Archives: Book Chapters

From our discussion so far one thing is clear: the crucial point and the very essence of Marx’s critique of religion is not its denial of God, but the affirmation and acknowledgment of human autonomy. The basis of religious belief that human beings are God’s creatures are countered by the thesis that they are their own makers. This is the source of the Marxist picture of history and of human being, with all its political and moral consequences. This critique of religion, and the element of atheism implied in it, is therefore an integral part of Marxist conception of the world.

Marx criticizes that the idea of God, the Creator God, bars the human person’s endless future and impoverishes the person’s perspectives, endeavours, and struggles. He emphasizes that human creativity cannot reach its potential in God, that is, outside the human. He does not accept the Christian conception of human being which begins and ends with God, the source of all human actuality and potentiality. Viewed in this way, for Marx, God is the end of the possibilities which are the breath of our being. Thus we can say that Marx’s critique of religion is not primarily and essentially a revolt against God, but rather a struggle on behalf of the human beings in all of their personal needs and social relations. As it was pointed out by Olof Klohr of Jena, "The atheism of Marxism is, in essence, not the ‘No’ to religion and God, but the ‘Yes’ to the world, the ‘Yes’ to the conscious formation of human life."¹ Marx is not out to get rid of God; he is to free human beings -- not to free from God but from themselves and from their enslavement to religion, which is their own creation. It is not God but the belief in God which must go, if human beings are to be free.

Thus at least theoretically Marx does not see the destruction of religion as an important aim. The disappearance of religion will be the normal outcome of a rational thinking and rational living. Mans ultimate task, as Marx sees it, is self-creation which man accomplishes by creating a world. The world which the human being thus creates is so rich that there is no room left in it for belief in anything but human. It is a world in which authentic humanity is guaranteed and gradually achieved in the material, moral, cultural and intellectual spheres. The primary aim of Marx’s critique of religion and his atheistic position is the realization of the positive factor of transcendence.

According to Marx, transcendence means not only abolishing the dehumanizing conditions of human life but also preserving the true essence of the human person and shaping the person’s own destiny by going beyond the given. This, of course, fits with the literal meaning of the word ‘transcend’ -- to rise above’ or ‘to go beyond the limits.

Marxist philosopher Jaroslav Krejci defines transcendence as "consisting essentially in endeavours and activities aimed at going beyond the given reality, the world as it is, overcoming it practically, conceptually and ideologically."² It is in this sense Marx employs the term transcendence, because transcendence perpetually opens the way for the future. However, he does not regard this opening of a new future as an incursion of the divine into human history, as in religion. Marx conceives transcendence as dynamic human reality, as a self-transcending formation of the meaning and values of our life, as an active, real, and not merely theoretical, crossing of the frontiers of human power, freedom, culture and perspectives. By transcendence Marx means the movement of the living and humanly experienced present into the future. This transcendence which is the human person’s openness to what is to come, unlimited openness, is in Marxism a human project in a definite historical situation, a human choice to remain open to the future as limitless human dimension, an absence of any final boundary. This choice and project form the content of the present fight for the future, including the political struggle. The concept of transcendence has so far not been sufficiently elaborated theoretically in Marxist philosophy. The primary reason for this lack of interest is that Marx himself did not systematically develop the concept of transcendence per se, though it was fundamental to his thought and lifework. Secondly, many Marxists have often been reluctant to use the term, for the term transcendence poses certain problems. Traditionally the notion of transcendence is related to belief in a world beyond, and it has some irrational and supernatural connotations. In religion, for example, according to Marxists, transcendence denotes the illusion of an absolute and static plenitude of moral ideals, justice, freedom, love, etc. But for Marxists, transcendence is the actual human experience that the human person, though belonging to nature, is different from the things and animals and that the human being, able to progress always, is never complete.

This claim to transcendence is crucial to the understanding of Marx’s critique of religion. Since Marx himself has not developed it, we shall examine this important concept by using an indirect method by means of the study of Marx’s humanism. By humanism Marx means the doctrine that affirms the value and dignity of the human being. It takes on a more precise meaning in as much as it affirms that man is an end in himself, and that he consequently rejects any form of servitude that would reduce him to a means at the hands of an owner. The decisive productive force of history is the human person at work in all the spheres of creative activity: in production, discovery, invention, artistic creation, political and moral decisions. This is why Marx says that the driving force of history is within history itself. History is not made from outside, neither by a destiny such as Greek thought posited, nor by a providence extrinsic to human activity, nor by Hegel’s "Absolute Spirit". Marx valued more highly than anything else the initiative of human beings in history. In "The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte" Marx stresses this point: "Men make their own history".³ Man is always something other and something more than the sum of the conditions which have produced him. This is what distinguishes him from other kinds of animals. Otherwise we should be relegated to an existence determined solely by instinct. Echoing the Italian philosopher Vico, Marx pointed out that man was not responsible for evolution of nature but for his own history.⁴

Marx also believed that the advent of real man is the goal of history, which can be attained only by revolutionary action. But, what is this "real man"? First of all, he is a man related to nature. Nature is man’s proper context. Nature and man interact; nature produces man but man produces nature by his labour. As Marx phrased it, "History itself is a real part of natural history -- of nature developing into man."⁵ Human history is the story of man’s humanizing nature, or, to put it in another way, in man nature becomes human. If man is abstracted from his context, both he and his context are destroyed.

Secondly, human being is a socially active natural being, and not just natural being as such. The history of human being in nature is properly realized only in the case of social human being. Here is where nature and human being are united by society. As Marx put it, "My own existence is social activity, and therefore that which I make of myself, I make of myself for society and with the consciousness of myself as a social being."⁶ It is the concrete web of relations which is actualized in human social existence.

Thirdly, human self-consciousness (in social activity) is seen as the theoretical form of that being whose living form is the community. The spiritual faculties and intellectual operations of human beings are simply the theoretical expressions of their real being. Any abstraction from this reality -- human being as a homeless spirit, as animal, as a kind of god, etc. --does not refer to real human being at all. Marx does not deny that human beings are, of course, individuals. They do think individual thoughts. Human beings are born and they die as individuals. But the use of the term human as opposed, say, to animal, is to man as he is "the subjective existence of thought and experienced society for itself". Man is what he is concretely: in society and in nature. This is his uniqueness and dignity.

This portrait of man is the basis of Marx’s humanism. Any form of social structure that negates this man must itself be negated. Since man was, and is, the maker of himself, since he alone makes history, he bears full responsibility for what becomes of him and history. Marx contends that the liberty of man is not yet an accomplished fact. Man is deprived of liberty, enslaved and made an instrument. In other words, man is alienated. Alienation is defined with reference to the ideal, complete man, as he ought to be, man as free. Man is alienated means, more precisely the following: (a) He is not what he ought to be (privation), (b) There is lacking in him something of his very self (mutilation), (c) He is estranged from himself and from reality (estrangement), (d) He identifies himself psychologically with an imaginary existence which becomes a substitute for reality (identification), (e) He is torn by a conflict between his real essence and his ideal essence (contradiction), (f) He is reduced to a means, to slavery (enslavement).⁷ The process of overcoming alienation is the process through which man becomes what he ought to be, attains his ideal essence, seeks and again finds himself, repossesses that part of himself which had been seized from him, resolves the contradiction within him and reaches liberty. It is this unceasing process which Marx calls ‘transcendence’.

In The Holy Family Marx wrote that the proletariat

Abolishing all the inhuman conditions of life in society, and thus humanizing the relation to the material world and nature, the human person will transcend all forms of alienation. Religion and state are only partial expressions of the one fundamental alienation of the human being from nature and are bound to disappear simultaneously with their cause. But a religious or political emancipation alone can never liberate human beings. The religious critique merely fights the consciousness of alienation and leaves the roots of alienation intact. The mistake lies in the assumption that ideas are independent of the social conditions of action and, consequently, that they can be changed without changing the conditions which produced them. This is what Marx means when he criticizes the atheism of his time: "Communism begins from the outset... with atheism, but atheism is at first far from being communism; indeed, it is still mostly an abstraction."⁹ The same holds true for the political critique. Not political reforms but only a reintegration of man with nature can return him to his true essence. The key factor to the reintegration of man with nature is labour. Labour is the factor which mediates between man and nature; labour is man’s efforts to regulate his metabolism with nature. Labour is the expression of human life and through labour human relationship to nature is changed, hence through labour human beings change themselves.

The re-integration of human being with nature will also restore the bond between the human being and fellow human beings, for the humanization of nature is essentially a social task. "Activity and mind, both in their content and in their mode of existence, are social: social activity and social mind."¹⁰

The adjective ‘social’ refers not just to work done in immediate cooperation with others. Even the lonely task of the scientist is social, for the material on which he works as well as his personal life are products of the community. His consciousness is "the theoretical shape of that which the living shape is the real community"¹¹ There is a mutual causality between the human person and society. The society which the human being creates through work will in turn create the human being. "Just as society itself produces man as man, so is society produced by him."¹² "Thus society is the unity of being of man with nature -- the true resurrection of nature."¹³

According to Marx, communism strives for such a society, and hence he describes communism as "the positive transcendence of private property,... the real appropriation of the human essence by and for man;... ¹⁴ Most communist theories suppress private property by making it into common property. But such a solution still maintains the basic principle of private property: it considers material possession and not man’s self-realization as the aim of labour. Marx criticized this kind of crude communism in these words:

Private property should be suppressed not by making it common property, but by abolishing the alienation itself of which it is the expression. Through this positive transcendence of private property, the object of man’s activity again becomes a human object. Man appropriates the world in a human way: his relation to it is no longer a means to an end outside himself but an expression of his entire being, in which he objectifies himself without losing himself. Nature becomes human and man becomes natural.

Man’s objectification of himself in nature creates a genuine culture when he uses nature in a truly human way. When man’s relationship with nature is truly humanized by the transcendence of private property, Marx believed, all expressions of estranged human life will disappear.

In religion, the content of transcendence is God, the transcendent future is the power of God which comes to humanity and evokes a response. But Marx denies any sort of superhuman transcendence. He is reluctant to identify transcendence with God because he understands the absoluteness of God to function as a limit, a restraint upon the otherwise unlimited field of human possibilities. Dependence on a transcendent God and full human autonomy are incompatible:

Thus the question of creation cannot even arise for Marx, because it conflicts with praxis.

We shall elucidate Marx’s concept of transcendence with reference to one of the leading Marxist thinkers of our time. Roger Garaudy, who is well known for his sympathetic attitude towards religion, has pointed out that religion may have some practical justification:

But this does not change Garaudy’s position on religion as a whole, for this transcendence must always remain within the immanence of human possibilities. According to him, "transcendence is no longer an attribute of God but a dimension of man, a dimension of our experience and our acts."¹⁹ It is a totally human phenomenon, a "dialectical supersession" of man by himself.²⁰

Thus the difference between religious (to be more precise, Christian) and Marxist concepts of transcendence is this:

Garaudy asserts that any attempt to refer transcendence to an absolute, to God, would be to limit man by imposing an antiquated worldview on him. To the Marxist, transcendence is actually a demand, an exigency, a driving force, but a force that cannot be conceived, named, or expected. As Garaudy put it:

The human being is an incomplete being, a creature in the process of formation. The goal of this self-creation is an ever fuller social consciousness, a more complete social integration, and an absolute domination of the physical world. In other words, the exigency of which Garaudy speaks is future oriented -- it is the demand for an ever more complete realization of the potential of human persons.

Here, then, is the sum and substance of Marx’s concept of transcendence: The moment, nature gave birth to man by a "spontaneous generation", it became essentially related to him, to be humanized by his free activity. Nature and man are no longer two powers in opposition to one another, but two terms of one relation. Through a vital interplay with nature man makes himself. Unlike other animals which are passively determined by their material environment he actively transforms nature and adopts it to his own needs. Thus man rises over all other animal species and begins an historical evolution. Here we have a qualitative leap, a real outgrowing, a transcendence in the strictly etymological sense of the term. The future to which he is moving is completely open to man. He shapes the universe and his own destiny, and thus he is not any more the object of history but its subject and agent. It is this possibility, which enables man to move towards the future along an original road that the animal was incapable of knowing -- the road that entails freedom and choice -- what Marx calls Aufhebung, which we might translate ‘transcendence’ in the strictly etymological sense of the term.

Notes

1. Cited by Erwin Hinz, "Toward a New Interpretation of Religion and Atheism in the Secular Society", Lutheran World, Vol. 13,1966, p. 379.

2. Jaroslav Krejci, "A New Model of Scientific Atheism", Concurrence, Vol. 1, No. 1, 1969, p. 87.

3. Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 97.

4. Ibid., p. 372 note.

5. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 143.

6. Ibid.

7 Cf. Giulio Girardi, Marxism & Christianity, trans. by Kevin Traynor (New York: The Macmillan Co., 1968), p. 23

8. Marx & Engels, The Holy Family, op. cit., p.52.

9. Manuscripts, op. cit., p.136.

10. Ibid., p. 137

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid.

13. Ibid.

14. Ibid., p. 135. By "private property Marx does not mean the private property of things for use such as furniture, automobile, etc., but the property of the "propertied class" (capitalists). Since they own the means of production, they hire the property-less individual to work for them, under conditions the latter is forced to accept. Thus the property-less individual is reduced to a means of production. Hence "private property" is considered here as an expression of human self-alienation.

15. Ibid., p. 133f.

16. Ibid., p. 144.

17. Ibid.

18. Roger Garaudy, From Anathema to Dialogue, trans. by Luke O’Neill (New York: Vintage Books, 1966), p. 76.

19. Ibid., p. 46.

20. Cf. Roger Garaudy, Marxism in the Twentieth Century, trans. by Rene Hague (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970), p. 209.

21. Garaudy Anathema to Dialogue, p.92

22. Garaudy, Marxism in the Twentieth Century, op. cit., p. 104.

Aristotle said that to understand a thing one must study its origins. Before expounding Marx’s critique of religion, let us first inquire what kind of religious influence Marx had at home and during the school days.

Marx’s father, Hirschel Marx, a lawyer, was a descendant of a respected family of rabbis. And yet, in 1816, when the edict went out from the Prussian government that no one of the Jewish faith could serve as a lawyer or an apothecary within the kingdom, Hirschel Marx abandoned his Jewish faith and embraced Protestantism. He entered the Evangelical Church as a convert and received the name Heinrich Marx. Nominally a Christian, he was a free thinker who attended church regularly, sang hymns and paid his tithes. He was prepared to conform to the outward form of the church, but did not believe that any faith was superior to any other. In his view Stoicism, Judaism, Christianity and Hinduism were all equally valid and equally vulnerable. In a letter sent to Karl Marx while he was a student in Bonn, Heinrich Marx said:

A good support for morality is a simple faith in God. You know that I am the last person to be a fanatic. But sooner or later a man has a real need of this faith, and there are moments in life when even the man who denies God is compelled against his will to pray to the Almighty... everyone should submit to what was the faith of Newton, Locke and Leibniz.¹

In other words, he professed a belief in reason. His belief in God restricted itself to an acknowledgment of a supreme moral value. Like the poet Heinrich Heine, he considered the sacrament of baptism only as "an entrance card into the community of European culture".

Karl Marx’s mother, Henrietta Pressborck, also came from Jewish background. Her father was a well-respected rabbi in Holland. At the time when her husband accepted the Christian faith, her father was still living and therefore she postponed her joining the church. She was baptized in 1825 after her father’s death. Unlike her husband she was not educated, and spent most of her time as a good housekeeper.

Karl Marx was born of these parents on May 5, 1818 at Trier in the Rhine province of Prussia. He was the third of the nine children in the family. He received baptism in the Evangelical church on August 26, 1824 and was solemnly confirmed on March 23, 1834. But in a family where baptism was considered only as "an entrance card into the community of European culture, these religious ceremonies did not mean much. In his childhood he lived a leisurely life of ease and bourgeois respectability, with wealth and servants at his disposal. His mother never bestowed upon him anything comparable to a religious education. He had special affection toward his father with whom he read Voltaire and Rousseau. At the home of Baron von Westphalen, his neighbour and later father-in-law, he began to appreciate Homer and Shakespeare.

Contrary to most of the Young Hegelians, Marx never went through a period of "religiousness". People like Hegel, Feuerbach and Bruno Bauer who influenced Marx began their career as students of theology. All of them came from middle-class Protestant families which tried to educate their children as good Christians. Even Engels grew up in a pietist family. Marx, on the contrary, grew up among men to whom religion never was more than a question of propriety or of expediency. The only place where he might have come into contact with practising Christians was the Friedrich Wilhelm Gymnasium in Trier which he attended for five years.

Since Marx’s ideas were to have such a revolutionary impact on the world, it is important to watch them as they first rose to the surface. Some of the essays he wrote for his Abitur, the German school leaving examination, permit us to watch them while they were being formed. Because these essays reflect his religious attitude, and because many of the ideas he presented to his teachers were to be enlarged and given greater resonance m later years, they now deserve our attention.

