Questions on Abortion and the Struggle Against Tyranny

The participants in the abortion debate seem, most of the time, to presuppose that the beliefs (moral/ scientific/ religious/ legal/ philosophical) of the pro-choice and pro-life camps are widely divergent at many points. The fact that a great cultural conflict is taking place over abortion seems to be a prima facie justification of this assumption. Yet this assumption, which to a large extent is undeniably true, may be serving to hinder a clear understanding of the nature of the conflict, as long as it remains what it is: an (unquestioned) assumption. I would like to pull this presupposition out of the shadows and into the light of day, so that a critique of it can lead to a valid perception of the actual outlines of the conflict.

In this essay I will examine the arguments of a pro-choice author and a pro-life author. I will try to understand the basic motivations which seem to drive them to adopt their philosophical stances and argumentative positions. I will not presuppose that they live in totally different intellectual worlds; instead I will listen to their arguments with an ear for possible unrecognized similarities between them. In this way, we will arrive at a clearer understanding of the political passions which drive the continuing debate over abortion.

In 1966 pro-choice activist Lawrence Lader published a book entitled Abortion, in which he anticipated the essentials of the reasoning behind the 1973 Roe v. Wade decision. Lader described the pre-Roe social situation in which a relatively small number of abortions were performed legally in hospitals, while a large number were performed illegally in underground abortion mills. Legislation regarding abortion was inconsistent from state to state, and some women who sought abortions went to other countries to have them. Lader argued that since early abortions are statistically safer for the woman than childbirth, and since the morality of such abortions is a matter of religious and philosophical dispute, the state ought not to prevent women from having legal access to abortion services:

A hospital abortion is as safe and simple as any other operation, requiring fifteen or twenty minutes of surgery and rarely keeping a patient hospitalized more than overnight. Yet a million or more women each year, automatically excluded from the realm of legality, are forced to seek out a private abortionist, to attempt abortion on themselves, or, if they are unmarried, to bear the child illegitimately. They may well wonder what bitter twist of medical logic, legal hair-splitting, or legislative inhumanity denied them the right to a safe and sacrosanct hospital abortion. [1]

Lader argued that the original intent of the anti-abortion laws which were passed in the 19th century was to protect the health of women from the dangers of quack abortionists, but since legal abortions had become so safe, the continued presence of these laws had the opposite of their intended effect, forcing women into a dangerous back-alley underground. [2]

At that time, Lader was clearly in favor of a complete liberalization of abortion laws, and he repeatedly suggested throughout the book that the main impediment to such a liberalization was the power of the "Roman Catholic hierarchy." He spoke of situations in which "one Catholic doctor" on a hospital abortion review committee was able to veto women's requests for abortions. [3] He described the idea that a fetus is a person from the moment of conception as a "minority dogma" by which the majority of Americans was being "tyrannized." [4] He summed up what can be called the standard pro-choice "argument from pluralism" in this way:

Every shade of belief must be protected under our democratic system, including the belief of the Catholic or anyone else that life starts at the moment of conception. The whole basis of abortion reform is to insure that all rights are respected. No religion or group, on the other hand, should impose its position on the rest of the nation. No religion, by demanding adherence to the status quo, by refusing to allow the slightest legal reform, should use the power of the law to force its belief on others.... Richard Cardinal Cushing, the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Boston, has already proclaimed in eloquent language: "Catholics do not need the support of civil law to be faithful to their own religious convictions and they do not seek to impose by law their moral views on other members of society." Unfortunately, the Cardinal's pronouncement remains unheeded by most of the Catholic hierarchy. As long as the Catholic Church, or any faith, continues to block legislation allowing individual conscience and free choice in abortion, the core of our democratic system is crippled. The right to abortion is the foundation of Society's long struggle to guarantee that every child comes into this world wanted, loved, and cared for. The right to abortion, along with all birth-control measures, must establish the Century of the Wanted Child. [5]

Earlier, Lader had written a book entitled, The Bold Brahmins: New England's War Against Slavery: 1831-1863. In Lader's mind there was a very definite connection between the struggle to abolish slavery in the 19th century and the struggle to abolish legal restrictions on access to abortion in the 20th. The last chapter of his book on abortion is entitled, "Legalized Abortion: The Final Freedom," and on the last page of the book one finds these paragraphs:

"When rulers have inverted their functions and enacted wickedness into a law which treads down the inalienable rights of man to such a degree as this," abolitionist minister Theodore Parker of Boston declared after the passage of the Fugitive Slave Bill in 1850, "then I know no ruler but God, no law but natural Justice." What rulers are we to acknowledge today? We have remained silent too long. We pay obeisance on the surface to laws we disregard in secret. We maintain a system by hypocritical silence when the time has come to seek natural justice. If men and women are going to break U.S. abortion laws at least a million times a year, let them declare their freedom boldly. Let them announce it at their clubs and town meetings and proclaim it in the press. Let them affirm with conviction: No law is a real law that prohibits the inalienable rights of human beings. [6]

I will now pose the question: "What motivates pro-choice activists to think and act as they do?" It would seem that Lader is motivated by (a) a concern to end back-alley abortions, because they harm women, and (b) a concern to abolish laws which restrict access to abortion, because they are a product of the tyrannical imposition of the moral beliefs of some citizens on others, and result in a diminishment of a woman's freedom to make decisions about the course which her life will take.

We will now consider the story of Bernard Nathanson, an obstetrician/ gynecologist who was one of the main leaders of the pro-choice movement in the late '60s and early '70s. Since that time he has changed his mind about the morality of abortion and has become a leader of the pro-life movement.

In the late '60s, Nathanson was a close associate of Lawrence Lader. They, along with others, founded NARAL, the National Association for Repeal of Abortion Laws (later changed to the National Abortion Rights Action League). The lobbying efforts of this group contributed to the liberalization of abortion laws in the State of New York before Roe v. Wade, and no doubt had an indirect effect on that decision itself. Nathanson told the story of his involvement in this group in his 1979 book, Aborting America. Nathanson described the various characters which he met during that era, and recreated the atmosphere of the pre-Roe days with accounts of the illegal abortion subculture, the appearance at hospitals of women who were suffering the after-effects of botched abortions, the under-the-table referral of women to abortionists in Puerto Rico and elsewhere, and the way in which hospital abortion committees were used to rubber stamp requests for "therapeutic" abortions.

Nathanson was a respected physician in New York City, but he had, in effect, one foot in the abortion subculture through his contacts and his involvement in pro-choice activism. Nathanson served as the director of a large abortion clinic in New York City for a period of a year and a half. In the years which followed his resignation from that position, he began to reflect on the social revolution in which he had been involved, and came to have doubts about the morality of unrestricted access to abortion. In 1974 he published an article in the New England Journal of Medicine entitled "Deeper into Abortion," in which he expressed in public his growing doubts about the ethical legitimacy of the pro-choice cause which he had been championing for years. The following are excerpts from this important article.

Some time ago--after a tenure of a year and a half--I resigned as director of the Center for Reproductive and Sexual Health. The Center had performed 60,000 abortions with no maternal deaths--an outstanding record of which we are proud. However, I am deeply troubled by my own increasing certainty that I had in fact presided over 60,000 deaths. There is no longer serious doubt in my mind that human life exists within the womb from the very onset of pregnancy, despite the fact that the nature of the intrauterine life has been the subject of considerable dispute in the past. Electrocardiographic evidence of heart function has been established in embryos as early as six weeks. Electroencephalographic recordings of human brain activity have been noted in embryos at eight weeks. We must courageously face the fact--finally--that human life of a special order is being taken. And since the vast majority of pregnancies are carried successfully to term, abortion must be seen as the interruption of a process that would otherwise have produced a citizen of the world. Denial of this reality is the crassest kind of moral evasiveness. Somewhere in the vast philosophic plateau between the two implacably opposed camps--past the slogans, past the pamphlets, past even the demonstrations and the legislative threats--lies the infinitely agonizing truth. We are taking life, and the deliberate taking of life, even of a special order and under special circumstances, is an inexpressibly serious matter. [7]

In 1983 Nathanson published a second book called The Abortion Papers: Inside the Abortion Mentality. In this work he discussed coverage of the abortion issue in the media, the ongoing developments in fetology, and the "anti-Catholic strategy" of the pro-choice movement, which Nathanson claims was formulated chiefly by his former associate, Lawrence Lader. Nathanson has very harsh words for his former colleague. Referring to Lader's book on the abolitionists, Nathanson says:

For Lader to have equated himself with these great men, even by implication, and drawn parallels between the abortion monster and the ineffable purity of the Brahmin cause, is a despicable claim in itself. I believe the abortion ethic is fatally and forever flawed by the immorality of the means of its victory. A political victory achieved by such odious tactics is at best an unstable tyranny spawned by an unscrupulous and unprincipled minority. At the very least this disclosure of those odious tactics should compel those who are uneasy with permissive abortion to re-examine the issue. I believe that an America which permits a junta of moral thugs to foist an evil of incalculable dimensions upon it, and continues to permit that evil to flower, creates for itself a deadly legacy: a millenium of shame. [8]

In the Epilogue to The Abortion Papers, Nathanson placed the abortion debate within the broader context of American history in this way:

Abortion is the most bitterly contested civil rights issue of our time. The nature of the oppressed, a defenseless, mute, and invisible minority (though increasingly less so with the advent of realtime ultrasound and other technologies) sets it apart from all other civil rights conflicts. The most eloquent angry spokesmen for the black civil rights movement were black themselves. Women speak and write passionately for the feminist cause. Gays parade through the streets of our cities decrying sexual prejudice and demanding the nation's approval. The human unborn is the ultimate civil rights victim. It cannot be heard; it cannot be read; it cannot demonstrate or parade through the streets. It cannot even be arrested and thrown into jail for civil disorder. The victim's silent anguished pleas are heard only by the pro-life cause. Paradoxically, Americans who have historically been deeply sympathetic to the plight of the oppressed and the downtrodden turn a deaf ear to these pleas. Congressman Henry Hyde, that lion of pro-life, has characterized the movement as one of the most admirable in history since those who labor in this cause reap absolutely no material gain from its success. It is a movement distinguished from all others in this nation's history, excepting perhaps the Abolitionists, by its pure and perfect altruism. Compare the crystalline selflessness of the pro-life cause to the shabby materialism of the abortion industry and the ruthless self-gratification of the Abortion People. [9]

When Nathanson was a pro-choice activist, it seems that his primary motivation was a concern for the health of women who were involved in the illegal abortion underground. But as his thinking on the morality of abortion gradually changed, he began to see the fetus as a very important being whose life ought not to be ended except under extraordinary circumstances. He came to see the pro-choice platform as morally inadequate and tyrannical since it did not grant any real ethical importance to the existence of the fetus. It seems that he, as a doctor motivated to protect the health of his patients, came to acknowledge the fetus as another patient alongside its mother.

I have briefly summarized the arguments concerning abortion which have been put forward by two authors. We have seen that the idea of struggling against tyranny is a vital component of each author's self-understanding. Further exploration of essays and books on abortion, by both male and female authors, would serve to strengthen this observation--that both camps see themselves as fighting against oppression and for freedom. [10] It seems that there is a tacit agreement between pro-choice and pro-life activists on the idea that tyrannical conditions exist or could possibly exist, and that there is a moral imperative to struggle against these conditions. We can attempt to articulate this tacit understanding by suggesting that both camps are working with the inchoate idea that tyranny is present when a law or a governmental policy or a social practice in some way harms human beings by adversely affecting the developing course of their life. The two camps diverge in that they focus their vision on different "objects" which are ostensibly being tyrannized--either the woman or the unborn child.

When we think about the abortion debate as it has developed in the context of American cultural history, the preceding analysis makes sense. What did the American colonists do at the time of the Revolution? They threw off the tyranny of the King of England. What was at the heart of the Civil War? Was it not a struggle between those who saw slavery as tyrannical and those who saw the power of the federal government to interfere with the states as tyrannical? Have not Americans in this century struggled against the "tyranny" of the Germans, the Japanese, the Communists, and Saddam Hussein? It is clear that Americans want to see themselves as people who are active participants in an ongoing struggle to overcome tyranny and expand the sphere of human freedom.

I am suggesting that if we consider the abortion debate as a clash between two philosophically divergent camps, who live in completely different intellectual worlds, then we are failing to recognize a crucially important element of the debate. In fact, the two camps are products of the same "world" that is American history. Perhaps this fact is so obvious that it is too painful to look at squarely. When one is attempting to separate oneself from "tyranny" it is very difficult to see one's opponents as one's philosophical siblings.

My primary purpose in this essay is not to provide answers for the abortion debate, but to facilitate its advancement by suggesting thought-provoking questions. Too often the way in which people think about the problem of abortion is like a broken record or a repeating tape loop. The same arguments get hurled at the "opponents" day after day, protest after protest, year after year. If my thoughts can serve to break this tape loop and challenge people to ask new questions, then I have succeeded in my purpose.

1) Why do different people have different understandings of the tyranny against which they are struggling? This question opens up problems of personal biography which can be approached from the perspectives of education, psychology, sociology, philosophical anthropology, and religion. For instance, we can ask: How did the social/ philosophical/ religious environment in which a person was raised affect the way in which that individual thinks about tyranny in general, and the problem of abortion in particular? If a person was raised in a particular environment and has rejected that upbringing and "gone over to the other side," what are the main factors which contributed to this "conversion"? Why are some articles or books which an individual may read influential in shaping that person's thought? How does "peer pressure" shape a person's moral views? How has an individual's study of history in high school and/or college affected his or her perception of social injustice and the current political groups which are struggling on behalf of "freedom"?

2) What is the significance of the language of "rights" in the abortion debate? When one camp argues that women's "reproductive rights" must be protected and another camp argues that the fetus' "right to life" must be protected, we seem to have reached an impasse which the language of rights, in and of itself, cannot lead us out of. [11] We are now led to ask, who is right about rights? Where do rights come from? The Constitution? The Creator? The social contract? The human will to power? Is access to health care a right? Is employment a right? Is housing a right? How do we know what rights "exist"? How do we know that "rights" exist at all? Alasdair MacIntyre is one contemporary philosopher who has argued that the language of rights is a grand philosophical mistake which has been foisted upon us by the Enlightenment. He argues that the rhetoric of rights is an intellectual cul-de-sac which was created in the wake of modernity's rejection of the Greek understanding of virtue and the Christian understanding of charity. How would one answer MacIntyre's claim that rights have as much reality as do unicorns and witches? [12] These are the sorts of questions which rarely if ever enter the minds of the activists, who seem not to be fully aware of the profound historical, ontological, and epistemological problems which are generated by the language of rights.

3) How ought we go about the task of defining (understanding) tyranny? How should we apply ourselves to the problem of developing a more adequate and rationally coherent understanding of tyranny? Should we read Plato and allow ourselves to be tutored by him concerning the tyrannical personality? Would we have to have attained a certain degree of intellectual maturity in order to understand what he was saying? Would we read the Bible and treat it as a source of enlightenment concerning the problem of tyranny? Would we have to be a Jew or a Christian in order to understand the vision of human nature and society which was being communicated there? Would we study the understandings of tyranny which can be found in various cultures at various times and places and somehow gain an understanding of tyranny through this study? In other words, is there some basic methodology for going about the process of thinking about a fundamental philosophical problem such as the nature of tyranny?

4) Why do people struggle against tyranny at all? This question may seem too simplistic to ask. One could say that people naturally struggle against tyranny whenever they feel that they are being oppressed. This is basic common sense, and is fine as far as it goes, but it does not explain why pro-life advocates would struggle against easy access to abortion when they are not being personally oppressed by it, or why some men would hold pro-choice views when they cannot become pregnant. Pro-life advocates see themselves as acting on behalf of unborn children, who cannot protect themselves. Why is there this concern for the unseen fetus? Is the basic motivation a desire to feel self-righteous in relation to others who are seen as morally inferior? Is it a concern for the moral progress of the human race, as with the Abolitionists? Is it a belief that abortion on demand is a form of legal anarchy which is eroding the moral fabric of Western civilization? Is it a concern to prevent women from harming themselves psychologically by deciding to end the lives of their own children? On the pro-choice side, is the basic motivation a desire to feel self-righteous in relation to others who are seen as politically and philosophically "backward" in our modern liberal society? Is it a concern for the moral progress of the human race, as with the Abolitionists? Is it a belief that abortion on demand is a triumph of respect for individual moral autonomy? Is it a concern to relieve the suffering of distressed women?

