Thomas Jay Oord is a theologian, philosopher, and scholar of multi-disciplinary studies. He is a best-selling and award-winning author, having written or edited more than twenty-five books. A twelve-time Faculty Award-winning professor, Oord teaches at institutions around the globe, and is the director of the Center for Open and Relational Theology. To find out more about him or view more of his works, visit his website or the Center for Open and Relational Theology.
This piece was originally delivered as the Wesleyan Theological Society presidential address at the 2009 meeting held in Anderson, Indiana. It was subsequently published in the Wesleyan Theological Journal, Volume 45:1 (Spring 2010): 81-107.
SUMMARY
Many ideas in this paper emerged while I flew to Akron, Ohio, to participate in a research team exploring love in the Pentecostal tradition. I thank the Stephen Post, Margaret Paloma, and Matthew Lee for the inspiring paper that served as the catalyst for “gelling” my thoughts about the variety of divine-action theologies.
Christians typically claim that God is active in the world. God’s activity is evident in the beauty and diversity of the natural world. Christians witness to an active God when they observe acts of kindness and generosity, see a mother loving her child, or witness care for the destitute, impoverished, and dying. Major social events like the end of apartheid or the demolition of the Berlin Wall are occasions during which many Christians say that God was especially active. Various people are particularly revelatory of God action. We often call them “saints.” And Christians typically witness to their belief that God was active in the life, death, and resurrection of Jesus. John Wesley’s theology is replete with claims about God being active in these several kinds of ways.[2]
These events and creaturely activities are also the domain of scientific investigation. In the last centuries, even the life, miracles, death, and resurrection of Jesus Christ have been subjected to scientific scrutiny. A variety of questions arise when considering the relationship between scientific inquiry and theology. Perhaps no set of questions is more complex than the set accounting for God’s action in the world. We wonder: What does God actually do in our lives and in the world around us? What should we mean when we say God creates, designs, sustains, and redeems the universe? Can science tell us anything about divine action?[3] Can God’s activity be tested by science? Or are we better off allowing science to give one set of answers, theology another set, and appealing to mystery when the two disagree?
John Wesley himself was very interested in science and how scientific theory and data might influence theology.[4] This essay offers a new response, a new paradigm, for thinking about divine action in relation to science. I propose that a particular view of divine love overcomes central methodological and metaphysical conflicts in the science-and-theology dialogue. These conflicts are serious ones, and failure to resolve them only perpetuates confusion. Confusion ultimately undermines the urgency for righteous and holy living. I will argue that a particular view of divine love accounts for divine causation and supports vital commitments in both theology and science.
My appeal to love as the new paradigm is not a way of asking, “Can’t we all just get along?” Love does not function as a way of asking theologians and scientists to be gracious and kind to one another. While I hope that those involved in these discussions conduct themselves in loving ways, this essay proposes that a particular understanding of love solves central methodological and metaphysical conflicts.
Method and Metaphysics
Most conflicts pertaining to God’s action emerge from methodological and metaphysical assumptions--the methods of science and the assumed metaphysical nature of God’s causal activity. Many people assume that claims about divine causation are irrelevant to science and its methodologies. This view, often called methodological naturalism, is understandable for at least two reasons. Because of these two reasons, scientists, both Christians and non-Christians, often do not refer to God’s activity in their scientific theories and explanations.
First, scientists are justifiably nervous when theists give supposedly full and sufficient theological explanations for events and things in nature. This nervousness is due in large part to the wide-ranging authority over science that the church once maintained and the assumed sufficient nature of theological claims. Some scientific theories thought to oppose official church positions were once deemed unacceptable by ecclesial leaders.[5]
Many scientists today consequently resist theories that require or seem to imply that science should assume a subordinate position to the authoritative claims of theology and the church. Contemporary science resists the notion that theology gives full and sufficient explanations for events and things in the natural world. For many scientists, in fact, theology is irrelevant.[6] No doubt, this resistance to or apathy toward theology motivates some who oppose the Intelligent Design movement, a movement that in recent years has gained power in the public arena but remains almost entirely absent in academia.[7]
A second reason why God’s activity has been assumed to reside outside the domain of science has, unfortunately, received much less attention. Theologians of various types, especially Christian theologians, have affirmed that God’s constitution is spiritual: “God is spirit,” says Jesus, “and we worship him in spirit and truth.” Insofar as spirits cannot be perceived by our five senses, it makes little sense to think that an empirical method based upon sensory perception could detect divine activity.[8] God’s spiritual constitution suggests that science is not capable of describing God’s direct causal action.
Due mainly to these two assumptions, many scientists, even scientists with Christian beliefs about God being creator, designer, sustainer, and redeemer, assume a form of methodological naturalism for their scientific work. Methodological naturalism says that scientific research, theories, and explanations should not refer in any way to God’s activity. Methodological naturalism allows scientists who are Christians to do and think about scientific work in the same way as atheistic scientists.
When asked about the ultimate explanation of things, scientists with Christian commitments are likely to mention God’s activity. Some distinguish between the order of nature, which science can explain without reference to divine causation, and the order of grace, which appeals to the mystery of faith or to special revelation. By following this practice, these Christians affirm methodological naturalism while denying metaphysical naturalism (where metaphysical naturalism amounts to atheism).
The dual affirmation of methodological naturalism and metaphysical supernaturalism intensifies the temptation to view science and theology as separate and autonomous domains. Theologians such as Langdon Gilkey and Rudolf Bultmann represent this perspective. They generally consider science and theology as two independent modes of inquiry.[9] Narrative theologians in the Wittgensteinian tradition, such as George Lindbeck, typically consider science and theology to possess separate and independent language systems, with their separate forms of life.[10] Biologist Stephen Jay Gould calls science and religion two non-overlapping magesteria. Religion is concerned with meaning and values, says Gould, while science deals with the facts and physical existence.[11]
A growing number of scholars, however, criticize the view that science and theology can be neatly separated.[12] I share this criticism. Many Christians reject the view that theology is unconcerned about facts and the physical world. Theology is concerned with the real world, in all its dimensions.[13] And it has become increasingly clear that science is value-laden and has important implications for morality. Reality cannot easily be divided into neat little compartments, some religious/spiritual/moral and others scientific/factual/physical. One critic of the independent view, Ian Barbour, says, “We cannot remain content with a plurality of unrelated languages if they are languages about the same world. If we seek a coherent interpretation of all experience, we cannot avoid the search for a unified worldview.”[14] I share with Barbour this quest for a unified worldview.
