting the Gospel’s Hard Demands

While guarding against a rush to judgment, we can easily think of ministries that are pushing all or many of the current success buttons: they are carried out by a professional elite; they utilize the best marketing and media techniques; they dispense a personal fulfillment strategy to essentially anonymous folk who are regarded as consumers and called to respond in carefully prescribed ways which do not implicate them or their leadership in the more complex and controversial human issues. At the same time, the mainline churches, with some forgivable nostalgia for the crowds and dollars of the ‘50s, struggle with a much smaller community, encouraging persons to express their gifts in responsible ministries within and beyond the walls and to pursue the application of the Good News to every area of life -- most of all the places of conflict and pain. The “unpopularity” of this approach can be demoralizing, but such a ministry must be encouraged and sustained by a long view of its essential truth, derived not from the current standards of success but from a stubborn faithfulness to the gospel itself.

Let’s not be too smug, however. It may well be that for all of their culturally based success ingredients, some of the “popular” ministries are still much less embarrassed and much more effective in facilitating the reality and experience of God’s grace than the mainline churches are. The call to develop a responsible Christian life style within the community may be resisted because of the hard demands of the gospel. It may also be resisted because at the heart of the church there is not much gospel exposed, so that it all comes out as just another prescribed and peripheral way of life without any energy or motivation from the center.

Bruce Reed of the Grubb Institute of London has given a provocative picture of the essential ministry of the church from the vantage point of the behavioral sciences (The Task of the Church and the Role of Its Members [Alban Institute, 1975]). He sees contemporary persons involved in what he describes as a process of oscillation: at those times when people have their bearings, there is a sense of wholeness, power and integration that encourages creativity and expression; at times of anxiety or weakness in the face of difficulties, there is a need to reach beyond the resources available in oneself to regain a sense of well-being and to “get it together.” The first experience is characterized by what Reed calls intradependence, a self-sufficiency, and the second by extradependence, or seeking support beyond oneself. He speaks of religion “as the social institution which provides a setting in ritual for the process of oscillation in a society.”

Reed has described quite accurately a familiar back-and-forth of life and demonstrated the pertinence of the church community to our human experience. A much less sophisticated description of the church’s task in this light is to say that we are together to enable people to be born again, and again, and again. Without this center there will not be much life in the rest of the church, however much integrity we ascribe to ourselves against the servants of success.

A Community That Lives Sacramentally

The heartening reality is that the typical mainline church, by maximizing its advantages, can provide an environment that encourages this kind of continuing renewal. If Jesus Christ is the model of God’s being in the world, if the word does indeed become flesh, then God addresses us in person, as “you”; God comes to us through human beings, and God has touched the whole of human experience.

The response, then, is a community that lives sacramentally, and that is precisely what the contemporary church is capable of being. We must not be offended by the personal “you” that God speaks, or embarrassed to reply directly. We must wrestle with God in person and as persons together. We must enlarge the sacrament so that it embraces the world, so that our symbols, celebrations and proclamations affirm God’s presence throughout. We must enhance the qualities of community that contribute to growth, specifically the sense of history, of being connected to others. What the church really offers is the experience of being in it together.

This kind of community-building is an arduous and consuming activity often frustrated by its opposition to so much in the current mainstream. It is certainly not a strategy for success but only an effort toward faithfulness,

The Reformed Churches: Enlarging Their Witness

The churches that bear the name “Reformed” are only a fraction of the churches in this country that represent the Reformed tradition. It is one of the curiosities of that tradition in the U.S. that, while Baptists are always called Baptists and Methodists are always called Methodists, many Reformed Christians are called Presbyterians! The difference, of course, goes back to the place of origin. Though both groupings belong to the Reformed family, the Presbyterian churches look to Great Britain for their beginnings, while the churches that are called Reformed had their origin in a variety of countries on the continent of Europe.

Two denominations in the U.S. include “Reformed” in their titles today -- the Reformed Church in America and the Christian Reformed Church. Both look to the Netherlands as the country of their origin, though in different ways. The Reformed Church in America, which celebrated its 30th anniversary in 1978, goes back to the earliest colonial times when New York was New Amsterdam; in addition, it has been enriched and enlarged by many immigrants from the Netherlands in the eighth century. The Christian Reformed Church was made up almost totally of 19th and 20th century immigrants from the Netherlands who represented a division that took place in the Reformed Church there in 1834.

By American standards, both churches are small. The total membership of the Reformed Church in America is 360,000, and that of the Christian Reformed Church is 288,000 -- far less than 1 million in total. Over 25 per cent of the CRC’s membership is in Canada, where that church has ministered extensively to Dutch immigrants since World War II. While there are a few RCA congregations in Canada, they represent only a tiny fraction of the denomination’s total membership.

Ecumenical Considerations

Perhaps the best way to begin discussing the future of these churches is to consider their relationships with each other. Though closely related historically and theologically, they have had very different ecumenical histories. As one of the oldest American denominations (and one of the strongest in two of the original 13 colonies), the Reformed Church in America has always had an ecumenical posture, dating back to the early United Missionary Societies. It was an original member of the Federal Council of Churches, and of the National and World councils.

Despite this history of ecumenical openness, however, the RCA has had a consistent record of refusing to combine with other denominations in organic union, beginning with the old northern Presbyterian Church in 1876, followed by the then Reformed Church in the United States (now part of the United Church of Christ) in 1889, the former United Presbyterian Church in 1949 and, most recently, the southern Presbyterian Church in 1969. From this record it should be abundantly clear that while it in no way rejects a posture of ecumenical cooperation, the Reformed Church in America is nonetheless unwilling to surrender its denominational identity.

The Christian Reformed Church, on the other hand, has followed a much more isolationist course from its beginnings in this country in 1857. Though it has from time to time looked favorably on some conservative alliances, it has eschewed joining either the National or the World Council of Churches, seeking fellowship rather with groups like the Orthodox Presbyterian Church or, more recently, with the new Presbyterian Church in America.

Within this decade, however, the two Reformed churches have begun conversations with each other. Not surprisingly, these talks have been disconcerting to the liberal wing of the RCA, which sees in them the threat of a church locked into Reformed confessional orthodoxy. The conversations have been equally distressing to the conservative wing of the CRC, which sees any cooperation with the RCA as leading to all the evils of participation in mainstream American Protestantism. But a strong middle group in each denomination has insisted that the two churches must address themselves seriously to the schism which has marred the lives of both for more than a century.

It would be impossible to predict where these conversations may lead. Probably no organic merger will take place within the next decade; many stubborn problems still must be resolved. But there is no doubt that talks will continue with greater seriousness. Instead of seeking ways in which they can react to each other -- the pattern of the past -- the two denominations should in the coming decade seek increasing areas of cooperation. It would be foolish to predict exactly what areas those may turn out to be, but it would be equally unwise not to point out a growing pattern of walking together for the future of the two churches.

Growth, Decline and Stagnation

During the past few years neither denomination has grown; both have stagnated. At an earlier period the Christian Reformed Church enjoyed a pattern of growth, but it seems to have been the result of heavy Dutch immigration to Canada; the rise leveled off when the’ immigration ceased. Despite protests to the contrary, neither church has yet discovered how to break out of its ghetto. In the case of the CRC and the midwestern section of the RCA, church growth has been largely a matter of remaining within areas where the denominations have had historic roots.

In the RCA there have been some recent exceptions to this traditional pattern. One is the development of a sizable number of Hispanic (and, to a lesser degree, black) congregations in northeastern urban areas like Brooklyn, the Bronx, Newark and Hudson County, New Jersey, which once were centers of traditional Reformed Church strength. The usual pattern of church flight from these areas seems to have been arrested as the RCA has begun to minister to the groups that have moved in. The fact that a denomination which had no record of previous work in Hispanic countries has had some success in meeting the needs of Hispanic immigrants to northeastern Cities may mean that, on this front at least, the RCA has been able to break out of its ghetto.

The other obvious exception is the enormous success of Robert Schuller in Garden Grove, California. While all kinds of questions have been raised about Schuller from within the Reformed Church -- some arising from petty jealousy and some based on serious concerns of theological integrity, the fact remains that the Schuller pattern has worked in Orange County, California, at a time when the rest of the church has been in stagnation or decline. The question for which no one seems to have the answer is how much of the Garden Grove Community Church’s success is the result of its leader’s charisma (at least several attempts at imitation elsewhere have been disastrous failures) and how much is the result of principles applicable elsewhere in the country.

The RCA’s top leadership has obviously decided to bet on the thesis that at least some principles of Schuller’s successful church are transferable. The denomination has recently raised a $5 million church growth fund, part of which is to be used in developing new congregations in the Sunbelt, particularly in Texas, where up to this point the Reformed Church in America has been totally unrepresented. Realizing that congregations, like individuals, do not do well in isolation, and that isolated congregations of the RCA have not been successful in the past, church leaders plan to develop clusters of congregations, rather than lone outposts, in these new locations.

At this point, therefore, the RCA is on the threshold of expanding into a rapidly growing area of the country where it has not previously had congregations. It should be pointed out that expansion of this kind seems necessary, since demographically the church is locked into areas like the northeast (where population is declining) and the midwest (where it is at least stagnant). Assuming that the move works, a decade hence there may be a growing number of healthy Reformed churches at various places in the Sunbelt.

If this happens, given the churches which already exist in southern California, Arizona and Florida (to say nothing of the growing number of Hispanic congregations back in the northeast), then at least two predictions of trends for the next decade would seem to be in order. The first would be a shifting of the power centers away from New York and Grand Rapids to some unspecified location where the growth of the church will be taking place.

Theological Positions

The more important prediction, however, has to do with what this shift could mean to the theological character of the Reformed Church in America. That character in recent years has been a middle-of-the-road ecumenical Protestant stance, hotly challenged but never dominated by a much more conservative evangelicalism in certain parts of the midwest. Given the overwhelming evangelical ambience of the Sunbelt, however, and the safe assumption that the RCA must reflect that attitude in order to succeed in the area, it is not difficult to predict that what has been the dominant theological position of the church may very well in the next ten years become a minority one as the conservative evangelicalism of the new Sunbelt churches joins forces with the existing strength of that position in the midwest.

The Christian Reformed Church presently contemplates no such massive, invasion of new territory, but population movements have already involved it in areas where there has hitherto been no Reformed witness. The usual pattern has been for a new church to be formed with a nucleus of Christian Reformed people whom industry has transferred to an area in which there is no existing CRC congregation. The nucleus is hardly enough to sustain congregational life unless other people in the community can he attracted. It is here that the enterprise has met with serious problems, for the CRC has always insisted on a life style different from that of its Reformed sister -- the maintenance of Christian schools, opposition to secret societies, two worship services (morning and evening) on each Lord’s Day, etc. By and large, the American Protestant world has not been sympathetic to these demands, and CRC growth in new areas has therefore been small.

It is safe to assume that the next decade will see questions being raised in the CRC about the essential character of many of these traditional demands for the life of the church. To what extent are they holdovers from situations in the Netherlands in which they were meaningful, and to what extent are they applicable in the U.S. in the last quarter of the 20th century?

Though the Christian Reformed Church is geographically limited and has usually chosen to live outside the mainstream of American Protestantism, it ought not to be cast in its traditional stereotype of hopeless Dutch conservatism. While there are undoubtedly those in that church who would like nothing better than to perpetuate the pattern of the past, there are a growing number of people in the CRC who believe that their inheritance has something significant to offer to the U.S. Already the holistic approach of Abraham Kuyper to theology and society has enabled the Christian Reformed Church to undertake some significant ministries in u

rban areas. It will be interesting to see how this group will seek to enlarge the future ministry of the denomination in other areas of this country.

Women and Ordination

In the recent past the attention of both Reformed denominations has been taken up with the role of women in the ministry. In 1972 the Reformed Church in America repealed its ancient prohibition against women serving as elders and deacons in consistory (both ordained lay offices) but retained the prohibition against their serving as ministers of the word. Since 1972 repeated attempts to do away with that prohibition have fallen just short of the two-thirds of the classes (presbyteries) necessary to make the change. Since the language of the denomination’s Book of Church Order already reads “persons” and not “males” in its rules governing ordination to the ministry, what is at stake here is really the repeal of a 400-year-old interpretation rather than of a specific law. Because of that fact, after it was announced to the 1978 General Synod that the proposed change had again failed to win a two-thirds majority, several classes proceeded to ordain women on their own. One class had in fact already ordained a woman in 1973, but in compliance with a strong request from General Synod, no other ordinations of women took place between 1973 and 1978.

Now that the issue has been joined in such a way that the question must be decided judicially rather than legislatively, some provision for ordaining women in the RCA seems assured. Since several ordained women are already serving in the ministry, it is hard to imagine any ecclesiastical action returning matters to their earlier status quo. Since at the 1977 General Synod a woman elder did well in the race for the vice-presidency (in the RCA the vice-president of General Synod is heir presumptive for the presidency the next year), it seems well within the realm of possibility that during the coming decade a woman (elder or minister) will be elected president of the General Synod, the highest office the church can bestow.

In the Christian Reformed Church the debate is at a much earlier stage; it may be longer and more heated, but advances have already been made. At its 1978 Synod the denomination voted to open the office of deacon to women. Whether the CRC will proceed to admit women also to the offices of both elder and minister remains to be seen. It is as deacons that conservatives can most easily envision women serving. The CRC may adopt the gradualist pattern of the RCA, or it may be forced to follow the more authentically Reformed tradition of viewing the three offices as a unity that cannot be broken.

Liturgical Change

Theologically speaking, the RCA is now more at peace with itself than it has been for many years. While there is still a very vocal and active right wins, a broad centrist evangelicalism across the church gives a more unifying position than has previously been the case.

Attracting much discussion is the recent proposal of the RCA’s theological commission that baptized children be allowed to receive the Lord’s Supper. In a church that has a strong commitment to covenant theology, that practice would seem to be the logical outgrowth of the theological premises, but the measure is being strongly opposed by those who feel that it would represent a serious lowering of the solemnity of the sacramental occasion. Paul’s admonition that “everyone should examine himself first and then eat the bread and drink the cup” is usually cited by the opposition. But since no change in the Book of Church Order is required, it seems likely that the new practice, which has already begun in some congregations, will be taken up by many others, though the whole question of Christian initiation will continue to be an unresolved problem in both churches -- as it is in Western Christendom generally.

Liturgically speaking, both churches have come a long way in the past decade, and attention to liturgical integrity and significance seems to be a sure characteristic for both in the future. Gone are the days when liturgical concern could be dismissed as the hobby of a few aesthetes. The CRC has at least one congregation which realizes Calvin’s ideal of the celebration of Word and Sacrament every Sunday. While no such congregation exists in the RCA, a growing number of churches have forsaken the traditional pattern of a quarterly and very penitential observance for a more frequent and joyous form of celebration. The number of congregations which celebrate the Supper monthly or on the great festival days is a growing one.

In times past, committees have been appointed to “revise the liturgy”; their task was to alter the punctuation and modernize the language of the 16th and 17th century liturgical forms. Those forms are still printed for congregations that wish to use them, but the number is a decreasing one, even in parts of the church where a few years ago the traditional forms were virtual “sacred cows.” The traditional revision committee has been replaced by a permanent worship committee which is to continue to suggest meaningful liturgical forms for congregational use.