These are the sorts of questions which will have to be asked and wrestled with if our society is ever to make any progress toward a solution to the problem of abortion. They are very profound philosophical and religious questions which shake the foundations of our understanding of ourselves, our society, and the natural order. Most of us are ill prepared by our high school and/or college educations to even be aware that such questions exist. And the most highly educated among us are certainly not in agreement as to how they ought to be answered. This means that we live in an environment of de facto moral and intellectual disorder. But there is always the possibility that order will be brought out of this chaos. It will be an arduous process taking many years of struggle. We need to begin, however, with a recognition that the problem of abortion is a moral civil war which has arisen out of the unclarity of the concept of tyranny in American legal, philosophical, and religious thought.

NOTES

[1] Lawrence Lader, Abortion (Boston: Beacon Press, 1966), 4. [2] Lader, 92. [3] Lader, 25. [4] Lader, 145. [5] Lader, 166. [6] Lader, 175. [7] Bernard Nathanson, Aborting America (Garden City: Doubleday, 1979), 164-166. [8] Nathanson, The Abortion Papers: Inside the Abortion Mentality (New York: Frederick Fell Publishers, 1983), 208-209. [9] Nathanson, The Abortion Papers, 216-217. [10] In the bibliography below, see, for example, on the pro- choice side: D. Callahan, D. Richards, B. Harrison, and J. Thomson; on the pro-life side see: J. Garton, J. Wiley, S. Callahan, and G. Grant. For an objective overview of the abortion debate in a vein which parallels the present essay, see M. Vanderford. [11] For an interesting discussion of rights language, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (New York: The Free Press, 1991). [12] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1981), 69-70.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

Callahan, Daniel. Abortion: Law, Choice and Morality. New York: Macmillan, 1970.

Callahan, Sidney, and Daniel Callahan, eds. Abortion: Understanding Differences. New York: Plenum Press, 1984.

Dumond, Dwight Lowell. Antislavery Origins of the Civil War in the United States. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1959.

Garton, Jean Staker. Who Broke the Baby? Minneapolis: Bethany House Publishers, 1979.

Glendon, Mary Ann. Abortion and Divorce in Western Law. Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1987

______. Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse. New York: The Free Press, 1991.

Grant, George Parkin. English-Speaking Justice. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1985.

Harrison, Beverly Wildung. "Theology of Pro-choice: A Feminist Perspective," in Edward Batchelor, ed., Abortion: The Moral Issues. New York: The Pilgrim Press, 1982.

Hunter, James Davison. Culture Wars: The Struggle to Define America. BasicBooks, 1991.

Jung, Patricia Beattie and Thomas A. Shannon, eds. Abortion and Catholicism: The American Debate. New York: Crossroad Publishing, 1988.

Lader, Lawrence. Abortion. Boston: Beacon Press, 1966.

______. The Bold Brahmins: New England's War Against Slavery: 1831-1863. New York: E.P. Dutton, 1961.

Luker, Kristin. Abortion and the Politics of Motherhood. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1984.

MacIntyre, Alasdair. After Virtue: A Study in Moral Theory. Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984.

Mohr, James C. Abortion in America: The Origins and Evolution of National Policy, 1800-1900. New York: Oxford University Press, 1978.

Nathanson, Bernard N., with Richard N. Ostling. Aborting America. Garden City: Doubleday, 1979.

Nathanson, Bernard N. The Abortion Papers: Inside the Abortion Mentality. New York: Frederick Fell Publishers, 1983.

Noonan, John T., Jr., ed. The Morality of Abortion: Legal and Historical Perspectives. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1970.

Noonan, John T., Jr. A Private Choice: Abortion in America in the Seventies. New York: The Free Press, 1979.

Powell, John. Abortion: The Silent Holocaust. Allen, Texas: Argus Communications, 1981.

Richards, David A. J. "Constitutional Privacy, Religious Disestablishment, and the Abortion Decisions," in Jay L. Garfield and Patricia Hennessey, eds. Abortion: Moral and Legal Perspectives. Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984.

Thomson, Judith Jarvis. "A Defense of Abortion." Philosophy and Public Affairs 1/1 (1971): 47-66.

Vanderford, Marsha L. "Vilification and Social Movements: A Case Study of Pro-Life and Pro-Choice Rhetoric." The Quarterly Journal of Speech 75/2 (1989): 166-182.

Wiley, Juli Loesch. "Solidarity and Shalom," in Phyllis Tickle, ed. Confessing Conscience: Churched Women on Abortion. Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1990.

 

 

Charles Bellinger's home page: http://libnt2.lib.tcu.edu/staff/bellinger/cbhome.htm

Brite Divinity School: http://www.brite.tcu.edu/Index.htm

TCU: http://www.tcu.edu/

Toward a Kierkegaardian Understanding of Hitler, Stalin, and the Cold War

He came to his own home, and his own people received him not. John 1:11

Søren Kierkegaard is widely acknowledged today as one of the most insightful philosophical and religious thinkers of western history. Although he was ignored in the 19th century, he has become a widely read, if not widely understood, contributor to 20th century intellectual life. Can he assist us in our ongoing attempt to understand the large-scale political violence of our age--the wars, persecutions, and holocausts which have made the 20th century the bloodiest in history? I believe that he can, and it is my purpose in this paper to suggest the way in which his thought helps us to understand the basic motives which impel human beings to violence. In this task I will draw on The Concept of Anxiety [Dread], Philosophical Fragments, and The Sickness Unto Death. A brief discussion of these works will lay the groundwork for the subsequent comments on Naziism, Stalinism, and the East-West conflict. In the concluding section, the theory of violence which is implicit in Kierkegaard's thought will be compared with the contributions of Carl Jung, Ernest Becker, Alice Miller, and René Girard. Throughout, I will be arguing that Kierkegaard's insights into the roots of violence grow out of his distinctive interpretation of the Christian doctrine of creation.

In the first chapter of The Concept of Anxiety Kierkegaard is at pains to make the point that Adam and Eve must not be placed "fantastically on the outside" of human history. That is, there is no essential difference between their spiritual situation and ours. The key to the spiritual situation of Adam and Eve and all their descendants is the concept of anxiety, which Kierkegaard describes as "a sympathetic antipathy and an antipathetic sympathy."[1] The following passage from the Journals relates to this expression:

The nature of original sin has often been explained, and still a primary category has been lacking--it is anxiety; this is the essential determinant. Anxiety is a desire for what one fears, a sympathetic antipathy; anxiety is an alien power which grips the individual, and yet one cannot tear himself free from it and does not want to, for one fears, but what he fears he desires. [2]

What is it that we both fear and desire, at the most basic level? It is freedom, possibility, the future.

I must point out that [anxiety] is altogether different from fear and similar concepts that refer to something definite, whereas anxiety is freedom's actuality as the possibility of possibility. For this reason, anxiety is not found in the beast, precisely because by nature the beast is not qualified as spirit. [3]

That which we simultaneously fear and desire, that which awakens anxiety in us, is not a "thing" in the external world, but--possibility. This possibility which we both fear and desire is the possibility of our own spiritual transformation. That is, the roots of anxiety are to be found in the spiritual relationship between we human beings and our Creator which excludes us from the immediately determined world of nature, and throws us into our own world in which our deepest, most primitive relationship is to the possibilities inherent within our own developing beings. Anxiety arises within us when we both fear and desire the spiritual transformation which we must undergo as beings who are coming into being. That which we both fear and desire is our own creation.

The subtle but profound shift which Kierkegaard is accomplishing in The Concept of Anxiety is a shift away from thinking of creation in the past tense to thinking of creation in the present tense.[4] Instead of looking backward through human history to find the origin of sin in Adam and Eve's disobedience, Kierkegaard is teaching us to look inward (within ourselves) and upward (to God), to find the origin of sin in our own individual flight, in anxiety, away from our origin, God the Creator.

Through every man's sin, sin comes into the world; that is, through every individual's failure to respond in faith to the creative Word of God, the sin of Adam and Eve is repeated once again. Kierkegaard defends himself against the apparently Pelagian implications of this thought by stressing that even though each individual sins through his own disobedience (sin is not a category of necessity), nevertheless, in this act of disobedience he reveals his solidarity with Adam and Eve and all other persons in history, who together make up the collective human race which, in Adam, stands guilty before God. Because every individual is at the same time himself and the race, the solidarity of sin is inescapable, even though the leap into sin is made by the individual without external compulsion. For Kierkegaard there is no "solution" to this paradox, other than the greater paradox of the God-man, who, without ever making the leap into sin, became sin for us, i.e., accepted his human solidarity with us, so that in him we might be reconciled with God through the Atonement. The underlying theological dynamic here is the sovereign act of creation which brings human beings into being as God's children in spite of their anxiety, disobedience, and guilt.[5]

In Philosophical Fragments, which was published in 1844 along with The Concept of Anxiety, this same dynamic of creation is presented from a different angle. In Fragments, the Christian doctrines of sin, the Incarnation, and redemption are contrasted with the Socratic doctrine of recollection. Essentially, this is a clash between a world-view which is grounded in an ongoing gracious act of creation, and a world-view which presumes a static order of reality from which the individual has become estranged through ignorance, and to which he may return through recollection and self-knowledge. In the Socratic doctrine there is no true sin, there is only the mist of ignorance which is dispelled by the discovery of the truth within oneself; and there is no true Savior, because the identity of the midwife is inconsequential; and there is no true moment in time, because the moment of self-awareness is swallowed up by the recollection of the eternal truth. In the Christian doctrine, on the other hand, sin is presented in its starkest reality as an act of rebellion against the Creator which throws the individual into a bondage from which he cannot save himself; the only hope for the individual lies in the coming into time of God himself, so that the individual may be given both the truth and the ability to receive it, which he has forfeited through his own fault; thus the moment in time in which God came to us in person acquires an eternal significance, and the moment in time in which the individual is met by this God-man and becomes contemporaneous with him also acquires an eternal significance. This eternal significance, this meaning which transcends all human meanings, is the sovereign act of creation through which God speaks to us and brings us into being, an act which is completely "over our heads"--beyond our powers of rational understanding.

--In the moment, a person becomes aware that he was born, for his previous state, to which he is not to appeal, was indeed one of "not to be." In the moment, he becomes aware of the rebirth, for his previous state was indeed one of "not to be." If his previous state had been one of "to be," then under no circumstances would the moment have acquired decisive significance for him, as explained above. Whereas the Greek pathos focuses on recollection, the pathos of our project focuses on the moment, and no wonder, for is it not an exceedingly pathos-filled matter to come into existence from the state of "not to be"? [6]

In The Sickness Unto Death Kierkegaard describes the self which is coming into being as a synthesis of paradoxical elements: the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity. The self is constituted by this synthesis, which he calls a "relation that relates itself to itself." But a self is not a static, given entity; a self is a potentiality. There are two sides to this potentiality; on the divine side there is the creative call of God, and on the human side there is the response to this call--either willing to be oneself or not willing to be oneself. Kierkegaard's formula for the state of the self when despair is absent is this: "in relating itself to itself and in willing to be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it."[7] This is the formulation of the ideal relationship between the infinite creator and the finite creature.[8]

But as is only too obvious, this ideal relationship is not seen in the life of individuals and the life of the nations which they make up.[9] Human beings do not will to be their self before God; they evade the Word of God which is calling them into being, and fall into despair. Despair is sin, which is understood by Kierkegaard to be active avoidance of the possibility of being a self constituted by the coming together of the infinite and the finite, the temporal and the eternal, freedom and necessity.

If I may use a simile, responding to the call of God, the call of creation, is like walking up a narrow mountain ridge which drops off steeply on either side. The way of willing to be oneself before God keeps one moving forward on the ridge. Sin, on the other hand, is falling off to one side or the other of the ridge. Kierkegaard spends much of the first half of the book describing the various forms of despair which result from falling off to one side or the other. His section titles are: "Infinitude's Despair is to Lack Finitude," "Necessity's Despair is to Lack Possibility," "Despair Over the Earthly or Over Something Earthly," "Despair Over the Eternal or Over Oneself," etc. For Kierkegaard, the self which God is calling into being is a synthesis of these paradoxical elements. The way of faith is the way of allowing these paradoxical elements to come together within one's being. To be in despair is to not allow the synthesis to come together.

* * *

As we shift from a focus on Kierkegaard's writings in themselves to their application to contemporary life, we must bring in the concept of the spheres of existence, in connection with the fourth chapter of The Concept of Anxiety.[10] In this chapter Kierkegaard speaks of anxiety before the good and anxiety before the evil. Anxiety before the good is the category which he uses to interpret the demoniacs in the gospels. While he does not explicitly refer to the Pharisees in this context, it seems clear that the category of anxiety before the evil is an allusion to the particular form of offense which the Pharisees manifested. These two character types represent the extreme, pathological forms of the aesthetic and ethical spheres of existence. In this dialectic we see once again what I have described as falling off to one side or the other of the ridge of human existence before God.

The essence of the demoniac mode of existence is anxiety before the good, a shrinking back from the redemption which God offers in the person of Jesus Christ. The demoniac is afraid of the future, that is, he is afraid to allow God to transform and recreate him. He tries to hide from God's voice because he is afraid that this voice is out to undo and "destroy" him. He prefers the unfreedom of closed-upness (Indesluttethed) to the expansive world of freedom and communication. In this state, the appearance of freedom before the demoniac, that is, the appearance of Christ, can only awaken anxiety once again. The demoniac becomes anxious when he hears the call of creation, spoken to him through the incarnate Word. In Kierkegaard's words:

The demonic is closed-upness and the involuntarily revealed. These two definitions indicate, as they should, the same thing, because closed-upness is precisely the mute, and when it is to express itself, this must take place against its will, as the freedom which is the ground underlying unfreedom revolts upon entering into communication with the freedom without; it now betrays unfreedom, and the individual betrays himself against his will in anxiety.... The demonic does not close itself up with something, but closes itself up, and in this lies the profundity of existence, that unfreedom makes a prisoner precisely of itself. Freedom is constantly communicating (even if we consider the religious meaning of the word [i.e. communion], no harm is done), unfreedom becomes more and more closed-up and wants no communication.... Closed-upness is precisely the mute; language, the word, is precisely that which saves, that which saves from the closed-upness of empty abstraction.... A demoniac in the N.T. says therefore to Christ, when he approaches: tiv e*moiV kai soiv [What have I to do with you? (Mark 5.7; Luke 8.28)]; he continues that Christ has come to destroy him (anxiety before the good). Or the demoniac begs Christ to go another way.[11]

Adolf Hitler's life reveals anxiety before the good in its ultimate demonic extreme. The demoniac fears above all else the possibility of becoming that self which God is calling him to become. He thus desires above all else to be in complete control of his environment. He must be like God in order to prevent himself from being changed by God. The social form which this spiritual panic takes is a deification of the nation-state of which one is a part, creating a sacred "nest" which protects one from the voice of God. The social group which is made up of people who are "in untruth"--who are fleeing from God--aesthetically idolizes itself in its attempt to hide from God. A charismatic leader can exploit this untruth very easily:

The crowd is untruth. Hence none has more contempt for what it is to be a man than they who make it their profession to lead the crowd.... For it is not so great a trick to win the crowd. All that is needed is some talent, a certain dose of falsehood, and a little acquaintance with human passions.[12]

The demoniac is afraid of the future and wants to keep it away; the essence of Pharisaism, on the other hand, is a dissociation of oneself from the sinful past in an anxious movement into "repentance." Anxiety before the good switches over to anxiety before the evil as the individual seeks to create his own world of "righteousness," separate from the "lost" world of the "sinners." But he is just as closed-up and unfree as the demoniac because he is still evading the Word of God which is calling him into being as a synthesis of temporal creatureliness and eternal spirit.