The essay for German composition, Reflections of a Youth on Choosing a Vocation involves a careful study of the purposes of life and human being’s proper duty to fellow human beings. Given free will, a man must strive for an occupation in which he can do the greatest good for the greatest number, and he gravely points out the dangers of alienation and self-deception. It is interesting to note that he employs the word "vocation" (Beruf) almost in the sense of a profession of faith. The task given to the human being is to choose a way of life which will best serve the human race. He writes:

Free will, the commandment of God, the ennoblement of mankind are all implied in the theme which will eventually encompass the whole field of human conduct. We shall not understand Marx unless we realize that when he became a revolutionary, he was carrying out the injunctions of his youthful essay, for he felt that he was choosing the position in society in which he could best serve humanity.

The essay on religion was titled "The Union of the Faithful with Christ, according to St. John 15:1-14, presented in its Reason and Essence, in its Absolute Necessity and its Effects." Marx notices that corruption and alienation are present in humankind to an intolerable and terrifying degree. No matter how much human beings strive, they know themselves to be incapable of achieving their purpose without divine help. So he depicts human beings as creatures at the mercy of their vices, saved only by the mercy of God. Without God people are helpless; with God they become divine. Marx points out that the ultimate proof of this assertion is found in the word of Christ himself in the parable of the Vine and Branches. By loving God, he wrote, human beings find themselves turning toward their brothers and sisters and sacrificing themselves for others. Instead of alienation there is the loving bondage of service and sacrifice. He continues:

In this way Marx resolves the theme of virtue by defining it in both divine and human terms, simultaneously bringing divinity down to earth and raising humanity to the level of divine. According to Marx, Christian virtue, being free of all earthly attachments, acts as God’s agent in the redemption of mankind. By virtue human beings become divine, while in no way losing their humanity. In fact virtue makes them only more human, more loving, and more understanding.

Marx was a Christian, and when he turned against Christianity, as Robert Payne observes, he brought to his ideas of social justice the same passion for atonement and same horror of alienation which characterize this essay.⁴

In his dissertation Marx provided the stimulus for the development of a materialistic-atheistic tradition by setting up the titanic figure of Prometheus as the archetype. When the twenty-three year old Marx called Prometheus "the most eminent saint and martyr in the philosophic calendar", he had in mind a philosophy with the basic creed: "In simple words I hate the pack of gods". According to Marx, Prometheus is opposed to "all divine and earthly Gods who do not acknowledge human self-consciousness as the highest divinity." Marx’s philosophic calendar therefore contains such a "saint and martyr" who hates the gods and extol human being’s self-consciousness as the highest divinity. The phrase "saint and martyr" should be understood as an interpretation of Prometheus’ answer to Hermes which Marx quotes:

In preference to Hermes’ servitude as faithful boy to Father Zeus, Prometheus would rather be the "servant to this rock" to which he is bound by way of punishment. Prometheus profession is the service of human beings over against Hermes service of the gods. The latter enjoys an apparent freedom, whereas the former is subjected to eternal sufferings and bondage. But in these sufferings and bondage he is free, because it is his own conscious and deliberate choice. His martyrdom for the sake of human beings makes him the real saint. Prometheus thus becomes the representative of a view of human beings and the world that sets up their own self-consciousness as the ultimate reality and supreme good. Prometheus’ act is, according to Marx, the true task of philosophy. Just as Prometheus, having stolen fire from heaven, begins to build houses and to establish himself on earth, so philosophy, having embraced the whole world, should rebel against the world of phenomena.⁶

In the Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction, we find another reference to the tragic aspects of Prometheus’ act. There, the gods of Greece are said to have already been "tragically wounded to death in Aeschylus’ Prometheus Bound." In other words, the real victim in the tragedy is not the human saint and martyr Prometheus, but rather the gods whose dominance has been fatally undermined by the disbelief of human beings.

Prometheus’ challenging answer to Hermes, the servant of gods, is applied to the actual political situation at the time of writing the dissertation, i.e., March 1841. At this time the government had begun to withdraw the semi-official support it used to give to the young Hegelians. It encouraged the theological faculty of Bonn to reject the appointment of Marx’s friend Bruno Bauer, one of the leading figures among the Young Hegelians, as professor. Thus, by the "poor March hares, who rejoice over the apparently worsened social position of philosophy", Marx meant all those in the universities who collaborated with the government by interfering in the academic freedom of the Young Hegelian philosophers. The political servitude of the theological faculty is compared by Marx to Hermes’ servitude to Father Zeus. Prometheus’ challenging answer to Hermes should therefore be read as an indirect assault on the analogous position of Christianity in the nineteenth century.

In the foregoing paragraphs we found that Marx’s critical attitude toward religion can be traced back to his student days. In Chapter 3 we already discussed specific aspects of the philosophies of Hegel and Feuerbach which had direct impact upon Marx’s critique of religion. Having set the stage we shall now proceed with his own critique. In doing so, first we will examine Marx’s critique of religion in general, and then we will discuss his criticism of Christianity in particular.

According to Marx and Engels, all religions reflect the fact that human lives are controlled by external powers over which they have no control. Engels put it this way:

He, then makes a contrast between primitive religions and contemporary religions. Whereas in the primitive society it was the power of nature which controlled man, in the modern world it is the forces of the social system which exercise this external dominance:

It is not only before nature that man is powerless; he is also overwhelmed by society, so that the processes of society appear to man as strange and terrible divinities. Thus the "fetishism of commodities" comes to replace fetishism of nature. Taking Feuerbach’s lead, Marx developed a theory of religious alienation -- that man projects his own perfection into the supernatural and calls the sum of these qualities ‘God’. This process, Marx said, actually alienates man from himself.

But Marx did not stop at the recognition of this alienation. He went beyond Feuerbach in asserting that it is the economic and social forces that drive human beings to create illusions such as God. Herein lies the genius of Marx. Merely recognizing the fact that man is alienated from himself does no good as long as man is not emancipated from the underlying causes of alienation found in the economic order. For "it is not the consciousness of men that determines their beings, but, on the contrary, their social being that determines their consciousness."¹⁰

Marx’s analysis of the human predicament and alienation leads him from the criticism of religion to the criticism of society. Religion cannot be disposed of, nor can the problem which begets religion be solved, without a radical change of the society and the economic system. Feuerbach’s calculation was wrong when he believed that mere criticism of religion could remove religion from the minds of the people.

Marx sees the criticism of religion only as a preliminary step to the criticism of society, and criticism of society goes hand in hand with the revolutionary political action which not only changes society but also destroys the basis of religion.

Feuerbach considered the concept of God to derive from the thought and temperament of the individual. On the other hand, Marx asks what conditions particular individuals to develop religious concepts and continue to believe in them. Whereas Feuerbach understood the consciousness of God as man’s consciousness of himself, Marx investigates the nature of the man who can develop the self-consciousness only in an alienated way. The problem is carried one stage further;

This is the fundamental principle of Marx’s critique of religion. State and society in their specific, imperfect, unjust, inhuman form produce in human beings a reversed or perverted consciousness, corresponding to human being’s perversion, i.e., religious consciousness.

The task therefore changes from traditional criticism of religion to practical criticism of social and political ,conditions which produce and maintain religious consciousness. Religion is described as the "moral sanction", the "solemn completion", and the "universal ground for consolation and justification" for this world.¹² This means religion is an integral part of this perverted world, and not simply the perverted consciousness belonging to it. It is necessary as the consolation of human beings in this bad world, to make the perverted world tolerable and to justify it. Without religion this world could not carry on, and for this reason it spontaneously springs up again and again out of the inhuman conditions of life. Therefore Marx finds that religion is still the better part in a bad whole. He says:

It is a complete distortion if this often-quoted passage is taken as some sort of vulgar atheism or as a rejection of religion per se, or even as an attack upon religion. It is as though one quoted the Psalmist saying "There is no God". He did say that, of course, but if one wishes to convey his thought one should complete the sentence, "The fool says in his heart, there is no God."

Unless we give careful attention to Marx’s description of religion as opium we will miss the point. Religion is described as the expression of this world’s distress, as the "sigh of the oppressed creature". Mention has already been made that this phrase occurs in Feuerbach’s writings: "God is an unutterable sigh, lying in the depths of the heart." However, religion is at the same time also a protest against this distress. But such protest according to Marx remains vain and ineffectual because it diverts attention from this world and focuses hope on the next. Only after the religious phenomenon has been described as a sigh which awakens concern and as a protest which calls forth sympathy, it is criticized as opium, a sedative and narcotic. Its narcotic effect stems from the fact that it teaches an acceptance of earthly unhappiness by holding out a promise of transcendental happiness. This is what Marx means when he says that religion is the "spirit of a spiritless situation". It takes on an increasingly spiritual and ethereal form, the more spiritless the material world becomes, the more it forces the human spirit toward an "other world". "The struggle against religion is therefore mediately the fight against the other world, of which religion is the spiritual aroma."¹⁴ Thus the denial of religion is not an end in itself, but a fighting doctrine; its source is not a theoretical interest for truth, but the practical interest in the changing of this world into a human one.

At any rate religion can make people content in their soul, in their consciousness, but in an imaginary way and not in any complete and real way. The medicine it offers cannot help to cure the disease from which society and man are suffering; it can only help to alleviate the pain. It therefore seems to Marx to be pointless simply to take this pain relieving drug away from man, quite apart from the fact that as long as the disease lasts it would be futile. It is instead a question of curing the disease itself and thus making the opiate superfluous. Marx poignantly says:

Thus, we find that Marx’s criticism of religion moves on two levels. That is, first, the unmasking of religion which, according to Marx, has been mainly completed by his predecessors, especially by Feuerbach. But as this unmaking of religion reveals that religion is ‘true’, in the sense that it is an invention of human beings to compensate for and to sublimate their real wretchedness, a second kind of criticism has to follow: religion has to be made false, i.e., the secular world has to be changed. Once the secular world is discovered to be the source of religious ideas, it must be "criticized in theory and revolutionized in practice".

Of these two tasks, Marx had seen the second quite clearly as early as 1844: radical human emancipation could only be effected by a class "with radical chains" the industrial proletariat, through whose action all human beings would be liberated at the same time, because it can only free itself as a class by trying to end every form of domination and exploitation. Once these inhuman social conditions are removed, poverty will also disappear and with it religion which was its inevitable expression and ineffectual protest.

The critique of religion contained in the early writings is continued, at least indirectly, in various sections of Capital. The first chapter of Capital contains the famous section on "The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof" which deals directly with the problem of religious alienation. In a manufacturing society the conditions of the individual seem to depend on things, on commodities and the laws of their movement in the market. A mysterious power transforms the results of the human labour into ‘commodities’, endows them with ‘value,’ and makes them exchangeable for other commodities of equal value. This is the mystery which Marx tries to elucidate in the passages from Capital that we quoted earlier.

Marx hopes religion will be overcome by a transformation of the method of production which would permit human relationships to be both ‘intelligible’ and ‘reasonable’:

Marx is offering here an outline of an ordered society in which the relations of human beings to one another and to nature are both clearly recognizable and rationally acceptable. This ordered society can be attained, according to Marx, only by individuals voluntarily forming themselves into associations to take over production and distribution. Then the religious reflex of the real world will finally vanish. The task therefore is not to fight religion but, more clearly stated here than before, to set up a society in which religious consciousness will die out. Suffering and mystery, to which Feuerbach attributed the existence of religion, are now seen more precisely as the sorrows brought about by enforced, unreasonable, incomprehensible and alien conditions of life (social structure). The accent is shifted from emotional to intellectual suffering, without losing sight of the reality of that suffering.

Engels found that while institutionalized religion generally seeks to defend the status quo, the content of the religious affirmations has its own logic, and may appeal to, and does appeal to, different classes. In other words, the ruling classes may wish to employ religious belief and feeling as forces for the retention of their power; but religion being a mass phenomenon that transcends classes, may serve as the justification for and inspiration of vast popular movements that are revolutionary. Marxism, thus, emphasizes the revolutionary quality of early Christianity and stresses the significant contrast between early and late Christianity. We can illuminate this point from some classical Marxist writings. In an essay, "On the History of Early Christianity," Engels wrote:

Karl Kautsky, one of the leading figures of the Second International, maintained that Christianity was originally a revolutionary organization. The liberation from poverty which it proclaimed was at first thought of quite realistically. It was to take place in the world and not in heaven. The transference of liberation to heaven only took place later.¹⁸

Marx and Engels do not mean that priests are necessarily impostors who cunningly divert the workers’ attention from their grievances by telling them lies about God and a spiritual world. Still less do they mean that men could be ‘cured’ of their religious beliefs by proving them false, as men might possibly be cured of drug addiction by lectures about the injury it does to them. Rather, the central idea is that religion is a social and psychological mechanism that makes the lives of unhappy men bearable to themselves and serves as a justification for the sufferings they undergo. The sufferings themselves are due to social maladjustments, and if these were remedied, religion would lose its raison d’etre and cease to exist. Therefore, Marx did not believe that a direct attack against religion would ever work. Since religion is only the symptom of a more basic discrepancy, the demise of religion cannot be hastened. Any direct struggle against religion appeared to Marx as useless and misplaced: useless, because religion simply cannot be abolished as long as the world is not put straight; misplaced, because the real enemy is the perverted social order of which, as Marx put it, religion is only the spiritual aroma. Any efficient treatment has to be radical, i.e., to reach the very roots of the evil. In the Manuscripts, Marx writes:

Marx believes that a full reappropriation of what human being has lost in alienation cannot be achieved by a mere annulment of God, but only by an annulment of the social structure of private property which produces the need for God. Thus, for Marx to be human is not to be something, but to do something.

Marxism, manifesting a profound humanism as the heart of its inspiration, naturally opposes religious persecution. It opposes coercive methods aimed at religion. The few references to religion made by Marx in his later years indicate that, in spite of his lack of interest in this kind of problem, his view on religion and atheism did not change as the years passed. Thus, for instance, in his "Critique of the Gotha Programme" (1875), Marx argues: "Everyone should be able to attend to his religious as well as his bodily needs without the police sticking their noses in."²⁰

Before we proceed with Marx’s critique of Christianity in particular, let us examine briefly how Lenin’s critique of religion differs from that of Marx. It is important to note this distinction, because the religious persecutions which took place in Russia under the dictatorship of Lenin are contrary to the spirit of Marx, as is evident from the last statement of the preceding paragraph. The key to understand Lenin’s attitude toward religion is his materialism.

Lenin was not satisfied with the materialism of Marx, but expanded his theory by adding a materialistic world view. Marx’s critique of religion was replaced by the eighteenth century popular critique of religion, clergy, and church, evidently because it was more effective as a political weapon. Lenin himself admits that Marx’s critique of religion did not have the same propagandistic effect as that of the eighteenth century Enlightenment:

For this reason, Lenin urges the distribution of "militant atheist literature" from the eighteenth century. His emphasis of a materialistic world view, may therefore be explained on the basis of the political need for effective weapons against contemporary, conservative churches.

He called for attacks on religion. Those who believe in God are regarded as ignorant and backward people in need of instruction. Instead of meeting Christians with tolerance and respect, they are met with persecution in the form of enlightenment. Lenin said:

Marx’s sociological critique of religion also influenced Lenin. He, like Marx, opposed the attempts of Bakunin and his anarchist disciples to put the struggle against religion in the centre of the class struggle. The question of religion must not be the principal issue that separates the religious and non-religious workers into two camps and weakens the class struggle. Instead the struggle must be focused on "the social roots of religion," i.e., capitalism.²³

When Lenin combined Marx’s sociological critique of religion with anti-religious belief in science, the result was a drastic intensification of the critique of religion. Religion as an unscientific world view is entirely negative. According to Lenin, the idea of God is simply a weapon in the hands of the oppressors:

The tendency toward intolerance became stronger because of Lenin’s theory about the Communist Party as an elite, especially as his successors interpreted it. The function of the party was to indoctrinate a revolutionary consciousness into the proletariat. It is the perils of this intolerance and aggression inherent in such a cleavage between the enlightened party and the unenlightened masses that we find in the subsequent developments in Russia.

In this respect, Mao Zedong is closer to Marx than Lenin is. Mao rejects Lenin’s insistence on a struggle against religion, and accepts the idea that religion will disappear once it is deprived of its social basis. Mao said: "It is the peasants who made the idols, and when the time comes they will cast the idols aside with their own hands: there is no need for any one else to do it for them prematurely."²⁵

This does not mean that Mao excludes the possibility of a conflict between the party and religion, because the socialist revolution is something which involves the life of the entire society. The significant point here is that this conflict is social and political.

On the whole, Mao’s critique of religion is essentially sociological and political, as is indicated in his statement: "If religion doesn’t interfere with the People’s Republic, the People’s Republic will not interfere with it."²⁶

We shall now turn our attention to Marx’s critique of Christianity in particular. Marx’s main target was not God but religion, and chiefly Christianity which he felt was an obstacle to man’s self-realization. In other words, in Marxism, propaganda against the church did not develop out of a denial of God and his work, or from a denial of the Gospel and its spiritual power. As a matter of fact, Engels declares of the early Christian writings: "they could just as well have been written by one of the prophetically minded enthusiasts of the International."²⁷ It grew rather from an opposition to the church as a definite socio-political form which in the name of so-called religion defended the old social order with all its injustices, its cultural backwardness, and its conservative immobility.

