7. Congregations

A theological school is a community of persons trying to understand God more truly by focusing its study of various subject matters within the horizon of questions about Christian congregations. That is the thesis we need now to refine.

Understanding God must proceed indirectly. If a community of persons sets out to understand God more truly, it is going to have to go about it by focusing on something else whose study is believed to lead to truer understanding of God. What should that be? This is a point at which the diversity of construals of the Christian thing that we noted in chapter 2 becomes decisive. In some construals of the Christian thing the answer would be, "Study of Christian scriptures (or, scriptures in tradition) is the indirect route to truer understanding of God." In other construals the advice would be, "Study religious experience" or "Reflect on liberating praxis," or "Study Christian tradition (or at least the first five centuries of it)." Each of these is an important element of the Christian thing, but only as it stands interconnected in various ways with the others. The Christian thing itself, I suggest, can be encountered concretely in and as Christian congregations; its major and most demonic distortions can also be encountered in the same place. Consequently, I propose that the answer to our questions ought to be:

"Focus study of all of the above through the lens of questions about Christian congregations in all their diversity and often appalling ambiguity."

In making this proposal I am building on a suggestion first advanced by James F. Hopewell.Growing out of years of involvement in a group exploring different ways to study congregations [1] and his own ground-breaking Congregation: Stories and Structures, [2] Hopewell wrote an essay, "A Congregational Paradigm for Theological Education." Theological educators from a variety of types of theological schools were gathered in a seminar to discuss not so much Hopewell's paper itself but the issues it raised for theological schooling. The papers for that seminar, including my own, have been published as Beyond Clericalism. [3] The papers raise a number of major objections to the general proposal I now want to explore further. The objections are serious and I agree with them. However, in thinking them through I have come to believe that they provide guidance for shaping my proposal more rigorously than it would have been otherwise and, ironically, provide strong arguments in favor of the proposal! It is enough to outline the objections here and explore their force; detailed response to them will come later.

There are three broad sorts of objections to the proposal that theological schooling focus on study of Christian congregations. The first is that it is an inherently sectarian proposal. A Christian congregation is not, for most Christians at any rate, identical with "Christian Church." To the contrary, the practices, beliefs, and history of any one congregation, as well as the proper concepts to use in describing and analyzing it, have their home in a much larger Christian tradition.[4] If a theological school wants more truly to understand God, surely it would be better -- to make a counterproposal -- to focus its study on that greater tradition than on individual congregations within it.

Moreover, for a second objection, the proposal is far too parochial. There are far greater reaches of reality than what may be found within the common life of particular congregations. [5] If a theological school wants to understand God more truly, if truth is really the issue, surely it would be better to focus study on the foundations that justify our getting involved in a congregation in the first place. Perhaps -- to make another counterproposal -- it would be wiser to focus on common human experience, or at least on distinctively religious experience of which the experience of a congregation is one variation.

The third objection is that the proposal is too complacent about Christian congregations. It is too uncritical in its assumption that by studying Christian congregations one could come more truly to understand God. That assumption is uncritical of congregations' faithlessness. They are faithless to God, faithless to what they themselves say is their mission in the world, faithless in their idolatrous captivity to society's values. Moreover, in their faithlessness, congregations become blind to social injustice and tend to reinforce and sanction the injustice. They become ideologically captive.[6] If a theological school wants to understand God more truly, surely it would be better -- to make yet another counterproposal -- to focus study on the Word of God that not only calls congregations into being and nurtures them but also judges and corrects them.

Behind these reasoned objections and giving them their power lies a deep offense. Christian congregations are occasions for offense. One need hardly be a theological educator in a seminar about theological schools to feel that. The morally earnest, the spiritually perceptive, the intellectually sophisticated, not to mention the aesthetically sensitive, are often scandalized by the actualities of Christian congregational life. And justifiably so. The phrase "the scandal of particularity" has usually been associated with Christian claims about Jesus of Nazareth. The claim that God is uniquely present among us, sharing our common human lot as this one particular first-century Jew, is offensive the way apparently arbitrary, exclusivist, and arrogant claims often are. But the phrase applies with even more cause to traditional Christian claims that congregations are, or are somehow part of, the "people of God," the "body of Christ," the "bride of Christ," that they are communities on which the Holy Spirit is particularly poured out. It is natural and appropriate to be scandalized that such claims should be made of just these all-too-well-known groups, faithless to their self-descriptions, thoroughly assimilated to the value system of the larger culture in which they live, complacent and at ease, often trivial and banal, subtly using the rhetoric of the faith to sanction their privileges and to obscure society's injustices.

So, of all unlikely candidates, why pick Christian congregations as the lens through which to focus study of scripture, experience, and tradition? The general answer lies in our maxim: The way to the generally relevant and universally true passes through the particular and concrete.

Scripture, for instance, may very well be that which both nurtures and judges congregations. But it does these things in concrete actuality only as it is used in certain ways in the common life of actual congregations. Or it may well be that it is elements, perhaps "religious" elements, of our "common human experience" that ultimately justify our becoming part of some congregation's common life. But that experience is never conceptually unformed. In order to see how it is actually formed in such a way that it warrants our taking this step, we need to see how experience is shaped by the common life of congregations in their cultural settings. So too, it may well be that congregations are largely constituted of traditional practices that are part of a much larger church tradition. But that tradition is nowhere concretely actual except as practiced in particular congregations. What one may study independently of congregations are relative abstractions from the concrete actuality of particular congregations of Christians like "the history of dogma" or "the history of liturgy" or "the history of canon law." The abstraction from concrete social reality in each case tends to create the illusion that theological ideas or practices of worship or church legal systems have ghostly lives of their own that transcend the concrete particulars of the communities that more or less believe the dogmas, practice the liturgies, and follow the rules.

It is in the common life of congregations that all these factors of the Christian thing come together to transform and empower persons' lives. The Christian thing can be concretely encountered in and as Christian congregations. Indeed, it is by comparative study of congregations that one can see how different construals of the Christian thing make real differences in the ways persons' lives are shaped and empowered. If it is believed that study of some or all of these construals of "the content of the Christian thing" yields truer understanding of God then, the proposal goes, it is best to study them as concretely as possible. One place in North American societies where they are most concretely available is the common life of Christian congregations. The Christian thing may, to be sure, be encountered elsewhere, say in the lives of exemplary persons, but no other place so insistently claims for itself that it instantiates and enacts the Christian thing as does the Christian congregation.

The way to the generally relevant and universally true passes through the particular and concrete. That is the reason for urging that study of all the subject matters to which theological schools attend, in the hope of understanding God more truly, be focused through the lens of questions about particular Christian congregations. However, it does not by itself answer any of the major objections to giving congregations this kind of systematic importance. I believe those objections can be answered. However, the answers must tie in the details of the way this proposal is worked out. Consequently, responses to the objections will need to be scattered through the rest of this chapter as the proposal is elaborated and developed.

A WORKING DESCRIPTION

Then how do we identify a congregation when we see one? What is going to count as a "Christian congregation"? We need to identify criteria by which to judge which groups belong within the circle of Christian congregations so that we can tell concretely just what it is that we recommend theological schools select to focus their studies. We need to identify the criteria to which congregations hold themselves accountable. We need to identify ways in which, for all their differences from one another, Christian congregations are nonetheless somehow "one" with one another in a more embracing "whole." We need to specify how congregations are not only located within but are somehow integral to larger social and cultural systems. We need to identify the methods of inquiry that should be used in the study of congregations. Only when we can identify these matters will we be in a position to respond to objections to the very suggestion that a theological school focus on the study of congregations.

To do all this we need an appropriate language. I propose to use the language of "actions" and "practices" sketched in the last chapter. I propose we think of Christian congregations as comprised of complex networks of interrelated practices. The public worship of God is, I suggest, the central practice of the set of practices that comprise a Christian congregation. There are, of course, an indefinitely large number of other practices that are part of the common life of Christian congregations: pastoral care of the ill, the troubled, and the grieving; nurture and education of children and adults; management of property; raising of funds; maintenance of institutions; and so forth. They are all ordered, however, to the practice whose end is to worship God.

It must be stressed that the practice of worship is a response to the odd presence of God. Historically, for Christians and Jews, the ways in which God is present have been understood to be unpredictable, unmanageable, and thoroughly peculiar: in dreams and a burning bush; in an Egyptian slave insurrection; in a crucified Jew. More exactly, it has been God's presence in memories of these occasions, remembered as promises of God's presence on equally unpredictable and peculiar occasions in the future. The response of worship has mostly been a response in the meantime, between memory and fulfilled promise. For Christians, almost by definition, the normative and decisive presence of God is in the life story of Jesus' ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection appearances. Christian worship is a response in joy, awe, and gratitude for the memory and promise of the sheer fact of God's presence in Jesus of Nazareth.

Consequently, this practice's end is internal to itself. That is, worship of God is not done to any further end. Rather, this practice is a celebration of God's presence for its own sake. Accordingly, it is misleading to characterize a congregation as "a redemptive community." It may be that on occasion the community is redemptive. However, to characterize the community that way suggests that the community's central practice is to "redeem" people. Rather, at very best, its practices are ordered only to being a context in which redemption may take place. If anything is redemptive it is God's own peculiar ways of being present in history, and congregations are constituted by the practices in which they respond to that redemptive presence.

When Christians' worship is understood in this fashion as a "practice" (in the somewhat technical sense of "practice" we have adopted), then James Hopewell's description of a congregation turns out to be unusually fruitful: "A congregation is a group that possesses a special name and recognized members who assemble regularly to celebrate a more universally practiced worship but who communicate with each other sufficiently to develop intrinsic patterns of conduct, outlook, and story." [7] To bring out its fruitfulness I shall first suggest an expansion of our working description of "Christian congregation" and then elaborate it piecemeal, drawing attention to its implications for theological study and the responses it implies to objections to focusing theological schooling on study on congregations.

What is a Christian congregation? As a working description I will adopt the following expansion of Hopewell's description:

"A Christian congregation is a group of persons that gathers together to enact publicly a much more broadly practiced worship of God in Jesus' name, regularly enough over an indefinite period of time to have a common life in which develop intrinsic patterns of conduct, outlook, and story, and that holds its conduct, outlook, and story accountable as to its faithfulness to biblical stories of Jesus' mission and God's mission in Jesus." [8]

IDENTIFYING CONGREGATIONS

Our working definition provides an answer to the question, "How do we tell which groups belong within the circle 'Christian congregations'?" After all, the proposal that a theological school focus study by attention to Christian congregations is useless unless we can identify which groups should and which should not be considered candidates for study. The working description provides a very permissive answer: The phrase "in Jesus' name" is definitive. Let groups describe themselves into or out of the circle. Any group of persons who gather to worship God regularly enough for an indefinite period of time to have developed a common life in which arise intrinsic patterns of conduct, outlook, and story and explicitly do so "in Jesus' name" as a deliberate act of self-identification should be considered a Christian congregation for our purposes.

"Jn Jesus' name" functions at once descriptively and normatively. It requires us to draw two distinctions where only one grew before: Christian vs. non-Christian, and faithful vs. sinful.

The original question concerned description: Descriptively speaking, which groups count as "Christian congregations"? The answer given here is: Let each group's self-description stand. If a group characterizes itself as one that meets in Jesus' name, let it be counted a Christian congregation. We will let "in Jesus' name" be a necessary condition of a congregation's "Christianness."

This has implications concerning the subject matter of theological schooling. It is a matter of theological controversy, of course, whether "in Jesus' name" is a sufficient condition of a congregation's "Christianness." More controversy turns on what further conditions a congregation would have to meet if the self-description "in Jesus' name" is not sufficient. Those controversies ought to be left open by a theological school so that the structure and merits of arguments on both sides can be rigorously tested. Indeed, it is precisely by raising these controversies in the process of studying actual congregations that the meaning and importance of contested theological views are best understood.

Adopting "in Jesus' name" as the necessary minimal condition for a counting as a "Christian congregation" for the purpose of a theological school's study does not, of course, require any particular answer to the quite different question whether God is truly known and worshiped by groups who do not worship in Jesus' name or whether God is redemptively present to them. That is a further question open for exploration in theological study.

Adopting this necessary minimal condition does mean, however, that any congregation that takes on this self-description thereby also affirms that there is a difference between Christian and non-Christian congregations and that the difference matters. What matters is the way the community's identity is shaped and the ways in which its members' personal identities are shaped. The difference it makes is a difference in who they are.

"In Jesus' name" also functions normatively. Any group that describes itself as gathering to worship God in Jesus' name thereby adopts a criterion to which it commits to hold itself accountable. Its worship is intended to be faithful to Jesus. No matter how a group may understand Jesus, he has been identified as a necessary criterion by which its conduct, outlook, and story must be assessed. This means that in addition to the distinction Christian/non-Christian congregation, there is the distinction faithful Christian/unfaithful Christian congregation. Conceptually speaking, any particular congregation might be truly "Christian," that is, deliberately assume the communal identity that goes with worshiping God in Jesus' name, and at the same time in some ways be faithless to Jesus. It can at once be "Christian" and "sinful."

This too has implications regarding the subject matter of theological schooling. These distinctions between "Christian" and "faithful" are purely formal. Whether they are accepted as distinctions in reality depends on different views of the church. It depends on controversial theological views about whether "faithfulness" should be added to "in Jesus' name" as a necessary condition of genuinely being a Christian congregation. Here too, the controversy ought to be left open for reasoned debate in a theological school. It is precisely by raising these controversies in the context of the comparative study of congregations that the full meaning and importance of contested theological views are best grasped.

One qualification of this way of identifying what counts as "Christian congregations" needs to be made. What if there were a congregation that adopted the self-description "in Jesus' name" but never, as a part of its practice of worship in that name, engaged in critical reflection on its own faithfulness to that norm? For reasons we shall discuss below, such a group should probably be excluded from the class "Christian congregations" on the grounds that it evidently did not understand what it means to describe itself that way.

SELF-CRITICAL CONGREGATIONS

According to our working description, a congregation is a group that gathers to worship God in Jesus' name and holds its conduct, outlook, and story accountable as to its faithfulness to biblical stories of Jesus' mission and God's mission in Jesus. Consider what is entailed in this. Worship, we have said, may be understood as a social practice. As we went to some length to show in chapter 6, critical self-reflection is inherent in any practice. Insofar as a congregation is constituted by a complex set of interconnected practices, critical self-reflection is inherent to the common worship life of a congregation. In our working description of congregations we have, in capsule form, the norm against which a congregation's conduct, outlook, and story are reflectively to be guided and critically to be assessed: the stories of Jesus' mission and God's mission in Jesus. Hence, a group that never engaged in critical self-reflection on its faithfulness to its own self-description "in Jesus' name" would seem not to have understood what is involved in describing itself "in Jesus' name" and should not be considered as a Christian congregation.

But how are Jesus' missions and God's mission in Jesus to be characterized? How are the norms to be stated? Once again, the differences we noted in chapter 2 among construals of the Christian thing are decisive -- and divisive. Different pictures of the significance of Jesus and of his relationship to God will yield significantly different but frequently overlapping formulations of the norms against which a congregation's life is to be assessed. One generalization may be ventured, however. In their diverse ways, all construals of the norms to which a congregation holds itself accountable tie worship of God to a commitment to truthfulness. Faithfulness to "Jesus' name" entails faithfulness to the truth. In one way or another critical self-reflection by a congregation involves not only attention to whether various features of its practices are faithful to the One to whom they are responses, but also involves attention to whether engaging in some particular practice or, indeed, to this entire set of practices is itself truthful.

There are several different sorts of untruth that constantly require critique and correction. As we have noted, practices are always historically and culturally situated and relative. One consequence of this is that practices shaped by one cultural and historical setting may become increasingly esoteric, private, and disengaged from the public realm as its host society goes through historical and cultural changes. In that case, the practices' growing unintelligibility and inappropriateness to the public realm require critique and imaginative reflection on how they should be revised.

A second consequence of a congregation's practices' social location is that they are threatened with ideological distortion. Precisely because a congregation has "material" bases and is necessarily located at some point in conflicts within a society which may tend to privilege its access to the material resources it needs, a congregation's practices are always in danger of serving to preserve the social arrangements from which they profit and of obscuring the inequalities inherent in those arrangements. When that happens the practices are filling an ideological function. They have also become idolatrous. The material interest being protected has displaced God as that to which response is being made. In that case, a congregation's practice requires a different sort of critique, and calls for creative reflection about how to avoid ideological captivity and idolatry.

Even more radically, the fact that the practice of worship of God inherently requires critical self-reflection means that it inherently requires critical examination of whether and why we should engage ourselves in the Christian thing at all, and hence in the common life of this or any congregation. Inherent in faithfulness to the One to whom worship in Jesus' name is a response is the call rigorously and critically to examine the truth of the Christian thing itself. Exactly how that is to be done is, of course, a highly controversial matter. The point is that by their own self-descriptions Christian congregations require that it be done and, therefore, doing it will be part of the work of a theological school whose study is focused through the lens of questions about congregations. This implies a response to one major objection to the entire proposal that theological schooling focus its efforts to understand God more truly through questions about congregations. The objection was that congregations are by and large far too ideologically captive to their host cultures to be suitable as the lens through which theological schooling is focused. However, the point is that given our working description of Christian congregations, theological schooling focused by study of congregations would welcome and endorse the most vigorous and detailed exposé of the cultural captivity and ideological functioning of congregations and their practices. By their very self-description as groups gathered to worship God in Jesus' name, congregations commit themselves to continuing self-critique in the light of norms that expose and judge exactly such idolatry, even though they may not do it very rigorously! Far from ignoring this idolatry, theological schooling focused by study of congregations would highlight it. In this regard theological schooling would be against a congregation..

By the same token, our working description's stress on the self-critical moment in Christian congregations' practice of worship has implications concerning the subject matter of theological schooling. A theological school's focus on the congregation in order better to understand God must involve several kinds of critical and constructive theological work. It requires what might best be called "theology of culture," theological reflection on critical implications of cultural change for congregations' practices, and it calls for envisioning possible constructive reshaping of a congregation's practices insofar as they are ways in which the congregation tells its story in and to its host culture. For example, it requires examination of the ways in which the roles and status assigned to women in a congregation reflect the ways in which they are assigned in society at large, to test whether they are in accord with what the congregation itself claims are the implications of worshiping God "in Jesus' name" in a manner "ruled" by New Testament stories about Jesus. It requires moral theology, critical normative assessment of the congregation's practices insofar as they are morally accountable conduct. It requires doctrinal theology for critical assessment of the ideological distortion and faithlessness of its practices insofar as they are statements of its outlook, and it calls for constructive proposals of preferable formulations of its outlook.

PUBLIC AND ECUMENICAL CONGREGATIONS

Our working description stresses that a Christian congregation is a group that gathers to enact publicly a much more broadly practiced worship of God in Jesus' name. The connection between "broadly practiced" and "public" is crucial if "worship" is not to be misunderstood or understood far too narrowly.

It is immensely important that "worship" not be understood narrowly. At this point we must face up to a methodological problem. Here, as in this entire discussion of the notion of "Christian congregation," no sharp line is possible between descriptive and normative remarks. Once again we encounter the consequences of the variety of ways in which the Christian thing can be and has been construed. Different comprehensive or synoptic judgments about what "the faith is all about" or what "the basic message of the Word is" or what "the point of the Christian life is" bring with them different theological norms by which to judge what is, is less, or is not at all adequate and

appropriate as worship of God in Jesus' name. One has always to make choices about the terms to use in description, and both the choices and the terms will inescapably be theologically laden, and therefore shaped by some normative commitments.

It is my hope to elaborate the concept "worship" in a way that will be compatible with the wide range of ways of understanding what is the Christian thing that we identified in chapter 2. However if in light of your construal of what Christianity is all about, this sketch of what worship is requires alteration, alter it! What is important is the proposal that theological schooling's effort more truly to understand God be focused through questions about Christian congregations whose defining practice is worship, however "worship" is understood. It will be impossible to assess the fruitfulness of that larger proposal to a particular theological school if the understanding of "worship" and of "congregation" it takes for granted is inapplicable in a particular tradition. If those descriptions need to be modified to make the larger proposal more applicable, let them be modified! If the concrete content of the proposal sketched here is irrelevant to you, test whether at any rate it might be illuminating to rethink theological schooling along analogous lines, that is, as focused through questions about the Christian community described in some other way.

Elaboration of what worship is may usefully begin with two relatively noncontroversial negative remarks and then move on to positive characterization. To begin with, as James Hopewell pointed out,[[9] worship "in Jesus' name" must not be understood as cultic worship in the strict sense. "Cultic worship" is a practice performed by a person empowered by the deity to serve as intermediary between human beings and divine powers by presiding over an esoteric ritual (usually a sacrifice) which evokes an appearance of divine power for the benefit of the worshiper.

The benefit for the worshiper might be anything from the success of an undertaking, to recovery from illness, to becoming immortal. Worship of God in Jesus' name is not cultic in this sense precisely because, as response to God's presence, definitively in the life, death, and resurrection appearances of Jesus, it does not seek to evoke God's presence but to celebrate it as an already given gift. Hence it permits no religious specialist to be intermediary between divine power and us and no esoteric ritual with the capacity to evoke divine presence. [10]

For much the same reason, worship of God in Jesus' name cannot be a practice whose defining end is to receive something from God. The fact that it is worship in Jesus' name means that the benefit which it is appropriate to seek of God is somehow predefined by "Jesus' name." It is defined as already given to us in the peculiar ways in which God has been and promises to be present, notably "in Jesus." Hence this worship of God is a practice whose defining purpose or end is nothing other than expression of joy, awe, and thanksgiving for the sheer fact of the gift of God's presence. However, in that context, petitions are made to God as part of a response in gratitude and joy. The response involves the community's total life. That means that acknowledgment of one's dependence upon God and of one's deepest yearnings (which, after all, are also part of the totality of life) is an appropriate part of the practice of worship. However, in this context petitions to God no longer define the practice of worship in a self-referencing way ("The point of worshiping God is to receive what we need"); rather petitions are themselves transformed into acts of thanksgiving as part of the practice of referring all our lives to God as a response to God's peculiar and disconcerting mode of presence.

More positively, the practice of worship of God in Jesus' name embraces everything involved in responding to God's presence. It is the practice of referring to God the entire life of the community and the world in which it lives. Perhaps the best comprehensive term for the practice of this worship as a whole is simply "discipleship." In its fullest sense, the practice of the worship of God in Jesus' name involves the shaping of the totality of persons' lives as an appropriate response to God's strange way of being present in the life of Jesus of Nazareth.

The tendency to understand "worship" more narrowly as limited to the "proclamation of the Word" and "the celebration of the sacraments" is understandable. It has legitimate roots in tradition. If; as discipleship, the practice of worship involves the shaping of the totality of our life as a response to God's way of being present, then discipleship needs constantly to be reminded of what it is responding to. Moreover, in order to be an appropriate response, it needs constantly to be tested and reformed by what it is responding to. That reminding, testing, and reforming is a major part of what goes on in conventionally and narrowly understood worship: the proclamation of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments. Clearly the two are at the core of the practice of worship. However,even as the core they are only part of a larger, more complex cooperative social practice, the public worship of God. It is for this reason that Bishop J. A. T. Robinson, noting that the end toward which the service of Holy Communion is ordered is its last line, "Go out into the world" (Latin: Ite missa est = Go, it is sent, or, more colloquially, Get out! Get to work!), claimed that celebrating the Eucharist is a profoundly political act. [11]

Thus our working description of Christian congregations underscores two central features of the practice that constitutes them: the practice of worship is a public practice and it is a broadly shared practice. These two points imply responses to two important objections to the proposal that theological schooling be focused through questions about congregations, namely, that it is parochial and that it is sectarian. They too have implications regarding the subject matter of theological study

The practice of worship in Jesus' name is a public practice in at least two senses. It is a practice, we said, in which persons' lives are being shaped in their totality as appropriate responses to God's strange way of being present in the life of Jesus of Nazareth. In the quasi-technical language we sketched in chapter 6, what is being shaped are the emotions, passions, beliefs, and intentions that enable someone to act in distinctive ways. They are acts in which persons are capacitated to engage self-critically in a distinctive social practice. What is being shaped is the life of a community of bodied persons who are agents in a public realm shared with many others, most of whom do not engage in this practice of worship. This more broadly shared public realm is an arena in which social, economic, and political power is arranged and rearranged. Discipleship in that realm inescapably involves some sort of engagement of those arrangements of power, ranging from compliance with them to direct attack on them. Public worship of God inherently involves politically significant social action..

There is a second way in which the practice of worship in Jesus' name is a public practice. Every enactment of this worship of God is located in some cultural setting. It must be done in such a way that it is understandable to any interested person in that culture. It cannot be an esoteric practice intelligible only to initiates. It must be conducted in language and expressive gestures at least some of which are already familiar to nonparticipants. Thus the cultural setting shapes the ways in which this practice is in fact celebrated in that place. The practice of worship is thus always localizable in temporally extended actions requiring particular, concrete physical and spatial location; and that constitutes a congregation.

Clearly, the inherently public character of the practice of worship implies a response to the objection that our central proposal is too parochial. The objection assumes that attention to the common life of congregations would tend to disengage theological schooling from serious attention to the broader world of the congregation's host culture and its global setting. However, if a congregation is understood to be constituted by a set of practices, and if the central practice is understood to be the worship of God in Jesus' name, and if that worship is understood to be inherently public in these two ways, then the objection seems to lose force. Attention to congregations whose practice of worship is the practice of shaping persons' identities for discipleship in the shared public arena could not be parochially limited to what de facto goes on within congregations.

They would necessarily have to attend to what is known about how persons' identities are shaped in general, and to what is known about the ways in which social, economic, and political power is arranged and could be rearranged in the public realm. So too, attention to congregations whose practice of worship is necessarily shaped by its cultural setting would not be parochially limited to what goes on "within" congregations but rather have to question the value of any sharp contrast between "inside" and "outside" and attend to what is known about the cultural settings that inescapably shape its enactments of worship.

Equally clearly, the inherently public character of the practice of worship has implications concerning the subject matter of theological study. A theological school's focus on congregations in order more truly to understand God must, if congregations constituting practice is truly public worship, involve two things. It must involve study of the "languages" in which its practice of worship will be intelligible in a truly public way. That is, it must involve study of the dominant images, symbols, and stories by which the congregation's host society tells itself who and what it is, what its vision of the "good" or "fulfilled" human life is, what its central values are. As participant in that culture, a congregation will be as deeply shaped by those "languages as is any other group in the culture. It could not avoid using those languages if it wished. Moreover, as we have seen, if it is to be true to itself, it could not wish to avoid use of those "languages." Its constituting practice of worship must necessarily be "public" in the sense of being to some degree generally comprehensible rather than esoteric. That can only be accomplished by employing the "languages" common to its host society.

At the same time, a theological school's study of these languages must be a critical study. The vision of the "good" life, the central values, even the corporate identity expressed by a congregation's host culture in its dominant languages will in various ways stand in tension with the congregation's own understanding of its own communal identity, its own picture of the good life, its own central values as they all are defined "in Jesus' name." Theological schooling will need to focus on those tensions and conflicts and the various strategies congregations employ in negotiating them when they use the host culture's languages to practice their own discipleship.

A theological school's attention to congregations will involve a second kind of study if congregations' constitutive practice is genuinely public worship of God. Worship in the full sense -- worship as discipleship - involves shaping persons as agents and thus involves action in the public realm which consists in arrangements and rearrangements of social, political, and economic power. How are persons' identities formed and changed? How are social arrangements of power rearranged? There is a good deal of well-founded knowledge about these matters, and theological study focused through questions about congregations and their constitutive practices must attend to it too. More importantly, theological study must attend to those disciplines by which to assess the truth of old and new claims about how persons' identities and societies' power arrangements are shaped and changed. It is not that theological schooling has an inherent responsibility to discover these truths. It is rather that theological schooling, if focused by attention to congregations, does have an inherent responsibility to keep in review congregations' wisdom or foolishness about how to go about enacting their central practice in such a way that persons' lives are in fact shaped appropriately as responses to God's presence in Jesus of Nazareth and review the wisdom or foolishness of the concrete ways in which congregations enact their discipleship publicly.

A congregation, according to our working definition, is constituted by the practice of the worship of God; and "worship," we warned, will be understood too narrowly if its public and its universal features are not held together. Thus far we have been exploring the content and implications of the public character of worship; now we must turn to the characterization of it as "much more broadly" practiced.

A local congregation gathers to enact "much more broadly practiced worship." It is precisely that practice whose public character we analyzed above, that is the worship of God, that is "broadly" practiced. It is the same worship that is practiced by Christian congregations globally in every type of social and cultural location. Empirically, of course, it does not look that way. It is not simply that cross-culturally the worship of Christian congregations uses vastly different "languages" shaped by different cultures. Beyond that, in a crazy-quilt pattern, enactments of the practice of worship differ profoundly cross-culturally and within the same cultures because of deeply differing construals of what the Christian thing is all about and, consequently, what the features of an appropriate response to it should be. Nonetheless, it can be argued [12] that despite all the variations, it all is a response to the same thing: the stories of Jesus' mission and of God's mission in Jesus. Those stories provide all celebrations of Christian worship with a common lexicon of images, metaphors, and parables. Moreover, the pattern of movement, the plot, as it were, of the stories about Jesus provides the basic structure of the movement of all Christian celebrations or enactments of the practice of worship.

That pattern or movement in the stories about Jesus, that structure, functions something like a "depth grammar" in all enactments of the practice of the public worship of God in Jesus' name, by virtue of which all its culturally and theologically diverse instances bear family resemblances to one another. The varieties can be seen as dialects of a single language-family. They are quite different dialects often, but nonetheless recognizable as dialects of one family because they overlap enough so that some of the "grammar" that governs each of them is the same in all of them. That grammar is rooted in the basic patterns, the plot movements of the stories of Jesus' life, his ministry, crucifixion, and resurrection appearances read as stories of the peculiar way God makes Godself present to us. This is not only true of what we called the core of the practice of worship, that is, in the proclamation of the Word and the celebration of the sacraments. It is also true of the whole of worship in Jesus' name in what we called discipleship. It is all enacted as a response to God's presence and all seeks to be appropriate to the odd structure and movement of that presence (crucifixion and resurrection!). This is not to say that the practice of worship is always, or very often, in fact appropriate to that structure and movement. To the contrary, it is constantly faithless and in need of reform. This is only to claim that the practice constitutive of Christian congregations is a practice inherent in which are norms for its own assessment, something like a grammar common to Christian congregations.

This implies a response to the objection that the proposal to focus theological schooling through questions about congregations favors a sectarian or radically "congregationalist" view. Most Christian congregations would reject the suggestion that they are somehow identical with the church as such. No, they would say, there is "more" to the church than just our congregation. At issue is how to understand the relation between church and congregation.

Some pictures of the relation are to be rejected. Consider some possibilities: See "the church" as an abstract (theologians') ideal of which individual congregations are concrete and relatively enduring particular instances? No, because the church universal is as concretely actual as is any local congregation. See the church as an invisible reality marked by permanence, of which congregations are relatively impermanent manifestations in ecclesial "events" or "acts"? No, because congregations too are enduring realities with concrete location in physical and social space. See the church universal and local congregations related to each other as are a great commercial enterprise and its local outlets (as the Coca-Cola Company is related to local Coca-Cola bottlers and distributors worldwide)? No, because it suggests that just as no local Coca-Cola distributor is more than a small part of a greater whole, so no local congregation is more than a fragment of the universal church's reality. To the contrary, there is no reason why, were it truly faithful to its own identity, each congregation could not have and be the fullness of whatever "church" is.

Our working description of congregations provides a more fruitful way to understand the relation between particular congregations and the church. Precisely because particular congregations are constituted by their enactment of a more broadly practiced worship, theological schooling focused by questions about congregations could not be content with a sectarian attention to individual congregations. It would need to attend to the more broadly shared features of a congregation's practice of worship by comparative study of congregations in the same culture and cross-culturally (synchronically) and through history (diachronically). Attention to particular congregations, when they are understood in terms of the practice of the public and universally shared worship of God, could only be carried on by reference to the "greater church." As we have seen, the public character of congregations' practice of worship means that the practice of worship is always localizable. It always has some concrete location in space, culture, and history. Hence congregations constituted by that practice are always concretely located socially, economically, and politically. The greater church is always actual in history only insofar as it is thus located. However, the broadly shared character of congregations' practice of worship means that the practice of worship can never be localized. That is, it can never be simply and finally identified with any one local enactment of the practice. The enactments are all culturally and historically conditioned and relative; the practice cannot be flatly identified with any of them. The greater church, with which particular congregations are in some way "one," that is, the church "catholic" or "ecumenical," while always necessarily localizable, always present as particular congregations -- though not necessarily only present as local congregations (whether or not it is present in other ways can remain an open question) -- is never localized, never exhaustively present as nor simply identical with a local congregation. When the public and the broadly shared characters of the practice that constitutes congregations are held together, it is clear that the proposal to focus theological schooling through questions about congregations need not imply a sectarian view of the church.

The more broadly shared character of the practice of worship also has implications regarding the subject matter of theological study. Two are evident. If congregations are constituted by the enactment of a more broadly practiced worship, then study focused by questions about congregations must locate the congregations it studies in history. It must study them diachronically or through time. Study of any particular congregation thus inescapably is study of it in its own tradition, in its likeness to other congregations in previous historical periods who share its basic construal of what the Christian thing is all about, what it is to understand God, and so forth (see chapter 2). At the same time study of that same congregation also involves comparing it with congregations in earlier periods whose enactments of the universally practiced worship of God are markedly different

It is evident, secondly, that if congregations are constituted by sharing in more broadly practiced worship of God, study focused by questions about them must compare and contrast congregations that are contemporaneous. It must study them synchronically, or at the same time, in a cross-cultural way to probe the ways in which the broadly practiced worship may be enacted in quite different dialects. In short, focusing theological study by attending to congregations necessarily entails a globalization of the frame of reference of theological study.

CONGREGATIONS AS SOCIAL SPACES AND SOCIAL FORMS

A congregation is a group that gathers to worship God "regularly enough for an indefinite period of time to have a common life in which develop intrinsic patterns of conduct, outlook and story." The congregation is a distinctive social form that the worship of God has assumed in the history of the Christian movement. As James Hopewell points out, the distinctiveness of this social form can be seen by contrasting it with other "sorts of collectivities by which humans corporately express their religion." [13] In human history, worship has often been focused by family loyalties, honoring ancestors, and ritually celebrating major moments in a family's life cycle. But "a congregation differs from a family at prayer. The local church bears a distinctive name to indicate ... that the congregation is not synonymous with a particular bond of flesh."[14] In another social form worship can be the celebration of the common piety of political units -- a city or an empire. But, as Hopewell points out, worship in Jesus' name draws a sharp line between the congregation enacting that worship and "all bonds of compatriotism." In yet another social form, Hopewell notes, persons can gather occasionally and informally at a religious shrine, each to perform her or his own individual meritorious rituals of devotion. They may do this in support of a resident community of religious specialists, say, a congregation of monks. Or they may do it as observers of rituals actually performed by the shrine's priests and other functionaries, who guarantee ceremonial proficiency and continuity. In neither case do these worshipers communicate with each other enough to develop common patterns of outlook and story.

[15] In each case, the collective is a set of simultaneous individual acts of worship. But worship in Jesus' name is the practice of a community with a common, communal identity, not an aggregate of individuals, because it is a response to the way God's presence in Jesus has made them a new extra-familial family of God's adopted "children," a new extra-national "people," a single "body."

It is abundantly clear from the history of the Christian movement that actual enactments of the practice of the worship of God in Jesus' name are constantly assimilated to one or more of these alternative social forms of worship. However, it is equally clear from the history of the reform of Christian worship that critical reflection reveals these assimilations to be inconsistent with the enactment of a much more broadly practiced worship of God "in Jesus' name." Unusually large gatherings in North American churches at Christmas and Easter tend to suggest that they are at least as much celebrations of loyalty to family and its tradition as they are response to God's peculiar ways of being present in Jesus of Nazareth. For most of European history from the emperor Constantine's embrace of Christianity onwards there has been a strong tendency to identify worship of God with loyalty to and reverence for the tradition and authorities that constitute the Holy Roman Empire, or its competing fragments in the Middle Ages, or their successor nation states, or one's home town and its familiar "way of life." From the time of martyrs during Roman imperial persecution, Christian worship has often taken the form of pilgrims' ritual devotions at shrines dedicated to persons deemed to be unusually holy in the hope that the saint would intercede with God to meet the pilgrim's individual needs, whereupon the pilgrim returns home. However, one theme the recurring reforms of Christian worship have in common is that none of these alternative social forms for the worship of God can be normative social forms. In one way or another as social forms they are inadequate to, or sometimes inconsistent with, the practice of worship of God "in Jesus' name."

We may generalize the point: A Christian congregation is a social form defined by its social space. What makes this social space distinctive is largely the medium by which members communicate with one another in the practice of worship and in the practices that are the effects of that communication. The communication takes place in various activities: preaching, praying, singing, action for the well-being of neighbors and society, educating, self-governing, and so forth. The medium in which these kinds of communication take place relies heavily on biblical texts and their metaphors and images. This is not to deny that both the social form and the social space of Christian congregations are also deeply shaped by social forms and cultural symbols prominent in the congregations' host cultures. To the contrary, one of the themes of this chapter is that theological schooling focused within the horizon of questions about congregations is inadequate theologically if it fails to attend as much to sociological and cultural analyses of congregations as it does to theological analyses. The point here, however, is to draw out implications of the narrower truth that a Christian congregation's social form is also shaped by its social space, which in turn is importantly and distinctively, if not exhaustively, shaped by the way biblical writings are used in the congregation's common life.

The use of these biblical materials has two types of effect. The biblical narratives and related writings are used in the activities comprising the community's common life to help shape and even transform the personal identities of the group's members. The shaping is as much a forming of their identities as agents, as embodied centers of power, albeit usually quite limited power, in a shared public realm, as it is a forming of them as patients, centers of a private inwardness or subjectivity.

At the same time, use of these biblical writings in the activities comprising the common life of the community has the effect of shaping a communal self-identity. Use of these materials helps shape relatively stable patterns of communal outlook, conduct, and narrative self-description. Among these will be relatively long-term patterns in which roles, responsibilities, authority, power, and relative status are arranged within the community's common life.

Together, these two effects mean that the social space created by the practice of the worship of God in Jesus name is moral and even political in character. Thus a congregation is a space in which individuals' personal identities are shaped in such a fashion that they are disposed to act in characteristic ways in the public realm. And a congregation is itself a social space defined and structured by certain arrangements of responsibility, power, and status. The history of Christianity exhibits quite a variety of these arrangements of responsibility, power, and status that structure congregations social space. [16] Some arrange responsibility, power, and status in rigorous ways so that persons' roles within the congregation are fixed for life hierarchically in a pattern that assigns different levels and degrees of status and authority to different people. Others arrange them so loosely and fluidly that there is near parity of status and power within the congregation and different people take on different responsibilities at different times. Between these two extremes still other congregations assign different responsibilities to different persons through a democratic process in which there is parity of status, but assign different sorts and amounts of power to different responsibilities. The point is that each of these is a different way in which congregations' social space may be structured as a concrete, if relatively small, political and moral reality. It has a particular social form.