In the century and a half since Kierkegaard's time the world has witnessed the eruption into history of a fervent political form of ethical Pharisaism. I am referring to the appearance of Marxism and the subsequent polarization of the world between the revolutionary impulse and the conservative reaction against it.

In Kierkegaardian terms, Karl Marx is a classic example of the ethical sphere of existence. Marx became profoundly alienated from the "aesthetic" milieu in which he found himself, which was a scene of misery for millions of workers, while a few business owners reaped huge profits. Marx rebelled against this exploitation and began to develop in his mind a vision for an alternative social order in which all exploitation would disappear.

The key to the ethical sphere of existence is confidence in humanity's ability to bring the good into existence in time. The person who has entered into this sphere begins to believe that this good has come into being in his own existence and in the existence of others who have begun to think and act as he does. Those who have not entered into this new sphere of ethical existence, those who continue to be trapped by the past, are seen by the revolutionaries as the enemies of this good which is coming into being in time. A sharp moral dichotomy is drawn between we who are for justice, peace, equality, etc., and they who are the "capitalists," "reactionaries," "imperialists," etc. We are good and they are evil.[13] The following quotation from Lenin evokes very clearly this dichotomizing outlook:

Thousands of practical forms and methods of accounting and controlling the rich, the rogues and the idlers should be devised and put to a practical test by the communes themselves, by small units in town and country. Variety is a guarantee of vitality here, a pledge of success in achieving the single common aim--to cleanse the land of Russia of all sorts of harmful insects, of crook-fleas, of bedbugs--the rich, and so on and so forth. In one place half a score of rich, a dozen crooks, half a dozen workers who shirk their work ... will be put in prison. In another place they will be put to cleaning latrines. In a third place they will be provided with "yellow tickets" after they have served their time, so that all the people shall have them under surveillance, as harmful persons, until they reform. In a fourth place, one out of every ten idlers will be shot on the spot. In a fifth place mixed methods may be adopted, and by probational release, for example, the rich, the bourgeois intellectuals, the crooks and hooligans who are corrigible will be given an opportunity to reform quickly. The more variety there will be, the better and richer will be our general experience, the more certain and more rapid will be the success of socialism, and the easier will it be for practice to devise--for only practice can devise--the best methods and means of struggle.[14]

The revolutionary is one who cuts himself off from the sinful past of the human race in a movement of "repentance" that leads to the setting up of another closed-up, unfree sphere of existence.

Kierkegaard's understanding of personality as a synthesis of opposing elements leads us to understand the concept of scapegoating in dialectical terms, in relation to the spheres of existence which humanity divides itself into.

For those who inhabit the aesthetic sphere of existence, such as the Nazis, the creating Word of God continually brings the possibility of redemption and new life. This possibility is feared and is struggled against (Mein Kampf). The demoniac personality attempts to fight off the possibility of its "destruction" by finding scapegoats and destroying them. In other words, the scapegoat is an unconscious symbolization of the self which the individual is called to become. For those who live in the aesthetic sphere, the scapegoat is the "shadow" of the future. The Nazis killed the Jews because they were panic-stricken before the redemptive future which God was calling them into.

The sphere of existence opened up by Marxism is a mirror image of Naziism. Here, the scapegoat which is killed is the symbol of the sinful past which has been left behind in the wake of the righteous revolution. The scapegoat now represents the ego centric, backward, "aesthetic" being who is responsible for the alienated condition of society. The revolutionary has escaped from this "bourgeois" sphere of existence, and now turns against it with a vengeance, separating himself from it completely. For those who inhabit the ethical sphere of existence, the scapegoat is the "shadow" of the past. In this we can see the "anxiety before the evil" which signifies once again the human avoidance of becoming a self, a paradoxical synthesis. Stalin's "purges" were a working out of the inner dynamic of this form of flight from God.

There is a sense in which World War II has not yet come to an end.[15] The struggle between Naziism and Stalinism which was set up at that time has continued on in the form of the struggle between the capitalist West and the communist East, the so-called Cold War. In Kierkegaardian terms this is a struggle between the aesthetic and the ethical spheres of existence. In the violent polarity which has developed between the eastern and western blocs we see the way in which people fall off to one side or the other of the dialectic of human existence. Each person is being called by God to become a synthesis of the temporal and the eternal, the finite and the infinite, necessity and freedom, the past and the future, and yet it is possible for us to reject this call and prevent the synthesis from coming together within our existence. We thus become estranged from ourselves and enter into a battle with the other side of the dialectic, from which we have alienated ourselves. We battle against the shadow of the future or against the shadow of the past, turning our fellow human beings into the embodiment of that against which we are struggling. We either try to kill the "new Adam" which we are called to become, or we try to kill the sinful "old Adam" from which we are attempting to escape. In either case, we are preventing the coming together of the synthesis which constitutes true human personality.

From the point of view which we have been developing it becomes apparent that the citizens of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. need each other in order to play out their despair; they need to have a scapegoat against which to battle in order to fortify their precarious sphere of existence. This is the central fact which lies at the root of the insanity of nuclear weapons. The magnitude of our weapons is a measure of the magnitude of our fear of being brought into being by God.

* * *

It is due chiefly to the influence of Carl Jung that the idea of the "projection of the shadow" has entered into popular consciousness.[16] My use of the word "shadow" in this paper is in a sense an echo of Jung, but unlike him I do not see the "shadow" as one among various elements which make up the psyche. I see the "shadow" as a possibility of being which is held at bay by the individual who is trying to avoid becoming the self which God is creating. The "shadow" is oneself, changed by the hearing of the Word of God. A Jungian reading this paper might say that what I have referred to as recognizing one's own sinfulness is essentially what Jung meant by the "withdrawal of the projection of the shadow." I have no objection to this comparison, but the question which needs to be asked is: "How does this withdrawal come about?" Is it a matter of a person simply deciding to stop hating his enemy? Is it a matter of a psychotherapist meeting with a person once a week for five years? Is it a matter of reading a book by Jung or Neumann and thinking about it? For Kierkegaard the recognition of one's sinfulness is only made possible by the reality of God's judgement; it is not an autonomous human possibility. If Kierkegaard were here today, he might say that instead of speaking of "the unconscious" we should speak of that of which we are not conscious, because of our closed-upness. We are unconscious of the God who brings us into being as he forgives our sins and calls us to enter into the new creation.

In relation to Kierkegaard's thought, Ernest Becker's theory of scapegoating is interesting but seriously flawed. In The Denial of Death and Escape from Evil Becker tries unsuccessfully to force Kierkegaard's thought into the mold of his own theory.[17] He argues that the "mainspring of human behavior" is the fear of death, and he seeks to explain all human culture on this basis. But his main blind-spot in relationship to Kierkegaard was his inability to see that, for Kierkegaard, the individual exists before the living God, who is calling him into fullness of life. Sin, for Kierkegaard, is avoidance of this call; in other words, sin is the denial of life, fear of creation, flight from God. Becker never took this essential theological basis of Kierkegaard's thought seriously, which left him fixated on the individual's relationship with his own physical death.

In For Your Own Good: Hidden Cruelty in Child-Rearing and the Roots of Violence Alice Miller argues that all violent actions of adults, whether self-destructive or destructive of others, are the result of some form of neglect or abuse which they suffered as a child. In her words: "... every act of cruelty, no matter how brutal and shocking, has traceable antecedents in its perpetrator's past."[18] Instead of looking primarily toward the past, Kierkegaard's thought leads us to find the roots of violence in the violent person's evasion of the call of God, the call of the future. Miller remains limited to the web of human relationships, and does not acknowledge the theological dimension of human existence. In the language of The Concept of Anxiety, she only sees the "quantitative determinations" of sinfulness in human history, without seeing the "qualitative leap into sin," which is human evasion of God in the present moment in time. She sees victims everywhere, but no sinners, no willful defiance of God. Her thought is analogous to the Marxist mythology which identifies evil with the bourgeoisie, the past, and identifies good with the proletariat, the future; Miller identifies evil with the parents and good with the children. But the human condition cannot be divided up so simply; the buck must stop being passed at some point. The doctrine of sin must be grounded in the real, active sin of each individual, instead of being watered down and lost in a universal haze of repetitious victimage which absolves everyone of responsibility (even Adolf Hitler!).

Among the various attempts to understand political violence of which I am aware René Girard's is the most impressive and thought-provoking.[19] His writings are justly described as having an epochal place in social science, and in general I find myself in agreement with his theses, to the extent that I can grasp them. My criticism of Girard is, however, that he is stronger in "social psychology" than in "individual psychology"; that is, his sociological edifice seems to lack the understanding of individual motivation which I have been attempting to articulate in this paper. Kierkegaard's dictum, "the crowd is untruth," is the perfect epigraph for Girard's work, but an understanding of the "untruthfulness" of the individuals who make up the crowd is only vaguely presented there, in the presupposition of a "desire" which drives the mechanism of mimeticism. In the end it seems that Girard's doctrine of sin is essentially Socratic: sin is ignorance, unconsciousness of the scapegoat mechanism. For a deeper understanding of sin we must turn to Kierkegaard. From him we can learn that the "social crisis" which is resolved through the "scapegoat mechanism" is in reality the crisis of human existence before God, the crisis of creation. Sin is flight from the possibility of new creation.

In fairness to Girard, I must say that he realizes very clearly that the key to the whole problem is found in the Prologue of John, but he writes in the genre of sociological theory rather than the genre of theology, which prevents him from speaking as freely as he might of the Incarnation of the Word of God in human history. The central point of the preceding criticisms is that it is not possible to understand human violence without acknowledging that human beings are addressed by the Word of God, and live their lives in reaction to this Word. I believe that Girard would agree with this statement.

In this chapter I have argued that Kierkegaard's thought helps us to understand the basic motivations which impel human beings to violence. This insight which Kierkegaard has into the human condition is not simply a product of his own genius; his source of knowledge is the New Testament. Everything which he knows about humanity comes from his life-long attempt to understand the meaning of Christ's life, teachings, and death.

Christ is the creating Word of God. As such, he speaks the message which humanity cannot bear to hear in its attempt to flee from its own creation. This message is a paradoxical call to the individual: a call "forward" into fullness of life as a child of God, and a call "backward" into a true awareness of one's sin. The gift of forgiveness brings new life and hope as it opens up the individual to God's future, but at the same time forgiveness brings with it the sorrow of confession and repentance. The person who is brought into being by Christ must live in this tension, without trying to escape from it.

That we do in fact try to escape from this tension is the most obvious fact of the modern world, for those who have eyes to see. Speaking very generally, we can see that the capitalist sphere manifests "anxiety before the good," a rejection of the call to move forward into the kingdom of God, while the communist sphere manifests "anxiety before the evil," a rejection of the call to confess one's own guilty participation in the sinfulness of humanity. In this sense the East-West conflict unwittingly witnesses to the world-creating message spoken by Jesus Christ, the Word of God.

AFTERWORD (1990)

The essay you have just read was presented at a conference in 1988 and revised in the following months. Since that time the remarkable events that have occurred in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, which can be called a "thawing" of the Cold War, have made some of the sentences in the paper sound a bit dated. In this connection, I have three brief comments to add: (1) The heart of the paper is an attempt to use Kierkegaard's thought as a help in understanding certain momentous events in 20th century history--the Holocaust, Stalin's purges, and the nuclear arms race. These events have occurred; they have become a permanent part of human history. If there is any validity in the way in which I have applied Kierkegaard's thought to the task of understanding these events, that validity will not be lost due to the occurrence of any other events later on in history. (2) I did not say, and did not mean to imply, that the Cold War would continue on indefinitely. To the extent that the Cold War has indeed "thawed" (in the Eastern Bloc, if not in China), that is a sign that individuals in both the East and the West have become less fearful (less anxiety-dominated) and more open to change (more open to the process of creation). Once again, that does not invalidate anything that was said in the paper, but is in fact the sort of change which was implicitly hoped for in it. Neither the present author nor Kierkegaard is a determinist with regard to the future. (3) I believe that there is a value in allowing this piece of writing to stand intact as an artifact of the year in which it was written. If it so happens that ten or twenty or fifty years from now all nuclear weapons have been abolished, a few of the persons who grow up in that post-nuclear era may read this essay at some point in their lives and glean from it a feeling for what it was like to live under the threat of global nuclear war. Of course, there is a wealth of other writing which they could read to similar effect, but this one is rather unusual in being a piece of Kierkegaard scholarship.

As a final note, even if 50 or 100 years from now all armies have been abolished (or if they haven't), there will still be an ongoing debate between the advocates of differing social philosophies. If this debate is still being carried on by those whose interpretation of human existence is distorted by what I have called falling off to one side or the other of the ridge, this essay will still be as relevant then as it is today, although the tone of urgency in which it was written will indeed be dated. That Kierkegaard's thought is an important contribution to the debates over social and political philosophy is my firm belief, as against those who would dismiss such an idea with a wave of the hand and a chuckle. When social and political thought is distilled to its essence, it always returns to the problem of understanding human nature, human psychology, the human condition. In this realm, those who wave off Kierkegaard do so at the risk of their own intellectual stultification (which is precisely what the Master of Irony expected to happen). It is my hope that at least a few persons will see in Kierkegaard not an impossible "individualist" but a profound visionary of the actualities and potentialities of human community.

NOTES

1. The Concept of Anxiety, trans. Reidar Thomte (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1980), p. 42.

2. The Journals and Papers of Soren Kierkegaard, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1967-1978), vol. 1, entry 94.

3. Anxiety, p. 42.

4. Stephen Crites gives a strikingly similar analysis of divine creation as something to be understood in terms of creative possibilities. See p. 154 in this volume.

5. The theme that the doctrine of creation is fundamental to Kierkegaard's understanding of human life and relationship is also prominent in the chapters by Michael Plekon and George Connell in this volume.

6. Philosophical Fragments, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), p. 21.

7. The Sickness Unto Death, trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1983), p. 14.

8. Compare Stephen Crites' account of the self-synthesis on pp. 149-158 in this volume.

9. Notice how naturally this analysis is extended from individuals to nations, confirming Crites' argument on p. 150.

10. For an introduction to the spheres, see Gregor Malantschuk, Kierkegaard's Way to the Truth, trans. Mary Michelsen (Minneapolis: Augsburg, 1963).

11. My translation. Cf. Anxiety, pp. 123-124.

12. The Point of View for My Work as an Author, trans. Walter Lowrie (New York: Harper and Row, 1962), pp. 113, 115. I have found an extraordinary quotation from Franklin Roosevelt that bears directly on the subject of this essay. It is found in a book by Frances Perkins, The Roosevelt I Knew (New York: The Viking Press, 1946), p. 148. Perkins describes how during World War II Roosevelt had become acquainted with a young Kierkegaard scholar named Howard A. Johnson, who encouraged the President to read some of Kierkegaard's writings. Roosevelt did so (apparently he read at least The Concept of Dread), and Perkins recounts a conversation with him that went as follows:

Some weeks later I happened to be reporting to Roosevelt on problems concerning the War Labor Board. He was looking at me, nodding his head, and, I thought, following my report, but suddenly he interrupted me. "Frances, have you ever read Kierkegaard?" "Very little--mostly reviews of his writings." "Well, you ought to read him, " he said with enthusiasm. "It will teach you something." I thought perhaps he meant it would teach me something about the War Labor Board. "It will teach you about the Nazis," he said. "Kierkegaard explains the Nazis to me as nothing else ever has. I have never been able to make out why people who are obviously human beings could behave like that. They are human, yet they behave like demons. Kierkegaard gives you an understanding of what it is in man that makes it possible for these Germans to be so evil. This fellow, Johnson, over at St. John's, knows a lot about Kierkegaard and his theories. You'd better read him."