Worship and Preaching

The charismatic movement has undoubtedly played a part in freeing up the liturgical life of both churches. Though it has had almost no strength in the CRC and only a small representation in the RCA, it has had a much larger effect on the worship of both churches than its numbers would seem to indicate. Worship had been almost uniformly stiff and formal and largely dominated by the domine (the traditional Dutch term for minister) to the extent that in many congregations he read the Apostles’ Creed and the Lord’s Prayer as a solo; in recent years the liturgy has become more varied and relaxed, with a great deal more participation by the people.

While there are still some congregations in which the traditional patterns are maintained, the number is increasing in which the old Calvinist liturgical framework (preparation, proclamation, response) is being restored; the fleshing out of this liturgical skeleton is done in a variety of ways, depending on the situation, of the individual congregation. It is not difficult to imagine that within the next few years this pattern will become almost universal in Reformed churches, together with an even wider observance of the Christian Year than is now the case (and the present practice is far more extensive than it was a decade ago).

Preaching continues to be central in the life of both denominations, and there is no indication that this focus will shift. It may well be that sermons will continue to grow shorter (they have already shrunk from 45 minutes to 20 within living memory), but that trend will persist because of increasing congregational liturgical and sacramental life and not because of any lack of emphasis on preaching. A move toward de-emphasis of preaching did appear in the ‘60s, but it has now been completely reversed; there is every indication from this generation of Reformed seminary students that good biblical preaching will be a continuing interest for some years to come. While Reformed churches have not recently produced any great preachers in the traditional sense (what denomination has?), both the RCA and the CRC have more than a fair share of competent preachers who take their task seriously. One likes to think that the next ten years will see that number increase.

The Future of Missions

The Reformed Church in America became involved in the world missionary movement much earlier than did the Christian Reformed Church. The RCA has therefore had to face, in a way the CRC has not, some of the problems which that movement today involves. Specifically these are a shrinking financial base at home and the rise of the indigenous churches of the Third World. Numbers of Reformed Church members have decried what has happened to the world missionary movement as a result of these factors and have urged a return to “old-fashioned” missionary work in a hitherto untried territory.

Partly in response to these pressures and partly in connection with its church growth movement, in 1977 the RCA decided to launch a new venture in Venezuela; it already has one missionary in the field. It would not be accurate to call this an “old-fashioned missionary effort among the heathen,” since there are Pentecostal groups in the area with which, it is hoped, close cooperation will be possible. In that sense, the new program is more in line with the mission philosophy of those who advocate working in concert with an indigenous church. The fact remains, however, that the project in Venezuela represents the first new missionary move in a long time in the Reformed Church in America and may well be a harbinger of things to come in a reinvolvement with the world mission of the church in the next decade.

Since allusion has already been made to the charismatic movement in connection with liturgical life, something more ought to be said about the future of that movement in the Reformed churches. In a real sense, it depends on the future of the charismatic movement in Christianity generally. Is it a wave of the future, or will it, having done its work, subside and become lost in the general life of the church? Because of a traditional Dutch rationalism (which can be conservative as well as liberal), it has never made the headway in the Reformed churches that it has in some others, though there are some RCA congregations in which the charismatic movement has proved to be divisive.

My own hunch is that, so far as the Reformed churches are concerned, charismatics may continue as a small minority for some time to come, but the movement’s principal effect on these churches has already been felt. Especially in the RCA, where for more than two centuries a theology based on experience has been a lively tradition, it has been able to reinforce that tradition and enlarge its sphere of influence. In both liberal and conservative wings of the RCA there is less rationalism and more piety than was the case 20 years ago. That fact may well account for the apparent growing theological consensus, but it would seem to be the lasting effect of the charismatic movement in the Reformed churches and one that probably will not change in the future.

Five or six years ago, when enrollments in the three seminaries of these two denominations began to show a marked increase, there were dire warnings about the placement problems that were being created for the future with an increasing number of ministers for a shrinking number of congregations. There can be no question that the situation has been tight, though it has never reached the proportions that were predicted. But given the quality of the large number of men and women who have been preparing for the ministry, it would almost seem that the Lord of the church knew more about the future than the church did!

Certainly the great thing that has happened in the Reformed churches recently -- something which one hopes can be continued into the foreseeable future -- is a new awareness of themselves and of their responsibilities and their possibilities. For the moment at least, they have put behind them any thought of looking to another denomination for their future -- unless it be that more of their future lies with one another. They have realized that while their smallness is something that can be a hindrance in many fields of endeavor, it can also be a virtue enabling them to do at least some things which cannot be undertaken by many larger denominations.

As for the immediate future of the Christian Reformed Church and the Reformed Church in America, many problems lie ahead: many tensions that will have to be resolved and at least some tendencies that make me personally uneasy. But I am also aware of a Spirit and sense of excitement that may well ensure for these churches a better future than their recent past would indicate.

Feminism and Ministerial Education

The recent revival of the women’s movement is affecting every area of American life. The term “revival” is used because an earlier movement culminated in the voting amendment of 1919, which women had hoped would become instrumental in achieving other forms of equality. The movement slowed during the 1940s and ‘50s until books by Simone de Beauvoir and Betty Friedan stirred a new feminism, later institutionalized in the National Organization for Women and presently focused on the Equal Rights Amendment and other issues.

The church, as a conservator of societal values, is understandably slow to affirm a movement that espouses change. But the church can hardly expect to remain untouched by this pervasive cultural development. The current task of biblical interpreters on the subject of women’s rights should begin in the theological seminary, where a variety of efforts may be undertaken to assist students in meeting this change during their professional preparation.

I

The knowledge/feeling level of the instructor is of basic importance. Students frequently regard their teachers as models by whose attitudes they are reassured, antagonized. reinforced or encouraged to change. What, in fact, do those who teach know about the present feminist ferment with reference to women and the Bible, theological insights or historical development? Some of the most thoughtful work in the field today is being written by evangelicals, to whom the authority of God’s word in Scripture is paramount. Two examples are Man as Male and Female by a Fuller Seminary scholar, Paul K. Jewett, and Virginia Mollenkott’s Women; Men and the Bible -- excellent both as book and as study course complete with cassettes. Other books about women in the Old Testament and about Paul’s view of women have appeared recently, as has a source-book of excerpts from historical writings: Women and Religion, edited by Elizabeth Clark and Herbert Richardson. Also to be considered are the thoughtful histories of church women’s societies that have been issued by several denominations.

Reading, however, is not enough. Highly educated people like to read about issues and digest them intellectually, but often prefer to avoid becoming inwardly affected. They can read about the misogyny of the church fathers and understand the cultural situation of biblical people, but remain personally untouched by their reading. If we are to fulfill our task, it is important to let this reading speak to us inwardly, compel us to think and feel deeply, affirm us where indicated and change us where necessary. Exploring one’s feelings can be uncomfortable, but it is important not to deny them; they will find expression in some form. Students can discern attitudes in the voice or manner of an instructor. Thus, no teacher should ignore the present situation.

The members of a seminary community also have pastoral responsibilities to one another. They ought to become aware of the needs that prompt a radical response to feminism on the part of some women and develop an empathy with their sense of frustration. Also, if it is concluded that women need to develop a more aggressive stance in order to minister in today’s world, attention should be paid to those women who are content with traditional roles, affirming those who know reasons for their stance and encouraging exploration on the part of those who seem unsatisfied but have defined no clear direction to follow.

II

What kind of help do women students receive from advisers? Some faculty see their advisory role primarily as that of assisting students to choose courses that will meet interests and fulfill degree requirements. Women should be encouraged to explore the full range of academic offerings -- especially those that would strengthen skills in theology and/or biblical languages, for example. In the past, women were advised to enter religious education, not because of special gifts, but because no adviser would have thought of suggesting a Ph.D. in theology or New Testament. Also, special female “sensitivity” to others often led to a hospital chaplaincy but not a pastorate, marriage counseling within a community setting rather than in a church. Sometimes it seems as though men are threatened by the aesthetic component in liturgy; in theory, women are supposed to appreciate the aesthetic but in ecclesial settings men are supposed to practice it. All of these attitudes need examination and revision.

The majority of seminary students may be male. If a teacher’s own inclination is to affirm traditional roles for men md women, some seminarians will be reassured -- but they will not be prepared or the future. Presumably such preparation is part of the educational task. There is no blueprint, but flexibility toward change is an essential element in vocational training. One might help by saying, “This is the way I still view the situation, but I can’t guarantee that it will not change in five, ten or 20 years” -- and then introduce options even if one does so on an intellectual level, with reservations and disagreements. If male students are involved in what some people like to call the new humanism, they will welcome affirmation from their instructors as they try new roles and modifications of accustomed ways.

III

Student responses to the women’s movement are as varied as those of their professors. Any class will encompass many viewpoints -- including reflections of wives’ feelings. Some student wives desire only to be a “good” minister’s wife. Some female members of the local church will affirm these women in a traditional role, while others, who work and are sensitive to matters of promotion and salary, as well as to the social and political implications of the rights movement, may wish for a pastor’s wife to be more supportive of their needs.

Certain women are abrasive in urging their case -- a posture which some people on campus will affirm, while others will withdraw in discomfort. In any case, confirming the proverb “The wheel that squeaks gets the grease,” emphatic protest has won some changes for women, frequently in terms of admissions policies, appointment to faculty positions and representation on committees.

Students are obviously aware of one another’s feelings. Women students are no longer tolerant of what they consider “put-downs” by men, such as the male seminarian’s remark that “women don’t need power in the church. They already exercise it through the kitchen and bedroom.” Male discomfort with the subject of women’s changing roles in the church is understandable: men will face stiffer job competition and will be threatened by more people within the power structure. Males who have learned how to deal with indirect power plays by women often do not find it comfortable to meet challenges directly. Whereas they have been able to joke about women “having their way,” they are not prepared to see them have their way through regular channels.

Male students who have internalized the pastor-laity roles with which they grew up struggle to restructure this role for their own ministry. But no one can live in the past, and the young, especially, should be alive to the future, The openness, even aggressiveness, of some women students in seminary could be positively construed as an opportunity for males to try out new roles in this supportive community before entering into the ambiguities of the parish situation. Presumably those preparing for pastoral or teaching ministry are alert to the feelings of others. They have it on good authority that this attitude was central to the life and ministry of Jesus. Support should go out to those men who are open to the aspirations of women and who are finding new directions for themselves.

One essential role for a teacher can be to act as a catalyst in restructuring perceptions among faculty. Every faculty is a team, and members know the others’ responses very well (more so within a small faculty than a large one). There are those who pay lip service: “I’m all for women studying for the ministry, but . . . Substitute “women becoming ordained” or “becoming pastors” or “having tenured positions”; the game of “yes, but . . .” continues. However, this game can be challenged. For example, it is important to note to what extent personality factors enter into faculty discussions about women students. Is this the case more frequently than in discussions of male students? Is the faculty more or less indulgent in carrying along the female student whose work is substandard? Equal treatment is what women want today, and faculty can help each other in seeking to establish uniform standards for student evaluation.

The place of women faculty on the functioning committees should also be explored. Is there at least one woman on each? I do not advocate proportional representation per se; it could result in unqualified committee members and would help neither the school nor the women s movement. But increasing female representation has the practical effect of bringing more women into the decision-making process, giving them opportunity to exercise their abilities and make their viewpoints known.

IV

In addition to amassing knowledge and analyzing feelings and interactions, seminary communities may take further steps to enrich educational perspectives on feminism. The most obvious is to schedule campus visits by people who represent new roles for women. However, to encourage positive reaction, visiting speakers will have to be chosen judiciously. This does not mean never to invite a woman who is overly aggressive in pressing her viewpoint; prospective clergy need to learn how to face acerbic approaches. since they cannot be guaranteed a lifetime of serene pastorates. They need to learn how to hear what people are saying instead of defensively turning off an unpleasant message, and they need to understand both the personal and tactical reasons why the speaker uses this approach.

Another goal should be to develop courses about women and religion. These ought to reflect on the subject biblically, theologically and historically. They may also explore feelings and attitudes and be designed to help women broaden their self-image in the religious professions, as well as to help men accept them there. In addition, there is a need for conscientious examination of all seminary courses to determine whether the roles of women have been ignored, neglected or distorted. A study of church history should not only include the council at Whitby but note that the head of that monastery was the Abbess Hilda. The Avignon period of the papacy cannot be seen in proper focus without examining the role of Catherine of Siena, who acted as mediator. No study of Christian spirituality is complete without the writings of Theresa of Avila.

And so it goes. Women have been heroic figures in the history of Protestant missions. The development of women’s societies within American churches made possible effective education and financial outreach for home and foreign missions. Women studying today want to know more about the biblical understanding of women. It comes as a surprise to some to realize (although they have read it many times) that women were the first witnesses to the resurrection. Women are also asking theological questions about the biblical understanding of God, seeking to comprehend what it means that God nurtured, led and fed his people.

V

It seems astonishing to one acquainted with the world of publishing that some teachers and many students in theological schools see no reason for changing their writing or speaking style to reflect present-day trends. Many women no longer hear themselves as being included in the terms “man” and “mankind.” Do teachers and clergy really want to remain unheard by part of their class or congregation? Women are discovering that the word “man” has sometimes been inserted and mistranslated in the Bible where Greek, Hebrew and Latin used a generic word whose English equivalent is “human being” or “humanity.”

The McGraw-Hill guidelines for non-sexist references in writing have been widely adopted among general secular publishers, a development to be noted in 1977-78 books. Some, but not all, church-related publishing houses are also sensitive to the trend. Students should not be permitted to hand in class papers written incorrectly. Admittedly one’s first attempts at change may be awkward, but writers soon learn ways in which plural forms and third-person usage can ease the transition. In a short time, one is making few lapses that a careful rereading does not uncover.

It is also important to become more sensitive to hymns and other liturgical materials used in worship services. Some women are looking for new worship materials. Others are asking only that the most blatant examples of sexist language be omitted. There are at least 500 hymns in any hymnal, and one does not have to choose “Rise Up, O Men of God.” Besides, its theology is bad. The kingdom does not tarry; nor does the church (her strength unequal to her task) wait for men to make her great. Women are not brothers of the son of man.

VI

In religious education, which has frequently been considered primarily a woman’s field, there are and have been few women attaining to the rank of full professor in theological seminaries. In the past generation, few women have been appointed ministers of education in large or “key” churches. Seldom have they been called as pastors even to medium-sized parishes. Rarely have there been women in top denominational or judicatory positions. In recent years, even the field of children’s ministry has been co-opted by men on the grounds that it needed more male figures (but no corresponding need voiced for adult ministry to have more female figures). A key responsibility will be to see that such positions are open to women, instead of wondering aloud how, with the increased numbers of women students, there will ever be found jobs enough to go around.

Some new positions may be opening, but not quickly enough to meet the needs of seminary graduates. Faculty members ought to use all the influence they have in finding openings and in encouraging laity to accept women In unfamiliar roles. At present, such efforts may be more difficult in the pastorate than in the fields of teaching or administration.

Where do all of these developments and suggestions leave male students and professors? They are left, as are men in other vocations, learning to look at women as persons and co-workers. They are learning that they can no longer protect certain boundaries, at the same time as they are gaining freedom to adopt life styles more open and less competitive. Their sometimes oppressive machismo role may vanish, opening the road to a new humanization. Aware of the importance of roles, models, methods and language, each professor and each student -- male and female -- can be a catalyst to help seminary communities move positively and creatively in the present situation of change.