Mention has already been made that Marx and Engels were critically aware of the significant contrast between early and late Christianity. Here let us examine more specifically how Marx found Christianity justifying the existing order. Marx’s criticism is that the church taught the masses that the established order is willed by God and that, as obedient and submissive subjects, they should resign themselves to it. The doctrine of original sin has been used for this purpose. St. Augustine wrote in his City of God that God introduced slavery into the world as a punishment for original sin. To seek, therefore, to abolish slavery would be to rebel against the will of God. The German church of Marx’s time literally followed this statement. They taught that ‘order’ was given by God, and therefore any attempt to interfere with it was a sin against God. Religion seemed to be a part of the ‘superstructure’ which sanctioned the existing order, promised rewards in heaven for enduring the pain on earth, and therefore suppressed any attempt to change the real social condition of this world. So Marx saw a parallel between the way the British and French used guns to force opium on the Chinese people in the mid-nineteenth century and the way the Christian church used religion to deaden the social awareness of the working people. Hence the critique that Christianity’s function is something by which the proletariat is rendered incapable of protesting against its own exploitation.

Marx and Engels point out that Christianity is grounded not in a political, but in an eschatological vision -- the second coming of Christ and the establishment of the Kingdom of God. Jesus and his disciples expected that this eschatological vision will be realized within their lifetime. Accordingly, the function of the teaching of Jesus was to prepare people for the second coming, and not to root them in an existence whose nature is basically corrupted. Since the second coming did not materialize in their time, Marx contends, early Christians began to abandon the teaching of Jesus.

When the much expected Kingdom of God did not realize, Christianity began to accept its given lot with the conviction that one is to render to Caesar what is his own and to submit to authority since it was "ordained by God". But as a result of its willingness to comply with any secular authority which would protect its own religious practice, Christianity ended by accommodating itself through history to everything wicked and degrading in the social existence of human beings. Marx says:

Marx and Engels never get tired of noting the baseness of organized religion and the extent of its hypocrisy. They maintain that except for its early days Christianity has always been on the side of the oppressor. Marx rarely misses the opportunity to vent his sarcasm at the self-seeking of the religious institutions as when he notes in Capital that "the English Established Church... will more readily pardon an attack on 38 of its 39 articles than on 1/39 of its income."²⁹

In 1855 during an anti-church demonstration in London, Marx criticized the established church for its callousness and reactionary policy, and said: "The classical saint of Christianity mortified his body for the salvation of the souls of the masses; the modern, educated saint mortifies the bodies of the masses for the salvation of his own soul."³⁰

Christianity, throughout its history and especially in the Middle Ages, appears to be an institution bearing the heavy imprint of class power and prestige. Since the time Constantine proclaimed Christianity as the official religion of the State, the church grew as "the most general synthesis and sanction of the existing feudal domination."³¹ Clergy obtained a monopoly on learning, which became essentially theological. Even politics and jurisprudence had the influence of theology. Eventually the church passed from a persecuted minority to a powerful oppressor. Christianity "had partaken of the fruits of slavery in the Roman Empire for centuries, and later did nothing to prevent the slave trade of Christians".³² It required of the small farmer to transfer the title to his land and his independence to its growing power. Thus Christianity hoped to reduce the free farmer to a serf. In these circumstances, "all the generally voiced attacks against feudalism were above all attacks against the Church, and all social and political, revolutionary doctrines were necessarily at the same time mainly theological heresies."³³ Since the church stood as the ideological sanction of the feudal system, it was necessary to de-mythologize that system before it could be directly destroyed. It was in the context of this need that the Protestant Reformation occurred.

Marx and Engels maintain that the religious revolution which goes by the name of Protestant Reformation was actually a reflection of underlying economic forces. It is to be noted here that for a Marxist the reformation has no ultimate foundation in religiosity for the simple reason that for him religion is a part of the social superstructure and is therefore primarily an effect, rather than a cause, of social action. What is progressive in religion does not, for Marx, derive from some inherent virtue in the religious mode of consciousness, but rather from the fact that the economic forces which are the ultimate causes of the religious mentality, are entering a progressive stage. There often have been in history humane religious movements directed at the reform of established religious institutions, but they do not derive necessarily from any logic inherent in the spirit of religion itself, but from more social causes.

Marx notes that the "forcible expropriation" of property in the sixteenth century received "a new and frightful impulse from the Reformation, and from the consequent colossal spoliation of the church property."³⁴ The inhabitants of the monasteries were hurled into the proletariat and subtenants of the church’s estates had their land confiscated as they were themselves forcibly removed. Again, Protestantism supported the genesis of capital by "changing almost all the traditional holidays into workdays". In these and numerous other ways, Protestantism was merely carrying out the underlying thrust of the growing tendency of capitalism itself. To Marx and Engels Protestantism was the perfect religious expression of capitalism.

When accused of trying to abolish Christianity and to establish atheism, the attitude of Marx and Engels is that such charges do not deserve serious attention at all. They remind us what happened in the history:

Marx and Engels believe that religion will be replaced by the proletariat in a similar way. In a review of G. Fr. Daumer’s, The Religion of the New Age, Marx and Engels elucidate this point further. They contend that all conceptions and ideas are transformed with each great transformation of social circumstances. Different social circumstances generate different religions. In their time, people have at last discovered the secret of this historical process and were no longer willing to deify this process in the exuberant form of a new religion. They simply strip off all religions. Once man has found his way back to himself in the ‘material’ order, he has no need to delude himself. Religion as an expression of his distress will disappear exactly as morbid delusion vanish with the body’s restoration to health. Insofar as it is a protest against this distress, the sigh of the oppressed creature, it will become superfluous. The illusory happiness which the religious opiate offers will be replaced by "real happiness".

Marx’s criticism of Christianity can be summed up in the declaration that Christianity is the transcendent justification of social injustice. He condemns the Christian substitution of charity for justice. Marx emphasizes this criticism once more by referring to the "Jewish Question". In the eighteen centuries of Christian domination, he says, whatever has been granted to the Jews has been given grudgingly and by way of concession, never as a recognition of their rights as human beings. The real Christian task should not be that of just helping the poor with charity; rather it is to ensure for the poor the exercise of those rights whereby they can cease to be poor.

From our discussion so far, one thing is obvious: Whenever Marx attacks religion, or particularly the church, it is an indirect attack on the evils of society. Similarly, attacks on the evils of society are indirectly attacks on religion. He challenged the religion of his time to build a just social order. Thus we can say that Marx was, by his sense of injustice found in the society, on the side of the angels. Hence he has been classified with the "Children of Light" and not with the "Children of Darkness."³⁶

At this point one might as well ask the question why Marx’s criticism was particularly aimed at Christianity among all the religions. The answer is quite obvious. Christianity was the dominant religion in the society which Marx knew. Also, along with Hegel, he considered Christianity as the absolute religion which synthesized in itself all the religious tendencies which the history of man had manifested. That is why Leslie Dewart says that Marxist atheism is truly anti-theism, and specifically and historically anti-Christian anti-theism.³⁷

To sum up Marx’s critique of religion: Marx believed that as long as the human being remains under the control of alien forces, let it be the power of nature or the various forces of society, religion will persist. As long as the human being is incapable of eradicating social evils, the need for "illusory compensation" will continue to exist. What is needed is that human beings must redeem themselves from the bondage of external forces. The only redemption open to them is that which will be gained through their own labour. When one is redeemed by one’s own potentialities, one will realize that the ideals which are rooted in one’s nature need no longer be projected beyond society and history into an unearthly realm. Human beings will recognize that it is the power within themselves that establishes the conditions of their own dignity and destiny. To hold that the evil of this world will be redeemed by an agency beyond the human person and time is to destroy the motive for secular transformation. If the secular transformation is to be achieved, people must destroy the foundation upon which religious illusion flourishes. Thus in the course of building a society "in which the free development of each is the condition for the development of all,"³⁸ one must fight religion because it will inevitably stand in one’s path. And yet, in the new transformed society there will be no need to persecute religion, for its essential function will have disappeared. There will no longer be an exploiting class, nor will the common people stand in need of religious consolation. Religion itself will disappear of its own accord without persecution. This contention is at the heart of everything that Marx wrote, and is not, as has been maintained by some, a youthful enthusiasm of Marx which he abandoned on attaining maturity. The autonomy of the human person -- that was the goal Marx wanted to achieve through his critique of religion. Marx’s criticism of religion ends

With the teaching that man is the highest essence for man, hence with the categoric imperative to overthrow all relations in which man is a debased, enslaved, abandoned, despicable essence.³⁸

Notes:

1. MEGA Ii (2) p. 186.

2. Easton & Guddat, op.cit., p.35, MEGA 11(2), p.164.

3. Karl Marx: On Religion, ed. & trans. by Saul K. Padover (New York: McGraw-Hill book Company, 1974), p. 5: MEGA Ii (2), p. 173.

4. Cf. Robert Payne, Marx (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968),.p. 42.

5. MEGALI, See also, Aeschylus, op.cit., p. 302, 303.

6. Cf. MEGA Ii (1), p. 131.

7. On religion, op. cit., p. 46

8. Engels, ‘Anti-Duhring,’ On Religion, op. cit., p.147.

9. Ibid.

10. Marx, "Preface to a Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy" Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 182.

11. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right; Introduction," On Religion, op. cit., p. 41.

12. Ibid

13. Ibid. p.42

14. Ibid.

15. Ibid.

16. Capital, Vol. 1, op. cit., 79f.

17. On Religion, op. cit., p. 316.

18. Cf. Karl Kautsky, Foundations of Christianity, trans. by Henry F. Mins (New York: Russell & Russell, 1953), p. 351ff.

19. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 145f.

20. Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 333.

21. V. I. Lenin, Religion (New York: International Publishers, 1935), p. 31.

22. Lenin, "Socialism and Religion", Religion, op. cit., p. 9f

23. Cf. Lenin, "The Attitude of the Workers ‘Party Towards Religion", Religion, op. cit., p. 14.

24. Lenin, "Letter to A.M. Gorky", Religion, op. cit., p. 46.

25. "Report on an Investigation of the Peasant Movement in Hunan, Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung (4 vols; Peking: Foreign Language Press, 1965), Vol. 1, p. 46.

26. Cited by Richard C. Bush, Jr. Religion in Communist China (Nashville: Abingdon Press, 1970), p. 399.

27. "On the History of Early Christianity", On Religion, op. cit., p. 334

28. "The Communism of the Paper Rheinischer Beobachter," On Religion, op. cit., p. 83f.

29. Capital, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 10

30. "Anti-Church Movement -- Demonstration in Hyde Park", On Religion, op. cit., p. 128f.

31. Engels, "The Peasant War in Germany", op. cit., p. 99.

32. Engels, "Origin of Family, Private Property and State", Marx & Engels: Selected works, op. cit., p. 570.

33. Engels, "The Peasant War in Germany", On Religion, op. cit., p. 99.

34. Capital, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 721.

35. "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 5.

36. Cf. Reinhold Niebuhr, The Children of Light and the Children of Darkness (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1960), p. 31 ff.

37. Cf. Leslie Dewart, The Future of Belief (New York: Herder & Herder, 1968), p. 61.

38. "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 53.

39. Marx, "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction", On Religion, op., cit., p. 50.

In the preceding chapter we found that in spite of his critical approach to Hegelian philosophy Marx never lost interest in Hegel, and that the problem of the continuity of Marx’s thought was bound up with his continuing interest in Hegel. Marx’s criticism of religion can only be understood against this background of Hegelian philosophy, and also of the anthropology of Feuerbach, which it extends and supersedes. Therefore, in this chapter we shall discuss to what extent Marx’ critique of religion was influenced by Hegel and Feuerbach. The great merit of Hegel’s philosophy wrote Engels, was that

It is impossible to give an adequate account of the ideas of so complex a thinker in so short a space. What is aimed at here is a very brief discussion of those aspects of Hegel’s thought which Marx took seriously for his own critique of religion. It is also to be kept in mind that the Hegel whom we are considering is Hegel as seen through the eyes of Marx and Engels, and hence we must place this qualification upon our reference to Hegel.

Hegel started from the belief that, as he said of the French Revolution, mans existence centres in his head, i.e., in thought, inspired by which he builds up the world of reality".² In his greatest work, the Phenomenology of Mind, Hegel traces the development of mind or spirit (Geist), reintroducing historical movement into philosophy and asserting that the human mind can attain to absolute knowledge. He analyzes the development of human consciousness, from its immediate perception of the here and now, to the stage of self-consciousness, the understanding that allows man to analyze the world and order his own actions accordingly.³ Following this is the stage of reason itself, understanding of the real, after which spirit, by means of religions and art, attains the absolute knowledge, the level at which man recognizes in the world the stages of his own reason. Hegel calls these stages ‘alienation’, in so far as they are creations of the human mind yet thought of as independent and superior to the human mind. This absolute knowledge is at the same time a sort of recapitulation of the human spirit, for each successive stage retains elements of the previous ones as it goes beyond them.

Hegel also talked of "the power of the negative", thinking that there was always a tension between any present state of affairs and what it was becoming. For any present state of affairs was in the process of being negated, changed into something else. This process was what Hegel meant by dialectic.

Hegel’s views on religion played a vital role in the formation of his thought.⁴ Religion, together with philosophy, was for him the highest from of man’s spiritual life. Religion⁵ was the return of the Absolute Idea to itself. The content of religion was the same as that of philosophy, though its method of apprehending was different. For whereas philosophy employed concepts, religion used imagination. These unsatisfactory imaginings afforded only a fragmentary and imprecise knowledge of what philosophy comprehended rationally. But religion could be linked to philosophy by means of a philosophy of religion, and Hegel considered that the particular dogmatic contents of the religious imagination were necessary stages in the development of Absolute Spirit. The philosophy of religion interpreted at a higher level both naive faith and critical reason. Thus Hegel rejected the view of the eighteenth century rationalists that religion did inadequately what only science was competent to do. According to him, religion (or his philosophical interpretation of it) fulfilled man’s constant psychological need to have an image of himself and of the world by which he could orient himself.

Also for Hegel, the acceptance of a certain form of religion conditions the development of a corresponding form of political community: a people’s idea of God determines what they are, and accordingly the form of their states. Hegel said:

According to Hegel, therefore, religion forms the "basis" upon which a superstructure is raised. Only with Christianity did a free state become possible, because only then was the "unlimited right of the personality" recognized, but this potential was only fully realized in Protestantism.

Hegelian philosophy leaves a number of open questions as far as the importance, nature and position of religion in real life is concerned. One of the questions is: Has religion an independent existence -- apart from the human being and society. or is it merely the objectified form in which the union of subjective and objective spirit is seen by people at a given stage, in which they imagine, feel, or understand this union? Another question that comes out of the Hegelian treatment of the subject is: Has the religious idea any value of its own apart from "absolute knowledge", speculative wisdom, or is it only to be accepted as a temporarily unavoidable consequence of the defective philosophical education of the majority of social classes? The suggestion of an elite in Hegel’s speculative philosophy is attacked by many, especially Bruno Bauer and his friends. Hegel said: "The content of religion and philosophy is the same, but religion is the truth for all mankind."⁷ This distinction between an esoteric form of truth accessible to all, and an esoteric form reserved for philosophers was again contested by the radical theologians of the time.

After Hegel’s death differences of opinion began to occur within the Hegelian school that were to lead eventually to a split between "Right Hegelians" and "Left Hegelians". These terms were used to designate religious attitudes. The right of the school held to the slogan "the real is the rational", and saw nothing irrational in the traditional representation of religion. They considered that the major representations of religion -- the transcendental personality of God, the uniqueness of Christ, the individual immortality of the soul, etc. were part of its essential content. Thus they upheld the Hegelian doctrine of the unity of philosophy and religion. The left Hegelians could not admit this unity; they began to ask whether Hegel was not really a pantheist. Questions began to be asked about the personality of God and the immortality of the soul. Hegel’s teaching on these points was not clear, and the verbal tradition of his lectures often varied. ‘The principle that the Left Hegelians held to was that "the rational is the real". Thus the left side of the school opposed the Right’s optimism with a pessimism that set out to destroy the dogmas enshrined in religious representations that were now outdated. In Germany religion and politics were very much connected in those days. Naturally, the Left Hegelians paved the way for a movement of religious criticism which would swiftly become secularized into one of political opposition. It was as a member of this rapidly changing movement that Marx first began to work out his views on philosophy and society.

He joined a sort of Hegelian discussion group: "Through several meetings with friends in Stralow I became a member of a Doctor’s Club."⁸ It was here Marx got acquainted with Bruno Bauer, the leading light in the club, who had been lecturing in theology at the university since 1834.