13. Of course Marxists by no means have a monopoly on this kind of dichotomous thinking; all of us tend to think that "God must be on our side."

14. The Lenin Anthology, ed. Robert C. Tucker (New York: W.W. Norton, 1975), pp. 431-432.

15. Perhaps the recent events in Eastern Europe mean it has finally ended. See the Afterword to this essay.

16. See "After the Catastrophe," in The Collected Works of Carl Jung, vol. 10, Civilization in Transition, trans. R.F.C. Hull (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964); The Undiscovered Self, trans. Eugene Rolfe (New York: Mentor Books, 1957); and Erich Neumann, Depth Psychology and a New Ethic, trans. Eugene Rolfe (New York: Putnam's Sons, 1969).

17. See The Denial of Death (New York: The Free Press, 1973); Escape from Evil (New York: The Free Press, 1975); and "The Heroics of Everyday Life," in Voices and Visions, ed. Sam Keen (New York: Harper and Row, 1974).

18. For Your Own Good, trans. Hildegarde and Hunter Hannum (New York: Farrar, Straus, Giroux, 1984), p. ix.

19. See Violence and the Sacred, trans. Patrick Gregory (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977); Things Hidden since the Foundation of the World, trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Meteer (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1987); and The Scapegoat, trans. Yvonne Freccero (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1986).

 

 

Charles Bellinger's home page: http://libnt2.lib.tcu.edu/staff/bellinger/cbhome.htm

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TCU: http://www.tcu.edu/

The Crowd is Untruth: a Comparison of Kierkegaard and Girard

The purpose of this essay is to provide an introductory comparison of the writings of Søren Kierkegaard and René Girard. To my knowledge, a substantial secondary article or book has not been written on this subject.[1] Girard's writings themselves contain only a handful of references to Kierkegaard.[2] This deficiency is unfortunate, since, as I hope to show in the following pages, these two authors do share common insights into the psychology of violence.

Girard's writings usually take the form of a scientific analysis of historical data. He is attempting to frame a theory of culture which takes into account all of the data which he has encountered. It would seem that Kierkegaard's mode of thought is very different, since he is primarily concerned with the meaning of personal existence before God. But Kierkegaard was in his own way and in his own time a kind of social scientist. He engaged in an extended "anthropological contemplation" (1967-1978, v. 1: #37), in which he attempted to map out the territory of the human spirit. Girard's thought, for its part, occasionally steps outside of the methodological atheism of the scientific guild to speak in theological terms. Thus in both realms, the scientific and the theological, there is the possibility of fruitful dialogue between these two authors.

I am assuming that the members of the Colloquium on Violence and Religion are more familiar with the writings of Girard than with the writings of Kierkegaard. My procedure will therefore involve listing certain key concepts in Girard's thought, such as mimetic desire, envy, the social crisis, etc., followed by a search for parallel ideas in Kierkegaard. If Girard were claiming complete originality for his interpretation of culture, my findings would show that he was in many respects foreshadowed by Kierkegaard. But, of course, he is not claiming this. He claims only to be restating and organizing insights which have already been achieved by great novelists and the Bible. I would argue that Kierkegaard is rightly seen as one of the great "novelists" who sees human culture clearly and penetratingly. It is not a coincidence that Kierkegaard's thought, like Girard's, is rooted in an interpretation of the Bible.

After this initial survey of similarities between Kierkegaard and Girard, I will outline a few possible differences between their approaches. This will lead to comments on the way in which Kierkegaard's thought can be used as a basis for understanding the motives which underlie political violence. I will propose that Kierkegaard's thought can be coordinated with Girard's in such a way that the thought of each author is strengthened by the contribution of the other.

Mimetic Desire Mimetic desire is the main starting point for Girard's theory of personality and culture. Human beings have a basic feeling of existential lack which leads them to look to a model who seems to possess a greater fullness of being. The desires of the model are imitated in the hope of acquiring a similar fullness of being. In Girard's words:

When modern theorists envisage man as a being who knows what he wants, or who at least possesses an "unconscious" that knows for him, they may simply have failed to perceive the domain in which human uncertainty is most extreme. Once his basic needs are satisfied (indeed, sometimes even before), man is subject to intense desires, though he may not know precisely for what. The reason is that he desires being, something he himself lacks and which some other person seems to possess. The subject thus looks to that other person to inform him of what he should desire in order to acquire that being. If the model, who is apparently already endowed with superior being, desires some object, that object must surely be capable of conferring an even greater plenitude of being. (1977, 145-46)

Is mimetic desire a phenomenon which is noticed by Kierkegaard?

Kierkegaard's book Christian Discourses, which receives very little scholarly attention, contains a psychological analysis which clearly anticipates Girard's theory of mimetic desire. In the discourse on "The Worry of Lowliness,"[3] for example, Kierkegaard describes three modes of being, which are represented by the bird, the heathen, and the Christian. The bird, along with the lily, represents for Kierkegaard the realm of nature. Kierkegaard's description of the behavior of the "heathen" is almost identical to Girard's psychology. Consider the following quotation:

For it seems indeed as if, in order to be himself, a man must first be expertly informed about what the others are, and thereby learn to know what he himself is--in order then to be that. However, if he walks into the snare of this optical illusion, he never reaches the point of being himself. (1971, 42)

Here Kierkegaard is debunking, like Girard, the idea that the desires of the "modern" person are spontaneous and unmediated by society. "Being," in the sense of a centered and coherent self-consciousness, is precisely what the individual lacks; therefore he looks around at the others so that he may pattern himself after them. Kierkegaard and Girard are both describing the double bind in which the individual places himself as he seeks to become himself by copying others. The next passage expands on this theme by opening up the theological dimension of human existence:

For from "the others," naturally, one properly only learns to know what the others are--it is in this way the world would beguile a man from being himself. "The others," in turn do not know at all what they themselves are, but only what the others are. There is only One who knows what He Himself is, that is God; and He knows also what every man in himself is, for it is precisely by being before God that every man is. The man who is not before God is not himself, for this a man can be only by being before Him who is in and for Himself. If one is oneself by being in Him who is in and for Himself, one can be in others or before others, but one cannot by being merely before others be oneself. (1971, 43)

This quotation highlights the emptiness and vanity of the "world." When human beings are looking to each other as models of being, the pathway of life is a treadmill or squirrel cage rather than an actual road. The thread is being pulled through the fabric without having been tied at the end. The only context in which human life gains coherence, stability, and purpose is found in the transcendent relationship between the individual and God the Creator. This theme is very clear in Kierkegaard, and I would suggest that it is implicit throughout Girard's writings, whenever it is not explicitly stated.

If we turn to Kierkegaard's psychological masterpiece, The Sickness Unto Death, we find the same anthropological insights. The person described as the "heathen" in Christian Discourses is now the despairing individual:

He [the person in despair] now acquires a little understanding of life, he learns to copy others,[4] how they manage their lives--and he now proceeds to live the same way. In Christendom he is also a Christian, goes to church every Sunday, listens to and understands the pastor, indeed they have a mutual understanding; he dies, the pastor ushers him into eternity for ten rix-dollars--but a self he was not, and a self he did not become. (1983, 52)

In a passage such as this, Kierkegaard twists the knife which he is plunging into nominal Christianity. He is arguing that the so-called Christians of Christendom are actually living in the way of the "heathen," which is the way of empty mimetic selfhood. Implicit here is the idea that the biblical texts have a great potential for transforming human thought and life; but this potential has been vitiated during the history of Christianity, as the biblical message has been watered down and made to conform to the pre-existing mimetic psychology of the "world." Kierkegaard's critique of Christendom is developed most decisively in his late works, The Sickness Unto Death, Practice in Christianity, For Self-Examination, Judge for Yourself!, and in the essays published in English as Kierkegaard's Attack Upon Christendom. When these works are placed next to Girard's comments on the "sacrificial" nature of nominal Christianity, it is apparent that the two authors are aiming at the same target.[5]

Envy The word envy points to a certain intensifying and souring of mimetic desire. Kierkegaard was keenly interested in this phenomenon, as we can see in an extended passage in Two Ages, 81-84:[6]

Ultimately the tension of reflection establishes itself as a principle, and just as enthusiasm is the unifying principle in a passionate age, so envy becomes the negatively unifying principle in a passionless and very reflective age.... The individual must first of all break out of the prison in which his own reflection holds him, and if he succeeds, he still does not stand in the open but in the vast penitentiary built by the reflection of his associates, and to this he is again related through the reflection-relation in himself, and this can be broken only by religious inwardness, however much he sees through the falseness of the relation. (1978, 81)

This work is a review of a novel entitled Two Ages by Thomasine Gyllembourg, which was published in 1845. It is interesting to note the similarity between Kierkegaard's comments here and Girard's review of 19th century novels in Deceit, Desire, and the Novel. Kierkegaard uses the metaphor of a penitentiary to analyze modern Western culture. When envy, which Girard calls internal mediation, is the basic principle of a social system, human life becomes a prison from which escape is very difficult. In his work, Girard speaks of "ontological" or "metaphysical" sickness, which suggests that modern culture is like a vast insane asylum which has been created by the minds of the inmates. Both authors are painting a picture of modern society as a hall of mirrors in which the self is lost, as it continually seeks to see itself in the other. As long as the individual strives to find himself in the nexus of reflections, he does not come to himself. In the asylum, men are either "gods" or "demons" in the eyes of each other. Religious inwardness, the life of faith, is the pathway which leads out of the trap, as it shows the individual the falseness of the culture in which he is enmeshed and opens up his existence to genuine transcendence. A "vertical" relationship with God is necessary in order for the person to gain authentic selfhood; this makes possible a different kind of social order, one which is based on truth rather than falsehood.

The Social Crisis Girard maintains that a society which is organized around the principle of mimetic desire is inherently unstable. It can degenerate into a war of all against all, as imitation of the desires of others leads to rivalry with them. The breakdown of society can produce a mass contagion which is most accurately described in terms of demonic possession. Here again, Kierkegaard's thought is cognizant of the same phenomenon. He not only spoke of the demonic as a category of individual psychology, but also as a sociological category. Indeed, this distinction between individual and society is broken down by Kierkegaard just as it is by Girard. The term which Girard coins to indicate the social construction of the mimetic self is "interdividual psychology." This term suggests a lack of coherent, discrete individuality in those persons who are suffering from the ontological sickness of mimetic desire. When an entire society is made up of such persons, there is a lack of genuine human subjectivity. As Oughourlian puts it, "the only subject is the mimetic structure" (Things Hidden, 199). In this light, consider this entry from the Journals which expresses Kierkegaard's understanding of an acute social crisis:

In contrast to what was said about possession in the Middle Ages and times like that, that there were individuals who sold themselves to the devil, I have an urge to write a book:

Possession and Obsession in Modern Times

and show how people en masse abandon themselves to it, how it is now carried on en masse. This is why people run together in flocks--so that natural and animal rage will grip a person, so that he feels stimulated, inflamed, and ausser sich. The scenes on Bloksberg are utterly pedantic compared to this demonic lust, a lust to lose oneself in order to evaporate in a potentiation, so that a person is outside of himself, does not really know what he is doing or what he is saying or who it is or what it is speaking through him, while the blood rushes faster, the eyes glitter and stare fixedly, the passions boil, lusts seethe. (1967-1978, v. 4: 4178)

This passage is reminiscent of Girard's comments on the The Bacchae in Violence and the Sacred. Girard's analysis of the play leads him to the conclusion that Dionysus is "the god of decisive mob action" (1977, 134). The subject of the play is the outbreak of violence which threatens the existence of the community. This threat is avoided through sacrifice. In Girard's words: "The metamorphosis from peaceable citizens into raging beasts is too terrifying and too transitory for the community to accept it as issuing from within itself. As soon as calm has been miraculously restored, the past tumult will be looked upon as a supreme example of divine intervention" (1977, 134).

The Scapegoat In Girard's sociology, the crisis of societal disintegration is resolved through the identification and killing of a chosen victim, a scapegoat. The killing of the scapegoat provides a means for the formation of a new social unanimity and cohesion, as acquisitive mimesis is transformed into conflictual mimesis, which is resolved by the destruction of someone arbitrarily designated as the cause of the conflict.

Kierkegaard had a unique perspective on the phenomenon of scapegoating as a result of what has become known as The Corsair Affair. The Corsair was a satirical paper which began to ridicule Kierkegaard after he complained about being the only intellectual in Copenhagen who had not been attacked in its pages. He could not stand the guilt by association. After the verbal insults and visual caricatures began to be published, Kierkegaard literally became a laughing-stock within Danish society. His beloved walks around the streets of the city became a continual gauntlet of derision. Mothers began to tell their children: "Don't be a Søren!" Kierkegaard's tendency to associate himself with Christ was exacerbated by this experience, as he came to see himself as being surrounded by vulgar mockery, just as Christ was when he was beaten by the soldiers. He saw himself as undergoing a repetition in his own life of the social expulsion which Christ experienced.

It was his experience of heterogeneity which enabled Kierkegaard to reflect deeply on the meaning of the crucifixion of Christ, an important theme in his later authorship. Works of Love, for example, contains a vivid description of the mockery of Christ, as it would have appeared from Christ's perspective:

I wonder if the wild, nocturnal howl of beasts of prey is ever so dreadful as the inhumanity of the raging mob. I wonder if one beast of prey in the pack can incite another to a frenzy greater than is natural for the individual beast in the same way as one man among the unrepentant crowd can incite another to a more than animal bloodthirstiness and frenzy. I wonder if even the most bloodthirsty beast's spiteful or flashing glance has this same fire of evil which is kindled in the individual's eye when, incited and inciting, he rages in the frenzied mob! (1962b, 166)[7]

The phrase, "incited and inciting," is a direct parallel with Girard's observations concerning the process of mutual "interdividual" reinforcement which constitutes the system of mimetic desire. In this system, persons may alternate from moment to moment between active and passive roles in the production of mass contagion.

Note that in a passage such as this, Kierkegaard is giving his attention to the dynamics of crowd behavior as they are revealed in the Gospels. This is a different mode of reading than that which is found in typical biblical scholarship. Kierkegaard is demonstrating that the Gospels have a fundamental anthropological interest and knowledge. It is this knowledge which Girard is seeking to exposit in his writings. Together they are forging vital links between theology and social science. These links are vital because they concern the very possibility of knowledge itself. An understanding of the basic motives which impel human behavior is made possible by the revelation of the scapegoat.

The Cross as Revelation Girard speaks of the Gospels as texts which reveal the scapegoat mechanism, because they are written from the point of view of the victim, not of the persecuting crowd. This process of revelation is echoed and amplified in Kierkegaard's writings, which stress as strongly as possible that truth does not lie on the side of the crowd, but of the individual. (It is a misconception that when Kierkegaard spoke of "the single individual," he was thinking of the so-called "individual" of the modern West. He was thinking of Christ.) Indeed, Kierkegaard wrote an essay on the theme "The Crowd is Untruth" (1962a, 109-120). This phrase could serve as the perfect epigraph for Girard's thought as a whole. In this essay we find passages such as this:

The crowd is untruth. Therefore was Christ crucified, because he, even though he addressed himself to all, would not have to do with the crowd, because he would not in any way let a crowd help him, because he in this respect absolutely pushed away, would not found a party, or allow balloting, but would be what he was, the truth, which relates itself to the single individual. And therefore everyone who in truth will serve the truth, is eo ipso in some way or other a martyr. (1962a, 114 [my trans.])