Process Thought and the Liberation of Homosexuals

In the small southwestern Iowa town where I grew up, there were three churches -- each with its own unique appearance and reputation. The largest church seemed rigid, formal, uncompromising, intractable. Its church plant was a huge, imposing brick structure designed to last forever. Not even a midwestern tornado could threaten to dislodge it. The medium-sized church was flexible, informal, accommodating and very much “up front.” Its buil

ding was an unpretentious frame edifice, built to accept all kinds of additions appropriate to the changing times. It had long since lost any trace of architectural symmetry. The smallest church was somewhere between these two. It advertised itself as the “via media.” As I recall, the church building was a symbolic mixture of brick and wood: anchored to the rock, but geared to the times.

It was fascinating to observe both the contrasting appearances and the diversified styles according to which these churches dealt with continually surfacing theological and social problems. There was always a conflagration. If the issue wasn’t ecumenicity, then it was civil rights, or the liberation and equality of women, or the immorality of war. No sooner was one fire extinguished than another started to inflame the congregations.

A New Debate

It is reasonable to assume that these three churches continue to carry on as usual, fueled by a fresh incendiarism. The current cause, no doubt, would be the desire of self-acknowledged, practicing homosexuals to be recognized as full and equal church members whose sexual orientation is irrelevant. At first glance, acceptance of homosexuals appears to be another on that homogenous list of liberation causes faced courageously and openly by some churches; another minority group which has experienced oppression by the majority would now be granted status as full participants within the Christian community. To the triumph of blacks and women would be added the freedom of another of God’s tyrannized persons -- the homosexual.

If this is the case, all Christians ought to welcome the event. As Robert McAfee Brown put it:

It is clear in the Biblical drama as a whole that when God takes sides, he sides with the oppressed. . . . God did not side with Pharaoh, the powerful political leader, but with the oppressed menial servants, the slaves. God sides with the oppressed. The oppressors are on the wrong side. It is as clear as that!

Is the homosexual issue in fact comparable to those other liberation movements of recent decades? At least in one very significant aspect, the answer is No. Quite simply, the Bible explicitly and repeatedly condemns homosexual acts. A task force of the United Presbyterian Church U.S.A. set up to study homosexuality summarized its examination of the relevant biblical material by stating that “homosexuality is a minor theme in Scripture.” To substantiate this assertion, the group offered a list of 14 passages. Collectively, these references constitute more than 275 verses. Rather than documenting the contention that homosexuality is a minor theme, the verses appear to have quantified the seriousness with which the Judeo-Christian communities regarded the problem. A reading of these scriptural materials can only lead to the conclusion that both the Old and the New Testaments emphatically oppose homosexual practice. In this important aspect, homosexuality must be viewed differently from the other liberation movements.

Rejecting Scriptural Authority?

The current debate has ramifications far exceeding the particular issue. At stake is not only the acceptance or rejection of a minority group; even more important is the question of whether Christians can accept a style of conduct which the Bible pronounces unacceptable. For many persons, an endorsement of homosexuals is tantamount to a rejection of biblical authority, and opens the door to an arbitrary selection and elimination of biblical standards. Surely this license must appear to be a radical departure from the confessions of many churches in which the Scriptures are declared to be “not a witness among others, but the witness without parallel.”

Can the church adhere to the authoritative witness of the Bible and still accept homosexuals? Is there a methodology whereby the God of the biblical community can be understood as having modified his ethical stance on such an important issue? There is such a theory, and it may be illustrated by an analogy built on the three small-town churches.

The indestructible brick church can represent a theological understanding known as classical theism, which eventuated as an alliance of biblical theology and Greek philosophy. The Bible defined God as perfect, and Plato and Aristotle argued persuasively that perfection implies changelessness. After all, they reasoned, if something changes, it must change either for the better or the worse. If it changes by adding something to itself such as a new idea or novel experience, then it must previously have been lacking this knowledge or awareness and, to that degree, it must have been deficient and imperfect. Since the biblical God is perfect, he must be complete and incapable of change. Theology and philosophy conspired to give us the Unmoved Mover, the Perfect Being with whom “there is no variation, no shadow of turning,” the One who announces, “I am the Lord, unchanging.” His son incarnates this immutability: “Jesus Christ, the same yesterday, today and forever.” The favorite hymn of the brick church must be

 “Great is thy faithfulness,” O God my Father.

There is no shadow of turning with thee.

Thou changest not, Thy compassions, they fail not;

As thou hast been thou forever shalt be.

 

In accepting this classical theistic understanding, one must relate to a God who never changes his mind, never alters his judgments, never allows himself to be moved by the exigencies of the world. His ethical pronouncements are binding on all persons in all places for all times. If homosexuality was an abomination in biblical times, it is still wrong today and will be wrong in the eschaton.

The second church model is the frame building with the asymmetrical proportions. Here, nothing remains constant. Change dominates. The concept this structure symbolizes is of a God who is not very dependable or predictable. He has no absolutes, no fixed character, no qualities which transcend the vagaries of time and place. A God ruled by change is not available to assist in solving ethical dilemmas. For either he continually changes himself, in which case his character lacks substance and stability; or he is determined by circumstances outside of himself, in which case he is powerless to direct and assist others. An entirely arbitrary and capricious God may inspire awe and fear, but he offers no model for formulating a coherent social ethic.

Finally, there is the heteromorphic church with the mixture of brick and wood. Such a structure symbolizes both change and permanence, both alteration and constancy. As applied to God, this idea suggests that in some ways he is immutable and absolute, while in other ways he is changeable and relative. This is the position of process theology -- an understanding which has much to offer the church in its current struggle.

A Creative Compromise

First, consider God’s changeless attributes. His love for his creation, his concern for persons, his availability to those who seek him, his sensitivity toward those who are wronged, his disdain for cruelty, his desire for the best, his keen awareness of our condition, his patience in the pursuit of value -- these are absolute and unshakeable characteristics of God. In us, these attributes are relative and variable, but God does not share this liability.

Second, consider the manner in which God changes. All of the above-mentioned characteristics of God are relational. They show what kind of God he is by showing how he relates to his creation. His awareness, concern and love are absolute in the sense that they are constantly present and continually expressed to us in our daily lives. However, we are creatures of temporality and we find ourselves thrust into a world of becoming and change. “There came a storm and a blinding rain, and the world was never the same again.” Therefore, if God is going to relate absolutely to us, to be genuinely aware, concerned and loving, then he must take into account the variables of our changing situation. God’s love is absolute and unchanging; but the particular manner in which that love expresses itself must be relative to time, place and person.

Viewed from this process perspective, God’s ethical judgments are manifestations of his absolute character. The biblical mores are expressions of that character, and any attempt to dismiss them as insignificant mitigates God’s seriousness in relating to his people. However, since these mores are relational and since at least one of the parties in that relationship changes, it follows that the mores must take into account the changing situation. Suppose that a child were fortunate enough to have a deeply concerned father. The father would demonstrate his concern by offering various commands and proscriptions which prohibit the child from staying outside after dark, from attempting to drive the car, from playing with matches. Relative to the development of his child, the father’s commands are absolute and they give evidence of his caring. However, 20 years later these same commands would not only be irrelevant but counterproductive. Instead of manifesting and enhancing the father’s love, they would show a possessiveness and insensitivity which would be in direct contradiction to the parent’s intentions.

Similarly, biblical mores ought to be perceived within the context of God’s dipolarity. They express the absoluteness of his love, relative to that community. As conditions and persons change, the particular mores may change as well, but God’s loving never changes. This is not an advocacy of cultural relativism or personal subjectivism in ethics. All changes must be defined through the absoluteness of God’s changeless attributes.

From the viewpoint of process theology, the question of homosexuality can evoke a new interpretation. There is no need to suggest that the Scriptures are perennially averse to this form of human sexuality. Instead, the church can affirm the validity of those proscriptions in manifesting God’s absolute concern for the nascent Jewish and Christian communities, and then raise the question concerning their value for contemporary society. Given the demographic situation of the early communities, God’s care might well have been expressed through his insistence that sexuality always be open to the possibility of reproduction. Therefore, homosexuality would be wrong. However, the situation has changed, and this same insistence may not now be advantageous or propitious. Relative to the mission and the stance of the 20th century church, the question would be whether the affirmation and acceptance of homosexuals is harmonious with God’s changeless love for his children.

No Easy Answer

Process thought pictures God as being passionately engaged in this evolving world. His nature is such that he continually urges the accomplishment of the best that can develop in each relationship. This desire, like that of the father with the maturing child, reveals itself in his constant love, and in his relative ethical injunctions commensurate with that love.

Process thought insists that there must be at least three ingredients in every meaningful experience. There must be an ideal or a goal to be achieved. There must be some elements of novelty, daring and freshness so that our experiences are not merely repetitious and anesthetizing. And there must be enough control and order so that our adventures do not result in a feeling of chaos and disintegration. These ingredients are relevant to the decision currently facing churches. Can the inclusion of homosexuals be integrated with the operative understanding of human sexuality which is a legacy from our previous conditioning in such a manner as to result in creative, exciting growth?

Certainly the process model does not offer an easy answer to the question of homosexuality, but it does provide a conception of God in which some positive affirmations can be made. Biblical authority can be recognized and taken seriously, and the possibility of affirming homosexuals can remain a viable option, regardless of the decision which the church has made in the past or makes in the present. Also, this interpretation offers the church an opportunity to realize that, like us, God is hard at work attempting to eventuate this conflict into a creative, liberating experience for all his people.

The Prints of Sadao Watanabe

The appealing works of the contemporary Japanese printmaker Sadao Watanabe have in recent years become quite popular in this country. Watanabe, a Christian, deals exclusively with biblical themes, and Western Christians are initially attracted to his art by the familiarity of the stories he illustrates. But the strong appeal of his prints is not due solely to our pleasure in encountering illustrations of familiar stories. Why do certain elements of the imagery linger in our minds even when, as is sometimes the case, we cannot identify the stories?

First of all, the boldness of pattern engages our emotions. The contrasting primary colors, the juxtaposition of masses and the compelling rhythms remind us of primitive masks. It should not surprise tis that there is in the prints the same kind of emotive power that we encounter in these, for Watanabe’s purpose is similar to that of the tribal carvers of ceremonial objects. Like them, he works within a framework of faith. He is a craftsman whose products fulfill a need -- the need of Christians to be reminded of their faith.

I

In speaking of his work Watanabe makes no allusions to self-expression or artistic purpose. Indeed, his training was that of an artisan it. the workshop of a textile printer; he was a designer of kimono fabrics before he became a printmaker. He describes his work simply as that of making pictures for Christians, and he gives the impression that he works in the spirit of those early medieval artisans who carved biblical characters on capitals and reredos to remind worshipers of well-known stories.

Says Watanabe: “My work is very easy; anyone can do it.” This self-effacing artist seems to conceive of himself almost as an anonymous agent: whatever is expressed in his prints comes from beyond him and is simply transmitted through him. It is as if he feels that the creative urge of the universe, which the Chinese have traditionally called Tao, is working in and through him. Do the prints appeal so powerfully because Watanabe is open to the Tao, and because something universal and greater that, the artist is at work? The painter Paul Klee used different terminology in discussing his own art, but he was obviously seeking a freewheeling state in which impulses could flow into his being to be transformed by his hand and tool into visual images. And there is in many of Klee’s images, as in Watanabe’s, an appeal that plumbs some unexplored depth of soul.

Watanabe, like the Romanesque sculptors, seems to be more involved in sharing his faith than in representing visible reality. Disregard for realism was possible for the early medieval artists because the Renaissance concern for a faithful rendering of reality had not yet come about. It is possible for Watanabe because of his roots in the Japanese decorative tradition.

Like his medieval counterparts, Watanabe communicates through symbols. In some cases his symbols are the old ones familiar to all Christians -- the cross or the lamb. But to these he adds such uniquely Japanese symbols as the tai -- a much-prized fish in Japan, regarded as especially appropriate for ceremonial occasions. To uninitiated Westerners the large-eyed red fish may be simply charming, but to the Japanese the tai on the table of the Last Supper print brings the biblical stories home as surely as the blond, blue-eyed Madonnas in northern Renaissance paintings took the far-off events of the Holy Land to the doorsteps of northern Europe. Similarly, Watanabe uses circular motifs derived from the family crests worn on formal kimonos. For the Japanese, still very conscious of important feudal families, use of these motifs suggests the association of biblical stories with important personages.

II

The Watanabe process of stencil dyeing is quite different from the wood-block technique usually associated with Japanese printmaking. Watanabe’s teacher, Keisuke Serizawa, learned the process in Okinawa in the early 1930s from craftsmen who made a traditional fabric called bingata. It can be used with equal effectiveness on either fabric or strong paper. Watanabe studied with Serizawa in the 1940s; he received early recognition in a 1947 prize from the Japanese Folk Art Museum for a large black-and-white print depicting Ruth and Naomi. He made only black-and-white prints for five years or so, until he developed the color prints for which he is now best known.

He begins by drawing in brush and Chinese ink on heavy, handmade paper which has been soaked in persimmon juice. This strong, brownish paper becomes the stencil; the motif he draws on it is the beginning of a design that changes and evolves as he cuts with small, sharp blades.

To make a black-and-white print he places the finished stencil on top of a sheet of strong handmade Japanese paper and places a fine silk screen over the stencil. Using a flat-edged wooden squegee, he applies a starch paste made from boiled rice just as serigraphers apply paint over a silk screen. Perhaps to increase the coverage or to hasten the drying, he sprinkles additional dry starch over the surface. When the paper is dry, he applies Chinese ink that has been ground in tofu water, a by-product in the making of curd from soy beans. Apparently the protein in the water increases the opacity and indelibility of the ink. When the ink is thoroughly dry, the paper is washed in cool running water and brushed vigorously with a stiff brush. The starch washes off, leaving a sharp-edged black-and-white pattern corresponding to the stencil.

To produce color prints, he places the stencil beneath the paper on a glass surface with a light behind it so that he sees the outline of the stencil under the paper. He then paints the light areas with the desired colors, using pigments derived from minerals and other natural sources. When color has been applied to all such areas, the stencil is removed and the paper dried. Stencil and silk are then placed on top of the paper, and starch is applied over the colors. When the starch is dry, ink is applied just as in making black-and-white prints. When the ink is dry, the starch is washed off, leaving the finished color print.

III

Watanabe’s approach to space is distinctly Eastern. A Western landscapist drawing a mountain scene in perspective will make the huts at the foot of the mountain larger than those near the top because the lower ones are closer to the viewer. A Chinese landscapist, on the other hand, makes each of several huts along a mountain path the same size, as if the viewer were standing just opposite each hut. Likewise Watanabe makes each person the same size with little regard for distance from the viewer. As in medieval painting Christ is sometimes larger than other figures because of his importance, but in general, size relates to the spatial organization of a design. The animals in the ark are more or less equal in size, whether ducks or lions, horses or mice!

The Chinese artist treats each section of a landscape as if the viewer were seeing just that horizontal segment; buildings and trees are shown in their most characteristic views. In one of his prints of the Last Supper, Watanabe treats the receding surface of the table in a series of horizontal bands, each of which contains bottles and plates of approximately uniform size. The plates are circles, as they would be seen from above, but the bottles are presented in profile as if seen from the side. We read these images clearly as plates and bottles because we see them in their most distinctive views. In Western perspective the table top would be wide at the bottom of the print, or at the end of the table closest to us, and narrow at the top or at the end most distant from us. In Eastern depictions of space, the area most distant from the viewer is spread out as the world expands in the distance, while the area close at hand is narrow and confined. Similarly Watanabe’s table is wide at the distant end and narrow at the close end.