Many Christians worry that methodological naturalism is de facto metaphysical naturalism. Assigning God no causal role in scientific explanations easily eliminates God from playing any meaningful role. The idea of God becomes an unnecessary addition to what can apparently be explained by natural causes alone. John Wesley’s worry that Christians are “practical atheists” when they act as if God does not exist, even if they cognitively affirm God’s existence, is a worry that seems to apply here.[15]
The loudest voices claiming that methodological naturalism is de facto metaphysical naturalism are found in the Intelligent Design movement. A quick look at the movement’s key voices reveals their worry that science, especially as it affirms one form of evolution and affords no role for an intelligent designer, supports a form of metaphysical naturalism leading to atheism.[16]
But philosophers and theologians of diverse persuasions, such as Philip Clayton, David Ray Griffin, John Milbank, and Alvin Plantinga, also worry that methodological naturalism affords God no real explanatory or causal role in the world.[17] Research on human interaction, especially religious experience, seems especially undermined when scientists assume methodological naturalism. It fails to answer our fundamental questions about God’s activity. It can easily be interpreted as providing sufficient answers to the phenomena of our world, despite lacking any reference to God.[18]
Christians who want scientific methodologies to include a legitimate place for divine causation, both methodologically and metaphysically, have a series of theological options from which to choose. I identify below eight such options. They do not exhaust all of the possible ways of thinking about God’s causal activity, but they do cover the most important options.
- Incessant Divine Coercion. This way of thinking about scientific method and divine action views God as the sole cause of every event or thing. Humans may think that created entities have a natural cause. They may think that self-determination or freedom exists such that at least some creatures report exerting genuine causal activity. But God is actually the hidden, unilateral cause of all things. Some forms of Calvinist theology either explicitly affirm or imply this view of God’s action.
- Frequent Divine Coercion. God completely controls the vast majority of events and things in the universe. But occasionally, God grants freedom to humans for genuine self-causation. Christians who want to make a strong split between occasionally free humans and entirely determined nonhumans typically presuppose this scheme. It also seems to fit a form of popular theology that describes a God who remains in control and yet, out of a desire for relationship, occasionally gives freedom to humans.[19]
- Accidental Freewill Theism. The difference between the Frequent Divine Coercion and Accidental Freewill Theism is a difference of degree, not kind. The accidental freewill theist may assume that many creatures have a measure of God-given freedom and causality. She may believe that chance events occur and that God typically works in and with creation without trumping creaturely agency. But accidental freewill theists also claim that God could withdraw, override, or fail to offer freedom to creatures. Some accidental freewill theists say that God occasionally controls others completely to perform miracles. Others in this camp say that God could but never does withdraw, override, or fail to offer freedom. They argue that God voluntarily became self-restrained at the creation of our universe. I think most Wesleyan theologians are accidental freewill theists.[20]
- Essential Freewill Theism/Essential Kenosis. This view says that God necessarily provides freedom to creatures and calls them to cooperate. God is personal, and God empowers, inspires, and calls creation to love. Creatures are utterly dependent upon God, but God cannot withdraw, fail to offer, or override the freedom God necessarily gives. Giving freedom to others is one aspect of the love part of God’s essential nature. Because God is love, God must give freedom. But the efficacy and form of God’s causal activity oscillates, in the sense that divine causation varies from event to event, depending on the circumstances and the creaturely responses. I will return to this scheme, because I prefer it to others.
- Steady-State Divine Influence. The basic difference between schemes four and five is the issue of oscillation in God’s causal activity. Steady-State Divine Influence says that God necessarily provides freedom to and cooperates with creatures. But this fifth scheme says that God’s causal activity remains in all ways constant with regard to influence on creatures. God may be called the Ground of Being or a Holy Reality. God is not personal, in the typical sense of personal giving and receiving in relationship. As such, God’s permeating influence is unchanging in content and character. Prominent theologians who understand divine action in the steady state sense would include Paul Tillich and process theologians like Henry Nelson Wieman.[21]
- Natural and Supernatural Action. This scheme has many versions. Perhaps the most common says that there are some events that can be entirely explained by creaturely action. The causes of these events are natural. Other events, sometimes called “miracles,” are acts of God alone. Such miracles are divine interventions. A third category has both divine and creaturely causes. Some forms of the Natural/Supernatural scheme propose a primary and secondary scheme whereby God sometimes acts as the primary or direct cause but often as a secondary or indirect cause. It remains difficult, however, to determine the nature of divine action when God functions as a secondary or indirect cause in this scheme. And it becomes difficult to determine when it is that God acts alone, when God and creatures cooperate, or when natural causes are all determining. The Natural/Supernatural scheme resides at the heart of much confusion about the relationship between science and theology. A theologian who understands divine action in this way is M. C. D’Arcy.[22]
- Deism. The deistic scheme suggests that God initially used coercion to create the universe ex nihilo and set its fundamental laws. But after this initial burst, God has left the world alone to follow God-designed laws. Although we would not find any evidence of divine action occurring in the present, we hypothesize that divine action was required at the beginning. The regularity of the laws, the fine-tuning required, and the exquisite design of the universe suggest a Creator. Deism supports the “God at a distance” approach to theology that John Wesley strongly rejected.[23]
- Mysterious Divine Action. Mystery should always play some role in every discussion of how God acts in the world. This final scheme, however, assumes that God’s activity is absolutely mysterious. God’s action is entirely unlike creaturely action, and God’s ways are utterly incomprehensible. This option assumes a complete via negativa. Proponents may argue that God exerts real influence in the world, but they simultaneously claim that we cannot know anything about what that influence is like. This option is tempting to a variety of theologians who wish to protect theology from becoming an enterprise in anthropology or politics. Those who want to allow space for theology in an age dominated by science also find it attractive.
We might compare these eight options in several ways. One of the more interesting compares them in relation to our interest in scientific methodology. Do one or more options help us make a judgment about divine causality? Which of these eight provides a theoretical basis for testing divine action?
Below are four options from the eight above that at least allow us to test divine action in the world. All four share the view that God at least sometimes provides free agency to creatures and, therefore, seeks cooperation. Each of these schemes supports, in one way or another, the view that both God and creatures exert causal influence. Notice that testability requires some variability of God’s action in relation to creaturely action. Theologies not conducive to testing are those in which God (1) controls everything, or (2) always acts in the same way, or (3) has no current active role, or (4) acts in incomprehensible ways. Those conducive to testing are four of the above eight models: Frequent Divine Coercion, Accidental Freewill Theism, Essential Free Theism/Essential Kenosis, and Natural and Supernatural Action.
1 | Frequent Divine Coercion | God is generally all-controlling or coercive, but God sometimes gives freedom to and cooperates with creatures (testable?) |
2 | Accidental Freewill Theism | God generally provides freedom and works with creatures, but God occasionally coerces (testable) |
3 | Essential Freewill Theism / Essential Kenosis | God necessarily provides freedom and works with creatures, but the efficacy and form of God’s causal activity oscillates (testable) |
4 | Natural and Supernatural Action | Some events can be entirely explained by creaturely action, some entirely by coercive divine action, and some by both (testable?) |
A question mark goes with two of these four options. Frequent Divine Action has a question mark because it suggests that God is generally the sole cause of events. Only occasionally would events occur that included a measure of non-divine causation. A question mark has been placed here because I know of no clear scheme to distinguish which events result from God’s absolute determination and which events do not. This inability to distinguish makes it difficult to gauge which events should be credited to divine causation and which are the product of divine and creaturely causes.