Girard maintains in his works that the most common Christian understanding of the Cross, as a vicarious atonement, is an example of the reversion of Christianity to sacrificial thinking. Such a reversion is a falling away from the revelatory insights of the New Testament. Girard is attempting to show that violence has a human origin alone. Violence is not directed or demanded by God. Concerning the Cross, he says that: "Neither the Son nor the Father should be questioned about the cause of this event, but all mankind, and mankind alone" (1987, 213). Kierkegaard anticipated Girard at this point as well, as we see in the following passage:

Rarely does one make a real attempt to understand how it was that Christ (whose life in one sense could not possibly have collided with anyone since it had no earthly aims) ended his life by being crucified. Perhaps one fears getting to know anything of the implicit proof of the existence of evil in the world. So one pretends as if Christ himself and God's providence ordained it this way.... The fact that Christ was willing to sacrifice his life does not at all signify that he sought death or forced the Jews to kill him. Christ's willingness to offer his life simply means a conception of the world as being so evil that the Holy One unconditionally had to die--unless he wanted to become a sinner or a mediocrity in order to become a success in the world. (1967-1978, v. 1: #305 [emphasis added])

The Key Differences Between Kierkegaard and Girard This very brief overview of Kierkegaard's thought suggests that Kierkegaard can be legitimately described as a 19th century thinker who reveals the workings of mimetic desire. While further research and articulation is warranted on this agenda, we need to turn our attention now to the differences between the two authors.

The first difference concerns the Kierkegaardian concept of the spheres of existence. Kierkegaard, through his pseudonyms, paints a picture of three primary spheres of existence, the aesthetic, the ethical, and the religious. Since Kierkegaard is most commonly construed as an individualistic thinker, these spheres are usually considered as describing different ways in which an individual thinks and acts. I propose, however, that it is also legitimate to interpret these spheres in social terms. In other words, there is a certain sub-group within the culture of the modern West which lives "aesthetically;" there is another sub-group which lives "ethically;" and there is another sub-group which lives "religiously." I suggest, for instance, that Naziism is an example of an "aesthetic" culture which became demonic. Stalinism is an example of an "ethical" ideology which became demonic.[8] I refer to the theory of the spheres at this point because I do not find a parallel theory in Girard's writings. He tends to make only a binary distinction between the way of mimetic desire and the way of the kingdom, which seems to parallel Kierkegaard's description of the aesthetic and religious spheres. I would suggest, however, that Girard's thought can be further nuanced by separating out the aesthetic and ethical spheres as two different types of mimetic culture. Kierkegaard's The Concept of Anxiety is helpful here in the distinction it draws between angst before the good (e.g. Naziism) and angst before the evil (e.g. Stalinism) (1980, 113-24). Girard's thought paints a picture of one social group forming around the lynching of a victim. But what if an "aesthetic" lynch mob enters into a war with an "ethical" lynch mob? They are not exact doubles of each other. Kierkegaard's concept of the spheres of existence sensitizes us to differences between the mobs which ought not to be elided.

The second main point of difference between Kierkegaard and Girard concerns the starting point for their interpretation of human psychology. Girard starts on the horizontal plane with a secular account of the origin of religion among primitive people. This is similar to Hume's attempt, in The Natural History of Religion, to provide a naturalistic, non-rational account of the origin of religion. We could paraphrase Hume as saying: "This is a plausible account of how religion first arose, even if there were no God." Girard is engaged in a similar project, in that he is providing a naturalistic explanation of the genesis of religion and culture. It is only after Girard has developed his theory of interdividual psychology and the scapegoat mechanism that he arrives at the doorstep of theology and points his reader to the way of the kingdom and the life of faith. In this movement from below to above we can see an apologetic framework which is in my opinion very powerful.

It needs to be seen, however, that Kierkegaard's thought is different in that it is theological from the ground up. It is not an example of apologetics but of confessional theology. In The Concept of Anxiety and The Sickness Unto Death, his two main psychological works, he understands human beings as creatures of God who unavoidably exist in relation to their Creator. The question is, what is the nature of this relationship? Are human beings going to live in faith and openness toward God, or are they going to turn away from God into despair? This basic decision, if we can call it that, defines the most central core of a human being. It is in the wake of this decision that the individual enters into social relationships. Whereas Girard's thought finds theology at its conclusion rather than at the outset, Kierkegaard understands the crowd to be an assemblage of individuals who are hiding from God and attempting to evade the difficult process of spiritual growth. The crowd is untruth because it is made up of persons who are falsifying what it means to be a creature of God.

I am not at this point putting forward a critique of Girard's thought, I am merely pointing out an important difference between his writings and Kierkegaard's. Girard writes within the genre of sociological theory. In the modern university, this genre does not allow theological postulates. Therefore, in order to gain any hearing at all, an author must start with non-theological premises. This places a certain stricture upon Girard which Kierkegaard did not have to worry about. For the open-minded among the social scientists, Girard's work can serve as a gateway for the introduction of Kierkegaardian insights into social scientific thinking, which will always remain woefully incomplete as long as it functions without reference to religious transcendence.

Kierkegaard's Reflections on Violence We turn now to a consideration of the way in which Kierkegaard's thought can help us to understand the basic motives which lead human beings toward violence. His thoughts on this subject are not exactly the same as Girard's, but the two visions can be coordinated.

Girard begins with the idea that human beings experience a basic feeling of existential lack. It is this experience which is the engine driving mimetic desire and its resulting mechanisms. But why do human beings have this feeling of lack?

I propose that there is a key in Kierkegaard's idea of continuing creation, as found in The Concept of Anxiety. This is suggested by Kierkegaard's decision to begin the book with a consideration of the creation story in Genesis. The crucial difference between human beings and the lower animals is that we have the ability to be conscious of the ongoing process of creation which is occurring within our souls. This ability produces anxiety, which makes sin possible; yet anxiety is also a sign of our relationship to our Creator and thus points toward the possibility of redemption and growth into maturity.[9]

What makes us anxious is the event of creation, as it is experienced by us. Kierkegaard is leading us to think of creation as an ongoing event in the present, rather than simply as a completed event in the past. In this light, the basic motivations which drive human behavior are understood as arising out of the relationship between the individual and God the Creator.

Girard leaves us asking why people have a feeling of existential lack. Kierkegaard gives one possible answer to this question. We have a feeling of lack because we are unfinished beings. We are immature. We have not yet attained the goal (telo") of our existence as creatures of God.[10] If we had attained the goal of our existence, then our desires would be consonant with God's desires. But since we are not completed beings, our desires are untethered. We are blown here and there by the winds of the culture into which we are born. We are lost in the "inconstancy" of the world.

Using The Concept of Anxiety as a starting point, a Kierkegaardian understanding of violence can be developed along the following lines. 1) Human beings are not "finished" creatures. The process of creation is ongoing within our souls. This process of creation opens up the potential for anxiety. We are anxious about the possibilities inherent within our developing beings. 2) The starting point of sin is the human attempt to evade the possibility of divinely directed spiritual growth. Kierkegaard speaks of this as "self-protection."[11] 3) In rejecting the ongoing process of creation, human beings are rejecting the work of God.[12] 4) The basic root of violence is the turn of the human soul away from God in an attempt to control the process of creation and lessen the pain of anxiety.[13] Violence is a means of fortifying a particular immature formation of the ego against the possibility of the ego's "death" and "rebirth" in a more mature formation. The immature ego finds support by belonging to a social group which consists of others who are immature in a similar way. The individual thus hides in the "crowd" which is "untruth."[14] The individuals who make up the crowd require scapegoats which they can denounce and attack in their ongoing efforts in self-protection. 5) The drama of human rejection of the possibility of spiritual growth is revealed most clearly in the crucifixion of Christ, as Kierkegaard suggests in this passage:

How Did It Happen That Christ Was Put to Death?

I can answer this in such a way that with the same answer I show what Christianity is. What is "spirit"? (And Christ is indeed spirit, his religion is of the spirit.) Spirit is: to live as if dead (to die to the world). So far removed is this mode of existence from the natural man that it is quite literally worse for him than simply dying. The natural man can tolerate it for an hour when it is introduced very guardedly at the distance of the imagination--yes, then it even pleases him. But if it is moved any closer to him, so close that it is presented in dead earnestness as a demand upon him, then the self-preservation instinct of the natural life is aroused to such an extent that it becomes a regular fury, as happens through drinking, or as they say, a furor uterinus. In this state of derangement he demands the death of the man of spirit or rushes upon him to slay him. (1967-1978, v. 4: 4360)

Conclusion To sum up, the key point at which Kierkegaard's thought advances Girard's is to be found in his description of the relationship between the individual and God the Creator, when the individual is attempting to avoid the process of spiritual growth. This is the central theme of The Concept of Anxiety, Purity of Heart, the essay on "The Crowd is Untruth," The Sickness Unto Death, and Practice in Christianity.[15] In these works, Kierkegaard lays the foundation for an understanding of the psychology of violence that is subtle and theologically profound. The key point at which Girard's thought improves upon Kierkegaard's is found in Girard's theoretical refinement of the understanding of the crowd. The idea that "the crowd is untruth" was an insight that Kierkegaard pointed to at various times in his authorship. But in Girard, this idea is developed into a comprehensive social theory which is articulated in conversation with current philosophical anthropology, taking into consideration a broad swath of social scientific data from the ancient Aztecs up to the present day. When Girard's thought is coordinated with Kierkegaard's, the result is a very strong testimony to the power of the Christian intellectual tradition as a resource for understanding the psychology of violence.[16]

NOTES

1. Eugene Webb's Philosophers of Consciousness and The Self Between contain discussions of Kierkegaard and Girard, but they are basically parallel sections which do not include a focused comparison of the two authors. David McCracken's The Scandal of the Gospels makes reference to Girard and contains a chapter on Kierkegaard, but it also lacks an extended comparison.

2. See Deceit, Desire, and the Novel, 58; The Scapegoat, 173; To Double Business Bound, 26-27; and p. xi of the Foreword to Robert Hamerton-Kelly, The Gospel and the Sacred: "Mimetic theory is too realistic and commonsensical to be confused with one more nihilistic stepchild of German idealism. And yet, unlike the positivistic social sciences, it is not blind to paradox; it can articulate the intricacies of human relations just as effectively as a Kierkegaard or a Dostoievsky."

3. Walter Lowrie translates the title as "The Anxiety of Lowliness." This is acceptable, but it is misleading now, given that a reader is likely to assume that the same word is being used here and in Kierkegaard's important book, The Concept of Anxiety. The word used here is not Angest, however, but Bekymring, which means worry, trouble, concern.

4. In the original: "han lærer at efterabe de andre Mennesker." Efterabe means literally to ape after, to mimic.

5. See, for instance, Things Hidden, 235-236: "In effect, this sacrificial concept of divinity must 'die', and with it the whole apparatus of historical Christianity, for the Gospels to be able to rise again in our midst, not looking like a corpse that we have exhumed, but revealed as the newest, finest, liveliest and truest thing that we have ever set eyes upon."

6. See Robert L. Perkins, "Envy as Personal Phenomenon and as Politics," in International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages, 116: "The highest relation between persons is that based upon the God-relation. Those who relate to this concept and to each other through this concept are ideally united.... This is the very heart of Kierkegaard's thought. If the idea is missing, then persons relate to each other simply en masse. The result is violence, anarchy, barbarism, decadence, gossip, rumor, and an apathetic envy that becomes the standard in human relations. Persons have nothing else to look at except each other, and they turn on each other in suspicion and aggression."

7. This is just a portion of a longer section which has astonishing resonances for the reader familiar with Girard. See also a parallel passage in the Journals and Papers, v. 3: 2926.

8. See my essay in Connell and Evans, eds.

9. See Nordentoft, Kierkegaard's Psychology, 75: "This synthesis-structure is a potential, and the possibilities it contains are, in brief, two: completion or despair."

10. The Sickness Unto Death, 33: "Every human being is primitively intended to be a self, destined to become himself." See also Eugene Webb's comments on "existential appetite" on pages 241-242 of The Self Between, which are among the most insightful words which I have read on the dynamic structure of the self.

11. See, for example, The Sickness Unto Death, 109, where he describes despair's attempt to hide from the good; For Self-Examination, 34, where he calls biblical scholarship an attempt to defend the self from God's Word; Judge for Yourself!, 176, where he speaks of his generation's effort to defend itself against Christ; and Kierkegaard's Attack Upon Christendom, 160-161, where he critiques the Christian Church in history for trying to defend itself against the possibility of following Christ as the Pattern.

12. See Gregor Malantschuk, The Controversial Kierkegaard, 13: "Kierkegaard maintains that when a person attempts to root out the thought of God he destroys his own worth as a human being. He declares that 'to murder God is the most horrible form of suicide, entirely to forget God is a man's deepest fall, no beast ever fell so deep as that.' [1971, 70] Presumably one can kill the thought of God--but not God himself. Kierkegaard believes that no human being can escape the relation to the eternal. This will assert itself in a positive or a negative way. Only by a positive relation to the eternal and to God will a person achieve his true destiny."

13. Marjorie Suchocki expresses similar ideas in The Fall to Violence. See pages 86 and 96-97.

14. See Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits, 134: "While the crowd makes a big noise and uproar and triumphs and jubilates; while one individual after the other hurries to the crowd's arena, where it is said to be good to be if one is seeking oblivion and indulgence from the eternal; while the crowd seems to be shouting mockingly at God, 'All right, see if you can get hold of us!' since in a throng it is of course always difficult to see the individual, difficult to see the trees if one is looking at the forest--then the earnestness of eternity calmly waits. And if all the generations that have lived on earth rose up and united into one crowd in order to charge against eternity and to coerce it also with their enormous majority, eternity splits them up as easily as the imperturbability of the cliff that, without moving from the spot, disperses the foaming surf, as easily as a storm wind in its advance scatters the chaff."

15. See Practice in Christianity, 88: "... this deification of the established order is the perpetual revolt, the continual mutiny against God. That is, God wants to be involved ... wants to have a little bit of control of the world's development, or he wants to keep the human race developing. The deification of the established order, however, is the smug invention of the lazy, secular mentality that wants to settle down and fancy that now there is total peace and security, now we have achieved the highest."

16. The author wishes to thank Andrew McKenna for valuable comments on an earlier draft of this essay.

WORKS CITED

Bellinger, Charles K. "Toward a Kierkegaardian Understanding of Hitler, Stalin, and the Cold War." In Connell and Evans, eds., 1992, 218-230.

Connell, George, and C. Stephen Evans, eds. 1992. Foundations of Kierkegaard's Vision of Community: Religion, Ethics, and Politics in Kierkegaard. Atlantic Highlands: Humanities Press International.

Girard, René. 1977. Violence and the Sacred. Trans. Patrick Gregory. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1977.

______. 1984. Deceit, Desire, and the Novel: Self and Other in Literary Structure. Trans. Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

______. 1986. The Scapegoat. Trans. Yvonne Freccero. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

______. 1987. Things Hidden Since the Foundation of the World. Trans. Stephen Bann and Michael Metteer. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

______. 1988. To Double Business Bound: Essays on Literature, Mimesis, and Anthropology. Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Hamerton-Kelly, Robert G. 1994. The Gospel and the Sacred: Poetics of Violence in Mark. Minneapolis: Fortress Press.

Hume, David. 1957. The Natural History of Religion. Ed. H. E. Root. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Kierkegaard, Søren. 1962a. The Point of View for My Work as an Author. Trans. Walter Lowrie. New York: Harper and Row.

______. 1962b. Works of Love. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. New York: Harper and Row.

______. 1967-1978. Søren Kierkegaard's Journals and Papers, I-VII. Ed. and trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong, assisted by Gregor Malantschuk. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

______. 1971. Christian Discourses. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1972. Kierkegaard's Attack Upon "Christendom": 1854-1855. Trans. Walter Lowrie. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1978. Two Ages: A Literary Review. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1980. The Concept of Anxiety: A Simple Psychologically Orienting Deliberation on the Dogmatic Issue of Hereditary Sin. Trans. Reidar Thomte in collaboration with Albert B. Anderson. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1982. The Corsair Affair. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1983. The Sickness Unto Death: A Christian Psychological Exposition for Upbuilding and Awakening. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1990. For Self-Examination and Judge for Yourself! Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1991. Practice in Christianity. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

______. 1993. Upbuilding Discourses in Various Spirits. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

McCracken, David. 1994. The Scandal of the Gospels: Jesus, Story, and Offense. New York: Oxford University Press.