In the context of the conventions of Western perspective Watanabe’s depiction of the table and its contents is symbolic of things as he knows them rather than representative of things as he sees them. Easterners have always thought of visual arts as symbolizing that which they know or feel. Medieval art as well dealt in symbols in an era when artists were more concerned with the world of Christian faith than with the world of scientific observation.

IV

The Western viewer tends to think of Watanabe’s images as expressively distorted, as indeed they are. But they are often distorted in the interest of rhythm and pattern. This kind of distortion was common in Japanese fabric design long before Western artists were concerned with the emotional impact of distortion. We can see rhythm in Japanese art as an expression of the strong feeling for movement that has traditionally permeated Eastern, religious thought. The Easterner tends to see the human being in the context of the slow working-out of a natural pattern through eons of time.

Hence, a favorite traditional form of painting has been the long makimono which one unfolds so that only a small section is viewed at any one time. The viewer unrolls the scroll almost involuntarily as the flowing lines entice his eye along a visual journey. Japanese connoisseurs delight in the rhythmic strokes of calligraphy, seeing them as manifestations of the vital processes of natural life. The Westerner looking at Watanabe’s prints may not be conscious of these implications, but one responds to the rhythmic lines nonetheless.

It may well be also that features which seem distorted to us do in fact have roots in Watanabe’s cultural heritage. The very high eyes, for example, bring to mind the custom of shaving the eyebrows and painting on new ones near the hairline -- a practice of beauties in the Heian period which has been perpetuated in the masks of the Noh drama.

Watanabe probably shares the commonly held Japanese view that Westerners have very long noses. Though there are many Westerners in large Japanese cities today, one still hears groups of small children giggling about a foreigners funny nose. We can see a manifestation of this kind of perception in the early Japanese paintings of Portuguese clerics or Dutch traders, who were characteristically shown with exceedingly long noses not unlike those in the Watanabe prints. The stereotyped perception of occidental noses corresponds to the Western idea that Orientals have slanting eyes. It may well be that the elongation is Watanabe’s way of signifying that, from the Japanese point of view, the people depicted in the prints are foreigners.

The distortions are also an outgrowth of the stencil process. It is possible to shade colors in stencil paintings, but Watanabe uses the stencil with directness and economy of means. The result is an adaptation of three-dimensional scenes to sharp-edged silhouettes and clearly defined patterns of flat color.

Whatever their source, Watanabe’s distortions create the feeling that his Christianity is humanistic. Over the years the human figures in his prints have filled more and more of the space, leaving less and less for the plant forms, abstract patterns and calligraphy that appeared in early works. The people seem drawn to each other by their big sad eyes; their thrust-back heads seem to speak of common griefs.

V

Returning to the question of why Watanabe’s prints appeal strongly to contemporary American Christians, I suggest that the answer lies in an expression of faith deeper and broader than even Watanabe may realize. On the one hand, his symbols are overtly biblical, and carry with them all the implications of Judeo-Christian faith. His figures speak of Christian concerns for human worth and human love.

On the other hand, Watanabe, devout Christian that he is, has received a host of Buddhist feelings as his birthright by virtue of his Japanese heritage -- just as a feeling for Christian values is an Americans birthright whether one chooses to accept the Christian faith or not. There is a common saying that Japanese live Shinto and die Buddhist -- that is, in daily life they take comfort from Shinto belief in hundreds of spirits, and in death they take comfort in Buddhist promises of future life. At the season of the Bon dance in mid-July -- when, according to Buddhist belief, the spirits of the dead return to visit the living -- Watanabe honors his father according to Buddhist custom by placing fruits before his picture, symbolically to nourish his soul. I have no doubt that his basic perception of the world is almost inevitably colored profoundly by Japanese Buddhism.

On its long trek from India to Japan, Buddhism absorbed many Chinese ideas, including the notion that we are most effective when we assert ourselves least and let forces beyond our own modest individuality work through us. Although this concept is Chinese in origin, it is basic in Zen Buddhism today.

Watanabe does not actively follow the tenets of Zen, but we recall that he spoke of his own work as being easy -- as something that anyone could do. His humility is genuine, as his demeanor and gestures express even more clearly than his words, and such a spirit does indeed seem to permit forces beyond himself to flow through his brush and knife. The resulting images touch fundamental chords that are universal. Christian faith has emphasized certain needs, and Eastern faith has emphasized others. But East and West are drawing closer together, and Watanabe’s seemingly naïve images penetrate to a core that is common to both.

Faith in Learning: Integrative Education and Incarnational Theology

The integration of faith and learning is the raison d’être of Christian higher education. On this point most people involved with Christian and/or church-related colleges agree. On the mode of this integration, however, there is a good deal of disagreement.

Setting aside those persons who would insist, whether explicitly or implicitly, on a choice between faith and learning, there remain the differences among those who advocate a faith above learning, those who simply place faith and learning side by side, and those who affirm a faith for learning. The latter maintain both that faith is the necessary foundation for learning and that Christian higher education ought to take place within a systematic, Christian world view. The stress here is generally placed on working out the implications of the doctrine of creation and specific “Christian” stances with respect to the major issues in the various academic disciplines.

Against this backdrop, I should like to propose yet another, and I believe more fruitful, approach to the integration of faith and learning. My own emphasis will be on faith in learning, and the axis around which my musings cluster is what I take to be the central notion of the Christian faith; namely, the incarnation. As will become increasingly clear, the posture which seems to me to flow from an incarnational approach is more concerned with method and/or process than with content and systematized product. To a large degree, the message of the incarnation is found in its medium; revelation is more a matter of action than of propositional truth.

The incarnation, the affirmation that “God was in Christ, reconciling the world unto himself,” serves as the “entry point” for Christian belief. Beginning with the doctrine of creation makes sense from a systematic, logical point of view, after one has worked out the ramifications of faith for the big issues of life from within a posture of commitment. Learning and knowing, however, are primarily matters of experience and relationship -- as is faith. Thus a sound approach to Christian higher education ought to be characterized by an incarnational motif which focuses on process and interaction rather than on content and results.

There are at least five facets of the Christian notion of incarnation which carry important implications for the relationship between faith and learning in higher education. I shall introduce and briefly explore these facets, first from a theological point of view. Then I shall make some concrete proposals as to the significance of these incarnational facets for the college curriculum and teaching methodology. Some of these proposals will be familiar and fairly obvious, while others may seem one-sided and outlandish. I take comfort in the thought that while many outlandish ideas turn out to be worthless, some do not.

The Human Context

To begin with, the Christian notion of incarnation is holistic and integrative. Jesus Christ came into the world as a whole, integrated person -- not as a “pretend” person, a la Clark Kent. Moreover, he was involved in all of life, not just its so-called “sacred” aspects. In his relationships with other persons he took an active interest in the physical, social and emotional well-being of those whom he met. Jesus himself was not divided, nor was his approach to the world. The primary theological significance of this holistic and integrative involvement is not just to qualify him as the Second Adam and make retribution for our fragmented relationship to God. Rather, it is in and by such involvement that God enters into our lives and we into God’s; such involvement itself constitutes salvation.

It is especially important to bear this unitary quality of the incarnation in mind when thinking about the development of a Christian stance toward the world in which we live. Such a stance must not be fragmentary or dualistic, separating and alienating the dimensions of the created order and human existence from one another. Paul does not exhort us to give Christ the pre-eminence above or beyond all things, but “in all things” (Col. 1:18). The Word became flesh, and like salt or yeast it interpenetrated all of life; Christians must do the same. An incarnational ethic is holistic and integrative.

Second, there is a contextual character to the Christian notion of incarnation. Jesus Christ came into a real world, into a specific time and place; he interacted with actual people and participated in concrete events. According to the Christian faith, God’s involvement in human existence is not in terms of abstract truths and generalized principles, but is rather a matter of interactive sanctification of the actual context in which humans live. The Christian message does not denigrate the “here and now” as mere illusion or preparation. On the contrary, it affirms the essential goodness and worth of God’s created order, distorted though it may be, seeking to redeem it by working in and through it. Time, place and people constitute the medium of the incarnation, and its meaning cannot be separated from them.

This contextuality also means that the divine nature has adapted itself to our mode of existence. Jesus Christ came to humankind speaking our language and concerning himself with our needs, not his own. This is indeed a radical idea. Certain pre-existent attributes and divine prerogatives were set aside -- in fact, the whole notion of superiority was exchanged for one of servanthood. Transposed into an ethical mode, this contextual quality of the Christian notion of incarnation entails an adaptive self-giving, a presenting of our bodies as “living sacrifices.” Such a posture neither ignores nor conforms to the human context; rather, it transforms that context by entering into it.

It is also crucial to bear in mind that embodiment is inherent in the Christian idea of incarnation. The Word became flesh, God indwelt human form, not in appearance only (or merely momentarily), but from birth to death. And even his death gains its primary significance from the manner in which he died, not from the mere fact that he died.

Human existence is embodied existence, and God’s involvement and interaction with us have come in this mode. In the Judeo-Christian tradition the body is basic and good, in contrast to the dualism of classical Greek philosophy (which, unfortunately, has influenced too much of traditional Christian theology). By indwelling (not just “borrowing”) a body, God made a statement about the nature and worth of human existence -- and about divine character as well. Moreover, the Christian hope is for a resurrected body, as well as a new heaven and earth, not for the immortality of a disembodied soul.

The Quality of Life

Additionally important is the mediated character of God’s self-revelation in the incarnation. As Paul puts it: “For now we see through a glass, darkly” (I Cor. 13:12). Even though God’s self-revelation in Christ is both necessary and sufficient, it is not exhaustive. As much of God’s reality and nature remains hidden in the incarnation as is revealed. More important, God chose an indirect mode of expression in communicating with humankind in and through the tangible dimensions of our existence. By extending the divine personhood to us through physical, social and historical means, God elected a mediated rather than an immediate mode of self-expression.

The indirect or “soft” quality of incarnational communication is highlighted, by Christ’s almost exclusive use of parable, dialogue and metaphor in his ministry. There are two important features of this approach. One is that in choosing an indirect mode of self-revelation, God preserves human freedom by not coercing us into a trusting relationship. Another important feature of the mediated approach is that while not coercing human agents into belief, it does urge and stimulate engagement and reciprocity. There is a kind of challenge and/or enticement. about what might be czlled the parabolic or metaphoric mode, an invitation to become involved.

Finally, the God revealed by the incarnation can be known only through participation. Relational truths, whether in the form of physical laws (such as gravity), social convention (as with mores) or personal reality (such as friendship), are known only by engagement and interaction. The meaning and truth of God’s self-revelation in Christ is known through identification with the incarnation, both in sacrificial living and in significant dying.

Truth which is known through participation is best expressed, and perhaps can only be expressed, in the quality of one’s life. There are some realities and truths which, while they cannot be spoken, can and must be known. Faith without works is not dead; it is a contradiction in terms. To know the meaning of the incarnation is to participate in its reality day by day. This is the thrust of Jesus’ comment, “By their fruits you shall know them.” Truth which is mediated through concrete embodiment must be “bodied forth” -- incorporated -- or it remains unknown.

From Theory to Practice

The foregoing incarnational model of the relationship between revelation and faith can now be fleshed out with respect to educational theory and practice. Five features of an incarnational approach to faith and learning correspond to the five facets of the incarnation sketched out above.

First, an incarnational posture toward Christian higher education would necessarily be interdisciplinary. Since the nature, quality and thrust of God’s incarnation in Christ is holistic and integrative, a corresponding educative stance would be opposed to the sort of compartmentalization and specialization which characterize most higher education today. Fortunately, there seems to be a movement afoot toward more generalized and integrative courses which emphasize overviews and the interconnectedness of all knowledge. One way to achieve this sort of interdisciplinary and synthesizing quality is to focus on methodology rather than on content.

Team teaching is another means of stressing the integrative nature of learning. This is an idea that almost everyone favors in theory but almost no one practices. In addition to its obvious advantages, team teaching provides the opportunity for students to experience faculty members in dialogue, and even disagreement, with one another. Such experience should heighten the student’s awareness of issues and approaches, as well as encouraging responsible thought and choice. Furthermore, sharing the responsibility for a course and jointly communicating with students has the effect of keeping professors “honest” as individuals and as representatives of their various disciplines. Teachers may even learn something from each other!

The contextual character of the incarnation suggests a second important educative quality; namely relevance. I am not unaware of the abuse this term has received, but perhaps the best way to correct the situation is to begin to use it again in a responsible manner. Even as God chose to be revealed in our world in embodied form, on our “turf,” so an incarnational approach to learning must begin where the student is. To remain where the student is would be both irresponsible and disrespectful toward him or her, but not to begin there is equally so. In my own experience, I have found that a healthy mix of vocabulary and knowledge from the student world (slang, music, sports, etc), along with that of my more specialized disciplinary concerns, builds helpful bridges for learning.

In addition to serving as a technique, keeping in touch with where students are in their own experience also provides an opportunity for the teacher to learn something for himself or herself. Often I have received important insights and helpful suggestions for my courses (as well as for my life) from my students. An incarnational approach to education might just require us to set aside some of our “professorial prerogatives” and “professional prestige” (i.e., academic arrogance) in order really to teach -- as well as to learn.

Incarnational education ought also to involve event-centeredness. The embodied nature of human existence requires that both our awareness (intake) and our activity (output) be anchored in social interaction and public performance. Thus the focus of learning ought to be on the process and not the product of knowing; on how to learn, not on what is learned. For too long we have proceeded as though knowledge is a substance, like information, which can be handed from one person to another and stored up in our memory banks (Or in the registrar’s office). At best we tend to encourage students to learn the results of other people’s investigations and formulations, rather than experiencing the disciplined activity for themselves.

It is possible to teach chemistry, history, literature, psychology and mathematics (as well as the arts) primarily as disciplines rather than as compiled information and/or intellectual history. The activity or event of knowing is, after all, both the necessary and the sufficient condition of education. It is necessary because unless students learn to learn, they will never really learn anything at all. It is sufficient because once a student has learned to learn, knowing is already taking place. The educated person is the one who knows how to go about acquiring and using information in ways which are appropriate to the situation. Such knowledge is a skill or an art, and can be obtained only through apprenticeship with one who practices it.

A Drastic Change

At this point, in conjunction with the mediated character of an incarnational posture, I should like to propose what may seem like a “wild and crazy” idea. To focus on knowing as a skill or an art is to conceive of it as an intangible reality which is not subject to straightforward explication and acquisition. Thus knowledge in this sense can only be approached indirectly. What this could mean for education is that perhaps the entire college curriculum and methodology should be organized around the studio and performing arts. Since these subjects tend to stress formulating rather than formulations, all other disciplines could take their cue from the arts. It is certainly the case that traditionally the arts have been second-class citizens in academia, the last offered and the first dropped. Perhaps it’s time for a change.

Another way of putting the point is to suggest that the arts rely heavily on intuition and tacit knowing, whereas the more discursive disciplines stress sequential and explicit thought. A case can be made for affirming the logical priority of the former with respect to the latter, and thus a parallel case can be made for placing the arts at the fulcrum of the educative process. There is an ever-growing body of research on the two hemispheres of the brain and their fulfilling of different functions -- functions which correspond to the intuitive (integrative) and discursive (analytic) modes of thought. It has been argued with some cogency that our culture overreinforces the discursive mode while practically ignoring intuition. It can also be argued that such things as values and religious commitments flow from the intuitive rather than the explicit dimension. Perhaps this situation has something to do with the breakdown of values and commitment in our culture -- and perhaps colleges have something to do with this breakdown.