An important consequence follows from this. It is inadequate to characterize a congregation simply by stressing its "intersubjectivity." True, it is an intersubjective community. That is, a congregation is a community of subjects in which the consciousness of each is shaped by its relations to all the others through awareness of the others' presence. This happens by way of shared experiences of love and fear and sorrow, mediated through a shared system of symbols by which to express those experiences. But it is all of that only insofar as it is constituted by a complex network of practices in which a group of human bodily agents cooperate. As we have taken pains to point out in chapter 5, practices inherently have material bases. A Christian congregation as a distinctive social space inherently is an arrangement of very material powers. They are creaturely powers and therefore good but open to corruption. Granted, the moral and political character of the type of social space characteristic of the practice of the worship of God in Jesus' name has not always been acknowledged, to say nothing of being the object of approval or rejoicing. Nonetheless, as Wayne Meeks's research in the "social world of the Apostle Paul" tends to show, even the earliest urban Christian congregations were politically and morally structured social spaces. [17]

Two things follow of importance concerning the subject matter of theological study. On one side, study focused through questions about congregations involves theological analysis of congregations as communities of discipleship, witness, and redemptive transformation of personal identities. Central to that study is analysis of how scripture is used as "Word of God" within the communities common life to evoke, nurture, and correct discipleship, witness, and new life. A crucial moment in that study is normative: Are some uses inappropriate to the texts themselves, and on what grounds? Are some uses suggested by the texts but not in fact practiced? Biblical studies oriented to theological questions about the nature and criteria of adequacy of congregations' common life are central to study of congregations as characterized by distinctive social space.

On the other side, attention to congregations involves the use of the human sciences to study them as distinctive social forms. If a Christian congregation is not only an intersubjective community but an interrelated set of practices, then it is materially rooted, as we have seen all practices are. Theological study focused on congregations is not just accidentally related to the things studied by sociologists, anthropologists, economists, and social psychologists; it inherently involves such matters.

The two sorts of inquiry, theological and social scientific, involve different methods. A purely sociological or anthropological study of a Christian congregation or of "the church" that purports to give a full account of what a congregation is, how and why it functions as it does, and when and why it succeeds or fails, would meet severe objections in most theological schools. All that it says may be true, but, the objection would go, its claim to give a full account of a congregation's "reality" is reductionist. It ignores the dimensions of the congregation that come to light when one thinks of its relation to God and "reduces" it to what can be studied empirically or phenomenologically. On the other hand, a purely theological study of a congregation or of "the church" that ignores its social space and social form ought to be subject to equally vigorous objection in theological schooling. A purely theological account may do full justice to those dimensions of a congregation that come to light when one considers it in its God-relatedness, but would ignore the dimensions that come to light when one considers its historical, social, and cultural location. Adequate attention to congregations necessarily involves a dialectic between the methods appropriate to both theological and social-scientific study. Neither can be "translated" into or simply identified with the other as though they were interchangeable ways of saying the same things. [18]

SUMMARY

Our proposal is that what makes a theological school theological is its overarching end of coming to understand God more truly. Because of the nature of God, however, that cannot be done directly. A variety of other matters have historically been made the direct objects of study in trust that studying them would lead indirectly to truer understanding of God. Our proposal is that what makes a theological school theological is that it seeks to understand God more truly by focusing study of these matters through questions about Christian congregations. In this chapter we have refined that proposal somewhat by exploring what constitutes a congregation. Congregations, we suggested, are constituted by enactments of a more broadly practiced public worship of God.

Exploration of how theological schooling should focus its inquiries has, in turn, highlighted subject matters that must be dealt with in theological schooling. Inasmuch as congregations are self-defining as groups gathering to worship God in Jesus' name, schooling focused by questions about them must attend to ecclesiological topics. For example, it must address such matters as whether faithfulness to that self-identification is a necessary condition for a group's counting as a Christian congregation, and whether groups that do not claim to worship in Jesus' name may nonetheless be said to know God and God's redemptive presence.

Inasmuch as congregations are constituted by a practice that is inherently self-critical, theological schooling attending to congregations must deal with both the topic of what the norms are for that critique and with the truth of the practice. To address the norms of congregational faithfulness is to do constructive dogmatic theology and moral theology. To engage in the critique itself is to do theology of culture, and to undertake "prophetic" judgment of congregations' common life.

Inasmuch as congregations are constituted by a public practice, theological schooling attending to congregations must therefore attend to "secular" wisdom about how the personal identities of persons engaged in public action are changed, and how the arrangements of power in a society are rearranged. And it must attend to the languages that are the medium of public discourse in congregations' host cultures.

Inasmuch as congregations are constituted by enactments of a more broadly practiced worship, theological schooling focused through questions about congregations must attend to their setting in time both diachronical and synchronical. That is, its attention to congregations must be both historical, placing them in the larger contexts of traditions through time, and globalized, placing them in the larger context of contemporaneous cross-cultural enactments of the same practice of worship.

Inasmuch as congregations are themselves social spaces with social forms, theological schooling focused through questions about them must attend critically to the scripture whose use creates the social space; and it must attend to the disciplines of the human sciences that provide understanding of the social forms that make congregations moral and political realities in their own right.

The proposal that has been partially elaborated in this chapter is that a theological school is a community of persons trying to understand God more truly by focusing its study of various subject matters within the horizon of questions about Christian congregations. I have suggested a way in which to understand what constitutes a Christian congregation and a way in which to identify one when it presents itself. That allowed me to show why various subject matters that ought to be studied by a theological school (e.g., Bible, Christian history, theology, psychology and sociology of religion, etc.) are best studied in their theological significance (i.e., as means to understanding God) by studying them in their relation to the common life of actual congregations. Exactly what it means to "focus study of various subject matters within the horizon of questions about Christian congregations" has not been explained and remains to be discussed in the following chapters. However, enough of what this proposal means by "Christian congregations" has been clarified now for us to return to the topic of a theological school itself. If the road to the universally relevant is through the concrete, then we must now ask what constitutes a theological school, what sort of social space and social form it may be, and how it is related to particular and equally concrete congregations. We turn to these questions in the next chapter. That will provide the context for turning finally in the last two chapters to what makes the school's curriculum a course of study rather than a clutch of courses, what it can do to and for its students, to and for congregations, and to and for traditions of academic research.

NOTES

[1] See Building Effective Ministry: Theory and Practice in the Local Church, ed. Carl S. Dudley (San Francisco: Harper & Row, 1983).

[2] James F. Hopewell, Congregation: Stories and Structures (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1987).

[3] Joseph C. Hough, Jr., and Barbara G. Wheeler, eds., Beyond Clericalism.

[4] Cf. esp. John B. Cobb, Jr., "Ministry to the World: A New Professional Paradigm," in Beyond Clericalism, pp. 23-31.

5] Cf. esp. John B. Cobb, Jr., "Ministry to the World," and Marjorie Hewitt Suchocki, "Friends in the Family," in Beyond Clericalism, pp.23-31 and 49-61.

[6] Cf. esp. Letty Russell, "Which Congregations?." and Beverly W..Harrison, "Toward a Christian Feminist Hermeneutic for Demystifying Class Reality in Local Congregations," in Beyond Clericalism, pp.31-37 and137-151.

[7] Hopewell, Congregation, pp.12-13.

[8] This description and following discussion grew out of my contributions to Beyond Clericalism, pp.11-23, 37-49.

[9] Hopewell, Congregation, p. 14.

[10] By no means is this a peculiarly Protestant claim; cf. Karl Rahner, "Priestly Existence," in idem, Theological Investigations, vol.3 (New York: Seabury Press, 1974); and Bernard Cooke, Ministry to Word and Sacraments (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1976), esp. Part 5.

[11] J. A. T. Robinson, Liturgy Coming to Life (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1964).

[12] See William Placher, Unapologetic Theology: A Christian Voice in a Pluralistic Conversation (Louisville: Westininster/John Knox Press, 1989), esp. chs. 1 and 8; George Lindbeck, The Nature of Doctrine (Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1984).

[13] Hopewell, Congregation, p.14.

[14] Ibid.,p.13.

[15] Ibid.,p.15.

[16] See Cooke, Ministry to Word and Sacraments.

[17] See Wayne A. Meeks, The First Urban Christians: The Social World of the Apostle Paul (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1983).

[18] For the classic statement of this point, see James M. Gustafson, Treasure in Earthen Vessels (New York: Harper & Row, 1961.)

6. Borrowed Language

The third of the three central issues that have surfaced in the discussions of the nature and purpose of theological schooling is how to understand theological schooling concretely. This is, of course, a highly relative matter. There is no absolute standard of "concrete" description against which to measure the degree of abstractness of other descriptions. No thinking or language somehow devoid of abstraction is possible or desirable. Concreteness in expression is a matter of degree. Nonetheless, we have reason to believe that in dealing with our subject, it is best to speak as concretely as is possible under the circumstances. My contention is that decisions about the terminology we use in describing theological schooling are decisively important in this regard. In particular, we need to pay attention to a few terms that will be of crucial importance for this thought experiment. The rest of this chapter will be devoted to a closer look at the concepts "pluralism," "understand," "action," and "practice."

Consequently this will be the most technical chapter in the book. Much of what I have to say is borrowed from others who have, to my mind, clarified these notions admirably. It will be an exercise in borrowing language and explaining why it is borrowed. It is quite possible to make sense of the following chapters without working through this one. However, much of the defense of posing the issues as I do is given here. Without this somewhat more abstract and careful discussion, what is argued later on may be reasonably clear but why it is argued may be more obscure.

PLURALISMS AND VARIATlONS

It is already clear that I have made a decision to describe certain features of the heritage and situation that shape a theological school as "pluralistic." That is not an innocent conceptual decision. Why not instead use "various" and speak of "variations"? It is relatively uncontroversial to say descriptively, for example, that theological school students and faculty come from a variety of social and economic backgrounds, or that they may exhibit a variety of ways of concretely practicing the Christian faith. It is a fair question to ask whether we have committed ourselves to more than this descriptive remark if we decide instead to write of socioeconomic "pluralism" and of a "pluralism" of ways of being Christian

Perhaps we have. Much current discussion of cultural, religious, moral, and intellectual pluralism uses the concept "pluralism" in a way that seems to shift from a descriptive use ("such diversity does in fact exist") to an evaluative and even celebratory use ("such diversity is a good thing and should exist"). Indeed, some high-flying, abstract, and vague talk of pluralism seems to assume the validity of a thorough relativism about these diversities ("each variation - culturally, religiously, morally, or intellectually -- is as good and true as any of the others"). Does the very use of the concept "pluralism" smuggle an evaluative judgment into what presents itself as a descriptive account of factors that make a theological school concrete? Moreover, does the use of "pluralism" involve the unargued assumption that any construal of the Christian thing, and concrete practice of the faith, and so forth, is as good as any other? If so, that is a serious danger that needs to be guarded against when we use "pluralism" in relation to a theological school. Such judgments might be valid, but they need to be argued and not simply assumed. They ought not to be settled before they are argued simply by the choice we make of the terms we will use.

On the other hand, it seems that use of "variety" has even greater drawbacks. To speak of a variety of construals of Christianity or of social and economic locations is to suggest a set of variations on a theme. To speak in that way of factors that make a given theological school concrete is to speak very misleadingly. It suggests that in regard to each "diversity" we can identify some one thing, the "theme," that all the variants share and which is normative for all of them. It suggests that the respects in which they differ, that is, whatever makes them "variations," are relatively less important than the one thing they share (the "theme") -- unless they so distort the theme as to make it unrecognizable, in which case the diversity is a decline and deformation. It suggests that the one thing they all share may be entirely abstract. No actual variant may ever be identical with the theme; the theme may be a wholly ideal entity abstracted from the array of variants.

But nothing is more concrete than the differences among the racial, gender, and socioeconomic locations of persons involved in theological schooling, nor more concrete than the differences among the practices through which persons have sought to understand God, nor more concrete than the differences between the ways in which models of excellent schooling have been institutionalized. These are the sorts of differences that help make theological schools concrete. It cannot be assumed at the outset that any one construal (of the Christian thing, social location, way of understanding God, model of excellent schooling, etc.) is the one Christianly correct version. Nor is it self-evident that any of these sets of differences amounts to a set of variations on a single abstract theme. The relations among them may be far more complex and unsystematic, more like overlapping resemblances among members of an extended family than like minor modifications of one common and underlying genetic structure in identical twins. Even less is it to be assumed that we are capable of identifying such a theme that could be used normatively to identify which "variants" are closer and which further from what is Christianly acceptable in a theological school. The very possibility of identifying such a theme would need to be demonstrated.

For these reasons I have chosen to speak of the "pluralism of pluralisms" rather than the "variations" with which every theological school must deal. To speak of issues raised for theological schools by this or that type of "variety" risks diverting analysis and critique away from the concreteness of theological schooling into a hunt for abstract thematic essences and ideal structures. To speak instead of this or that "pluralism" raising issues for theological schooling at least has the advantage of tending in current usage to keep the focus of analysis and critique on what is concretely actual.

PRACTICES AND ACTIONS

We shall be speaking of a focus in a theological school on questions about "particular Christian congregations" as a means to understanding God Christianly. The common life of Christian congregations consists of a multitude of kinds of common activities: worship, preaching and listening to sermons, education, mutual pastoral caring, counseling, action for the well-being of the larger society, and the like. Craig Dykstra has shown that it is illuminating to analyze the educational activities in a congregation by using a technical sense of the concept "practice."[1] More broadly, in Art in Action Nicholas Wolterstorff has relied on the concept "practice" for an illuminating analysis of art and its place in Christians' common life. [2] I propose to generalize the point. I shall suggest that we think of congregations and of theological schools as comprised of complex networks of interrelated practices.

Here "practice" will be used in a somewhat narrower way than it usually is in ordinary English. Following, albeit at considerable distance, philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre's analysis of "practice"in After Virtue [3] I will mean this by "practice":

A practice is any form of socially established cooperative human activity that is complex and internally coherent, is subject to standards of excellence that partly define it, and is done to some end but does not necessarily have a product.

Note several features of this description of"practice."

Practices are human activities: "activities" is used in a limited, technical way here and one needs to be careful about what one reads into it and infers from it. Activities are comprised of human acts or actions. Act and action are not simply identical with "behavior"; some behavior is not action.

Roughly, the distinguishing mark of action is that it is "intentional," it is "done on purpose," it has an end or motive. [4] Some behavior is intentional action. But some behavior is nonintentional. A standard illustration is the case of a man who repeatedly moves an arm in a sweeping gesture. We ask, "Why are you doing that?" If it is possible to give an intention as answer (call it a purpose, or a reason, or a motive), as in "I want to hail a cab," he is performing an act. But if all there is to be given is a causal explanation, for example, "I suffer a rare but medically understood muscular spasm," it is still clearly a piece of human behavior but it is not, properly speaking, an "act."

Actions are not as such "practices"; practices are cooperative human activities. That brings out two interrelated features of practices. They are social, they are done by two or more persons acting together in an interactive, social way. Secondly, they are governed by rule-like regularities. One learns how to engage in a practice by learning its implicit rules. One's enactment of a practice can be (and usually will be) subject to evaluation and, if necessary, correction by reference to its implicit "rules." Mostly the rules that seem to govern practices are implicit in them and have never been codified. Often people who are most adept at a practice are quite incapable of formulating even its most basic rules, although some of them may be skilled at coaching less adept people on how to "do it better" in an ad hoc way.

Note further that central to the concept of action is stress on its bodiliness. For that reason the possibility of answering the question, "Why are you doing that?" by identifying an intention is not inconsistent with also answering the question by identifying a cause. Indeed, it may well be that this question asked of genuine actions always requires both sorts of answers. Intentions, in any case, are not causes and it is a profound conceptual confusion to treat them as though they were. Sometimes, to be sure, the question "Why are you doing that?" cannot be answered by identifying an intention because there is none; all that can be provided is a cause. In that case, what is in question is a piece of behavior, but it is not an act.

Of course, sometimes (much of the time?) we do not know what to say when we are asked why we have done something. That may be because we do not understand the relevant causal "mechanisms." Or it may be because we are in varying degrees unclear about our intentions. In order to have a purpose or an intention, and engage in intentional action, it is not necessary always to be self-awarely clear about all of them. Indeed, we may be quite unconscious of some of our intentions. We may have unconscious purposes and motives. Furthermore, there may be causes (and not simply further motives) for these intentions having become unconscious, and psychoanalytic theory may have identified some of those causes. Clarity in self-awareness is a matter of degree, however, and in principle the degree of clarity is capable of being increased. We can hope to come to greater clarity and greater ability to say what the intention or (more unusually) complex of intentions are in our acts. One of the functions of psychotherapy is to assist that growth in clarity Not all pieces of bodily behavior are acts; nor are all acts pieces of overt bodily behavior. We engage in "mental acts." They are private in that they are unobservable. We read silently, think unspeakingly, imagine unexpressively, daydream impassively. It is not simply that a body somehow houses these mental happenings. Nor does the body merely provide them necessary physiological conditions. Beyond that, it is probably the case that our bodies are as deeply engaged in our mental happenings, including mental acts, as they are in our overt behavior. In the one case as in the other "acting" involves bodily changes. We probably imagine, think, and read silently with our bodies quite as much as we walk, speak, and make things with our bodies. None of this is done without the body. It is organic, bodily persons who read, think, imagine, dream, and hallucinate. Some of such behaviors we do intentionally and we may call them "mental acts." Some of them, however, like night and day dreams and hallucinations, happen to us. Like muscular spasms, they are caused but not intended.

Now, most if not all mental acts are capable of being overtly performed bodily. Using our bodies, we can say aloud what we are reading, thinking, imagining, and daydreaming silently. Sometimes we can also enact them bodily. We may, in the broadest sense, "act out." When we do, we are performing these intentional acts bodily. Private mental acts and public bodily acts are the same type of thing: intentional acts. It is the same concept "act" we employ in both cases. Consequently it is profoundly misleading to say of the overt public act that it is an "outer manifestation" or "expression" of an inner mental act. That wrongly suggests that the two are quite different sorts of realities, that the inner mental act is logically independent of; prior to, and -- most important of all -- the cause of the "meaning" of the outer act. Rather, in these cases the overt bodily intentional action is an observable performance of an unobservable embodied mental act. They are two modes of enactment of the same type of intentional action.

These are some features of the concept "act" or "action" that are used in our description of practices. If we choose to discuss both theological schools and Christian congregations in terms of practices, this concept of act will have important consequences. It will focus attention on the concrete bodily character of those who engage in the practices in question, subverting all tendencies to draw a systematic distinction between "physical" or "natural" or "material" practices, on one side, and "spiritual" or "intellectual" practices on the other. Furthermore, by holding "inner" intention and "outer" behavior together in a single dialectical whole, and by denying any difference in kind between mental and overt acts as acts, indeed, as bodily acts, it will subvert all tendencies to draw any systematic distinction between "interior spiritual life" and "engagement in the public realm."

A second notable feature of our description of practices: Because they are socially established, practices have a history. Indeed, they can be seen as traditions of human action, in distinction, although not separation, from traditions of thought. Practices are not spontaneously invented in the moment as improvisations to deal with passing and novel problems. They are instead already established, relatively settled and accepted over a period of time as social conventions. By the same token, however, they are deeply rooted in larger cultural settings that shape them. As those cultures undergo historical change, so do practices. To stress that practices have a history is to stress that they are historically and culturally relative.

Because, third, they are cooperative and complex, practices are necessarily institutionalized to some degree. By "social institution" I mean an established and relatively fixed arrangement of social status, roles, and various sorts of power among a group of people engaged in some sort of common activity. The complexity, formality, rationality, and rigidity of these arrangements are a matter of degree and vary enormously from practice to practice. However, among persons engaged in complex cooperative activities some degree of institutionalization is inherent in their practice. These persons will have different roles to play in their cooperative activity, different responsibilities, different authority, different power, and different status.

Thus "practices" and "institutions" ought not to be contrasted to each other; they entail each other. This contributes to the complexity of the practice. Some of a set of practices will be those of maintaining, monitoring, and, if needed, modifying the institutional arrangements of the rest of the practices.

This need for practices to maintain the institutionalization of other practices creates one of the possibilities for practices becoming deformed. A practice, we said, is done to an end. But the more formal and complex its institutional patterns are, the stronger will be the tendency for their maintenance to become an end in its own right. That end may then compete with and tend to supplant the practices' proper end. Nowhere is this clearer than in the case of that highly formal, highly rigid, allegedly highly rationalized form of institutionalization known as "bureaucracy," which so notoriously deforms many of the practices it organizes.

Because, fourth, practices are forms of cooperative human activity and are institutionalized, they inescapably have a "material" base. As forms of human action, practices are forms of bodily action. whatever else they are, the human beings who act are living bodies whose continued action requires the care and feeding of those bodies. Furthermore, as institutionalized cooperative activity, practices involve various kinds of tools and instruments and all manner of material media of communication among the cooperators. It would be a mistake to look at this material base of practices as merely a "precondition" for practices but not really "part" of any practice. The two are not logically distinct. One can see this by noting the impossibility of defining any given practice without including in the definition either reference to bodily action or reference to physical media of communication among practitioners and the physical tools they employ in the practice. This is an important point to stress because it underscores that practices have concrete social and cultural locations in their larger host societies. Access to the sorts of material base that different practices require is determined by the ways those host societies arrange social, economic, and political power. Consequently, practices will tend to have some interest in preserving social arrangements that give them access to the resources they need and some interest in resisting changes in those societal arrangements that might limit their access to the resources they need. This obviously creates another possibility for practices becoming deformed: inherent within them is the possibility of their coming to fill an ideological role.

Because, fifth, they are ordered to ends and are partly defined by certain standards of excellence, practices inherently require self-critical reflection. Self-critical reflection is not a separate practice in its own right; it is an integral part of a practice. Like the whole of the practice, self-critical reflection itself must be a cooperative activity.

As critical reflection, it finds its criteria partly in the end to which the practice is ordered (As currently practiced, does this practice realize its end? If not, what is amiss?) and partly in the standards of excellence that partially define the practice (How excellently do these particular cooperators engage in this practice, and if not very excellently, are they really engaged in the practice they say they're engaged in, or are they doing something else? How excellently did the Somoza government govern Nicaragua; and if not very excellently, was it perhaps not really engaged in the practice of "government" at all, but rather in the practice of commerce and trade, treating the nation as a single privately owned corporation for the personal profit of the Somoza family and its associates?). Beyond that, however, critical reflection must raise questions about the practice itself: why become involved in it at all? Insofar as engagement in this practice brings with it commitent to certain claims about reality, are they true?

As reflection, critical reflection is not logically prior to practice. It presupposes that the practice is already going on, a practice that already is and has been critically self-reflective. So reflection doesn't simply follow practice either. It asks, "what is this practice? In what ways does it shape the actions and the personhood of the people engaged in it? How has it changed through history?" or even, "what would the characteristics be of a practice in some ways analogous to this one but radically different from it in other regards?" -- reflections that imagine utopias, lead to radical reformations and to revolutions. Thus critical reflection does not involve a movement from detached theory to practical application. Rather, it involves a circular movement from practice to critical reflection and back to corrected practice, or to radically transformed practice.

To summarize: As socially established cooperative activities, practices are historically and culturally relative, to some degree institutionalized, materially based, and inherently critically self-reflective.

Clearly, in order to engage with others in a practice requires that one have a certain range of abilities and capacities that the practice may call for. What is in question here are not skills and techniques but "conceptual" capacities. These conceptual capacities are deepened by disciplined participation in the relevant practice. Some involve far more shaping of one's personal identity than do others. This will vary a great deal from practice to practice. Consider the differences between the abilities and capacities called for respectively by the game of football and by farming, by creating and maintaining human communities and by painting, by physics and by the worship of God.

TO UNDERSTAND

We will be speaking of "understanding God," indeed, of trying to understand God indirectly by way of "understanding other matters within the horizon of questions about particular Christian congregations." We noted in chapter 2 that in Christian history there have been several different notions of how to go about understanding God:through contemplation, discursive reasoning, the affections, or action. But we did not reflect on what it is "to understand" in any of these ways. what is it to "understand"? This is the final somewhat technical concept we must examine with care.

To understand" is no one thing. That is obvious in a broad and vague way when we consider some of the various ways in which we speak of trying (and often failing) to understand: We speak of hoping to understand the instruction manual that accompanies a new word processor and of trying to understand a novel like James Joyce's Ulysses; though both are printed texts, what it is to understand one is quite different from what it is to understand the other. Neither is quite what we are after when we try to understand some particular human person. That, in turn, is still different from what we mean when we say we have failed to understand one of Beethoven's last string quartets. And then there are those who say they would like to understand the meaning of life.

Furthermore, what it is to understand any one of these may vary depending on who is trying to understand and what the context is. It is one kind of thing to understand a person when she is my wife in the context of our life together, another to understand her when she is a potential buyer and I an advertiser in the context of contemporary American consumerist culture, still another when she is a client and I a psychiatrist in a psychotherapeutic context, even though these various senses of "to understand" overlap in various ways.

Surely these various senses of "to understand" have something in common? If not, then we are using the expression in wildly equivocating ways. There is one thing all these uses of "to understand" do have in common. It can be generalized like this: "To understand" something in some context is to have some abilities in relation to that "something." Charles Wood puts the point well: To understand a map is ordinarily to be able to find one's way around by it. To understand an order is to be able to obey it if conditions permit, or to know what obeying it would involve. To understand algebra is to be able to perform and apply various mathematical operations in appropriate circumstances, and to know when and why a particular operation is right or wrong....One who understands a text will be able to make use of the text in ways that demonstrate -- and in some sense even constitute - understanding. [5]"

A more complete account of each of these "understandings" could be given in terms of specific abilities and capacities. The abilities differ from one another a great deal. Note that while it is important to relate "understand" to "be able to use," to relate "understand x" to "have certain abilities in relation to x," it is just as important to stress that "to understand" is not identical with "to agree" (e.g., with a text) or "to obey" (e.g., a command) or "to follow" (e.g., a map). Among the abilities that in some sense constitute understanding are abilities to assess critically, to entertain what is understood in an "as if"or imaginative mode, and mindfully and deliberately to disregard that which is understood. There is no one core of which all these abilities are merely variations. To understand is no one thing.

There are three further points to be made about "understanding" as sets of abilities. The first is that, within limits, we may grow tn understanding. There are degrees of understanding because abilities admit of degree. To grow in understanding something is to grow in a set of abilities in relation to what is being understood. The growth comes through our engagement over a period of time in certain relevant practices. It was implicit in our discussion in the previous section that practices are patterns of activity that are governed by rule-like regularities: thus the judiciary, the making of western music on the piano, and batting a baseball are all rule-governed activities and hence are practices. Practices usually involve criticism, that is, rules according to which our activity has to be corrected in certain respects from time to time.

The traditional name for what grows through these practices is habitus. A habitus is a settled disposition to act in a characteristic way. Sometimes it is a disposition to engage in a certain practice. Habitus is thus rather like what in English is called a habit, but with major qualifications. where many habits dispose us to act automatically in mechanical and rigid ways, habitus dispose us to act in a certain characteristic way (say, prudently) but to do so intentionally (as opposed to automatically), thoughtfully (as opposed to instinctively), self-critically (as opposed to mechanically), and inventively (as opposed to rigidly) in light of the actual circumstances of the action. Here we are considering specifically cognitive habitus, dispositions to act in regard to something in ways that comprise understanding it. In short, growth in understanding comes through some kind of discipline that leads to acquiring capacities to act according to relevant rules.

One distinction among these various sorts of growth is important for our purposes. Growth in some sorts of abilities shape who we are far more deeply than does growth in other sorts of abilities. Growth in our abilities to trust, for example, or to take risks, abilities that are integral to understanding "faithfulness," shapes us very deeply, whereas growth in our ability to manipulate checker pieces according to the rules of the game of checkers and to design strategies as we play, abilities integral to understanding checkers, scarcely shapes us at all. Coming to understand certain things is existentially significant in ways in which coming to understand other things simply isn't.

Understanding, secondly, is guided by our interests. We can bring this out by reflecting on the question, "Just which abilities constitute 'understanding,' say, this map, and why?" As Charles Wood points out, "The cab driver and the cartographer may have somewhat different understandings of the same map." [6] That is, they may have somewhat different sets of abilities in relation to the map. The differences between their sets of abilities are dictated by the different objectives they have. The cab driver wants to find a particular address; the cartographer wants to assess the reliability and complexity of the map. And their differing objectives are rooted in different interests: The cab driver is interested in getting around the city; the cartographer is interested in the art and science of mapping urban areas. The differences in their "understandings" of the map are rooted in different interests.

We recognize this point informally all the time in everyday life. To understand other persons will require different sets of abilities depending on whether our objective is to be their friends, sell them something they don't really need, or command them in the heat of battle. To be sure, these sets of abilities may well overlap in various unsystematic ways. Nonetheless, they will be different. What it is "to understand" other persons will vary depending on our objectives and interests. Similarly, a person whose objective is to acquire a sense for a particular historical period and a person whose objective is to savor a skilled writer's use of the mother tongue will have to bring somewhat different sets of abilities to a historical novel; they will have different understandings of the same novel.

These interests, or, to speak more concretely, the people who have these interests, are always "located" culturally, socially, economically, and politically. This is the third point to be made about "understanding" as sets of abilities relative to what is to be understood. Because these abilities are guided by interests and the interests are located in some society and its cultures, understanding is always "situated."

That has two important distinguishable but interrelated consequences. One is that the abilities that comprise "understanding" are in varying degrees culturally formed. To understand is always to understand in some cultural context, in terms provided by the culture's conventional practices and traditions. The other is that to be located in a society is, concretely, to be situated at some point in the distribution of power and status within that society. To the extent that social,

economic, and political power is inequitably distributed and to the extent that this inequality generates tension or conflict within the culture, the interests that guide understanding may be shaped by one's location in these tensions -- shaped either as an interest to right the inequality (perhaps because one is oppressed by it) or as an interest to preserve it (perhaps because one benefits from it).

Now, both consequences of the fact that interests are "situated" can lead to distortion and bias in understanding. The term "ideology" is sometimes loosely used to refer to distortion and bias rooted in both of these consequences of the situatedness of our interests. However, "ideology" properly connotes unself-conscious bias that functions to deny or obscure inequalities from which some people benefit and by which others are oppressed. Hence "ideology" is probably best reserved for that distortion and bias in understanding whose guiding interests are located, not simply in some culture, nor simply on one side or the other of an intrasocietal conflict, but quite particularly on the privileged side of such a conflict. However that may be, it follows that the abilities that comprise what it is "to understand" must include critical and self-critical abilities to detect and correct ideological and other distortions.

There are, to be sure, other ways to explicate what it is to understand something. It is possible, indeed common, in contemporary theology to assume that the concept "to understand" must be explained in terms of a philosophical analysis of the structure and dynamics of human consciousness or subjectivity which the philosophical analysis shows to be identical among all human persons. Explained that way, understanding is taken to be some one phenomenon which is the presence to consciousness of something called the meaning of that which is understood. On this explanation, understanding is, as Wood puts it, a phenomenon "experienced, as it were, in the privacy of one's mind, apart from any practical entanglements or consequences."[7] when this sort of analysis of the concept "to understand" is used in relation to theological schooling it does tend to yield an "essentialist" picture: It suggests that to understand God or anything else is some one phenomenon and that what is understood is some one meaning. It tends to yield an individualistic picture of theological schooling; it suggests that to understand God is a phenomenon experienced "in the privacy" of students' and teachers' individual minds. And it tends to yield a picture of theological schooling in which the life of faith is disengaged from the public realm. It suggests that to understand God or anything else is a phenomenon in consciousness "apart from any practical entanglements or consequences."

By contrast, "to understand" (God or anything else) has been analyzed here in a way that excludes "essentialist" implications by insisting that to understand is itself not some one thing, but rather an indefinitely large number of capacities and abilities. Furthermore, the analysis does not push toward an essentialist picture of the subject matter that is understood, because it does not require us even to mention anything called "the [essential] meaning" that must be grasped in any successful effort to understand a subject matter. So too, by tying understanding to capacities and abilities for engaging in practices that are inherently social, our analysis of "to understand" avoids individualistic implications. And precisely by tying understanding to dispositions to act, our analysis avoids disengaging the effort to understand from the public realm.

We have been sharpening a few tools. With this preparatory clarification of the concepts "pluralism," "practice," "action," and "understanding" in hand, we may now proceed to refine our proposal. These concepts are central to the proposal. In ordinary usage they are remarkably vague notions and quickly create confusion. If we take care to use them only in ways guided by the analysis we have given them here, we may be able to make our proposal both more clear and more persuasive.

Notes

[1] Craig Dykstra, "Reconceiving Practice," in Shifting Boundaries: Contextual Approaches to the Structure of Theological Education, ed. Barbara G.Wheeler and Edward Farley (Louisville, Ky.: Westminster/John Knox Press, 1991), pp. 35-36.

[2] Nicholas Wolterstorff, Art in Action (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1980). See esp. pp. 1-19, 65-91.

3] Alasdair MacIntyre, After Virtue (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1981), pp. 175-283.

[4] Of the extensive literature in philosophical psychology dealing with the concepts "action" and "act," cf. esp. G.E. M. Anscombe, Intention (Oxford:Blackwells, 1957); Anthony Kenny, Action, Emotion, and Will (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1963); A. I. Meiden, Free Action (London:Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1961); R. S. Peters, The Concept of Motivation, 2nd ed. (London: Routledge&Kegan Paul, 1963).

[5] Charles Wood, The Formation of Christian Understanding (Philadelphia:

Westminster Press, 1981), pp. 16-17.

[6] Ibid.,p.19

[7] Ibid.,p.17.

5. Utopia

Now a thought experiment and an invitation: The experiment is one more utopian exercise in sketching what makes a theological school theological and what makes a theological school a school. Along the way the experiment will urge that there are a few issues that are truly basic. They are more fundamental than are any of the issues in which theological educators have tended to invest a great deal of attention and energy. They are more basic, it will be urged, because the ways in which they are decided pretty much determine how other issues in theological schooling are worked out. Further, the experiment will propose a language in which it may be more fruitful to state both issues and proposals than is the language often employed.

The invitation is to conduct your own thought experiment about what some theological school known to you is and ought to be. It may very well be that you see good reasons to disagree with the proposals sketched here. All the same, it may be that the issues identified here as basic strike you as the right issues to think about. In that case, this proposal is an invitation to discuss a shared agenda, even though the discussion leads us to differing proposals about how to deal with the issues. Or it may be clear to you that the wrong issues have been identified that there are other issues more fundamental than the ones singled out here. Nevertheless, it may be that the modest conceptual scheme proposed here will prove useful in formulating those issues, showing why they are more "basic," and showing why your proposals about them are illuminating and fruitful. In that case, this proposal is an invitation to use a shared language to discuss what the issues really are as well as to discuss alternative resolutions of them. Or, of course, you may have reasons to believe that even the slightly technical language advocated here leads me to state the issues misleadingly. In that case, this proposal is an invitation to make a counterproposal about how best to say what the basic issues are in theological schooling and how best to resolve them. Naturally, I hope to persuade you of the wisdom of my own thought experiment; far more importantly, the experiment will have served its purpose if it stimulates and focuses fresh and continuing discussion of theological schooling by all of those who are involved in it, students and trustees, administrators and faculty.

The three central issues

The next five chapters are devoted to developing a proposal about the purpose and nature of a theological school. That is, they elaborate a proposal about how to explain what makes a theological school theological and what makes it a school. As I noted in the first chapter, the proposal is a contribution to a larger, ongoing conversation about what is more frequently called "theological education" than it is called "theological schooling." That conversation raises three major interconnected issues which my proposal aims to resolve.

Since the relative success of this proposal depends on the degree to which it does show how to resolve these three issues, and since the proposal is organized by the way the issues depend on one another, it is important to identify them clearly here at the outset:

a) How shall the theological course of study be unified?

b) How shall the theological course of study be made adequate to the pluralism of ways in which the Christian thing is actually construed, that is, interpreted and lived in concrete reality?

c) How can "theological education" itself be understood concretely, that is, how can it be described so that what makes it "theological" is made clear without denying or ignoring its concreteness and the ways in which that concreteness makes it deeply pluralistic in actual practice?

A word about each of the three is in order.

The first two issues arise within the conversation about "theological education" itself; the third arises when one stands back from the conversation and reflects on the way in which it has been conducted. As the new literature about "theological education" began to grow during the past decade it quickly became clear [l] that for some participants the central issue facing "theological education" is the fragmentation of its course of study and the need to reconceive it so as to recover its unity, whereas for others the central issue is "theological education's" inadequacy to the pluralism of social and cultural locations in which the Christian thing is understood and lived.

Edward Farley's path-breaking Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education, [2] which may fairly be said to have launched the conversation, urged that the major issue for theological education today is the fragmentation of the theological course of study and proposed a way to recover its unity. In quite different ways, so have such other widely read books as Charles Wood's Vision and Discernment: An Orientation in Theological Study[3] and Max L. Stackhouse's Apologia: Contextualization, Globalization, and Mission in Theological Education.[4] It has been a common student complaint for a long time, of course, that the theological course of study lacked "integration." The fact that a great many theological schools' curricula long ago fragmented, in H. Richard Niebuhr's phrase, into "a series of studious jumps in various directions"[5] is beyond dispute. It is important to underscore that the writers who focus on this issue stress that fragmentation of the course of study is unacceptable in a theological school not simply because it makes for bad schooling, but because it makes for bad theology. Generally they hold that a fragmented theological curriculum is unacceptable because it is inadequate to a unity that "the faith" or the "life of faith" is supposed to have. Because it fragments the integrity of the faith, it is inadequate to its theological subject. Writers in this group (Charles Wood is perhaps an exception) tend to assume that the Christian thing has some time-and culture-invariant essence or structure that makes it one selfsame thing in all times and places. Accordingly, a course of theological study would be theologically adequate if its organizing structure were derived from the inherent structure of the Christian thing. Hence they propose that unity can be restored to theological education by recovering for its course of study the structure and internal movement that is dictated by the very essence of Christian faith.

The centrality of the second issue is most passionately urged in God's Fierce Whimsy,[6] written by Katie Cannon and the Mud Flower Collective. It is also pressed in various ways by several contributors to Beyond Clericalism: The Congregation as a Focus for Theological Education, a collection of essays edited by Joseph C. Hough, Jr., and Barbara G. Wheeler.[7] Many theological students, especially women, African Americans, and Hispanics, regularly and vigorously object that their "theological education" is in important respects inappropriate to the faith communities to which they belong and to the social and cultural worlds in which they expect to live and work in the future. Theological educators in this second group stress that the conventional course of theological study is inadequate to the pluralism of ways in which the Christian faith is understood and lived. They are impressed by the ways in which gender, race, and class differences shape both different understandings of Christian faith and different social worlds in which it is lived out. They contend that the conventional course of study in "theological education" unjustifiably privileges a very narrow spectrum of that diversity as though it were somehow "normative" and definitive of the Christian thing.

To be sure, justification for privileging certain construals of Christian faith is sometimes offered through the claim that these construals best represent the essence of the Christian thing. However, as writers in this group tend to suggest, that type of argument overlooks the fact that characterizations of the "essence" of Christian faith are themselves deeply shaped by the social and cultural locations of the people who make them. Theological education thus ends up being inadequate to a great many construals of the Christian thing that have not been privileged, and is also inadequate to a great many "worlds" in which the faith is actually lived. Here too it must be underscored that this group's contention is not only that this is educationally inadequate, but, more than that, it is theologically inadequate. It is theologically inadequate because its unwarranted privileging of a narrow spectrum of construals of the Christian thing amounts to a kind of idolatry, an absolutizing of a historically and culturally relative human construct.