Malantschuk, Gregor. 1980. The Controversial Kierkegaard. Trans. Howard V. Hong and Edna H. Hong. Waterloo: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

Nordentoft, Kresten. 1978. Kierkegaard's Psychology. Trans. Bruce H. Kirmmse. Pittsburgh: Duquesne University Press.

Perkins, Robert L., ed. 1984. International Kierkegaard Commentary: Two Ages. Macon: Mercer University Press.

Suchocki, Marjorie Hewitt. 1994. The Fall to Violence: Original Sin in Relational Theology. New York: Continuum.

Webb, Eugene. 1988. Philosophers of Consciousness: Polanyi, Lonergan, Voegelin, Ricoeur, Girard, Kierkegaard. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

______. 1993. The Self Between: From Freud to the New Social Psychology of France. Seattle: University of Washington Press.

 

 

Charles Bellinger's home page: http://libnt2.lib.tcu.edu/staff/bellinger/cbhome.htm

Brite Divinity School: http://www.brite.tcu.edu/Index.htm

TCU: http://www.tcu.edu/

Practical Help for Afghans

As allied forces narrow their hunt for Osama bin Laden, the broader mission is creating a stable, secure Afghanistan. That will take time and resources, but President Bush can start now by drawing on one of .the most effective, cost-efficient weapons in the fight against poverty: Providing very small business loans to the poorest people -- especially women --through microlending.

Fortune 500 companies may not be lining up to do business in war-ravaged Afghanistan, but there is still businesses to be done. Like much of the developing world, Afghanistan has a well-established, yet informal, economy of street vendors, neighborhood shops and cottage industries. Small loans go a long way. Just $50, for example, could buy a used refrigerator to keep a vendor’s produce fresh, a used sewing machine to make stitches go faster or a bicycle to deliver goods. Tiny transactions like these are part of a proven strategy of poverty reduction. Across the globe, 25 million microentrepreneurs are using loans of very small amounts to increase their incomes and lift their communities.

Microfinance has worked well in war-torn areas. Within nine months of the start of a microlending effort in Kosovo's hardest-hit areas, 1,500 mlcroentrepreneurs were in business and paying their loans back on time at an incredible rate of 99 percent. In El Salvador, recovering from the effects of civil war and then devastating hurricanes, microfinance institutions are now making more business loans than commercial banks.

Microfinancing serves both men and women, but all around the world, it focuses especially on women’s business development, because helping women helps children. One group that can benefit greatly in Afghanistan, for example, is the many women who have become the sole support of their children after years of war. Afghan women and men need the access to microfinance to build something better.

While I served at the Small Business Administration, our own domestic microenterprise initiative grew to a permanent program. With average loans of $10,000, Americans with ideas and initiative but no credit history have been able to start thousands of businesses providing services from day care to gardening to travel arrangements. As small businesses were established, poor communities were strengthened.

Worldwide, the demand for microcro-credit keeps growing far faster than the funds available for it. Despite increased microlending support in recent years, the World Bank estimates nearly half a billion microentrepreners have no ability to get financial accesss. Many are forced to turn to loan sharks, who may charge interest of as much as 10 percent a day.

Microfinance is clearly good development policy, but it is also good security policy. Microenterprise assistance won’t end the threat of terrorism, but it is a down payment on building stronger economies and more stable societies..

As Congress considers legislation to renew international microcredit assistance, the president should raise our investment to $500 million in annual aid from the current $150 million. Unlike other foreign aid, this is a renewable resource; as one family repays a loan, another receives one, multiplying the impact thousands of times over.

The World Bank should also do more. Today less than one penny out of every World Bank dollar is devoted to microlending. The bank should reform its charter to allow it to provide direct financing to microfinance institutions. The United States should also urge other wealthy nations to increase their contributions and include microfinance on the agenda of upcoming meetings of the G-7 group of industrial nations and the World Trade Organization.

We need to update our thinking about helping the world’s poor. Everyone knows the adage that says, "If you teach a person to fish. . ." But in Afghanistan and throughout the developing world, people already know how to fish and farm and make and sell all kinds of goods and services. They need capita1 to invest in what they know. And that investment will pay dividends for us all.

On Message

The day that the Secretary of Defense left for the Middle East and Central Asia, I spent a morning with John McWethy. One of the senior reporters on the Pentagon beat, McWethy, fifty-four, works out of a windowless cubicle that he shares with Barbara Starr, anABC News producer who does radio. The office measures approximately eight feet by eight feet, the size of the cage at a parking garage, which it greatly resembles, with the addition of the dark institutional carpet that runs up the walls. Stuffed with books, papers, television monitors, and broadcast equipment, the office gives the two of them just enough room to work at their desks while sitting back-to-back. Fluorescent light pours into the room from a boxlike plastic fixture. It’s government-issue light, the kind you might see inside a big-city courtroom in the middle of December.

[Samuels asks McWethy for an assessment of Secretary Rumsfeld]

"He’s so absolutely . . . I don’t know how to say this," McWethy says, when I ask him about Rumsfeld. He pauses. "He has a passion for secrecy," he finally says, "and he is absolutely unforgiving and unrelenting on this issue." Not only has Rumsfeld threatened sources with legal prosecution, from the Briefing Room podium, on national television, he notes, but the Pentagon also refuses to confirm or deny much of the information that reporters do manage to find out, thus ensuring that the news that does reach the public is often riddled with guesswork and error.

"You’ve already seen disinformation created by this policy," he says, referring to rumors of a deployment of F-15 fighter planes to the Middle East, which turned out to be false. Refusing to answer reporters’ questions, he says, is hardly compelled by a desire to protect the lives of American troops.

"I think it’s nonsense," he says flatly. In recent off-the-record meetings with the Secretary, he adds, reporters aired their concerns about the effects of the department’s policy for the second or third time this month. "I think he was delighted to hear the effect of his edicts," he says. In the talks that McWethy gives at the Naval Academy, he adds, he has noticed how often the cadets make reference to "the Vietnam effect," a phrase that implies, in so many words, that the press was responsible for losing that war.

"What they seem not to understand is that we were being lied to at the highest levels of government," McWethy continues. "This terrible breach of trust . . ."

***

The effect of this attitude on the psyches of even the most experienced reporters is easy to spot. In the middle of the afternoon, on the fourth day of the American bombing campaign in Afghanistan, David Martin, fifty-eight, the correspondent for CBS, is sitting alone in the dark. His office is larger than McWethy’s, and it has a window: the sun is blocked out by a plastic shade.

It makes sense that Martin might be depressed. The job he does now is no longer the same as the job he was hired to do. Like McWethy, Martin belongs to an older generation of reporters who imagined that television would provide them with a way to reach tens of millions of people with stories that shed real and necessary light on the actions of their government. (The evidence of the nineties suggests that the networks are no longer interested in reporting the news. By cutting news budgets year after year, and by eliminating investigative and foreign reporting in favor of the serial dramas of 0. J. Simpson, Jon-Benet Ramsey, and Monica Lewinsky, the networks have succeeded in transforming "news" into yet another shabby subdivision of the Magic Kingdom. The networks now have little choice but to treat the war as a dramatic entertainment, rather than as an occasion for asking the larger and subtler questions that need to be asked.)

***

I talk to CNN’s regular Pentagon team, Jamie McIntyre and Christopher Plante, whose sunny, capacious surroundings say all one needs to know about the relative importance of the networks and instant news: the total square footage of the CNN office is roughly equal to that of ABC, NBC, and CBS combined.

"The first ‘N’ stands for ‘news," says Plante, gesturing toward the network logo with his thumb, "as opposed to the domestic entertainment networks down the hall."

Plante is shooting down a rumor that originated on debka.com, a website that offers actual reporting on troop movements, intelligence agencies, and the motivations for actions by foreign governments. "Major portions of this story," he remarks, "will be impossible to verify and impossible to report." Still, he adds, he is quite satisfied with the product that CNN is putting on the air.

"The guys down the hail do one show a night," he explains. "They do one small package. They know what we have, because they’re watching us all day long. Our mission is to leave them with nothing at the end of each and every day."

There’s plenty of nothing at the Pentagon. As the sun sinks below the highway, Charlie Aldinger is sitting in the press room, talking to the Reuters Washington desk. "When in doubt, fudge," he says. "You got that?" The rank of senior Pentagon correspondent is not without its privileges; his cubicle adjoins a large window.

"The man was in a lot of trouble before the war came along," he says, using his pointer finger to indicate the man upstairs. "He staked it all on missile defense, then the tax cut eliminated the surplus." Back then, he says, Rumsfeld’s relationship with the press was poor.

"There was the sense that he didn’t have time for the press and that he didn’t give a rat’s ass about the press," he explains. His conclusion is simple:

"The war saved the man."

But what about the press?

***

[Samuels talks with the "oldest living reporter at the Pentagon" -- ninety-one year old Raymond Cromley.] The hour is getting late, so I ask him if he can sum up all that he has learned in a few simple sentences. He is happy to oblige.

"People of all countries are nice," he offers, gently. "There are some villains in every country. All the top commandments of every religion are the same."

Down the Corridor, the Fox News guys are preparing for their seven o’clock hit.

A line of black-boxed videotapes marches west on a shelf across the far wall. They are the visuals, perhaps several miles’ worth of Pentagon-approved operational footage of destroyers and aircraft carriers, bombers, fighters, and other weapons systems in action, produced in concert with the defense contractors who profit from their manufacture and who would love nothing more than to gain additional appropriations from Congress based on cool-looking footage. In the meantime, the footage stands in for the reality of a war that is impossible to see, hear, or touch.

***

The gap between what the correspondents say in private and what they can say on the air is one of the most familiar features of the American corporate news business. The arrangement is fair to everyone—unless, of course, you are one of the 11.4 million viewers who watched tonight’s broadcast of ABC news. In that case it appears that you were robbed.

Two USAF C-17s Globemaster III from Charleston AFB, SC perform high altitude humanitarian airdrops into Afghanastan using the TRIAD (Tri-wall Airdrop) system to deliver Humanitarian Daily Rations (HDR’s) to fleeing refugees, I read. The text is a precise description of the footage I have just seen on television. I wonder, idly, when "fleeing refugees" might gain its own acronym. This mission, the handout continues, with pride, was the first Combat Airdrop for the C-17 aircraft, the first operational test of the TRIAD system with the C-17, and the first high-altitude airdrop of its kind for the C-17. The footage serves as a plausible facsimile of the war as defined by the Pentagon; it tells viewers nothing about the origins and nature of an enemy that Republicans and Democrats alike have been ignoring for the last ten years, out of deference to the demands of Big Oil and in the hope that a world of six billion people might wake up one morning, consider the odds, and start bowing to Bill Gates, Michael Jordan, and the Goddess of Democracy.

Somehow, it seems, the Pentagon has got the lessons of Vietnam exactly wrong. In a great democracy, a policy of honesty and openness with the public and the press is probably the only way to win the war on terrorism. It is important for reporters to ask difficult, even unpardonable questions of people in authority, in order to keep themselves and the rest of us informed. We should all know the answers to the questions that are not being asked, or are not being asked often enough. Otherwise, it is difficult to imagine any other result than another long, expensive, frustrating, fruitless, and divisive war.

Empiricism and Process Theology: God Is What God Does

In 1932 The Christian Century published for 25 weeks a series of articles on empirical theology, with disclaimers by a cheerful atheist, Max Otto. The discussions on "Is There a God?" were by Douglas Clyde Macintosh and Henry Nelson Wieman. Otto made positive statements about the nonexistence of God, and the two theists criticized each other. Both Macintosh and Wieman were empiricists; they believed that by the method of observation, experiment and reason one could establish the existence of God. Macintosh accused Wieman of being like "a tightrope walker at a circus. At one time it almost seemed as if he were going to come down on the side of theism." What irked Macintosh was that Wieman talked about God as "the growth of meaning and value in the world" and saw no evidence pointing to God as a person; Wieman thought that Macintosh, though starting with empirical evidence, proceeded to interpret God in terms of human wishes rather than in terms of the facts. Furthermore, Macintosh was guilty, said Wieman, of relying on the religious consciousness, with results that were subjective.

Theological Winds of Change

In 1939, the Century ran a series of 35 articles on "How My Mind Has Changed in This Decade." Sixteen of the writers mentioned Karl Barth, but only three responded favorably to his thought. The emphasis was still on some brand of liberalism. Halford Luccock titled his article "With No Apologies to Barth!" At this time, Charles Hartshorne was making an impact with his process thinking and especially with his logical analysis of the ways in which God is both absolutely and relatively perfect, so that God is unsurpassable except by self: this analysis opened the door to thinking about God as one who suffers and therefore changes in response to the world. The empirical theologians leaned toward such process thinking, but at this point they had not worked out the implications.

With the coming of World War II there was a Barthian blackout of this kind of thinking. The emphasis was on revelation and the wholly other God. Natural theology was at least suspect and in some cases was ruled out altogether. Macintosh characterized Barthian theology as "reactionary irrationalism," but as a younger generation took over theological discourse, Barthian ways of thinking predominated. Slowly the whole of theology was permeated by what was called neo-orthodoxy. After Shelton Smith wrote Faith and Nature (1940), even the liberal religious educators began to be influenced.

During all this time, most of the churches held to a standard biblical othodoxy that was only slightly swayed by the winds of either neo-orthodoxy or liberalism. Yet there were disturbing changes taking place among many believers. The emphases of the culture as a whole were influenced by secularism, scientific discoveries and technology. There were criticisms of theology from within as theologians began to take account of these secular forces. John A.T. Robinson’s Honest to God (1963) was a reaction to standard orthodoxy rather than to neo-orthodoxy or liberalism, and the response of lay people in both England and the United States revealed that there were many unanswered questions.

We were ready, then, for the "death of God" movement. Paul van Buren’s Secular Meaning of the Gospel (1963) pointed directly to Barth’s concept of God. The logical positivists with their demand for verification addressed themselves mostly to traditional supernaturalism. Many concepts of God were dead, but that did not mean that God was dead. Henry Nelson Wieman looked at the carnage and concluded that no one was talking about his concept of God, for an empirical approach required the kind of verification that the logical positivists were demanding.

Certain developments in theology pointed to a recovery of belief in God. Following Bultmann and Heidegger, Schubert Ogden moved toward an existentialist approach in Christ Without Myth (1961). However, Ogden was also steeped in the thought of Wieman, Hartshorne and Alfred North Whitehead; in The Reality of God (1966) he moved toward an empirically based process theology, albeit one with the pointedness of existentialism. About the same time, John B. Cobb, Jr., building on Hartshorne and Whitehead, developed A Christian Natural Theology (1965). When in 1969 Bernard E. Meland edited The Future of Empirical Theology, it seemed that there had been both a recovery of empiricism and an enrichment of it. The specifically Christian developments became evident in The Spirit and Forms of Love (1968), by Daniel Day Williams, which Cobb called "the first systematic process theology."

Conversions to New Paradigms

If we broaden our historical perspective, we will see that there have been constantly changing viewpoints throughout the history of Christianity. The biblical faith came into contact with Greek thought, and this cross-fertilization led to a new perspective on the world. When Thomas Aquinas adopted Aristotle for his philosophical framework, another world view replaced the earlier one. Kant, Hegel and Kierkegaard provided new ways of looking at things. Today we have modern physics and process philosophy. A paradigm determines both the data we select and the way we interpret them. In each case, data previously ignored have forced themselves upon human consciousness, effecting a conversion to a new paradigm. Ian Barbour describes this process in his Myths, Models, and Paradigms (1974). It has occurred in science as well as in theology, and it is through such a process that human knowledge is advanced.