Finally, incarnational education must be lived. With respect to the faculty of an institution, whom I prefer to think of as “senior colleagues,” this necessity would mean that the enfleshment of commitment and knowledge must be widely evident. Teachers must be paradigms of that which we “profess” both academically and religiously. In a word, professors must be “doers,” both in the classroom and out of it. Far too often we take the attitude that because we have earned advanced degrees we have already paid our dues; we forget that dues must be paid every year. Students -- junior colleagues -- need to see their teachers developing new ideas and skills, and they need to share in that developmental process.

Although there is room for, indeed a need for, a wide variety of professorial styles within the college setting, the sine qua non of an educator is the ability to communicate through embodiment. Presenting ideas and questions clearly, listening attentively, evidencing continued growth, and integrating faith in learning are priorities. Such criteria place a necessary premium on selectivity in faculty recruitment. Moreover, continual faculty development must provide models and skills for educational growth. Here again it is the fruits that count – learning as participation rather than as accumulation.

From the student’s perspective, the living-out of an incarnational approach to education will involve active participation in the learning process. The passive reception of information and someone else’s ideas does not constitute education any more than merely giving mental assent to a set of doctrines constitutes Christian faith. Students must take responsibility for their own education as well as for their faith. They must search and sift, think and feel, create and synthesize; moreover, they too must apply and incorporate their learning in order for it to become an actuality.

Sounding this note is not popular in a day of real yet excessive concern with the job market. The purpose of a college is to help educate, not to train people for specific tasks. Furthermore, the integration of faith and learning is a connection that must be forged: it will not come about by itself or by the accumulation of disembodied information and specific techniques. Forging that bond should be the goal of religious or church-related institutions of higher learning.

Myth and Incarnation

When it came out in England earlier this year, The Myth of God Incarnate (SCM Press) raised orthodox hackles and stirred up more public furor than theological works normally do in Great Britain (see Trevor Beeson’s “Debating the Incarnation,” August 3-September 7 Christian Century). Now that Westminster has brought out the book in the United States, this controversial collection of scholarly essays (edited by John Hick) can provide an occasion for fresh thinking here on the central theme of Christian faith. It is not my purpose to offer a full-scale critical assessment, but rather to examine a cluster of assumptions at the heart of The Myth of God Incarnate. Nor am I concerned to deal with the question of the heretical or nonheretical character of the authors’ ideas. My interest in and ultimate dissatisfaction with the book stems rather from the importance and fundamental naïveté of its philosophical and theological presuppositions.

Early Christian Myth-Makers

To begin with, there is a great deal of confusion among the seven contributors about what is perhaps the book’s central concept, “myth.” On the one hand, the traditional doctrine that Jesus Christ was both fully God and fully human is frequently treated as a myth in the sense that Bultmann has made popular -- a spiritual or existential truth that New Testament writers couched in historical and physical events. As the preface puts it, the book contends that “the later conception of [Jesus] as God incarnate, the Second Person of the Holy Trinity living a human life, is a mythological or poetic way of expressing his significance for us” (ix). On the other hand, the concept of myth is frequently employed, especially in the chapters by Maurice Wiles, to express the modern-day “demythologized” christological doctrine which is being offered as a replacement for the traditional notion. This ambiguity is never resolved in The Myth of God Incarnate.

In addition to the above confusion, the authors tend to strike a condescending note when speaking of the theological beliefs and/or language of earlier Christian thinkers. Repeatedly we are told, in effect, that those incarnational modes of thought may have served more primitive minds well, but they will hardly do for us today. This might be termed the “man-come-of-age fallacy” -- the assumption that later interpretations are ipso facto better, and that at any cost the contemporary mind must not be offended. Perhaps the most disturbing thing about this posture is its naive confidence in the state of current scientific knowledge. One need he no romanticist to question the basis of such confidence when many scientists themselves are the first to admit the limits of their knowledge.

‘Proclamation’ and Historical Fact?

Next, there is a serious muddle over the use to be made of recent biblical criticism. Sometimes the proposal being presented sounds like a warmed-over version of the 19th century liberal “quest of the historical Jesus.” Over and over again we are told that Jesus did not himself claim to be God, for this was the invention of the later New Testament writers and early church fathers (see especially the chapters by Michael Goulder). At other times the authors take a more contemporary stance, reminding us that the New Testament is “proclamation” through and through, thereby making it impossible for us to know what Jesus actually said or did not say (chapter two by Frances Young).

What is never faced by these authors, however -- or for that matter by the Bultmannians -- is the question of whether or not the proclamation character of the New Testament writings necessarily obviates their historical authenticity and linguistic reliability. Simply to point out that interpretation is involved in no way establishes the unreliability of the account given.

A similar flaw in reasoning undermines the authors’ repeated argument that because the incarnation concept was extant before and in proximity with the inception and development of Christianity, the Christian notion of incarnation is neither unique nor valid. Behind this argument is the assumption that any form of “conceptual borrowing” invalidates the insights and/or claims of the borrower. This assumption is not intuitively obvious, nor is it defended by the authors of The Myth of God Incarnate. In contrast, it can be argued that the Christian notion of incarnation, as the New Testament literature actually embodies it, is quite distinct from the Neoplatonic idea of emanation and the Samaritan gnosticism discussed by Goulder in chapter four, and from Philo’s Logos doctrine as presented by Frances Young in chapter five. The obvious and simple humanity of Jesus Christ in the gospel account -- especially his servanthood -- is hardly derivable from any of these doctrines.

Fact Versus Metaphor

This brings me to the most fundamental presupposition of all, the cornerstone of nearly all the arguments offered in support of the book’s composite position: the superficial dichotomy between literal language and all forms of metaphorical and/ or mythological language. The former is assumed to express factually true statements (or false, as the case may be), while the latter is claimed to be either “merely poetic” or “existentially significant” (or insignificant). Factual language is cognitively meaningful while metaphorical speech expresses attitudes and/or commitments.

Not surprisingly, the most straightforward articulation of this basic dichotomy is found in the chapter written by John Hick, “Jesus and the World Religions.” Hick is very well known for approaching the whole issue of religious language from a rather orthodox empiricist perspective. Cognitive significance, Hick maintains, can be preserved only by showing how an utterance understood as an eschatological prediction meets the empiricists’ “verifiability criterion of meaning.” Accepting such a narrow standard of cognitive meaning from the very beginning hardly equips one to deal with the variegated richness of religious, theological and biblical literature.

Hick’s application of this definition of meaning to the doctrine of the incarnation is pinpointed in the following remarks:

I suggest that its character is best expressed by saying that the idea of divine incarnation is a mythological idea. And I am using the term “myth” in the following sense: a myth is a story which is told but which is not literally true, or an idea or image which is applied to someone or something but which does not literally apply, but which invites a particular attitude in its hearers. Thus the truth of a myth is a kind of practical truth consisting in the appropriate. ness of the attitude to its object. That Jesus was God the Son incarnate is not literally true, since it has no literal meaning, but it is an application to Jesus of a mythical concept whose function is analogous to that of the notion of divine sonship ascribed in the ancient world to a king [p. 178].

Hick concludes his analysis of the logical status of incarnational language by expressing the hope that

there will be a growing awareness of the mythological character of this language as the hyperbole of the heart, most naturally at home in hymns and anthems and oratorios and other artistic expressions of the poetry of devotion. Christianity will  -- we may hope -- outgrow its theological fundamentalism, its literal interpretation of the idea of incarnation, as it has largely outgrown its biblical fundamentalism [p. 183]

I have termed the reliance on such a simple dichotomy “naïve” because it completely ignores the insights of important thinkers working in diverse fields but converging on the theme that language is much more complex and metaphor-based than this dichotomized view allows. Wittgenstein’s attack on the superficiality of such a narrow view of meaning and truth is never even mentioned, let alone answered. The important work of phenomenologists on the nature of language, from the later Heidegger to Merleau-Ponty, goes unrecognized. Moreover, the insights of such literary critics as Owen Barfield about the bedrock character of metaphoric language seem to have completely escaped the authors of this book. I am not arguing that any or all of these other points of view are correct. But a study which purports to deal with myth in biblical and theological literature ought to reflect an awareness of them and address the issues they raise.

A corollary to this simplistic dichotomy between factual and metaphorical meaning is the authors’ implicit use of a narrow empiricist interpretation of knowledge, whereby “raw” evidence is gathered and “logical constructs” or theories are built on it by means of inference alone. Not only does this view run counter to how in fact scientific knowledge is actually acquired, as the work of Michael Polanyi and others makes clear; it also gives the impression that one can make an absolute distinction between fact and theory. Thus the authors can treat incarnation doctrine as a theoretical “interpretation” of God’s revelation in Christ, but not the incarnation in itself as part of the revelation. They can affirm the reconciling character of God’s activity without implying a historical incarnation as such.

What they fail to mention, however, is that by their own criteria the very notion of God’s activity in human life is itself an “interpretation.” In addition, to speak of the “facts” of Scripture as providing “evidence” for a “logical” interpretation of Christian faith and theology betrays a naïve understanding of the concept of fact in history as well as in literature.

A Dimensional Model of Reality

I should like now to offer some brief suggestions of my own as to how the foregoing difficulties can be avoided and a fruitful approach to the notion of incarnation can be undertaken. My proposal involves changing the models on which we traditionally have based our thinking about reality, knowing and language. Obviously only a sketch can be offered here.

Western thought has consistently portrayed reality according to a “realm model.” Classical thought was constructed around the notion that reality is essentially dualistic: the natural world and the “other” world of Forms and/or divinities. In contrast, modern thought may be characterized as maintaining that there is but one world, the natural order; and much energy has gone into invalidating the possibility of a “higher” world or at least its knowability. Traditionally Christian theology has held to the dualistic view, while the efforts of many modern theologians -- including the authors of The Myth of God Incarnate -- have been directed against such an understanding.

The difficulty with this modern endeavor, however, is that it has sought to set aside the dualistic interpretation without first removing the realm model upon which it is based. Such thinkers end up affirming a naturalistic or humanistic interpretation of reality because they have consented to operate within the “two-realms-or-one” framework.

I would propose shifting to a “dimensional model,” in which different aspects of reality form a simultaneously interpenetrating dimension -- the richer, more complex aspects being mediated in and through the less complex. An example of such mediation ready to hand can be found in the way the meaning of these very sentences is conveyed to you in and through the words and grammatical structures. How odd it would be to say, “Unless the meaning can be shown to exist independently of the words and grammar, it can be nothing more than the words and grammar. Clearly the meaning is more than words organized in certain ways; it cannot be reduced to an account of them. But neither can it be experienced apart from some words in some grammatical form.

In the same way, then, we can think and speak of the incarnation as the mediation of the religious dimension in and through the historical dimension. We can assert this meaning without having to puzzle over the two-realms question of how Christ could “leave” the divine world and “enter” the natural one. The incarnation can, in fact, be taken as a paradigm of mediation. Ironically enough, my own thinking along these lines was initially stimulated by John Hick’s excellent discussion of the mediational model of reality in his book Faith and Knowledge. I can only hope he will reread his book again before too long.

Where Knowing Begins

In a similar vein, Western theology has consistently bought into the epistemological dichotomy between explicit (objective) and mystical (subjective) knowledge. This dichotomy parallels that of the realm-model in metaphysics, with explicit knowledge corresponding to the natural realm, and mystical knowledge corresponding to the divine. In the modern era, the denial of mysticism’s viability has left theologians embracing explicit knowledge as the only mode of knowing. Thus the authors of The Myth of God Incarnate are continually pressing for a factual approach (whether historical or metaphysical) to theological thinking and speaking.

My own proposal is to jettison this dichotomy between the explicit and the mystical in favor of a more flexible and functional distinction between explicit and tacit knowing. According to this view, all cases of the former are grounded in the context provided by the latter. In knowing, we work from certain factors which are accepted acritically to others which we examine focally. All knowing begins somewhere, and not all beginning points can be justified explicitly -- otherwise we would never get started in the first place. This model of knowledge fits nicely with the model of mediated dimensions of reality: the particulars which comprise the mediating dimension and yield explicit knowledge take their meaning from the mediated dimension which is known tacitly.

The divinity of Jesus Christ can be said to be encountered in and through the particulars of his teachings and activities, but that unique identity cannot be reduced to their sum as empirical facts.” The incarnation is a mediational phenomenon. Its meaning is neither simply factual nor merely mythological, for the divine dimension is embodied in the human dimension without being exhausted by it. Our discernment of this meaning involves an awareness of the historical particulars of Jesus’ life but goes beyond them as well; thus our knowledge of the particulars is explicit, while our knowledge of the incarnation is tacit in character. Such tacit knowing can no more be fully articulated than can knowing of any mediated reality, such as the aesthetic or moral dimensions of life. Therefore the way we talk about the incarnation need not be either straightforwardly explicit or couched in “merely poetic” phrases which are debunked as bogus.

The Richness of Language

Traditionally Western theology has based its understanding of language on a dichotomy which is related to the two dichotomies already discussed: namely, literal versus symbolic meaning. For a long time all language, including talk of God, was taken as seeking to provide a picture or mirror of reality. In modern times language in general has come to be viewed as having diverse functions, and religious language in particular has come to be understood as symbolic in order to escape being classified as nonfactual and therefore meaningless.

Here again theologians have generally continued to play within the rules set up by the dualistic model, confining themselves to arguments over whether God-talk should be taken as literal or symbolic. The authors of The Myth of God Incarnate have clearly opted for the latter. More important, they have failed to consider the possibility that the simple dichotomy between literal and “poetic” meaning hardly does justice to the richness of language -- religious language in particular.

What is needed here, I submit, is the replacement of the picturing model of language with a functional model, one which emphasizes the vast variety of jobs that get done by means of linguistic activity. To take description-giving as the primary task of language is to put the cart before the horse. Not only are there other functions of language -- such as the imperative, the evocative, the convictional and the performative -- but these functions are logically prior to the descriptive function, in that it is in the process of engaging in these other linguistic tasks that one’s descriptions become relevant. Rarely, if ever, do speakers give descriptions for their own sake. Rather, descriptions are employed as part of an order, an invitation, an explanation, or a story as a means to an end in a concrete context.

This functional model of language is coupled with an appreciation for the primordial character of metaphoric speech. According to the picturing theory of meaning, metaphor is simply foam on the surface of the stout. A functional model of meaning, on the other hand, acknowledges that metaphoric meaning -- which contains a certain degree of interpretive openness and double-entendre -- is logically prior to the more precise descriptive function, which must take place within the context provided by metaphor. Some meaning must exist in order for it to be made more precise.

All of this is not to deny the importance of cognition nor of the descriptive function of language. The question of whether talk about transcendence is true is not to be sidestepped. The concern here is simply to place this question in perspective by recalling the broader and deeper purposes of language. The concept of truth is far more complex than many theologians seem to realize. What needs exploring is the ways in which metaphor, and its extended expression in parable and story, can be related to enriched concepts of cognitivity. If the transcendent is an especially rich dimension of reality which is humanly known by mediation, then it is only fitting that our talk of the transcendent be couched in metaphor, for such language allows one dimension of reality to be revealed in and through another.