Do we have to choose between these two issues? This is where the third issue comes in. It seems clear on the face of it that both of these first two issues do genuinely confront North American theological schooling today. Yet as stated they seem interconnected in a negative way. If we focus on coping with the loss of unity, are we not driven to postulate an inherent structure or essence to Christian faith that is the basis of the curriculum's restored unity and is more basic than and more important than all pluralism? Focusing on restoration of the unity of "theological education" seems to require us to treat pluralism as something relatively superficial or merely apparent. It seems to lead to minimizing the importance of the issues raised for theological schooling by pluralism.

On the other hand, if we focus on coping with a theological course of study's inadequacy to pluralism, are we not driven to deny that the Christian thing has any one underlying structure or that it is any one thing in and through all of its diversity? Focusing on the challenge to make theological schooling adequate to pluralism seems to require us to deny the usual basis for unifying the course of study. It seems to lead to minimizing the importance of the issues raised for theological schooling by the fragmentation of the course of study. Indeed, it seems to threaten us with an increase in that fragmentation as more adequate attention is given in the theological course of study to more and more of the diverse ways in which the Christian thing is concretely actual. Is it not the case that to stress the issue of fragmentation is to deny that there is any serious issue raised by pluralism, while to stress the issue raised by pluralism is to deny that there is any serious issue about fragmentation?

The answer to that last question is, "No, not necessarily." It only looks that way because of the terms in which the issues have been posed, especially the "unity and fragmentation" issue. A central theme of my proposal is that these first two issues appear to be mutually exclusive because of the unnecessarily abstract manner in which they have been formulated. They are both posed as issues about something called "theological education," which is conceived as a kind of process that is one self-identical reality even though it admittedly "takes place" in or is "contexted by" a great variety of institutions in a great variety of social and cultural locations. But the "process" cannot be disengaged so neatly from its institutional "housing" and social "husk." Part One of this book has been devoted to sketching some of the ways in which "theological education" is in actual practice something particular and concrete, and in its concreteness deeply and irreducibly pluralistic. Thus the very way in which the conversation about "theological education" has been conducted gives rise to the third of the three issues to which this proposal is addressed: How can "theological education" be described so that what makes it "theological" is made clear without denying or ignoring its concreteness and the ways in which that concreteness makes it deeply pluralistic?

Where we are going, and why

As will be quickly evident, the proposal developed in this part of the book first addresses the third of the three issues sketched above as the way to get at the other two in their interconnectedness. Before launching into the development of my proposal, it will be helpful to have an overview of where the discussion is going and why. First I will summarize the proposal itself, and then I will outline the steps through which we will move in order to develop the proposal.

What is theological about a theological school? What makes a school "theological," as I argued in Part One, is that it is a community of persons engaged together in the enterprise of trying to understand God more truly. However, we immediately noted that God cannot be "studied"directly; "understanding God" always proceeds indirectly. So we modified our characterization of a theological school: It is, I suggested, a community of persons trying to understand God more truly by way of studying some other thing or things whose study is supposed to enhance our understanding of God.

What are these "other things," and under just what circumstances might their study lead to "understanding God"? We have noted that historically there have been a variety of subjects whose study has been taken to be the best indirect way to come to understand God more truly: scripture, tradition, "salvation history," liturgy and the dynamics of worship, religious experience, the historical Jesus, and so forth. These are the various subject matters that are the immediate or direct objects of study in theological schooling. However, they are not what make theological schooling "theological." They may perfectly well be the immediate subject matters of inquiries that lead to truer historical or psychological or sociological understanding with no necessary bearing on understanding God. If it were a distinctive subject matter (say, the Bible) that made theological schooling "theological," then every time scholars examined 1 and 2 Kings to help reconstruct the economic history of the ancient Near East, they would be engaged in "theological schooling"! We must look beyond its immediate subject matter to identify what makes theological schooling theological.

Each of the subject matters that may serve as an immediate object of inquiry in theological schooling may be studied in ways made rigorous and critical by any of several methods and "disciplines" of inquiry. Predominant among them in modern theological schooling have been the historians' disciplines, but the methods and disciplines of psychologists, sociologists, philosophers, and literary critics have also been widely used. However, none of these methods and disciplines is what defines the inquiry as theological or makes the schooling that engages in them theological schooling. There is no distinctive "theological method" that must be used to make all inquiries into all subject matters studied in a theological school genuinely theological. All of the disciplines actually employed in the study of various subject matters in a theological school are also used in a variety of types of schooling that do not claim to be and are far from being theological. We must look beyond the scholarly methods and disciplines it uses to identify what makes theological schooling theological.

What makes a theological school theological is neither its various subject matters nor the scholarly disciplines it employs but rather its overarching goal: to understand God more truly. But insofar as God can be understood, it is only indirectly and not directly. The way of indirection goes through some tradition, that is, through a complex of beliefs, truth claims, practices of worship, stories, symbols, images, metaphors, moral principles, self-examination, meditation, critical reflection, and the like. For Christians it is what I have chosen to refer to as the Christian thing. In actual concrete practice, it is diversely construed. It is, perhaps, more an extended family of traditions than the "Christian tradition." Nonetheless, the various subject matters that are the immediate subjects of study in theological schooling are studied insofar as they are constituents of the Christian thing. They are not studied because study of them one by one in independence of one another and free-standing, as it were, is going to lead to truer understanding of God. Rather, they are studied in their highly complex and variable interrelations as the Christian thing. In Christian theological schools, I suggest, they are studied insofar as their study leads, to that understanding of God which can come in and through the Christian thing, that is, insofar as their study can lead to understanding God 'Christianly.'

The interconnections among a theological school's immediate subject matters are elusive. If the goal that makes a school "theological" is to understand God more truly, and if such understanding comes only indirectly through disciplined study of other "subject matters," and if study of those subject matters leads to truer understanding of God only insofar as they comprise the Christian thing in their interconnectedness and not in isolation from one another, then clearly it is critically important to study them as elements of the Christian thing construed in some particular, concrete way. But where does one find that?

That brings us to the heart of my proposal. I will argue that the Christian thing is present in concrete reality in and as various Christian congregations or worshiping communities in all their radical pluralism. This is not to claim that the Christian thing is only present concretely in the mode of actual congregations. It is to claim that for the purposes of addressing our three central issues about theological schooling it is the decisively important mode in which the Christian thing is present. My proposal will be that those three issues can be resolved if theological schooling is reconceived this way: A Christian theological school is a community of persons trying to understand God truly by focusing study of various subject matters through the lens of questions about the place and role of those subject matters in diverse Christian worshiping communities or congregations.

Some things this proposal is not: It is not a proposal that a theological school be defined by the overarching goal of being "for" congregations. The proposal might be misread as a suggestion that a theological school be seen as chiefly a research center and training school dedicated to promoting "church growth," celebrating (perhaps uncritically) the importance of churches to American history and culture, and devising "pro-church" ideological positions on major social policy issues. To the contrary, as I hope to show, this proposal entails that a theological school be as vigorously against Christian congregations and churches as it ought, in other ways, to be genuinely "for" them.

Nor is this a proposal that a theological school be "about" Christian congregations in the sense that they become the central subject matter studied in a theological school. The proposal does imply that congregations ought to be one of the subject matters that are the direct objects of study. However, the proposal does not imply any major changes in the traditional array of subject matters studied in theological schools. The proposal does not even imply that study of congregations should be given pride of place (and of curricular time and faculty energy!) over, say, biblical studies. The subject matters are not what define a school as "theological" and rearranging them or changing them will not of itself make a school any more genuinely "theological."

Furthermore, this is not a pedagogical proposal. It does not imply any particular recommendations to the effect that theological schooling ought (or ought mostly) to take place within particular congregations, or that classes ought to include selected parishioners along with theological school students, or that only persons who also lead congregations (or have recently done so) ought to do the teaching, and the like. Such suggestions may well have merit for certain schools under certain circumstances. It is, I shall argue, a contingent matter. Individual schools must decide such questions in the light of their unique histories, particular traditions, and concrete locations. It is doubtful whether such pedagogical questions can be helpfully discussed or answered in the abstract. In any case, this proposal carries no necessary pedagogical consequences and tends to imply that the effort to devise generally applicable pedagogical proposals of this sort is a dubious project.

What the proposal does argue is this: Study of various subject matters in a theological school will be the indirect way to truer understanding of God only insofar as the subject matters are taken precisely as interconnected elements of the Christian thing, and that can be done concretely by studying them in light of questions about their place and role in the actual communal life of actual and deeply diverse Christian congregations. The proposal will be that doing this would provide a way to make a theological school's course of study genuinely unified without denial of the pluralism of ways in which the Christian thing is construed, and it could make the course of study more adequate to the pluralism without undercutting its unity. A way to make this point is to exploit two metaphors: We could think of questions about the communal identities and common life of diverse Christian congregations as the lens through which inquiry about all the various subject matters studied in a theological school could be focused and unified. We could think of questions about the place and role of the various subject matters within the common life and identity-formation of pluralistically diverse Christian congregations as the horizon within which all inquiry, teaching, and learning regarding any subject matter takes place.

The chapters making up Part Two develop this proposal. The initial move will be sideways. In chapter 6, 1 will address the third central issue noted above. I will suggest some ways in which to describe very concretely both congregations and schools, what pluralizes them, what goes on in them, and how that is somehow "unified" without denial of their deep diversity. In chapter 7, 1 will then follow my own suggestion and offer a sketch of what a congregation is. In chapter 8, 1 will apply the same method of description to sketch what a theological school is. Then building on these two chapters side by side, in the next two chapters I will draw out what happens when theological schooling is focused through the lens or within the horizon of questions about congregations. Chapter 9 will develop the proposal's implications regarding a theological school's course of study, the basis of its unity and of its adequacy to the pluralism of actual concrete construals of the Christian thing. Chapter 10 will develop the proposal's implications regarding education of church leadership, including clergy, and its implications regarding education in the several academic "disciplines."

It will be obvious that one background assumption has been important throughout this book: the best way to the universal is through the concrete particular. This maxim has shaped the book in several ways. So far as the task of this book is concerned, it means that if one wants to understand truly and Christianly the universal God, the "God of all," it is best to do it by going through the concrete particularities of communities of persons who describe themselves as engaged by and responding to the universal God.

Furthermore, so far as the "voice" of this book is concerned, this background assumption means that I can hope to address "universally" all who are involved in theological schooling only by writing openly and explicitly out of my own concretely particular situation in theological schooling. This book grows out of my experience teaching theology in a university divinity school that has no organic relation to any Christian denomination, was historically associated with the Reformed, in contrast to Lutheran or Anabaptist, branch of the Protestant movement, and has now become thoroughly interconfessional in both student body and faculty. Furthermore, I reflect on these matters as a Protestant Christian whose theological views have been most deeply shaped by the Reformed theological current within the Protestant river, as that was channeled by nineteenth-century theological liberalism and then intersected first by that peculiar eddy in liberalism called "neo-orthodoxy" and then by various other theological eddies still swirling in the last half of the twentieth century. This is hardly a unique location for a North American white male theologian. But it is mine and is certain to shape my reflections in specific and concrete ways, to many of which I may be largely oblivious.

The background assumption of this book means, finally, that so far as its content is concerned the best hope of saying things of general relevance to persons involved in all types of theological schooling today lies in making some particular and fairly concrete proposals that may turn out to be directly pertinent only to a few types of theological schools but may provoke and help other persons in other types of schools to think through these issues for themselves.

Notes

[1] See, e.g., David H. Kelsey and Barbara G. Wheeler, "Mind Reading: Notes on the Basic Issues Program," Theological Education, vol. 20, no. 2 (Spring 1984), pp. 8-14.

[2] Edward Farley, Theologia.

[3] Charles Wood, Vison and Discernment.

[4] Max Stackhouse, Apologia: Contextualization, Globalization, and Mission in Theological Education (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1988).

[5] H. Richard Niebuhr et al., The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry, p. viii.

[6] Katie G. Cannon et al., God's Fierce Whimsy (New York: Pilgrim Press, 1985). Cf. I. Carter Heyward et al., "Christian Feminists Speak," Theological Education, vol. 20, no.1 (Autumn 1983), pp. 93-103.

[7] Joseph C. Hough, Jr., and Barbara G. Wheeler, eds., Beyond Clericalism (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1988).

Chapter 4: Excellence as <I>Wissenschaft</I> and Professionalism

There have been two models of excellence to which theological schooling in North America has held itself accountable. The more ancient is paideia. We have examined it in the last chapter and noted its consequences for theological schooling. The second is only about a hundred and eighty years old. It is rooted in the modern research university, for which rigorous "scientific" research or Wissenschaft is the defining goal. It was at the founding of the University of Berlin that a decisive argument was won to include a theological school within the research university. Therefore we shall make Berlin the emblem of this model. The burden of that successful argument rested on the notion of a "profession" and a "professional school." Hence, when a theological school adopts the research university as the model of excellent schooling, it takes on not only a standard of appropriate schooling (Wissenschaft) but also a particular end for theological schooling (the production of "professionals"). We shall explore the origins of this model. Then we shall go on to review revisions of this model in modern thinking about theological education. We can then track the tensions that arise within theological schools as their paideia-shaped roads from Geneva, Trent, and others intersect with the Berlin Turnpike.

THE RESEARCH UNIVERSITY

The research university developed out of a century of university reform in Germany. This reform reflected a cultural spirit and value commitments that are usually associated with the Enlightenment, understood as a very broad cultural movement. From the Reformation on, universities in each German state had been dominated by the church established in that state. Within the universities the faculties of theology were dominant. During the eighteenth century there was a steady movement of reform to encourage free inquiry within the universities. These reforms involved greater independence from the established churches, a shift from Latin to German as the language of instruction, and greater prestige accorded to faculties of law and philosophy than to theology. The spirit permeating the entire movement focused on two intellectual values: critical historical methods of inquiry applied to every appropriate topic, sacred as well as secular; and reason as the final arbiter of all questions about truth. "Reason" and "rationality" were understood in a distinctively modern way that was shaped by the new learning symbolized by empirically tested Newtonian physics, the invention of calculus, and critical historical research. Usually the University of Halle is named as the first reformed university in Germany institutionalizing this modem spirit, soon followed by Göttingen and Erlangen. [1]

The University of Berlin, founded against the background of this century of reform, was the occasion for a historically decisive debate about whether theological schooling rightly belongs within a modern university. The university was created as part of a reorganization of the Prussian educational system in the wake of Prussia's devastating defeat by Napoleon. The reorganization was part of the larger movement in Europe to reform education in ways shaped by Enlightenment principles; Napoleon, for example, was reforming the French educational system at the same time. The founder of the University of Berlin is usually said to be the scholar Wilhelm von Humboldt, who proposed the founding of the university as part of a general restructuring of the educational system that he designed and initiated during a short sixteen-month tenure in government service as head of the section on cultural and educational affairs. In June 1810, to help him draft the provisional statutes for the new university, he appointed a three-person committee, including the theologian Friedrich Schleiermacher. Schleiermacher actually wrote the founding document. The university opened in October of 1810. [2] As Daniel Fallon points out, von Humboldt and Schleiermacher designed a university based on three principles.[3] The first principle was the unity of research and teaching. In his reorganization of the entire educational system von Humboldt envisioned both a major contrast and a symbiotic relationship between secondary schools and the university. The secondary school, or Gymnasium, deals only with well-established and derived principles, conveying them to the student. Universities, by contrast, "always treat knowledge as an as yet unsolved problem, and thus always stay at research." [4] Conducting original research, therefore, is central to what distinguishes a university from secondary schools. The only degree to be given was the doctorate, the research degree. Only persons who had published significant research beyond the doctorate could even be considered for faculty positions. Only full professors were to be considered members of the faculties of the university. This was a radical educational innovation. However, von Humboldt and Schleiermacher were educational conservatives in insisting that the older picture of universities as teaching institutions be retained. Rather than adopting the more radical view that research should always be confined to non-teaching research institutes they insisted that research needed to be accompanied by teaching.

This changed the teacher-student relationship. Teacher and student now have the same function: to cooperate in the promotion of knowledge. The teacher does not exist for the student, as was the case in paideia. Rather the teacher needs the student to achieve the goal of research by, as von Humboldt put it, "combining a practiced mind, which is on that very account apt to be more one-sided and less active [the teacher's], with one which, though weaker and still neutral, bravely attempts every possibility [the student's]. "[5]A second principle on which the university was based was the central importance of the arts and sciences. This was viewed at the time as a recovery of what was central to paideia. Study of the liberal arts had come to be considered preliminary to more specialized study of one of the professions, theology, law, or medicine. Accordingly, the faculty of arts and sciences was considered the "lower" faculty and the faculties in the professions considered the "higher" faculties. Moreover, the faculties in the professions had often come to be ranked by law in a hierarchical order, with dominance given to the faculty of theology. The University of Berlin marked the emancipation of the faculty of arts and sciences from institutional domination by the higher faculties, especially theology.

Von Humboldt was explicit that, as had been the case in ancient paideia, such liberal arts schooling "transforms the character." However, he did not note the significance of one major difference. In his classic history of German universities Friedrich Paulsen points out that recovery of the centrality of the liberal arts at Berlin would have this character-transforming result "not on the basis of medieval church unity," nor, we might add, on the basis of the coherence of a Hellenistic view of what constitutes the good life, "but rather upon the basis of the unity of human civilization and scientific work, the unity based on the modern ideal of humanity." [6]

The "modern ideal of humanity" is the Enlightenment view. At its heart is a particular view of rationality, one defined by the idea of scholarly research that yields net increases in knowledge. To have one's character "transformed" is to have one's rational capacities brought out and honed through learning how to be an expert researcher.

The third principle exemplified by the University of Berlin was the protection of academic freedom. Its two mottoes were Lernfreiheit: the freedom to learn; and Lehrfeiheit: the freedom to teach. The former gave students the right to follow any curriculum; the latter gave scholars the right of free inquiry and was institutionalized in a provision for faculty tenure. Academic freedom was the direct application to higher education of the central value of the Enlightenment:reason's independence from all authority and its innate responsibility critically to scrutinize any claim to authority.

It is very important to notice the context of assumptions in which academic freedom was institutionalized. It was simply assumed that the university exists for the well-being of the state. In a way this is a return to the public context in which paideia was understood in classical Athens up through Plato: the context and goal of excellent schooling is the well-being of the public realm understood as a political realm..

Because the university existed for the state's well-being, the state, not the university, selected and appointed faculty members. The state funded each faculty member and the member's research through bilateral negotiations with each scholar separately. It may be that at the time there was no clear distinction made between concepts of state and society. In any case, von Humboldt and Schleiermacher offered no challenge to the understanding of the state they had inherited. They simply assumed that if the state provided the university with space for independent inquiry, the students educated that way would provide the state with enlightened servants through whom the state itself would become progressively enlightened.

This created, of course, an extremely ambiguous legacy. From the perspective of Enlightenment ideals it seemed exemplary. Writing before both world wars, Paulsen saw the University of Berlin as far more successful at institutionalizing Enlightenment values than were its French counterparts. Whereas the French model relied on centralization and standardization so that universities were transformed into "professional state-schools with hard and fast instruction and without scientific spirit" centralized in Paris at the expense of the provinces, the University of Berlin was the model for "an abundance of flourishing universities distributed throughout the country whose competition created greater efficiency." Moreover, their "free, non-political universities became important" even for "the political life of the German people." [7]

From a post-World War II perspective, the confidence that state self-interest would guarantee academic freedom and, conversely, that duly enlightened graduates functioning as civil servants would progressively enlighten the state strikes Fallon as "romantic heroism." [8] Direct state control of faculty appointments and finances made possible politically inspired direct state influence, especially in regard to opinion and policy. Inevitably, "by the end of the nineteenth century the German university had become a very conservative institution -- in fact, as the historian David Schoenbaum remarked, 'conservative enough to survive Bismarck, William II, and Hitler, attenuated but largely intact."' [9] It is not self-evident, although it is arguable, that Enlightenment ideals themselves bear part of the responsibility for the ambiguity of the legacy of the University of Berlin. What is clear is that the way in which the university institutionalized the public ends and roles of schooling did directly contribute to that ambiguity.

The research university, exemplified by the University of Berlin, became the normative model of excellence in higher education in the United States during the last third of the nineteenth century, though there had been movement in that direction for the better part of the century. For example, the University of Michigan, which had been chartered in 1817 with a rationale inspired by Napoleonic ideals, was shaped for a generation after 1835 by leadership explicitly emulating Prussian higher education. The model became decisive for American higher education, however, in 1876, when Johns Hopkins University opened as the first graduate school in the United States. Virtually all of its faculty by 1884 had studied in Germany and thirteen had been awarded German doctorates. Indeed, the Ph.D. degree was itself assumed directly from the German Dr. phil., the highest degree awarded by the German faculty of arts and sciences. 'Throughout this period of birth and development of the American university the dominant influence, the overriding ideal, was the model of Humboldt's enlightenment university. " [10]

What are the consequences of Berlin's influences. The Enlightenment involved major changes in what counted as "inquiring," "knowing," and "understanding," and research universities institutionalized those changes. When the research university became the normative model of the excellent "school" a new and quite different set of methods and aims came to dominate schooling, including theological schooling.

The overarching aim of a research university is inquiry leading to the mastery of the truth about whatever is studied. The German word for such inquiry is Wissenschaft. It is usually translated into English as "science." That is misleading, because in ordinary English "science," unless qualified as "life" or "psychological" or "social" science, usually designates the physical sciences, the "hard sciences." Better simply to characterize such inquiry as "critical research that is orderly and disciplined." [11] This becomes a powerfully influential model for inquiry in theological schools.

Such inquiry is characteristically "critical" inquiry in that it rationally tests all alleged bases of truth. Schooling on the paideia model in pagan or Chnstian academy, monastery, cathedral school, or medieval university had always been critical in the sense of testing arguments for clarity, logical validity, and coherence. But it acknowledged certain sources of information as authorities in secular as well as sacred studies. In particular, the sheer antiquity of a source was characteristically taken to establish it as an authority. For the research university, however, critical inquiry requires that no alleged authoritative source of truth, either sacred or secular, be exempt from rigorous testing of its veracity. It follows that inquiry turns quite literally into "re-search." One does not inquire into the truth by searching to discover what previous authorities said, the more ancient the better. Rather one conducts re-search, a second and independent search for the truth about the subject under consideration -- a search, furthermore, that can in principle be repeated and so reconfirmed by any other qualified inquirer.

Critical research is "orderly" when it attempts to locate its subject in the largest possible context of relations to other things. Inquiry in the research university shows an extraordinarily intense passion for building theories that are all-encompassing. The ideal goal is to develop and validate one unified theory that can outline the interconnections among all things. This is not simply a matter of exhibiting relationships among concepts: Ancient and medieval schooling engaged in inquiry that was orderly in that sense. Rather, two other kinds of relations are crucial here: natural or physical relations and historical relations. Consequently, "understanding" a subject consists in mastering how it is related to other matters, that is, how it may be located in the web of physical and historical relationships that make it what it is.

Note that "theory" means something quite different in the research university than it did in the context of paideia. In paideia, as we have seen, theoria is the understanding one may have of such reality as is unchanging and eternal. It is obtained by contemplation. It has no bearing on managing the changing worlds of physical nature or human politics. For coping with changing political situations one needs instead practical wisdom. For coping with the changeable physical world one needs the artisan's or craftsperson's skilled know-how. By contrast, in the research university "theory" is about nothing other than endlessly changeable physical and social worlds, and it is significant only to the extent that it is applicable to them. The very idea of "theory" now entails the movement from "pure science" to "applied science," from research to engineering, from theory to application.

Orderly inquiry, finally, is "disciplined" when it devises methods for exploring the relations among things, methods for critically testing all alleged authorities. They must be methods that rely on types of evidence appropriate to the subject, minimize the biases of the inquirer, and can be followed by another researcher to establish the same conclusions over and over again.

Only the results of critical, orderly, disciplined research can count as yielding "knowledge." Knowledge in this sense is by definition "public," that is, in principle accessible to anyone capable of understanding it and open to being re-searched by anyone who is skeptical of it.

In actual practice, inquiry in the research university has divided all possible subjects of inquiry into two broad classes, natural and cultural, the "sciences" and the "humanities," according to the types of discipline each requires. The disciplines and types of theorizing that constitute the "sciences" have created subject matters that simply did not exist within schooling on the model of paideia. However, the type of subject matter into which the humanities inquire simply was the subject matter with which paideia dealt.

That makes possible a continuing tension between the two models of schooling in the humanities. In a third-century A.D. pagan or Christian academy one might study ancient texts so as to become more deeply shaped by the virtues. On the model of paideia that is what excellent schooling aims at. By contrast, the disciplines that make inquiry in the humanities in a research university genuinely critical research yielding truly public knowledge are the disciplines of the historian. In a research university one studies ancient texts to re-search the truth about them, their origins, their meanings in their original settings, the history of their uses, the history of teachings about them or readings of them, perhaps the social or psychological dynamics that explain why such texts come to be written. Because theological schooling focuses so heavily on ancient texts, it clearly is going to experience deep tensions if it accepts the research university as its model of excellent schooling without giving up values central to paideia as the model of excellence.

RESEARCH UNIVERSITY AND THEOLOGICAL SCHOOL

That is precisely what began to happen with the founding of the University of Berlin. Prussia was a Protestant state. A Protestant faculty of theology was included in the university. It was by no means obvious that it should be. Given an Enlightenment view of what it was to "inquire" and to "know," no "inquiry" belonged within the university if it ended up appealing to some authority that could not itself be subjected to critical inquiry. For a decade there had been a public debate about whether theology failed this test. Schleiermacher argued that it did not or, at least, need not. Since he prevailed and a theology faculty was included in the paradigmatic research university, the structure of his argument continues to affect us for whom the research university remains the culturally dominant model of excellence in schooling.

Schleiermacher was solving a problem. Protestant theological faculties of Schleiermacher's generation had inherited a fourfold theological curriculum. In his historical sketch of its development, Edward Farley [12] argues that it was an uneasy and unself-conscious compromise between a pre-critical and a post-critical view of scripture. On the pre-critical side two subtle but decisive changes had taken place in Protestant theological schooling.

First, "theology" had been made objective. In theological schooling on the model of paideia, "theology" named one's understanding of God and, by derivation, the act of meditative reflection on scripture that was believed to lead to that understanding. However, during sixteenth-and seventeenth-century polemical controversies (Catholics vs. Protestants; Lutherans vs. Calvinists; everybody vs. "anabaptists"), "theology" came to name church teachings, truths that could be stated propositionally. Scripture was treated as the divinely inspired repository of these truths. The theological curriculum was a set of things one did with the truths scripture provided: exegesis drew the truths out of scripture; dogmatics arranged them in coherent systematic structures and defended them polemically; church history traced changes in practices and teachings that either exhibit faithfulness to those truths or decline; practical theology reflected on how the truths apply to daily life. Theological schooling involved a movement from source of truth (scripture) to application. To get there involved four areas of study, a fourfold curriculum.

The second subtle pre-critical change was introduced by the pietist movement. It arose as a reaction to this objectification of theology and the intellectualization of faith. Faith was more a matter of a heart warmed by love for God. Theology was reflection on scripture that yielded the truths that guide one into doing God's will. Theology was still objectified.. Only now its truths were seen as a body of theory to be applied to practical cases. Furthermore, as Farley points out, for the pietists the "practice" that was the goal of theological education was not the individual person's practice of the Christian life. Rather, it was ministerial practice. Theological schooling was shaped by the distinctive roles played by clergy. It still involved four areas: exegesis uncovered the content of scripture; but now dogmatics was not so much a matter of systematic arrangement of that content as it was a matter of deriving a body of theory about the practice of the Christian life; church history was a narrative describing different forms that the church had taken at different times, so as better to understand the present time; practical theology was now the training of clergy in the skills they would need to help others practice the Christian life. Theological schooling involved a movement, not so much from source to application as from theory to practice.

On the critical side, this fourfold structure of theological schooling underwent a third, less subtle change. The rise of critical methods of historical investigation began to be applied, first to scripture and then to the institutional and intellectual history of the church. "Exegesis" and "church history" became, in the Enlightenment sense, "sciences. "They were areas of orderly, critical inquiry. Thus the curriculum of theological schooling began to be fragmented. It divided into two major parts, one "practical" and the other "scientific"; and the three traditional parts of the "scientific" (exegesis, church history, dogmatics) tended to be divided among various disciplines in the faculty of arts and sciences.

This created a serious problem. The result was an ad hoc and uneasy compromise: The fourfold nature of the curriculum presupposed some sort of grounding in scripture as authority, whether as source of truths to be applied or as more indirect basis of theory to be applied; whereas the critical methods, as they gained hegemony, simply ignored the privileged position traditionally claimed for scripture. The rationale and structure of the theological school curriculum suffered a deep self-contradiction.

Schleiermacher developed an argument that at once offered a rationale for the inclusion of a theological faculty in the research university and offered a way to unify the fragmented curriculum for that faculty. His argument for the inclusion of theology rests on an implicit theory of human society: As the research university itself exists for the well-being of the state, so the theological faculty is necessary, in Farley's words, to "give cognitive and theoretical foundations to an indispensable practice." [13] More particularly, the theological faculty's presence in the university is justified by its goal or purpose: to train leadership for this practice. The same is true of law and medicine. Every human society has had sets of practices tied up with basic human needs like bodily health or social order or salvation. Those practices require "professional" leadership educated in "professional" schools.

To be sure, this means that theology is not a pure science; it cannot be part of the faculty of arts and sciences (i.e., the "philosophical faculty"). Rather, it is a "positive" science. That is, it is rooted in something specifically historical and cultural (the Christian church) in contrast to something universal. But theology need not assign any privileged status to anything historical and cultural (say, the Bible) on the grounds that it is revelatory and so beyond the scope of critical inquiry. What justifies the inclusion of a school of theology in the university simultaneously unifies the theological curriculum. The theological faculty's curriculum is unified by virtue of its goal to train professional church leadership for their indispensable social roles.

This has had major implications for the structure of the theological curriculum. It must be at once "scientific" and "professional." There is a single, proper, normative structure to a theological school curriculum, argued Schleiermacher, because it is rooted in the inherent structure of the focal subject matter of the curriculum, the faith of the Christian church as something "positive" or concretely given in history and culture. Note: The essence hunt functions as prominently in this model of excellent schooling as it did in many versions of paideia. The purpose of a theological school and the structure of its curriculum are rooted in the historical and cross-cultural universal essence of the Christian faith

In effect Schleiermacher proposed collapsing the traditional four areas into three. One area would be the study of the positively given historical community of faith itself. This includes study of scripture, dogmatics, and the history of church institutions and practices. Schleiermacher calls it "historical theology." It is one field because all its subject matters are studied by one discipline, critical history. On the one hand this helps legitimate the theological curriculum in a research university since critical history is a recognized type of Wissenschaft. On the other hand, it establishes the hegemony of critical, orderly, disciplined historical research in theological schools as the model of rationality and excellence in schooling.

But how does historical research decide which historical phenomena are indeed "Christian"? This calls for a second area. What is needed from this area is some grasp of Christianity as such, and here is where the search for an "essence" comes in. What is needed is a formulation of the "essence of Christianity." Essence here does not mean simply a commonality among all the details, a lowest common denominator abstracted from all periods and modalities of Christianity. Rather, for Schleiermacher the search for the essence of something is to address the question of its truth and value. In relation to Christianity, Schleiermacher calls this second discipline "philosophical theology." Its task is to show that there is a correlation between Christianity as a particular type of piety or religiousness, on the one side, and the structure and dynamics of human consciousness, on the other. This also helps legitimate the theological curriculum in a research university since critical, orderly, disciplined philosophical reflection and analysis is a recognized type of Wissenschaft.

The third area in Schleiermacher's proposed curriculum is aptly characterized by Farley as a "normative field which critically apprehends the rules for carrying out the tasks of ministry."[14] This honors the "professional" character of the school. It is defined by the goal of the curriculum to educate professional religious leaders. Schleiermacher calls it "practical theology," but it is not a cluster of skills courses. It is a normative discipline, a body of theory related to the practice of the clergy. It derives its information about what is normative from historical theology. The historical-critical study of Christian community as a concrete cultural and historical reality provides the foundation for practical theology.

The movement of this theological schooling is still from theory to practice as it was in pre-Schleiermacher pietist theological schooling. But because the theory is based, not on historically and culturally conditioned biblical writings held to be beyond critical inquiry, but on the realities of Christian piety as manifested precisely in their historical and cultural facticity and relativity, it is an inquiry admissible in a research university. Moreover, because it is theory aimed at preparing leadership for a socially indispensable practice, it is of public importance and hence a research university ought to include it.

Theological schooling on the model of the research university brings with it, as we saw, a new understanding of "rationality" in inquiry. It is clearly compatible with three of the senses of"understanding God" we sorted out above. It certainly could be a way to discursive understanding of God. It definitely could be a way to affective understanding of God; that seems to be the genre in which Schleiermacher himself construed "understanding God." Given a revision in the way Schleiermacher understood the relation between theory and practice, it could also be compatible with understanding God in and through action. The model is not, however, compatible with contemplative understanding of God, since on the research university model scripture can be taken as a subject of study only if it is a subject of critical inquiry.

Furthermore, theological schooling on this model is compatible with some, but probably not all, of the various construals of the subject matter of theological schooling that we distinguished earlier. It surely is compatible with the picture that the Christian thing is Christian experience (that was Schleiermacher's own claim) and with the picture that it is "Christian tradition." It is very much more difficult to see how it would be compatible with the construal of the subject matter of theological schooling as "Word of God" (i.e., something historically given that is unconditionally and unqualifiedly revelatory).

In summary, theological schooling on the model of a research university is marked by four characteristics. First, it is ruled by "professional" interests. Because its justification as "excellent" schooling lies in its social function to train leadership for an indispensable practice in society, its central preoccupations focus on the characteristics of "excellence" in leadership in a particular institutional structure, namely the church, as that bears on society in general. Farley terms this focus on training church leadership the "clerical paradigm" for theological schooling. However, it is not the focus on clergy education as such that is decisive. Rather, it is the construal of church leadership as a role necessary to the well-being of the society (not to mention the "state") as such. That rightly introduces sociological criteria of what counts as "excellence." And the appropriate language to employ in discussing leadership with regard to its importance for society at large is the rhetoric of "professionalism."

Second, that which is focused upon with these professional interests in view is a set of topics to be researched. Neither biblical texts nor any others are attended to in the belief that doing so may lead to an understanding of God. Rather, they are researched to learn what they can contribute to a better understanding of the essence of the Christian community and, more particularly, a better understanding of what makes for effective leadership of that community. No conversion is needed as a condition.

This has important implications regarding faculty. The principal criteria for selecting faculty have to do with their demonstrated capacity to engage in such research, to continue to contribute to knowledge through continuing research, and their ability to cultivate the same disciplined skills in critical inquiry in others.

This, thirdly, has implications for students and student-teacher relationships. The individual student is only incidentally a focus of attention in this type of schooling. The subject matter being researched is the center of attention and students and teachers together engage in the research as a team. To be sure, they are unequal partners. The teacher has a greater flind of knowledge and more highly developed research skills. The student acquires both indirectly through the process of apprenticeship in research. And the aim of the apprenticeship is the acquisition of those research competencies; but the subject currently being researched is the immediate focus of attention. From the founding of the University of Berlin onward, the disciplines and methods of the historian have had hegemony in theological schooling. This student-teacher team of unequals requires a distinctive context. It most maximizes the freedom of their inquiries, protecting them from constraint by political, religious or academic authorities.

Finally, theological schooling on the model of the research university is a public enterprise in two senses of the word which are in some practical tension with one another. On the one side, it is "public" in the sense that it is accessible to any interested person who is competent in the requisite ways. Indeed, as schooling in critical research, it is accessible independendy of the social and political opmions and location of either the researcher or the reader. On the other side, it is "public" in the sense of contributing to res publica, to the general well-being. Indeed, as schooling of leadership for a practice indispensable to the well-being of society in general, it cannot help but be importantly engaged in social and political issues confronting the society as a whole. The unresolved tension between these two ways of being "public" accounts for much of the conflict about theological schools' under- or over-engagement in the controversies of the day.

WISSENSCHAFT AND PROFESSIONALISM REDUX

Neither Schleiermacher's threefold theological curriculum nor his argument that it grows out of the essence of the Christian faith had much impact on theological schooling; but his rationale for including theology as a professional school in the research university has deeply shaped theological schooling in twentieth-century North America, especially in the United States. This has been true not only of the relatively few schools that are organic parts of research universities but also of the vast majority of Protestant freestanding theological schools. Schleiermacher's picture of the nature and purpose of theological schooling in a research university has provided a model of excellence for theological schools seen as a distinctive combination of "professional" schools and centers for critical inquiry. That is, it has generated a rhetoric in which theological schools describe themselves as precisely "professional" schools and not simply "theological academies" or "theological colleges" or "Bible schools"; and it has generated expectations that theological schools will be "graduate schools" whose faculties include persons skilled in a variety of ways of critical, orderly and disciplined inquiry, who possess earned research doctorates, are backed to some degree by library resources, are productive of scholarly research that is published and discussed by peer researchers, and use pedagogical methods associated with the research university such as the research seminar, the research paper, and field-based research.

By the second quarter of the twentieth century, however, central elements of Schleiermacher's picture of a theological school had begun to undergo significant modification, so that it is a substantially revised version of Schleiermacher's vision that now serves as a model of excellence for theological schools. These modifications were first called for by W. R. Harper's 1899 manifesto, "Shall the Theological Curriculum Be Modified and How?" [15] When the University of Chicago was founded, a Divinity School was located at its geographical center. Harper proposed a revision of research university-related professional theological education that would take further advantage of psychological and sociological scientific research regarding how persons change and how institutions grow. Very influential major, comprehensive studies of theological education by Robert Kelly in 1924 [16] and by William Adams Brown and Mark A. May in 1934 [17] monitored the development of these changes in theological education in North America, worried when they did not develop sufficiently, and celebrated them when they did. They urged increased cooperation among theological schools to raise commonly accepted levels of standards of excellence in theological schooling. One measure of the influence of these studies is that an organization for such cooperation was founded and served to legitimate revisions in the Berlin model of excellence. As the organization developed into theological schooling's instrument for self-evaluation and academic accreditation, now called the Association of Theological Schools, those revisions tended to become institutionalized in standards for theological schools' academic accreditation. In 1957 H. Richard Niebuhr, Daniel Day Williams, and James M. Gustafson published a third comprehensive study of theological education [18] under the auspices of the American Association of Theological Schools (as it was then called), which in some ways urged restraint in these modifications. However, widely acclaimed as this third study was, it does not seem to have resulted in widespread abandoning of the modifications of the Berlin model that have become commonplace. The modifications have come at three points. what"professional" means has changed; the sorts of critical inquiry or Wissenschaft deemed relevant have changed; and the ways in which the two are related have all changed.

"Professional" has increasingly come to be understood in a largely functionalist and individualistic way. A "professional" is someone who has the specialized skills needed to fill the function of meeting specific needs of his or her clients one by one. Everyone from the neurosurgeon to the hairdresser is a "professional."

Schleiermacher had proposed that a theological school educate persons able to lead church communities in their distinctive practices which, as it happens, are important for the health of society as a whole. He proposed that the school give future clergy the ability to do this by teaching them relevant information about the church and its faith, by cultivating their capacities for discriminating judgment about what is authentically Christian, and by helping them grasp the rules for carrying out the tasks of ministry. As the idea of "professional" changed, however, a theological school that sought to approximate the model of excellence provided by the Berlin model instead focused on equipping future clergy with skills they needed to fill certain functions in the lives of persons who were viewed more as "clients" ministered to mainly one by one than as fellow members of a congregation whose common life was built up out of cooperative practices that needed to be led as whole systems.