The common paradigm in secular knowledge today is determined by developments in science, technology, communications, political procedures and, ultimately, a world view that comes not only from recent discoveries but also from new ways of looking at old data. Wittgenstein once said that "the problems are solved, not by giving new information, but by arranging what we have always known" (Philosophical Investigations, p. 47 [third edition, 1968]). So we are called to re-examine data from the biblical and historic traditions as well as to interpret new data.

Becoming and Perishing

Given a process paradigm, we see reality as a process of becoming .and perishing, with new "becomings" building on that which has perished. The model is that of the human body, with its interrelationships whereby plural activities constitute a unity; the constant process of becoming and perishing is the key to understanding it. The process paradigm evokes a picture of the world that is consistent with the findings of modern science and yet is specifically religious in its orientation.

Within this framework, the starting point of theology is the study of the relationship between human beings and a superhuman reality we call God. But even to assume such a reality as God leads to a careful examination of our experiences to determine how any thing or entity can be known to exist. We reflect on these experiences and make sure that our concepts are coherent with other concepts understood within this paradigm, and then build a world view that includes our religious beliefs as part. of a coherent system.

This approach makes use of radical empiricism, pragmatism, and a pluralistic world view. Radical empiricism, as derived from William James, is based on an analysis of our experience of objects and the relationships between objects of fact and value, with a testing process to check conclusions. The pragmatic aspects, which involve us in checking whether our ideas work, also including value judgments; for a tree is known by its fruits, and faith without works is dead. Unless we impose a premature unity on our interpretation, there are always some loose ends in this kind of thinking. All experience is seen as being within the process of becoming and perishing, with God as an active entity within the process working toward value, and as a transcendent factor who is -everlasting. (These views are spelled out in detail in the writings of the process theologians and summarized in my book The American Spirit in Theology [1974]).

Such a theology becomes biblical when the methods are used in dealing with the biblical record. The Bible provides a historical statement of religious development, a dynamic and vital interpretation of the search for God, and primary data for any normative approach to Christianity. It is the basic source for Christian beliefs. All the diversities of Christian theology claim the Bible as their source, and this claim places upon us responsibility to deal intelligently with all that we can know about the Bible.

Seen in this way, the Bible is not centered on humanity. Although it is a record of the human search for God, the emphasis is on God. It provides historical data open to human interpretation, but the theme is the acts of God. The message from God is received by the men and women of the Bible -- sometimes in muted tones, sometimes in distorted forms, and sometimes with amazing clarity. It speaks to a different view of the nature of the world, and therefore we need to see how to fit it into our paradigm.

God as Creative Order

When empiricism is used to seek out and interpret the data about God, we begin with the statement that God is what God does. Revelation has to do with events and not propositions. Therefore, we identify God with the creative order of the world, a process which transforms human beings, brings values from a potential to an actual state, and works to overcome evil with good. God is that process by which we are made new, strengthened, directed, comforted, forgiven, saved, and by which we are lured into feelings of wonder, awe and reverence. This may not be all that we can know about God, but as Daniel Day Williams suggested in reference to Wieman, this view of God as creative order

actually stated what has become the practice of people in wide areas of our culture, including much of the practice of religious institutions. When we ask what [people] actually put their trust in as revealed by their actions, we see that we may require something like "creative interchange" to describe the operative process to which we give our attention and even our devotion [Charles Hartshorne and Henry Nelson Wieman, edited by William S. Minor (Foundation for Creative Philosophy, 1969) p. 56].

Beyond the empirical findings as part of this approach to religious knowledge, there are what William James called "overbeliefs." Here we move into the area of analogies, models and metaphors. We use words normally restricted to human relations to describe our experience of God. We think of God as holy; we experience God as just and righteous; we construe God as persuasive love; we see God as good. These are ways of looking upon God as having certain characteristics; as long as we don’t take them literally and make God in our own image, it is a helpful way to think.

Process theologians think of reality as becoming and perishing, and this process could degenerate into chaos if there were no limits. God is thought of as dipolar. As abstract, God is the principle of limitation, the source of potentialities waiting to be born, the primordial reality which structures what would otherwise be chaos. The aims or purposes of God reside in the abstract nature.

God is also the concrete process which works in and through nature and humanity. Thus, when we think of God’s consequent nature, we are pointing to that immanent process which is the persuasive love of God at work. It is God’s grace, God’s free gift of self, God’s concrete presence which we experience. God’s abstract nature is everlasting and does not change, while God’s concrete nature participates in the life of the universe and is affected by it. God suffers, enjoys, and changes. So God affects history and is affected by the joys and sufferings of humankind. Insofar as we share in the subjective aims of God, we are on the right track.

God is not the all, as in pantheism, and God is not separate from the world, as in deism. God is both cause and effect, is independent as primordial and involved as consequent, is good and yet suffers from evil. In God "we live and move and have our being" (Acts 17:28). This concept is sometimes labeled panentheism. This dipolar God is one God, for the abstract nature is included within the consequent nature.

The emphasis on God’s love suggests an approach to the problem of evil. Whitehead was adamant that the "brief Galilean vision" pointed not to a monarchial deity, but to God as working through persuasive love and therefore not in complete control. There was no doctrine of predestination, and evil was beyond God’s purpose as something to be overcome with good. Evil is a brute motive force, and "the fact of the instability of evil is the moral order of the world" (Religion in the Making [1926], p. 95). If chance, novelty and freedom are seen as existing independently of God’s aims, they may either be aligned with God’s aims or opposed to them. Thus evil is opposed to God as external, and God has an environment. We can account for the world we live in and still have faith in God.

An Open Future

The implications of this concept of God for Christianity are significant. It is a theology that is both incarnational and sacramental. God comes into human life at all times, for God is immanent and is capable of ingression. There is a basis here for understanding how God was present in and worked through Jesus as the Christ and how the spirit of God or Christ may be present in the sacraments of the church. God draws us into community, and this act becomes a basis for understanding the church (see Bernard Lee, The Becoming of the Church [1974])

Because this kind of thinking sees the individual in relation to society, keeping the independence of the actual entity and yet seeing reality as societal and organic, religious beliefs lead to faith, worship and action. Religion may begin in solitariness, but it expresses ‘itself in community. It may begin with an experience which needs to be interpreted within the framework of a process paradigm, but its fruits are in the achieving of personal and social values. And because God is a "companion -- the fellow-sufferer who understands," the concern for the oppressed is central. Thus, social action fits into this overall view of Christianity.

The future is open. There are no guarantees that God will take over. If "God’s power is the worship he inspires," we find that great responsibility is thrown on human beings. If chance and novelty are operating principles and if human freedom is a crucial factor, the future is not known even to God. There is a creative advance into novelty," and in this advance God may surprise the world and the world may surprise God. Thus, there is hope of liberation for the oppressed, of strength to achieve values, of comfort in the face of unsurmountable obstacles, and of wisdom to distinguish which is which. "Beloved, we are God’s children now; it does not yet appear what we shall be" (I John 3:2, RSV).

Shared Experience

One reason for the great variety of beliefs is that at the center of all religious experience is mystery. This mystery remains such, to be pointed at or shown but not to be explained. The limitation of language is that words can only point or show. Words can become an invitation to share an experience or even to share a paradigm, and in some cases they may be very persuasive, but meaning is found in those words only after there is recognition -- of a shared, experience. The heart of religion is still the idea of the holy or numinous, to which we respond with awe, even dread, as well as reverence.

Thus, one of the most important empirical anchors is the shared experience of worship, but this sharing depends to some extent on common perceptions, feelings and beliefs. We still have to participate in the use of words if our beliefs are to be meaningful. Often we see the meaning for ourselves and others when these beliefs lead to commitment and action, for faith without works is dead.

We start with a paradigm that accounts for the data of our experiences in all areas of human endeavor. If the paradigm chosen is based on an empirical and process methodology and a philosophy of organism, the resulting Christian beliefs will be something like what we have briefly described. At least they point to the reality of the world as many people perceive the world today. This way of viewing things has a respectable history supported by some outstanding thinkers who are devoted Christians. Perhaps you will want to take a closer look.

World Opinion Opposes the Attack on Afghanistan

According to Tony Blair and George Bush respectively, 'world opinion' and the 'collective will of the world' supported the attack on Afghanistan. Yet analysis of international opinion polls shows that with only three exceptions majorities in all countries polled have opposed the policy of the US and UK governments. Furthermore there have been consistent majorities against the current action in the UK and sizeable numbers of the US population had reservations about the bombing.

World opinion

The biggest poll of world opinion was carried out by Gallup International in 37 countries in late September (Gallup International 2001). It found that apart from the US, Israel and India a majority of people in every country surveyed preferred extradition and trial of suspects to a US attack. Clear and sizeable majorities were recorded in the UK (75%) and across Western Europe from 67% in France to 87% in Switzerland. Between 64% (Czech Republic) and 83 % (Lithuania)of Eastern Europeans concurred as did varying majorities in Korea, Pakistan, South Africa and Zimbabwe. An even more emphatic answer obtained in Latin America where between 80% (Panama) and 94% (Mexico) favoured extradition. The poll also found that majorities in the US and Israel (both 56%) did not favour attacks on civilians. Yet such polls have been ignored by the media and by many of the polling companies. After the bombing started opposition seems to have grown in Europe. As only the Mirror has reported, by early November 65 per cent in Germany and 69 per cent in Spain wanted the US attacks to end (Yates, 2001). Meanwhile in Russia polls before and after the bombing show majorities opposed to the attacks. One slogan which reportedly commanded majority support doing the rounds in Moscow at the end of September was 'World War III - Without Russia' (Agency WPS 2001). After the bombing started Interfax reported a Gallup International poll showing a majority of Moscow residents against the US military action (BBC Worldwide Monitoring 2001)

Polling companies.

The questions asked by a number of polling companies such as MORI, Gallup and ICM have been seriously inadequate. They have failed to give respondents a range of possible options in relation to the war. When polling companies do ask about alternatives, support for war falls away quite markedly. In the UK prior to the bombing all except one poll, which asked the question, showed a majority against bombing if it caused civilian casualties. After the bombing started UK polling companies stopped asking about concern for civilians. From the start of the bombing to the fall of Kabul on 13 November there were only four polls on British opinion (by ICM (2001a, 2001b) and MORI (2001a, 2001b)) compared with 7 between the 11 September and the start of the bombing on October 7. None has asked adequate questions about alternatives to bombing. ICM did ask one alternative questions about whether bombing should stop to allow aid into Afghanistan and 54% said it should (Guardian October 30). Where questions about aid or alternatives to bombing are asked the results have been consistent: Clear and sometimes massive majorities against the bombing. In an ignored poll, the Scottish Sunday Mail found that fully 69% of Scots favoured sanctions, diplomacy or bringing Bin Laden to trial. Only 17% favoured his execution and a minuscule 5% supported bombing (21 October). The Herald in Glasgow also found only 6% favoured the then current policy of bombing alone (3 November). It is well known that Scottish opinion tends to be to the left of UK opinion, but not by more than a few points on average. Although the Press Association picked up on the Herald poll it was not reported in the British national press. Between the start of the bombing and the fall of Kabul, (with the exception of the single question in the Guardian poll showing 54% in favour of a pause in bombing) not a single polling company asked the British public any questions about alternatives to war.

It is not altogether clear whether the lack of options given to poll respondents is due to the media or the polling companies. Certainly both UK and US polling companies have been guilty of misrepresenting their own data almost without exception overemphasising support for the war. For example Mori claimed that their polling in late October had 'extinguished any lingering doubt' that support was 'fading' (Mortimore 2001). Of course this completely ignores all the poll data which would give an alternative view and the fact that the polling questions have been inadequate. Furthermore, according to Bob Worcester of MORI, (in an address to an London School of Economics meeting on the media and the war on 15 November) the text of press reports on their polls are 'approved' by MORI itself before they are published. This is clearly a matter of good practice and should be applauded. But the benefit is fairly marginal, if MORI are content for the press to distort the level of opposition by concentrating on the 'overwhelming' support for the war and relegating opposition to the war to the end of reports.

Media reporting

It comes as a surprise to many in the UK and US to discover that opinion is so markedly opposed to or ambivalent about the current action. One key reason is that the polls have been systematically misreported in the media. Both television and the press in the US and UK have continued to insist that massive majorities support the bombing. Senior BBC journalists have expressed surprise and disbelief when shown the evidence from the opinion polls. One told me that she didn't believe that the polling companies were corrupt and that she thought it unlikely that the Guardian would minimise the opposition to the war. This was days after the Guardian published a poll purporting to show that 74% supported the bombing (Travis 2001, 12 October). What the BBC journalist hadn't noticed was that the Guardian's polls had asked only very limited questions and failed to give respondents the option of saying they would prefer diplomatic solutions. In the poll on 12 October one question was asked but only if people thought enough had been done diplomatically. Given that the government and the media had been of the opinion that enough had been done and alternative voices were marginalised, it is surprising that as many as 37% said that enough had not been done.

Furthermore the Guardian's editorial position has offered (qualified) support for the war and it did not cover the demonstrations in London and Glasgow on 13 October. As a result of a 'flurry' of protests this was raised by the readers' editor at the Guardian's editorial meeting on 14 October and the editor agreed that this had been a 'mistake'. But, the readers editor revealed that it is the papers 'general policy' not to cover marches (Mayes 2001), thus condemning dissent to the margins of the news agenda and leaving the field open for those with the resources to stage 'proper' news events.

Elsewhere in the media, almost every poll has been interpreted to indicate popular support for the war. Where that interpretation is extremely difficult journalists have tried to squeeze the figures to fit. One Scottish newspaper was so concerned at the low numbers supporting bombing that they phoned me to ask how best to interpret the findings. Another paper, the Sunday Mail showed only 5% support for bombing and 69% favouring conflict resolution. Nevertheless the closest they got to this in their headline was that Scots were 'split' on bombing (21 October 2001).

TV news reporters have routinely covered demonstrations in Britain and the US as if they represent only a small minority of opinion. The underlying assumption is that demonstrators only represent themselves rather than seeing them as an expression of a larger constituency of dissent. Thus BBC reporters claim that 'the opinion polls say that a majority of UK public opinion backs the war' (BBC1 Panorama, 14 October 2001) or in reporting the demonstrations in London that 'Despite the strength of feelings here today those opposed to military action are still very much in the minority' (BBC1 News 13 October 2001 21.50). These reports are at best naïve, at worst mendacious, and a clear violation of the legal requirement of the BBC to be balanced.

In the US dissent has been markedly harder to find in the news media (Solomon 2001). The pictures of dead children featured in the rest of the world press been hard to find (Lucas 2001) and the debate on the use of cluster bombs and the 'daisy cutter' bombs (a weapon of mass destruction) which were debated in the mainstream UK media in late October were almost non existent on the television news in the US. * CNN continued to report under the heading 'America Strikes back' which is of itself a woefully partial version of what was happening. Polling companies in the US have given their respondents little choice of policy options. Where they have asked a variety of questions answers opposing US policy have been downplayed in media reports. The New York Times reported on 25 September that 92% of respondents agreed that the US should take military action against whoever is responsible for the attacks'. But the text of the report belied the 'support for war' headline indicating that fully 78% felt that the US should wait until it was certain who is responsible', before responding. As Edward Herman, leading critic of US foreign Policy has written of the inadequacy of polls which do not ask about extradition, civilian casualties, or whether they would support action which breaches international law (Herman 2001). One little reported poll for Newsweek in early October showed that '58 percent of respondents said the U.S. government's support for Israel may have been the cause' of the attacks, thus indicating that America may have struck first rather that simply striking back as CNN would have it.