This conversion to Hegelianism, however, did not last for long. Marx’s doctoral dissertation begun towards the end of 1838 and submitted in April 1841, reveals his growing disagreement with Hegel. The dissertation, entitled "The Difference Between the Democritean and Epicurean Philosophy of Nature", consisted of a criticism of those who had equated the natural philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus and a catalogue of the differences between these philosophies. Marx’s choice of the subject for the dissertation was destined to throw light on the contemporary post-Hegelian situation in philosophy by the examination of a parallel period in the history of Greek philosophy.

In discussing the difference between the natural philosophies of Democritus and Epicurus, Marx favoured the latter. He found Epicurus’ concept of the atom superior to Democritus’ more empirical view because it implied independence, freedom, and an "energizing principle" for experience. Marx begins his account of the relationship of the two philosophers with a paradox: Epicurus held all appearances to be objectively real but at the same time, since he wished to conserve freedom of the will, denied that the world was governed by immutable laws and thus in fact seemed to decry the objective reality of nature. Democritus, on the other hand, was very skeptical about the reality of appearance, but yet held the world to be governed by necessity. From this Marx concludes that Epicurus’ physics was really only a part of his moral philosophy. He did not merely copy Democritus’ physics, as was commonly thought, but introduced the idea of spontaneity into the movement of the atoms, and to the Democritus world of inanimate nature ruled by mechanical laws he added a world of animate nature in which the human will operated.⁹ Marx thus favours the views of Epicurus for two reasons: firstly, his emphasis on absolute autonomy of the human spirit has freed human beings from all superstitions of transcendent objects; secondly, the emphasis on "free individual self-consciousness" shows one way of going beyond the system of a "total philosophy".

In an extended note that he added to his dissertation at the end of 1841, Marx claims that Hegel inverted the traditional proofs for the existence of God and thereby refuted them. Whereas traditional theology said: "Since contingency truly exists, God exists," Hegel turned this into: "Since contingency does not exist, God or the absolute does."¹⁰ Marx, then, poses a dilemma. The first possibility is that the proofs for the existence of God are "empty tautologies," like the ontological argument which Marx stated in the form: "What I conceive for myself as actual is an actual conception for me."¹¹ In that case any gods would have an equal reality.

The second possibility is that

Marx claims that in this sense all proofs for the existence of God are proofs for his non-existence.

In the previous chapter we found Marx’s observation that in Hegel the dialectic stood on its head. For Hegel, the self-development of thought is the real movement and facts are only reflections of this superior reality. As for Marx, the dialectical movement is merely a reflection of the actual development of the real world. So Marx set out to put the dialectic back on its feet. Dialectical laws, he maintains, are abstracted from facts. For him, the dialectic is a matter of social relation. The moments of opposition are objective conditions independent of thought. The opposing elements are classes; moments of opposition become revolutionary phases of development.

The Hegelian relationship of spirit and the world become the Marxian notion of the relationship of man to his social being. Marx says that Hegel only takes account of man’s mental activities, i.e., of his ideas, and that these, though important, are by themselves insufficient to explain social and cultural change.

As Sydney Hook has pointed out,

To sum up how Marx differed from Hegel: Hegel wanted to provide an idealist (spiritual) philosophy of all reality. This philosophy was intended to comprehend reality as it was, i.e., as it had become. So Hegel took the world into his political philosophy and made of it an object of thought. Hegel thought then became a confirmation of the world, because in it the world was justified as and for what it was. Against this materialism of descent Marx posited human self-consciousness as the determinant of the form of government. Marx wanted to comprehend reality as it already, and of itself, pointed to the future; he looked in the present reality for the seeds of the reality to come. History could not stay put in the present state of affairs, but had always to move on in the direction of future rationality. Rationality lay in the future as that which ought to be pursued, and was in striking contrast to present reality. Thus the path which history must follow is a dialectical one.

Whereas Hegel’s dialectic was one of concepts, Marx’s dialectic was one of social forces. While Hegel remained in a world of abstract ideas, Marx turned back to concrete reality. It is to be noted here that though Marx reacted against Hegel’s idealism, his reaction was not one of materialism. It is true that Marx used the term materialism for his own thought, but even in his later writings Marx didn’t use it in the formal sense of the word. Marx’s materialism is concerned not with matter in the physical and chemical sense, but with the human being who influences nature through the work process. He wanted to eliminate the opposition between a supernatural and a natural reality. The supernatural reality could be one of God, or of ideas, or of religion, or of metaphysics -- and it is this ideal reality which was rejected by Marx. The spirit which does exist is the human spirit, bodily spirit; and according to Marx, there is no other. From the beginning to the end of his thinking and writing Marx made use of Hegel’s dialectical method, and he continued to urge his followers to study Hegel. However, we should keep it in mind that he accepted only Hegel’s method but rejected the content of Hegel’s philosophy. He regarded Hegel as standing outside reality. Marx looked for the reality in man --man as he actually is, set in this world, equipped with all his needs and desires. The human being had to change the circumstances of life; and to make the world a human world. Marx rejected the philosophy which was only contemplation, but retained the philosophy which actually intervened in the world.

It is against this background that Marx’s enthusiastic reception of Feuerbach’s philosophy is to be understood. Marx’s profound interest in Feuerbach can be found in a short note that he wrote in 1842 entitled, "Luther as Arbiter between Strauss and Feuerbach". In this note he cited at length a passage from Luther to support Feuerbach’s humanist interpretation of miracles as against the transcendent view of Strauss.

Marx depended very much on Feuerbach for his own criticism of Hegelian philosophy. Every page of the critique of Hegel’s political philosophy that Marx elaborated during the summer of 1843 shows the influence of Feuerbach’s method. In his "Critique of the Hegelian Dialectic and Philosophy as a Whole"¹⁴, Marx discusses the various attitudes of the Young Hegelians to Hegel, and singles out Feuerbach as the only constructive thinker. Feuerbach was the only one of Hegel’s disciples who had been able to come to terms with Hegel’s dialectic. Marx said:

Engels also shared this view. Reminiscing in later years about Feuerbach’s magnum opus, The Essence of Christianity, Engels remarked:

What was this great message of Feuerbach which had such a significant influence on Marx and Engels? Feuerbach abolishes the "theological essence" of religion in favour of its anthropological essence, reducing it precisely to the non-spiritual form which Hegel attacked as being mere "feeling". As Karl Lowith argues,

The axiom of Feuerbach’s criticism of religion is that anthropology is the mystery of Christian theology: "Man is the God of Christianity, Anthropology the mystery of

Christian theology."¹⁸ The task of anthropology is to awaken human being to the truth of religion and to eliminate its falsity: to show that the consciousness of God is the consciousness of the species, and that what the human being adores is self. The true view of the human being is the reverse of the religious view, since

This means that the essence of religion is the essence of the human being. Religion is an ‘objectification’ of human being’s primitive essential needs; it has no particular content of its own. Properly understood, the knowledge of God is man’s knowledge of himself, but knowledge which is as yet unaware of its own nature. "Religion is man’s earliest and also indirect form of self-knowledge,"²⁰ a detour taken by man on the way to finding himself.

According to Feuerbach, both religion and Hegelian philosophy have deprived the human being of natural absoluteness. Actually, Hegelianism is only religion brought to reason. Claiming that God is different from man and, accordingly, that man’s divinity is something to be achieved, both religion and Hegelian philosophy have alienated man from his very essence. They ascribe human being’s own highest perfection to a being different from the human being, to someone who does not even so much as exist. Therefore the more they exalt the ‘absolute’, the more they degrade the human being. That is why Feuerbach said: "The more empty life Is, the fuller, the more concrete is God. The impoverishing of the real world and the enriching of God is one act. Only the poor man has a rich God."²¹

The intention of Feuerbach’s critical philosophy is to break down both theology and speculative philosophy into anthropology. Not only religious consciousness, but also its sublimated philosophical form, Hegelian speculation, must be exposed as false consciousness. In contrast, actual material human being is taken as the positive starting point, and the "I-Thou" relationship and love as the fundamental social aspect. Positivism is chosen as the methodical principle.

This is the precise opposite of the formula in which Hegel’s speculative philosophy had expressed the relationship between God’s self-knowledge and man’s consciousness of God.

In the Essence of Christianity there is another indication of a theory of the origins of religion. Feuerbach says:

Later we will find that some of the comments Marx makes on religion and God are reminiscent of this statement of Feuerbach.

In short we have two sources from which religious concepts spring according to Feuerbach. First, there is the intellectual side, which consists of the inability of the individual to attribute to oneself the human qualities of the endlessly self-perfecting species. Then there is the emotional side, which consists of the inability to comfort oneself in any other way in the pain and sorrow which are an integral part of human existence.

Feuerbach believes that Christianity is opposed to the entire situation of the modern world. Christianity is negated even by those who continue to believe firmly in it. It is denied in life and in science, in art and in industry. If, in practice, the individual and work have replaced the Christian and prayer, theoretically the essence of the human being must replace the divine. Christianity has been reduced to a Sunday affair, it has vanished out of the everyday life of the human being, because

For Feuerbach the criticism of religion is justified, because in divesting God of the good qualities of the human species falsely attributed to God, it enriches and liberates humankind. Like all rationalist philosophers of the time, Feuerbach tends to believe that the act of liberation can be brought about through a simple reformation of people’s consciousness.

To sum up Feuerbach’s critique of religion: The real world, the world which counts, is found right here in the material things available to our senses and passions. Man has a certain distinctive reality of his own, in this sensuous world. He is able to communicate, and to engage in common projects. Man has a community type of existence due to the sharing of aims and passions. In this community he develops certain ideals. He wants to protect those ideals when they are under attack from bad social conditions. Therefore, he projects them, separates them from himself, or, in terms of Hegel’s dialectic, he alienates them from his everyday existence. He puts his moral ideals at a great distance from himself and regards them as a separate reality, or as God. Therefore, the content and substance of religion are entirely human. The key to the mystery of the divine being is the human being, the secret of theology is anthropology. In religion man projects his own nature or nature itself into something superhuman and supernatural Feuerbach reverses the biblical statement "God created man in his own image"²⁴ into man created God in his own image. He says: "Man first unconsciously and involuntarily creates God in his own image, and after this God consciously and voluntarily creates man in his own image".²⁵ What we have to do, says Feuerbach, is to recover the purely human meaning of religion. We have to bring religion back to its proper proportions as an expression of human moral aspirations.

Now let us see how far Marx agreed with Feuerbach and in which sense he may be said to have differed from Feuerbach. Marx repudiated Feuerbach because the latter took as the basis of his philosophy an abstract human being , i.e., human being apart from his world. According to Marx, Feuerbach’s only uncontested merit was his reduction of the absolute spirit to human terms. By his definition of human nature as a naturalistic generic entity, Feuerbach "pushed Hegel aside" without "overcoming him critically". He constructed a human being whose reality reflects only the life of the bourgeois private individual.

Marx agreed with Feuerbach’s claim that both religion and speculative philosophy are forms of the "alienations of man’s essence", but he disagreed with Feuerbach’s claim that the human nature underlying this alienation is fully developed, untainted and divine. On the other hand, though rejecting Hegel’s idealism, Marx agreed with Hegel that history had not yet become the "real history of man -- of man as a given subject, but only man’s actor of creation -- the story of man’s origin."²⁶ In short, the divinity, or rather the humanity, of the human being is something still to be achieved and always to be the result of an achievement. Hence Marx wrote in 1844:

In the same year he again wrote:

Therefore, it is legitimate to say, as Nicholas Lobkowicz points out, that Marx’s philosophy of man is a materialist interpretation of Hegel’s Phenomenology rather than a pendant of Feuerbach’s anthropotheistic materialism.²⁹

Marx’s most significant criticism of Feuerbach is that the latter interpreted reality, but did not change it. In other words, his thought stayed at a theoretical level, and never became praxis. As a result Feuerbach remained stuck in the individualism of bourgeois society. Though he saw religion as a projection, he was unable to explain it in terms of the needs of humanity alienated from itself by the social structure. Hence Marx wrote in his Theses on Feuerbach:

With this philosophical background, Marx started his own critique of religion which he hoped would pave the way for changing the world.

Notes:

1. Engels, "Socialism: Utopian and Scientific," Marx & Engels: Selected Works, op. cit., p. 413.

2. Philosophy of History. Trans by J. Sibree (New York, P.F. Collier & Son, MCMI)

3. cf. The Phenomenologv of Mind, p. 147 ff p. 215 ff.

4. See especially, Lectures of the philosophy of Religion, Vol. I, op.cit., p.6-48.

5. By religion Hegel meant Protestant Christianity, which he considered the highest and final form of religion. He remained a Lutheran all his life.

6. Cited by Iring Fetscher, "Developments in the Marxist Critique of Religion". Councilium, Vol. 16, ed. by Johannes Metz (New York: Paulist Press. 1966), p.133

7. Ibid., p. 135.

8. Writings of Young Marx on Philosophy and Society, trans. and ed. by Lloyd D. Easton and Kurt H. Guddat (New York: Doubleday & Co. 1967).

9. Cf. David McLellan, Marx before Marxism. op. cit. p.52 ff

10. Easton & Guddat, op. cit., p. 65.

11. Ibid.

12. Ibid., p. 65f.

13. Sydeny Hook, op. cit., p. 40.

14. Cf. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 170 ff.

15. Ibid., p. 172.

16. "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," On Religion, op. cit., p. 224.

17. From Hegel to Nietzsche, trans. by Davis E. Green (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1967).

18. The Essence of Christianity, trans. by George Eliot (New York: Hoper & Raw, 1957), p. 336.

19. Ibid., p. 270 f.

20. Ibid., p. 13.

21. Ibid., p. 73.

22. Ibid., p. 121 f.

23. Ibid., p. xliv

24. Genesis 1:27.

25. Essence of Christianity, op. cit., p. 118.

26. Manuscripts, op.,cit., p.173.

27. "Contribution to the Critique of Hegel’s Philosophy of Right: Introduction on Religion, op.cit., p. 4l-58.

28. Manuscripts, op.cit.. p.145•

29. cf. "Karl Marx’s Attitude Toward Religion", The Review of Politics, Vol.26, No.3, 1964, p.319

30. On Religion, op.cit., p.72

The question of continuity and discontinuity of Marx’s thought has been a major issue of debate in the study of Marxism. This question is particularly important not only because numerous conflicting answers have been given to it, but also because the different theoretical answers have been connected with divergent practical aims and actions. Unless we resolve this problem the study of any aspect of Marxism, particularly that of Marx’s critique of religion, will not be fruitful.

There are those who maintain that fundamental differences exist between the ‘young’ or ‘immature’ Marx, represented by his writings up to 1844, and the ‘old’ or ‘mature Marx, represented by his later works. They hold the view that alienation, a concept that was central to Marx’s early thought, was abandoned later by Marx. Sidney Hook, for example, writes: "It is easy to show that the notion of human alienation -- except for the sociological meaning it has in Capital is actually foreign to Marx’s conception of Man."¹

Another writer has stated that whereas:

In a major study of Hegel and Post-Hegelian movements, Herbert Marence gives an extensive summary of early Marxism and concludes: ‘Under all aspects, however, Marx’s early writings are mere preliminary stages to his mature theory, stages that should not be overemphasized."³

Those who distinguish between the ‘young’ and ‘old’ Marx claim that the ideas of the young Marx contained in The Economic & Philosophic Manuscripts of 1844⁴ were abandoned by the older and mature Marx as remnants of an idealistic past connected with Hegel’s teaching.

Since Marx has not worked out his thoughts on alienation systematically in later writings, the impression is given that they do not have much to do with the self. Their manifest content is not the self but society. This is epitomized in Marx’s statement: "Capital is... not a personal, it is a social power".⁵ As presented in the Manifesto of the Communist Party, the Marxian theory of history runs exclusively in abstract social and economic categories. The realities with which it purports to deal are socio-economic realities, such as the economic base of society and the ideological superstructures, the antagonistic classes into which society is said to be split, the property system by means of which the capitalist class exploits the proletarian class, and so forth. Here everything is impersonal, strictly societal. The very idea of the human being has seemingly gone out of sight along with the idea of self-alienation. Thus those who postulate the split between the young’ and old’ Marx seem to be confronted with two distinct Marxisms -- the most striking difference being that of the disappearance of the "self-alienated man" in the later writings of Marx.

On the other hand, there is a significant group of philosophical scholars, existentialists, religious thinkers and Marxist dissenters who take the opposite position. For them the original ‘humanistic’ Marxism is the most valuable and significant contribution of Marx, and the depersonalized mature system appears to be a distortion of humanistic concerns. Those whose primary field of interest is religion find serious religious significance in the earlier writings of Marx. Existentialists who regard modern man’s alienation as their central problem consider the early Marx as one in their fold. Within the Communist movement itself, particularly in various European sections of it, the early writings of Marx have been of great influence. A number of so-called ‘revisionists’, disillusioned by the Stalinist outcome of Russian Communism, have turned to Marx’s Manuscripts in search of a morally meaningful Marxism.

We hold the view that the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ Marx are essentially one and the same, and that there is a continuity of thought in Marx’s writings. The basic ideas on the human being, as Marx expressed them in the Manuscripts, and the ideas of the older Marx as expressed in Capital, are not contradictory. Marx did not renounce his earlier views completely. Evidently Marxist ideas of both earlier and later periods are significant for us. Therefore, our approach to the problem should be that of considering it in a purely factual way by inquiring into the relation between them.