A question mark has also been added to the Natural and Supernatural Action option. In that scheme, some events or things result entirely from creaturely causation and others result entirely from divine causation. The ones occurring without direct divine causation would, of course, not be capable of testing for divine activity, at least direct divine causation. Theologians should rightfully reject the increasingly popular idea that some event might occur without God’s causal activity.
Championing Love in Scientific Method and Metaphysics
Which of the options best fits with the central Christian claim that God is love? The answer would be important to theological traditions that affirm love as God’s supreme or reigning attribute.[24] It would appeal to Wesleyans who typically believe that the sentence “God is love” resides at the heart of the Christian revelation of God.[25] It was Wesley who called love God’s “reigning attribute, the attribute that sheds an amiable glory on all [God’s] other perfections.”[26] The theological vision of divine action that best champions divine love would likely be most persuasive to those who believe that love always and necessarily characterizes God’s causal activity.[27]
What if we also affirmed the widespread intuition that love never coerces? Coercion and love are antithetical. Empirical evidence seems to support the view that love is never coercive, insofar as coercion is defined as completely controlling others. If God’s nature is love, it would seem to follow that God’s causal activity would never be coercive. In fact, the God whose essential nature is love would seem incapable of coercion. Divine causal coercion would mean that God withdraws, overrides, or fails to offer freedom to others and thereby controls them entirely. I argue that God cannot do this. Rejecting divine coercion does not entail that God fails to exert force. I think God exerts force on everything, which is part of what it means to say that God exerts causation. God exerts force as the most powerful being that exists. God is almighty, in the sense of being the mightiest being that exists and in the sense of exerting that might in some way upon all others. But God always exerts power in love, and God’s power never entirely controls others. By virtue of God’s nature as a loving Spirit, God cannot coerce.
Creatures are not free to do just anything, however. Here, Augustine was right to object to the view that creatures are entirely autonomous and completely free agents. Creaturely freedom is limited. Both theology and science suggest this. Theologians have noted the important effects that sin and environment have on limiting the range of creaturely freedom. And scientists speak about the genetic, biological, neurological, embodiment, and social constraints to freedom.[28] But limited freedom is freedom nonetheless! Wesleyans are right to emphasize our tradition’s denial of predestination and it ancillary notions. Wesleyans are right to affirm that prevenient grace provides creatures the conditions for free response.[29]
If we deny that God ever coerces, because God always loves, one option remains from the four potentially testable schemes. I label this option Essential Freewill Theism or Essential Kenosis. For the rest of this article, I will use the term “Essential Kenosis.” Doing so is not only convenient, but “Kenosis” better emphasizes the Wesleyan notion of prevenient grace, whereby God acts first to give the gift of God-self to others.
Essential Kenosis
Essential Kenosis avers that God’s essential nature is love, and God necessarily gives freedom and/or agency to others. Because God’s nature includes freedom-giving love, God cannot withdraw, override, or fail to offer freedom/agency to others. Creatures are essentially free, although that freedom is limited. To use the language of the apostle Paul, “The Lord is the Spirit, and where the Spirit of the Lord is, there is freedom” (2 Cor. 3:17).
My proposal shares affinities with how Randy Maddox talks about John Wesley’s understanding of divine power in relation to divine love. Maddox suggests that “perhaps the best way to capture Wesley’s conviction . . . is to say that he construed God’s power or sovereignty fundamentally in terms of empowerment rather than control or overpowerment. This is not to weaken God’s power but to determine its character! As Wesley was fond of saying, God works ‘strongly and sweetly’.”[30]
Sometimes, creatures use their God-given freedom and/or agency badly. Evil is the result of this misuse. Essential Kenosis clears God from any legitimate charge of culpability for causing or failing to prevent evil, injustice, and debilitating confusion that creatures or conditions of existence cause. God is not to blame for the genuine evil of the world.
The Essential Kenosis view of God’s love and causal activity has the benefit of solving the theoretical aspect of the problem of evil.[31] This view also resolves the question of why a loving God would not see to the fair distribution of goods to the poor and needy. It solves the problem of why a loving God would allow an errant and ambiguous revelation of information that this God apparently deems necessary for full salvation. Essential Kenosis solves the theoretical aspects of all these problems and more by claiming that God cannot withdraw, override, or fail to offer freedom and/or agency to creatures, and creatures sometimes use that God-given freedom badly. Essential Kenosis offers a conceptual scheme that clears God from being culpable for causing or failing to prevent evil, injustice, and debilitating confusion.
Essential Kenosis provides a new paradigm for thinking about divine action in relation to science. This new paradigm, with its particular view of divine love, overcomes many key metaphysical and methodological conflicts that arise in the science-and-theology dialogue. To support my argument that Essential Kenosis may be a helpful paradigm for thinking about divine action in relation to science, I outline what this view entails. Essential Kenosis proposes the following.
1. No creaturely event or thing is entirely caused by God. God cannot coerce. Because no creaturely event or thing is entirely caused by God, divine causation should never be considered the full or sufficient explanation for any particular event. This statement overcomes the fear that theology or the church makes science unnecessary. The rejection of methodological and metaphysical supernatural sufficiency means that science should always play an explanatory role in our attempts to make sense of existence in general and any event or thing in particular.
To say that God never unilaterally determines any event or thing also means that attempts to wed science and theology by selecting particular events as explainable only by divine design are unwarranted. For instance, Essential Kenosis rejects intelligent design claims that the irreducible complexity of any particular molecular structure is best explained as the work of God alone. God never designs unilaterally, which means that all complex organisms emerge from both divine and creaturely causes. The argument that creatures or natural forces play no role in evolution in general or the emergence of anything in particular runs contrary to Essential Kenosis.
2. Creatures and/or non-divine forces never entirely cause events. Creatures cannot coerce. Because creatures or non-divine forces cannot unilaterally determine any event or thing, creaturely causation should never be considered a sufficient explanation. Methodological and metaphysical naturalism are rejected. Any attempt to explain fully a particular event by reference to natural causes alone is inadequate. Creaturely causal closure does not exist. Instead, God exerts causal influence, but never complete control, on all existents whatsoever. God’s causal activity is all-pervasive.
John Wesley was especially insistent that God’s causal activity pervades all things. He argued, “God is in all things, and . . . we are to see the Creator in the glass of every creature.” He insisted that we “should use and look upon nothing as separate from God.” God “pervades and actuates the whole created frame, and is in a true sense the soul of the universe.”[32]
To say that creatures never entirely cause any event or thing because God always plays a causal role is also, obviously, to deny metaphysical atheism. According to my proposal, any claim that science provides a full and sufficient explanation of any particular event without reference to divine action is unjustified. Of course, some explanations may require more appeal to divine action than others because of the complexity of the organisms involved and the degree of value that pertains. Contrary to the arguments of some well-known apologists for scientism, Essential Kenosis argues that divine causation is necessary for every event or thing.
