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Mythmakers: Gospel, Culture and the Media by William F. Fore William F. Fore received a B.D. from Yale Divinity School and Ph.D. from Columbia University. A minister in the United Methodist Church , he was Director of Visual Education for the United Methodist Board of Missions, then Executive Director of the Communication Commission of the National Council of Churches in New York City. From 1989 to 1995 he was Visiting Lecturer in Communication and Cultural Studies at Yale Divinity School.. His publications include Image and Impact (Friendship Press 1970), Television and Religion: the Shaping of Faith, Values and Culture (Augsburg 1987, currently reprinted by SBS Press, 409 Prospect St., New Haven, CT 06511), and Mythmakers: Gospel Culture and the Media (Friendship Press 1990). Published in 1990 by Friendship Press, 475 Riverside Drive, New York, NY 10115. Used by permission of the author. This material was prepared for Religion Online by Ted Brock.
Chapter 4: How Culture Shapes Our Meanings "Greed
works." -- Michael Douglass in the film Wall
Street The Spirit of Capitalism The new technologies of electronic communication have taken on a
central, dominant role in our culture. But why? Why have TV and radio and film
achieved such success in our society? After all, technologies flourish only if
they are useful in society. For example, about the time color TV came on the market, General
Electric also came out with the oven hoods that contained electric exhaust
fans. For thirty years the electric oven hood has sold an average of less than
a few hundred thousand units a year, while today almost every household in the
United States and Canada owns at least one color TV set, and more than 5
million sets are sold annually.1 What made the difference? Simply that our
North American culture could hardly function as we know it today without color
TV, while the loss of the electric oven hood would scarcely be missed. In other
words, the mass media did not simply impose themselves upon our culture: something
in the culture itself needed what the mass media of communication could supply. As I have studied the mass media and their effects for many year, I have
come to believe that the formative power that made mass communication
technology both possible and powerful was the development of industrial
capitalism. Capitalism, in its industrialized form beginning about two hundred
years ago, was something radically new in the history of the world. Growing
over the previous two centuries out of the Renaissance and Reformation focus on
the individual, and building momentum from new economic ventures, new markets
and new industrialization, its fundamental values were pragmatism and
technology. Its measure of success was efficiency. Its method was
standardization. It asked only "does it work?" not "what, or
whom, does it work for?" In order for standardization to work, everything -- including people --
had to be fragmented, that is, divided into components that could be put
together quickly, cheaply and with as little attention to individual
differences as possible -- like in printing. This affected everything in our
society, but especially the way we communicate. With standardization came
fragmentation, separation. Cultural historian John Staudenmaier believes that
capitalism tends to separate people's inner selves from their outward
"persona," that is, the self they project to others. Finally, it
tends to separate news and information from their context, so that we find it
difficult to connect bits and pieces of information in ways that make sense to
us. And it tends to separate those who shape public mass media messages from
their audience, so that we cannot easily judge whether the writer or speaker is
"real" or trustworthy. 2 Capitalism is not just an economic theory of infusing profits into
businesses to produce more goods. It also brings with it an ideology, which
Staudenmaier believes is essentially anti-human: The frightening
invention of capitalism is not the creation of artificial or new needs. The
terrible invention is the concept that there is such a thing as purely physical
or biological need. Other social systems had treated human beings as social
entities, not biological machines. Only capitalism . . . conceived of human
beings as raw material. 3 An interesting example of capitalism's determination to standardize people
was the development, beginning in the 1830s, of the etiquette book. At that
time waves of new immigrants were arriving in the cities of North America, and
etiquette books emerged which taught these newcomers, who would become middle
class citizens, how to avoid misbehaving in public. Society's leaders saw
etiquette books as valuable management of an unruly underclass; its readers saw
them as a valuable way to climb the social ladder. Here, for example, is advice
from an 1889 book called "Success in Society": Never look behind you in
the street, or behave in any way so as to attract attention. Do not talk or
laugh loudly out of doors, or swing your arms as you walk. If you should happen
to meet someone you know, take care not to utter their names loudly. 4 Today's "etiquette manuals," such as House Beautiful, Woman's
Day, Cosmopolitan, Playboy and Field and Stream,
continue to tell us how to dress our selves and our homes, how to play and
work, how to treat our children and friends, and above all, how to act in order
to be a "success in society." Today's other "etiquette
manual" is, of course, television. A hundred and fifty years ago, the demands for conformity and
standardization were most pressing in the area of industrial production. In
1815 the U.S. Ordinance Department standardized its weapons production, which
set in motion a revolution in all production values. Not only was the
Winchester repeating rifle a cheap and efficient way to subdue the Indian, but
its interchangeable parts were the harbinger of new ways to produce and move
goods of all kinds. Consider, for example, how grain transportation changed radically during
the 1860s. In St. Louis, following the old system, grain was bagged, loaded
onto train cars, then off-loaded at the edge of town where the tracks ended,
carried by wagon across the city, and then loaded onto river boats. By
contrast, in Chicago a new design allowed the grain to be bulk loaded into cars
because the company owned tracks all the way to the docks, where the grain was
bulk loaded onto grain boats. Historian J. L. Larson points out that the
Chicago system was far more efficient, but it also eliminated the ability of
the small operators -- the loaders, the cart drivers and so on -- to negotiate
their own contracts, and thus to maintain their livelihood: If the Chicago system
was a model of integration, speed, and efficiency, the St. Louis market preserved
the integrity of each man's transaction and employed a host of small
entrepreneurs at every turn -- real virtues in ante-bellum America. 5 The new capital-intensive standardized system in Chicago eliminated many