Marx and Engels themselves are our only authoritative sources to shed light on the issue of continuity of thought in Marx. If we make a thorough study of their writings, we will discover that they did not admit the existence of two Marxisms. On the contrary, many of their statements implied a belief in the essential unity of Marxism from the Manuscripts to the Capital. If Marx and Engels had supposed that there was a break between the Marxism of the Manuscripts and that of the Capital, they would never have spoken as they did about the relation of the latter to Hegelianism. Though Marx and Engels later avoided the philosophical language of their early years, and in the Manifesto of the Communist Party laughed at the German literati who "beneath the French criticism of the economic functions of money... wrote ‘Alienation of Humanity,’⁶ they always recognized that "The German Working class movement is the heir of German classical philosophy."⁷ It is obvious that the problem of the continuity of Marx’s thought is bound up with his continuing interest in Hegel. His contemporaries may have been incapable of understanding Hegel, but Marx never lost his interest in him. Lenin himself lent some support to this view by writing in 1914:

Engels, too, shared this view of Hegel’s importance.

In later life Marx cherished the thought of writing a short treatise on the Hegelian dialectic and his relation to it. However the famous passage in the 1873 preface to Capital was his only further word on the matter. There he said:

In the same context Marx reminds us: "The mystifying side of Hegelian dialectic I criticized nearly thirty years ago, at a time when it was still the fashion."¹⁰ Here the reference is to the year 1844 and to the Manuscripts. This obscure reference to his unpublished Manuscripts is entirely understandable for us when we recall that he did indeed develop in them a systematic criticism of Hegel.¹¹ Marx turned Hegelianism "right side up again", by reading Hegel in materialistic economic terms. This inversion of Hegel’s dialectic of history was the constitutive act of original Marxism. And now, in 1873, Marx describes it as the constitutive act of the mature Marxian dialectic. The implication is that he considered the Manuscripts as the birth place of mature Marxism, the founding documents of scientific socialism.

When Marx made the statement of the inversion of Hegelian dialectic in the 1873 preface to Capital, the Manuscripts had not been published, and their very existence remained unknown to the public. Naturally, his followers, or at least many of them, failed in making any sense out of his remarks about the genesis of scientific socialism out of German philosophy. The followers could only speculate in vain as to what he meant by the mysterious version of Hegel. Thus the false legend gradually arose that Marx’s early philosophical period was pre-Marxist, and that Marxism itself came into being only in the aftermath of his apparent break with German philosophy in the middle of 1840’s. Accordingly, his intellectual career was divided into a pre-Marxist early philosophical period and a later post-philosophical period.

If there was one theme running through the whole of Marx’s writings, the most obvious would be ‘alienation’, a concept that he developed through confrontation with Hegel. Whereas for Hegel alienation is a state of consciousness subject to elimination by another state of consciousness¹² for Marx alienation is related to real, existing objects subject to elimination only in the real sphere of object-related activity.¹³ Marx’s critique of Hegel, in this connection, is that the abolition of alienation on the level of mere consciousness recognizes the immanent impossibility of abolishing real alienation. Hegel’s consciousness only approves a reality that it cannot change. Such a merely spiritual emancipation forces man to legitimize his chains. But Marx sees alienation as residing in a concrete relationship between man and his products, and hence his discussion on alienation is in materialistic terms. And yet, in spite of the materialistic tone, Marx’s writings are related to issues of general philosophical significance, and his later writings on economy and society are meaningful only within this wider context. Marx’s critique of the way in which Hegel handled the question of alienation restates Marx’s general critique of philosophical idealism, and the Marxian version of materialism emerges from this discussion of alienation. Marx’s views on alienation and his materialism are thus inseparable.

The continuity of Marx’s thought has been demonstrated beyond doubt by the publication of some of Marx’s notes, written in the six months from October 1857 to March 1858, under the title Foundations of the Critique of Political Economy.¹⁴ The time and place of their publication prevented their attracting attention and it was not until 1953 that there was an accessible edition. Questions that were important in Marx’s Manuscripts -- such as the true nature of labor and the resolution of the conflict between individual and community -- are taken up again in the Foundations and explained in detail.¹⁵ In the foundations Marx used the same argument which he used in the Manuscripts, arguing that the need to work does not constitute in itself a restriction of freedom, provided it is not alienated work. He also speaks of the ‘self-realization’ of the person, hence of true freedom. The Foundations then, is as Hegelian as the Manuscripts and in the light of that it is impossible to maintain that only Marx’s early writings are of philosophical interest and that he lost the humanist vision in the later writings.

The idea that the aim of human evolution is the unfolding of the human being, the creation of ‘wealthy’ human being who has overcome the contradiction between self and nature and achieved true freedom, is expressed in many passages of Capital, written by the mature and old Marx. He wrote in the third volume of the Capital:

The concept of alienation is expressed in the Capital in these words:

Thus the content of Capital is a continuation of Marx’s early thoughts. The main theme of the first volume of Capital, surplus value, rests on the equation of work and value that goes back to the conception of man as being who creates himself and the conditions of his life -- a conception outlined in the Manuscripts.¹⁸ It is man’s nature -- according to the Manuscripts -- to be constantly developing himself and the world around him in cooperation with other men. What Marx in Capital is describing is how this fundamental nature of human being -- to be the initiator and controller of historical process -- has been transferred or alienated and how it belongs to the inhuman power of capital. The counterpart of alienated man, the unalienated or ‘total man of the Manuscripts, also appears in Capital. In the chapter of "Machinery and Modern Industry" in Capital, Marx makes the same contrast between the effects of alienated and unalienated modes of production on the development of human personality. In other parts of Capital, Marx speaks of the importance of producing "fully developed human beings,"¹⁹ "the full development of human race",²⁰ man’s "necessity to develop himself",²¹ and of the "fragment of a man" as the result of the process of alienation.²²

The section of Capital that most recalls the early writings is the final section of the first chapter of volume I, entitled ‘The Fetishism of Commodities and the Secret Thereof’. The Whole section is reminiscent of the section on alienated labor in the Manuscripts.²³

Marx writes:

Marx, then, draws a parallel between alienated labor and religion:

From this point of view, Capital is a detailed study of the economic aspects of the process outlined by Marx in his Manuscripts. What was philosophically postulated in 1844 is now verified and vindicated by an analysis of capitalist economic activity undertaken with the tools of classical political economy.

Marx never repudiated the idea of alienation in its human sense rather he claimed that it cannot be divorced from the concrete and real life process of the alienated individual. Marx criticized capitalism precisely because it destroyed individual personality, just as he criticized "crude communism" for the same reason. As Erich Fromm has pointed out,

It should be remembered that Capital is only an unfinished fragment of the task that Marx set himself. In the preface to the Manuscripts he had outlined the program of his life’s work:

But Marx never got beyond his first ‘pamphlet’ on political economy. Had he finished the whole work he intended to do, we could have received much more insights into the humanistic vision of the mature Marx.

Marx never gave up his concept of the essence of the human being. This point will be understood better when we examine the Manuscripts where Marx decided that human self-alienation could and should be grasped as a social relation between human beings. ‘Only man himself can be this alien power over man, he said, but this relation of man to himself takes practical shape as a relation between the alienated worker and another man outside him, i.e., the capitalist.’ In this way the inner conflict of the alienated human being became, in Marx’s mind, a social conflict between "labor" and "capital," and the alienated species-self became the class divided society. Thus, self-alienation was projected as a social phenomenon.

One of the passages of The Holy Family, written in the so-called transitional period (1845), illustrates this point quite vividly:

Society is here envisaged as a self-system whose inner dynamics are those of alienation. The antagonistic classes are collective expressions of the conflicting forces of the self-system. The proletariat and the capitalist class, or labor and capital, are opposite sides of "the same human self-alienation".

Marx sees in society a self-system in conflict. To put it differently, that which he sees presents itself to him from now on simply as ‘society’. Thus in his short work Wage Labour and Capital (1847) he asserts:

"The same human self-alienation" has now become simply "the same relation". Marx also describes labor power as a commodity that its possessor, the worker, surrenders to capital, and declares:

Here is the picture of the alienated labor given in the Manuscripts, the only difference being that Marx no longer calls it alienated labor, but simply wage labor. He now apprehends the alienated self-relation as a social relation of labor and capital, and on this basis he can say that "Capital is... not a personal, it is a social power".³¹

This makes it clear why Marx proceeded in the Manifesto of the Communist Party to formulate Marxism without explicit reference to the concepts of man and his self-alienation, and why he here scornfully dismissed the whole notion of "man in general" as unreal. For him there was no longer any generic man, and hence no longer any use for the idea of man’s self-alienation. The alienated self-relation had transformed itself into an alienated social relation, and ‘man’ was just the ‘ensemble’ of such relations. Man had been split into two. There were left only the dissociated antagonistic parts, the ‘worker’ and capitalist’, neither of them wholly human. Society itself was splitting down the center into two hostile camps of workers and capitalists. It appeared that the realities were the warring classes themselves, and so it had always been: "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggles".³² It was absurd of the German literati to espouse the misty cause of mankind.³³ The only real and pressing issue was that of which side to take, labor’s or capital’s, in the ongoing class struggle. Thus the Marxism of the Manifesto evolves directly out of the Marxism of the Manuscripts. What he sees is still the process of self-alienation, but he sees it as a social process. Alienation remains his central theme, but it has gone underground in his image of society.

In spite of certain changes in mood and language, the Core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never changed. It is impossible to understand his concept of socialism, and his criticism of capitalism as developed in his later writings except on the basis of the concept of the human being which he developed in his early writings. The ‘young’ and the ‘old’ Marx are essentially one and the same -- Marx the fighter against self-alienation dehumanization and exploitation, Marx the combatant for the full humanization of man, for the many sided development of man’s human possibilities, for the abolition of class society and for the realization of an association in which "the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all".³⁴

This does not mean, however, that Marx’s views never changed, but rather that there are not two fundamentally different and mutually unconnected Marx. Marx’s thought was constantly changing (in the sense that it was developing), but there were not such turns in this process as would represent a complete break with former ideas and the passage to entirely different or even opposite conceptions. The young Marx is not an abstract philosopher, nor is the old Marx a stem scientist. Marx’s thought from beginning to end is a revolutionary humanism, and only when it is considered as a whole can it serve as an adequate theoretical basis of the revolutionary struggle for a democratic, humanistic socialism. It is in the light of this fundamental coherence of his thought that we should examine Marx’s critique of religion.

Notes:

1. From Hegel to Marx (Michigan: University Press, 1971), p. 6.

2. Daniel Bell, "The Debate on Alienation", Revisionism: Essays on the History of Marxist Ideas, ed. by Leopold Labedz (London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd., 1962), p. 210.

3. Reason and Revolution (Boston: Beacon Press, 1960), p.295.

4. Ed. by Dirk J. Struik, trans. by Martin Milligan (New York: International Publishers, 1971), hereafter cited as Manuscripts.

5. "Manifesto of the Communist Party," Marx & En gels: Selected Works, op. cit. p. 47.

6. "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx & Engels: Selected Work, op. cit., p. 57.

7. F. Engels, "Ludwig Feuerbach and the End of Classical German Philosophy," On Religion, op. cit., p. 268

8. Cited by Raya Dunayevskaya, "Marx’s Humanism Today", Socialist Humanism ed. by Erich Fromm (New York: Doubleday & Co., 1965), p. 66-67.

9. Karl Marx, Capital (3 vols.; New York: International Publishers, 1972-73), Vol. I, p. 19, 20.

10. Capital, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 19.

11. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 170ff.

12. Cf. Hegel, The Phenomenology of Mind, op. cit., p. 509ff.

13. Cf. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 178 ff.

14. Trans. by Martin Nicolaus (Middlesex, England: Penguin Books Ltd., 1973). It should be noted that this title is not Marx’s, but stems from the first editors of these notes. It was published for the first time in Moscow in 1939. It is generally known as the Grundrisse, obviously, from the first word of the German title. These notes amount to almost one thousand pages which actually served Marx as a basis both for his Critique of Political Economy (1859) and Capital (1867)

15. See, for example Ibid., p.163ff, 831ff.

16. Capital, Vol. III, op. cit., p 820.

17. Capital, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 432.

18. Cf. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 78ff.

19. Capital Vol.I op.cit., p. 483f.

20. Ibid., p. 505f.

21. Ibid., p. 513.

22. Ibid., p. 645.

23. Cf. Manuscripts, op. cit., p. 106ff.

24. Capital, Vol. I, op. cit., p. 72.

25. Ibid.

26. Erich Fromm, op. cit., p. 77f.

27. Manuscripts, p. 63.

28. Marx & Engels, The Holy Family or Critique of Critical Critique, trans. by R. Dixon (Moscow: Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956), p. 51.

29. Marx Engels, Selected works, op.cit, p. 84.

30. Ibid., p. 75.

31. "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx & Engels: Selected works, op.cit., p. 47

32. Ibid., p. 35.

33. Cf. Ibid., p. 56f

34. "Manifesto of the Communist Party", Marx & Engels:Selected works,op.cit., p. 29

This study is presented as a contribution to Christian -Marxist dialogue. Marx proclaims the autonomy and affirms the self-transcendence of the human being. Both these are deepened and challenged by Bonhoeffer’s theological understanding of Incarnation. What is being investigated here is the extent to which Bonhoeffer’s theology will help in the development of an adequate theological approach to Marxism. This study seeks to elaborate a Bonhoefferian corrective of Marx’s critique of religion.

There are certain areas of similarity in the writings of Bonhoeffer and Marx. For example, Bonhoeffer’s criticism of metaphysics echoes Marx’s denunciation of religion as "a reversed world consciousness." The "opium of the people" in Marx is not unrelated to the "cheap grace" in Bonhoeffer. To a certain extent, both Marx and Bonhoeffer consider religion a particular stage in human historical development. Marx believed that when class oppression ended the "false consciousness" that arose from the alienation of the human being and reflected in religious systems, would disappear. Bonhoeffer thought that religion was nothing but a "garment of Christianity" which it wore during a particular epoch of human history, and that we are now moving f⁰ a time of "religionless Christianity".

Nevertheless, these apparent similarities should not be overemphasized. Though both Marx and Bonhoeffer criticized religion the differences in their respective critiques are remarkable. Marx’s critique of religion stems from the notion that the idea of a creator God hinders the limitless future and impoverishes the perspectives, endeavours and struggles of human beings. Human creativity cannot reach its potential in such a God, i.e., outside the human. Accordingly, Marx’s concept of transcendence consists essentially of endeavours and activities aimed at going beyond the given reality, the world as it is; overcoming it practically and transforming it to the benefit of humanity. Transcendence opens the way for the future. However, Marx does not regard this opening of a new future as an incursion of the divine into human history. He conceives transcendence to be a dynamic human reality, a self-transcending formation of the meaning and values of human life. Thus the objective of Marx’s critique of religion is the affirmation of human creativity and automony.

Whereas Marx completely abandoned the concept of God by his critique of religion, Bonhoeffer tried to reinterpret the concept of God so that it would be understandable to the autonomous modern person living in a "world come of age". According to him, it was the Incarnation which made possible the coming of age. He recognized that the world’s coming of age consisted of a knowledge of God which seeks to follow God where He has preceded us. This requires that we act responsibly in the situations where God has placed us. It was this recognition of the world’s coming of age that led Bonhoeffer to a critique of religion. He did not want to abolish religion, but maintained that if the Church is to be relevant to our time it must be ready to criticize itself and re-examine its traditional beliefs find practices. The paradoxical expression "religionless Christianity is not to be understood as a movement against the organized Church, rather it is a new way of life in which the Christian will practise the "secret discipline," for "Jesus calls men, not to a new religion, but to life".

There is a notable lack of reference to Marx in Bonhoeffer’s writings. However, we may employ Bonhoeffer as a catalyst for a meaningful encounter with Marxism. Whereas Marx considered that God stood in the way of human freedom and autonomy, Bonhoeffer demonstrated that it is precisely God who grants freedom and autonomy to human beings. He does it by making Jesus the point of disclosure of God’s transcendence. He believed that a world isolated by its illusion of autonomy, which does not take seriously the revelation of God in Jesus Christ, is only a utopia of ambitious people. Bonhoeffer directs our attention to the figure of Jesus of Nazareth, who humbled himself and made himself of no account, as a norm and standard for revolution and humanization. The task of revolution and humanization is accomplished not by overthrowing the world but by its reconciliation with God. The reality of the world can be confronted and overcome by the perfect love of God, as it is revealed in Jesus Christ. The transformation of the world is thus achieved by participating in this Jesus "being there for others". These are the outlines of a Bonhoefferian corrective of Marx. And yet, this is not just a corrective to Marx, but a clarion call to the church to awaken from its dogmatic slumber and come to a new understanding of Christian witness in our time.