Every event or thing emerges through the causation of both divine and non-divine causes. This consistency of combination causes overcomes the conceptual problems in the Natural and Supernatural Action option, as well as similar conceptual problems in the other theological options. Most other options either require or allow God to be the sole cause of some events. Or they allow for the possibility that creatures act as sole causes for some events. Essential Kenosis insists that God is a necessary cause in the evolution and continued existence of all things.
3. The efficacy of God’s causal activity oscillates. While every event has both divine and creaturely causes, Essential Kenosis proposes that God’s causal efficacy varies from event to event. Divine causation oscillates in the sense that God’s will is more or less expressed as creatures respond well or poorly to God’s freedom-providing activity.[33] God’s activity is most clearly expressed when an event profoundly promotes overall well-being. God’s activity is less clearly expressed when an event profoundly undercuts overall well-being. In other words, the presence or absence of creaturely love indicates the degree to which God is active. When well-being is undermined in any particular event, God’s purposes are not accomplished. And yet God exerts some causal influence on even those who do not love or do not respond well to God’s calling.
It is important to note that the oscillation of divine causation is not a function of the divine will. To say that divine causation oscillates does not mean that God chooses sometimes to be more influential and other times to remain relatively uninfluential. Instead, God’s nature as love prompts God to exert the most influence possible in any situation. To use an engine metaphor, God always runs at full throttle. Divine oscillation occurs as creatures cooperate in greater or lesser degrees.[34]
It is also important to note that God’s causal activity does not oscillate arbitrarily. One disadvantage of the word “oscillate” is that it connotes to some an arbitrary and periodic increase or decrease. I do not intend this connotation. Rather, God’s causal oscillation depends on the choices God and others make and upon the conditions and features of any particular situation. Divine oscillation is not random.
The claim that God’s causal activity oscillates is particularly important for Christians doing research on love and who think that God is the source of dramatic events, signs, and wonders. Essential Kenosis accounts for dramatic events by claiming that God’s causal activity is especially effective during those times. And yet, the scheme does not claim that God is the sole cause of such events. God can do and does new things, and God’s activity is profoundly revealed when creation conforms to the lure of divine love. The theory of divine oscillation should be helpful for those who want to point to particular events as especially revelatory of divine action. These events are rightly called “miracles.”
4. God’s causal activity is diverse. God’s causal activity varies in form as God lovingly offers opportunities to each creature relevant to that creature’s situation and potential. How God loves a worm will be different from God’s love for an eagle. God’s love for bacteria differs from God’s love for people. The form of God’s causation varies depending on the diversity of the situations and opportunities.
The fact that God loves all creation is unwavering and uniform; God seeks overall well-being. But how God chooses to love each creature, in each situation, at each moment, varies. How God loves is pluriform. The diversity of the form of divine causation is possible in part because of God’s omnipresence. But God’s diverse causal activity also hinges upon the diversity of the creatures with which God relates. Diverse causation arises from God’s own varying plans and desires. God’s causal diversity emerges from the diverse relations and communities that influence each creature. And God’s diverse causation depends upon what possibilities for the future are genuinely available in the present moment. The diversity of the divine vision and the diversity of creation result in diversity of God’s causal activity.
5. Love always characterizes God’s causal activity. Essential Kenosis understands divine love in a particular way. We need to explore this particularity. I define love as acting intentionally, in sympathetic (or “empathetic”) response to God and others, to promote overall well-being. Love requires free and intentional agents who exist in relationship with others, especially in relationship with God, and love is concerned with promoting the common good. To use the language of St. John, “We love because he first loved us” (1 Jn. 4:19). This definition of love applies both to creatures and to God, although only God expresses love necessarily.[35]
Love is a deliberate, free, and motive-laden activity, expressed in response to one’s community of others that includes God, other agents, and one’s own past actions. Love aims to promote overall well-being. By promoting overall well-being, I mean enhancing the kind of quality of life, health, happiness, wholeness, and flourishing that is well expressed in the Hebrew word shalom, the biblical word “blessedness,” and the abundant life Jesus said he came to offer.[36] The insertion of the word “overall” reminds us of the social justice aspect present in love. Heaping benefits on the few at the obvious detriment to the whole is unjust and therefore not loving.
Wesleyans are prone to regard love as God’s chief attribute or super-essential characteristic. All divine acts have been, are, and will be acts of love.[37] God cannot not love.[38] Divine causation always endeavors to promote overall well-being.
Although love is God’s essence, God freely chooses how best to love each creature in each situation. God is not free not to love because love is God’s nature. But God is free to decide how to love. As a personal being, God freely chooses some ways instead of others as God loves creation.[39] As essentially kenotic, God lovingly empowers and inspires others by providing them freedom in relationship. Because God’s nature is love, God cannot withdraw, fail to offer, or veto the freedom God provides to all creatures capable of acting intentionally. God can be counted on to love relentlessly, because, as Charles Wesley put it, God’s nature and name is love.[40]
Testing Divine Love
We are ready to see what this new paradigm means for scientific method. I want to focus on one of two main areas of research that the Essential Kenosis research program illumines.
The first area is the scientific testing of divine action. We’ve seen that many of the options examined earlier require or allow divine coercion. God’s alleged capacity to coerce makes those options inherently difficult if not impossible for testing divine action. But the Essential Kenosis scheme, which requires both divine and creaturely causation for any creaturely event and suggests that God’s causal activity is diverse and oscillates in effectiveness, provides a uniform theory for testing divine action.
If, as the Essential Kenosis option presupposes, God is a necessary cause in every event, scientific testing will not determine if God acts as a cause. God always plays some causal role. Essential Kenosis affirms the words of the Apostle Paul that “In all things, God works for the good with those who love him” (Rm 8:28, RSV). The scheme does suggest a research program, to use the language of Imre Lakatos,[41] that presupposes a particular view of divine causation while rejecting the view that God is ever causally absent or inactive. Testing cannot gauge whether or not God acts in the world. God always acts, and in God “we live and move and have our being” (Acts 17:28).
Essential kenosis allows for testing the degree to which divine causation is effective. Divine causation is more effective in one or some events compared with others. This level of effectiveness can be tested. Such testing does not involve putting events or things under a microscope in the attempt to see more or less of God. As spirit, God’s actions are not discernible by our five senses. Testing to gauge whether God’s causal activity is more effective in some events compared to others requires a different measuring stick.
The general measurement most helpful for gauging divine action is the measurement of love. That is, divine causation is most evident in those events or things that express love, in the sense of promoting overall well-being. Divine causation is less effective and therefore God’s causal efficacy is less observable in those events or things that undermine overall well-being. In short, testing divine action in the world directly relates to the promotion of what the Hebrew prophets called “shalom” and Jesus called “abundant life” (Jn. 10:10) The extent to which an event promotes overall well-being reveals the extent to which God’s causal activity is effective.