Furthermore there is evidence that dissent in the US is being underrepresented in responses to opinion polls. In a Gallup poll 31% agreed that the attacks on the US had made them 'less likely to say things that might be unpopular?' (http://www.gallup.com/poll/releases/pr011008c.asp). And opposition to the war is pretty unpopular in media coverage of the war. When Bill Maher, host of the Politically Incorrect chat show criticised remarks by Bush describing the WTC attackers as 'cowards', the White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said: 'There are reminders to all Americans that they need to watch what they do, and this is not a time for remarks like that' (Usborne 2001). His show lost advertisers and was dropped by some networks.

Conclusion

The most fundamental problem with the polls is that they assume the public has perfect information. But, notwithstanding some dissent in the press, the media in the UK, and even more emphatically in the US, have been distorting what is happening in Afghanistan especially on civilian casualties and alternatives to war. To ask about approval of what is happening assumes that people actually know what is happening. But given that a large proportion of the population receives little but misinformation and propaganda (especially on TV news which is most peoples main source of information) then it is less surprising that some should approve of what they are told is happening - that the US and UK are doing their best to avoid civilian casualties, that Blair exercises a moderating influence on Bush. When they are asked their own preferences about what should happen (rather than approval questions about what is happening) then there is much less support, even in the US. In other words there is no world support for the attack on Afghanistan and public opinion in the US and UK is at best dubious and at worst flatly opposed to what is happening. If Bush and Blair were really democrats, they would never have started the bombing.

David Miller is a member of the Stirling Media Research Institute.

http://staff.stir.ac.uk/david.miller

*Author's observation. The author spent 10 days in the US between 26th October and 4th November and compared the news in the US with the debates taking place in the media in the UK.

References

Agency WPS (2001) 'What the papers say. Part I', October 1, 2001, Monday 'RUSSIANS WON'T SUPPORT PUTIN IF HE INVOLVES RUSSIA IN RETALIATION' Zavtra, September 27, 2001, p. 1

BBC Worldwide Monitoring (2001) 'Public poll sees threat to Russia from US military action' Interfax news agency, Moscow, in English 1137 gmt 9 Oct 01. October 9, 2001, Tuesday,

Gallup International (2001) 'Gallup International Poll on terrorism in the US', http://www.gallup-international.com/surveys.htm

ICM (2001a) ' ICM RESEARCH / GUARDIAN POLL OCTOBER 2001', published in the Guardian, 12 October. http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2001/guardian-afghan-poll-oct-2001.htm

ICM (2001b) ' ICM RESEARCH / THE GUARDIAN AFGHAN POLL - OCTOBER 2001', published in the Guardian, 30 October. http://www.icmresearch.co.uk/reviews/2001/guardian-afghan2-poll-oct-2001.htm

Herman, E. (2001) 'Nuggets from a nuthouse', Z Magazine, November.

Lucas, S. (2001) 'How a free press censors itself', New Statesman, 12 November, 14-15.

Mayes, I. (2001) 'Leading lights', The Guardian, Saturday review, 20 October: 7.

MORI (2001a) 'First poll on the Afghanistan War: Britons fully support Blair but fear retaliatory Strikes' Poll for Tonight with Trevor McDonald, 11 October, 10.20pm, ITV. http://www.mori.com/polls/granada.shtml

MORI (2001b) 'War of Afghanistan Poll' for the Mail on Sunday, 4 November 2001

http://www.mori.com/polls/2001/ms011104.shtml

Mortimore, R. (2001) 'Commentary: Britain at war' 26 October, http://www.mori.com/digest/2001/c011026.shtml

Solomon, N. (2001 'TV news: a militarised zone', Znet, 9 October, http://www.zmag.org/solomonzone.htm

Usborne, D. (2001) 'Jokers and peaceniks face patriotic wrath', Independent on Sunday, 30 September: 7.

Yates, N. (2001) 'War on Terror: the World questions America', The Mirror, 9 November.

Wake Up, America

It is the broadest move in American history to sweep aside constitutional protections. Yet President Bush’s order creating military tribunals to try those suspected of links to terrorism has aroused little public uproar. Why? Because, I am convinced, people do not understand the order’s dangerous breadth — and its defenders have done their best to conceal its true character.

The order is described as if it is aimed only at Osama bin Laden and other terrorist leaders. A former deputy attorney general, George J. Terwilliger III, said the master-minds of the Sept. 11 attacks "don’t deserve constitutional protection."

But the Bush order covers all non-citizens, and there are about 20 million of them in the United States —immigrants working toward citizenship, visitors and the like. Not one or 100 or 1,000 but 20 million.

And the order is not directed only at those who mastermind or participate in acts of terrorism. In the vaguest terms, it covers such things as "harboring" anyone who has ever aided acts of terrorism that might have had "adverse effects" on the U.S. economy or foreign policy. Many onetime terrorists — Menachem Begin, Nelson Mandela, Gerry Adams — regarded at the time as adverse to U.S. interests, have been "harbored" by Americans.

Apologists have also argued that the Bush military tribunals will give defendants enough rights. A State Department spokeswoman, Jo-Anne Prokopowicz, said that they would have rights "similar to those" found in the Hague war crimes tribunal for the former Yugoslavia.

To the contrary, Hague defendants like Slobodan Milosevic are entitled to public trials before independent judges, and to lawyers of their choice. The Bush military trials are unlike the Hague defendants, they may be executed.

The SixthAmendment provides: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury."

That covers citizens and noncitizens in this country alike. On a few occasions in the past, acts of war have been treated as outside Sixth Amendment protection. Franklin Roosevelt set up a military tribunal to try Nazi saboteurs landed on our shores in World War II. But that example — a tribunal for a particular occasion, limited in time and scope — shows the very danger of the Bush order. It is unlimited, in a fight against terrorism that could go on for years.

"It’s worth remembering that the order applies only to noncitizens," a Wall Street Journal editorial said in its defense. I hope The Journal’s editors, who are usually supportive of immigrants and their role in building this country, will consider the pall of fear this order may put on millions of noncitizens.

And the Bush order could easily be extended to citizens, under the administration’s legal theory. Since the Sixth Amendment makes no distinction between citizens and aliens, the claim of war exigency could sweep its protections aside for anyone in this country who might fit the vague def initions of aiding terrorism.

But George W. Bush would never let his order be abused, one of its defenders said the other day. It was a profoundly un-American comment. From the beginning, Americans have refused to rely on the graciousness of our leaders. We rely on legal rules. That is what John Adams meant when he said we have "a government of laws, and not of men."

The Framers of our Constitution thought its great protection against tyranny was the separation of the federal government’s powers into three departments: executive, legislative, judicial. Each, they reasoned, would check abuse by the others.

There is the greatest danger of the Bush order. It was an act of executive fiat, imposed without even consulting Congress. And it seeks to exclude the courts entirely from a process that may fundamentally affect life and liberty. The order says that defendants may not appeal to any court.

I do not doubt that leaders of Al Qaeda could properly be tried by a military tribunal. But the Bush order cries out for redrafting in narrower, more careful terms. Under the Constitution, that is the duty of Congress. Its leaders have so far been afraid to challenge anything labeled antiterrorist, however dangerous. It is time they showed some courage, on behalf of our constitutional system.

 

 

 

 

Res Publica

Throughout the month of October the fire continued to burn in the ruin of lower Manhattan, and the numerous politicians who came to look upon the face of apocalyptic destruction never failed to see, somewhere behind the veil of rancid and still-drifting smoke, an American phoenix rising from the ashes…. Almost as soon as they had said that America never again would be the same, they began to talk about the restoration of the familiar and heroic past, making good the losses of September 11 with quicker witted intelligence agents, heavier artillery, more patriotic displays of consumer confidence in all the nation’s better stores….

As construed by the household sophists in the Reagan Administration and endorsed by their successors in the Bush and Clinton administrations, the intellectual foundation for the country’s wealth and happiness rested on four pillars of imperishable wisdom:

1. Big government is by inclination Marxist, by definition wasteful and incompetent, a conspiracy of fools indifferent to the welfare of the common man. The best government is no government. The agencies of big government stand as acronyms for overbearing bureaucracy, as synonyms for poverty, indolence, and disease.

2. Global capitalism is the eighth wonder of the world, a light unto the nations and the answer to everybody’s prayers. Nothing must interfere with its sacred mysteries and omniscient judgment.

3. The art of politics (embarrassingly human and therefore corrupt) is subordinate to the science of economics (reassuringly abstract and therefore perfect).

4. History is at an end. The new world economic order vanquished the last of the skeptics by refuting the fallacy of Soviet Communism. Having reached the final stopping place on the road to ideological perfection, mankind no longer need trouble itself with any new political ideas

All four pillars of imperishable wisdom perished on the morning of September 11, reduced within an hour to the incoherence of the rubble in Liberty Street. By noon even the truest of true believers knew that they had been telling themselves a fairy tale. If not to big government, then where else did the friends of laissez-faire economics look for the rescue of their finances and the saving of their lives; if not the agencies of big government, who then brought the ambulances from as far away as Albany or sent the firemen into the doomed buildings with no promise of a finder’s fee? It wasn’t the free market that hijacked the airplanes and cross-promoted them into bombs, or Adam Smith’s invisible hand that cut the throats of the pilots on what they thought was a flight to Los Angeles. History apparently was still a work in progress, the strange thoughts grown in the basements of Tirana possibly closer to the geopolitical spirit of the times than the familiar platitudes handed around the conference tables at the American Enterprise Institute.…during the weeks since September 11 the rush into the shelters of big government has come to resemble the crowding of sinners into the tent of a prairie evangelist.

By the end of October it had been generally understood that America no longer enjoyed a special arrangement with Providence, preserved by the virtue of its inhabitants and the grace of its geography from the provocations of death, chance, kings, and desperate men. Confronted with determined enemies (many of them still unknown, some of them armed with appalling weapons) the nation stood exposed, like other nations, to the insults of outrageous fortune. The awareness of the predicament (on the part of both the politicians at the microphones and the voters in the streets) conceivably could lead to a reconstitution of the American idea, but the finding of the phoenix in the ashes presupposes a debate rising from an intellectual structure a good deal sturdier than the one lost in the wreckage of the World Trade Center. I imagine the argument falling along the division between the people who would continue the American experiment and those who think that the experiment has gone far enough, and if I can’t frame all the questions that might well be asked, I can think of at least a few:

How high a price do we set on the head of freedom? If we delete another few paragraphs from the Bill of Rights (for our own protection, of courw, in the interest of peace, prosperity, and carefree summer vacations), what do we ask of the state in return for our silence in court? Do we wish to remain citizens of a republic, or do we prefer the forms of participatory fascism in which the genial man on horseback assures us that repression is good for the soul? With what secular faith do we match the zeal of militant Islam and combat the enmity of the impoverished peoples of the earth to whom the choice between war and peace presents itself as a choice of no significance? How define the American democracy as a res publica for which we might willingly give up our lives? Our own lives, not the lives of foreign legions. And of what does the res publica consist?

None of the questions lead to certain answers, but if we don’t ask them of ourselves I don’t know how we can expect to rediscover the American idea in a world unknown to Jefferson. …The barbarism in Washington doesn’t dress itself in the costumes of the Taliban; it wears instead the smooth-shaven smile of Senate resolution sold to the highest bidder—for the drilling of the Arctic oil fields or the lifting from the rich the burden of the capital-gains tax, for bigger defense budgets, reduced medical insurance, enhanced surveillance, grotesque monopoly. If we took more of an interest in the making of our foreign policy, usually for the profit of our corporate overlords rather than for the safety of the American people, maybe we would know why, when bringing the lamp of liberty to the darker places of the earth, the United States invariably chooses for its allies the despots who operate their countries on the model of a prison or a jail.

As was proved by events on the morning of September 11, the laissez-faire theories of government do us an injustice. They don’t speak to the best of our character; neither do they express the cherished ideal embodied in the history of a courageous people. What joins the Americans one to another is not a common nationality, race, or ancestry but their voluntary pledge to a shared work of both the moral and political imagination. My love of country follows from my love of its freedoms, not from pride in its armies or its fleets…. The Constitution serves as the premise for a narrative rather than as the design for a monument or a plan for an invasion.

Any argument about the direction of the American future becomes an argument between the past and present tense. Let us hope that it proves to be both angry and fierce. The friends of the status quo (both houses of Congress, most of the national news media, the Hollywood patriots, and a legion of corporate spokespersons) already have made it clear that they prefer as little discussion as possible. Domestic political dissent they regard as immoral and, in time of war, treasonous. They believe it their duty to invest President Bush not only with the powers of a monarch but also with the attribute of wisdom. Put out more flags, post more guards, distribute the pillows of cant.

Maybe two or three years from now, when all the terrorists have been rounded up and the Trade Center towers replaced with a golden statue of Mammon, the time will come to talk of politics. In the meanwhile, my children, while waiting for that far-off happy day, follow directions, submit to the surveillance, look at the nice pictures brought to you by the Pentagon, know that your rulers are wise.

Alfred North Whitehead once observed that it is the business of the future to be dangerous (not because the future is perverse but because it doesn’t know how to be anything else), and whether we like it or not, the argument now in progress in Moscow and Jerusalem and Islamabad is the same argument that enlivened the annals of republican Rome, built the scaffolds of the Spanish Inquisition, and gave rise to the American Revolution. If we fail to engage it, we do so at our peril. The freedoms of expression present democratic societies with the unwelcome news that they are in trouble, hut because all societies, like most individuals, are always in some kind of trouble, the news doesn’t drive them onto the reefs of destruction. They die instead from the fear of thought and the paralysis that accompanies the wish to believe that only the wicked perish. The climate of anxiety is the cost of doing business, discomfort the state of mind in which the oyster brings forth the pearl. .

Welcome to Kabul

KABUL

The only foreigners not sweeping into Kabul so far are those from the American government. Diplomats from other key countries are in town to set up embassies, but American diplomats are conspicuously absent.

The tardiness of the American diplomats is one of several signs that Washington risks repeating its mistake of a decade ago, when it won the war against the Soviet invaders of Afghanistan and then betrayed the Afghans by walking away from them. We point fingers at other countries for allowing Afghanistan to become a terrorist haven, but we were the ones who abandoned the Afghans to the feuding factions whom we had armed and whose fundamentalist Islamic passions we had ignited in the, campaign against the Soviet Union. This terrorist "swamp," as we like to call it, was partly made in America.

"We dumped them when we should have helped them reconstruct," said Thomas E. Gouttierre, one of America’s foremost (and few) experts on Afghanistan, in a view that is almost, universal among Afghan-watchers -- "We’re paying the price now. One week of war would have easily paid the price of reconstructing all of Afghanistan."

Evidently, we have not learned much. President Bush sees his job as defeating the Taliban and Al Qaeda; and then bringing the troops quickly home. He has often expressed revulsion for "nation building," but that is precisely what is needed now. Afghanistan is so fragile that it will need vigorous American leadership to ensure vast aid, a major security presence and brutal diplomacy to force the factions to cooperate.

The United States operates a forward military base in Afghanistan for Marines trying to destroy the Taliban and Al Qaeda, but we don’t have a forward diplomatic base to try to rebuild the country. Our diplomats grapple with Afghanistan, but. long distance from Bonn.

Talk to Afghans, and they inevitably say their greatest need is security. Yet, incredibly, the Bush administration initially not only refused to provide security itself in Kabul but also blocked the Europeans from sending in their own troops. Fortunately, European diplomats out-, maneuvered the Americans at the negotiations in Bonn, and Washington is being forced to acquiesce in a modest number of foreign troops in the Kabul area.

In the north of the country, Afghans are starving because Uzbekistan will not open a bridge for relief supplies to cross, since it is worried about security in the area. Secretary of State Colin Powell will visit Uzbekistan in the next couple of days and ask it to open the bridge, but the United States refuses to provide the needed security. One can’t help thinking that if the Pentagon was asked to bomb the bridge, instead of protect it, there would be no hesitation.

So it’s past time for the Americans to deploy diplomats in Afghanistan as well as troops. In this strange, World of Kabul, what is needed more than anything is for Americans to show leadership not just in destroying, but also in rebuilding.