When applied to the notion of incarnation, this more functional, metaphoric view of language allows us to avoid the either/or dichotomy which lies at the heart of the confusions in The Myth of God Incarnate. For now we can. understand such expressions as “God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself” without having to affirm either that the sense of “in” is the same as that of “The book was in the drawer,” or that the word is being used “merely poetically.” Rather, we are free to explore other uses of “in,” such as “I’ll keep you in mind” or “The meaning of his remark was in his face.” In fact, the incarnation itself might well serve as a paradigm of such mediated meaning in every-day speech.

Shaping and Being Shaped

This is the seventh in a series: New Turns in Religious Thought

As I understand the aim of this series of articles, it is not an attempt to garner direct predictions from those who have been invited to participate. Rather, the purpose is to sketch out possible new directions in religious thought in an indirect fashion as they are mediated through the concerns, activities and reflections of the participants. Thus I shall offer here a brief indication of the forces forming the shape of my own life as one who is involved in the interaction between Christian faith and contemporary life.

I

My work as a college teacher provides the primary context for my activity and thought. This constant involvement with young minds as they deal with old as well as new ideas may be one of the better environments within which to discern future trends. At any rate, the environment is as invigorating and enriching as it is demanding and draining. I find my students today more interested in honest dialogue and more willing to develop discipline than students were a few years back. Like students of those other years, they remain somewhat aloof from established cultural norms and ideas, while putting more energy into "tending their own garden," but they are less wrapped up in the narcissism of the youth culture.

Over the past few years one of my chief concerns has been to create an atmosphere and develop teaching techniques that stress the social, dialogical and ongoing dimensions of the educative process. Learning to learn has become the primary focus of my classroom work, and this focus is expressed in such methods as dividing large classes into rotating discussion groups; assigning shorter, more frequent written work that can be rewritten; structuring group oral examination experiences; and stressing the application of what is learned to other disciplines and life situations. Many students are engaged in independent study, and they show increasing interest in interdisciplinary studies that incorporate religious issues.

These aspects of my teaching situation may indicate something of the posture to be assumed by students of religion in the next decade. It is my own hope that the social, dialogical and interdisciplinary thrust will become more pervasive than the individualistic, isolationist tendencies. Among the many things we need today, one of the more important is the ability to integrate positive commitment and genuine openness, to combine faith and growth. To put it another way -- with a nod to Reinhold Niebuhr, whose work appears even sounder as it ages -- we need a greater capacity to be at ease with limited and partial solutions to problems, rather than continually seeking permanent "peace and prosperity."

The courses I regularly teach include ethics, philosophy of religion, philosophy of language, theory of knowledge, and art and language. It is my deep conviction that one of the chief sources of difficulty in our time is the common, uncritical acceptance of the foundational dichotomy between judgments of fact and judgments of value, between so-called "objectivity" and "subjectivity." This dichotomy not only separates disciplines from one another and fragments them within themselves; more important, it produces a schizophrenic sensibility within contemporary culture and individuals.

The unquestioning acceptance of this dichotomy has pernicious effects in religious thought and life as well. It lies at the base of existentialist and death-of-God theologies on the one hand and the Jesus movement and "flight to the occult" phenomena on the other hand. In each case it is assumed that human experience divides neatly into objective and subjective realms, and that value, meaning and spiritual concerns reside exclusively in the latter. On the other side of the dichotomy, those who reject or ignore questions of a spiritual or existential nature generally do so in the name of "objectivity."

II

A dominant theme in nearly all of the courses I teach is that of tracing the character and modes of this dichotomy with an eye to replacing it with a sounder, more holistic and integrated epistemological foundation. In this effort I receive forceful inspiration from the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (cf. Philosophical Investigations and On Certainty). His grounding of language and meaning in the context of human community and "form of life," together with his understanding of linguistic activity as multidimensional in character, goes a long way toward overcoming simplistic dichotomies between fact and value. For neither our language nor our lives divide up as easily as we have been led to believe.

My other primary source in this epistemological reconstruction effect is the thought of Michael Polanyi (cf. Personal Knowledge and Knowing and Being). His insightful emphasis on the personal and tacit matrix of all judgments, be they "objective" or "subjective," provides both the cornerstone and much of the framework for a postcritical, non-dichotomized theory of knowledge and an integrated way of being in the world. Polanyi makes it clear that all judgments are grounded in various subsidiary and somatic factors, which, though they can be neither fully defined nor rationalistically justified, must nonetheless be acknowledged as cognitive and accredited as our own. All judgments arise out of the common tacit yet bedrock structure of social reality, and they seek the agreement of those who take part in this reality. Nevertheless they are judgments made by individuals, and the risk and responsibility for their confirmation in the give-and-take of everyday life rests finally with the individual judgment-maker. Out of this dialogue between the individual and social poles of human existence emerges what we call truth (cf. my "Linguistic Phenomenology," International Philosophical Quarterly, December 1973).

Here again my concern with the social, dialogical and integrative dimensions of the human situation comes to the fore. These are the dimensions which have been torn asunder by the "modern sensibility" and whose repair alone can provide a fruitful basis for the continuation of human life. This is why the insights of Wittgenstein and Polanyi strike me as so sound and important. Thus they find their way, in some form or other, into nearly every course I teach and form the context for most of my research. I take as my main task to shed light on how the heart can have "reasons that the reason knows not of" while avoiding the arrogance of empiricism and the muddles of existentialism (cf. my The Possibility of Religious Knowledge [Eerdmans, 1971] and "Saying and Showing," Religious Studies, fall 1974). My commitment to this task grew out of my encounter with William Poteat at Duke University, a man for all seasons plus one.

The one theological thinker whose thought most closely parallels that of Wittgenstein and Polanyi is the late Ian Ramsey (cf., Religious Language, Models and Mystery and especially Christian Empiricism). His understanding of the major elements of contemporary philosophy, his careful and penetrating analysis of the multidimensional nature of the religious use of language, and his grasp of the tacit and mediated character of religious awareness and knowledge all exhibit a kind of thinking badly needed in religious circles today.

Ramsey was a self-acknowledged "bridge-builder" who sought to correlate the focal emphases of Christian theology with issues and developments in a wide variety of fields, while avoiding a "pontifical posture’ on the one hand and a "pandering posture" on the other. In his view, religious meaning grows out of, comes in and through, the other, more "objective" dimensions of human experience, while being neither exhaustible in terms of them nor separable from them. And his efforts to explore these issues always began with and never strayed far from the way religious people actually talk (cf. my forthcoming book Ian Ramsey: To Speak Responsibly of God).

III

The second major influence shaping my life and thought is found in engagement with and reflection upon the vastly complicated dimensions of contemporary popular culture. For me this engagement and reflection take place within the context of a Christian perspective which, guided by the insights of H. Richard Niebuhr, seeks a responsible and transforming relationship between the Christian gospel and cultural life. Such a posture demands both empathetic involvement with and prophetic criticism of the moods and movements of our world.

One point of cultural interaction arises out of involvement with the life situation of college students. My students are expected to read what I suggest; it behooves me, in turn, to be conversant with what they are reading, listening to and seeing. I have, for example, made a place in my life for rock music, though I must admit that soul music does more for me.

More recently I have spent a good deal of time studying and discussing the four books by Carlo Castaneda on the teachings of Don Juan. Th intense and widespread interest in these books warrants serious attention at both the appreciatory and evaluatory levels. Don Juan, be he historical or fictitious, has much to offer by way of counteracting the materialism and egotism of our Western heritage. Both his overall vision -- the life of peaceful and powerful self-reliance -- and his down-home proverbial wisdom ("choose the path with heart") are worthy of practice. At the same time his excessive individualism and "warrior" motif -- to say nothing of the conceptual difficulties attendant upon his notion of "a separate reality" -- need to be challenged, both philosophically and religiously (cf. my "The World of Don Juan: Some Reflections," Soundings, December 1974).

Another important aspect of contemporary culture with which I feel it imperative to be involved is film. Although I see a fairly wide variety of films, it is the work of Ingmar Bergman that impresses and influences me most. I offer a course on his work every other year. To my mind -- and viscera -- his particular combination of medium and message provides a most penetrating presentation and expression of contemporary existence. Bergman’s depth and popularity make his work a key juncture at which the meaning of modern existence and religious thought converge. Keeping in touch with film will be an increasing responsibility of religious thinkers in the years ahead. I might add that while I think that Bergman’s diagnosis of the human condition is telling and provocative, I find his vision a bit too pessimistic and his understanding of love too simplistic to keep pace with those of Christian theology (cf. my Ingmar Bergman and the Search for Meaning [Eerdmans, 1969]).

IV

Yet a third point of reference for engaging and reflecting upon the contours of our time is provided by my teaching of social and political philosophy especially that of Marxism. Following, and to some degree participating in, the experience of minorities in America has helped me see the viability of the Marxist critique of capitalism as a socioeconomic system. The inequities and oppression constituting the reality within which blacks, Chicanos and native Americans live have begun to press in on our consciousness. One hopes that they will serve as well to make us -- religious and nonreligious people alike -- increasingly aware of the inequities and oppression created and perpetuated for nations of the "underdeveloped" Third World by the "overdeveloped" nations East and West.

Most of my time abroad has been spent on Crete studying the life and work of Nikos Kazantzakis (cf. Zorba the Greek, The Last Temptation of Christ, Saviors of God and Report to Greco) and the ancient Minoan culture. My American students are very much challenged by the former’s emphasis on growth through struggle and by the latter’s achievement of a large, nonaggressive, stable society. My Greek friends are tired of Greece’s being used, whether as a tourist attraction or as a military pawn. In order to be viable in the next decade, religious thought and activity are going to have to strike a more international posture and address themselves to the problems of imperialism and oppression in the Third World (cf. Franz Fanon’s The Wretched of the Earth, Ivan Illich’s Church, Change and Development, Dom Helder Câmara’s Revolution Through Peace).

One is thankful that some Christian thinkers -- and doers -- have begun to awaken to the radical meaning of the Christian message. The central thrust of Jesus’ life and teaching, in my reading of the New Testament, was directed against all forms of oppression, and it is imperative that we step up our efforts to unpack and apply the ramifications of the "gospel of liberation." Fortunately we are increasingly being forced to face these issues by blacks, Chicanos, Indians, the women’s movement, and by the peoples of Africa, South America and the Arab nations. I hope that we will not take a defensive or evasive stance vis-à-vis these confrontations (cf. James Cone’s Black Theology of Liberation, Frederick Herzog’s Liberation Theology, Rosemary Ruether’s Religion and Sexism).

V

The invitation to participate in this series came as I was putting the finishing touches on a sabbatical year spent studying -- and that means doing -- the arts. One reason for investing a year in this way was strictly personal: I felt aesthetically deprived in my upbringing and education, and it was time to begin to do something about it. Another reason was professional: our college had recently reorganized itself, and I had assumed responsibility for a large part of the required interdisciplinary courses in the Creative Arts Collegium. Thus it behooved me to experience firsthand the fields in which my students were laboring. In addition, I had a growing interest in exploring art as a way of knowing. Both the creative process and the employment of artistic skill seem to me to be based firmly in tacit knowing, and so I have spent this year incarnating that possibility.

My close friends Jim Crane (Eckerd College artist, cartoonist, and perpetual brainstormer) and Leon Arksey (literature professor par excellence at Seattle Pacific College) have been my primary goaders and guiders in this undertaking.

I took courses in a wide variety of fields -- ceramics, music, imaginative writing, drawing, dance and literature; I have begun to get an idea of how aesthetic awareness feels and what it entails. The vast bulk of my work was devoted to sculpture; I worked in clay, plaster, bronze and alabaster. My teacher was Harriet Hughes, a young woman possessed of great skills and diverse interests. Patiently but forcefully she put me through the rudiments of modeling, critiquing, casting and finishing more than a half-dozen major projects. I learned as much about myself as I did about art, but this is not the place to discuss either.

This is the place, however, to share three motifs which have been playing in and around my consciousness for several months as a result of my encounter with sculpting. One has to do with the notion of apprenticeship or discipleship. I am increasingly convinced of the value of placing oneself at the lower end of a master-apprentice relationship in fields where one knows next to nothing, where who one is and what one knows in one’s own field are unrevealed and beside the point. Having to take instructions and orders from someone much younger and less experienced while keeping my own ideas to myself has been a humbling and enlightening experience. To have demands placed upon me in areas where I do not know my way about has been good for the soul. I trust I have profited a good deal from this sort of discipline, and I cannot help’ thinking of it as a possible source of renewal for others as well. I would hope that Christian communities might call us back from a life of talking and softness to the wisdom of patient listening and fortitude. In my bones I know that this discipline has a great deal to do with Jesus’ teaching about servanthood.

VI

Another motif arising from my sculpting experience is a growing respect for material reality -- I mean that sort of understanding of and loyalty to the medium in which one is working that marks all sound artistic endeavor. It is essential to listen to the materials, to come to know their basic characteristics and limitations and, to borrow a phrase from Heidegger, "to allow Being to speak through them." Usually we are so addicted to using materials for our own ends that this is an extremely difficult lesson to learn. Further, by a respect for material reality I also mean a deeper awareness of my own embodied existence.

Perhaps the most important difference between this year and others has been that for the most part I have had to shut my mouth and work with my hands, to think less with my mind (explicitly) and more with my body (tacitly). It is undoubtedly no accident that my recent religious and theological probings have centered on the ramifications of the incarnation. What does it mean that God was in Christ, that the Word became flesh? What does it mean for me to present my body as a living sacrifice in worship of God? Clearly God has a greater respect for material reality than is dreamed of in our traditional and contemporary religious perspectives.

In this connection I should mention that I am continually surprised by how often my current musings dovetail with the emphases of my seminary mentor, Robert Traina, who insisted that theology must be grounded in the incarnation and the atonement, that all other doctrines must flow from and be in harmony with these basic revelatory motifs.

Finally, I have begun to do some thinking about how theology and art might be employed in order to shape each other. The notion of mediation is crucial to both. Meaning in the arts -- aesthetic awareness -- is mediated through the nature and elements of the medium without ever being directly present itself. It is "incarnated" in the theological sense. In like fashion, theological meaning -- religious awareness -- is mediated in and through the other dimensions of human experience. In both cases we destroy the meaning if we seek to extricate it from its concrete form of expression. In theology as in art, the question "What does it. mean?" can be answered only after it is reshaped to ask "How does it mean?"

The Death of God: A Belated Personal Postscript

All the fun and games, the agonies and ecstasies, the caricatures and sober evaluations of the death-of-God theologies of the ‘60s are excessively well known, tediously overdocumented, and to a large degree out of mind in the ‘70s. I did my share of first commending Thomas Altizer and William Hamilton for "speaking to the condition" of us skeptically inclined and despairing theologians, then scornfully dismissing their writings as theologically esoteric, puerile, reductionistic and (ironically) not really in touch with the current religious Zeitgeist. Despite my skepticism, I never ceased hankering after transcendence, and so I enthusiastically welcomed the "recovery of transcendence" in theology that "gave us back God," restored us to multidimensionality, and made us in a way comfortable once again.

An Old and Permanent Specter

But here I am, ten years later, having awakened somewhat belatedly to discover that God has indeed died for me as well. There are crucial differences between my own recent experience of the death of God and the theologies of Altizer and Hamilton, and the differences perhaps point to the varieties even of this form of "religious experience." One difference is tonal: the necrotheologians of the 1960s were exultant; for me the experience is filled only with pathos and nostalgia. The other chief difference is etiological: their problem was a relatively new phenomenon called secularization; mine is an old and permanent specter called evil. What oppresses me sufficiently that God has not been able to survive it -- and I am almost embarrassed to admit defeat by such a well-worn issue -- is that there is simply too much suffering. Dr. Bernard Rieux, the narrator of Albert Camus’s challenging statement on suffering called The Plague, sums it up with appropriate intensity and particularity. This world, he says, is "a scheme of things in which children are put to torture." It is a world in which, from many causes, children are too easily stunted, warped, denied, deprived, abused, malnourished, diseased, shot, gassed, bombed and generally robbed of their potentiality. What happens to children is a particularly graphic indicator of the depth of our human bondage to forces within ourselves and our planet.