The corrective is developed examining the writings of Karl Marx and Dietrich Bonhoeffer. Since it is impossible to divorce Friedrich Engles from any consideration of Marxist philosophy, his writings also are taken into account. Although all the works of Marx are utilized, special emphasis is given to his early writings. This does not mean that we subscribe to the theory held by some that Marx’s early writings are basically different from his later writings and that there is a discontinuity in his thought. In fact the continuity of Marx’s thought is the topic of the opening chapter in this study. Marx’s thinking was very much influenced by his predecessors, and without reference to Hegel and Feuerbach his thoughts cannot be properly understood or interpreted. We do this as briefly as possible. In analyzing Marx’s critique of religion, caution has been taken not to confuse our understanding of Marx through a premature Christian apologetic. This approach is necessary to understand Marx’s criticisms in the right perspective. The chapter on "Transcendence According to Marx" deals with the deeper dimensions of Marx’s critique of religion as these might be applied in the fulfillment of Marxist programme. We then make a theological evaluation of Marx’s critique of the religion and find out how much the church can appropriate from this critique.

Our next step is to examine Bonhoeffer’s critique of religion. All the writings of Bonhoeffer are used, with special emphasis on his prison writings. Dissatisfaction has been expressed in various circles of the theological world about the fragmentary nature of the prison writings. Here the writer agrees with John Phillips when he says,

It was Bonhoeffer’s realization of the world’s coming of age that made necessary for him a critique of religion and that led him to a new understanding of the church. He found the guidelines for this new understanding of the church in what he calls "non- religious interpretation". But by this new kind of interpretation he did not reject the idea of the church; but the way of life in the church which he envisioned, he called "religionless Christianity". Accordingly, we develop these three interrelated themes -- world come of age, nonreligious interpretation, and religionless Christianity. The chapter on "Transcendence According to Bonhoeffer" develops Bonhoeffer’s Christocentric view of human life. It is from this Christocentric view of human life that we offer our corrective of Marx’s critique of religion and present a challenge to contemporary Marxists.

Both Marxism and Christianity have come a long way from the time of Marx in their attitude toward each other. In the light of this unfolding development we discuss, in the concluding chapter, the necessity and promise of Marxist-Christian dialogue, and suggest how the mutual challenge could serve the interests of both in pro-existence.

Bishop Dr. Paulose Mar Paulose was a student of theology in Berkeley University in the United States at a time when Berkeley became well known as a campus of radical student protests. The demand of the students to the United States government to withdraw its forces from Vietnam and the protests around it influenced Bishop Paulose’s theological thinking. He was convinced that on certain occasions Christian obedience has to be shown through protest and resistance. He recalls in the introduction to his book in Malayalam, Swathanthriyam Anu Daivam ("Freedom is God") that it was when he was at Berkeley, that he was influenced by the humanism of Karl Marx and the "religionless Christianity’’ of the German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer. He was awarded doctoral degree in 1976 for the thesis" A Bonhoefferian Corrective of Karl Marx’s Critique of Religion. It was "submitted as a contribution to Marxist Christian dialogue which has in recent years been smothered by unfavourable international politics." It is "addressed primarily to the Christian community, but it is also hoped that it might invite the perspective of other groups."

This publication is an edited version of the thesis. We have taken every care to maintain fully the integrity of the thesis. Portions of the thesis which consist mainly of references to other authors and quotations from them have been omitted while ensuring the continuity of thought in the thesis. In the rest of the thesis we have made only minor editorial changes.

Three things this dissertation is not, Bishop Paulose makes clear. First, this is not an attempt to prove that Christian theology is superior to Marxist philosophy. Second, this is not an attempt to place Bonhoeffer in the Marxist camp. Third, this is not an attempt to make a synthesis of Marxism and Christianity. ‘Rather, Marx’s and Bonhoeffer’s critiques of religion are examined objectively, and the possibility of undergirding the positive criticisms of Marx with a sound theology is explored. This exploration is in the nature of an analytical study of Bonhoeffer’s theology.’

The thesis is a brilliant examination of how Bonhoeffer’s theology will help in the development of an adequate theological approach to Marxism. In elaborating a Bonhoefferian critique to Marxism the author points Out areas of similarity as well as those of differences with regard to criticism of religion.

At the very beginning of the thesis, Bishop Paulose makes a significant contribution to the understanding of Marx. Many scholars have suggested that there are two distinct phases in Marx’s writings: early Marx, which includes at least the rather humanistic ideas of the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts (1844) and The Communist Manifesto (1848); and later Marx which has the much more technical and ‘scientific’ economics of Das Capital, the first volume of which was published in 1867. Bishop Paulose shows that the ‘young’ and the ‘old’ Marx are essentially one and the same and there is a continuity of thought in Marx’s writings. The basic ideas about the human being as Marx expressed them in the Manuscripts and the ideas of the older Marx as expressed in Capital are not contradictory. If there is a theme running through the whole of Marx’s writings, the most obvious would be ‘alienation’, a concept that he developed through confrontation with the ideas of Hegel. Marx’s views on alienation and those on materialism are thus inseparable. Bishop Paulose does not accept the view that only Marx’s early writings are philosophical and that he lost the humanist version in his later writings. "In spite of certain changes in mood and language, the core of the philosophy developed by the young Marx was never changed and it is impossible to understand his concept of socialism and his criticism of capitalism as developed in his later writings except on the basis of the concept of man which he developed in his early writings". The fundamental coherence of Marx’s views is affirmed here. It is that affirmation that provides the theoretical basis of the revolutionary struggle for a democratic humanistic socialism.

Marx was influenced by the philosophy of Hegel and the anthropology of Feuerbach. Hegel may well be the most influential philosopher and political theorist Germany has produced, with the possible exception of Kant. His influence is undeniable across an enormous range of modem social thought, especially in Marxism. Hegel’s views on religion played a vital role in the formation of his thought. Religion together with philosophy was for Hegel the highest form of the spiritual life of human beings. In Germany religion and politics were very much connected in those days. Marx was at one stage a member of a Hegelian discussion group though he soon differed with it. Hegel is well known for his dialectics. The dialectic, according to Hegel, is the process in which any social or intellectual state contains an essential contradiction. To Hegel the contradiction was one of ideas and concepts. To Marx the conflict was of social forces. While Marx made use of Hegel’s dialectical method and continued to urge his followers to study Hegel, he accepted only Hegel’s method and not his philosophy. Marx was not interested in philosophy which was contemplation. He was only interested in philosophy which was capable of intervening in the world.

Bishop Paulose points out how Marx found the views of Feuerbach on religion more helpful. Both Marx and Engels were deeply influenced by Feuerbach’s The Essence of Christianity. This was mainly because Feuerbach abolishes the "theological essence" of religion in favour of its anthropological essence. According to this the essence of religion is the essence of the human being. "Religion is man’s earliest and also indirect form of self-knowledge". Marx obviously liked the origin of religion given in The Essence of Christianity. "Nature listens not to the plaints of man, it is callous to his sorrows. Hence man turns away from Nature, from all visible objects. He turns within, that here, sheltered and hidden from the inexorable powers, he may find audience for his griefs. Here he utters his oppressive secrets; here he gives vent to his stifled sighs. This open air of the heart, this outspoken secret, this uttered sorrow of the soul, is God. God is a tear of love shed in the deepest concealment of human misery. God is an unutterable sigh, lying in the depths of the heart." Bishop Paulose shows how these thoughts of Feuerbach find echo in the comments that Marx made later on religion and God. "Religious distress is at the same time the expression of real distress and the protest against real distress. Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people". Bishop Paulose says that it would be a complete distortion if this oft-quoted passage from Marx is taken as some sort of vulgar atheism or as a rejection of religion per se or even as an attack upon religion. The passage has been misused both by Marxists some of whom have made atheism part of their doctrine and by followers of religion who want to show that Marxism is a rejection of rejection of religion. Bishop Paulose points out how both are wrong.

Some of the ideas of Engels have been particularly helpful for Marxist-Christian dialogue and collaboration. These ideas are highlighted by Bishop Paulose. While the ruling classes may wish to employ religious belief and feeling as forces for the retention of their power, religion being a mass phenomenon that transcends classes, may serve as the justification for and inspiration of vast popular movements that are revolutionary. Marxism emphasizes the revolutionary quality of early Christianity and stresses the significant contrast between early and late Christianity. Engels wrote that the history of early Christianity has notable points of resemblance with the modem working class movement.

Marx did not believe that a direct attack against religion would ever work. Any direct struggle against religion appeared to Marx useless and misplaced: useless because religion simply cannot be abolished as long as the world is not put straight: misplaced because the real enemy is the perverted social order of which, as Marx put it, religion is only the spiritual aroma. In the Manuscripts Marx draws an important distinction between atheism and socialism. "Atheism... has no longer any meaning, for atheism is a negation of God, and postulates the existence of man through this negation; but socialism as socialism no longer stands in need of such a mediation." Marxism, manifesting a profound humanism as the heart of its inspiration, naturally opposes religious persecution, Bishop Paulose points out. This is something that has been forgotten both by Marxists and Christians in several situations. The few references to religion that Marx made in his later years indicate that in spite of his lack of interest in this kind of problem, his view on religion and atheism did not change as the years passed. "Everyone should be able to attend to his religious as well as his bodily needs without the police sticking their noses in", Marx argues in his Critique of the Gotha Programme (1875).

But it needs to be pointed out that several followers of Marxism did not follow this wise advice of Marx. Lenin in the 1920’s said, "We must tirelessly carry out atheist propaganda and struggle". The period following the Russian revolution was one of direct confrontation between the church and the state. However not long after, the approach of the government to religious matters became rather cautious. There was much greater emphasis on the need to undermine religion by social and economic action rather than by direct confrontation with religious institutions and believers. Lenin died in 1924, leaving a rather ambiguous legacy concerning religion. An observer commented, "A mainly atheistic outlook tempered by the conviction that the subordination of action against religious bodies to the wider objectives of the state leaves the maximum freedom to pursue whatever policy appears to be the most expedient at any particular juncture".

Bishop Paulose points out that with regard to religion, Mao Zedong is closer to Marx than Lenin. Mao also did not think a struggle against religion was necessary. His critique of religion is essentially sociological and political, as indicated in his statement, "If religion does not interfere with the Peoples Republic, the People’s Republic will not interfere with it". He also said, "We allow various opinions among the people; that is, there is freedom to criticize, to express different views, and to advocate theism or atheism (i. e. materialism)".

The conclusion that Bishop Paulose arrives at after examining in detail Marx’s critique of religion is important. "Whenever Marx attacks religion, or particularly the church, it is an indirect attack on the evils of society. Similarly attacks on the evils of society are indirectly attacks on religion. He challenged the religion of his time to build a just social order. Thus we can say that Marx was, by his sense of injustice found in the society, on the side of the angels. Hence he has been classified with the "Children of Light" and not with the ‘Children of Darkness".

Bishop Paulose follows up his argument in the next chapter where he deals with "Transcendence According to Marx" and points out that the crucial point and the very essence of Marx’s critique of religion is not its denial of God but the acknowledgment and affirmation of human autonomy. Marx does not accept the Christian conception of the human being, which begins and ends with God, the source of all human actuality and potentiality. Marx’s critique of religion is not primarily and essentially a revolt against God, but rather a struggle on behalf of the human being for fullness and transcendence. This transcendence which opens the human being to unlimited possibilities is a human project. It perpetually opens the way for the future. It is a human choice to remain open to the future. God has no place in it. In religion, transcendence rests on God. God opens the future for the human being who responds. But in Marx’s transcendence God is absent. God puts a restraint on the autonomy and therefore the potential or the human being. Dependence on such a God and the autonomy of the human being are incompatible. For a Christian, transcendence is the act of God who comes to him. For a Marxist, it is a dimension of human activity exploring full potential.

Another distinguished Indian theologian who studied Marx’s views on religion was Fr. Sebastian Kappen. His doctoral thesis submitted to the Gregorian University in Rome, in the year 1961 was "Praxis and Religious Alienation According to the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of Karl Marx." The text of the dissertation was published as Marxian Atheism in 1983. Kappen wrote "The essence of Marxian atheism lies not so much in his denunciation of religion as in his affirmation of the radical autonomy and self-sufficiency of man. His criticism of religion is aimed at making man ‘revolve about himself as his own true sun". (page 14)

Bishop Paulose rightly points out that there is no other aspect of Marxist ideology that has drawn the attention of Christians as much as atheism. He asks Christians to avoid a propagandistic and condemnatory approach in dealing with atheism. Marx’s atheism is essentially humanistic. It starts not from a negation but an affirmation. It affirms the autonomy of the human being and rejects any attempt to deny the human being’s creative power and potential. Therefore Bishop Paulose says, "Marx is trying to restore to people a purpose in life and to give of mankind a higher meaning. We cannot completely ignore this effort, to the extent that it is directed at the progress of humanity. This reminds us that the church must be ready to witness to the Lordship of Christ by cooperating with men of goodwill of all religious and non-religious groups who are genuinely concerned about better ways of living and working". Marx’s critique of religion challenges Christians for a vision of the human being rooted more deeply in reality. It exhorts Christians to act out the implications of the human being made in the image of God who has become incarnate.

We are reminded that Marx’s critique of religion is in many ways similar to those of the prophets of the Old Testament. Like the Biblical prophets Marx fought against the established religion. The prophets criticized religion that was hands in glove with those in power. As Fr. Kappen points out "Believers will have little difficulty in concurring with Marx’s violent attack on the God of ideological legitimation. It is his abiding contribution to have unmasked the class character of God in much of popular worship. The same God is very much alive even today where religious leaders are in league with the powers that be" (Marxian Atheism, page 84). It is therefore our responsibility to prove that to be a Christian does not mean to be the defender of the established order. The church, certainly, can play a vital role for the transformation of society.

Bishop Paulose finds a ‘religious’ element in Marx’s critique of religion. Marx’s concern for the ‘self-consciousness of man’ lies very close to the religious task of being relevant in the world. Seen in this light Marx’s critique of religion may very well be a "religious criticism" of the world. As Fr. Kappen says ‘paradoxically, in spite of his avowed atheism, Marx’s philosophical concern has much in common with the ultimate meaning of human existence. What is the theory of alienation and its suppression but an attempt to unravel the hidden meaning and ultimate goal of history"? (Marxian Atheism, page 84).

It is in connection with Marx’s criticism of religion especially as an ally of the establishment that Bishop Paulose brings in the theology of liberation which he says "represents the final coming-to-terms with Marx, the positive appropriation of Marx’s contribution to modern thought and life".

Bishop Paulose raises some fundamental questions while expressing his hopes about a socialist society. What is the authentic human life? What is the ultimate meaning of human existence? One might say that these questions ought to have been raised with regard to Marxism itself, rather than to the socialist society. It is here that Bonhoeffer’s theology is brought in as a corrective of Marxist critique of religion.

There is a continuing interest in theological circles in the writings of Dietrich Bonhoeffer. This is especially true of Letters and Papers from Prison. Bonhoeffer was executed in the last days of the Second World War in a vengeful act of cruelty by the Nazi regime which he had contested since Hitler came to power in 1933. The Letters as well as the great biography by his close friend Eberhard Berthge, have proved to be of worldwide and lasting significance for many of the leaders and the issues in the ecumenical movement. Much of the subsequent fascination with his legacy has focussed on many layered phrases such as his advocacy of radically new Christian responses to "a world come of age" or his practice of a "secret discipline" of meditation and prayer.

In dealing with Bonhoeffer as a corrective to Marx there is one major difficulty. There are few references to Marx in Bonhoeffer’s writings. This may look strange; there is no reason to believe that he was not familiar with Marxist philosophy. Bishop Paulose suggests two reasons. It would not have been politically wise for Bonhoeffer to refer to Marx in his writings as it would have given Hitler another weapon against him. Again Bonhoeffer was dealing with the greatest challenge of the times viz: Nazism. So rather than trying to find what Bonhoeffer might have written or thought about Marx, the writer examines Bonhoeffer’s critique of religion and then finds the similarities with and differences from Marx’s critique.

At the very outset Bishop Paulose says, "What is important to note is that in spite of the similarities between Marx and Bonhoeffer there is a striking difference which is crucial for our enquiry: Bonhoeffer’s critique of religion grew from, and was directed towards, an extraordinary faith in Christ, Lord of the world. Without this faith such a critique would be impossible. The foundation for the Christian encounter with Marxism is found in Bonhoeffer’s theology in the more basic framework of the confrontation of Christ with the world. His thoughts will, therefore, help us to formulate and synthesize an adequate theological approach to Marxism." Here the thesis becomes a personal testimony. When Bishop Paulose is dealing with Marxism it is out of an extraordinary faith that he speaks. The call for dialogue with Marxists comes out of the basic framework of the confrontation of Christ with the world.

The fundamental question that Bonhoeffer poses before us is "If religion is no more than a ‘garment of Christianity’ which must now be cast aside because it has lost its meaning in a ‘world come of age’, if the real problem facing Christianity today is not so much that of religionlessness, but precisely that of religion, then what does all this mean for the church?" The church must be ready for self-criticism and closely examine the validity of its traditional beliefs and practices in a "work come of age". In one sense the world come of age is a secularised world, where more and more areas of activity which were traditionally under religion are no longer there. Scientific progress and political evolution have brought in this autonomy. Some of the earlier boundaries are gone. This according to Bonhoeffer is the work of Christ. The lordship of Christ corresponds to worldliness, and discipleship to a sharing in this world: the natural, the profane, the rational and the humane are placed not against but with this Christ. This is what Bonhoeffer means by the phrase "world come of age".