Correlatively, the sorts of critical inquiry deemed relevant to professional ministry have changed. In one way the change is a matter of a broadened range. If professional education must focus on equipping potential clergy with a variety of skills, then the sorts of critical inquiry that provide the theoretical background appropriate to different sorts of skills are what is needed Accordingly a variety of human sciences, both social and psychological, have been added to historical and philosophical inquiry to provide bodies of theory to guide both the way one talks about the Christian faith and the way clergy are to fill their roles.

At the same time, the way these various sorts of Wissenschaft are related to professional clergy practice has changed from the relation Schleiermacher envisioned. This is the most decisive change. The changes regarding relevant sorts of inquiry involve more than a broadening of the range of what is relevant. Governed by the clerical paradigm, the aim of a theological school is to educate professional ministers.

At issue is what should inform the practice of ministry. We saw in chapter 3 that theological schooling on the model of paideia involves a movement from source, usually taken to be scripture, to appropriation, in which one is "formed" in specifiable ways -- the source forms me, and I, thus in-formed, engage in ministry.

.We saw earlier in this chapter that in post-Reformation theological controversies theology was increasingly objectified in "truths" that could be "applied" to "problems" in thought or action. Accordingly, theological schooling became a movement from source (scripture alone or scripture-and-tradition, depending on whether one was Protestant or Roman Catholic) to application. Indeed, we saw that among seventeenth-century pietists theological schooling became a movement from source to application in quite specifically clergy tasks. Thus, made knowledgeable about the contents of the source, I apply them in my practice of ministry.

Schleiermacher had proposed that a moment of theorizing be placed between the source and the application in practice. The "source" is simply a collection of historical facts and has no normative force to it that could "form" practice. It is philosophical theology, critical reflection on the nature, meaning, and truth of the Christian faith, that ought to inform practice. To be sure, "theology" had intervened between scripture and practice for Christians all along. But "theology" had been a process of organizing, clarifying, and generalizing what was already normatively present in the source. For Schleiermacher "theology,' is not just a matter of generalizing what is already normative; it is a matter of theorizing from the given historical facts to uncover what their normative essence must be. Theology generates the normative, it does not simply generalize and systematize it. So theological schooling ought, he proposed, to be something like a movement from theory (not "source") to application (not "appropriation"). That would mean that theological schooling would cultivate persons' capacities to do this theorizing, to do "philosophical theology"for themselves. Furthermore, "practical theology" would cultivate their capacities to do theology in relation to the actual practice of ministry to identify the rules or norms governing that practice when it is authentically Christian ministry. Thereby they would also be capacitated to be discriminating about things done in the name of Christian ministry that ought to be reformed or abandoned.

In the twentieth century, however, theological schooling seeking to match this model of excellence relies less and less on theology as the body of theory that is to inform the practice of clergy tasks. Instead it is a variety of bodies of theory in the human sciences that are relied on to inform practice. There are, however, far too many of them for students to be schooled in how to do them for themselves as exercises in critical inquiry.

This is where the decisive change comes in this model of excellence in theological schooling. Schleiermacher had argued that, precisely in order to be the sort of "professional" school that society needs for its own well-being, a theological school must school future clergy in certain sorts of Wissenschaft, namely historical and philosophical, so that they can do the relevant theorizing, "do theology," for themselves. The movement of the schooling was to be from theory to application in ministry. But now students are informed about the prevailing theories in the field and then informed about the ways others have applied those theories to particular ministerial tasks. That information then serves as background to their training in the skills that the application suggests would be useful when undertaking those tasks.

To be sure, biblical, historical, and theological studies continue to take up a great deal of a theological school's time and space. However, they have tended more and more either to give background information that provides a "context" within which clergy need to be aware they are fulfilling their roles, or to give intellectually challenging and interesting alternative "options" or "perspectives" from which to view what they are already doing anyway in filling their roles. The irony is that much the same fate awaits the bodies of theory that have increasingly come to inform the practice of ministry. Students are not inducted into the relevant Wisscnschaft, as Schleiermacher had proposed they should be. They are not schooled in critical inquiry or pure research that generates theory. Nor are they really schooled in doing the applied research that generates the array of skills they are taught. The movement of theological schooling has tended to become this:from information about pure theory, "academic systematic theology," to information about applied theory, "academic practical theology" (chiefly counseling theory and church growth theory), to skills training; from science to technology to practitioner.

BETWEEN ATHENS AND BERLIN

The world of theological schools is highly pluralistic. I argued in chapter 2 that individual concrete theological schools differ from one another partly because they are theological. They have different understandings of the Christian thing, different construals of the central subject matter of theological schooling and different views of what it is to understand God. The burden of the last two chapters is that particular schools also differ from one another because they are schools. They seek to be adequate to some model of excellent schooling. However, in point of fact, they are faced with trying to be accountable to two quite different models of excellent schooling, for one of which ancient Athens is emblematic and for the other of which modem Berlin is emblematic. For historical reasons they cannot evade either model. Yet the models are in tension with each other and cannot be synthesized. They bring with them different ways of understanding the overarching purpose of theological schooling, different pictures of what makes for excellent teachers and students, different pictures of how students and teachers are to be related to one another in schooling, different pictures of the sense in which a school can be a community. Between Athens and Berlin, theological schools are caught between a rock and a hard place. The most that any school can do is negotiate some sort of truce, strike some sort of balance between them. There are many different ways in which to do that. The sheer variety of ways of negotiating between paideia, on the one side, and Wissenschaft-and-professionalism on the other is another major factor pluralizing theological schools.

Clearly, this suggests further questions to ask of any one theological school you are trying to understand in its concrete particularity. Does it tend to make one model central and honor the other only in subordinate ways? Look, for example, at the way the school's ethos patterns relations between students and faculty, the way it organizes the curriculum, and the apparently dominant purposes of individual courses; do these all suggest that the Berlin model is dominant, with its stress on Wissenschaft, while attention to paideia-like "formation" is subordinated or marginalized to the status of voluntary activities? Or is it perhaps like this: Expectations of faculty make the Berlin model central for them, but the structure of the school's common life tends to organize student life around the demands of paideia and its expectations. That is, does the school divide its common life between the two models, so that one dominates the school's intellectual style and the other its extracurricular common life, or so that faculty are held accountable to one model and students to the other? Are there structural features of the curriculum, of the ways in which individual courses are usually designed, of prevalent teaching styles that suggest an effort by the school to integrate the two models? Is one model in fact dominant and the other chiefly honored in the rhetoric of the school's self-description?

The first four chapters have suggested questions it would be useful to ask of some particular theological school you are trying to understand more deeply. In Part Two I shall sketch my own utopian proposal about how best to understand the nature and purpose of a theological school. I hope it will persuade you by its cogency. Even if it does not, however, I hope it will help make more concrete just what the force of those questions has been, just how they can be illuminating. Perhaps it may even prompt you to formulate an even better proposal of your own.

Notes

[1] Cf Friedrich Paulsen, The Gennan Uniersities and University Study, trans. E. T. F. Thilly and W. W. Elang (New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1906), pp. ~~0; Daniel Fallon, The German University, (Boulder, Colo.:Colorado Associated University Press, 1980), ch. 2.

[2] For this paragraph, cf Paulsen, pp-. 50-55; Fallon, pp. 1~20, 32-35.

[3] See Fallon, pp. 2~30.

[4] Quoted in Fallon, p.17.

[5] Quoted in Paulsen, p. 53.

[6] Paulsen, p. S4.

[7] Ibid.

[8] Fallon,p.36.

[9] Ibid.,p.53.

[10] Fallon, p. S2. For the entire paragraph, see Fallon, pp.S 1-52.

[11] See Edward Farley, The Fragility of Knowledge (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1988), ch. 5.

[12] See Fancy, Theologia, chs. 4 and 5.

[13] Ibid.,p.86.

[14] Ibid.,p.91.

[15] W. R. Harper, "Shall the Theological Curriculurn Be Modified and How?"AmericanJouma1 of Theotogy, vol.3, no.1 (January 1899), pp. 45~6.

[16] Robert Kelly, Theological Education in America (New York: George H. Doran Co., 1924).

[17] William Adams Brown and Mark A. May, et al., The Education of American Ministers, 4 vols. (New York: Institute of Social and Religious Research, 1934).

[18] H. Richard Niebuhr et al., The Advancement of Theological Education (New York: Harper & Row, 1957).

Chapter 3: Excellence as <I>Paideia</I>

There is a fourth, nontheological factor that pluralizes "theological schools." Ironically, often it brings with it a temptation to find an underlying unity that will overcome the pluralism of theological schools by showing that they all share the same essence. We have just seen that, far from unifying them, the fact that theological schools are theological makes them irreducibly different from one another because of different theological judgments about the nature of the Christian thing, what it is to understand God, and what sort of community a theological school is. But the next question must be: How shall that school go about schooling?

Concretely speaking, schooling requires accepted conventions by which it is organized and governed, however informal they may be. Schooling is inherently an institutionalized set of practices. What shall those institutionalized conventions be? How shall the distinction between "students" and "faculty" be specified? By what criteria, and why? Which disciplines should be exercised in the struggle to understand, and why? And how shall the network of interactions among students and faculty be structured and ordered? To what ends, and why?

Answers to these questions have always been borrowed from the larger host culture within which theological schools are placed. Cultures tend to adopt some model of schooling as the standard of excellence in schooling. Christian theological schools have always aspired to meet the going standards of excellence. That is to say, theological schools have characteristically acted in this regard as though they acknowledged a responsibility to be part of a larger public cultural life and to be accountable to its standards.

Late-twentieth-century theological schools in North America, however, exhibit the strain of trying to appropriate two quite different models of excellent schooling, both of which are by this time traditional in our cultural setting. One, paideia, which has its roots in the ancient Greco-Roman world, was unquestioned until the eighteenth century. It is an integral part of every tradition of Christian schooling, whether that tradition is on the road from Nicaea or Trent or Augsburg (or Geneva, or Northampton, etc.). The other model of excellence in schooling is the modern research university, for which we may let the founding of the University of Berlin in 1810 serve as the emblem. Each model brings with it different criteria by which "faculty" are distinguished from "students," different principles governing how faculty and students relate to each other, and different assumptions governing how a school's common life ought to be run. No accredited theological school in North America escapes the probably unresolvable tension created within its common life by trying to assimilate itself simultaneously to both models of excellence and their inconsistent demands. However, theological schools vary considerably in the ways in which they attempt to negotiate between the two. The way any one school does negotiate the two is a major factor making it the concrete particular school it is. Every theological school grows up at the intersection of the Berlin Turnpike with one or more of the roads: Trent Road, Augsburg Road, and so forth.

PAIDEIA

In current discussions of the nature and purpose of theological education Edward Farley has invoked the older of these two models of excellence in schooling when he describes his book Theologia as an essay "which purports to promote a Christian paideia." [1]. This model is rooted in an understanding of schooling already at least four centuries old by the time Christian churches appeared on the scene. It was the understanding of schooling dominant in the Hellenistic host culture of the earliest churches outside Palestine. The Greek word paideia meant at once "schooling," "culturing," and "character formation." Although, as we shall note, it underwent important changes between the fourth century B.C. and the fourth century A.D. the concept of paideia retained important continuities through this history. Its aim was to form in the souls of the young the virtue or arete they needed to function as responsible citizens. In its earliest form this schooling had focused on athletics and on the study of the poetry ascribed to Homer. The assumption was that by simultaneously subjecting the bodies of the young to physical discipline and their souls to the traditions and customs of ancient Greece as conveyed by literature, they would emerge deeply shaped by those dispositions or habits, that is, virtues, that make the good citizen. At the same time it meant that the ruling class were all genuinely "cultured" in the same way so that, whatever their differences of judgment on particular matters, they were unified by a shared picture of the good life and of what was to be most valued in it.

This was the manner in which educated, Greek-speaking Christians from the very beginning had been schooled, whether they were from pagan families or from Jewish families that had become assimilated into Greek culture. Fragments of quotations from Greek authors and adaptations of conventional Greek rhetorical devices and literary forms by the authors of some New Testament writings, notably the Acts of the Apostles, testify to this. Even more striking is the explicit use of the traditional concept of paideia in a letter written in A.D. 90 by the bishop of Rome, Clement, to the church in Corinth, which was badly divided by controversy. Werner Jaeger, who has written the classic history of the idea of paideia,[2]pointed out in a later book on Early Christianity and Greek Paideia that Clement not only uses literary forms and types of argument calculated to sway people formed by paideia but, beyond that, he explicitly praises paideia in such a way as to make it clear that his entire epistle is to be taken "as an act of Christian education."[3] What early Christians inherited was both a practice of paideia and a body of literature about paideia. Central to the literature about paideia were Plato's writings, especially the Republic which, along with some of his shorter dialogues, can be read, so Jaeger urges, as a proposal for the reform of ancient Athens' paideia. Indeed, Jaeger points out, it was in Plato's time, in the fourth century B.C., that Athens developed humankind's first "conscious ideal of education and culture."[4] In Athens"a 'higher culture' grew up with its own representatives, the Sophists, whose profession was 'to teach virtue.' But . . . despite all their hard thinking about educational method and styles of teaching, and despite the bewildering multiplicity of subjects embraced in their higher culture, none of them really understood the assumptions on which his profession was based."[5] To solve these problems, Plato proposed in the Republic a reform of paideia that was inseparable from a reform of the social structure and governance of the polis. This generated a differentiated proposal of reformed paideia, with significantly different modes of education for persons filling different functions in the city. In particular, it led to a proposal that those responsible for the protection of the city, the "guardians," be "cultured" in a way that inculcated civic traditions and virtues particularly needed for their tasks, especially courage. By contrast, those responsible for ruling, the "philosopher kings," were to be "cultured" in a way that formed in them the "philosophical virtue" that was grounded in knowledge of the Good itself and not, as were the guardians' virtues, simply trained into them by custom and practice. Plato retained the traditional pattern of understanding paideia in terms of political goals.

Of course Plato's utopian proposals were never adopted by early Christian churches and were not part of the practice of paideia inherited by them. But at least four interrelated themes in Plato's proposals about the education of ideal rulers took on a life of their own and did shape ordinary paideia as the Christians knew it centuries later. First, Plato argues that, instead of focusing on disputes about which virtues are the needful ones and how they are to be distinguished one from another, it is more important and fruitful to attend to what they have in common and inquire into what Virtue is in itself -- the essence of virtue. To know that is to know the Good. Hence, to be shaped by arete simply is to know the Good.

The next theme concerns the nature of the Good. In Plato's analysis, the Good is the highest principle of the universe. Greek philosophers before Plato were accustomed to calling the highest principle "God" or "the divine." Plato's followers assumed that he had been founding a new religion. The understanding of Plato that early Christians inherited assumed that the goal and deep foundation of paideia was knowledge of the divine.

The third theme has to do with the teacher of paideia. Taking his own teacher Socrates as the ideal teacher, Plato argues that, strictly speaking -- virtue cannot be taught. The Sophist proposed to teach virtue by conveying information about what other thinkers had taught about virtue and by training in techniques of rhetoric and argument. But what is needed in order to be shaped by virtue is "to recognize one supreme standard, which was binding on all alike because it expressed the innermost nature" [6] of human beings. Knowing the Good involves not only knowing the divine but also a deep knowing of one's own humanity. Like Socrates, who always had claimed that he had nothing to teach anyone, the teacher of virtue can at most serve as a midwife for someone else coming to that knowledge of self which is at the same time knowledge of the divine, that is, knowledge of the Good. It comes through contemplation that yields intuitive insight or gnosis of the Good.

The final theme has to do with the student. Paideia requires conversion, "the wheeling around of the 'whole soul' toward the light of the Idea of Good, the divine origin of the universe" [7] Conversion has to happen in order for one to have intuitive insight into the Good. It comes as the culmination of a long educational process like "slow vegetable growth." [8] Like vegetable growth, it requires a climate and nutrients that, Plato believed, must be provided by the social atmosphere of the city. Unlike the Sophists' highly individualistic view of paideia, Plato stressed its inherently social nature.

It is important to note one feature of Plato's "self~conscious ideal" of paideia: It is the result of the hunt for the essence of the subject studied in paideia "the Good." Plato thought that one could show the underlying unity of the apparent plurality of the virtues by discovering something that was identically the same in all of them, the Good, the essence of moral virtue. It is one and the same thing in all of the virtues, even though the virtues themselves differ from one another. It is the one subject that we seek to understand better through paideia. Hence, although particular, concrete occasions of paideia, the actual practices of paideia, we might say, appear to be both many and enormously diverse, they are "really" all identical with one another because they are practices through which people are shaped by one selfsame reality, the Good.

This is not to say that the idea of paideia itself logically requires that one adopt the view that there is one essence underlying a plurality of occasions of paideia. That was Plato's contention. His was not the only "self-conscious ideal" or theory of paideia; the Sophists had their own. But Plato's was the way of understanding paideia that historically most deeply influenced Christian theological schooling. In consequence, the hunt for the essence of paideia's subject matter came to seem perfectly natural.

In the century and a half between Clement of Rome's letter to the Corinthians and Clement of Alexandria's Christian school of the Catechetes, Christian spokesmen went from perhaps unself-conscious reliance on traditional pagan paideia (in order to make their cases persuasive to both pagans and fellow Christians) to a self-conscious ideal of Christian paideia for its own sake. It was, we might say, in third-century Alexandria, in the time of Clement and his successor Origen, that there first developed the conscious ideal of Christian education and culture as something integral to the Christian thing itself. This is the crucial point: Paideia was built into the very way the Christian thing was construed.

Of course, the received practice of paideia had itself undergone major changes between the rise in fourth-century B.C. pagan Athens of the "first conscious ideal of education and culture" and the rise in third-century A.D. pagan Alexandria of the first conscious ideal of Christian education and culture. What remained unchanged was of utmost importance: The aim of paideia is to shape persons in such a way that they are literally "in-formed" by virtue. However, the governing interests guiding the practice of paideia had decisively shifted from political to religious interests.

Within two generations after Plato the political autonomy of the Greek city-states, which had been the original context of paideia, had been destroyed by the relentless spread of Alexander's empire from Macedonia to India. Alexander recognized the value of Greek culture as a unifying force in his cross-cultural empire and encouraged the spread of Greek paideia in non-Hellenic cultures, but not to the end of culturing virtuous self-ruling citizens! During the social and political turmoil of the centuries following Alexander's death -- in which his empire was dismembered, the "members" seemed continuously to war with one another, and then were largely absorbed into Rome's growing empire -- the practice of paideia continued to be the dominant force shaping the educated classes. But by the third century A.D. it was a practice focused not on shaping virtuous political agents, but rather on preparation for that conversion of soul which would bring religious knowledge of the divine. Plato's contentions that virtue is knowledge of the Good, that knowledge of the Good is at once knowledge of one's own humanity and knowledge of the divine, and that it comes only through a conversion of the soul had all been separated from his contention that the proper home for such knowledge is public life in the polis.

By the third century A.D. the practice of paideia treated all the classical philosophical traditions -- Stoic, Epicurean, Aristotelian, but most of all Platonic -- with religious interests. Using them, teachers "led their pupils the way to that spirituality which was the common link of all higher religion in late antiquity."[9] Furthermore, it was increasingly stressed that in undergoing paideia one needed divine assistance one could not expect to accomplish conversion and come to knowledge of God on one's own unaided resources.[10] Paideia had to do with the interior and entirely private life. "Greek paideia," writes Jaeger, itself "became a religion and an article of faith."[11]

This was the frame of reference in which it was unavoidable that educated Greek-speaking Christians would understand the Christian thing from the late first century (cf Clement of Rome) onward. It was not only an effective device in commending and defending the Christian faith to pagans -- "See, Christianity is paideia too, aiming at the same goal, but superior in the way it does so" -- no, more deeply, it was the Christians' own way of taking Christianity. In their view, the

Christian thing is not "like" paideia; it does not merely make use of received paideia, as Clement of Rome had done. Rather, as claimed by Clement of Alexandria and, with much greater intellectual power, Origen, his pupil and successor as head of the Alexandrian Catechetical school, Christianity is paideia, divinely given in Jesus Christ and inspired Christian scriptures, focused in a profound conversion of soul, and divinely assisted by the Holy Spirit.

As paideia, the Christian thing is inherently a school. In the fourth century under Origen's leadership the Catechetical school in Alexandria was the most influential institutionalization of this school. It provided schooling, not principally for future clergy, but first of all for those who wished to be baptized, and even for those who wished merely to inquire into Christianity. We may let it serve as the symbol for the rise of paideia as the model of excellence in theological education.

Paideia requires texts as its subject matter. In ancient Athens the subject matter had been Homer. Here we touch on a second major change that slowly took place in the practice of paideia before Christian churches appeared on the scene. The subject matter had slowly expanded to include Greek poetry at large. Then paideia had come to mean Greek literature as a whole. "Only relatively late were the more rational branches of education added... and the system of liberal arts, invented. . . ; finally philosophy was added,"[12]above all, from the second century on, "divine Plato." Ironically, Plato's dialogues, intended as a challenge to the notion that paideia would be accomplished by ways of conveying information, were themselves included in the mass of information conveyed in the name of teaching knowledge of the Good. It needs to be stressed that the interest in which the "liberal arts," including literature and culminating in philosophy, were read was religious. These texts were studied in the conviction that doing so would lead to deeper knowledge of the divine. Now, the central subject matter of paideia in Christian schooling was the literature of the Bible. Origen applied the traditional forms of Greek scholarship to the biblical texts, producing critical editions, commentaries, and scientific treatises. However, this was done in the service of something else. The dominant interest in studying scripture was to come to know God through that conversion of the soul that yields gnosis, intellectual intuition of God. That was also the interest in which pagans read Greek literature. It required them to move from literal interpretations of the texts to allegorical interpretations in which the religious insight of the texts was uncovered. Origen followed suit, interpreting biblical texts allegorically with a power that made itself felt for centuries thereafter.

Alongside commentary on scripture, Origen formulated the subject matter of Christian paideia in a second way. He wrote more or less systematic reflections on the implications of the content of scripture regarding human nature, the predicament that requires conversion and how that predicament could have come about, the conditions under which one can be saved from one's predicament, and what all this implies about the nature of God. He produced the first great "Christian philosophy" which dealt, not with all the branches of traditional Greek philosophy (e.g., "logic," "physics," "politics"), but only with what was customarily called "theology," reflection on divine things (although Christians of the time avoided the term "theology" because in their setting it usually had to do with pagan gods). This too, secondarily to scripture, was part of the subject matter of Christian paideia, as the writings of pagan philosophers were in pagan paideia.

Furthermore, Origen insisted that Christian paideia had to be practiced in conversation with the pagan paideia dominant in the church's host culture. In his view pagan paideia was "the gradual fulfillment of the divine providence,"[13] culminating in the paideia which was Christianity. Accordingly Christian paideia had to include schooling in the best of pagan philosophy. That paideia became the model for excellence in theological schooling was simply inherent in the way the Christian thing was construed by Christians and pagans alike in a Hellenistic culture that understood itself to be paideia

As a schooling, Christian paideia must be seen as a process of slow ("vegetable") growth requiring a climate and nutrients. Plato had taught that they must be provided by the social atmosphere of the polis. By the time Christian churches appeared on the scene, "polis" was no longer a living concept. Within two generations after Origen the intellectual leadership of the Christian churches in Cappadocia were calling for the churches themselves to develop that "atmosphere" by developing a distinctively Christian literature in the broad sense. Gregory Nazianzen and his younger contemporary Gregory of Nyssa, both bishops, worked very self-consciously to write and to encourage other Christians to write in the finest literary fashion of the age. Gregory of Nyssa's explicit rationale for this lay in his view that educational activity and the work of the creative artist, painter, and sculptor were essentially identical in the shaping of the human person.[14] In his view, excellent theological schooling is in conversation with its host culture not only by learning from it but also by contributing to the host culture's arts and letters. In this way Christian paideia, like paideia in Plato's day, bore on the public realm, but in a quite different sense of "public." For the tradition to which Plato had been heir, paideia was as essential to the well-being of the public realm as of the political realm, by forming virtuous citizens capable of filling political roles wisely; for fourth-century Greek-speaking Christians paideia, while it aimed to shape persons' private interiority rather than their public political activity, contributed to the well-being of the public realm as a cultural realm accessible to any literate, educated person, Christian or pagan.

Because the construal of the Christian thing of which it is an integral part is not only the earliest construal but has been historically much the most influential one, paideia has been the most influential model of excellence in theological schooling. Jaeger holds that this model "...can be pursued through the Middle Ages; and from the Renaissance the line leads straight back to the Christian humanism of the fathers of the fourth century A.D. and to their idea of man's dignity and of his reformation and rebirth through the Spirit." [15]

THEOLOGICAL SCHOOLING AS PAIDEIA

Theological schooling as paideia is ruled by a religious interest to know God by gnosis, an immediate intellectual intuition. That is compatible with at least three of the senses of "understanding God" we sorted out above (contemplative understanding; discursive understanding; affective understanding) and perhaps with some versions of the fourth (understanding in and through action). Even when, as with the Protestant Reformers, knowledge of God is reserved for the eschaton and theological schooling focuses on faith, schooling remains a practice of paideia -- notably, in Calvin's academy in Geneva. Furthermore, it is compatible with the various construals of the subject matter of theological schooling (Word of God, Christian experience, Christian tradition -- paideia as "Christian culture" - or various combinations of these). When the institution of the university developed in the Middle Ages and the writings of Aristotle were rediscovered, theological schooling stressed far more than it previously had discursive reasoning, technical logical skill, and academic specialization. Nonetheless, it continued to be a type of paideia, governed by paideia's characteristic religious interest. With the Renaissance, theological schooling among Protestants and Roman Catholics alike began to

emphasize literary-critical studies of scripture and other texts, but still as a practice of paideia. Paideia proved compatible both with the more social understanding of human personhood that marked medieval life and with the more individualistic assumptions about personhood that marked much Renaissance culture.

In all these settings, theological schooling that meets paideia's standards of excellence exhibits four features in particular. First, it is ruled by a religious interest in coming to better understanding of God. This religious understanding comes in gnosis, immediate intuitive understanding. As we have seen, this means that at bottom all the senses of "understanding God" which we have sorted out can be and were understood as the fruit of paideia.

Second, theological schooling on the model of paideia requires divinely assisted conversion of the one who learns. This has implications for who can teach and what teaching is. It means that the identification of who is qualified to teach and the character of the relationship between "teacher" and "learner" are very complex matters. In principle, the relationship must be indirect. No one can directly give another person gnosis of God by teaching. In part this is because, as Plato held, knowledge of the Good cannot be taught. Additionally there is the theological reason that the condition of having gnosis is that one undergoes a conversion which finally only God can give. At most, the teacher "teaches" only indirectly by providing the context in which the student may be graced himself or herself to come to that combination of immediate self-knowledge and God-knowledge which is the aim of paideia. Among the factors that make that "context," of course, are those texts and practices whose study is believed to lead to understanding of God, that is, scripture and the practice of the way of the Christian life, including but not limited to worship of God.

Accordingly, there are two quite different sorts of capacities that qualify one to be a "teacher" in theological education as paideia. One is unusual learning in regard to the relevant texts and practices, that is, the subject matter. As we have seen, this holds true for all of the various construals of the Christian thing that we have sorted out. The other sort of qualification necessary for being a teacher is the possession of personal gifts for the indirect "teaching" that, as a midwife, helps another come to gnosis. It has always been difficult to hold the two together in balance. If the former is stressed, "teaching" becomes direct communication of information and ceases truly to be life-shaping paideia. If the latter is stressed, technique becomes dominant, the substance by which the student is to be "molded" is lost, and again schooling ceases truly to be paideia.

It follows, third, that theological schooling as paideia focuses on the student because it supposes that for the student to understand God some kind of shaping or forming of the student is required. Theological schooling thus tends to be individualistic.

Finally, theological schooling in this model is, in a qualified way, public schooling. Because understanding God cannot be achieved directly, it is sought by studying material whose study is thought to lead to understanding God. That subject matter, whether sacred texts only or inclusive of other "extra-Christian" or "secular" texts, is understood to be publicly available and publicly explicable. Furthermore, as paideia, theological schooling generates its own writings that are intended not only for use within Christian communities but also as contributions to the cultural life of the communities' host societies.

However, this is "public" schooling only in a qualified sense. It is open to and engaged in a "public" cultural life broader than the common life of the communities for whom the schooling is undertaken. But because its governing interest is "religious," theological schooling on the model of paideia has characteristically been disengaged from the public realm in the sense of the realm of political, social, and economic power, its arrangement and its management. This is not to say that the Christian churches have necessarily been disengaged in this way. To the contrary, whether they should be so engaged and, if so, how, has been a continuing point of disagreement among them. But theological schooling, even when undertaken by a Christian community itself committed to vigorous engagement in the public realm, has not itself been rooted in such engagement. Indeed, it has not on principle. Its model of excellence is an ancient paideia that once was so engaged because in ancient Athens it was ruled by political interests. But it came to be ruled by religious interests when the social conditions for the political interests were destroyed along with the social reality of the polis. The very idea of paideia became privatized and entailed economic, social, and political interests, that is, "public" interests, in one sense of the term, incommensurate with its religious interests.

It cannot be stressed too much that paideia as a model of excellence in theological schooling continues to be very powerfully influential in theological schooling today. There is a historical reason for that. From the second century on, the Christian thing has been understood as a kind of "forming" of persons' lives on the model of education as paideia. Every construal of the subject matter of theological inquiry and of what it is to "understand" God simply assumes the validity of this model. The idea that Christianity is some type of paideia has come to be so deeply built into all construals of the Christian thing that the two are inseparable. It would be sheer self-deception to suppose that one could reconceive theological schooling by abandoning paideia as a model of excellent schooling. Indeed, recent books about how best to understand theological education include proposals by both Edward Farley, in TheoIogia, and Charles Wood, in Vision and Discernment, [16] paideia as the central model quite deliberately and self-consciously. However, as we shall see in the next chapter, in the modern world it is not possible simply to settle for paideia as the model of excellent education. There is a second model that is as unavoidable as paideia. The two cannot be synthesized. There are different ways to negotiate between them, and that fact constitutes the fourth major factor that pluralizes theological schools.

Notes


1. Farley, Theologia, p. xi.

2. Werner Jaeger, Paideia, vols.., trans. Gilbert Higher (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1939-63), vol.11; idem, Earty Christianity and Greek Paideia (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1961).

3. Clement, furthermore, refers to the "paideia of God" and the "paideia of Christ" and closes with a prayer thanking God for sending us Christ "through whom thou hast educated and sanctified us and honored us.," In this Clement echoes the frequent use of paideia by the Septuagint and by Ephesians. However, Jaeger argues, "it is clear that he applies it in a much wider sense in his letter and, while using Scriptural testimony, he himself conceives of paideia as precisely that which he offers the Corinthians in his whole letter ......... There can be no doubt that what he takes over in his letter from a great philosophical tradition and from other pagan sources is included by him in this comprehensive concept of divine paideia, for if it were not so, he could not have used it for his purpose in order to convince the people of Corinth of the truth of his teachings." Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p.25.

[4] Paideia, vol.11, p.5 (emphasis added).

[2] Ibid., p.123.

[6] Ibid., p. 125; for this entire paragraph, cf. ibid., chs. 4 and 5, passim.

[7] Ibid., p.295

[8] Ibid., p. 228.

[9] Jaeger, Early Christianity and Greek Paideia, p. 46.

[10] Ibid., p .88.

[11] Ibid., p.72.

[12] Ibid., p.91.

[13] Ibid., p.67.

[14] See ibid., p.87.

[15] Ibid., p.100.

[16] Charles Wood, Vision and Discernment (Atlanta: Scholars Press, 1985)




2. Crossroads Hamlets

Where may we locate these crossroads hamlets? At what crossroads do North American theological schools develop? The piously conventional answer has been, "At the crossing of Athens Highway and Jerusalem Road." Perhaps in a dismal February after the fall, a frustrated and disillusioned contemporary answer is likely to be, "At the intersection of Snare and Delusion." A more helpful and, at any rate, historically more accurate answer would provide a multiple choice: Theological schools grow up at the intersection of the Berlin Turnpike and (pick one or more) Trent Road, Augsburg Road, Geneva Road, Canterbury Road, Northampton Road or Azusa Street. That is to say, the factors that shape the concrete ethos of each particular theological school derive from its relation to the history and traditions of higher education as symbolized by the University of Berlin, on the one side, and on the other side, from its relation to some tradition of organized Christianity, as symbolized by Ecumenical Councils (Orthodox) or by place names emblematic of various reforms (Trent, Augsburg, Geneva, Canterbury) or emblematic of various revivals (Northampton, Massachusetts; Azusa Street Mission in Los Angeles, California).[1] More exactly, theological schools differ from one another precisely because the ways in which they relate to the turnpike to Berlin vary, and because the ways in which they relate to the road to Azusa (or Northampton, Canterbury, Geneva, Augsburg, or Trent) vary, and because the ways in which they interrelate these two sets of relations themselves vary. If one's expectations and hopes regarding a theological school are going to be concretely appropriate to the school in its concrete reality, then it is important to attend to the way that school weaves these factors together. To that end it will be useful to sort them out and map some of the quite different ways in which they may be combined.

There is nothing odd about "theology" associating with "school." A school we might say is a particular community of persons whose central purpose is to understand some subject truly. The community includes some persons whose understanding of the subject matter is acknowledged to be somehow more advanced or deeper than the understanding of other members of the community; they are recognized to be skillful at helping the others develop and deepen their understanding. It is customary to describe the interaction between these two groups by saying that the former teach and the latter learn. However, teaching and learning are effectively accomplished only when both are done as subordinate moments in one common quest for truer understanding. Furthermore, since that quest always involves a struggle against various kinds of impediments, it requires appropriate methods and disciplines that serve as strategies in the struggle. It is not so much teaching and learning that make a school but the disciplined common, communal struggle to understand more truly.

What distinguishes a theological school is that the subject it seeks to understand truly is tbeos, God. However, God cannot be studied directly, as though God were immediately given like the page of a text. Nor can God be studied by controlled indirection the way, for example, subatomic particles, which also are not immediately given, can be studied indirectly under the conditions of controlled manipulation in the laboratory. Therefore it is more accurate to say that what distinguishes a theological school is that it is a community that studies those matters which are believed to lead to true understanding of God. Thus, for example, schools as communities of study of scripture have always been central to the life of both Judaism and Christianity precisely, because scripture was believed to be a body of "sacred" texts whose study, would lead to truer understanding of God. A synagogue is by definition a place to study the Torah; "school" was an early image for the church, the "school of Christ."

However, while there is nothing odd about "theology" associating with "school," the association immediately pluralized "school." Far from naming the essence that makes theological schools basically all the same thing despite apparent differences, "theology" indicates one range of factors that accounts for the irreducible differences among theological schools. "Theology" does not name the unifying factor; it names one pluralizing factor. This can be seen in relation to three of the characteristic features of a school: the subject matter that focuses its common endeavor; the "understanding" it seeks through study of that subject matter; and the kind of community the school is.

Diverse subject matters

Theological schools are academic hamlets located at crossroads, one of which is the road from (select at least one): Nicaea, Trent, Augsburg, Geneva, Canterbury, Northampton, Azusa Street Mission, and so forth. Each of those place names is the emblem of a different way of construing the subject matter on which a theological school focuses. Indeed, they are so different that it is difficult to find a relatively neutral generic term for this subject matter. To refer to the subject matter as "the word of God" easily appears to favor either the Lutheran "Augsburg" or the Calvinist "Geneva" road; and any effort to clarify that easily leads to complaint that the Augsburg Road is being privileged over the Geneva Road, or vice versa. To refer to it as the Christian "tradition" will raise the objection that that implicitly favors the Counter-Reformation Roman Catholic 'Trent" Road. To refer to it as "Christian experience" sounds too easily like a privileging of the revivalist "Northampton" Road or the charismatic "Azusa" Road. And any effort to clarify "experience" is likely to arouse complaints that one of those two is being favored. If, in an irenic move, one suggests it is "scripture, tradition, and experience," one will be charged with covert preference for the Anglican "Canterbury" Road! Hence, for convenience sake, I am going to borrow a phrase from G. K. Chesterton and refer to the subject matter on which theological schools focus as "the Christian thing"' I will use the phrase "nominalistically," simply as a place-holder for all communities of practice and belief who call themselves "Christian."

The point is: the Christian thing is construed in a number of different ways. To be sure, they overlap at many points in many unsystematic and unsystematizable ways. Nonetheless, they are irreducibly different. The Christian thing may be construed as a piece of good news about something that has actually already happened to human history or, indeed, to the entire cosmos, and all the implications of that news for our attitudes and values and orientation in life: "God has already decisively overcome evil and is actively at work liberating the whole creation from its bondage; live accordingly." Or the Christian thing may be construed not as a report about what is already actual, but as the offer of a possibility: "Here is the possibility of forgiveness of your sin and release from your burden of guilt; or, the possibility of coming into truly authentic human life and leaving behind a deformed, inauthentic life; all you have to do is appropriate it for yourself in joy and trust." Or, the Christian thing may be construed as an entire ethos, a total way of life complete with the necessary institutional framework, traditional structures of relationships among persons, values, norms, and so forth. Or the Christian thing may be construed as a total interpretation of reality or of the whole of experience, something like a body of theory that gives, at least in principle, a single unified explanation of everything.[2]

There is no one "core" or "basic" or "essential" material theme or doctrine, nor any one pattern of them, that is the Christian thing. The generally accepted conclusion of historical studies is that there never has been. There is not even a past, perhaps originating, "essential" or "core" construal of the Christian thing from which Christians have departed in different ways and to which they might return.[3]

The important consequence is this. Since the "subject matter" on which theological schools focus (in the belief that its study will lead to truer understanding of God) is itself construed in irreducibly different ways, then that which makes all the schools nonetheless of the same kind (namely, theological schools) cannot be that they all finally study the same subject matter.

This is a radical simplification of the actual situation, of course. It wrongly suggests that each theological school exhibits allegiance to some one way of construing what Christianity is all about. In fact, theological schools vary in the way they relate to the construal of the Christian thing to which they are tied by history. Many quite intentionally and explicitly adhere to one construal. Others, equally intentional, are internally pluralistic on this score. They distance

themselves from any one construal by including within their communities persons with allegiances to a variety of construals of the Christian thing or persons proposing original syntheses of older construals. They may all study what they do study to the same end: understanding of God. But that is a different matter. Insofar as the concrete particularity of each school is shaped by its central subject of study, theological schools differ from one another precisely because they are theological and, among Christians, that involves different construals of the immediate subject matter of theology.

Diverse "understandings"

The diversity of ways in which the Christian thing is construed makes the world of theological schools irreducibly pluralistic for a second reason. Different construals bring with them significantly different notions of what it would be to "understand" God truly. Note: What is at issue here is not the conflict among different concepts of God. Rather, it is a matter of different concepts of understanding God.

What is it to understand God? The dominant answer, from the second century through at least the sixteenth century, on all sides -- Orthodox, Roman Catholic, and Protestant "scholastic" -- would have been, "To understand God is to have a kind of wisdom or sapientia."[4] However, left at that, "wisdom" obscures important differences. This wisdom concerning God embraces contemplation, discursive reasoning, the affections, and the actions that comprise a Christian's life. But the ways in which these four are interrelated vary enormously. Each way of interrelating contemplation, discursive reasoning, affections, and action amounts to a different way of leading the Christian life. They might be called different types of "spirituality" or "piety." However, in current usage both spirituality and piety tend to connote mainly inward states, and that is an inadequate characterization of some of these ways of understanding God. We shall simply refer to them as different types of Christian life.