I foresee several possible objections to love as the criterion for scientific testability of divine action. I answer these objections in hope that the plausibility and fecundity of this research program may be more apparent. While answering these objections, the contours of my proposed research program, with its methodology and metaphysics of love, should become clearer.
Objection #1: Assumes the existence of God. First, some may object to the whole enterprise of testing divine action on the ground that Essential Kenosis assumes the existence of God and then promptly moves to test how God acts in the world. These critics would like prior proof of God’s existence before trying to test divine action.
Response: Yes, I assume that God exists. But all scientific research programs make assumptions. A number of strong arguments for God’s existence suggest to me and many others that it is more plausible to assume that God exists than not. I know of no absolute proof; faith always plays a role in the believer’s claim about God.
Any adequate research program contains hard-core presuppositions that researchers accept upfront as reasonable, although perhaps not capable of proving. For instance, the vast majority if not all scientific research programs assume some view of cause and effect. But proving cause and effect is, as David Hume pointed out, inherently impossible.[42] And the vast majority if not all scientific research programs assume value-laden criteria to claim that some explanations are better than others (e.g., some explanations are more simple, more elegant, more comprehensive). Proving values and aesthetics is also inherently difficult if not impossible.
Those searching for the most adequate research program should compare the relative superiority of one program to another based upon how each accounts for what seems important facets and facts of existence. We are likely willing to accept one research program as superior if that program accounts well for what we know best. The Essential Kenosis methodology I propose accounts for existence better than a naturalistic or atheistic methodology. Here I agree with my philosophy colleague, Joseph Bankard, that the best overall explanation for existence in general and morals in particular is an explanation that includes the presence and activity of God.[43]
My proposal takes seriously the widespread accounts of religious experience, including claims about God’s working in human lives and in creation. Claims about divine action based on religious experience are non-negotiable to many Christians, even if Christians may not affirm all religious claims.[44] Furthermore, the Essential Kenosis program does a better job than most for accounting for love in general and the view that love is not coercive in particular. Accordingly, this program seems potentially more fruitful for love research than others.
Objection #2: This research program does not offer certainty. Some may object to the criterion of love as the ultimate measurement for divine action because the efficacy of divine love cannot be deduced with certainty from observed phenomena. “God” and “love” cannot be perceived by our five senses. They evade certitude.
Response: Neither science nor theology offers absolute certainty. The Essential Kenosis research program does not support claims of absolute certainty. At its best, however, contemporary science also does not claim to have obtained absolute certainty. Essential Kenosis does support scientific practices that are central to the scientific enterprise such as induction and inference. It supports the scientific practice of moving from observed data to a hypothesis and then testing that hypothesis by further observation. Simultaneously, it reminds us that science, relying as it does on fallible sensory perception, does not provide grounds for absolute certainty. Science deals in the provisional, not the absolutely provable. Theology does as well. We all live by faith.
Objection #3: It is impossible to measure overall well-being. Some may object to the criterion of love as the ultimate measurement for testing divine action, because this criterion requires an assessment of nearly everything. That is, if love means promoting overall well-being, the critic might wonder how one could do such all-embracing measuring.
Response: Like other scientific research, the Essential Kenosis program examines limited samples and generalizes to the whole. All-inclusive measuring is not possible for localized creatures, but this should not prevent researchers from speculating about the whole based upon observations and experiments from a limited set. In fact, this speculation is a bedrock practice of science. Researchers examine the few and make provisional claims about what this means for the whole.
Likewise, while love intends to promote overall well-being, it must assess what might be done to promote the global good when acting locally. Insofar as an intentional response to promote well-being is helpful to some, and not an obvious determinant to the whole, it can provisionally be deemed an act of love. Researchers need not measure all things when speculating about how overall well-being is promoted.
Of course, we not only find it impossible to measure overall well-being, but we also recognize that differences can arise as to which courses of action best promote overall well-being. Diverse people in diverse cultures have diverse ideas about how best to promote the common good. This healthy diversity of views can, of course, lead to epistemic problems. We should remember that we can hold different views about the details of what constitutes the greatest well-being without thinking that embracing this diversity necessarily entails embracing radical epistemic relativism. Here, the Wesleyan doctrine of prevenient grace can once again be helpful, insofar as we want to claim that human moral intuitions have their basis in God’s love as revealed to our hearts and minds, even if that revelation can be misunderstood and partially ambiguous.
Objection #4: Testing divine causal action requires research on creaturely causal action. Some may object to Essential Kenosis as a basis for testing the Creator’s action because it requires appropriate responses from creatures. This objection rightly sees that Essential Kenosis claims that the efficacy of divine causation relates directly to the love that non-divine beings may or may not express.
Response: In an interrelated universe of multiple causes, we make inferences about which actors exert primary causation given what we have reason to believe about these actors. This objection reminds us that one agent is never entirely responsible for any particular event. All events and things in the world arise through the influence of multiple causes. Existence is interrelated. My scheme builds upon this interrelatedness and accepts a multiple causation view. But it also agrees with the widespread intuition that, despite interrelatedness and multiple causes, we can plausibly attribute more causal responsibility to one agent or some agents than others. We may justifiably assert that the fulfillment of Jesus’ prayer, “Thy will be done,” is more evident in some events than in others.
Let’s look at an example. What do we regard as the causal explanation when we say that a boy threw a ball through a window? Assuming that the boy actually threw the ball, we may simply attribute responsibility to the boy. We would be correct in doing this, so long as we do not claim that the boy is the sufficient cause of the event. After all, wind, gravity, the hardness of the ball, the thickness of the glass, and a host of other factors played contributory causal roles. When we say the boy is responsible, we are making a claim about a particular cause, the boy’s throwing, as playing the primary causal role. But we need not also claim that the boy’s throwing was the full and sufficient role.
Likewise, saying that divine action is more prevalent in the world when creatures respond appropriately in love is compatible with saying that divine action is the primary cause of this love. This is especially true if one has reason to believe that God is the source of love. “Every good and perfect gift is from above,” to quote St. James (Js. 1:17).
Objection #5: All creatures should be equally revelatory of divine action. Some may object to love as the ultimate measurement for testing divine action because it affords greater revelatory capacity to complex creatures, e.g., dogs, dolphins, and humans, and less revelatory capacity to simpler entities, e.g., atoms, cells, or microorganisms. This objection is based upon the view that all creatures are equally capable of revealing divine love.
Response: Complex creatures are potentially more revelatory of God’s causal activity because they enjoy greater and more varied freedom and responsibility. If divine causation is necessary for all events and things, all creation can reveal God’s activity. However, creatures that are more complex afford greater opportunities for testing divine action in the world based, in part, on the nature of human inquiry. What we know best is our own complex experiences, although we still have much to learn. And we make more accurate inferences about complex creatures similar to ourselves than we make about creatures less similar. We are more likely, for instance, to attribute sadness to a dog after watching her listless behavior than we would sadness to a worm.