Bonhoeffer claims that it is the work of Christ that has made the world secular and "come of age". In his significant work Christianity in World History, a prominent theologian Arend Theodor van Leeuwen has argued that the idea of separating out the things of God from the things of people in such a way as to deny the divine nature of kingship was first formulated in ancient Israel and then became a major motif of Christianity. As Christianity spread across Europe it brought the message of secularization with it. By secularization van Leeuwen did not mean secularism -- the worship of worldly things -- but rather the separation of religious and temporal spheres. Secular culture was according to Leeuwen, Christianity’s gift to the world.

For Bonhoeffer the guiding principle for Christians in this realm is that of identification with the world. We are part of the world Christ came to save and we cannot participate in his saving act unless we do so at those places in the world where we live alongside fellow human beings, whether or not we bear a Christian name. The coming of age leads us to a true recognition of our situation before God. Bishop Paulose says, "It is by this reasoning, namely by a bold effort to answer the question of how Jesus Christ can become lord even of the religionless, that Bonhoeffer arrived at his conclusion that the church should work out and proclaim a ‘non-religious’ interpretation of Biblical and theological concepts".

The two concepts associated with Bonhoeffer are examined in detail in the thesis. They are "non-religious interpretation" and "religionless Christianity". These are interrelated and both are important for an adequate understanding of the development of the thinking of Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer maintains that the Biblical understanding of God directs us to a powerless and suffering God who is with us and who calls us to share his suffering for the sake of the world. But it is not this God that religion presents. He observes that Christian religion has become a separate part among the other parts of life, a mere section of the whole. This is because of the partial nature of religion in contrast to ‘faith’. "The ‘religious act’ is always something partial, ‘faith’ is something whole, involving the whole of one’s life." Bonhoeffer criticises the privileged character of the church.

Bonhoeffer’s critique of religion in its most comprehensive form found in his prison writings. But it had evolved over a number of years. Bishop Paulose points out that the critique of religion confronted Bonhoeffer immediately with a problem: finding a non-religious language to interpret the Biblical and theological concepts. "It will be a new language, perhaps quite non-religious, but liberating and redeeming-as was Jesus’ language; it will be the language of a new righteousness and truth, proclaiming God’s peace with men and the coming of his kingdom". Bishop Paulose became a "secular theologian" as he described himself, by using such liberating and redeeming language, listened to and understood perhaps by more outside the church than inside. The influence of Bonhoeffer on Bishop Paulose was profound and direct. He affirms, "We should remember that Bonhoeffer’s non-religious interpretation does not arise out of any doubts about Christ but is first and last a Christological interpretation. He always tries to pursue Christological questions by means of non-religious interpretation." The non-religious interpretation of Biblical concepts means that the concepts must be interpreted in such a way as not to make religion a precondition of faith.

Bishop Paulose followed in his preaching what he learned from Bonhoeffer. "One thing is quite clear from what Bonhoeffer says: the criterion for the understanding of our preaching should not be how well it is understood by the believer, but by the non-believer". The usual Christian preaching does not communicate to those outside the church; it is not understood by them. Bishop Paulose was one of the few church leaders who spoke in a language that was understood by all. He could speak to people outside the church also about his faith in a secular language.

Like Bonhoeffer he believed that "The church is the church only when it exists for others". With his interpretation Bonhoeffer does not reject the church, only affirms it in a new way; the way of life in the church which Bonhoeffer envisions is one of what he calls "religionless Christianity". This of course is a concept which has led to endless controversy. Bishop Paulose points out that surprisingly, Bonhoeffer himself used the expression "religionless Christianity" only in the famous letter of April 30, 1944. Bishop Paulose elaborates three themes which were very close to Bonhoeffer and revealed in his prison letters. These themes are "holy worldliness", "theology of responsibility" and "secret discipline". With regard to "holy worldliness", Bishop Paulose quotes from the diary of Dag Hammarskjold, the second Secretary-General of the United Nations, Markings, "In our era, the road to holiness necessarily passes through the world of action". Bonhoeffer defines responsibility as "the total and realistic response of man to the claim of God and of our neighbour". The "secret discipline" is not something to escape from the reality of the world but one of struggle as Andre Dumas points out. "The secret discipline is... A reminder that man following after Christ is subject to the whole of reality, and cannot be content with only a portion of the world around him that has become tolerable and manipulable under his direction. To have come of age, to be religionless, implies this secret discipline of struggle, which for the Christian is the very secret that God shares with man".

Marx maintained that the future to which the human being is moving is completely open. It is this possibility that enables the human being to move towards the future along an original road that entails freedom and choice. This according to Marx is transcendence. God does not play any role in this. Bonhoeffer’s concept of transcendence is similar to that of Marx up to a point only. He rejected the doctrine of God popularly associated with much of the history of theology. He replaced it with an understanding of transcendence which is focussed upon the humanity of Christ and the participation of the disciple through him in the life of the world come of age.

Bishop Paulose underlines the critical difference between the two. Bonhoeffer’s thesis responds to Marx that faith in the transcendent God is not a fleeing away from the affairs of the world. On the contrary, it is taking full responsibility of the reality of the world. Bishop Paulose sums up the discussion, "Marx and Bonhoeffer emphasised the autonomy of man. But in the search for the autonomy of man Bonhoeffer was not so much removing God from the world’s affairs as searching for God’s real presence in the world. Whereas Marx found God as standing in the way of man’s freedom and autonomy, a barrier to human emancipation, Bonhoeffer believed that God granted freedom and autonomy for man by making Jesus the point of disclosure for His transcendence. Whereas Marx defined transcendence as mans possibility to move towards the future with freedom and choice, so that he could shape his own destiny, Bonhoeffer gave a this-worldly interpretation of transcendence in which the experience of transcendence is Jesus being there for others."

The thesis proceeds to show how m addition to being a challenge to the church, Bonhoefferian theology functions also as a challenge to Marxist philosophy. Bonhoeffer emphasized that in the modern secular age the mission of the church must assume a secular style. His consistent effort for a non-religious interpretation of Christianity was to reform the church in such a way that it could truly be a prophet and servant to the contemporary person. As already pointed out, his plea for a non-religious Christianity is also a plea for a redefinition of the church. He reminds us that if the church is to fulfil its mission it needs to be redefined and refashioned from within.

As Marx’s criticism is a challenge to the Christians to rethink their own beliefs, Bonhoeffer’s criticism also is a challenge to the church. Bishop Paulose draws a parallel between "opium of the people" and "cheap grace". For Marx, "Religion is the sigh of the oppressed creature, the heart of a heartless world, just as it is the spirit of a spiritless situation. It is the opium of the people". According to Bonhoeffer, "We Lutherans have gathered like eagles around the carcass of cheap grace, and there we have drunk of the poison which has killed the life of following Christ".

In spite of this apparent similarity there are fundamental differences as already shown. Bonhoeffer’s theology functions as a corrective of Marx’s criticism of religion. The challenge to the Marxists is to re-examine their philosophy to see whether they take into consideration the human person in wholeness. Bishop Paulose makes this his own challenge to Marxists. Quoting Marx’s famous words "The philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point, however, is to change it", Bishop Paulose says, "In order to change the world, philosophy must embrace the totality of human existence, its material as well as spiritual dimension. Marx fails to do this".

Fr. Kappen also grapples with this question of the larger issue of human existence in dealing with Marxian atheism. "In his preoccupation with the analysis of the capitalist system, he (Marx) failed to do justice to the sphere of the personal and the subjective, the sphere where the human drama of hope and despair, love and hate, death and survival is enacted... Had Marx paid sufficient attention to these existential problems, he might have been led to a more critical assessment of his atheist stance."

The authentic Christian faith that Bonhoeffer upholds is something other than the ‘religion’ that Marx criticised. Therefore Bishop Paulose points out that Marx’s theory that all religions are enemies of social revolution does not hold true. The "religionless Christian" who leads a "worldly life", as portrayed by Bonhoeffer, certainly plays a vital role in the transformation of society. Bishop Paulose concludes this discussion, "In this way we respond to Marx’s critique of religion that Christianity is not the opium of the people but a way of life in which the Christian participates in Jesus’ ‘being there for others’, for the total humanization of humanity."

The final chapter of the thesis is "A Call for Dialogue". The Bishop sums up the basis of this call succinctly. "By examining Marx’s critique of religion optimistically and without prejudice we found that Marxists and Christians can agree, in spite of several disagreements, that both are ultimately concerned for true humanity, especially for the rights of the poor and the needy, the hungry and hopeless; both could agree that they strive to be ‘true to the earth’. We observed that Marx’s atheism is primarily an anthropological affirmation; it is another way of putting human being in the centre of human interest and concern. We also found that Marx’s critique of religion indeed helps us to awaken from our dogmatic slumber. By making a Bonhoefferian corrective of Marx’s critique of religion, we demonstrated that whatever the traditional interpretation or historical function of Christian faith may have been, its essential ingredients allow for a radical reaffirmation of man’s this-worldly being. The essence of Christian faith is even consistent with unqualified commitment to revolutionary struggle in the name of man against the forces of alienation. This corrective also served the purpose of presenting to the church a new understanding of itself and of autonomous modern world, and it reminded us what it means to be a Christian in the world come of age."

Bishop Paulose offers a number of guidelines for dialogue. The dialogue that Bishop Paulose calls for is not to be confined to philosophical or doctrinal issues although dialogue on these issues will always be necessary. Primarily it should be on the common task of dealing with the urgent issues that confront us, like hunger and poverty, illiteracy and pollution.

There is only one reference to liberation theology m the thesis. This may be because liberation theology was just at its beginning stage when the thesis was written. Bishop Paulose expresses the opinion that liberation theology was the final coming to terms of theology with Marx, the positive appropriation of Marx’s contribution to modern thought and life. While Bishop Paulose was popularly known as a liberation theologian he preferred the title "secular theologian". He was conscious that he was always speaking to an audience larger than the church, a secular audience.

While the thesis mentions directly only about the influence of Marx on liberation theology, students of liberation theology have always acknowledged the influence of Bonhoeffer. Bonhoeffer issued a call to redefine religion in a secular context. His theology emphasizes human responsibility towards others, and stresses the value of seeing the world with "the view from below -- the perspective of the poor and the oppressed. This was a framework many liberation theologians found significant and useful.

Liberation theology burst on the scene with startling creativity in the early seventies in Latin America. "While the rich variety ‘of liberationist writings defies easy characterization, most of the writers are united in one overpowering theme; the Gospel of Jesus Christ is represented most authentically in the liberation of the world’s oppressed people from their bondage. The gospel is not an otherworldly escape from the hard realities of this world. Rather it addresses these realities directly, empowering the oppressed to seize control of their own destiny and to establish a new order of freedom and peace." (J. P. Wogaman in Christian Perspective on Politics).

Liberation theology started in Latin America gut quickly extended its influence to many parts of the world. The theologies of liberation had a strong anti-systemic stance which brought them often into conflict with powers they addressed, both political and ecclesiastical. Their approach to poverty arid oppression came out of their understanding of the gospel. To be sure their analysis explored the roots of the problem and found more than economic causes. Liberation theologians have been at their strongest when they have been related to concrete communities and problems.

Here in studying the thesis of Bishop Paulose we will confine our discussion to the question of relationship between liberation theology and Marxism. It is sometimes suggested that liberation theology is little more than Marxism with a Christian face. Many of the liberation theologians particularly the Latin Americans, do substantially and consciously rely upon Marxist forms of analysis. Bishop Paulose says, in an essay in honour of Fr. Kappen, Liberation theology and Marxism, "There are a number of liberation theologians who employ Marxian methodology and terminology in their writings. However they do not exhort the people to read the works of Karl Marx in the light of the Bible but to study the Bible in the light of Marx’s works. In other words they seek the aid of Marx for a deeper insight into and clearer understanding of the Bible".

Liberation theologians want to make sure that Christian faith will not be used as ideological support for selfish interests and repressive situations. In an interesting chapter on the Marxian theme of religion as the "opiate of the people", Jose Miguez Bonino welcomes the criticism "as a valid warning against the self-deception and confusion which so easily creep into a political programme of any sort when it is clothed in religious language" . He adds "we can see how religious faith can be used for reactionary purposes. It does not need to be a conscious use, it even functions better when it is practised unwittingly" (Christians and Marxists).

Liberation theologians believe that real truth is revealed through praxis -- a term that is itself derived from Marxist literature. Knowledge about things that matter is not derived through exposure to abstract ‘truths’, rather it is in reflecting upon our actions to affect things that matter. "A theology of liberation", writes Gustavo Gutierrez, "offers us not so much a new theme for reflections as a new way to do theology". Such a theology "does not stop with reflection on the world, but rather tries to be part of the process through which the world is transformed". A Theology of Liberation… (sic) Such words are reminiscent of Marx’s own dictum that "the philosophers have only interpreted the world, in various ways: the point however is to change it." Bishop Paulose says "The proposition of liberation theologians is exactly the same. They are bent on ‘doing’ theology rather than contemplating it. Theology which is based on the gospel can be timely, only as it assumes new and bold forms in relation to the actual historical situation and the particular needs of the people in their own time" (Liberation Theology and Marxism). The theologian must be immersed in the struggle for transforming society and proclaim the message of the gospel from that point. Theologians are not to be mere theoreticians, but practitioners who participate in the ongoing struggle to liberate the oppressed.

Liberation theology to a large extent agrees with Marxist analysis in its identification with the oppressed in the struggle against the oppressor. Christians have a "preferential option for the poor"; conveying the point that Christians choose side with the poor. Many liberation theologians have largely accepted a Marxian interpretation of class conflict and the causes of poverty.

Bishop Paulose claimed that liberation theology is more prophetic than Marxist. It gives poignant expression to the swell of protest against oppressive socio-economic formations and to the powerful yearning for a system founded on justice.

The question is raised how relevant liberation theology is, if it owes so much to Marxism, in the wake of the collapse of the socialist system in Eastern Europe and the widespread disillusionment it has created. There is no denying that there is a crisis with regard to liberation theology and many of its earlier supporters do not find it relevant. The response to this has to be, whether the situation in the world and the lot of the oppressed today do not demand even a greater commitment of a theology of liberation? If liberation theology arose out of a consciousness of the oppression of the people by the capitalist system, then there is surely greater need of a theology of liberation in this age of globalization.

Speaking to the European Parliament in November 1989 at a time when socialist regimes were falling all over Central and Eastern Europe, the Archbishop of Canterbury Robert Runcie said, "The apparent defeat of communism in Europe should not be seen as a triumph of capitalism. The nearer capitalism comes to triumphing totally more questions are raised about its capacity to be magnanimous in victory, to heed the cries of the poor at home and aboard to seek the path of peace and to care tenderly for the earth". Three years later in an interview to an Italian journal, Pope John Paul II said, "The proponents of extreme capitalism in any form tend to overlook the good things achieved by communism, the struggle against unemployment and the concern for the poor".

About the new situation that raises questions about the relevance of liberation theology, Pablo Richard says, "The conditions in the Third World that gave birth to liberation theology have not changed. As long as the scandal of poverty and oppression exists and as long as there are Christians who live and critically reflect on their faith in the context of the struggle for justice and life, liberation theology will continue to exist". The relevance of many elements of Marxism, as a basis for reflection to identify the root causes of oppression as well as to explore the means to overcome this oppression, is re-affirmed by liberation theologians. They remind us that liberation theology has never been a new theology but rather a new way of doing theology -- from the perspective of the poor and their struggle for justice and liberation. They had always rejected the idea that theology is a systematic collection of timeless and culture-transcending truths that remains static for all generations. Rather theology is in flux; it is a dynamic and ongoing exercise involving contemporary insights into knowledge, humanity and history. Therefore there is a new demand on liberation theology to take into account the new dimensions of oppression and subjugation brought in by economic globalization.

Here the tools of analysis developed under Marxist influence are still found useful. Even non-Marxist social scientists have found the description of globalization in the Communist Manifesto not only prophetic but of validity in analyzing the new stage of capitalism. As ‘description’ of systems of oppression Marxism has much to teach. As a ‘prescription’ for a new society it will need re-appraisal especially in the light of recent experiences and new developments. In general liberation theologians have given more emphasis to description of the situation than to prescribing economic alternatives. Their concern was for the dehumanizing consequences of capitalism as seen through the prism of the gospel and Jesus’ own way of life. This concern should heighten in the context of the new stage of capitalism, encourage search for alternatives and affirm signs of hope in the new struggles and resistance of the marginalised.