They are not to be confused with the different ways in which the Christian thing has been construed, which I discussed in the previous section. The construals of the Christian thing are different ways of construing the immediate subject matter on which we focus in theological schools as the way to come to a better understanding of God. By contrast, what we are attending to now are different pictures of just what it is to understand God by way of focus on that subject matter. Obviously, the two intersect in a bewildering variety of ways. A particular theological school is helped to be made the concretely distinctive school it is through the way in which it combines (a) a tendency to construe the subject matter in one way rather than another with (b) a particular picture of what it is to understand God. That is why it is important to distinguish the two factors and discuss each separately.

Christian thinkers in the third and fourth centuries made contemplation central.[5] They reasoned that Christianity has to do with the fulfillment of human life, and that our fulfillment comes in contemplation. In making this judgment they were shaped, as all Christians are, by the intellectual tradition centered on the question, "What is the best life for a human being? What life brings full realization and happiness?" The common assumption was that there were only two truly human ways to life: the life of political action and the life of contemplation. The dominant assumption in classical Athens had been that the citizen's life of political action was to be preferred because in it one fulfilled what is highest in human nature, the capacity for free and rational action. It was action in the public realm aiming at the common good. Involvement in the political life of the city of Athens was enormously expensive and time-consuming. It presupposed one was rich enough to be free of having to labor for a living. Political action itself largely involved rhetoric, trying to persuade others to adopt one policy rather than another. Such speech exercised and exhibited logos, which does not so much name one's rational capacities as it refers to the rationality inherent in effective rhetoric. Plato's project, successful in the long run, was to reverse these assumptions. He sought to persuade Athenians that the way of contemplation was higher than the way of political action. Contemplation was a way of understanding. The contrast to contemplation, or theoria, from which the English word "theory" is derived, was not (as it is in current English) action or praxis (cf. "practice"). Rather, the contrast term was some other way of understanding, having to do with guiding human action ("practical" understanding) and with making things ("productive" understanding).

Thus we get two definitive characteristics of contemplation. First, what distinguishes contemplation from these other ways of understanding and makes it the highest form of life is the nature of its subject matter. Contemplation is the way to understand that which does not and inherently cannot change. Practical understanding, by contrast, is the way to understand wise political action, and that is notoriously changeable. In Plato's view that which cannot change is inherently the most rational and the "real" reality. Its contemplation involves the fullest realization and hence the happiness of creatures of a rational nature such as human beings. The second definitive mark of the way of contemplation is that it is inimical to the way of action. The way of contemplation involves all of one's energy and attention and a disengagement from the distractions of the everyday world, including political action.

A philosophical development contemporaneous with third-century Christians introduced a third definitive mark of contemplation. Until then contemplation was discussed as a way of understanding unchanging things that combined discursive reasoning, or coming to understanding by a process of thinking things through, and immediate intuition, coming to understanding by a kind of intellectual direct "seeing" of how things unchangingly are. In the third century the philosopher Plotinus, and the Neoplatonic philosophical tradition that followed him, sharply distinguished between these two and identified contemplation solely with an immediate intuition of unchanging reality.

To third-century Christian thinkers it was obvious that the Christian life centers on that understanding of God which brings to full realization our humanity and happiness. They identified this with the biblical "blessedness." It was equally obvious to them that such understanding is identical with the way of contemplation. God is the most real and utterly unchanging reality. The heart of Christian life is contemplative understanding of God.

However, this judgment created a serious problem. As Christians, these third-century thinkers also held that the best way to contemplate God is through meditation on sacred scripture. Now, if there is anything obvious about the biblical texts it is the high premium they place on action -- precisely that with which contemplation was said to be inherently incompatible. Understanding God in and through some sorts of action had to be combined with understanding contemplatively. This was worked out first by redefining "action" and then by subordinating it to contemplation.

Scripture was interpreted as commanding either ascetical acts or acts of charity. In the third century stress fell on defining action as ascetical practice, as "acts" ultimately directed at oneself to purify one of all engagements with the everyday world that distract from pure contemplation.[6]

By the fifth century Augustine was acknowledging that "action" includes acts positively done in love for the neighbor's well-being, that is, acts of charity in addition to acts done negatively to purify oneself. Together they are a walk of life defined by Christian perfection. That is, they are acts defined by the degree to which they are formed and guided only (i.e., perfectly) by God-given love for neighbor and for God. Augustine seems increasingly to have restricted these acts either to activities serving the neighbor's more basic needs or to those connected with religious service.[7] They may be performed by anyone in any position in society. It does not matter whether one is by God's providential decree placed in the role of politician, engaged in public action for the common good, or in the role of a lover of wisdom (philosopher), engaged as a private person in contemplation of eternal truths, or in some combination of the two: "A man can still lead a life of faith in any of these three lives and reach the eternal rewards. What counts is whether he lovingly holds to truth and does what charity demands."[8]

No longer is the "action" in which our humanity is realized primarily political action, as it was in classical Athens, action in the public realm for the public good. Rather, acts of charity are acts outside the public realm, that is, private action, aimed at the well-being of private persons, oneself, and one's neighbors. Such action constitutes the practice of a Christian life through which one can come to understand God.

This way to understanding God in and through action can be combined with the way of contemplation by being subordinated to it. As early as the mid-third century Origen of Alexandria[9] had urged that the actions enjoined by scripture constitute a "practice" that begins a spiritual journey and comprises the Christian life of most people in time; it flowers into pure contemplation in the afterlife as the ultimate and certain reward of faithful practice. This pattern of thought became normative in Western as well as Eastern Christianity. Actions of charity and asceticism, including the discipline of meditating on scripture, lead to a certain understanding of God in this life, but Augustine stresses, doing these actions does not itself constitute the full actualization of human life. Acts of love for the neighbor and of ascetical self-discipline are therefore a burden. Nonetheless, Augustine held, because they are burdens laid on us by God they must be accepted willingly in love for God. Doing them requires the "right use of worldly things," which involves discursive reasoning or scientia. Thus discursive thought is indirectly involved in understanding God through action infused by love. However, this entire way to understanding God, including scientia, is prior to, inferior to, preparatory to, and so subordinated to the way of understanding by contemplation, or sapientia. [10] The Christian life, in short, is construed as mainly a life spent actively preparing by disciplined loving for a future fulfillment of our humanity in a perfect contemplation of the unchanging God.

This picture of what it is to understand God has tended to have a high correlation with distinctive cultural situations. As Robert Schreiter has pointed out, [11] it is characteristic of contemplative understanding of God, or sapientia, that it has a strong interest in integrating all aspects of the world into a single meaningful whole. It goes with a sensibility that sees the world as an elaborate code of analogies, in which everything at the material level of reality refers to a higher level of spiritual realities, which in turn refer still higher to God. Hence it is characteristic of this picture that the dominant metaphor for coming to understand God is a "path" or "journey" up through the levels of meaning in the cosmos until one grasps God. Such a picture of how to understand God tends to predominate in cultures that see human life as a cycle replicating the cycles that make the world a unified whole. These cultures tend to be ones that, on the one hand, will sacrifice other things to maintain a unified view of the world, and that, on the other hand, maintain important rites of passage by which human life is tied in with the recurring cycles that make the world one. Such cultures tend to value conformity to the underlying patterns of the universe far more than they value personal growth as one's own personal achievement. Cultural situations in which contemplative understanding of God thrives tend to be highly homogeneous and intolerant of pluralism.

This picture of Christian life shapes the nature of a theological school in distinctive ways. When it dominates, the understanding of God that is the aim of theological schooling is basically an understanding by way of contemplation as one is empowered for that by loving one's neighbor and God. It tends to be correlated with construals of the Christian thing as either good news about a divine act that has transformed the fallen cosmos that it is again genuinely a harmonious whole, or as an ethos that embraces all of human life, or as a total interpretation of reality. In the first two cases the subject matter on which one focuses contemplatively tends to be treated intellectualistically as the mind's guide to the contemplation of the structure that makes reality a harmonious whole. In the last case the subject matter is treated more practically as a guide to how to order life so that contemplation is possible. In any case, theological schooling centers on disciplines of spirituality. This notion of what it is to understand God has been definitive in Eastern Orthodoxy and enormously influential in Western European theological schooling. Under various terminological guises it continues to shape deeply many North American theological schools historically rooted in Roman Catholic and certain Anglican movements.

A second notion of what it is to understand God gives much greater place to understanding by way of discursive reason. In the thirteenth century, it grew out of the earlier view centering on contemplation under the impact of newly recovered writings of Aristotle. Thomas Aquinas, for example, preserves a number of themes central to the earlier view. He continues to hold that human fulfillment is fully realized only in sapientia or contemplation of that which is most unchanging, God. He also affirms the traditional conviction that the best way to contemplate God is through meditation on scripture and the practice of its injunctions. Moreover, he maintains the traditional subordination of understanding through acts of charity to understanding by immediate intuition in contemplation.

Indeed, he radicalizes it. He holds that immediate intuition or vision of God comes only in the hereafter. Sapientia is reserved for the eschaton. Nevertheless, there is a way of truly understanding God in this life. His study of Aristotle helped Aquinas recover the role of

discursive reasoning in theoria as it was understood before Plotinus. This is the way of understanding one has when, in a relatively disengaged fashion, one observes (in Latin, speculari) what is going on and thinks through what are the patterns or principles that explain what is happening. It is understanding by way of scientia, or speculative theoria, rather than by way of sapientia, or immediately intuitive theoria. Where Plotinus had limited contemplation to the latter, Aristotle had seemed to combine the two in contemplative understanding. Aquinas follows Aristotle's lead. For him, understanding by way of contemplation is rich enough to embrace scientia as well as sapientia, discursive reasoning as well as intellectual intuition.

Indeed, for Aquinas there are two kinds of scientia or speculative understandings of God.[12] They differ in what they "observe" and in what they led to. Discursive reasoning can lead to understanding of God either by meditation on the everyday world or by meditation on scripture. Either will lead to some kind of understanding of God because each in its own way is given by God. To attend to both of them in their God-relatedness is, as Augustine had taught, one important way in which to love God with one's mind. From Aristotle's writings Aquinas acquired a set of concepts and some theoretical principles that he could use as tools to reason discursively from what can be grasped in the books of scripture and in the book of the world to an understanding of God.

They result in two rather different kinds of scientia. Observing (speculari) what goes on in the world and reasoning discursively from that lead to what Thomas calls scientia divina, "divine knowledge." It is not so much understanding of God as it is understanding of God-related matters. It leads, more particularly, to understanding how all things are related to One Unknown (who, on other grounds, one understands is God). Meditatively observing in faith what goes on in scripture and reasoning discursively from that leads, by contrast, to what Thomas calls scientia dei, "knowledge of God." It is not so much understanding of what and how God is, as it is understanding true things to say about God, such as, "God is merciful." They are true to say because they derive from God's revelation communicated in scripture. But because they are said of a transcendent God, we have no grasp of how they apply in God's case, that is, of the "mode" of their application in God's case.

This picture of what it is to understand God tends to have a cultural location that is characteristically different from the one that correlates with understanding by way of sapientia or wisdom. Where understanding by way of sapientia tries to grasp the unity of the world, understanding by way of discursive reasoning or scientia tries to construct a system of propositions to explain the world. Furthermore, it is characterized by a drive to show that its understanding is sure, demonstrably preferable to competing explanations. That lays a high stress on specialized skill at analysis and sophistication about the methods and strategies for "demonstrating" something. As Schreiter has pointed out in his reflections on the sociology of theology, [13] such a picture of what it is to understand God tends to predominate in cultural situations marked by high specialization and differentiation, like urban societies and their economies, and marked by a plurality of competing worldviews. They are more complex and pluralistic societies than those that tend to correlate with understanding God contemplatively.

On this picture, the understanding of God that is the aim of theological schooling is basically understanding by way of discursive reasoning. It is done in faith and done as a way of loving God. It is a way of Christian life to which acts of neighbor love are integral but subordinate. Both the acts of love and the discursive reasoning are a preparation for future fulfillment of our humanity in contemplative vision of God. But in this life, understanding of God is by way of discursive reason.

This has had important consequences for theological schools. Because such understanding focuses on truths established by discursive reasoning, it tends to correlate with a construal of the Christian thing as a total interpretation of reality. Theological schooling consequently focuses on cultivating capacities for reasoning, capacities for formulating and testing the propositions by which those truths are expressed. This notion of what it is to know God has been enormously influential in both late Western medieval and modern theological schooling. It continues to shape many North American theological schools historically rooted in certain Roman Catholic communities, especially those in which neo-Thomist theology, and philosophy were dominant, and schools rooted in the Reformed tradition, [14] especially those rooted in British and Dutch scholastic Calvinism of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries.

A third picture of what it is to understand God stresses understanding that comes by way of the affections. It too grew out of the earlier view centering on contemplation as sapientia. That earlier view had also held that contemplative understanding of God comes by way of love for God. But as articulated by Augustine, for example, that love was quite specifically a love of the mind, in obedience to the biblical injunction: You shall love the Lord your God with all your heart, soul, mind, and strength. Contemporaries of Aquinas who stood in the Franciscan tradition developed this thought a step further. They urged that loving was distinct from reasoning and went beyond it. The Franciscan Bonaventure, Aquinas's great theological debate partner, held that sapiential contemplation "starts with knowledge and reaches its completion in love," [15] and may do so in this life.

What is distinctive about this tradition is that it associates love with will rather than with reason. According to Nikolaus Lobkowicz, Bonaventure is following Thomas Gallus's contention that "instead of applying the intellectus theoreticus" (i.e., our capacities for discursive and "speculative" reasoning, on which Thomas Aquinas focused), we "ought to reach God by the summus affectionis apex, the 'tip of the will': 'It is by this communion (unitio) that we have to know things divine, not in terms of the sobriety of our intellect.'" [16]

The picture that God is understood by way of the affections is shared by a number of later Christian movements that otherwise differ strongly from Bonaventure's Franciscan tradition and, indeed, in varying degrees differ from one another. They all agree that God is not to be understood chiefly either by way of contemplation (sapientia) or by way of discursive reasoning (scientia). They differ in how they understand the affections that replace sapientia and scientia. They have all deeply influenced theological schools in North America.

Beginning in the late seventeenth century, the pietist movement tends to distinguish the affections from both reason and will and associates them instead with feeling states. Love for God is more focused, perhaps, in one's "heart" than in one's "mind" or "strength." In the eighteenth century the picture that one understands God through love as a feeling state deeply shaped the early Methodist movement through John Wesley's experience of a heart "strangely warmed." As his work on the Religious Affections shows, it was also central to Jonathan Edwards's understanding of the great revival that began in his parish in Northampton, Massachusetts.

Different versions of basically the same picture continue through the nineteenth century in both theologically liberal and theologically conservative circles. No longer are the relevant affections associated with love, however. Among liberals, "affections" tends to mean "religious experience." For some that designates a distinctive type of experience, perhaps the experience of the numinous, that combination of intense fascination and terror one experiences in encounter with the uncanny or the holy. For others the relevant affection or feeling state is more like a dimension of all human consciousness, and hence a dimension of every particular experience, than it is some one class of experiences among others. Perhaps, as it was for Friedrich Schleiermacher, human consciousness may be understood to have several levels. At very least, one is at once conscious and (most of the time) self-conscious. Underlying it all is a level of consciousness of which one is not often aware, of a "feeling of absolute dependence" on some reality that is not itself in any way dependent on us. Such understanding of God as we may have comes from attending to that feeling.

Conservative American theological circles were more deeply shaped throughout the nineteenth century by continuing waves of religious revivals on the American frontier. There, understanding God was often identified with a "personal knowledge" of God that came, not so much through any particular affection such as love, but rather through the very intensity of one's emotions, intensity so great that in the surge of emotion distinctions between love, fear, guilt and joy blurred entirely. [17]

In one distinctive version of this, "affections" mean quite specifically the ecstatic experience of possession by the Holy Spirit as evidenced for example, by speaking in tongues. From a revival meeting in 1906 in the Azusa Street Mission in Los Angeles, in which such a second Pentecost occurred, this particular stream has had powerful and broad impact on many Christian traditions in North America through the charismatic movement. [18]

This picture that God is understood by way of the affections tends to have much the same cultural location as does the view that God is understood by way of discursive reasoning or scientia: It is a culture marked by the high differentiation and specialization of social roles characteristic of urban societies and their economics, considerable pluralism of subcultures and worldviews, social fragmentation, personal anonymity, and rootlessness. Such a cultural setting tends to generate a deep hunger for certainty about one's worldview in its competition with other worldviews, about one's identity in the face of social rootlessness and anonymity, and about one's unsubstitutable significance as a person in the face of specialization that reduces one's personhood to a single socially useful role. Where understanding God by way of discursive reasoning addresses these problems by trying to explain the world and to establish the sure validity of its worldview, understanding God by way of the affections grounds certainty in the sureness of immediate experience and grounds a sense of personal significance in the intensity of the intimate face-to-face communities in which those experiences occur and flourish.

All of these variations on the picture that God is understood by way of the affections, it may well be said, are a far cry from anything Bonaventure had in mind when he stressed that understanding comes through a love which goes beyond reason. Their important differences from Bonaventure and from each other arise from differences about what is central to human nature. They are differences regarding precisely what it is about us that makes it possible for us to understand God. But for all their differences, they share in taking feeling states or experience or emotions to be at the heart of Christian life.

This picture of the Christian life tends to correlate with a construal of the Christian thing as an offer, as news about a possibility of new and fulfilled or blessed life that one may appropriate for oneself -- and the appropriation is by way of the affections. Where this picture predominates, theological schooling is organized around the goal of preparing leadership for Christian communities that is knowledgeable about the conditions under which such experiences occur, may be nurtured, and will flourish. When such schools are located in a cultural context marked by the "triumph of the therapeutic,"[19] there is a strong tendency, to construe those conditions in psychological and sociological categories and to equate the requisite knowledgeabilitv with counseling skills and related psychoanalytical and social-psychological theory. Evidence of that tendency is widespread in Protestant theological schools, both conservative and liberal, that have roots in religious communities shaped by one or another of these movements of revival. Given the history of Protestant Christianity in North America, most schools do have such roots. Nor is this tendency entirely lacking in Roman Catholic theological schools.

A fourth picture of what it is to understand God roots understanding in action. It first surfaces in the generation after Bonaventure in the thought of Duns Scotus as yet another development of the Franciscan version of the Augustinian heritage. Scotus shared the Augustinian ,conviction that ultimate human fulfillment lies in love for God, and he shared with Bonaventure the traditional Franciscan view that love for God is more an act of will than of reason. But he "replaced the innocuous notions of affection and 'affective knowledge' by the notion of 'practice'"[20] or praxis, which he had thoroughly reconceived. (Scotus seems to have been the first medieval thinker explicitly to ask the question, "What exactly is praxis?" Indeed he seems to have been the first Latin author to use the expression praxis in a philosophical or theological context.) [21] Broadly speaking, Scotus takes praxis to be any action that is conscious and deliberate, is something other than a purely "mental act," and is capable of being either right or wrong. Human life is defined, not simply by intellectual acts, but by praxis, by a complex mix of those acts that are different from purely intellectual acts and, while analogous to many activities of animals, are generically different from them.

Scotus has very nearly revived Aristotle's notion of praxis, with the glaring difference that because Scotus does not define praxis by reference to the public realm or the common good it lacks any political connotations. But then Scotus disagrees with Aristotle. In Scotus's

view, Aristotle had rightly held that understanding of human behavior in politics and ethics has to be practical and not contemplative understanding because behavior is so changeable. However, Aristotle wrongly held that the unchanging God can be understood only contemplatively. Against this, Scotus insisted that God is the "doable knowable" (cognoscibile operabile). That is, God may be understood by way of any action which is true praxis. [22]

With this notion of praxis Scotus effectively subverts the other three pictures of what it is to understand God. He removes action from its subordinate role and makes it central. Recall that from the third century onward the actions enjoined by scripture had posed a problem to Christian thinkers because action was perceived to be inconsistent with contemplation. Of human action, that is, of politics and of ethics, as of all changeable things, one might acquire practical understanding and acquire it precisely by way of engaging in the action, but the unchanging God one can hope to understand only by way of contemplation undistracted by action. Hence action is given only a subordinate role in our coming to understand God. Action might be ascetical, playing the role of purifying us of distracting entanglements. Or action might be works of neighbor love, done in joy because God commanded them, but burdens because they do distract from contemplation. Or action might be the actions involved in worship by which we express our inadequate love for God and pray for the grace of an adequate love for God. Taken together, these actions make up the way of Christian perfection and are in the service of and subordinate to contemplation, in which alone is understanding of God to be found. Scotus's idea of action reverses this. Action's role in understanding God is not limited to our purification. It is not limited to acts of worship. It is not to be understood as a burden distracting us from the effort to understand God. Rather, since praxis comprises our entire life as human life, it can be so shaped that it is itself the way to an understanding of God which may then flower into that love for God in which we are one with God.

For third-century Christians sapientia, contemplative understanding, might here and now yield human fulfillment in vision's union with God. For Thomas Aquinas scientia, understanding by discursive reasoning, might help prepare us for a future intellectual vision of God. For Bonaventure understanding of God might start in reason's contemplating (sapientia) but then must go on beyond reason to the completion of understanding in wills affectionate union with God. But for Scotus, because understanding God culminates in precisely will's love of God, it must begin here and now neither solely in reason's sapientia nor solely in its scientia, but in will's deliberate and conscious action, that is, in praxis.

As Nikolaus Lobkowicz points out, "One only has to forget for a second that for Scotus the ultimate secret of will, and thus of practice, is love, in order to be reminded of statements such as: the only knowledge able to reach God is practical, not theoretical (Kant); the only source of meaning in the whole universe is praxis (Marx)." Of course Scotus says nothing of the sort. Nonetheless, his picture of what it is to understand God "anticipates, and in a sense paves the way for, the notion ... that it is an atheoretical practice [i.e., practice without theoria] in which God is encountered or missed."[23]

There have been a number of variations on this picture of what it is to understand God, largely in late nineteenth-and twentieth-century Protestantism. Some of these versions take "action" in a highly individual and private way: To understand God is to understand God's will for me in this particular situation; understanding God's will consists of the rigorous effort to clarify what my unconditional moral duties oblige me to do. Or, in a less moralistic and more psychological mode: To understand God is to act in such ways in this given situation involving another person that I may discern how God's grace is at work in the trans-actions between us to correct what is amiss and, where life is broken, empower for new life. Alternatively, "action" may be taken in a more public and political way: One comes to understand God as one engages in action with others in the public realm struggling to redress some social or economic injustice by taking realistically prudent political action. Morally such situations are inescapably ambiguous, but in their midst one may -- though one's companions in the struggle may not -- discern the grace of God at work judging the evil resisted and forgiving the evil committed (cf. Reinhold Niebuhr). In this version, the praxis in which one comes to understand God is public in the classical Athenian sense, but the atheoretical understanding itself is entirely private.

Currently the most influential version, of course, is associated with movements shaped by liberation theologies: We come to understand God as we are a part of a community that is united by a common history of oppression and struggles for liberation by radically changing the arrangements of economic and social power that have made the oppression systemic in our society. In that action we encounter the God who is already at work in world history ahead of us and on behalf of the oppressed to establish God's kingdom of justice and peace. In this version, praxis is understood quite differently than it is in the others. Both praxis and an atheoretical understanding of God are communal, intersubjective, and hence, in that sense, public. There is a place for theoria in this practice. Out of praxis that aims at transforming oppressive social power arrangements arise fresh theoretical understandings of the structure and dynamics of oppressive relationships within society. These new theories may then guide further transformative praxis. Theory is a dialectical moment within practice.

This theoria is not so much theoretical understanding of God as a theoretical understanding of society and ourselves in it. However, it can be shaped by the atheoretical understanding of God we already have. To understand God as the One who liberates oppressed people into a realization of their true social humanity, for example, can put us in a position to recognize the falsity of the social relationships our society imposes on us.

The picture that God is understood in action tends to be correlated with cultural situations marked by deep social change or by newly widespread consciousness in parts of a society of the need for deep social changes. They need not be cultures marked by high degrees of differentiation and specialization of social roles. Nor need they be highly pluralistic societies. They need not be highly urbanized societies. But they do need to be marked by sharp contrasts between small elites who control massive economic, social, and political power, and large groups whose consciousness of their relative powerlessness is sharply rising. In such societies, this picture of what it is to understand God tends to be best sustained in relatively small Christian communities that can retain a degree of communal identity in the midst of these social changes without moving to the margins of social turmoil and withdrawing from active participation in the reformist or revolutionary movements that cause the changes.

Where variations on this picture of what it is to understand God prevail they deeply shape theological schools. The schools differ in the degree to which the action in and through which God may be understood is thought of as Christian communal action and, if it is, in how far it is precisely political action. They share, however, the view that Christian life and therewith Christian ministry are above all an active life. Accordingly, the common life of a theological school that educates those who lead and nurture communities of Christians in that life must in high moral seriousness focus above all on the nature and demands of that activity and on analysis of the society in which it must be lived.

It is precisely because theological schools are theological that they are irreducibly plural. The pluralism is a consequence of the irreducibly plural ways in which the idea of "understanding God" is itself theologically understood, combined with the irreducibly diverse ways in which the subject matter (the Christian thing), whose study is believed to bring us to a better understanding of God, is construed. Together these two points bring with them important pointers regarding how to go about better understanding any particular theological school. In the interest of following the recommendation that any such effort ought to be kept as concrete as possible, it would be important and fruitful to ask whether there is some one dominant assumption within the school as a community about (a) how the Christian thing is best construed and (b) how one best goes about "understanding" God. Since a society's ethos is rarely entirely coherent, it is likely to be even more fruitful to ask whether there is tension among two or more sets of assumptions on these matters widely held within the school as a community.

Rarely are these assumptions stated self-consciously and explicitly; even more rarely are they stated in official school publications. Rather they are assumptions almost wholly implicit as the structures, patterns of behavior, and common talk of such communities. One can hope to find symptoms of them in several ways. One is to explore how intensely the school identifies with Geneva Road or Azusa Street, Augsburg or Trent Road, and so forth. The historic traditions within Christianity emblematized by these place names characteristically bring with them commitments to specific answers to our two questions. The more intensely a school identifies with such a tradition, the more deeply the tradition's commitments on these matters will shape the school's ethos. This is a rare case in which the school's assumptions may be explicitly in a reliable way, in its official documents. Increasingly, however, a great many schools, especially Protestant ones, are not very intensely identified with any one Christian tradition.

A second place to look for symptoms of a theological school's implicit ethos-shaping theological commitments is the structure of the curriculum it requires of its students and the relative richness of the courses it offers them. For example, a curriculum that seems to privilege courses having to do with religious experience, worship, spirituality, counseling, and the like over, say, systematic and philosophical theology may reveal a commitment to the assumption that God is understood effectively rather than discursively; while a curriculum relatively more rich in offerings in ethics, sociology of religion, liberation theology, and the like than in offerings in historical theology, patristics, liturgics, and mystical traditions may reveal a commitment to the view that God is better understood in action than in contemplation.

Yet another place to look for assumptions that shape a given theological school's distinctive ethos is its organization of activities not strictly academic, such as worship or social action. To what extent is such activity organized by the faculty as a matter of school policy and to what extent by students at their own initiative? To what extent does it engage faculty energy and to what extent student energy? Major differences between faculty and student responsibility for the very occurrence of such activities may suggest tensions between different sets of implicit commitments regarding what is central to the Christian thing and how best to go about understanding God. One has, in short, to be an amateur anthropologist studying the school's ethos as participant observer to discern those deep theological assumptions that help make a given theological school the distinctive social reality that it is.

Diverse communities

A third theological factor that pluralizes theological schools is their understanding of the kind of community they are or ought to strive to be. Earlier I characterized a school as "a particular community of persons whose central purpose is to understand some subject truly."[24] A theological school in particular is a community whose central purpose is to come to understand God more truly. The fact that what the community seeks to understand is God presumably has implications regarding the sort of community it is. The central issue here can be focused by asking the question as concretely as possible: How does a given theological school understand the relationship between itself as a community and a Christian congregation as a community? Granted that a theological school surely has some kind of relationship to the Christian church, just what is that relationship?

Not all theological schools have explicit, formal answers to this question. Nevertheless, some answer is always implicit in the way the school conducts its common life and the reasons conventionally given for doing some things in the way in which they are done. The answer is theological in the sense that, if challenged, theological reasons would be given in support of it. At least three broad types of answer to this question can be found among American theological schools. What is important for our purposes is that a school's answer to this question shapes its peculiar ethos.

The first type simply identifies a Christian theological school with a Christian congregation. The school community's common life is ordered to its being a congregation. Of itself that does not constitute the community as a theological school. Something more is needed for it to be a school; we shall take that up in the next chapter. However, on this view it is more determinative of the community's particularity and identity that it is a Christian congregation than that it is a school. To be school requires first that precisely this community be church. This shapes the school's ethos in deep and distinctive ways. On the Trent or Canterbury road it means that eucharistically centered worship is the basis of the school's community. It means that focus on everyone's spiritual formation is central and not peripheral to the community's common life. Furthermore it means that the spiritual health of members of the community is somehow the responsibility of the entire community. On this view, the fact that the school community is a worshiping community is not just terribly important; it is the foundation of its being a community at all.

When a theological school understands itself in this way it tends to develop an ethos in which high value is placed on its being a resident community set apart from the "world" so that there will be maximum time, energy, and attention focused on that which defines it as a community. Such schools tend to be placed physically in rural or small town settings. At its most extreme this ethos tends to foster a certain antintellectualism, seeing academic work itself as a possible distraction from the spiritual shaping that is the basis of the community.

This view and its ethos are evident in North American schools in Catholic traditions. There, theological schools are simply assumed to be religious communities living under orders. Such schools see themselves as modern embodiments of medieval Cathedral schools or monastic schools which were, unambiguously, ecclesiastically ordered communities. This picture may be exhibited quite unambiguously, of course, in many North American Roman Catholic theological schools operated by religious orders or by a diocese, even when the schools' communities in fact include persons not literally "in orders." This is reflected in the conventional structure of Roman Catholic theological education in which theologates are a subset of seminaries. "Seminary" covers schools at the high school and college levels as well as theologates. What makes them "seminaries" is that their common life is that of a community of worship aiming at the spiritual formation of its members as priests. "Theologates," academically the most advanced, the institutions that provide professional education for ministry, what this book calls "theological schools," are first of all "seminaries." This view becomes more ambiguous when increasingly large numbers of men and women students are admitted who are not "in orders" and require a different sort of spiritual formation.[25]

Basically the same view underlies the ethos of many Episcopal theological schools, although with a good bit of ambiguity generated, perhaps, by the way differences in church polity and theology of ordination alter the clarity of the idea of being "in orders." Nor is this view of the relation between theological school and congregation and the ethos that goes with it limited to Catholic traditions. In 1754 Thomas Clap, self-consciously a Calvinist theologian, the rector of Yale College, then still self-consciously a school in the Reformed tradition, forbade Yale students to worship anywhere except at the college church on the grounds that the school itself, ordered to educate ministers, was a religious society "of a superior nature."[26]

A second and more complicated view of the relation of theological school to church, however, was more characteristic of New England Congregationalism and mid-Atlantic Presbyterianism. There "school" was an amplification of the study of a congregation's senior minister.[27] Future clergy were apprentices schooled by the minister as he conducted his weekly ministerial rounds. The student or students and the minister did not constitute a church; they were related to a church in the way in which clergy and congregation are understood to be related to one another in the Reformed tradition. Looked at one way, clergy (and student clergy) and laity are all together one congregation. But with regard to the preaching of the Word they are differentiated, and the relation between them is hierarchical. Nonetheless, clergy and their students do not themselves comprise a Christian congregation. This view, and the ethos it tends to create, persists in this tradition long after theological education has passed from the studies of ministers to theological seminaries.

A particularly clear illustration of this is provided by the founders of Union Theological Seminary, New York, in their preamble to the school's constitution. The constitution was drafted in 1836, just before the school opened. After noting the need for well-trained ministers, and that in New York and Brooklyn there were promising persons who could not go away from home to get such training, and professing their allegiance to the Presbyterian church, they announced their intent

"that its students, living and acting under pastoral influence, and performing the important duties of church members, in the several churches to which they belong, or with which they worship, . . . shall have the opportunity of adding to solid learning and true piety, enlightened experience."[28]

The theological school provides "solid learning/" It is a community constituted by the pursuit of learning. The students bring "true piety." Worship is an important part of the common life of the school. But it is not foundational to its being a community as, precisely, a theological school. Nonetheless, the school community is essentially related to church communities. The churches nurture the "true piety" of students who live under their "pastoral influence."

The school is not a Christian congregation, but it is related to a number of Christian communities by virtue of the fact that its students, (and faculty) are active members of them. And this is what will provide "enlightened experience." As Robert Handy points out in his comment on this preamble, Union's founders made a "distinctive contribution" to theological schools of this type when they included this theme in their vision for their school. "Enlightened experience" was to come through performing the duties of church membership while "acting under pastoral influence." In effect, its founders institutionalized "supervised field work" in the very structure of the school. "It was later widely copied, for their aim was to draw on the rich educational and religious resources of what by then was America's largest metropolitan area for preparing ministers.[29]

This way of understanding the relationship between theological school and church tends to create an ethos that has probably been the most influential one in Protestant theological schools in America. Union did not originate it. It had been pioneered by the founding of Andover in 1808, and by the time Union opened in 1836 more than twenty-five seminaries had been established. The prevailing ethos of schools with this heritage is profoundly shaped by the conviction that they are constituted as communities by academic purposes and not, as church communities are, by doxological purposes. Common worship tends to be highly valued and it is characteristic of schools with this ethos to include in the weekly schedule stated times for worship by the entire community. However, it is uncharacteristic for such a school to institutionalize in its common life a structure for nurturing and monitoring its students' "piety" (which would be the closest structural equivalent to "spirituality" in the first ethos I sketched). Furthermore, if situations arise in which academic interests compete with concerns for students"'piety" for added time or financial resources, the response characteristically shaped by this ethos would be to assign to the "churches" responsibility for "piety" and to assign priority within the school to the academic interests.

To be sure, it too is an ethos that places a high value on avoiding distractions. Until the early decades of the twentieth century, schools of this sort were strictly resident communities of unmarried male students. Schools tended to be located physically in rural settings or small towns. When they were in larger cities, they tended to be located in the suburbs. However, it was more important to avoid distractions from academic work than distractions from spiritual formation. As the founding document of Union shows, such a school would quite deliberately be set in the midst of a major metropolitan center on the grounds that this environment was necessary to, rather than a distraction from, its proper academic purposes.

Theological schools with this sort of ethos have tended to be especially comfortable associating with or being an organic part of other types of academic communities such as undergraduate colleges, graduate centers, and universities. This is a theological school ethos that values intellectual seriousness and disciplined rigor as the way in which to love God with one's mind. In the larger context of the Christian life it gives an especially highly valued place to the life of the mind. In its extreme form this ethos can tend to alienate the common life and familiar language of a theological school from the ordinary language and patterns of common life of the churches, giving rise to complaints that theological schooling is "irrelevant" to the "real life" of actual congregations.

A third pattern has had considerable influence in American Protestantism. Under the conditions of the frontier, where the population was widely scattered and revivalist movements became the dominant form of Christian religious experience, especially where the Methodist movement was influential, persons were appointed to circuit riding ministries before their "theological education" was completed. They might be thought of as a cadre of preachers. But since they tended to live a fairly isolated life of frequent travel they could not as a group be considered a community living together under orders. Nor could they he considered a part of a larger group of worshipers settled in one place. Their education took place by private reading and was monitored by examinations set by denominational officials.[30] As theological schools emerged, they were considered adjunctive to the actual practice of ministry. The activity of theological education often had the character of "extension" education. Theological students were certainly part of the church construed as a movement or a denomination. But they were not part of a settled local congregation by whose leadership they were schooled. And the theological school itself most certainly was not a congregation. Rather, the theological school was seen as basically a service agency to a denomination.

The ethos of theological schools sharing this view of their relationship to "church" is markedly different from the other two we have identified. The school is constituted a community, not by being a resident worshiping congregation nor by a common academic undertaking, but by the fact that it consists of a cadre of persons called by the larger church to a mission in the world. Little value is placed on the school's being a resident community; much of the time its members must be away in mission, probably part-time, in the place to which the larger church, that is, the denomination, has appointed them. Many of them are married and have families who live, not at or near the theological school, but in the place where they are sent to minister. Shared worship when all are together as a school is valued. Indeed, given the roots of this tradition in pietist and revivalist movements, it is characteristic in this ethos to invest high energy not only in communal worship but also in Bible study and prayer in intimate small-group settings in which students' individual piety may be nurtured and formed. However, none of this constitutes the school as a community.

Rather, what constitutes the school community is its basic focus on equipping its students with professional ministerial skills and competencies. The students are already responsible for founding, maintaining, and expanding the programs and organizations of local congregations. Preparing them to fulfill these institutional responsibilities more effectively is the common activity that constitutes the theological school as a community. In extreme forms, this ethos tends to value training in what is demonstratively effective and successful in practice over academic learning, to value what sustains clerical careerism over what cultivates the capacity for critical reflection.

I have sketched three ideal types of community that a theological school might be or be committed to becoming. It might be a community under orders sharing a common religious discipline. It might be a community of quasi-clergy related to Christian congregations in the way in which clergy are supposed to be related to the congregations they lead, yet distinct because it is constituted by academic interests of special interest to clergy rather than constituted as a church. It might be the community of a cadre of persons sent individually in mission but concurrently sharing a program of training for that mission. There may well be other types of community to which some theological schools belong. If a theological school were a community of only one of these types it would probably be a relatively harmonious and calm community. In reality, most theological schools are strained communities because they implicitly mix two or more of these types in a single institution.

This suggests an additional set of questions to ask oneself about any particular theological school one is trying to understand. What type of community do the people who comprise it assume it ought to be? It is not sufficient to consult the school's bulletin or catalog for its official self-description in this regard. That may or may not accurately describe how the community's common life is actually lived out. Rather, one needs to attend to such matters as the systems of rewards that shape the community's common life.

Different systems may function in different aspects of that life. Official school policy, for example, might put pressure on students and faculty to invest significant amounts of time and energy in a common life of worship as though the school were a Christian congregation; while faculty put pressure on themselves and students to invest energy and time in scholarly study and writing; and students, concurrently, are under financial pressure that can be met only by taking positions with local congregations so time-consuming that their academic work is conducted on the pattern of extension education. Or the pattern among contrasting types of community that constitute the school might be very different. The point is that some such pattern characterizes every school and the tensions within it profoundly shape the distinctive ethos of that school.

If one is to have a realistic grasp of the school, one needs to be clear about this feature of its ethos also. This is especially important if, as we imagined in chapter 1, one harbors hopes of changing the school. Some kinds of change may be plausible if they involve a strengthening of a commitment to be a certain type of community which is already dominant in a school, but other kinds of change may be much less plausible precisely because they would involve a change in the type of community a school already is or a change in the current equilibrium among contrasting types of community.

In a dismal February

Here we have three broad types of things to look for if, in a dismal February well after the fall, we want to get a firmer grip on the concrete reality of some particular theological school in which, perhaps, we have invested deeply felt expectations. If we may think of a school as a

community of persons whose central purpose is to understand some subject truly, then a theological school is such a community that seeks to understand God. That is what makes it "theological," and that is also what helps make one school irreducibly different from another and in some ways peculiarly resistant to change. Precisely because it is a theological school, it will be helpful to ask three different sorts of questions about it, and then to ask how the answers to the three are themselves interrelated in the structures that pattern the school's common life: What construal or construals of the Christian thing are assumed in the way the subjects of study are addressed? What picture of what it is to understand God dominates the school's common life? How does the school seem to understand itself as a community in relation to churches?