Additionally, the degree to which atoms, cells, and microorganisms can respond appropriately or inappropriately seems impossible at present to gauge with scientific instruments. I know of nothing beyond metaphysical speculation to say that the smallest entities of existence have the capacity for responses. But this does not mean that God is not active as a necessary cause in the smallest entities of our universe. Nor does it mean that such entities are entirely devoid of all capacities for responsiveness. It only means that our ability to test divine activity at the micro-level is seriously hampered. Our ability to recognize divine activity increases among complex creatures, in part because the diversity of their responses provide a wider range of possible actions to assess as possibly promoting or undermining overall well-being.
Christians have a strong precedent for claiming that organisms that are more complex are more revelatory of divine love. That precedent is Jesus Christ. That the highest revelation of divine love would take human form suggests that our best scientific measurements for divine love are likely to be most accurate when evaluating complex forms of existence. I know of no strong argument or evidence that God has been incarnated among beetles to the degree of complexity and diversity that God was incarnate in Jesus of Nazareth. As John put it in the first of his three letters, “In this way the love of God was revealed to us: God sent his only Son into the world so that we might have life through him” (1 Jn. 4:9).
Testing Creaturely Love
Below is an abbreviated explanation of what Essential Kenosis suggests for testing creaturely love. These comments are meant to help researchers wanting to explore love while avoiding methodological naturalism and metaphysical naturalism. They are brief and will be expanded in work set to be published elsewhere.
1. Robust research on creaturely love includes reference to effective divine causal activity, insofar as the creaturely actions in question are deemed loving. The researcher who operates from the Essential Kenosis research program cannot account well for creaturely love without some reference to divine love. The more complex the organism, the more important reference to divine activity becomes. Research purporting to offer a robust explanation of creaturely love without reference to God runs the risk of adopting methodological naturalism. This essay might be taken as a clarion call to scientists who believe in God to be bolder in their references to divine action, or at least to adopt a less definitive or conclusive tone to love research that omits reference to God. If the researcher believes in God and believes that God is the source of all love, explanations of creaturely love will be incomplete and less robust if God goes unmentioned.
Essential Kenosis also suggests that God’s empowering not only transforms the creature; it also empowers the creature to be an agent of loving transformation for others. Christians who believe that God empowers and inspires love may be eager to accept an Essential Kenosis methodology that not only accepts but requires an explanatory role for divine action.
Of course, a key element in this work is an adequate definition of love. Too often love research is bogged down or largely irrelevant because love has not been defined well enough. Naturally, I recommend my own definition (to love is to act intentionally, in sympathetic response to God and others, to promote overall well-being) as potentially more adequate than others. This definition requires a role for both divine and creaturely causation in any act of creaturely love.
2. Robust research on creaturely love will include reference to the lover’s presumed intent or motives. If love requires intentionality, robust research on love cannot neglect reference to the agent’s motives and intent. An appeal to particular consequences will not suffice. After all, sometimes good emerges despite an agent’s intentions to generate ill instead of good. We should not call such unintended good the fruit of love. This means that researchers must either infer intent based upon particular indicators or ask the subject of research themselves to confess their motives. Either of these options will not provide indubitable grounds for measuring intent. But they do allow for significant degrees of probability, and they are necessary for research on love, if acting lovingly involves right intentions and motives.
3. Robust research on creaturely love will include references to the lover’s environment, relationships, and/or embodiment. If love involves a sympathetic (or empathetic) response to others (including God), robust research on love will refer to the lover’s relations. These relations may be social, societal, or cultural. They may be personal, familial, or romantic. The relations a person enjoys also include the bodily members, genetic structures, and mental capabilities. And these relations will always include a relationship with God, positive or negative, mature or immature, conscious or unconscious. Some of the most interesting research on love explores how these various types of relationships and constraints shape or hinder complex expressions of love.
4. Robust research on creaturely love will include reference to the consequences or outcomes of presumed loving or non-loving acts. Perhaps the most common way to do research on love is to examine the consequences of various acts and habits. This is important for the Essential Kenosis scheme because the scheme defines love in part as promoting overall well-being. To a greater or lesser degree, promoted well-being is measurable in part by the consequences of various events.
Assessing these consequences can take many forms. Researchers might set up experiments designating some events as value-positive (say, the giving of money to the poor). Others may research acts that are value-negative (say, the stealing of money from the poor). Some may do objective, statistic-based research based on the consequences. Some researchers may pursue qualitative analysis through use of testimonials and interviews. A very wide range of possible scientific methods avail themselves.
Conclusion
We need a philosophy of science that accounts for theological claims about God’s action in the world. In humility, Christians should make constructive claims about who God is and what God does. Wesleyans will likely be favorably disposed to my proposal that love is the divine attribute through which Christians should make sense of God’s other attributes and God’s interaction with others.
Some readers may want to ponder further my proposal that God’s love is never coercive, in the sense that God cannot fail to offer, withdraw, or override the freedom and agency God provides. This proposal is tied to the claim that God’s very nature is kenotic self-giving love. God’s relentless and steadfast love never fails to empower and inspire creatures. My proposal is really the view that prevenient grace is an essential feature of God. Understood in this light, I hope fellow Wesleyan theologians will see the proposal’s merits.
This article also proposes that the form and efficacy of God’s love varies and oscillates as our personal and relational God interacts with others. This may be the most novel idea of the essay, but I think readers will find it attractive upon reflection. Wesleyans have often implicitly recognized the importance of measuring divine action, although they rarely have suggested a conceptual scheme for doing so. I propose that the variety and oscillation of the efficacy of God’s love allows for the possibility of testing God’s action in the world by the degree to which events and individuals express love. My scheme may help both scientists and theologians make sense of claims about God’s activity in the world. The conceptual and ethical stakes are high enough that bold proposals like the one I offer are desperately needed.
The logic present in most paradigms relating science and theology leads to major problems. This logic leads to hostility between scientists and theologians and their disciplines. It leads to deep confusion and frustration, and it can lead to severe apathy and hopelessness about making some sense of life.
These negative consequences, at best, fail to inspire and motivate Christians to live holy lives of love. At worst, the usual ways of relating science and theology encourage humans to abandon loving God with their minds. At worst, the usual ways implicitly or explicitly reject a reasonable account of why a life of love and wisdom should be pursued at all. I find this unacceptable.
My humble hope is to have provided a proposal that many will find helpful. I endeavor to encourage us to live lives of love in response to the God. For God makes such love possible. This message seems most clearly revealed in light of the revelation of love as we find it in Jesus Christ and as expressed in the church’s Christ-life.