It is not a sour Marcionitism, "down on the world," that I have come to. Quite the contrary: There are many aspects of this life and this earth that I love sensually and cling to devotedly. I know full well that earth, so heedless of our personal welfare, also nurtures us remarkably and graces our lives with myriad beauties. I recognize that the unconscious which is the abysmal source of our earthly demons is also the dynamic ground of love and creativity which, together with our cognitive capacities, produces the truths and beauties and goodnesses of human life. I acknowledge that the social environments of family, race, class, education, work, culture, cult and nation are the inescapably human contexts that shape all our possibilities and achievements as well as our blindnesses and follies.

My religious despair is not over finite existence as such, but over the crushingly heavy burden of what seems to me nonsensical bondage. It is the sheer excess -- the disproportion of our human bondages and the absurdity resulting from this excess, the grotesque pointlessness of so much of it -- that undermines my sense of ultimate meaning as transcendent willing purpose. Doctrines of a fall of humankind, original sin, and satanic power -- whether historically or symbolically understood -- fail to alleviate this brooding impression. They simply transpose the problem into another key and continue to beg the agonizing question posed to a sovereign divine purpose.

The Demise of Transcendence

It is largely these human bondages of ours that have fundamentally altered my relationship to the languages and perspectives of the Bible and Christianity. Certain aspects of that tradition remain vibrantly meaningful as psychological, ethical, social and historical insight, expressed often in irreplaceably poetic and mythical form. The biblical and classical Christian perceptions of the slavery and freedom of the self in all their ambiguous interplay and of the social implications of such selfhood continue to be the most adequate I know, as articulated masterfully in the writings of Reinhold Niebuhr. And long before reading Sam Keen’s Beginnings Without End, I was quite aware from my own experience that death and resurrection, finding oneself only through losing oneself, are built into the very structure of human life. I remain committed to a vision of the ethics of agape as the most creative and all-embracing direction the good life should take. And I persist in believing that the course of human history is truly unpredictable, full of surprises. These dimensions are the vital foci of my ongoing relationship to Christian theology, and of my continuing identification with the profound and distinctive caring for people and the world that I see in the Christian community at its best.

What is missing now from my relationship to Scripture and the Christian tradition is just that crucial foundational dimension of transcendence. Recognizing that it is precisely the believing encounter with the God of Israel and its interpretation out of which the insights I cherish come, I find nonetheless that it is this very God with whom I am no longer able to reckon. The living God has died for me partly because the bands of suffering with which the world is bound have squeezed God’s reality first into a conundrum and then into an emptiness.

I hasten to add that I am not so naïve as to think that the demise of the transcendent God within my own interpreted experience entails the universalized conclusion that he does not exist. I have become increasingly impressed by the inescapably contextual character of all our "ultimate concerns." I can appreciate the fact that all sorts of people deal with existence in terms of faith in the sovereign God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob. On questions of ultimate meaning, none of us knows for sure who is closer to the mark. But in my own ongoing struggle to make sense of the Christian context of life- and world-interpretation, I find basic elements of that context which I simply cannot render coherent any longer, and I earnestly wonder how other persons manage to.

I have never ceased puzzling mightily over this old, old "problem of evil" until, to adapt a line from Dr. Seuss, my puzzler is chronically sore. My incapacity to make sense of the world as the creation of a personally caring Creator because of the magnitude of sin and suffering is, to extend the metaphor a long-festering sore that simply will not heal. Theologically it is somewhat awkward to be still bleeding over the issue when everyone else has gone on to exciting things like liberation and parables. (I suppose that what I am doing in this essay could be construed as belonging to the "autobiography" genre.) Chalk it up, if you wish, to a poverty of experience and imagination.

Still, there it is, my tiresome old wound, and its pain will not go away. I spent a major portion of my book Borderland Christianity trying to salve the affliction theologically while clinging to some semblance of a Christian perspective that preserved the element of transcendence in its God-talk. But one thing I affirmed there with all the earnestness and energy I could muster: a being who creates this universe ex nihilo is inescapably responsible for its features, and to call such a being "love" is to me incomprehensible and offensive. I suggested, without choosing among, some alternative views of God that in varying ways preserved divine love at the expense of divine power. (I consider the process theologies simply another subtle variation on this theme.) I still believe that my suggestions there are among the only tolerable and viable ways forward for faith and theology faced with the magnitude of evil. But such alternatives have limitations and problems of their own which have propelled me to move hesitantly beyond them. When I came to write my recent study of Camus (Camus: A Theological Perspective), for the most part I simply shared in his heartache over human suffering and reaffirmed my rejection of a love that is omnipotent. I had very little to offer in the way of positive theological suggestions.

Finite Gods

So the God of classical faith and theology -- the sovereign Creator, Preserver and Consummator of absolutely everything who is nevertheless said personally to love his creatures -- died for me some time ago. Such a being I can only consider grotesquely incredible in view of the excessive estrangement, conflict, destruction, pain and waste on the earth. But what are my difficulties with the finite gods I and a number of other contemporary theologians have envisioned as softened, chastened, more "dynamic" alternatives? Surely if one must choose between ultimate love and ultimate power, a certain sort of decent sensibility suggests sacrificing a bit of power. I still regard the affirmation of a God who is in some way finite to be a lively theological option. Yet what has happened is that I have reluctantly discovered that for me this attempt to preserve a transcendence conceived as personal and purposive may have been only a temporary remission, not a cure.

For a God who is less than ultimate power may be morally and spiritually admirable, but compared to the superabundant power of our earthly bondages such a God appears somewhat impotent and seems to operate very raggedly. The older picture of an inscrutable Absolute in whose hands we can nevertheless at least be sure we are held for good or ill, whether in life or in death, has given way to the modern Bild of a kind of sympathetically groping, eagerly persuasive deity who does the best he can with all sorts of obstacles beyond his control. The omnipotent God of traditional Christianity may have behaved at times like the very devil, but at least he was inescapable and held all the cards; the outcome was not in doubt. The Tao-like God of an up-for-grabs universe who rolls with the punches suffers defeat, while his many adversaries remain full of fight. I am at last impaled on the horns of the old dilemma, pithily expressed by Nickles’s repeated jingle in Archibald MacLeish’s play J. B.:

I heard upon his dry dung heap

That man cry out who cannot sleep:

"If God is God He is not good,

If God is good He is not God;

Take the even, take the odd. . . ."

Dying to Transcendence

As I recollect it, the myth of the death of God affirms that the meaning of the incarnation, supremely of the cross of Christ, is that the sovereign transcendent Creator empties himself wholly into his creation. He "dies" completely to his transcendent status and identifies himself entirely with humankind and our world. The only revelation of God is the faces of us unlikely human beings, his only worship our compassionate devotion to one another and to the needs of our earth. I must confess that this version of the Christian myth is the one I now find personally tolerable and meaningful. Is it biblical? Of course not -- but a great deal that passes historically and at the present time for Christian faith and theology is not biblical but an imaginative development or a logical implication out of the biblical sources. How seriously do I take this new version? As seriously as I take my continued involvement with Christian theology -- and as lightly and irreverently as a Zen master takes the myths of the Buddha relative to his pursuit of enlightenment.

The death-of-God myth symbolically articulates, from within the Christian perspective which is my religious framework, my own inability any longer to affirm anything more in the way of grace and love than the human faces and voices and bodies around me, those persons with whom I enter into relationships of various kinds and intensities and patterns of communion and brokenness. They are all so fallible and fragile like me, but they are all I have for certain. Luther’s well-known words have become undialectically true for me: "One shall be Christ to another." I am becoming reluctantly content, in the words of Camus, to "live with what I know."

Anguished Contemplation

Nor, like Camus; can I overlook the earth itself. What graces it too bestows together with its afflictions! That young redbud tree delicately budding in my front yard in early spring, that golden haze in which the rolling hills close to my home are bathed on a summer morning, that lovely pond on my walk home from work out of whose rushes a red-winged blackbird almost invariably flies up as I pass by in early autumn, that winter belt of trees across the street transformed by an ice storm into a glittering fairyland -- all those beauties of which nature is so achingly and serendipitously full are likewise my modest sources of healing and renewal. These human and natural graces must be sufficient for me. I am slowly, painfully becoming resigned to learning from them how to live, how to love and, I hope, how to die.

Have I experienced suffering and tragedy in my own life? Hardly at all. Different persons with different life experiences are burdened by the excessive absurdities and cruelties of life in varying ways. For me it is anguished contemplation of the world around me past and present, attentive involvement with and observation of persons and situations, and repeated self-examination that create a cumulative impression of tragically disproportionate bondage. Some of the specific stimuli of my sober reflections have been the histories of the fiendishly diverse injustices, cruelties, tyrannies and butcheries human beings have inflicted on one another -- in particular the long, appalling story of Jewish suffering at the hands of Christian Europe with its insane climax under the Nazis; Camus’s searing reflections on our blood-soaked century; accounts of the horrors of plagues and epidemics at whose complete mercy human beings for so long existed; and insights of depth psychology into the character and influence of the unconscious, childhood and repression in our behavior.

My own life up to this point has been on balance remarkably pleasant and favored. However, I attribute such good fortune to a lucky combination of contingencies which many, many persons on this earth do not enjoy. To call such contingencies "blessings of God" too blatantly suggests to me a very capricious omnipotence or a finite deity who has managed to exert a bit of benevolent influence in this particular instance -- and either way I am back with my old problem.

The Possibility of a Richer Reality

Perhaps surprisingly, by no means is my recent experiencing of the death of God to be equated with an abandonment of every sort of transcendence. One of my cardinal beliefs of long standing which I see no reason to give up is a strong suspicion that the reality of both ourselves and the cosmic context in which we find ourselves is far richer than we know and doubtless contains dimensions of which we have only scratched the surface. Of course, this "more" to human and cosmic reality need not be transcendent in any sense other than "beyond": beyond our present ordinary awareness and knowledge, perhaps in principle beyond purely scientific avenues of knowledge. Even in this sense transcendence may have all the depth and richness I at least could ask: mystery, ineffability, ecstasy, reunion and reconciliation, worlds upon worlds of various sorts and stages of existence, an ideal order of which our experiences of truth, beauty and goodness are fragmentary glimpses.

My problem is that I can no longer make sense out of certain images of transcendence, supremely the Christian image of the loving, personal Creator and Redeemer. Nor can I relate in any meaningful way at all my very general beliefs about transcendence to all the absurd and tragic things that go on in this little sphere of reality called earth. I simply cannot get the transcendent and the earthly together coherently -- and so I content myself with what I know, with the earthly.

I am somewhat drawn to certain aspects of what I understand of the world orientation of Gautama the Buddha: the difficult art of learning to accept the quite specific limitations and possibilities of my life without making myself unhappy struggling to affirm beliefs I cannot honestly affirm. One of my favorite sources of consolation is the Buddha’s famous dialogue from the Pali canon on "Questions Tending Not to Edification." I am trying -- haltingly and amateurishly -- to incorporate some of his wisdom, but for the present I am still more comfortable dealing with my life-situation in the more familiar terms of the Christian tradition. And at this stage in my pilgrimage, that has come to mean the myth of the God who in Christ dies to his deity and lives only as grand and miserable human beings within this beautiful ruined Eden called earth.

Listening to B F. Skinner

Amid the furor periodically aroused by B. F. Skinner’s behaviorism, scant attention has been given to the intriguing relationship between his ideas and Christianity. The shortcomings of Skinner’s theory -- that human acts are the product of heredity and environment -- are well known; I shall return to one of them later. At the same time, criticism of Skinner’s work tends to be marred by emotional overreaction and by downright inaccuracy. Defensiveness about behavior modification’s apparent threat to “freedom and dignity” has to some degree blinded critics to its positive value  -- both as it illuminates human behavior and as it has proved to be a means of helping persons. In contrast, I believe that Skinner’s work and the growing influence of “behavior mod” techniques in educational, mental health, and penal programs need to be responded to in a constructive and integrative way. Here, then, is a modest attempt to spell out the implications of Skinner’s thought for religion.

The Earnest Adventure That Failed

No unusual or significant involvement with religion seems to have touched Skinner’s own life, at least as he describes it in the first volume of his autobiography, Particulars of My Life (Knopf, 1976). He attended the Presbyterian Sunday school regularly in his hometown of Susquehanna, Pennsylvania, and he recalls being terrified as a young child by his grandmother’s vivid description of the hell that awaits children who tell lies. In the classes of a revered English teacher, Mary Graves, Skinner appears to have received a thorough exposure to the Old and New Testaments taught as literature. But in terms of serious personal involvement with faith, his experience was textbook-typical: an intense but brief period of religiosity as an early adolescent that accompanied and conflicted with his awakening sexual awareness. As Skinner described it in a “historical-religious” account of his religious education, written a year after graduating from college: “Religion and religious ideas bothered me and I thought a great deal about them. I had never associated freely with other boys [as he began to do at that time] and now my doubts about things and my sex shame drove me almost to solitude” (Particulars, p. 110).

The adolescent Skinner considered the recovery of a lost watch a divine revelation; Elijah-like, he believed that faith really could move mountains, and he tried to demonstrate it with an experiment in levitation that failed. But the earnest adventure with faith was short-lived. Having come up against the usual sorts of doubts about religion that arise for persons as intelligent as Skinner, he marked the end of this period of religiosity by announcing to Miss Graves that he no longer believed in God -- to which that fascinating woman replied (sardonically? sympathetically?), “I have been through that, too” (p. 112).

The Christianity ‘Phenomenon’

The adult Skinner evinces in his writings a literate awareness of the phenomenon of religion, specifically of Christianity. References to religion are scattered liberally throughout his works. He recognizes religion as one of the chief social and ideological elements in human experience. Frequently, Skinner’s references to aspects of religion are illustrations of behavior or behavior control, as for example when he writes in Beyond Freedom and Dignity (Bantam, 1972): “Heaven is portrayed as a collection of positive reinforcers and hell as a collection of negative, although they are contingent upon behavior executed before death” (p. 129). Only in his early, very systematic work Science and Human Behavior (Free Press, 1953) does Skinner deal with religion topically. There he devotes a chapter to it as one of several “controlling agencies” -- along with government and law, psychotherapy, economic control, and education (pp. 350-58).

Religion also figures importantly, if briefly, in his historical analysis of how scientific explanation developed. In Skinner’s perspective, prescientific humans needed the gods -- mythical “theoretical entities” -- to explain natural and human phenomena. Our continued belief in mind as an “indwelling agent causing the behavior of a body is a relic of the old unscientific belief in invisible causes of phenomena. “Physics and biology soon abandoned explanations of this sort,” says Skinner, “and turned to more useful kinds of causes, but the step has not been decisively taken in the field of human behavior” (Beyond Freedom and Dignity, p. 5).

Skinner’s characterization of the gods as explanatory fictions is, of course, a very familiar partial truth: it constitutes the least interesting aspect of his treatment of religion. He also persists’ in attacking the “homunculus” caricature of mind or self even after nearly all sophisticated accounts of the human being and behavior have long abandoned mind/ body dualism.