What matters, of course, is how a school answers these questions in practice, not necessarily in its official public rhetoric about itself. The answer can be complex in regard to each of these questions. As we have noted, since God cannot be understood directly we must focus on other matters whose study we believe will lead to better understanding of God. But from the very beginning of Christianity there have been a number of different ways of construing this subject matter. All theological schools stand in some historical tradition in this regard. Some, because of mergers of schools, stand in more than one tradition. In some theological schools a traditional construal is simply assumed; in others one or more traditions of construal of the Christian thing are very self-consciously celebrated ("This is a school in the Reformed tradition, with the following consequences ... !"). Still others self-consciously seek to be open to all construals of the Christian thing and attempt to distance the school as school from any one of them ("We are a truly ecumenical school!"). Sometimes one can see that one kind of construal is assumed in one area of the curriculum, say biblical studies, and quite another in some other area, say pastoral theology.

These differences will interconnect in complex ways with different assumptions about what it is to understand God: contemplatively, discursively effectively, or actively. Here too schools inescapably stand in some historical tradition or traditions and differ from one another in the attitudes they adopt toward those traditions. Moreover, here too different assumptions about this matter may be made in different sections of the curriculum. This can be further complicated by the fact that different assumptions about what is involved in understanding God may be made in regard, say, to the school's common worship life than are made in its curriculum.

Finally, the answers made to these two types of questions will interconnect in complex ways with answers made to the question of how the school as community is related to church communities: Is the school itself an ordered Christian congregation; is it an expanded version of the academic aspect of the work of ministerial leadership in a settled congregation; is it an agency for the extension education of practicing clergy? Once again, every school stands in one or more historical traditions with regard to this question. And schools differ in the attitude they adopt to their own histories. Moreover, as we have noted, one answer to this question may be assumed by a school historically, another adopted by its faculty, and still another be mandated by financial constraints on students. Especially as one harbors hopes for significant changes in a theological school, it is important to understand a particular school in its concrete particularity. These are major theological factors that help make it the concretely particular school it is, and analyzing it in the light of these three questions will help give a realistic understanding of it.

Notes

[1] In 1906 the Azusa Street Mission in Los Angeles, under the leadership of William J. Seymour, became, Sydney Ahlstrom's phrase, "the radiating center of Pentecostalism" in the United States, from which Pentecostalism has grown into a worldwide movement. A brief account of the history of Pentecostalism may be found in Sydney E. Ahlstrom, A Religious History of the American People (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1972), pp. 816-822.

[2] For an elaboration of the notion of diverse construals of "the Christian thing," see David H. Kelsey, The Uses of Scripture in Recent Theology (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1975), ch. 8.

[3] See, e.g., Robert L. Wilken, The Myth of Christian Beginnings (Garden City, N.Y.: Doubleday & Co., Anchor Books, 1972). 1

[4. For a sketch of the history of the idea of "wisdom" as our understanding of God, see Farley, Theologia, pp. 33-39; p. 46, nn. 6 and 12.

[5] For the following paragraph, see Nikolaus Lobkowicz, Theory and Practice: History of a Concept from Aristotle to Marx (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1967), chs. 1-6.

[6] Cf. Clement of Alexandria, Stromata, II, 10; VI, 9.

[7] See Lobkowicz, p. 67.

[8] Ibid., p. 64

[9] See Origen, On the Gospel of John, I, 16.

[10] See Augustine, City of God, xix, 19;xv, 106

[11] Robert J. Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies (Maryknoll, N.Y.: Orbis Books, 1985), pp. 85-87.

[12] Cf .Victor Preller, Divine Science and the Science of God (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1967), ch. 1; Ralph McInerny, St. Thomas Aquinas (Notre Dame, Ind.: University of Notre Dame Press, 1982), pp. 140-170.

[13] See Schreiter, Constructing Local Theologies, pp. 87-91.

[14] For similarities on this topic between Thomas Aquinas and the Reformed tradition, see Arvin Vos, Aquinas, Calvin and Contemporary Protestant Thought (Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Publishing Co., 1985), chs. 1 and 5; Farley, Theologia, p. 46, n. 12.

[15] Lobkowicz, p. 74; see pp. 71-74 for the historical context.

[16] Ibid., pp. 73-74.

[17] See Ahlstrom, chs. 19,20,26, and 27, for a historical survey of successive waves of revival movements in American religious history.

[18] See ibid., pp. 819-820; 1059-1060.

[19] For the classic discussion of the "triumph of the therapeutic" as a movement in American culture, see Philip Rieff, The Triumph of the Therapeutic (New York: Harper & Row, Harper Torchbooks, 1966).

[20] Lobkowicz, p. 74.

[21] See ibid., p. 71.

[22] See ibid., P. 74.

[23] Ibid.

[24] See above, p. 3 1.

[25] For an account of a major study of Roman Catholic seminaries in regard to the above issues, see Katarina Schuth, O.S. F., "American Seminaries as Research Finds Them," in U.S. Catholic Seminaries and Their Future (Washington, D.C.: United States Catholic Conference, 1988), pp. 29-59.

[26] Clark Gilpin, "The Seminary Ideal in American Protestant Ministerial Education, 1700-1808," Theological Education (Spring 1984), p. 95.

[27] See Mary Latimer Gambrell, Ministerial Training in Eighteenth-Century New England (New York: Columbia University Press, 1937), esp. chs. 6 and 7.



[28] Quoted in Robert Handy, A History of Union Theological Seminary in New York (New York: Columbia University Press, 1987), p. 8.

[29] Ibid., p. 9.

[30] See Douglas R. Chandler, Pilgrimage of Faith: A Centennial History of Wesley Theological Seminary, 1882-1982 (Cabin John, Md.: Seven Locks Press, 1984), esp. chs. 1 and 2, for an illustration of how one theological school developed in this fashion.



This is a book addressed to those who have felt the pinch of a misfit between their expectations of theological education and the realities of a theological school. Theologically speaking, what ought to be the purposes and nature of theological education? What theological commitments ought to be decisive criteria for assessing and reshaping the ethos and polity of a theological school? The readers he has in mind include: perhaps a student starting her second year of study, or an academic who has just joined a theological school faculty and has never herself been previously involved in theological education, or a person newly appointed to the board of trustees of a theological school.

1. Orientation: Or, After the Fall

Every year on the weekend before the start of the fall term of the theological school where I teach, the student organization offers a retreat as part of the orientation for new students. New faculty members have also found it helpful. For years it was held at a lovely little conference center on a rocky neck projecting into Long Island Sound. It is an opportunity to reflect on one's own expectations of theological education and to begin to get a sense of the nature and overarching purposes of this particular school in which one has invested those expectations. The retreat has always been called "Before the Fall."

Inevitably, a fall does come. Innocent idealizations of theological education give way before concrete realities of the particular theological school whose ethos is the medium in which one now largely lives and whose polity constrains one's life in powerful but often elusive ways. At some point virtually everyone involved in the enterprise feels the pinch of a misfit between yearnings and expectations that are important (and vulnerable) parts of one's personal identity, on one side, and on the other a set of unexpected, often unintelligible, frequently frustrating "givens" that appear to be important (and invulnerable?) parts of the identity of the school. The pinch gives rise to questions. What are the purposes and priorities that really govern and structure this school? What is realistic to expect of theological education, whether done in this school or in some other? If institutional reality could be remade to heart's desire, what would the ideal theological school be like? Most basic of all, since it is theological schools and theological education we are questioning, what is theological about them? Theologically speaking, what ought to be the purposes and nature of theological education? What theological commitments ought to be decisive criteria for assessing and reshaping the ethos and polity of a theological school?

Those are the types of questions this book addresses. I have five hopes for it. First, I hope for the book to be accessible. I have not tried to achieve this by simplifying complex issues or by avoiding serious theological analysis, critique, and argument. Of course, I hope to achieve accessibility partly by explaining what I mean, and what I take others to mean, as clearly as possible in plain English! But I also hope to achieve it by constantly supposing that I am addressing someone who has entered the world of a theological school fairly recently -- perhaps a student starting her second year of study, or an academic who has just joined a theological school faculty and has never herself been previously involved in theological education, or a person newly appointed to the board of trustees of a theological school. This is a book addressed to those who have felt the pinch of a misfit between their expectations of theological education and the realities of a theological school. It is addressed to questions that arise after the fall -- usually in the dreary February of the second year one is in the school.

Second, I hope the book will succeed at being a collegial partner in an ongoing conversation. For nearly a decade now a lively but fragile, potentially important theological conversation has been going on among theological educators about the basic nature and purpose of theological education. It has been nurtured in many ways: by research into basic issues in theological education underwritten by competitive grants offered by the Association of Theological Schools (ATS) and funded by the Lilly Endowment, Inc.; by the work of some theological educators commissioned by the Endowment to think about these questions; and by a series of seminars and conferences convened by the ATS to discuss some of the results of this research and reflection. I have had the opportunity to observe this conversation from a privileged vantage point.[1] I have become deeply impressed by the importance of this conversation to the health of theological education in North America.

The conversation is nonetheless fragile because hitherto there has never been a lively tradition of discussion of theological education by those who are engaged in doing it. Fortunately, theological education is not itself a scholarly specialization. It has no academic guild. Consequently, no faculty member is promoted or awarded tenure for research and writing on this topic. There is little literature on the matter. There is not even the shared vocabulary that would make discussion easy. Nor has there been a clear knowledge of which assumptions are widely enough shared to make it possible to state disagreements as genuine engagements and not as exercises in talking past one another. The conversation could easily break down because it has so little standing in the world of theological education, has no well-established tradition to nurture it, no reward system to encourage it, no institutional home to give it enduring structure. At the same time the liveliness and potential importance of this conversation are shown by the remarkable number of significant articles and books it has generated over the past half dozen years. I intend this book to be a contribution to the conversation, moving it along in new directions, perhaps, but only in dialogue with other voices from whom I have learned a great deal.

My third and fourth hopes for this book are closely connected but are quite distinct. I hope to make suggestions about the most helpful way to think about these issues -- suggestions about the differences between more useful and less useful ways to pose the issues -- as a contribution to making others' discussions of these topics more fruitful. I consider these suggestions to be largely formal. They are not designed to support one side of a disagreement about the nature and purposes of theological schools against the other side. Rather they are designed to help disagreements be posed in ways that are as productive as possible in generating further conversation and new insights.

My fourth hope is to make a cogent case for a sketch of the particular theological view that the purpose of a theological school is to seek to understand God more truly, and that a school's "nature" follows from this "purpose." I consider this to be a material theological proposal. In a discussion of his book Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education, [2 ] Edward Farley once ruefully observed that any essay on the nature and purposes of theological education is inescapably a contribution to utopian literature. This book will be no exception. It will be utopian both in the sense that I make no attempt to explain how we can get from here to there -- how to actualize my proposal - and in the sense that, given human nature and the state of the world, it is probably a quite "unrealistic" proposal. In these ways utopian essays are "useless.' However, at its best a utopian essay provides both unusual distance from the world as it is and a view of the world from an unusual angle. It sketches its city -- or, in this case, its crossroads hamlet -- in ideal terms with ironic intent. Despite its straight face, it is not so much a proposal seriously to be believed to be the best of all possible practical arrangements as it is a critique of present arrangements that is pointed enough to provoke significant conversation. A manifesto is flatfooted advocacy of a blueprint for reform; it's the irony that makes a proposal utopian. I hope for this book to be useful precisely because it is ironically utopian.

My ways of realizing these two hopes will be deeply intertwined in this book. Formal suggestions are terribly abstract. Without some illustrative material it is often very difficult to grasp and hang on to the point of the suggestion. Accordingly, the way I develop my own theological sketch of the idea of a theological school and the way I argue for it in preference to alternative theological views is meant as a series of illustrations of some suggestions about fruitful ways in which to pose these issues. Of course, I hope to persuade you that my material theological view of the theological school is the most compelling one. If I fail to do so, however, I hope that by that very failure I will have commended to you the fruitfulness of my suggestions about how to pose some of the central issues. The two are quite distinct hopes.

My final hope for this book is to bring into the center of the conversation the importance of the public and concrete character of theological education and the importance of attending to all the factors that make for that concreteness. It is for that reason that I propose to shift the name of the topic from "theological education" to "the theological school." "Education" is a very abstract term. It is used to designate a process. But the educational process always takes place in some particular institutional setting located in a particular socio-economic context, has a particular ethos of its own that amounts to a "culture" open to ethnographic study, has its own structure of power, is offered by a particular group of faculty members themselves socialized in various ways as academic professionals, and is undergone by a particular student body. The phrase "theological education" misleadingly invites us to consider our topic in abstraction from much or all of that. In ordinary English, the word "school' seems more readily to connote the concrete institutional dimensions of the enterprise than does "education." I hope to make the case that it is theologically necessary to attend to the concreteness of theological education. A genuinely theological answer to the question "what is theological about theological education?" will keep these sociological, political, and economic dimensions of the enterprise at the center of the discussion.

What have we got into?

The most obvious characteristic of the world of theological schools is the enormous diversity among its citizens. It is a deeply pluralistic world. Oddly, much discussion of what is theological about theological education ignores the diversity among theological schools. It may well be that theological education, if it deserves the name, is a process whose governing purposes are the same in all theological schools. It is also true, however, that the process never takes place in the abstract. It always takes place in some concrete location, in some particular school whose unique identity is rooted in its history, in some tradition of piety and theology, in its local culture, its ways of being financed, its ways of governing itself, its relations to a denomination, and its relation to the academic disciplines' "guilds."

The relation of this concrete location of education to the process of education is not like the relation of a husk to a kernel of wheat. It should not be assumed, for example, that the differences between theological education at Denver Seminary and at Harvard Divinity School are merely marked variations on "essentially" the same process simply because they are both genuinely places of theological education. "Theological school" should not be contrasted to "theological education" as "container" and "contained." Because the two interpenetrate so deeply, conceptual contrasts like "form/content" and "structure/ content" are not helpful in trying to understand theologically the nature and purpose of theological schools.

The diversity among theological schools is partly rooted in differences among their deepest theological commitments and it is partly rooted in historical and sociocultural factors. I shall argue that any theological "idea" of a theological school must take the "non- theological" factors shaping a school as seriously as it takes the "truly" theological issues. This is my first formal suggestion about the most helpful way to pose questions covering theological education: Keep reflection tied to concrete social reality by keeping the concrete particularities of theological schools central to the discussion. To that end it will be useful to sketch the "location" of theological schools on the map of North American academic and religious institutions.

For purposes of this book we shall identify the world of theological schools in North America as all accredited graduate schools of theology in the United States and Canada. That is, we shall identify the boundaries of the world of theological schools with the membership of the Association of Theological Schools. Admittedly, this is somewhat arbitrary. There are many schools that are not members of the ATS calling themselves "theological schools" or "seminaries" that train leaders for churches. However, it can be justified as the least problematic way of tracing the boundaries of the world of theological schools. The Association of Theological Schools is an agency that accredits Protestant and Roman Catholic theological schools in Canada and the United States. Its criteria for accreditation give us the most formal description of what all these schools have in common. Among those standards, for example, is the requirement that usually degree recipients from accredited undergraduate colleges and universities may be admitted as students: thus theological schools are "graduate" schools. Despite the extreme pluralism marking this world, all 179 of the association's accredited member schools (as of 1990) have in common that they have met ATS standards. (In addition to its accredited members, the ATS in 1990 included eight "Candidate" schools involved in the two-year process of accreditation, and eighteen nonaccredited "Associate" members, for a total membership of 205 schools.)

If a theological sketch of the idea of a theological school is a utopian exercise, the community it describes is less an ideal city than a crossroads hamlet with an overwhelmingly white male population. In the larger world of academic institutions, theological schools are lilliputian. Twenty years ago Warren Deem, a professional consultant to the ATS, remarked that "the average Protestant seminary today -- with its 15 faculty and 170 students -- has resources which are more analogous to a neighborhood primary school than to a modern graduate professional institution. [3]

Modest changes in the relative statistics during the past twenty years have not undercut the force of the analogy. In 1989, enrollment in the M.A. and M.Div. programs of 202 reporting theological schools averaged 278 students per school if one simply did a head count of students (or 188 if one calculated on the basis of "full-time equivalence" [FTE], and they averaged a faculty of 17 full-time faculty members per school (on an FTE basis.)[4] About 46 percent of the students were enrolled in M.Div. degree programs requiring three or more years and designed to prepare persons for ordained leadership roles in the churches. Almost 37 percent of the total student population were enrolled in one- and two-year master's programs (M.A.R., M.R.E., M.T.S.)[5] or in nondegree certificate programs. The rest were enrolled in other, more advanced degree programs.

On average, they are still overwhelmingly white and male communities. As of 1989, there were more than twice as many men as women in M.Div. programs.[6] African American students, men and women combined, amounted to less than 7.3 percent of the total student population.[7] In size, theological schools are still more like primary schools in white neighborhoods that discourage the education of women than they are like modern graduate professional institutions in an open and pluralistic society.

Within this world of hamlets there is nonetheless a good deal of variety. For one thing, despite their small size on average, there is a great range of size among theological schools. Moreover, there has been a twenty-year trend toward relatively larger student bodies. In 1989 there were twenty-nine schools with fifty or fewer students. The smallest had a student body of eight. At the other end of the spectrum there were three schools with student bodies of a thousand or more in 1989. The largest reported 3814 students.[8] For another thing, there has been a steady drop in the number of students engaged in theological education full-time. Only a little more than two-thirds of the total enrollment of theological schools (68 percent) were full-time students in 1986 (the last year for which this figure was available); by contrast, well over three-quarters (78 percent) were full-time in 1978.

The financial resources of these academic hamlets are as relatively small as are their populations.[9] Theological schools accredited in the United States by the ATS in 1988-89 averaged expenses of $15,226 per FTE student out of average revenues of $15,560 per student. Almost a third of all expenditures (32.1 percent) went on average to pay instructional costs. Another 20.4 percent was spent on administrative costs and 6.2 percent for library expenses. On average only 9.5 percent of total expenses was reported devoted to the costs of operation and maintenance of the schools' plants.

The greatest part of revenues (36 percent) came on average from annual gifts and grants from religious organizations, individuals, and government contracts. This is "soft" money that cannot be relied on to repeat itself yearly. On average, roughly a quarter of the revenue (24 percent) came from student tuition (excluding tuition covered by financial aid) and another fifth (20.5 percent) from endowment funds. Only the latter is relatively "hard" money, a source of income providing a reliable basis for long-range planning.

It is important to note that none of these figures, whether for expenditures or for revenues, covers what the ATS calls "auxiliary enterprises," food, housing, books, and so forth (12.4 percent). This area is a net drain on theological schools. Between 1983-84 and 1985-86 theological schools reported that their deficits in auxiliary enterprise expenditures grew on average by 73 percent. [10] Presumably much of the apparent surplus of revenue over expenditures went to cover this deficit.

Within this financially constrained world there is nonetheless a striking variation of revenue and expenditure per student from one denomination to another. In 1987, the last year for which these figures are available, the continuum ranged from revenues of $15,727 and expenditures of $14,501 per student in schools affiliated with the Protestant Episcopal Church to revenues of $3,950 and expenditures of $3,536 per student in schools affiliated with the Southern Baptist Convention. In the same period Roman Catholic theological schools reported average revenues of $9,137 and average expenditures of $8,613 per student; nondenominational and interdenominational schools reported average revenues of $5,664 and expenditures of $5,673 per student.[11]

Clearly, the average theological school is not awash in funds available for discretionary spending, for covering the start-up costs of major new academic "experiments," for providing new student services, or even for providing adequate support services for administration and faculty. Nor has the average school likely sources in industry, government, or organized religion to which it can turn for major grants to fund such projects - or even to fund research with a high enough surcharge for "administrative costs" to help release other funds for innovative projects. Financially, the average theological school is like a primary school in a small town with a very limited tax base that is not likely to grow much in the foreseeable future.

In the cosmos of higher education, theological schools are in other respects like crossroads hamlets. Their small scale invites certain kinds of expectations. Clear recognition of their small size, however, imposes important reality checks on just those expectations. Compared to theological schools, most institutions of higher education in the United States and Canada seem to range in size from large to gigantic societies. After several years spent earning a degree in such contexts one understandably comes to yearn for an educational experience in a more intimate community, not just advanced seminar by advanced seminar, but as a total academic environment. A theological school's relatively small size fosters the expectation that it might provide just that kind of setting for learning. Moreover, the religious needs and commitments that often interest people in theological school tend to place a high value on experiences of "community." Again, the school's small site encourages the expectation that sharing the common life of a theological school ought to provide just such experience. Furthermore, when one begins to see ways in which the theological school one has entered might be improved, its relatively small size can invite the thought that, compared to much more massive institutions, it ought to be relatively easy to change.

Further reflection suggests, however, that it is precisely the smallness of theological schools which requires that such expectations be checked for realism. This does not mean that we should abandon such expectations. It means, rather, that expectations should be kept concrete. That is, they should be carefully nuanced so that they are expectations of these schools in their concrete particularity. "Smallness" is an abstraction; it is theological schools that are (relatively) small. For one thing, as we have seen, they are very limited financially. Hence, one's picture of an ideally intimate community as the context for teaming must involve a 'smallness' a theological school can afford. The picture's implications regarding ratio of students to instructors or to supervisors, its implications regarding support services for students personally, support services for students' work in the library or in the "field," for housing arrangements, and so forth, must be manageable in a financial setting with few discretionary funds. If realization of the picture requires changes in the school's faculty or overall deployment of resources, there may need to be changes that can be introduced incrementally. Most school budgets do not allow for massive start-up costs for new programs. For another thing, as we have seen, the average theological school is not a very pluralistic hamlet. It includes far fewer women and people of color than does American Christianity at large. That is another feature of the present concrete reality of theological schools. The absence of internal pluralism in a theological school can significantly inhibit change. That is especially true if the changes one has in view are responses to perceived theological and cultural pluralism within the churches, or responses to religious and cultural pluralism in the host cultures into which the churches are sent in mission. If pluralism outside the theological school is not reflected inside it, the school as a community may itself be too invested in institutional patterns appropriate to a less pluralistic church and world to be easily changeable . Small, intimate but homogeneous villages are not necessarily easier to change than large, pluralistic, and impersonal cities.

Grumbling

The citizens of these crossroads hamlets grumble. It is not too much to say, that they complain vigorously about their common lot sometimes loudly. About what, specifically? It depends a bit on one's role and status in the hamlet.

Anyone who has lived for a time in student dormitories or apartment buildings or has eaten in their dining halls can recall endless student complaints about the theological school's curriculum. The complaint may be that the curriculum is too "academic" and insufficiently 'Professional"; too "theoretical" and insufficiently "practical"; or, conversely, that it is too single-mindedly focused on producing 'Professional ministers" in a certain model and too inflexible to allow individual students to pursue their own intellectual interests; and, above all, that the curriculum consists of too many small pieces of information that are not adequately "integrated," that it provides not so much a course of study as -- in H. Richard Niebuhr's wonderfully wry phrase - "a series of studious jumps in various directions."[12] One will also recall equally frequent complaints about the lack of "real community" within the theological school. Increasingly during the past two decades one could also have heard complaints that there are insufficient numbers of women and persons of color within the student body and faculty, that the school is insufficiently "pluralistic."

If one had spent time with faculty at coffee hour or lunch or weekend socializing, one might have heard these complaints and, in addition, grumbles of a different sort: that the teaching load is so large as to leave no time for research and writing; that local church and denominational demands on faculty leave insufficient time to keep up with new literature in the field, let alone contribute to it; that committee responsibilities cut inappropriately into time required for academic matters, that responsibilities to provide pastoral care and spiritual direction to students erode time needed to prepare for teaching and to contribute to scholarship;[13] that sabbatical leave policies are nonexistent or inadequate to help resolve these conflicting demands on faculty time. Faculty characteristically complain about inadequate resources as well, inadequate library resources, inadequate secretarial and other "support" services, too little power in the school's governance structure to help shape the context of their work, and the like.

Administrators grumble about these same matters and in addition have complaints peculiar to their roles. A recent survey, whose confidentiality was guaranteed, asked deans of Protestant and Roman Catholic theological schools belonging to the Association of Theological Schools what the major problems or issues are that their schools face. [14]Their responses included familiar problems: the need for curricular reform to integrate "theoretical" and "practical" sides of ministerial education more adequately, or to make the course of study more truly "professional"; the need to make theological schooling more adequate to ecumenical and global "pluralism"; the need to improve the quality of theological school teaching; the need to make theological schooling more truly a "spiritual formation." Their answers, however, included another range of problems rooted in administrators' specific roles and responsibilities. As one respondent wrote, 'I need basic help [regarding]: Board governance and development, administrative structuring, and dealing with a diverse student body. . . ." The complaints from this quarter are that theological schools have been badly organized, inadequately managed, insufficiently prepared to raise needed funds; they face a shrinking pool of candidates for admission and an ever smaller pool of appropriately prepared future faculty members. Newly appointed administrators complain of being inadequately supported by their own schools to deal with this legacy. Genuinely basic help would be help that addresses this sort of problem. At this point administrators' grumbles even extend to the recent literature addressed (like this book) to basic issues in theological schooling. "Too often," one respondent wrote, the literature "fails to move beyond the hermeneutics of the issue or problem, leaving the person who must 'do something with the problem' frustrated!"

Clearly, there are certain problems in theological schooling today that keep reappearing in this grumbling. They have to do, notably, with

  • The goal of theological schooling -- how to prepare genuinely "professional" church leaders, or how to "form" future church leaders "spiritually";
  • The curriculum of theological schooling -- how to integrate the "theoretical" and the "practical" sides of the curriculum, or how to overcome the fragmentation of the curriculum;
  • The adequacy of theological schooling to its social and cultural context -- how to make it adequate to the pluralism of its immediate and worldwide settings, or how to "globalize" it, or how to make it "inclusive";
  • The human resources of theological schooling -- how to cope with the apparently shrinking national pool of candidates for admission, or how to find appropriately prepared younger faculty;
  • The financial resources of theological schooling -- how to be most effective at "development";
  • The governance of theological schooling -- how most effectively to provide leadership in a theological school, or how most effectively to engage a board of trustees in the enterprise, or how most fruitfully to involve faculty in governance of a school.

These are all crucial problems confronting theological schools today. For some schools they are critical. The survival of some schools depends on the solution of one or more of these problems in the near future. More broadly speaking, the future of all theological schools obviously depends on the ways they solve these and other such problems. Indeed, they are often cited as cumulative evidence that theological schooling is, as such, in a state of crisis today.

Note, however, that grumbling in theological schools gives expression to another type of issue that cuts across these problems. It is not accidental that the grumbles listed above can all be formulated in the "how to" form. They are all problems in the strict sense that at least in principle they admit of solutions. Of course, in many concrete cases circumstances may be such that they cannot be solved in actuality. The needed resources imagination, or skill may simply not be available. Nevertheless they invite a problem-solving approach. In many theological schools it is urgent that the problems be addressed. If they aren't the schools' futures will be seriously compromised. Grumbles about theological schooling expressed as problems calling for solutions must not be denigrated as though they were a relatively superficial nuts-and-bolts approach to challenges faced by theological schooling. They signal real difficulties, and deep ones.

However, complaints about theological schooling can give rise to another kind of question. Indeed, many of the expressions of theological school grumbling as "problems' to be "solved" also give indirect expression to this second type of question. This second type of question raises issues, notably:

  • Should we think of the goal of theological schooling as the preparing of "professional" church leadership; if not, how should we characterize its goal;
  • Should we organize our thinking about theological schooling by using such contrast terms as "theoretical/practical," "academic/ professional," "head/heart'; if not, how should we think of it;
  • Should we think of theological diversity as a "pluralism" or as a "variety," or think of ethnic, racial, sexual, and class diversity as "pluralism" or as "variety;
  • Should we think of theological schooling as "character formation" or "spiritual formation" or "personal formation" or "intellectual formation"; and if more than one of these, how are we to understand their interrelation?

It is not accidental that grumbles about theological schooling are expressed here in questions taking a "should we" form. They raise conceptual issues. They do not pose a problem; rather, they challenge the very terms in which conventional wisdom has posed the problems. They do not solicit workable "solutions'; rather, they solicit conceptual "resolution" of basic conceptual disagreements about how best to describe theological schools' (problematic) reality. They arise at the point of conflict between differing perspectives on the nature and purpose of theological schooling and force the basic issue: "What's this enterprise all about, anyway?" "What's theological about a theological school?"

This book addresses grumbles about theological schooling insofar as they are expressed in the second, the "should we," form. That in no way, discounts the importance, nor minimizes the urgency, of grumbles expressed in the "how to" form. At least partial remedies, it should be noted, are available for some of the "how to" complaints. Some graduate business schools offer summer institutes for academic administrators. Workshops are available to help boards of trustees and their presidents clarify their goals and responsibilities. Institutes are available to assist theological schools to develop more effective "development offices." Moreover, many of the "how to" problems can only be solved in ways unique to a particular school's concrete situation; generalized advice and abstract recommendations are of little use. By focusing on issues in the "should we" form, this book, like a number of other recent studies of theological schooling, raises questions that must be asked constantly while we are attempting to solve the real problems of any particular theological school. It challenges conventional wisdom about how most helpfully to describe what the problems are. It asks whether some of the most widely perceived problems in theological schooling are not in fact made more obscure and intractable simply because of the concepts we conventionally employ to pose them in the first place. This book urges that it is of utmost importance to think critically about how we are thinking about theological schooling precisely while we are in the midst of the process of "doing something with the problems" that most certainly do threaten theological schooling.

The first step in that direction is to get clearer about the types of factors that make each theological school the concrete reality it is. That involves clarifying where our theological school hamlets have been located by history and how very diverse these locations are. The next chapter offers a sketch of those matters.

Notes

[1] Cf. David H. Kelsey and Barbara G. Wheeler, "Mind-Reading: Notes on the Basic Issues Program," Theological Education (Spring 1984), pp. 8-14. Representative articles generated by this discussion have appeared frequently in Theological Education since 1983, notably in the issues for Autumn 1983; Spring 1984; Spring 1985; Supplement, 1987; and Supplements I and II, 1988.

[2] Edward Farley, Theologia: The Fragmentation and Unity of Theological Education (Philadelphia: Fortress Press, 1983).

[3]Warren Deem, Theological Education in the 1970's: A report of the Resources Planning Commission (Dayton, Ohio: ATS, 1968), p.779.

[4]Gail Buchwalter King, ed., ATS Fact Book on Theological Education for the Academic Years 1988~9 and 1989-90 (Pittsburgh: ATS, 1990), pp.4-10,25,26, tables 1.01, 2.04, and 2.04b.

[5]Ibid., p.25, table 2.04a.

[6]Ibid., p.36.

[7]Ibid.

[8]Ibid., p.14, tab1e 1.04a; and pp.4-10, table 1.01.

[9]See ibid., pp. 8~91, for documentation of this paragraph and the next.

ml figures used are the most recent audited figures available at the time of writing. The figures are calculated on a "per head" basis.

[10]It grew from $60 per FTE in 1983-84 to $104 per FTE in 1985-86; cf. ibid..; cf. William L. Baumgaertner, ed., ATS Fact Book (Vandalia, Ohio:ATS, 1987), p.47.

[11]Baumgaertner, ed.,ATS Fact Book (1987), pp. 132, 142.

[12]H. Richard Niebuhr et al., The Purpose of the Church and Its Ministry (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1956), p. viii.)

[13]For an account of the severity of this particular time bind in Roman theological schools, see Robert J. Wister, 'The Teaching of Theology I9501990: The American Catholic Experience,"America (Feb. 3, 1990), pp 90-91.

[14]The survey was conducted in 1989 by Auburn Theological Seminary as part of research leading to an evaluation of a variety of projects in theological education sponsored by the Lilly Endowment.

Chapter 6: Provocations

Introduction

This is a working document. Its purpose is to help pastors and church leaders articulate contextualized pastoral strategies for responding to the challenges presented by this particular moment in Latin American history. No solutions are offered, just stories, questions, and a few tentative clues.

You will need to ponder and assemble these disjointed pieces to see if they respond to your particular situation. But the puzzle will remain unsolved unless you add the pieces unique to your particular context.

This is a biased reflection. It gives special attention to reality as it is experienced by the excluded majorities in our countries. If your pastoral call is to other sectors of society, this document maybe of little use to you.

Before I forget, let me ask a favor of you. If this document (or the others included in this collection) provokes you to put some thoughts down on paper, send them along to us. (You'll find the address at the beginning of the book). We'll do our best to circulate your comments.

Pieces of Evidence:

Helpless

A few weeks ago, Leonardo died. At 35 years of age, his liver could no longer resist the ravages of alcohol. He left a wife and four children. Leonardo and his family, Kaqchikel Mayas, had left their village 30 years ago to seek their fortune in the city. They built a shack on the periphery of the city. Leonardo became an ironworker.

When he went on a binge, Leonardo would beg for money to pay for his next drink. His family would find him collapsed on the street in a drunken stupor. They would take him home, but he would leave again, helpless before alcohol's fury.

Leonardo was a timid person. He was not a violent drunk. He did not beat his wife and children. Rather, he seemed perplexed, sad, silenced before his inner demons.

He had tried many times to control his alcoholism. He had tried attending Alcoholics Anonymous. He had gone to the meetings of the Catholic charismatic renewal. He had asked a Pentecostal pastor to pray for him. He had joined the church choir. But the fury always returned, the fury rose up within him, and he was helpless before its power.

Have you met Leonardo?

Luz María Coto, a Salvadoran pastor, shares this testimony:

Three years ago, when Consuelo was five months pregnant, she decided to tell her father and mother that she was expecting. Her father has not spoken to her since. She had to go to live with a friend of her mother. The father of her little girl never helped her in any way. After Gabriela was born, she had to abandon her studies and go to work.

Looking for a companion for herself and a father for Gabriela, Consuelo became pregnant again. It was the same story. The father abandoned her as soon as Marta was born. She gave up her search for a companion and confronted life alone with her daughters. She has raised them by herself and has been an example to them of what a woman can do, even without a life companion. Both girls study while she works.[1]

Have you met Consuelo and her daughters?

David Stoll, American anthropologist, relates what he has observed in El Quiché, Guatemala:

By the late 1980s... the town's youth were no longer following their older siblings and parents into the churches. Many of the earlier generation of converts had left (Sacapulas) to pursue careers in the capital, leaving the town's congregations smaller than before. When I quoted the 1984 health census, that 33 percent of the family heads in town were evangelical, a disappointed pastor replied: "The majority of this town may have passed through the evangelical church, but where are they?" The ambience had changed, another leader explained. Through cable television, youth were becoming absorbed in worldliness and drugs. Jesus Christ had been very popular with the teenagers of this town in the 1970s; now their successors were more interested in rock music and videos. They were being converted to consumer capitalism as represented by the town's new satellite dish. Where Protestantism still boomed was on the dry, scrubby ridges above town, in hard-scrabble aldeas that clustered around government schools and Church of God chapels. Here, evangelical leaders claimed, their members were outnumbering Catholics.

Already in Nebaj, a second generation was emerging in the evangelical churches, of adolescents who were more interested in acquiring sunglasses than imitating their parents. According to one such youth, who was already "fallen" due to drinking, Protestant as well as Catholic youth engaged in the same kind of behavior because of the influence of their friends. The more prosperous households were acquiring televisions and, by 1992, there were three video parlors on the plaza specializing in Rambo-style violence. Young Ixils were being bombarded with images of sex, status, speed and mobility. Like so many millions of other Latin American youth, they were being taught to imitate urban consumption patterns far beyond any visible means of attainment.[2]

Have you met the young people from Nebaj and Sacapulas?

Xavier Gorostiaga, a Jesuit economist, shares alarming data

...When the world was largely rural, a social fabric protected the poor. But today's urban poor are isolated, alone, without community . . . This process of marginalization is filled with contradictions. The free-market economic system pushes people out of rural areas because it promotes only the export-led growth of powerful agro-industry. Urban migration has created cities of 20 million that are unlivable: Mexico City, Rio de Janeiro, Calcutta, Shanghai, and Cairo. In these cities, people arm themselves because crime and insecurity create a permanent war among the citizenry. In the United States alone, there are 200 million guns in the hands of private citizens. Just think. They try to defend themselves from a product that their own society has created.

. . .Most sadly (we have created) a civilization of hopelessness. And, where there is no hope there is no life . . . As the possibility for hope is slaughtered, what remains is mere escapism where people seek consolation in things like drugs. According to a declaration of 132 nations that met in Naples,Italy in November, 1994, the yearly global expenditure on drugs, prostitution and arms totals $732 billion, a sum equal to 40 percent of the per capita income of humanity.[3]

Do you find your region reflected in the data cited by Gorostiaga?



I Know Her

Up at dawn.

Life is numbness, noise, being pushed, pushing back, going through the

motions.

Do we have water today? No, no water.

What about breakfast? Just enough for the kids. You know how it is-- as a woman, I'll get by.

Do we have electricity? Yes,for the moment.

She turns on the radio. Country music.

For a moment, she identifies with the woman's musical lament.

Life is numbness, noise, being pushed, pushing back, going through the motions.

Going to work. An hour and a half in buses. Exhaust fumes, crush of

people.

When it rains, mud. When it doesn't, dust.

Careful with those guys at the corner! Are they thieves?

Here come the cops.

Are my papers in order? if not, they'll hit me for a bribe.

Got to hurry! if I'm late, I'm fired!

Going home. Another ninety minutes.

She arrives exhausted.

And the kids?

(Her mother stays with them all day).

Not sick, are they?

Fix some food. And do some wash if there is water.

There's a meeting at church. Does she want to go?

They want to form a committee to demand

clean water and a health clinic.

She's not up for a meeting tonight.

Maybe tomorrow.

Tonight, just switch on the tube and catch a soap.

Just as she settles down, she hears noise from the neighbors. He's drunk again.

Their boom box is shaking the walls. No rest tonight,

but tomorrow, up at dawn.

She begins to think.

Think? Maybe think is too strong a term.

Life is numbness, noise, being pushed, pushing back, going through the motions.

Think.

The reflection of what once would have passed for thought -

A moment of nostalgia.

Who can she count on when push comes to shove?

The neighbors? Sometimes, when they're not drunk.

The father of her children? No way! Cost me an arm and a leg to get rid of

that jerk.


People from back home? Sometimes. But here in the city nobody stays in

touch anymore.

The family? Yeah, sure, my family. Most of the time.

The church? I think so. I'm not sure. Sometimes they're all talk.

God?

Yes, God. God has not abandoned us.

We still have someplace to live. We're not on the street.

We have life. Today the kids are well. . .



But all around me, nothing seems to make sense anymore. .

so many things I just don't understand
...



She goes back to watching TV...

The Emptiness Within

A group of us were meeting, pastoralists from several Latin American countries. The task for the morning was to identify the religious feelings of people we work with, especially among the excluded majority.

A spiritual laundry list for our time:

We yearn to feel that we belong to a community.

We long for meaning in our lives. Noteworthy are those preachers who offer people the discipline they need to survive the current social and economic crisis. Noteworthy are those who claim they have the authority to conquer alcoholism, dishonesty, domestic violence.

Violence and aggressiveness dominate interpersonal relationships.

We feel exhausted, harried, empty, pushed to the limit.

In our hearts, we long for tenderness and affection.

We yearn for joy, for celebration.