Notes
This paper was delivered as the Wesleyan Theological Society presidential address at the 2009 meeting held in Anderson, Indiana. Many ideas in this paper emerged while I flew to Akron, Ohio, to participate in a research team exploring love in the Pentecostal tradition. I thank the Stephen Post, Margaret Paloma, and Matthew Lee for the inspiring paper that served as the catalyst for “gelling” my thoughts about the variety of divine-action theologies. ↑
For a collection of essays on John Wesley, science, and contemporary Wesleyan theology as it pertains to science, see Thomas Jay Oord, ed., Divine Grace and Emerging Creation: Wesleyan Forays in Science and Theology (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2009). This book is comprised primarily of papers delivered at the 2008 WTS meeting at Duke University. ↑
Among the better collections of writing on divine action in science are Philip Clayton, Adventures in the Spirit: God, World, and Divine Action (Minneapolis: Fortress, 2008), Robert John Russell, Nancey Murphy, and Arthur R. Peacocke, eds. Chaos and Complexity: Scientific Perspectives on Divine Action, 2nd ed. (Vatican Observatory Foundation, 2000), and Keith Ward, Divine Action (London: Collins, 1990). ↑
For essays exploring John Wesley’s approach to science and philosophy of science, see the following chapters in Oord, Divine Grace and Emerging Creation: Laura Bartels Felleman, “Degrees of Certainty in John Wesley’s Natural Philosophy,” John W. Haas, Jr., “John Wesley’s Vision of Science in the Service of Christ,” Randy L. Maddox, “John Wesley’s Precedent for Theological Engagement with the Natural Sciences,” and Marc Otto and Michael Lodahl, “Mystery and Humility in John Wesley’s Narrative Ecology.” ↑
See John Hedley Brooke for a nuanced historical account of the relation between science and theology, Science and Religion: Some Historical Perspectives (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991). The paradigm case for the clash between the church and science is the case of Galileo, and the authority on that conflict is William R. Shea, with Mariano Artigas, Galileo in Rome: The Rise and Fall of a Troublesome Genius (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004) and Galileo Observed: Science and the Politics of Belief (Sagamore Beach: Science History Publications, 2006). ↑
See Karl W. Giberson and Donald A. Yerxa, Species of Origins: America’s Search for a Creation Story (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 2002), and Karl Giberson and Mariano Artigas, Oracles of Science: Celebrity Scientists verses God and Religion (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). ↑
Key texts for the Intelligent Design movement include Michael Behe, Darwin’s Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution (New York: The Free Press, 1996), William Dembski, Intelligent Design: The Bridge Between Science and Theology (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1999), Phillip E. Johnson, Darwin on Trial, revised edition (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1993). For a strong Wesleyan critique of Intelligent Design, see W. Christopher Steward, “On Giving Intelligent Design Theorists What They Want,” in Divine Grace and Emerging Creation: Wesleyan Forays in Science and Theology, Thomas Jay Oord, ed. (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2009). ↑
For what a Wesleyan approach to perceiving God through nonsensory perception might entail, see my essay, “Prevenient Grace and Nonsensory Perception of God in a Postmodern Wesleyan Philosophy,” in Between Nature and Grace: Mapping the Interface of Wesleyan Theology and Psychology (San Diego, Calif.: Point Loma Press, 2000). ↑
See Rudolf Bultmann, Jesus Christ and Mythology (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1958) and Langdon Gilkey, Religion and the Scientific Future (New York: Harper and Row, 1970). ↑
George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine: Religion and Theology in a Postliberal Age (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1984). ↑
Stephen Jay Gould, Rocks of Ages: Science and Religion in the Fullness of Life (New York: Ballantine, 1999). ↑
See Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford Lectures 1989-91, Volume One (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990), Philip Clayton, ed., The Oxford Handbook of Religion and Science (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), David Ray Griffin, Religion and Scientific Naturalism: Overcoming the Conflicts (Albany, N.Y.: State University of New York, 2000), John F. Haught, God After Darwin: A Theology of Evolution (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 2000), Alan G. Padgett, Science and the Study of God: A Mutuality Model for Theology and Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 2003), Ted Peters, “Theology and Science: Where Are We?” Zygon: Journal of Religion and Science 31:2 (June 1996): 323-343. ↑
On the issue of realism and the epistemology of theology and science, see Paul Allen, Ernan Mcmullin And Critical Realism in the Science-theology Dialogue (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), Ian Barbour, Issues in Science and Religion (New York: Prentice Hall, 1966), Philip Clayton, Explanation from Physics to Theology: An Essay in Rationality and Religion (New Haven, Ct.: Yale University Press, 1989), Alister McGrath, A Scientific Theology (London, T&T Clark, 2001), Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990), Arthur Peacocke, Intimations of Reality: Critical Realism in Science and Religion (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1984). ↑
Ian Barbour, Religion in an Age of Science: The Gifford Lectures 1989-91, Volume One (San Francisco: HarperSanFrancisco, 1990), 16. ↑
John Wesley, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount,” The Bicentennial Edition of the Works of John Wesley, Frank Baker, ed. (Nashville: Abingdon, 1984 ff), 1:516-517. ↑
The key Intelligent Design texts opposing naturalism are Phillip E. Johnson’s Reason in the Balance: The Case Against Naturalism in Science, Law & Education (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 1995) and The Wedge of Truth: Splitting the Foundations of Naturalism (Downers Grove, IL: InterVarsity Press, 2000). ↑
Clayton addresses these issues in several books, but see especially God and Contemporary Science (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1998). Griffin deals with the problem by arguing for a religious and scientific naturalism, whereby God acts but never interrupts the causal structures of the natural world. Griffin argues that science need only reject a form of supernaturalism that entails the possibility that God could and would occasionally interrupt the causal laws of existence (Religion and Scientific Naturalism). Milbank addresses naturalism in several publications, see especially Theology and Social Theory: Beyond Secular Reason, 2nd ed. (Malden, Ma.: Blackwell, [1990] 2006). Plantinga deals with the problem in several writings, including “Methodological Naturalism,” in Perspectives on Science and Christian Faith 49 (Sept. 1997): 143-54. ↑
For arguments from scientists for the compatibility between belief in God and contemporary science, see Francis S. Collins, The Language of God: A Scientist Presents Evidence for Belief (New York: Free Press, 2006), Richard G. Colling, Random Designer: Created from Chaos to Connect with the Creator (Bourbonnais, Ill.: Browning, 2004), Darrel R. Falk, Coming to Peace with Science: Bridging the Worlds Between Faith and Biology (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 2004), Karl Giberson, Saving Darwin: How to be a Christian and Believe in Evolution (New York: HarperOne, 2008). ↑