‘Walden Two’: Human Utopia, Not Machine

Significantly, it is in his popular fictional work Walden Two (1948) that Skinner chiefly manifests a fascinating relationship to Christianity. Almost 30 years after its publication, this novel remains the best introduction to the man and the spirit of his behaviorism. More fully than any of his nonfiction writings, Walden Two reveals Skinner’s humanity and humanism, his wide reading and general literacy, his wit and imagination, his loves and aversions. In personal passion it much surpasses his autobiography. Walden Two also has the virtue of making appealingly clear the fully human face that “behavior mod” has always had for Skinner and his followers -- over against the sinister, mechanistic caricature of the Skinnerian world.

Walden Two lets us see the principles of behaviorism ideally at work among concrete, normal human beings interacting in a social setting. In the course of the story Skinner touches on a remarkable number of issues large and small, dramatizes specific examples of behavior-changing techniques, and reveals a larger appreciation of the nuances in actual human behavior than is apparent in his other books. In one way (but only one!) he is like some of the existentialist writers: he seems to state his position more clearly and compellingly in fiction than in nonfiction.

It is commonplace for novelists to warn us against identifying them with any of their fictional creations or the particular views that characters express. As it happens, however, in a 1956 American Psychologist article we have Skinner’s own word for it that his protagonist, Frazier, is to a large degree a spokesman for himself -- boldly setting forth some ideas that Skinner at the time was not prepared to advance in his own name. Even without the author’s confirmation, the reader is most likely to infer such an identification from the clearly didactic -- indeed, evangelical -- tone of the book, a tone which is also the source of its artistic flaws. There is no reason to believe that Frazier’s remarks about Christianity do not reflect something of Skinner’s own thinking.

Frazier turns out to be a warm admirer of Jesus -- not, of course, as a religious figure, but as a person with great psychological insight. Burns, the narrator of the story (Burrhus Frederick Skinner’s questioning alter ego?), relates that Frazier “spoke as if Jesus were an honored colleague whose technical discoveries he held in the highest esteem” (Macmillan, 1962, p. 299). Jesus’ greatness lay in his being “the first to discover the power of refusing to punish” Frazier is deeply impressed by Jesus’ injunction to love one’s enemies. This he sees as an effective method of avoiding both self-punishment and the use of physical force to control other people’s behavior:

To “do good to those who despitefully use you” has two unrelated consequences. You gain peace of mind. Let the stronger man push you around -- at least you avoid the torture of your own rage. That’s the immediate consequence. What an astonishing discovery it must have been to find that in the long run you could control the stronger man in the same way [p. 261].

Frazier chides Castle, the philosopher who is a wretched caricature and little more than a foil for his arguments, because the latter sees only two alternatives -- free will on the one hand, and on the other, control of behavior by physical force or threat of force: “Not being a good behaviorist -- or a good Christian, for that matter -- you have no feeling for a tremendous power of a different sort” (p. 259). What Frazier is talking about is positive reinforcement as a means of changing behavior; he seems to equate it with what Jesus and Christianity are trying to get at with the notion of agape, the power that alone overcomes evil and reconciles human beings to one another. Of course, Frazier goes on to say, Jesus discovered and articulated the principle but lacked the knowledge we now possess: through reinforcement theory we can deliberately create social conditions in which punishment has been eliminated as a way to control behavior.

As exegesis, of course, all this is seriously wanting. But as a practical contribution to the Christian “art of loving,” Skinner’s work on the effectiveness of positive reinforcement and the ineffectiveness of punishment continues to deserve serious attention.

Frazier’s Providential Economy

In Walden Two Skinner indulges in a bit of fun directed, I think, at both himself and his critics. Frazier confesses that, as the designer of the Walden Two community, he “likes to play God”; jokingly, but not altogether facetiously, he compares himself to the Creator-Father and to Christ the Son. At one point his physical posture even mimics Jesus on the cross.

“In many ways the creation of Walden Two,” its creator says, “was closer to the spirit of Christian cosmogony than the evolution of the world according to modern science” (p. 299). That is, Walden Two was brought into being by Frazier’s purposeful design; it did not evolve hit-and-miss. The “science of behavior” enables Frazier to design the community so that he knows what the consequences of each aspect of its design will be -- just as in traditional theology it is according to God’s eternal plan and purpose that the universe as a whole and in all its parts unfolds. In a key passage, Frazier goes on to relate this creation analogy to what he calls “the old question of predestination and free will.” As he describes it to Burns:

All that happens is contained in an original plan, yet at every stage the individual seems to be making choices and determining the outcome. The same is true of Walden Two. Our members are practically always doing what they want to do -- what they “choose” to do -- but we see to it that they will want to do precisely the things which are best for themselves and the community. Their behavior is determined, yet they’re free [pp. 296-7].

Skinner’s Denial of Freedom

It is the linkup Frazier makes here -- between Walden Two’s “behavioral engineering” and a classical theological determinism -- that provides the touchstone for the rest of this essay. Skinner’s explicit and robust determinism is of course well known, not to say notorious among his detractors. He grants that determinism is unprovable; nonetheless he claims that it is axiomatic for scientific inquiry and continually vindicated by it. Frazier makes this claim unmistakably: “I deny that freedom exists at all. Perhaps we can never prove that man isn’t free; it’s an assumption. But the increasing success of a science of behavior makes it more and more plausible” (p. 257).

There is no contradiction in Frazier’s two statements -- his assertion of freedom and his denial of it. In the first he uses “free” in the everyday sense of being able to do what one wants to do. In the second he uses the term “freedom” to refer to the idea of a causal agent, a personal author of actions, whose agency is necessarily but not sufficiently accounted for by its antecedent conditions.

John Hick very aptly describes this concept of freedom in Evil and the God of Love: “Whilst a free action arises out of the agent’s character it does not arise in a fully determined and predictable way. It is largely but not fully prefigured in the previous state of the agent. For the character is itself partially formed and sometimes partially re-formed in the very moment of decision” (London: Collins, 1968, p. 312). It is this basic notion of freedom as indeterminisin that Skinner denies. (I shall return shortly to Frazier’s positive use of an “everyday” notion of freedom.)

According to Skinner’s behaviorism, all human behavior results from the interaction between genetic-evolutionary endowment and environmental contingencies. He grants that human actions are highly complex and that frequently we cannot predict them accurately because of the many factors involved. But he believes that all actions are predictable in principle. He is. furthermore, convinced by the actual successes of behavior-modification experiments that empirically we can learn enough of the relevant factors to predict and bring about desired behavior.

Other references in Skinner’s writings indicate as well that Skinner is clearly aware, at least in broad outline, of the tradition of theological determinism in Christianity. Theologians, perhaps more than any other humanistically oriented inquirers, should be able from out of their own biblical and theological tradition to appreciate the Skinnerian picture of our utter creatureliness and interdependence. Admittedly, his narrowly physicalist conceptual scheme and terminology are off-putting. Those who are scandalized by Skinner, however, should recall that some of Christianity’s finest minds have been driven into a theological determinism by central elements in the biblical and theological portrayals of the Creator and his relationship to his creatures. I am speaking, of course, of Augustine and those other luminaries of the Augustinian tradition: Luther, Calvin and Edwards.

Edwards’s Necessary World

Jonathan Edwards in fact provides an excellent example: the exponent of a thoroughgoing, consistent theological determinism, he brilliantly reworked theology in the light of that early modern philosophical and scientific knowledge which made possible Skinner’s work. Edwards was overwhelmed by the mystic contemplation of the infinite, eternal, omnipotent, omniscient Being whose creative power and wisdom brings into being out of nothingness, alone sustaining the whole universe of myriad creatures visible and invisible.

To Edwards it was metaphysically preposterous to think that there was anything whatsoever, whether in the “natural” or in the “moral” order, that did not have a necessary and sufficient cause. In Freedom of the Will he wrote: “So that it is indeed as repugnant to reason, to suppose that an act of the will should come into existence without a cause, as to suppose the human soul, or an angel, or the globe of the earth, or the whole universe, should come into existence without a cause” (Bobbs-Merrill, 1969, p. 54). As for the Arminian notion that the will is self-determined, Edwards attempted to show that the very concept of self-determination is riddled with contradictions.

The alternative to self-determination is other-determination. Edwards’s analysis of human behavior might be called “environmental,” in Skinner’s sense of the total environing field -- physical, social, linguistic -- to which human behavior is a response. According to Edwards, volitionally the human mind is determined by the strongest among the various “motives” that it perceives. A motive is any sort of fact -- or environmental contingency or set of contingencies, if you will -- perceived as an object of choice or preference. Volition or “willing” is inseparable from motivation so understood. In his classic study of Edwardean theology, Piety Versus Moralism, Joseph Haroutunian -- writing in the heyday of the earlier (and much less sophisticated) Watsonian behaviorism -- made this striking observation:

A modern rendering of this analysis is the study of human behavior in terms of “stimulus and response.” A stimulus is Edwards’ “motive,” and response is volitional behavior. Such a study is based upon the principle that where there is no stimulus, there is no response; where there is no action, there is no reaction; where there is no cause, there is no effect. The nature of a given stimulus is irrelevant to the fact that it acts as a stimulus. An “S-R bond” may be physical or it may be moral, and in both cases it is a “certain connection” between a “motive” and an act of volition. Edwards’ metaphysical principle of necessity is the modern methodological principle that all action is reaction [Harper & Row, 1932, p. 225].

Like the other Augustinians, Edwards considered the “ordinary language” definition of freedom to be the only coherent and usable one: “power, opportunity or advantage that any one has, to do as he pleases” (Freedom of the Will, pp. 31-2). I am free insofar as I am able to carry out in action without impediment what I prefer to do. But of course what I prefer to do is determined by the strongest motive that presents itself. It is certainly the case that I may or may not be able in any given circumstances to do as I please, but it is not the case that I am similarly able or not able to “please as I please.”

As we have seen, Frazier expresses an analogous notion of freedom in Walden Two. Persons in the utopian community do what they want to do -- and hence are “free” in the ordinary sense. But what they want to do is determined by environmental contingencies of reinforcement. A chief difference, of course, between Walden Two and God’s world is that behavior in the former is a predictable and humanly desirable consequence of reinforcers that are designed and controlled by human beings.

The Limits of Determinism

Of course, theological determinism is utterly out of fashion -- for what are generally good and substantial theological reasons. As for Skinner’s contemporary naturalistic determinism, many natural scientists would simply deny that the deterministic hypothesis is absolutely necessary to scientific inquiry. They would point to the indeterminacy principle in physics, which establishes at least the possibility that scientific theory may have to adapt itself in some areas to phenomena that are insufficiently determined by general laws. Some scientists engaged in the biological study of human behavior would go on to say that a strictly determinist theory is not adequate to explain the nature and complexity of data such as self-awareness, self-criticism, symbolization and choice-making.

There are several other important criticisms to be made of Skinner’s theory that I shall not go into: his apparent obliviousness to the inherent limitations of his and every particular theoretical model, his methodological tunnel vision, and his explanatory superficiality. And yet even when the severe inadequacies of Skinner’s portrayal of the human situation are taken into account, we must go on, I believe, to acknowledge the sobering measure of truth contained in it. For Skinner is simply an extreme and provocative exponent of a persuasive general proposition with which we have long been familiar, chiefly through the work of the social sciences: that human being and behavior are, at least to an indeterminably large degree, shaped by the interaction between biological nature and social/physical environments.

Skinner’s challenge to the defenders of human freedom is one of his most important and useful contributions. There is still far too much unwarranted confidence, careless equivocation, unexamined assumption, and plain self-deception in our talk of personal liberty. Skinner forces us to face up to the formidable reality of genetic-environmental conditioning, the elusive nature and scope of freedom, and the far-reaching ethical, social and theological implications of such data.

In the continuing debate about human freedom, not only determinists but also nearly all indeterminists (the early Sartre is the notable exception) recognize that our behavior is at least to a very large degree determined by heredity and environment. C. A. Campbell, one of the most distinguished philosophical defenders of freedom in this century, believed that very few human actions qualify as free behavior. And in The Ghost in the Machine -- a brilliantly creative synthesis of recent work in the biological study of human behavior, albeit a dismal caricature of Skinner’s behaviorism -- Arthur Koestler defends human freedom on biological grounds, while concluding nevertheless that it is impossible to decide whether or not anyone’s actions in a given situation are free. “How am I to know,” he asks, “whether or to what extent his responsibility was diminished when he acted as he did, whether he could ‘help it’? Compulsion and freedom are opposite ends of a graded scale; but there is no pointer attached to the scale that I could read” (London: Pan Books, 1970, p. 251). Koestler here puts his finger on the dilemma: on the one hand, if we are faithful to the full range of the data of human selfhood we need to be open, pace Skinner, to genuine indeterminacy. On the other hand, such indeterminacy is impossible to identify.

A Balanced Response to Persons

Skinner’s work -- and 20th century advances in the social and natural sciences generally -- poses a practical moral question for all of us: How can I respond compassionately to the bondage in your and my character and actions, while at the same time nurturing the elusive, unbound dimension of our selfhood? The balance between these two responses is extremely difficult to strike; we are hampered by our deep-rooted assumptions about freedom, as well as by the nature of our involvements with other persons. Nonetheless, it is just such a balanced response to persons that the data of human behavior demand of us.

Contemporary knowledge of human nature and action gives new force to the commandment to love my neighbor as myself. It is typically the case that I rationalize my own behavior -- in part, that I excuse it with causal or determining explanations: “I’ve had a bad day,” or “It’s just the way I am.” At the same time, I tend not to excuse other persons in this way but to hold them fully responsible for their actions. In other words, generally speaking I am a determinist with regard to myself and an indeterminist with regard to others. To love others as myself means, in part, that I must be compassionate enough to recognize in their actions the determining factors that I recognize honestly in my own life.

The balanced response of love also demands that I recognize, challenge and nurture both in others and in myself, in a quite unmoralistic way, that mysterious and hidden center which is an unpredictable source of creative response-ability. The elusiveness of freedom that should make us charitable in our judgments about other persons is that same freedom which renders all of us responsive to challenge and which enables us to grow in surprising ways.

A Powerful Reminder of Creatureliness

In the final analysis, Christianity does not need to be reminded of human freedom -- quite the contrary. However, neither classical nor modern Christian thought, I believe, has faced with utter seriousness the heavy “weight” of biology and environment as they shape human actions. Even the Augustinian theologians indulged in tortuous verbal gymnastics at they attempted, for example, to hold persons responsible for their sins within the context of a theological determinism. (In view of my previous remarks, the vital notion of responsibility must be justified on pragmatic -- behavioral -- grounds; it cannot, it seems to me, be defended “ontologically” by arguments for human freedom.)

Skinner’s work is an invaluable, if clearly limited, reminder to Christians of some of the radical implications of our earthly creatureliness and interdependence within the web of nature and society. In depth and explanatory power, the psychoanalytic tradition remains a far more illuminating interpretation of human bondage, one that (in good “Augustinian” fashion) graphically accounts for the demonic character of that bondage over against Skinner’s irrepressible optimism. Nevertheless, his single-minded scientific labors, in spotlighting what is surely the enormously important role of environmental reinforcers in human behavior, are of real practical usefulness in understanding and helping persons. Skinner’s work also forms yet another essential piece in that whole puzzle of human nature and behavior which theologians are obliged to integrate into a realistic picture of human life and the cosmos.