Maybe we don't know how to express it. But somehow, we yearn for a personal experience with God. We long to abandon ourselves in God and savor the mystery of God's absolute otherness. We yearn to become channels of divine grace.

In the cities many want to "consume religious goods," but without losing their anonymity, without risking discovery.

People are fed up with religious institutions and with the organized religion industry.

More evidence:

Slipping Out the Back Door

In 1988 a Costa Rican evangelical businessman became concerned by the claims of local preachers that a quarter of the population had become Protestant. He consulted with a respected local public opinion firm and they decided to study the religious preferences of Costa Ricans. The study was carried out in July, 1989. They interviewed 1,276 adults. They discovered that:

8.9 percent of those interviewed identified themselves as Protestants. (The word we use in Central America is evangélicos).

81.7 percent of those interviewed identified themselves as Roman Catholics.

72.8 percent of the Protestants were born into Roman Catholic homes.

Besides the 8.9 percent who identified themselves as Protestants, an additional 8.1 percent admitted to having been Protestants at some time in the past. This represents a desertion rate of 91 per-cent.

Of this 8.1 percent of those surveyed who abandoned Protestantism, 62 percent returned to the Roman Catholic church, 1 percent became Jewish, 6 percent became Jehovah's Witnesses or Mormons, and 31 percent ceased to profess religious belief.

Let me run that by you again. Of the 8.1 percent of Costa Rican adults who abandoned evangelical churches (the author of the study calculates that we are talking about approximately 42,500 people), 31% ceased to profess religious belief.[4]

It's the Real Thing

Kristian Führer is the pastor of Nikolai Church in Leipzig, Germany. His church played a key role in the movement that brought down the Berlin Wall. In the autumn of 1989, despite the threats of the secret police, 200,000 people came to Monday night prayer meetings at Nikolai Church. Last year an American journalist asked Führer if it was tougher keeping their spiritual life alive now that they formed part of the capitalist world. His reply:

For 40 years we had in the East the experience of theoretical materialism, and atheism. In the past two years we are confronted with something new --actual materialism. Materialism used to be a theory; in this integration with the West, it is a fact... Before and during 1989 there was a genuine spirit, a true reform light, and our church was filled by no other means than word of mouth... But today, even if we put out 1,000 posters, we would not get so many.[5]

The All-Consuming Gospel

It's not as if there were a dearth of religious options out there. They're everywhere! And not all the religious options come in the guise of churches. Take televison, for example. TV's gospel is called the consumer society. Human worth, preaches television, is measured by the "exclusiveness" of the products that one consumes. Those assured of salvation by this gospel are the young, the beautiful, and the successful. (Don't be surprised if most of them also happen to be white!) Everyone else must scramble to buy a bit of salvation (and identity) by collecting some of the crumbs that fall from this exclusive table: a pair of Nike tennis shoes, a Sony Walkman, Calvin Klein jeans, or whatever the commercial badges of the moment might be.

The pure and undefiled religion of the consumer society is beyond the reach of the great unwashed multitudes. All that it offers to the excluded are carefully measured and mediated dreams and expectations. Television suggests to the excluded concrete ways for dealing with the frustration produced by their exclusion. First, violence. Armchair Rambos frequently live out their TV-generated fantasies by beating up on the women closest to them. Second, sex. Television tells us that ultimate human meaning can be found in the mechanized, mindless practice of the sexual act. Sex, of course, is closely related to violence in televisionland. Again, women are usually the objects, not the subjects, of the sexual act.

Don't be surprised to find that some of the new religious movements have quite successfully adapted themselves to the gospel of the consumer society. Since Constantine, churches have always had to define themselves in relation to the gospels preached by those in power. Some remain faithful to the Gospel of Jesus Christ; others go with the flow.

Today, for example, the theologians of the consuming gospel explain that God wants us all to be healthy and wealthy. What about the poor and the sick? Simple! Either they lack faith or are living in sin. But this all- consuming gospel grants them the authority to grab God by the throat and DEMAND material blessing. Your God isn't big enough to give you a new car? Try mine! The result? The excluded continue to be excluded for having committed the gravest of all sins: having been excluded in the first place!

Where do we go from here?

Back to that meeting of Latin American pastoralists.

We ended our time together by compiling another laundry list. Why? Its our way of encouraging you to rethink your pastoral strategies and, if necessary, to provoke you to design strategies that are appropriate to your particular context, strategies that respond to this particular moment in history:

Christian churches have lost our monopoly over the institutionalization of spirituality in Latin America. Every day less of the spirituality experessed by average folks is channeled through the churches. The range of alternatives is enormous: from Umbanda to New Age, from the consumer gospel to ancient Mayan spirituality. Our churches must abandon our historic triumphalism and assume our minoirty position with dignity. Furthermore, without abandoning our principles, we must learn to establish relationships of mutual respect with both ancient and new spiritualities that proclaim values not wholly alien to the Reign of God.

Faced with our minority status, historic churches, both Roman Catholic and Protestant, can no longer afford to dismiss Pentecostals as the enemy. We must learn to be allies.

Our common identity with other Christians grows out of our common faith in Jesus of Nazareth. This is sufficient. Enough of competition! Enough of numbers! Enough of our self-promoting arrogance! The time has come to set aside our sectarianism and live out the Gospel. Together! (We always suspected as much. These are the values we have celebrated in the lives of so many of our local saints. "Therefore, since we are surrounded by so great a cloud of witnesses, let us lay aside every weight, and sin which clings so closely, and let us run with perseverance the race that is set before us." Hebrews12:1).

We urgently need to design pastoral strategies (and even select the times for our meetings and worship services) according to the needs of that great mass of excluded people who form part of non-traditional families: single mothers, families divided by divorce, grandmothers who raise their grandchildren, widows, orphans, street children, etc. We must accept the fact that women are the protagonists in many Latin American families. Women take the initiative in creating and defending family spaces. Women administer the family budget. Women take the initiative in promoting gospel values and celebrating God's presence in the home. At the same time, we need to hold up responsible male role models that break with machismo, insensitivity and violence.

We need to rescue a spirit of celebration and not get lost in rationalism. We need to develop contextualized, coherent and celebrative liturgies, balancing form and content. This will grow out of a permanent conversation between Pentecostal and historic churches. It is not enough to pentecostalize the liturgies of the historic churches.

Kleptocracies. Narcocracies. "Formal" democracies (that is, governments where the army and the economic elites have retreated to run things from behind the scenes). These are the political systems that dominate the Latin American landscape. How do we move from corrupt, manipulative and abusive politics to the responsible administration of public resources for the common good? As Christians, we need to articulate an ethic for public servants and a theology of power. As Christians, we need to participate in the decentralization of the functions of the state and strengthen regional and local democratic institutions. When the excluded begin to participate in local boards and commissions, democracy begins to take root.

We are flesh. We are spirit. But we have divorced one from the other. Our human dignity, rooted in our divine parentage, resides in the holistic integration of flesh and spirit. For this reason, aggression against a human being is an aggression against God. But there's more. We also must learn to decipher in our own selves the constant conversation between body and spirit. And how to we comprehend the closely-related mystery of our sexuality? Or the mystery of our spiritual yearning? Or the enormous impact that these yearnings have on our physical beings?

The principal source of values, dreams and expectations in our world is the communication media, especially television. At this point in history, any serious Christian Education program must include media literacy: criteria and methodologies that facilitate a critical perception of media messages.

Preaching is in crisis. We must train our preachers to preach simple, creative, prophetic, humane, tender, contextualized sermons. ï

Many people slip out the back door of the neo-Pentecostal churches feeling deceived, defrauded, damaged. But the same thing happens in many historic and Pentecostal churches. We must humbly ask ourselves if we are prepared to provide caring communities, communities of integrity, for some of the many people who have become fed up with organized religion.

We need to review our theologies in light of our increasingly pluralistic world. What contribution can the Christian faith make to humankind's common reflection on the human condition at this moment in history? In this process, the members of our churches must learn to articulate their own beliefs, not so that they can proselytize more effectively, but so that their living faith becomes a useful tool in building the common good.

 

ENDNOTES:

[1] "New Ways of Being Family: Testimonies from Guatemala" by Luz María Coro de Peña in Latin American Pastoral Issues, Year XVIII, 1994. CELEP, Guatemala. p. 19.

[2] David Stoll Between Two Armies in the Ixil Towns of Guatemala. Columbia University Press, New York. 1993. pp. 275-6.

[3] "World has become a 'champagne glass.' Globalization will fill it fuller for wealthy few" by Xavier Gorostiaga in National Catholic Reporter. 27 Jan 95. Kansas City, MO, p.9.

[4] "La crisis evangélica costarricense en cifras," by Juan Kessler. Mimeographed paper, fourth revision, Aug., 1989.

[5] "We Lost Our Fear and Went Onto the Street" Robert Marquand interview of Kristian Führer

in the Christian Science Monitor, Aug. 19-25, 1994.

Chapter 5: Between Pentecostalism and the Crisis of Denominationalism, by Paul Freston

Paul Feston is a graduate in Latin American studies from Cambridge University and received his Ph.D. in sociology from the University of Campinas. He is a researcher and author of numerous books and articles in English and Portuguese in the sociology of religion, among them his doctoral thesis: Protestantes e Política no Brasil: Da Constituinte ao Impeachment. After residing in Brazil for 19 years, Dr. Freston has recently (1996) returned to Cambridge for two years as a visiting professor. This document first appeared in THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, Edited by Benjamin F. Gutierrez & Dennis A. Smith, published in 1996 by PC(USA)WMD AIPRAL/CELEP, pp. 195-211.

Pentecostals and historic Protestants: the global picture

Studies of Protestantism in Latin America generally make a basic distinction between Pentecostals and historic Protestants, the latter being non-Pentecostals in churches of immigrant (Lutheran) or missionary (Congregational, Presbyterian, Methodist or Baptist) origin. The nomenclature makes less and less sense as time goes by; while younger than their historic brethren, the Pentecostals have been installed in Latin America since 1909. At first, the going was hard. Signs of rapid growth in parts of the region (Chile and Brazil) only date from the 1950s. But by the 1980s there was almost generalized growth, as well as a new relationship to public life in a few countries (notably Guatemala, Brazil and Peru). It is now possible to talk of a region-wide phenomenon, "Pentecostalism in Latin America."

The precarious statistics available give an idea of its importance. Protestants (historics and Pentecostals) now constitute about 10% of the Latin American population, or some 45 to 50 million people. Brazil, about 15% Protestant, leads the way in absolute numbers (25 million). Chile, the other long-standing mass Protestantism in the region, is somewhat higher in percentage terms; Guatemala and El Salvador may now be higher still. Pentecostals make up at least 60% of all Latin American Protestants (being a much higher percentage in Chile, and much lower in the Andean countries).

Some comparative data give an idea of the relative importance of Latin American Protestantism. Brazil now has the second largest community of practicing Protestants in the world, behind only the United States. One Brazilian denomination alone (the Assemblies of God) has more members than all the Christian churches in Great Britain put together. Only some peripheral regions of Europe (Scotland, Northern Ireland, Western Norway) have a higher percentage attendance at Protestant churches than Brazil.

Protestant growth rates seem to be accelerating in Brazil and Chile, although they may have peaked in Central America. Not surprisingly, Pentecostalism has now replaced the Catholic Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) as the academically fashionable subject of research in the sociology of Latin American religion. A survey carried out in Greater Rio de Janeiro in 1992 (Fernandes 1992) discovered that an average of one new Protestant church was registered per weekday. The number of Protestant places of worship now exceeds that of Catholics in the city as a whole; in the very poorest districts, the ratio rises to almost seven to one. The survey concludes that Protestantism is an "option of the poor," in a reference to the less successful Catholic "option for the poor." The needier the district, the higher the percentage of Protestants: according to a 1988 survey, nearly 20% in the poorest areas of Greater Rio versus 6% in the rich South Zone.

The Rio survey also found that 61% of Protestant churches are Pentecostal, a percentage which increases daily: 91% of new churches registered are Pentecostal. Of the 52 largest denominations in Greater Rio, 37 are of Brazilian origin, virtually all Pentecostal. We can thus conclude that Protestant (and especially Pentecostal) religion is a national, popular and rapidly growing phenomenon.

Towards a History of Brazilian Pentecostalism

Although the study of this vast Brazilian Pentecostal community has advanced rapidly in recent years, little attention has been paid to its overall historical development. This may betray an unconscious belittling: since the Pentecostals are not historic Protestants, they must have no history worth studying! In fact, they have had a dynamic relationship to Brazilian society and culture in their more than 80 years of existence.

One can characterize the history of the main Brazilian Pentecostal churches in terms of three "waves" of institutional creation (Freston 1994a, 1994b, 1994c and 1995a). The first wave dates from the 1910s, when the Christian Congregation and the Assemblies of God arrived. This wave corresponds to the Pentecostal movement's origin in the Los Angeles revival of 1906 and its rapid international expansion by means of American missionaries in contact with events at home (as in Chile), and the many immigrants in the USA in contact with their homelands (like the Swedes who founded the Brazilian Assemblies of God) and with countrymen elsewhere (such as the Italian who founded the Christian Congregation among Italians in São Paulo). The initial reception, however, was limited.

The second wave corresponds to the beginnings of rapid growth in the 1950s. Urbanization and mass society, especially in São Paulo, facilitated new forms of Pentecostalism. New churches used enterprising methods, galvanizing Pentecostalism's relationship to society. The Foursquare Gospel Church imported a new model from California, the birthplace of modern mass media: the use of circus tents to take the message outside the churches; emphasis on divine healing; a relaxation of behavioral taboos and greater adaptation to the sensitivities of consumer society. But the Foursquare Gospel Church was soon overtaken by an innovative nationalist version, the Evangelical Pentecostal Church "Brazil for Christ," which took the Pentecostal message into secular spaces such as cinemas and stadiums, besides making the first large-scale use of radio and even a short-lived incursion into television.

The third wave started after the authoritarian modernization of the country by the military regime. The now overwhelmingly urban population was feeling the effects of the waning of the "economic miracle," and nowhere more so than in the former capital, Rio de Janeiro, beset by violence and economic decadence. The Universal Church of the Kingdom of God (now the fastest-growing, most politically powerful, and most controversial Protestant church in the country) and similar smaller groups, often referred to as "neo-Pentecostal," once again updated Pentecostalism's relationship to Brazilian society.

The concept of waves emphasizes Pentecostalism's versatility in theology, liturgy and ethics. Although older groups can and do evolve over time, newer ones are freer to innovate, both by adaptation to recent changes in society and culture and by greater boldness in delving into the country's religious tradition in a search for more efficient communication. The latter practice can be regarded positively as "contextualization" or negatively as "syncretism" (a common Protestant accusation against the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God); in any case, the Universal Church's success has a lot to do with its capacity to build effective bridges linking it both to what is most traditional and religious and to what is most modern and secular in Brazilian culture.

Pentecostalism and the Mass Media

Brazil would seem to be the world's second largest producer of evangelical television programs. Several characteristics of its Protestant community help to account for this: the doctrinal emphasis (more favorable to the use of impersonal means of communication than sacramental traditions); the evangelistic imperative; and the impulse towards alternative socialization, creating a range of cultural activities parallel to those of the larger society. Entry into the media is facilitated by the relatively open and market-oriented media system in Brazil, by the high rate of national production of television programs in general, and by the breach between the secular culture industry and the Catholic Church.

Radio still dominates Protestant use of the media in Brazil. Several Pentecostal churches of the second and third waves have made it a central part of their strategy. Other Pentecostal churches and some historic ones have used it moderately. The use of television is more limited but still important. There have been two main experiences of Protestant ownership of channels. The current president of the Brazilian Baptist Convention had a short-lived and unsuccessful experience in the 1980s; and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God has, since 1989, owned the fifth- largest network in the country, "TV Record."

Large-scale Protestant use of television dates from the late 1970s, when the medium already reached the vast majority of the population. In the 1980s, it followed the same course as Brazilian television in general: nationalization of the programs. By the early 1990s, foreign evangelical programs had disappeared. Although Pat Robertson had returned by the mid-1990s, Brazilian evangelical television remained overwhelmingly national. It was also heavily Pentecostal: about three quarters of the 25 or so programs aired weekly in Rio or São Paulo are Pentecostal. Pentecostals alone make more use of television than all the other religions put together. While definitely not the most technically developed segment of national television, the Pentecostals are certainly the poorest sector of the population to produce their own programs.

The contribution of the evangelical mass media to rapid church growth in Brazil is uncertain. In the United States, televangelism is a reflection more than a cause of a large evangelical community. In Brazil, the Protestant media may be somewhat more efficacious evangelistically; but they also, and primarily, have important internal functions, fortifying the self-image of an expanding minority, structuring the Protestant (and especially Pentecostal) field and providing a way into politics.

Pentecostal Politics

Pentecostals were virtually absent from electoral and parliamentary politics until after Brazil's return to democracy in 1985. Since then, several leading Pentecostal churches have elected official candidates to congress. About 40 members of Pentecostal churches have held seats in congress in the last few years. The majority of these have been official candidates of the Assemblies of God and of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. Most Pentecostal and some historic Protestant congressmen have had links with the electronic media, either as presenters of programs or as owners of stations. In the 1994 elections, the federal deputy with by far the largest vote in the state of Rio de Janeiro was the owner of evangelical radio stations. He himself has a very nebulous relationship with the churches (he seems in fact to have invented an ecclesiastical affiliation for himself), but his media power has enabled him to make alliances with many pastors and become famous in the vast Pentecostal community.

Official candidates of Pentecostal churches are typically one or more of the following: men who have achieved prominence in the church as itinerant evangelists, singers, or media presenters; sons and sons-in-law of head pastors; and Pentecostal businessmen who reach accords with their ecclesiastical leaders.

We cannot go into detail here regarding the reasons for the politicization of Pentecostalism in Brazil (see Freston 1993 and 1994d). Suffice it to say that the main beneficiaries of this corporate politics have been the church leaders themselves. The upward social mobility of their families has been furthered, their public status advanced, their ecclesiastical positions strengthened and their projects financed. Unlike the historic churches, with their traditions, middle-class clientele and professional and bureaucratic standards, the Pentecostal field is, by comparison, young, fast-expanding, popular and sectarian. (When in italics, sect/sectarian and denomination always bear their non-pejorative, sociology-of-religion meaning. As an ideal type, denomination signifies a body that sees itself as one among many expressions of the true church. The sect rejects the dominant religion and preaches voluntary affiliation and independence from the state; leadership is established by charismatic criteria, with little or no formal training; the faithful generally come from the lower classes, and are expected to show a high level of group participation and theological consensus; their lives are rigorously controlled by the leaders, who expect separation from the "world." Primitive Christianity was sectarian). Pentecostal pastors often suffer from a double status contradiction: as holders of a de facto power which is not legitimated by sectarian ideology (which tends to be egalitarian and anti-clerical); and as leaders in the church but marginalized by society (Wilson 1959). These contradictions are not new, but they become more acute as Pentecostalism grows. More importantly, it becomes possible to attenuate them. Going into politics, or sending in a relative or protegé, can reduce tensions and help professionalize one's religious field. The public connection helps internal structuring, strengthening positions and organizations. Politics also helps access to the media, another powerful way of establishing leadership in the evangelical world.

Like all sects which are not geographically isolated, Pentecostals oscillate between their own status system and society's. Although "despising the world," they often accept "worldly" opinions about themselves when favorable. That is why many Pentecostal leaders value so highly the freedom of the city and other symbolic honors to their persons and activities. But politics also gives access to more concrete resources which help to structure this vast popular religious field whose rapid expansion is always producing new leaders anxious to strengthen their positions.

Protestant and especially Pentecostal politicians have acquired a reputation for conservatism, moralism, time-serving, and (in some cases) corruption. In all the scandals which have rocked Brazilian politics in recent years, Protestants have been involved: not only politicians but also denominational leaders, charities and organizations claiming to speak in the name of all evangelicals. This political activity, together with the money-raising activities of the newer churches, has badly damaged the public image of the Protestant community.

On the other hand, at the micro level, there has been a more positive re-evaluation of the cultural effects of the Pentecostal phenomenon by sociologists and social analysts. After a phase in which analyses were dominated by former Protestant or liberal Protestant academics who emphasized its alienating character, a new generation of non-Protestant scholars has nuanced the picture. Now, for the anthropologist John Burdick (1993), Pentecostalism's supposed "alienation" is precisely the source of effective changes because it creates transformative communities that break with normal social identities. It therefore has greater appeal than the CEBs for the poorest of the poor, for women, for young people and for blacks. For the anthropologist Elizabeth Brusco (1993), evangelical religion confronts machismo more effectively than feminism does. Despite its patriarchal rhetoric, it resocializes men away from the destructive patterns of machismo and redefines male aspirations to coincide with their wives'. For another anthropologist, Luiz Eduardo Soares (1993), Pentecostalism represents the emergence of a new egalitarian society. In its "aggressive" posture towards popular spiritism, it rejects the complacent tolerance typical of the traditional hierarchical social order. "It is the purified religious language of warring Pentecostalism which is making our modernizing revolution."

Political scientist Aspásia Camargo says that evangelical religion points to the birth of a true civil society in Brazil (Folha de São Paulo, 1/ 27/95). Rubem César Fernandes, a prominent anthropologist of religion, says the evangelicals are currently the movement which speaks of a radical change of life in the most convincing way. In an interview in the main Brazilian news magazine in 1994, an influential leader of Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs) was asked whether there was anything vibrant in the shanties except drug-dealing and violence. The evangelicals, he replied. In modern Rio, they are the alternative to the drug-traffic, the main resistance movement in terms of the forging of identity, values and respect for the force of the community. "It is time we stopped viewing the pastors in jacket and tie who go and preach the Bible in public squares as depoliticized imbeciles" (Veja, 26/10/94). Or as the well-known author of a book on Rio says: "More than the police, the courts, the Catholic Church, the family or the schools, [the evangelicals] are the counterculture to drugs....Who knows, they may be doing beforehand what the Roman church did too late, after the empire had fallen: the conversion of the barbarians" (Ventura). 1994).

The Situation of the Historic Churches in Brazil

Pentecostals are now (1995) probably about two-thirds of all Protestants in Brazil, but this numerical predominance is recent. The only census figures which distinguish between "traditional" (i.e., historic) and "Pentecostal" Protestants are from 1980 (the religious results of the 1991 census are still not available). In that year, historicals (51%) were still just ahead of Pentecostals; due to differences in age structure, the historical advantage (54.4%) was greater among the adult population. An important factor in this was the (largely nominal) Lutheran population in the South, the state of Espirito Santo, and parts of the new agricultural frontier in the North-west. Rondonia is the most Protestant state in the country, being the only case where the two types of Brazilian popular Protestantism (Lutheran and Pentecostal) coincide geographically. Non-immigrant historicals are strongest where Baptists and/or Presbyterians managed to create a weak form of popular Protestantism. Such is the case in the border region between Minas Gerais and Espirito Santo, where many towns were founded by Presbyterians. Even today, the region (due to economic stagnation and the church's educational institutions) is a source of pastoral vocations for the Presbyterian Church of Brazil.

Historic Protestantism in Latin America, says David Martin (1990:230), "provided a vehicle of autonomy and advancement for some sections of the middle class, conspicuously so in Brazil . . .This Protestant seed came with its flowerpot - 'the world view, the ethos and the ideology of the . . . expanding capitalist countries'. . . .The whole Protestant style remained remote from the largely illiterate millions." Sociologically, the historic churches are denominations, with all the usual implications of greater individual freedom, weaker community life, and less ascetic rigor, in comparison with the Pentecostal sects. From the 1960s, Pentecostalizing ("charismatic") schisms arise in all the historic churches. But rather than the descent of the historic churches to the Brazilian masses, these represent the ascent and adaptation of Pentecostal phenomena to new social levels.

Historic Protestantism arrived in Brazil in the mid-nineteenth century, along with other foreign currents such as Kardecist spiritism and Comtist positivism. The latter currents were transformed in Brazil into mystical religions. Protestantism also found its mystical version, Pentecostalism, but only 50 years later and by means of separate institutions. Of all the imported currents of the period, Protestantism was the exception to the rule, in that it was introduced (and, in its initial development, controlled) by foreigners. It could have been different.

Protestantism could have entered Brazil as it had entered Northern Europe, by means of a reformation of the national church. There were Jansenist and royalist tendencies among the clergy favorable to such a move; in the 1830s, several attempts were made in Parliament to separate the Brazilian church from Rome. The first Protestant "project" for Brazil (by American Methodists in the 1830s and 1840s) was a national reformation, in which the political desire for a breach with Rome would be supplemented by a reform of doctrine and practice stimulated by ample distribution of the Scriptures.

A second possibility was that Protestantism would enter Brazil as spiritism and positivism did: in the "baggage" of Brazilians returning from abroad who would then spread it autonomously. The problem was that intellectual contacts were much stronger with France than with the Protestant countries. A third possibility was that missionaries would limit themselves to founding autonomous congregations of new converts. The first Brazilian ordained to the Protestant (Presbyterian) ministry, the former priest, José Manoel da Conceição, seems to have dreamed of this possibility. "He did not desire the establishment of a transplanted Protestant church but a movement of reformation.. . which would lead to the creation of a Brazilian evangelical Christianity rooted in popular tradition and habits" (Ribeiro 1979:206). We can speculate that Conceição, once disabused of the idea of reforming the national church, would have supported this solution, leaving an indelible mark on nascent Brazilian Protestantism (greater understanding of popular religiosity; Franciscan simplicity of life free of bourgeois tendencies; a mystical spirituality closer to the Latin heritage).

What happened, of course, was the transplanting of foreign denominations, or more specifically an insertion of the "American pattern" of religious organization into a Brazil still marked by the traditional "Latin pattern." According to Martin (1978), the "American pattern" is of generalized denominationalism, with no established church but an almost unlimited pluralism associated with a popular and almost universal religious culture. Religion itself is not seen as politically problematic. In the "Latin pattern," on the other hand, religion is monolithic and allied to the state, making it politically problematic.

This "American pattern" of exuberant Protestant denominationalism, separate from the state but forming almost a cultural establishment, was brought to Brazil specifically by sectors marked by two recent historical experiences: the colonization of the American frontier and Southern slavery. Not surprisingly, the missionaries did not find it easy to relate to a secularized intellectual elite formed in the "Latin pattern." As Erasmo Braga, one of the few Brazilian Protestant leaders capable of such a dialogue, recognized, "Brazilian Protestantism is on the one hand too Anglo-Saxon and on the other hand too ignorant to impress the intellectuals . . . The cultured class should be reached by a literature closer to that of French Protestantism . . . to take advantage of the prestige of French culture" (in Ferreira 1975:137,59).

Although the historic churches invested heavily in schools to reach the elites, the result in conversions was negligible. Nine members of the 1934 Constituent Assembly were alumni of the Presbyterian Mackenzie Institute, but not one of them was a Protestant. Another disappointing result was the inability to win or even to produce intellectuals. Frontier pragmatism was ill-equipped to create an intelligentsia capable of gaining the respect, much less the allegiance, of intellectuals trained in the "Latin pattern." The siege mentality, the suspicion of aesthetic values and the foreignness of the denominational solution led to the creation of an illustrious list of lapsed Protestants.

Richard Niebuhr showed how, in the North American context, even the old territorial churches tended to become more democratic (1929:205). In Brazil, on the other hand, even democratic denominations became more authoritarian. The clearest example of this is the Presbyterian Church of Brazil (IPB).

The IPB paid for its early success in rural Brazil. Even today, a third of its members are from the "Zona da Mata" region of Minas Gerais and Espiriro Santo. In São Paulo and Paraná as well, the church grew on the agricultural frontier and acquired a strong rural ethos. Not surprisingly, the IPB went through a severe crisis in urban regions in the 1950s and 1960s. This questioning led to a reaction, which preceded but was later emboldened by the military coup of 1964, and consisted of internal repression, manipulation of the electoral system, and isolation from international Presbyterian networks.

The crisis of the IPB, previously the leading Protestant church in Brazil in social and intellectual influence, seriously weakened the historic churches' contribution to Brazilian Protestantism (especially through the virtual abandonment, after 1964, of the main trans-denominational organ, the Evangelical Confederation) and increased Pentecostal isolation. The IPB thus lost its chance to supply the leadership for Protestantism's new public relationship with Brazilian society in the 1980s and 1990s. Today, the IPB operates an elitist model of pastoral training (four or five years in full-time residential seminaries), but without the investment and academic seriousness which characterize the Catholic equivalent, and without the Catholic advantages of social prestige and/or access to the masses to compensate for the lack of secular qualifications. At a time when secular educational possibilities were mushrooming, the IPB chose the worst possible route. It neither freed itself from the elitist model (which had previously attracted capable people because it meant social mobility, but no longer does so) nor took the model seriously in the context of modern Brazilian society (which would mean raising the academic level and integration into the university world).

The other main Presbyterian denomination, the Independent Presbyterian Church (IPI), has followed a somewhat different route. In sociological and political terms, it is half-way between the IPB and the more (at the top) left-leaning and ecumenical Methodist Church. With a much poorer geographical distribution (heavily concentrated in São Paulo and Paraná), the IPI went through a weak form of the IPB's ecclesiastical repression in the 1960s and 1970s. But from 1981, during the military regime's "opening," it also began a cautious ecumenical opening, besides investing heavily in theological education and accepting theological pluralism in the seminaries. The result was a weak version of the schism between leadership and grassroots which characterizes the Methodists.

The relative (or in some cases absolute) numerical stagnation of the historic churches has a lot to do with Catholic changes since Vatican II, which allowed greater internal pluralism and thus discouraged conversion to Protestantism. Another factor is urbanization, which has made the middle classes either more secularized or more attracted to privatized forms of (often esoteric) religion without dogmas or communitarian demands. Where historic churches do grow, it is often due to their charismatic sectors.

Charismatic renewal began in Brazil's historic churches before the parallel Catholic phenomenon. Being initially repulsed, there were schisms in all the main historic denominations between the mid-1960s and early 1970s. The charismatic offshoots have placed Pentecostal phenomena in a new format (more orderly and less taboo-ridden) which is more acceptable to the middle class.

However, the charismatic denominations which resulted from these schisms have been less successful than expected. Recent Protestant expansion in the middle class has been mainly due to the independent charismatic "communities" (whether totally autonomous or joined together in networks). Although these are not as important as in Central America (where they make up the major part of middle- and upper-class Protestantism), they have made a significant impact in Brazil since the late 1980s. They are part of an international trend which mirrors post-modern tendencies in which the large traditional denominations lose much of their importance. In middle class Brazil, as in the developed West in general, denominationalism itself is in decline. As Grace Davie (1994) says, people "believe without belonging; " religious practice (Christian or not) goes on without the controlling presence of large religious organizations. Although one has to be cautious of translating such Western tendencies into the Brazilian context, there would seem to be a case for viewing the pulverization of middle-class Protestantism partly in this light.

Pentecostalized Historicals and Historicized Pentecostals

For some years, it was fashionable among analysts of Latin American Protestantism to say that the historicals had no future. They were supposedly destined to be squeezed out of existence by the Pentecostal explosion on the one hand and by renewed post-Vatican II and post-Medellin Catholicism on the other. In fact, the internal evolution of the Catholic Church has been quite different from that envisioned in the wake of the Vatican Council, and all measures tried have been ineffective in stopping Catholic losses. The Charismatic Renewal has gained ground as a possible Catholic answer to the Pentecostals, but its effectiveness is largely among the middle class. As such, it is one more strong competitor for the historic Protestant churches.

As for the Pentecostal explosion, it has, of course, led to a progressive increase in the Pentecostal percentage of the Protestant field, but not to an absolute decline of historic Protestants. In addition, as the vast majority of both the older and newer Pentecostal churches see themselves as part of a broader community of evangélicos which includes their historic brethren, the latter have been able to bask in some of the reflected glory of Pentecostal growth. Greater social and political visibility has led to a multiplication of projects to unify the Protestant field and address areas of national life previously distant from Pentecostal concerns. This has opened up space for a contribution from historicals, based on their middle-class cultural capital if on nothing else.

Historicals thus still have an important role, especially perhaps in Brazil where they are older and more firmly rooted than in many parts of the region. At this moment of Protestant arrival at public visibility, there are new demands that historic Protestants are best equipped to meet, such as recovering the history of broader Protestant experience in politics, having well-qualified lay people in various roles related to the wider mission of the church and developing theological reflection on all the new questions which Pentecostals had previously thought irrelevant. The new questions and controversies caused by Pentecostals' public presence will oblige them, albeit grudgingly, to rethink the sense of omnicompetence that usually characterizes sectarian mentality. Although Wallis says that sects tend not to concede the possibility of a non-member having any valid view on their structure or behavior (1979:211), the new public responsibilities of Brazilian Pentecostals (perhaps unequalled in the history of Christian sects) may lead them to discover that they can learn from sympathetic non-members about the world and about their own role in it. A sect cannot take on a wider role without attracting qualified people for a whole range of new tasks.

Much will depend, however, on historic Protestants' attitudes. Non- Protestant academics are now often more comprehending and less elitist in their view of Pentecostalism than are historic Protestant thinkers. Too often, the latter have imagined they were a cultured elite bringing light to their benighted brethren. Recent studies of Pentecostalism should be read to overcome elitist prejudices (Burdick, Mariz, Ireland, Antoniazzi et al, Garrard-Burnett & Stoll eds., Boudewijnse ed., Freston, Martin, Stoll, Soares, Fernandes...). Historic churches and individual historic leaders must adapt to the new reality of the religious field in Latin America: a market situation in which institutional loyalties are precarious, middle-class denominationalism is in decline and the Protestant community is overwhelmingly Pentecostal. But the adaptation must be a theologically consistent one, not mere sociological opportunism. The historic churches' intention should not be to duplicate Pentecostalism but to complement it. It is not easy to be a multi-class church in a religious market situation, as Catholic attempts to confront Pentecostalism show. Hierarchical and elitist tendencies almost always win out in such a church, making it difficult to be really popular (i.e., tuned in to the popular classes). A flow of recent sociological literature on the relative failure of the CEBs as compared to Pentecostal success is instructive reading for all historic Protestants (see Burdick, Hewitt, Teixeira et al. . .). A true multi-class church would need several forms of pastoral formation, appropriate for different social con- texts, without any trace of hierarchical ranking among them.

It is probably time to revise our traditional image of the Protestant field in Latin America. Although it is still useful to employ the "Pentecostal" and "historic" terminology, these should be seen not as two watertight compartments but as ideal types at the two extremes of a continuum on which most real cases are a highly variable and creative mix. Not only that, but all denominations and individuals are in fact in constant movement along the continuum. This movement is in both directions: towards a Pentecostalization of historic Protestantism and a historicization of Pentecostalism.

The Pentecostalization of the historic churches is fairly well known and illustrates Pentecostalism's capacity not only to grow but to influence other groups inside and outside the religious field. In a study of the 1994 general elections in Brazil (Freston 1995b), I point out that Afro-Brazilian religious leaders now wish to present official candidates because the evangélicos do so; that some left-wing candidates now imitate the right by apparently opportunist affiliations to evangelical churches; and that some historic denominations try to copy elements of post-1986 Pentecostal politics, creating ecclesiastical spaces for candidates belonging to the denomination to present their views (Methodists), taking pains to stress how many Presbyterians were elected (IPB), and even attempting to officialize candidacies (IPI).

Recent studies of Argentina's fast-growing Protestant field have stressed not only its Pentecostalization, such as the diffusion in historic circles of Pentecostal forms of worship and theological themes such as healing, prosperity and "spiritual warfare" (Wynarczyk et al. 1995), but also the growing interaction and development of a genuine pan-evangelical allegiance. This is not just a question of uniform practices, but of a shared identity, common goals and unifying public figures. In this sense, it resembles the "new social movements" in Latin America. Of course, there are divisions, as in all the social movements; but "unity" is precisely the word used by evangélicos themselves to speak of their common efforts (Marostica 1994).

In the Brazilian case, the multiplication of para-church organizations since the 1960s and of pan-Protestant representative entities in the last decade has not only hastened the declining importance of middle-class denominationalism (intellectual leadership and reforming initiatives stemming increasingly from para-church circles peopled mainly by historicals but with some Pentecostal penetration). They have also greatly increased the transit between historic and Pentecostal tendencies. In addition, evangelical television programs have popularized models of preaching and worship beyond denominational boundaries. The greater visibility for Protestants as a whole in Brazil also means that denominations can no longer live in such isolation: the public image of evangélicos affects all sectors and the desire for power leads to alliances which overlook denominational polemics.

A parallel tendency is the historicization of the Pentecostal field. Sociology of religion is familiar with the phenomenon of the evolution of the sects towards denominational forms (Niebuhr 1929). This is not as automatic and uniform a tendency as Niebuhr detected in the North American context, but it alerts us to the fact that historic Protestantism can have a role beyond the borders of the denominations with which it is usually associated. For many reasons (passage of time and, especially, of generations; social pressure; political expediency; upward social mobility of membership; intra-Pentecostal rivalry, especially between older and younger churches), sectors of Pentecostalism begin to adopt more historic theologies and practices. An interesting recent example in Brazil is the rivalry between the Evangelical Association (AEVB), led by Pastor Caio Fábio, and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, led by Bishop Edir Macedo. Faced with the media's "discovery" of Caio in 1994 as the "anti-Bishop Macedo," and the sympathetic coverage they have given to Caio's social projects in the dramatic social scenario of Rio de Janeiro, Macedo perceived that he also needed to invest heavily in social projects. Thus, whatever the motives, the competition which characterizes the new religious market and the new Protestant public visibility can have a cross-fertilizing effect.

Caio Fábio can be seen as a paradigmatic figure of the new Protestant moment in Brazil: a charismatic leader (in the sociological sense) of elitist social origin, but self-taught because of a youth spent in the drug culture; a Presbyterian pastor (IPB) with charismatic tendencies (in the theological sense) and a broad acceptance in both historic and Pentecostal fields; head of his own parachurch organization and presenter of his own television program. The AEVB's capacity to remain the major pan-Protestant unifying entity, despite being besieged by Bishop Macedo's National Council of Pastors (CNPB), depends heavily on Caio. Although the AEVB has many Pentecostals in it, the space for historic perspectives in the new Protestant field also hinges very much on the AEVB's survival, which in turn hinges on Caio's willingness to depersonalize its workings and create a greater density of theological and practical interchange.

The new challenges facing Brazilian Protestantism also require a creative theological response. A merely pragmatic and piecemeal union of Pentecostal and historic elements will not produce a healthy integration or orient a project for Latin America's mushrooming Protestant community.

In 1994, 1 was invited to attend a study meeting of theologians and social scientists connected with the progressive wing of the Catholic Church. In several moments, the desire was expressed for a synthesis capable of uniting the best in the Base Communities and the best in Pentecostalism. I expressed sympathy with this project, but added that it demanded a new theological basis firm enough really to integrate the desired elements and not merely juxtapose them. I suggested a key element in this might be eschatology: the Biblical vision of the resurrection of the body and the New Earth gives meaning to our individual lives and to our participation in public life. Death, which takes us out of history before the end, appears to make these mutually exclusive options. But the dichotomy of public and private worlds is healed in the New Jerusalem, the consummation of public history and the end of each soul's journey.

The same emphasis may be fruitful in the historic-Pentecostal dialogue. In addition, the recovery of what can be called, in a broad sense, the Protestant ethic, is vital at this moment in Brazilian Protestantism. By Protestant ethic, I refer to three things. Firstly, the classic reformed view that revelation has to do with the whole of life and that, in Niebuhr's (1951) phrase, Christ is the transformer of culture. Secondly, the classic Protestant attitude towards work and worldly goods, summed up in diligence and frugality, which sees work as having a positive finality in fulfillment of the will of God, and consumption as being controlled by criteria which differ from those of the surrounding society. Thirdly, the biblical worldview which underlay the development of modern science: a desacralized view of the natural world and an ethical rather than ritualistic approach to life within it.