See Rick Warren, The Purpose Driven Life (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Zondervan, 2002). ↑
In a personal email, Kenneth J. Collins notes that his understanding of divine action probably fits best here. For Collins’s explication of John Wesley’s theology, see The Theology of John Wesley: Holy Love and the Shape of Grace (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 2007). ↑
Paul Tillich, Systematic Theology Vol. I (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1951). Henry Nelson Wieman, The Source of Human Good (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1946). ↑
See his book, The Mind and Heart of Love: Lion and Unicorn: A Study in Eros and Agape (Cleveland: Meridian, 1956). ↑
See John Wesley, “Upon our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount,” (BE 1984, I:516f). ↑
See Craig A. Boyd, ed., Visions of Agape: Problems and Possibilities in Human and Divine Love (Burlington, Vt.: Ashgate, 2008), and Gary Chartier, The Analogy of Love: Divine and Human Love at the Center of Christian Theology (Charlottesville, VA: Imprint, 2007). For Arminian accounts of love as God’s reigning attribute, see Clark H. Pinnock, Most Moved Mover: A Theology of God’s Openness (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Baker, 2001), Pinnock, et. al., The Openness of God: A Biblical Challenge to the Traditional Understanding of God (Downers Grove, Ill: Intervarsity, 1994); Richard Rice, The Openness of God (Nashville: Review and Herald Publishing Association, 1980), John Sanders, The God Who Risks: A Theology of Divine Suffering, rev. ed. (Downers Grove, Ill.: Intervarsity, 2007). ↑
See Mildred Bangs Wynkoop, A Theology of Love: The Dynamic of Wesleyanism (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 1972), Barry L. Callen, Discerning the Divine: God in Christian Theology (Philadelphia: Westminster John Knox, 2004), Barry L. Callen, God as Loving Grace: The Biblically Revealed Nature and Work of God (Nappanee Ind.: Evangel, 1996), H. Ray Dunning, Grace, Faith, and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic Theology (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill, 1988), and Thomas Jay Oord and Michael Lodahl, Relational Holiness: Responding to the Call of Love (Kansas City, Mo.: Beacon Hill Press of Kansas City, 2005). ↑
John Wesley, Explanatory Notes Upon the New Testament, 1 John 4:8. ↑
For a powerful argument in the regard, see Michael Lodahl, God of Nature and of Grace: Reading the World in a Wesleyan Way (Nashville: Abingdon, 2003). ↑
One of the better scientific books to address the constraints to freedom is Nancey Murphy and Warren Brown, Did My Neurons Make Me Do It? Philosophical and Neurobiological Perspectives on Moral Responsibility and Free Will (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007). ↑
See Randy L. Maddox, Responsible Grace: John Wesley’s Practical Theology (Nashville, Tenn.: Abingdon, 1994). See also John B. Cobb, Jr., who titles his book on divine love and free creaturely response Grace and Responsibility (Nashville: Abingdon, 1995). For the importance of prevenient grace in religious pluralism, see Al Truesdale, With Cords of Love: A Wesleyan Response to Religious Pluralism, with Keri Mitchell (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 2006). ↑
Maddox, Responsible Grace, 55. ↑
On how Essential Kenosis overcomes the theoretical aspect of the problem of evil, see Thomas Jay Oord, A Turn to Love: The Love, Science, and Theology Symbiosis (forthcoming from Brazos, 2010), ch. 6, “An Open Theology Doctrine of Creation and Solution to the Problem of Evil” in Creation Made Free: Open Theology Engaging Science, Thomas Jay Oord, ed. (Eugene, Or.: Pickwick, 2009), and “Championing Divine Love and Solving the Problem of Evil,” in The Many Facets of Love: Philosophical Explorations, Thomas Jay Oord, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Press, 2007). ↑
John Wesley, “Upon Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount,” (BE 1984), I:516f. ↑
This is similar to what David Ray Griffin calls “variable divine influence.” God’s influence upon others, says Griffin, is always formally the same but variable in content (Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism, 147). ↑
The notion that God offers to creatures possible options for action is perhaps best articulated in the writing of some process theologians. See, for instance, John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology: Based on the Philosophy of Alfred North Whitehead (Philadelphia: Westminster, 1965), David Ray Griffin, Reenchantment Without Supernaturalism: A Process Philosophy of Religion (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2001), Catherine Keller, The Face of the Deep: A Theology of Becoming (Routledge, 2003), and Marjorie Hewett Suchocki, God-Christ-Church: A Practical Guide to Process Theology (New York: Crossroad, 1993). ↑
I defend this definition of divine love in several publications, but one of the fullest defenses is “The Love Racket: Defining Love and Agape for the Love-and-Science Research Program,” Zygon 40:4 (December 2005): 919-938. ↑
Promoting well-being involves enhancing the mental and physical aspects of reality. It may involve acting to attain sufficient food, clean air and water, adequate clothing and living conditions, personal security, and the opportunity for intellectual development. It may involve attaining the satisfaction of being cared for and sense of belonging, diversity of life-forms and cultural expressions, appropriate level of leisure and entertainment, and economic stability. Promoting well-being may involve acting responsively to secure a feeling of worth, medical soundness and physical fitness, deep personal relationships, social and political harmony, and the opportunity to develop spiritual/religious sensibilities and practices. Acting responsively to increase well-being may involve acting in ways that develop the person’s virtuous dispositions, habits, and character. To promote well-being is to act to increase flourishing in at least one but often many of these dimensions of existence. ↑
This seems to be the position of H. Ray Dunning, Grace, Faith, and Holiness: A Wesleyan Systematic Theology (Kansas City: Beacon Hill, 1988). ↑
Jürgen Moltmann argues this point well in The Trinity and the Kingdom: The Doctrine of God (San Francisco: Harper and Row, 1981), 52-56. See also Mark Lloyd Taylor, God is Love: A Study in the Theology of Karl Rahner (Atlanta: Scholars, 1986). ↑
On this, see “Divine Love,” in Philosophy of Religion: Introductory Essays, Thomas Jay Oord, ed. (Kansas City: Mo.: Beacon Hill, 2002). ↑
This line comes from a Charles Wesley hymn by the same name. It also serves as the title of the book Thy Name and Thy Nature is Love: Wesleyan and Process Theologies in Dialogue, Bryan P. Stone and Thomas Jay Oord, eds. (Nashville, Tenn.: Kingswood, 2001). ↑
See Imre Lakatos, The Methodology of Scientific Research Programmes: Philosophical Papers Volume 1 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1978). For a compelling case for why Lakatos’s approach is helpful for relating science and theology in pursuit of research programs, see Nancey Murphy, Theology in the Age of Scientific Reasoning (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1990). ↑
See David Hume, Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, 1748. ↑
Joseph Bankard, A New Defense of Universal Morality: Synthesizing the Natural and Social Sciences with Theism (doctoral dissertation, Claremont Graduate University, 2008). ↑
On the importance of religious experience, see Stephen T. Franklin, Speaking from the Depths: Alfred North Whitehead’s Hermeneutical Metaphysics of Propositions, Experience, Symbolism, Language, and Religion (Grand Rapids, Mich.: Eerdmans, 1990). ↑