Bishop Paulose’s thesis is a plea for Christian- Marxist dialogue. By the time the thesis was submitted Christian-Marxist dialogue had received a set-back. Ans vander Bent traces the History. "Dialogue between Christians and Marxists, which began in the 1950’s and flourished in the 1960’s, was the result of a relaxation in the East-West tensions of cold war. The de-Stalinization campaign, the changes in the Roman Catholic Church following the Second Vatican Council, and the growth of the ecumenical movement all contributed to bringing Marxists and Christians together for serious conversations about critical issues. Prominent participants from Marxist side included R. Garaudy, V. Gardavsky, M. Machovec and E. Bloch; and such Christian theologians as H. Hromadka, A. Dumas, G. Girardi, K. Rahner and J. M. Gonzalez -Ruiz were involved at one time or another. The Paulus- Geselleschaft, under the leadership of Erich Kellner, sponsored a number of international symposia during the 1960s in the Federal Republic of Germany and Austria, bringing together Marxist and Christian thinkers.’ (Ecumenical Dictionary)

After the Warsaw Pact forces moved into Czechoslovakia in 1968 to suppress the movement led by Alexander Dubcek, Marxist-Christian dialogue declined swiftly. although it did not disappear entirely, encounters during the 1970’s were less publicized and more widely diffused than earlier ones. Bishop Paulose wrote the thesis around the time and notes that Christian- Marxist dialogue "has in recent years been smothered by unfavourable international politics."

A welcome addition to the subject of Marxist-Christian dialogue is a book by the Anglican theologian James Bentley, Between Marx and Christ, The Dialogue in German-Speaking Europe. 1870-1970. This book was reviewed by Rudolf C. Heredia in the Economic and Political Weekly of September 12, 1992. In the second half of the nineteenth century Germany contained the largest urban proletariat in the world. Clergymen and politicians had to grapple with this to retain any kind of credibility. Christian theologians set out on a critical examination of the life of Jesus and the social and political implications of his teachings. Marxist ideologues too began "to describe the founder of Christianity as a quasi-mythical primitive communist". Reviewing the book Heredia says, "In going back to their origins both sides discovered the potential for a constructive dialogue, even though dialectical contradictions still remained. However it was in their resistance to Hitler that their mutual suspicions were finally dissolved and the need to cooperate in building a socialist humanism was strongly felt. After the war, radical Christians criticized the Church’s cooperation by the ruling classes even as open-minded party members came to realize how repressive some Marxist regimes could be. But just as the dialogue was gaining momentum the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia set it back drastically".

Heredia sums up the lessons of Christian-Marxist dialogue till now, with the end of cold war establishing a new and unprecedented context for dialogue. "We discover that the real openness to dialogue is created not in the intellectual world of concepts, but in the existential encounter of action. For it is in working together to liberate the oppressed masses through critical social intervention, and to oppose tyrannical oppression like Nazism, that mutual trust and appreciation is engendered, and a common ground founded on our basic humanness opened."

From the time he returned to Kerala, India, after his studies in the USA, Bishop Paulose was in constant dialogue with Marxists, in the fields of thought and action. His main interlocutor was E. M. S. Namboodiripad, popularly known as EMS, the most distinguished of Indian communists, a Marxist intellectual of high calibre who was also a brilliant strategist. Bishop Paulose openly acknowledged his indebtedness to EMS in the evolution of his political ideas. He apparently influenced EMS to some extent in his attitude to followers of religion. There were other Christian leaders in Kerala too engaged in dialogue with EMS. They included Metropolitan Paulose Mar Gregorios and M.M.Thomas. Unfortunately all these four persons passed away within a short period between 1996 and 1998.

After reading the thesis of Bishop Paulose, EMS wrote an article in which he suggested its publication. This book is a response to that suggestion as well as to similar suggestions made by many. EMS pointed out that the commitment to dialogue that is reflected in Bonhoeffer’s "religionless Christianity has two aspects. One, the centre of Christianity is not the salvation that will be available in the other world, but the human good in this world. Second, belief in God and devotion to Jesus Christ are needed for the good in this world even if not for salvation in the other. EMS said: "On one hand there is similarity and on the other there is difference between Marxism and this theology about Christian belief. Action for the good of the human being is at the centre of both". EMS was conscious of the limitations as well as the possibilities of Christian-Marxist dialogue. He maintained that what is feasible is cooperation on the practical plane with recognition on both sides of the differences at the theoretical level while having dialogue also at the theoretical level. But not only dialogue but also common action should be organized between Marxism and theologies including Christian theology. (EMS Diary, Volume I)

In the introduction to his book Freedom is God Bishop Paulose had acknowledged the influence of Marxian humanism in addition to Bonhoeffor’s "religionless Christianity" at the time of writing his thesis. EMS criticised this statement of the Bishop on Marxian humanism as half-truth in the article mentioned above. EMS maintained that Marxian humanism is unique. Marx’s socio-economic vision is not just humanism, but humanism arising out of the vision of class struggle. Perhaps EMS was not familiar with the ideas of a number of prominent theologians who accept class struggle as a fact and as a tool for analysis. They acknowledge the role of class conflict in social transformation. Many liberation theologians have quoted the opening sentence in the Communist Manifesto "The history of all hitherto existing society is the history of class struggle". George Cassalis says: "Marx and Engels, in the wake of other philosophers, used the notion of class struggles to formulate a value judgement on social reality. At the same time, it can be said that they have also made us aware of a fundamental fact about the evolution of society and, even more than that, they have indicated a basic law for operating in its evolution". (Correct Ideas Don’t Fall from the Skies)

In the George M. Philip lecture of 1995, EMS said that the idea of finding solutions to practical problems by cooperation between religious believers and Marxists is more relevant in Kerala than in any other state of India. He pointed out the baneful effects of politics in Kerala as a result of the conflicts between religious believers and Marxists from the time of the formation of the state. If cooperation is to be possible there should be a radical reappraisal on both sides about their perceptions of each other. In another article (in Marxist Samvadam, "Marxist Dialogue") EMS said that a problem that needs solution in dealing with Kerala politics is the approach of Marxist-Leninists to religious communities and their followers. The responsibility of Marxists-Leninists is not only to propagate materialist ideas but to lead the social, economic and political struggle. Marxist-Leninists have a duty to work along with leaders and followers of religious communities. Overcoming the contradictions in the realm of ideas, it is possible for followers of different religions and Marxist-Leninists to join together in practical politics. He said that for this some things have to be done on both sides. Though not believers themselves, Marxist- Leninists should be prepared to respect religious leaders; on the other hand religious leaders and their followers should understand the position of the Marxist- Leninists and be prepared to respect it. He points out that there is a tendency on the part of Marxist- Leninists to hold on to the one sentence of Marx, "religion is the opium of the people" and always to oppose the religion which is described as opiate. This should change and Marxist-Leninists should try to understand the context of this sentence and also learn about the form and growth of religion on the basis of Marxism- Leninism.

Bishop Paulose was seen always in the border regions of faith. There he saw the struggles of the exploited workers, toiling masses and the oppressed tribals. He developed a language of secular theology there. It was his solidarity with the people in their struggle, his ‘doing theology’, that equipped him for the dialogue with Marxists. Secular Kerala heard a special voice from Bishop Paulose, a voice that is rarely heard from Church leaders. Once when I showed him an extract from a well-known pastoral letter of a French Bishop, he felt it reflected his own views. The pastoral letter by Bishop Huyghes of Arras was written in March 1972 on the occasion of a visit by the French Prime Minister, M. J. Chaban- Delmas, following demonstrations by workers: "Christians, both workers and officials, joined their comrades in the legitimate defense of their employment, which is increasingly under fire in the region. These Christians were the Church, and they did not wait for me to make it present. Silence is imposed on the poor of the world, on the poor of Pas-de-Calais, in the name of economic necessity or of political prudence. But if the poor are silenced, Christians are entitled to provide them with a voice.

Bishop Paulose’s call for a dialogue with Marxists is a call to join together in giving a voice to the poor, affirming solidarity with them, and to be part of the larger struggles for justice and liberation. This call he made as a participant in the struggle for justice for the poor and as one who consistently defended secular democracy in India. It is thus easy to identify the main areas in which there should be dialogue and cooperation between Christians and Marxists in India today. They are economic justice in the context of globalization and secular democracy in the context of the onslaught of communalism and fascism.

Christian response to what happens in the secular order should not be for Christians alone, nor should it be in a country like India by Christians acting alone. The East Asia Christian Assembly (Kuala Lumpur 1959) affirmed two things: Christians have certain Christian insights about the contemporary historical situation which may be held in faith; Christian insights can be translated into secular insights. Today Christians in India are called upon to translate their Christian insights into secular insights and join forces with all those who work for justice and human dignity. On issues like economic justice and secularism this opens up avenues for cooperation between Christians and Marxists.

In a famous pastoral letter in 1986 the Catholic Bishops Conference of the United States identified political economy as one of the chief areas where Christians live out their faith. There is a clear demand on the part of the Christians in India to work for economic justice especially in view of the swifter and greater marginalization of the poor as a result of economic reforms under globalization. The French thinker Ignacio Ramonet in an article in the Fall 1999 issue of Foreign Policy magazine wrote, "globalization is set up to be a kind of modern divine critic requiring submission, faith, worship and new rites". Christians have a special responsibility to challenge and expose the false theology of the free market. For doing that they will find Marxist analysis useful.

A study by the National Council for Applied Economic Research recently found that poverty has increased in India since the liberalization process began in 1991. The same conclusion has been reached by studies of the World Bank and Food and Agriculture Organization. The Tenth Human Development Report of 1999 observed: "...market dominated globalization has led to the growing marginalisation of poor nations and people, growing human insecurity and growing inequality with benefits accruing almost solely to the richest people and countries... the global gap between the haves and the have-nots is widening". Christians and Marxists can have fruitful collaboration in the struggles for economic justice.

As already mentioned Bishop Paulose was a champion of secular democracy. In defending and promoting the principles of secularism in India, which is inseparable from democracy, he actively collaborated with Marxists. He brought Christian insights into the discussion and underlined the task of the church in promoting secular democracy.

One major issue that Christians in India have to deal with today is the threat to the secular state. The threat is manifested in the attacks on minorities and assaults on religious freedom but they are only part of a project to alter the secular character of India.

The attempt to alter the character of the state is sought to be carried out through redefinition. Secularism is redefined as tolerance of the majority community. Once secularism is redefined as tolerance, then the secular state comes to mean the truly tolerant one. From there it is an easy step to advocating a Hindu nation and implicitly a Hindu state or one which is in some sense affiliated to the majority religion. After all Hinduism is claimed to be the most tolerant of all religious systems and therefore most conducive to true secularism. Those who support this argument provide powerful legitimacy to the overall project of Hindutva. In India only the leftist movement has openly opposed this equation of secularism with tolerance forthrightly and it is clear with whom Christians can cooperate in the matter.

There is also the redefinition of nationalism linking it to the majority religion. This goes against the fundamental principle of nationalism as upheld during the freedom struggle as the aspiration for freedom of all people living in this country irrespective of religion or caste. The principle that the nation belongs to all its citizens has been repeatedly questioned by the Hindutva forces. In trying to impose the ideology of the Hindu nation these forces are using fascist methods. Christians should collaborate with secular movements, especially the Marxists, in affirming and protecting the frame and content of the secular state in India.

The prophetic criticism by Bishop Paulose will continue to inspire a large number of those inside and outside the Church. He drew lessons for such criticism from Bonhoeffer and Marx. Such criticism was effective because he was a participant in the struggles. M.M.Thomas, who also influenced Bishop Paulose deeply, has written, "There are many Christians and Churches who like to engage themselves in prophetic criticism. There is certainly a place for it. But only participants earn the right to be prophets. The call by God to speak the word of judgement comes only to those who have affirmed their solidarity with the people under God and stood where they stand".

In the thesis and in his life, Bishop Paulose showed that the task of theology is not just to interpret the situation. He was ‘doing theology’ and thus attempting to change the world. This is the task of every Christian, to discern the times and work for the change. The followers of Marx also are engaged in a similar task. Together they should analyze and attempt to change the world. This message of encounter in humanization is conveyed powerfully through this significant theological contribution of Bishop Paulose Mar Paulose.

Bishop Dr. Yuhanon Mor Meletius is the Secetary of the Bishop Dr. Paulose Mar Paulose Trust.

Nelson Mandela, the legendary figure in the history of South African freedom struggle wrote about Archbishop Desmond Tutu, "here was a man who inspired an entire nation with his words and his courage, who had revived the people’s hope during the darkest of times" (Long Walk to Freedom p. 678).

These words come to mind when one begins to write about Bishop Dr. Paulose Mar Paulose. He was a unique personality and a special kind of bishop who inspired many and revived the hopes of the people. He was less concerned about the dogmas and doctrines of the church that often only helped to torture Jesus by dividing his community than about the plight of millions of people in this very world which Jesus came to liberate. He was disturbed about the institutionalization of injustice in the name of religion and God. He believed in Jesus who liberates people from oppressive forces of this world in their social, political, economic and religious manifestations.

Bishop Dr. Mar Paulose was not a member of any political party. But he was politically more active than many a party worker. He believed that human beings are basically political beings, and hence should actively participate in political life. Through the political involvement of individuals and communities a free and just society should evolve. In this process, there is no ideology or community that should be ignored or excluded. He exhorted that those who believe in God should join forces with all those who struggle for justice because liberation from bondage is a common concern of humanity irrespective of religion or ideology.

It was in this context that he entered into very realistic dialogue and active participation with the Marxists who are considered by vast sections of Christians as anti-religious. Bishop Dr. Paulose found several areas where Christianity and Marxism could cooperate for the creation of a new world order. He was critical of Christianity for preferring to keep the status quo intact and making people slaves to outdated dogmas, customs and practices that never addressed and represented the aspirations and struggles. His studies on Marxism and its critiques along with Christian theology helped him formulate this position. He found Christianity silent at several crucial historical junctures where the message of liberation of Jesus was to be put into practice. He found the institutional Christian community most often insensitive towards the agony of people.

Bishop Dr. Paulose was a student in the US at the time of American military involvement in Vietnam. Berkeley the University where he studied was a centre of protest against this and large sections of American Christians were opposed to the war. The Bishop participated in the protests against the American policy in Vietnam. This was the same time when he was influenced by the humanism of Karl Marx and the "religionless Christianity" of Bonhoeffer. He was very much fascinated by the life and work of Bonhoeffer who was imprisoned and killed by Hitler for opposing Nazism. Bishop Paulose found in Bonhoeffer’s writings a corrective for Marx’s critique of religion. That became the subject of his doctoral dissertation which is a plea for Christian-Marxist dialogue.

Bishop Dr. Paulose Mar Paulose was born on September 14, 1941, at a place called Chirayathu in the suburb of Thrissur in Kerala, as the youngest of the five children of Konikkara Antony and Kochumariam. He did his schooling in the Chaldean Syrian High School and college studies at the St. Thomas College, Thrissur. Bishop Mar Paulose did his basic theological studies at Serampore College, West Bengal and later went to Princeton Theological Seminary for higher studies. He was awarded Ph.D. for his dissertation on "A Bonhoefferian Corrective of Karl Marx’s Critique of Religion" form Berkeley Graduate Theological Union, California. He was ordained a deacon of the Chaldean Syrian Church in 1958 and in 1965 a priest in the Church. In 1968 he was elevated to the position of an episcopa (bishop).

When he came back to India after his studies in the States, he found himself in a situation where his principles were under test. Those were the days of the "Internal Emergency" imposed by Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Bishop Paulose who was deeply concerned about civil liberties and other fundamental rights of citizens realized that the Emergency was an attempt to crush democracy by an authoritarian regime. He took a firm stand against the Emergency. All those who craved for freedom and justice found a new friend in the Bishop. Here was a different kind of Church dignitary. He was welcomed in many places where Christian clergy had failed to reach. He was looked upon by a lot of people, in the Church and society at large, who had no voice. He became their voice. He was a good friend of the working class, exploited, oppressed and marginalized. His sudden death at the age of 57 came as a shock to all those who knew him and left a void hard to fill.

Bishop Dr. Paulose was the Chairman of the Student Christian Movement, Kerala, for two terms. He served as the President of the Indian chapter of the Christian Peace Conference and as the Chairman of the World Student Christian Federation. He traveled widely and participated in several international conferences and symposiums. He was the Secretary of the Episcopal Synod of his Church when he died.

It has been a long cherished desire of many who respected him, including the late E.M.S. Namboodiripad, the guru of Indian Communism, to see his doctoral thesis published. After the demise of the Bishop, his friends and well wishers got together to form a trust called "Bishop Dr. Paulose Mar Paulose Trust, Thrissur", to continue the work the Bishop had begun. The Chaldean Syrian Church graciously entrusted the rights of the literary property of the Bishop with the Trust. The Trust has already published a few collections of Bishop Paulose’s articles as books. Dr. Ninan Koshy, the Chairman of the Trust and a close associate of the Bishop, has done careful editorial work on the thesis for publication. He has also written the introduction to the book. The Trust is very grateful to the Christhava Sahithya Samithy, Thiruvalla for undertaking the publication of this book. We are confident that this publication will be of interest to a large number of people and will significantly contribute to Christian Marxist dialogue and cooperation.