This ethic has been largely lost or seriously attenuated in Brazilian Protestantism (see the conclusion to Freston 1994e). Instead of the active ethic of social transformation, we have, on the one hand, the passive and legalistic ethic of the good functionary, and on the other hand, the triumphalism of "dominion theology" which dreams of a divine right of evangelicals to temporal power. Instead of the ethic of diligent work and frugal consumption, we have "the theology of prosperity" and its ideal of rapid enrichment by ritual means. And instead of the desacralized worldview which contributed to science and to the ethical treatment of problems, we have the modern version of "spiritual warfare" with its return to a pagan view of the world. If the recovery of this historic Protestant ethic is vital at this moment of unprecedented numerical presence, public visibility, and social responsibility, then the historic churches, and above all those that lay claim to the Reformed heritage, must first of all rediscover their own past and apply it creatively to the Latin American present.

Bibliography

[1] Alberto Antoniazzi, et al. Nem Anjos Nem Demônios: Interpretações Sociológicas do Pentecostalismo. Petrópolis: Vozes, 1994.

[2] David Bebbington, Evangelicalism in Modern Britain. London: Unwin Hyman, 1989.

[3] Boudewijnse, et al, eds. Alga Más Que pio: una lectura antropológica del pentecostalism latinoamericano e caribeño. San José: DEl, 1991.

[4] Elizabeth Brusco, "The Reformation of Machismo: Asceticism and Masculinity among Colombian Evangelicals", in Garrard-Burnertt, V. & Stoll, D. (eds.), Rethinking Protestantismin Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1993, pp. 143-158.

[5] John Burdick, Looking for God in Brazil, Berkeley, University of California Press, 1993.

[6] Grace Davie, Religion in Britain since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell, 1994.

[7] Rubem César Fernandes, Censo Institucional Evangélico CIN 1992: Primeiros Comentários, Rio de Janeiro, ISER, 1992.

[8] Rubem César Fernandes, "Governo das Almas: As Denominações Evangélicas no Grande Rio" in Antoniazzi, et al. 1994, pp. 163-203.

[9] Júlio Andrade Ferreira, Profeta do Unidade: Erasmo Braga, uma Vida a Descobeno, Petrópolis: Vozes/Tempo e Presença, 1975.

[10] Paul Freston, "Protestantes e Política no Brasil: da Constituinte ao Impeachment," Doctoral thesis, University of Campinas, 1993.

[11] Paul Freston, "Breve História do Pentecostalismo Brasileiro: 1. A Assembléia de Deus," Antoniazzi et al., 1994, pp. 67-99.

[12] Paul Freston, "Breve História do Pentecostalismo Brasileiro: 2. Congregação Cristã, Quadrangular, Brasil para Cristo e Deus é Amor," Antoniazzi eral., 1994, pp. 100-130.

[13] Paul Freston, "Breve História do Pentecostalismo Brasileiro: 3. A Igreja Universal do Reino de Deus", in Antoniazzi et al., 1994, pp. 131-159.

[14] Paul Freston, "Popular Protestants in Brazilian Politics: A Novel Turn in Sect-State Relations," Social Compass, 41(4), 1994d, pp.537-570.

[15] Paul Freston, Evangélicos na Politica Brasileira: História Ambigua e Desafio Ético. Cuririba, Encontrão. 1994e

[16] Paul Freston, "Pentecostalism in Brazil: A Brief History," Religion, 25, 1995a.

[17] Paul Freston, "As Igrejas Protestantes nas Eleições Gerais Brasileiras de 1994," paper presented at the V Jornadas sobre Alternativas Religiosas en Latinoamerica, Santiago, Chile, April 1995, (1995b).

[18] Virginina Garrard-Burnett and David Stoll, eds. Rethinking Protestantism in Latin America. Philadelphia: Temple University Press,1993

[19] W. Hewitt, Base Christian Communities and Social Change in Brazil. Lincoln, Nebraska: University of Nebraska Press, 1991.

[20] Rowan Ireland, Kingdoms Come: Religion and Politics in Brazil. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 1991.

[21] Cecelia Mariz, "Religião e Pobreza: uma comparação entre CEBs e igrejas pentecostais,"Comuniçãoes do ISER, 1988, 7, 30, pp. 10-19.

[22] Cecelia Mariz, Religion and Coping with Poverty in Brazil. Doctoral thesis, Boston University, 1989.

[23] Cecelia Mariz, "El Debate en Torno del Pentecostalismo Autónomo en Brasil." Sociedad y Religi6n, 13, pp. 21-32, 1995.

[24] Matt Marostica, "La Iglesia Evangélica en Ia Argentina como Nuevo Movimiento Social," Sociedad y Religión, 12, pp. 3-16, 1994.

[25] David Martin, A General Theory of Secularization. Oxford: Blackwell, 1978.

[26] David Martin, Tongues of Fire: The Explosion of Protestantism in Latin America. Oxford: Blaclewell, 1990.

[27] H. Richard Niebuhr, The Social Sources of Denominationalism. Cleveland: World Publishing Co. 1929.

[28] H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture. New York: Harper & Row, 1951.

[29] Boanerges Ribeiro, 0 Padre Protestante, 2nd. ed. Saão Paulo: Casa Edirora Presbiteriana, 1979.

[30] Luiz Eduardo Soares, "A Guerra dos Pentecostais Contra Os Afro-Brasileiros: Dimensões Democráticas do Confliro Religioso no Brasil," Comunicações do ISER, 44, pp. 43-50, 1993.

[31] David Stoll, Is Latin America Turning Protestant? Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990.

[32] Faustino Teixeira, et al., CEBs: Cidodonia e Modernidade. São Paulo: Paulinas, 1993

[33] Zuenir Ventura, Cidade Partida. São Paulo: Companhia das Letras, 1994.

[34] Roy Wallis, Salvation and Protest: Studies of Social and Religious Movements. London: Frances Pinter, 1979.

[35] Bryan Wilson, "The Penrecostalist Minister: Role Conflicts and Status Contradictions,"American Journal of Sociology, LXIV, 5, pp. 494-504, 1959.

[36] Wynarczyk, P. Semán, and M. De Majo, Panorama Actual del Campo Evangélico en Argentina. Buenos Aires: FIET, 1995.

Chapter 4: Pentecostalism and Confrontation with Poverty in Brazil, by Cecilia Loreto Mariz

Cecilia Loreto Mariz received her Ph.D. in the sociology of religion from Boston University. She is a researcher and professor of sociology at Fluminense Federal University in Niteroi, Rio de Janeiro. Dr. Mariz is the author of Pentecostals and Christian Base Communities in Brazil: Coping with Poverty and of numerous articles on Pentecostalism. This document first appeared in THE POWER OF THE SPIRIT, Edited by Benjamin F. Gutierrez & Dennis A. Smith, published in 1996 by PC(USA)WMD AIPRAL/CELEP, pp. 129-146.

 

Introduction

Pentecostal churches are multiplying in Brazil, especially in the poorest neighborhoods in the largest cities, attracting the people with fewest economic resources and least education.[1] Since Pentecostals are the poorest, the media and members of the more intellectualized social classes tend to conclude that ignorance explains the rapid growth of these churches, which they think exploit the good will of a poor and ignorant people. They criticize the Pentecostal churches for asking the poor for high contributions and for promoting cures and all kinds of miracles. Due to the political positions they take, Pentecostal churches are also accused of distancing the working class from the struggle for its own interests. Critics of Pentecostalism aver that poor people don't recognize where their own interests lie; they argue that the Pentecostal churches have grown more than the (Catholic) Base Ecclesial Communities (CEBs) --groups that propose to defend popular interest, inspired by liberation theology-- because the poor have been fooled by false promises.

This kind of accusation and the explanation that Pentecostalism grows because of the intellectual poverty of the people assume a cognitive inferiority of the least favored classes. By inferring that the poor people who adhere to this faith do not know what is good for them, such arguments take an authoritarian point of view. They presuppose that the intellectual classes are competent to choose what beliefs are better for the poorer and less cultured part of the population.

I begin with the contrary presupposition: If a person chooses something it is because it is good for him. In this article I try to identify the elements which can have positive effects on the lives of poor people and which explain the attraction of Pentecostal churches.[2] I pose the following questions: "What attracts poor people to Pentecostal churches?" and "How are these churches capable of creating a sense of commitment that persuades individuals to adopt a rigid personal morality and to tithe?" I argue that Pentecostalism offers certain experiences and values to poor people which help them confront difficulties in their daily lives. In other words, these churches help people survive and are, among other things, tools for confronting poverty. In affirming this I do not wish to imply that anyone adopts a religion only in order to survive better or obtain material advantages. Religious sensibility, which motivates the faith of the individual-- what she felt and thought when she decided to join the church or when she held up her hand and "accepted Jesus"-- must be distinguished from the non-intentional consequences, or the "collateral effects" of this adherence. I am not questioning individual religious motivations, but merely analyzing the non-intentional consequences of their conversion. As I am concerned with understanding the attraction of Pentecostal conversion and to search for positive results, my analysis consequently results, as will be seen later, in a criticism of the accusations made against Pentecostalism.

The diversity of Pentecostalism in Brazil

Pentecostalism was brought to Brazil at the beginning of the century by missionaries, some coming from Europe via the United States, and others coming directly from the United States. Brazilian Pentecostalism derived from three churches: The Assemblies of God, the Christian Congregation of Brazil, and the Foursquare Gospel Church (Rolim, 1985). There is presently no way of knowing how many Pentecostal churches exist, but it is known that they make up 60% of the Protestant population of Brazil.

The largest Pentecostal church in Brazil is the Assemblies of God. Founded in 1911, it grew significantly only after the 1960s. From that moment the Assemblies of God in particular and Pentecostalism in general have not only grown rapidly but have divided into various denominations. The new denominations which emerged were created in Brazil by Brazilians. In this way, as Rubem Cesar Fernandes has shown, Protestantism, or better yet, Pentecostalism, is no longer a foreign religion. Brazil has even become an exporter of missionaries,[3]-- not only does Brazil receive missionaries from the United States, it also sends missionaries there.

The fragmentation of Pentecostal churches created wide diversity in Pentecostalism. This diversity can best be demonstrated by a comparison between two kinds of churches: the Assemblies of God and Christian Congregation of Brazil on one hand, and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, the House of Blessing, and the International Church of Divine Grace on the other. The first group, which in itself is quite diverse, is distinct from the second group not only in the customs and the emphasis placed on some gifts of the Spirit, but also in forms of administration and the way pastors and leaders are recruited.

In order to understand this diversity, some writers have tried to classify the Pentecostal churches, distinguishing the traditional churches from the autonomous (Bittencourt Filho, 1991), or differentiating classic Pentecostalism from neo-Pentecostalism (Oro, 1992). Another attempt to account for the diversity among Pentecostal churches is the proposal of Paul Freston (1993) which identifies three waves of Brazilian Pentecostalism. The first wave is characterized by greater emphasis on the gift of speaking in tongues, the second wave on the gift of healing, and the third on the gift of liberation. Although useful in making some important distinctions in Brazilian Pentecostalism, these classifications are not broad enough. They have difficulty, for example, including middle-class Pentecostal churches in general, and distinguishing between middle-class churches and churches born of the charismatic renovation in the historic churches. They also fail to include small churches that cannot be considered classically Pentecostal and at the same time are quite different from neo-Pentecostal churches.

Despite the recognized diversity in the Pentecostal universe, my principal concern in this article is its homogeneity. A great part of the Pentecostal experiences that we analyze here as tools for facing poverty are common to all Pentecostal churches. And besides, almost all these churches are objects of the same kinds of accusations, although most recent criticism of Pentecostalism in the media has focused on the so-called neo-Pentecostal or autonomous churches, and specifically on the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God.

In fact, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, the second largest Pentecostal church in metropolitan Rio de Janeiro, and perhaps the second largest in Brazil in terms of church membership, has identifying characteristics, such as the size of its temples, its relation with a television network, its controversial bishop, its emphasis on fighting Afro-Brazilian religions, its emphasis on exorcism, the theology of prosperity, and asking for contributions. It also has a notably lower level of biblical education among both pastors and the faithful (Pereira, 1995). Nevertheless, even in this case it is possible to speak of specific, central, basic elements of the Pentecostal experience that are common to members of an Assemblies of God church and members of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. The similarities in their experiences tend to increase, since there is a lot of communication between Pentecostals of different denominations. Research indicates a permeability in the borders between the different Pentecostal churches. This is revealed by the frequent transit among the faithful who share the same identity and experience (Mariz and Machado, 1994). It is about this identity and experience that I wish to speak.

Pentecostalism and politics

The Pentecostal churches have always been criticized for the political indifference of their members or the political conservativism and adventurism of their leadership. Until the 1970s, the Pentecostals, as well as the evangelicals in general, were absent from the political sphere in Brazil. Since the New Republic (1985), which began when the military regime ended, this panorama has changed. The evangelicals, as Paul Freston (1993) has shown, are transforming themselves into political pressure groups and electing their own candidates. Autonomous Pentecostalism and the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God are not backward in this respect. On the contrary, as Father Jesus Hortal (1994) has observed, "in 1990, the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God was the only Protestant denomination to save itself from the defeat of the evangelical group in Congress."

Unlike the traditional Pentecostals criticized at the beginning of the 1970s for separating religion from politics, the autonomous Pentecostals are criticized for mixing the two, and for using their churches to get votes. The enchanted or magical view of the world of these Pentecostals does not distance them from politics, yet the political behavior of the leaders of these churches is interpreted as "political adventurism" (Hortal, 1994).

Despite all this political involvement, Pentecostals generally declare themselves politically neutral and deny, in principle, a religious motivation behind any activity related to politics. Most Pentecostal discourse demonstrates a concern for maintaining the appearance of neutrality of the religious group. Despite this discourse, the majority of churches tend to accept the slogan, "brother votes for brother," using their religious identity to promote their programs and justify votes and political action on behalf of the group's interests. In this case, political opinion is clearly tied to group interests and the exchange of favors. When this happens, the Pentecostals are criticized for patronage, yet political patronage isn't limited to autonomous Pentecostalism or to evangelicals but characterizes the political vision of popular culture, as well as the dominant political culture in our society. The political behavior of the Pentecostals, then, does not differ from that of traditional religiosity, which also rejects politics and employs a patronage-based model.

The critics of Pentecostalism tend not to question whether the political model-- be it conservative, patronage-based or indifferent-- was created by this religious group or if it was pre-existing. These critics see this kind of political behavior as bad for the poor because they assume that the root of poverty and, consequently, the struggle against it, can be reduced to the political context. Since Pentecostal experience emphasizes personal morality and the search for individual transformation instead of political struggle, these critics accuse it of being alienating and consider it an obstacle to social change. This criticism begins with the false assumption that social change happens only in the realm of politics, and that the stage of history is set exclusively in the political world.

In order to understand the role of Pentecostalism in the lives of poor people, it is important to perceive that, despite its roots in the international political and economic context and in class relationships, poverty is above all experienced as a daily problem in the lives of individuals. In fact, the fight against poverty takes place primarily on the microsocial level of the actions of individuals, alone or organized in groups, and only secondarily on a macrosocial level of political and social struggles. When individuals confront serious personal crises and find it difficult to survive, they usually lack the conditions necessary to develop social consciousness or to become politically involved.

A significant number of Pentecostals have serious personal problems when they join the church. By giving them the means to overcome these personal difficulties, the Pentecostal churches help poor people on a microsocial level, that is, in the daily life of the individual, his family, and organizations. Thus, the political path is not the only one which permits social transformation. Changing individual lives not only does not impede social change, but it can even be an instrument for this change. It is important not to reduce individuals to mere consequences of the social structure.

The analysis of the role of Pentecostalism in the daily struggle for survival can contribute to understanding the process of cultural and social change among the poorer classes. Although this daily struggle may always have intermediate goals, sometimes it has unintentional effects that go beyond its limited goals. These activities have potential for making macro-structural change. Recognizing this helps us to avoid the reification of the social structure and social determinism, and helps us to be attentive to the relative autonomy of individuals and small groups.

As I have already stated in other works, I think that the belief that since poverty is the fruit of the social structure it cannot be changed is almost as damaging to poor people as the idea that they are responsible for their poverty (Mariz, 1994). The poor are not passive and powerless victims of society. They know what they want and how to get it. In order to help them, we have to respect their ways of acting. We must try to discern what strategies they adopt to confront and overcome the privation in which they live. Thus, in this article I do not adopt the concept of false consciousness or alienation because, besides being authoritarian, as I argued above, these concepts do not help us understand the growth of Pentecostalism and its meaning.

To understand the Pentecostal phenomenon it is more useful to identify the meaning and the practical consequences of the religious beliefs and experiences in the daily lives of the faithful than to discuss the degree of political conservativism of their ideology. By concentrating on the analysis of ideology, criticisms of Pentecostal political behavior do not take into account the changes in the culture promoted by this religious experience. In the following sections, 1 will consider how churches help individuals to overcome their crises, and will try to identify the experiences which transform them in personal terms, even those experiences which question the dominant political culture.

Experiences which transform the individual

The extreme material privation and the consequent problems of this privation create a sense of powerlessness, low esteem, exclusion, insecurity, fear, fatalism, and anomie. In situations of extreme poverty and cultural and material marginalization, sometimes aggravated by racism, one's sense of personal dignity becomes impoverished. Other problems, such as alcoholism, unemployment, or the abandonment of women, reinforce this self- hate. Other religions also offer experiences which help people to overcome these feelings and shore up personal dignity. These experiences, which are common to almost all groups which develop strong social ties, religious or not, are: the sense of belonging to a group, the experience of power, and the creation of a new identity.

Pentecostal churches help the poor to regain their dignity in different ways. The stories of Pentecostals attest to the fact that their first contact with the church contributes to enhancing their self-esteem. The warm welcome they receive when they first visit the church helps them to see things differently. Many interviewees explained that the concern their problems awoke in others contributed to the increase in their self-esteem.

The emphasis on spiritual gifts, as opposed to material riches, is another strategy to fortify the dignity of the poor (Bobsin, 1984). The direct experience of the sacred, the belief in direct contact with God, also opposes the feeling of impotence and increases the self-esteem of those who feel weak.

Another strategy to strengthen personal dignity can be seen in the eagerness of the Pentecostals to build a new identity involved with keeping up a good appearance as decent or "cultured" people. Care given to dress and personal appearance has this function. Men must wear jacket and tie to worship every day. Pentecostal women must also wear clothes that distinguish them from the rest of the poor population. This kind of behavior is common to all Pentecostal churches, though it is most evident in the classic Pentecostal churches. The search for distinction, though it may seem to the poor as a negation of class origin, appears to be more a rejection of the negative stereotypes associated with poverty.

A criticism commonly made of classic Pentecostalism focuses on the rigidity of the customs, or the "doctrine," as they call it, which prohibits people from dressing fashionably and participating in popular forms of entertainment. Nevertheless, some of the faithful cited precisely this strict style of dress as something which attracted them. The dress code protects a poor person from being mistaken for a marginalized one. The men do not want to be taken as thieves or the women as prostitutes, as some researchers have noted (Gilkes, 1985). Part of the Pentecostal project involves constructing a prosperous, "cultured" image.

In addition to self-esteem, the churches sustain the poor person by offering her a mutual support network, an alternative to family and neighborhood ties. Having access to a wider social network makes a person feel more supported, and she begins to feel that she can make something of her life. This also contributes to overcoming what social psychologists call "the syndrome of powerlessness."

This syndrome has been identified as a characteristic of poor populations (Cavalcante, 1987). Those most lacking in economic resources have the fewest possibilities to change their destinies. They have fewer options and are more easily overwhelmed by misfortune or caught by the social structures. To the degree that they offer a supernatural power which compensates for lack of power in this world, religion and the belief in miracles generally attract the weakest of our number. Through religious or magic power, individuals can overcome the syndrome of powerlessness and stop feeling that it is impossible to determine their own destiny. Nevertheless it does not seem to be the belief in a supernatural power or the experience of miracles that most helps an individual to gain a feeling of control over his own life. Belief in magical power is not always enough. In the life histories of Pentecostals, as well as of other religions, we can note that as much as they believe in supernatural power or magic, they confront miracles which do not happen in everyday life. The sense of power and control over one's life remains, however, when they also are endowed with something Antonovski (1979) calls "lawfulness," that is, when meaning is attributed as much to a miracle as to the absence of one, and people believe that "things will be how they should be."

The experience of "lawfulness" seems more important than direct experience with miracles, and in principle, is found in all religions which accept the idea of divine providence. Faith in divine providence and the idea that God has a specific plan for each person is strongly emphasized in Pentecostalism. It encourages people to feel that irrational events and the suffering of life have meaning and obey a superior logic in which Good will always win. This belief also helps to overcome the fear and insecurity which are inevitable for those who know they have no power.

Before they were converted, many Pentecostals that I interviewed felt they were at the mercy of spirits and spells put on them by personal enemies. Pentecostalism functions as a protection from spells, evil spirits, and black magic. Faith in divine providence, as Weber shows (1972, p. 143), is already constitutive of primitive Christianity for the important role it plays in neutralizing black magic and hexes.

In fact, the poorest people are entirely right to be afraid, since they are the most vulnerable in many aspects of life. The slum dwellers in Rio live daily with the danger of stray bullets, threats, and all kinds of violence from the police, from organized crime, and from the almost constant struggle between the two. In a visit to a church of the Assemblies of God on the edge of a favela in Rio de Janeiro, I heard a preacher clearly express the promise of protection that faith offers. This pastor, black, toothless, dressed in a jacket and tie, preached with emotion about how, when he comes every day to the favela where he lives, he can pass by all the drug traffickers with their AR15 rifles and have no fear. Against their rifles he carries the Bible. A believer can feel strong and have the courage to confront not only evil spirits but also the threats of this world. It is common to find mothers or wives of drug traffickers who are converted by the Pentecostal churches and try to bring their sons and husbands with them.

Pentecostalism transforms the individual not only through the experience of belonging to a community and through direct contact with the sacred-- experiences which other religions offer that are capable of restoring dignity to an individual, offering him power, courage, and "lawfulness"-- but also through experiences that help poor people adapt better to modern society. In this way Pentecostalism is distinguished from most popular Brazilian religions by exposing the faithful to "modernizing" experiences. These experiences occur when Pentecostalism requires an individual option for the faith and the adoption of a new ethic in daily life, and when it emphasizes the use of the word, reading and studying the Bible, and the intellectual systemization of the faith. The new ethic reinforces rational option over tradition and cultural inheritance. Emphasis on the word and the study and systemization of the faith encourage attitudes and abilities that are useful to poor people in modern capitalist societies.

Pentecostalism breaks with traditional religiosity by emphasizing "rebirth" and conversion as an individual option. In traditional religiosity, there is no conversion. Religion is innate, not the result of personal choice. To be a "medium," for example, is not a destiny that one chooses, and in the Afro-Brazilian religions, each person is born with his or her "saint, which cannot be chosen. Involvement with Pentecostal churches thus represents a rupture with the dominant traditions and their way of living and seeing the world. This view of life is non-fatalist because it recognizes the capacity of the individual to be different and/or to act differently from the norms.

In order to explain a religious option that breaks with tradition, the Pentecostals elaborate a rationalization or a series of ideas which justifies their faith. Contrary to traditional groups, the Pentecostals emphasize the intellectual aspects of faith. To read the Bible and interpret it is fundamental to Pentecostalism. According to some of the Pentecostals who were illiterate before their conversion, the emphasis on the written word and the theoretical elaboration of faith motivated them to learn how to read. It also seems to encourage verbal competence and an ability to argue, fundamental skills in democracy and modern societies.

Another modernizing element is the transformation of the daily life of the believer toward a new ethic proposed by the religious group. The fusion of faith and life defended by the theology of liberation and the CEBs is also practiced by the Pentecostals. According to James Hunter (1989), the rejection of the modern division between public and private lives is characteristic of fundamentalist religions. Paradoxically, in the Pentecostal groups this rejection has modernizing and transforming consequences.

In relation to these modernizing experiences which reinforce individuality, some Pentecostal churches, with their congregational style, offer their members a relationship to power that is innovative compared to the dominant political style of the traditional religions and of our society in general. Although Pentecostal ideology is conservative, Pentecostalism fosters a new political culture that is more egalitarian and participative, and therefore more compatible with the interests of those less favored socially.

Experiences of a new relationship to power

Three aspects of Pentecostal group experience redefine elements of the dominant political culture, especially among the poor. They are: a) participation; b) depersonalization of power by attributing a greater power to the "word" and the law than to people; c) less distance between the leadership and the base.

As Fernandes (1994) pointed out, "to adhere to Protestantism is to participate intensely." Fernandes argues that Protestantism breaks with the model of Brazilian behavior of little social commitment and involvement, observed by W. Guilherme dos Santos. Contrary to the dominant model-- where the poorest are the least committed --in the evangelical milieu, the poorest are those who most participate.

The participation of the Pentecostal believer is broader than merely singing, preaching, praying out loud, or helping in missionary or social works. In some churches, members participate in administrative meetings when practical decisions are taken about where to use the money collected in the offering, or whether to invite a pastor. The participation of church members in this kind of meeting, however, is not common to all churches. It doesn't occur, for example, in the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God. This kind of meeting happens in Assemblies of God churches, as one of our interviewees from the Baixada Fluminense in Rio de Janeiro told us who was very impressed that the leaders accounted for all the money received from the community. In that particular month, our interviewee told us, part of the money went to help two church women who were having trouble, and another part went to repairing the temple.

Pentecostalism is authoritarian in the sense that it strongly emphasizes obedience, but it is a different kind of authoritarianism than is practiced by the Afro-Brazilian religions, the carnival clubs, and other popular Brazilian associations, which depend on a single leader. Pentecostal authoritarianism is based on the law. The leader must submit to law, to the Bible, and to doctrine. The word has more authority than the person. In this way, Pentecostals are breaking with popular culture. The authority of a pastor is legitimated not only by his personal charisma, but also by the institution to which he belongs. Furthermore, the pastors are required to obey a code of ethics that is referred to in some churches as "doctrine." It is legitimate--one can almost say it is common--for a Pentecostal believer to oppose a pastor who has disobeyed the doctrine.

Generally, Pentecostalism is criticized for its lack of theology or for its simplified theologies, such as the theology of the "spiritual war" focused on the struggle against demons, or the "theology of prosperity." It is more correct to say that these criticisms point to an absence of elements of erudite culture in this religiosity and to the lack of intellectual sophistication of its leaders. The pastors are less educated in erudite culture and therefore less distant from the church members. Although they can take authoritarian postures with regard to the members the relationship in cognitive terms between believer from the popular classes and his unsophisticated Pentecostal pastor is closer and less asymmetrical than that in the Catholic Church or the historic Protestant churches, whose pastors have university and post-graduate degrees. Thus, the distance between the producers of the sacred and the consumers is less than in the traditional religions, as others have also pointed out (Canales, Palma and Vilela, 1994; p. 99). Through their participation and their experience of an egalitarian religion, the faithful have their sense of dignity and power reinforced even more.

Improving the material life and the "theology of prosperity"

Despite the fact that many Pentecostal believers experience a new form of political organization in their churches, this does not occur in all churches, and the search for a renewal of political life and culture is not part of the discourse of Pentecostalism. Its discourse commonly refers to changes in the life of the individual and her family, emphasizing the improvement of the material conditions of life after conversion. Pentecostal preaching, testimonies, and the stories of conversions or answered prayers frequently mention solutions to material problems in daily life. Although the emphasis on material life with the acceptance of some kind of "theology of prosperity" varies from one church to another, and is more evident in some churches than in others, the belief that the new faith will bring material benefits is generalized among almost all Pentecostals. In the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, for example, this theology dominates its discourse. The importance of money in autonomous Pentecostalism, and in the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God in particular, is evident as much in its theology of prosperity as in the request for contributions, which takes up a large part of the worship service (Hortal, 1994). Freston (1993; p. 105) thinks the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God "is the principal port of entry to Brazil" for the North American stream of Pentecostalism known as the "health and wealth Gospel." In other churches, such as the Assemblies of God, they also spend much time speaking about the solution to material and health problems, but in the preaching and in the testimonies they mention other, non-material improvements. In all the churches, however, it is affirmed that the believer always overcomes the crises of life, and that survival will not be threatened when one has faith.

Insofar as it is a set of values and beliefs, any religion can be useful to the material survival of the poor, whether it provides the individual with experiences, such as those we have described above, which strengthen the dignity and self-esteem of the poor, or because it creates motivations and proposes new values and a new economic culture which lead to new, more productive economic behavior. In its values and world view, Pentecostalism does not seem to create a new attitude or motivation regarding work. As several anthropologists have noted (among them C. Flora, 1976, and J. Hoffnagel, 1978), Pentecostalism places value not on producing or working more, but on consuming less. Through its rigid doctrine opposing the "vanities," drink, and worldly distractions, Pentecostalism-- and especially classical Pentecostalism-- motivates people to save. Although saving is valued by poor Brazilians of other religions, only the Pentecostals attribute a religious meaning to the restriction of superfluous consumption.

Different religious communities or groups can also contribute to the struggle for survival by poor people in other, more direct, ways, such as (1) the donation of goods, or "charity," (2) the creation of remunerated positions for church leaders, or (3) the creation of a network of mutual support. As religious groups, the Pentecostal churches tend to differ from the dominant religions of Brazil by giving less emphasis to charity, which is central to Catholic and Spiritists religiosity. The poorest Pentecostal churches, especially, de-emphasize charity, particularly when it is for the non-evangelical poor. Although some churches, such as the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God, use a missionary strategy of giving material aid to beggars and street people, most Pentecostal churches take only the Bible to their missionary work.

Since the majority of Pentecostal churches are poor, their members don't receive or hope to receive any material aid from them; on the contrary, they contribute to maintain their churches. Nevertheless, in a moment of crisis they know that they can count on help from the mutual support network and the support of the church. This happened in the above-mentioned case in the Baixada Fluminense which gave part of its monthly income to two sisters in the faith who were living in penury. It is also frequent in the popular neighborhoods that believers who are temporarily without shelter live in a room next to the sanctuary (Pereira, 1995).

Although they do not contribute in a regular and direct way to the daily survival of their members, the churches sometimes provide the only source of income for their leaders. Thus, they become an alternative source of employment, usually for men, though there are cases of Pentecostal churches accepting women as pastors.

The network of mutual support can be seen as another kind of strategy for material advancement developed by different religious groups, including the Pentecostals. These networks, as we have noted above, do not substitute for, but combine the traditional kinship and neighborhood networks which form spontaneously in poor neighborhoods. The religious networks have the advantage of wider social and geographical reach. Through their churches, evangelicals enter into contact with people from other neighborhoods, cities, and even distant reaches of the country.

Another kind of support which the church offers the poor is exemplified by the story of a plumber from an Assembly of God church in a favela in Rio de Janeiro. He told about the festivities commemorating the birthday of an elderly pastor who for many years taught music to the members of the church, especially young people, so that they could play instruments in the worship services. Many former brothers in the faith who had turned aside from the gospel and left the church showed up at the festivities. They were ex-students of this pastor who had become professional musicians in the "world." In this way, the church had offered them a profession.

Although poor people who convert generally tell about the improvements in their lives after adhering to the Pentecostal faith, many people, including the media, see the Pentecostal churches as exploiters of the poor because they emphasize the importance of tithing and other contributions. The harshest and most frequent criticism-- which is made especially of the neo-Pentecostal churches and specifically of the Universal Church of the Kingdom of God-- is that they exploit the poor and enrich the pastors by asking for too much money. In fact, it is shocking to see poor people who are skinny, toothless, and poorly dressed give money to young pastors who are well-dressed, healthy, own cars, and look like the upper classes. Still, to say that people give money because they are ignorant is not sufficient.

Many anthropologists ask themselves why poor people give away such a large part of the little they have. Ari P. Oro (1992) argues that with their donations they are trying to make a pact with the divine. To give is to be a patron, to become a creditor. To be God's creditor is to have power. In a magical world view, or a non-secular one, much value is placed on spending for the sacred and for the supernatural world. It is a logical and legitimate expense. Popular religiosity in Brazil in its different expressions is always characterized by donations. In the Afro-Brazilian religions, there are rituals, "cults," and donations to the spiritist counselors. In Catholicism there are promises to be paid for prayers that have been answered. In this view of the world, the believer does not care how the money will be used. What is important is the material sacrifice that the believer has made for the saints or for God. The concern for the destination of these donations --whether they are robbed or used for non-religious purposes-- is a secular concern, that is, characteristic of those who do not share the "enchanted" vision of the world. In this symbolic vision, donations as well as sacrifices make sense and are useful in themselves.

There are other reasons and motivations than the value of sacrifice, the magical vision of the world, and the desire to make a pact with God which can explain why poor people make such proportionally large donations. In the act of tithing and making donations the poor discover the capacity to give. Whoever gives has power, whoever receives has no power. Poverty, weakness, and submission are reinforced symbolically when one receives. In potlatch, as in Carnaval, whoever spends the most and gives the most is the most powerful. To receive is to be dependent. With alms comes humiliation. Everyone yearns to be one who does charity. Since Pentecostalism generally doesn't give to the poor, but asks them to give, it makes the poor cease to be poor, subjectively.

The faithful who tithe and contribute donations say that they receive double what they give, and that after they began to give their economic life improved. We can suppose that these persons changed their self-image, and even, as Freston (1993; p. 109) suggests, that these donations represent a commitment to a new lifestyle and substitute for former spending on drugs and medicines. Further, there are indications that members give less than they are asked for, and that they do not wholly accept the discourse of some pastors and churches (Freston, 1993; p. 109) on unchecked donations.

The theology of prosperity and the emphasis on tithing link material riches to faith and adopting a Christian life. Although this discourse is open to criticism, it is important to recognize the instrumental role it plays in the survival of the poor by rejecting the theodicy that the poor are redeemed through suffering.

Pentecostal support for the family

The Pentecostal churches are also strategic in combating poverty when they motivate members, especially men, to give up alcoholism and other vices for family life. In fact, a large part of masculine conversions to Pentecostalism are related to alcoholism. These conversions are frequently preceded by the conversion of their wives and mothers. In this way, Pentecostal churches provide support for the families of problem drinkers as well as for the problem drinkers.

Feminists have criticized Pentecostal discourse on the family for adopting a patriarchal model and defending the predominance of masculine power. Nevertheless, Pentecostalism notoriously attracts more women than men and it is less macho than the rest of Latin American society. Some anthropologists even suggest that Pentecostalism could be reform Latin American machismo (Brusco, 1994).

Through its sexually rigid morality and defense of ascetic behaviors, Pentecostalism changes the attitude of men in relation to family and alcohol, playing an important role in reinforcing family relations and preserving domestic unity. In this way, it not only protects women, but allows an economic improvement in the family unit. As R. Parry Scott (1988) showed, the presence of the couple in the domestic unit tends to avoid a greater deterioration in the conditions of life of the poor family.

Although Pentecostalism does not overcome the subordinate feminine condition, it protects women in their daily lives, helping them to obtain advantages in specific day-to-day questions. In fact, Pentecostal churches attract men to the domestic world and redefine the macho role, proposing new values for masculine behavior. Pentecostalism, then, seems to redefine the masculine and feminine roles in the public and private spheres by opening space outside of the home for women and by "domesticating" the masculine sex.

Some writers argue that Pentecostalism helps women, then, by creating a new model for men, especially in Latin American societies where the machista model is widely adopted. Salvatore Cucchiari (1990) points out the differences between characteristics of Latin masculinity and the image of God in Pentecostalism. For Cucchiari, the fact that among the Pentecostals God has qualities held to be feminine in the machista world, means that it can bring about a new relationship between the sexes.

The redefinition of the masculine role is accompanied by a redefinition of the way of conceiving the individual, who is now seen as a fragile prisoner of the demons. With their conversion, women "discover" that when their husbands drink or abuse them they don't do it of their own free will, but because they are possessed by demons. Someone who acts negatively or in error is seen with tolerance by the Pentecostals since, as a 26-year-old woman we interviewed says, "they don't do evil because they want to, it's because they're being used (...) These people are being used and they're unhappy." In this way, all the oppressors are seen as oppressed by the demons.

Oppressors are thus considered victims for whom one should pray to God. On seeing her spouse also as a victim, the woman feels stronger; she tends to adopt a more tolerant attitude toward her spouse and tries to deal with marital conflicts more peacefully (Machado, 1994). Symbolically inverting the relation between power and oppression, Pentecostal women don't interpret marital conflicts as the result of the opposition between masculine and feminine interests, but as a result of the man being possessed by evil. Unlike feminist discourse, the discourse of the Pentecostal woman does not oppose the man and his interests, but the demons. Since liberation from demons only occurs through the Holy Spirit and the individual option for Jesus, the evangelical, although always hoping for the conversion of a family member, must respect him and wait until "Jesus touches his heart," as they say.

This attitude of tolerance reflects a new way of understanding the individual that is well described by a 63-year-old Pentecostal domestic worker as she tells about how her behavior toward her children changed. "In the church, we learn that we have to accept people how they are. Even to convert someone we have to know how to talk about God, but not to insist (...) if he doesn't want to go on. If his heart is hard, no one can do anything." The new concept of the individual and his relation with evil implies changing the strategies for conversion as well as the way of reacting to conflicts and aggression. It redefines family relations without necessarily redefining the discourse about the family.

Conclusion

The struggle for survival is the principal daily concern of the poor person. It affects his life style, values, and the organization of his groups. His religious option cannot escape this concern and is also immersed in this struggle.

Pentecostalism is efficient in supporting individuals in situations of extreme privation or family crisis. When the believer who used to confront precarious material conditions joins the church, he overcomes crisis and misery, and experiences an improvement in the material standards of his existence. Pentecostalism

For Pentecostals, poverty is not a political question, but a personal or supernatural one. Thus, we find no Pentecostal innovations in political life. Pentecostal innovations are found at a personal level when they motivate the believers to adopt an ascetic lifestyle and dedicate themselves to the family. Besides showing men how to be more concerned for their families, Pentecostalism engenders in women, through its vision of the individual as a victim of evil, a critical but compassionate and tolerant opposition to their irresponsible or aggressive spouses. Pentecostalism smoothes out family conflicts. By perceiving that their spouses are also victims of evil and not responsible for it, women try to convert them without attacking them, which contributes to the preservation of the family. Strengthening the domestic group and asceticism have proven to be instrumental for the survival of the poor.

Pentecostalism also helps the poor by offering a mutual support network and the subjective experiences of power and dignity and of belonging to a community --experiences shared by members of traditional religious groups. Unlike these other groups, the Pentecostal churches encourage experiences which tend to modernize behavior. Since the modernizing aspect is Pentecostalism's novelty and what also makes the motivational strategies for confronting poverty of the Pentecostal groups more adequate and useful in modern capitalist societies, it can be concluded that perhaps these elements are the strongest attraction for the poor.

ENDNOTES:

[I] For a socioeconomic profile of Pentecostals in Brazil, see the data of Prandi and Pierucci, 1994.

[2] The present article summarizes ideas developed from data which I collected while doing research on Pentecostals in Brazil. The methodology and general conclusions of this research have previously been published.

3] Brazilian Pentecostal churches, especially neo-Pentecostal churches, also send missionaries to other countries in the southern cone of South America. (Frigerio, 1994).