of the variables -- human negotiations -- and increased profits much more
rapidly. It was, in terms of the rapidly developing cultural value of
efficiency, a very "successful" system, though hundreds of small
operators lost their jobs. Control of all components of society became an even more important for a
profitable business climate as we moved into the twentieth century. Social
scientists began to write about the importance of social management. For
example, in 1889 sociologist Edward Alsworth Ross urged the right persons [that
is, social scientists] to undertake the study of moral influences . . . in the
right spirit as a basis for the scientific control of the individual. 6 Ross warned that scientists who undertook this task must not reveal
their scientific secrets, because "to betray the secrets of social
ascendancy is to forearm the individual in his struggle with society." 7 Individual creativity tends to disrupt the smooth functioning of a large
production system, and the investment of large amounts of capital in production
requires procedures that will minimize risk and maximize profits. Thus Henry
Ford could raise the capital necessary to produce the epitome of mass
production system only after he designed an assembly line. First identical
parts were manufactured; then they were assembled in sequence by identical
workers who each attached only a single part, and who were otherwise completely
isolated from the process. Ford's assembly line produced a car that could be
purchased in only one style and in any color -- so long as it was black. It
produced workers who contributed nothing creative to the production and who got
no joy out of it, except for their paycheck at the end of the week. Capitalism's Shaping of Communication But industrial production and transportation were not the only parts of
culture transformed by the spirit of capitalism. Communication was affected
perhaps more than other aspect of society, because the new communication
technologies were the key not only to production but also to the distribution
and consumption of those products. Consider the transformation of news. Before Morse's telegraph, almost
all news was local. The town crier and the local newspaper writers lived among
their audiences. When news came from out of town, it often was accompanied by
visitors who, as they delivered a newspaper or magazine, could say "but I
was there, and it was not like that, it was more like this." Electronic communication quickly separated source from audience. Soon
local newspapers were buying "news" written by anonymous
writers in centralized agencies in the big cities. A small town paper in Iowa
could get this newly created, purchased news almost as quickly as those in the
cities -- but without personal contact. The system that wire made possible was
largely a one-way system. The audience no longer was able to interact with the
story writers and town criers were no more. The audience became totally
passive. Also, when "news" became a commodity, its content changed.
There had to be news to sell every day, whether or not something newsworthy had
happened. The newspaper had to be run as an efficient business, selling
advertising and appealing to readers (who were now customers) every day. So
news had to be interesting enough to persuade the local editor to purchase it
on a regular basis, and entertainment value became more and more important. It
had to be fast -- faster than the locals could get it elsewhere, or it was
worthless. Thus news became transformed from the old story-telling format to an
endless conveyor belt of disconnected items. Its priority was to interest as
many readers as possible, and immediacy counted far more than accuracy or
thoughtful background and perspective. Radio began in the early 1920s and almost immediately became a
commercial enterprise in the United States. While Canada had a mix of public
and private radio, as early at 1929 "the majority of programmes heard
[were] from sources outside of Canada", namely, the U.S.. 8 Radio took the immediacy of news one step
further. Now the audience could "participate" in events "as they
happened." But the impression of "being there" was actually
based on events carefully selected for their ease of coverage, their universal
appeal, and their simplicity. Radio provided an illusion of "knowing"
about an event when in reality the audience was given no chance at all to
question the situation, to participate in discussion, or to hear a wide
diversity of opinions about it. In other words, listeners experienced
fragmented communication -- little pieces of information supplied with very
little context, background, or perspective. Just as the demands of production
had fragmented people into interchangeable jobs and skills that fit the system,
so the demands of communication to "reach" people in the mass further
fragmented their understanding, yet without touching them in their wholeness as
persons. Now even people's ideas were fragmented. With the coming of television, people were further encouraged to meet
the needs of capitalism: to consume without end, to use up, throw away and buy
again; to repress individuality so as to not question the process which
provided an endless stream of products; to seek the immediate and the
sensational, changing the channel every few seconds if it did not provide
immediate stimulation; and, above all, never to ask questions about the real meaning
of the system itself. Sylvester (Pat) Weaver, President of NBC-TV in the early 1950s, was one
of the first to recognize the true nature of television. In 1955 he told a
group of advertising executives that the automation in post-World War II
factories required exactly what television could provide: ...the automated
business needs a constant, dependable, unflucutating demand for its output. ...
This and other solutions to steady demand mean a new kind of selling -- a
complete change in emphasis -- educational selling to wean consumers from old
habits.... That instrument - the greatest mutation in communications history...man's
greatest communications invention -- television. A medium that proved itself,
from the first, to be also the most powerful, exciting, flexible of all advertising
media. 9 Yes, television and the whole new commercial media environment was a
great success, but what was the measure of "success?" We have briefly sketched how our culture interacted with the new
technologies during the last century and a half, producing a new culture based
on the technologies. The technologies have "cultivated" the culture,
and the culture has appropriated the technologies. To see how this
acculturation process works and how the spirit of capitalism has succeeded in
influencing our lives through communication, let us look at examples in two
rather unlikely situations: an amusement park and the national space race. Disneyland as Moral Educator In August 1965, Nikita Khrushchev accepted an invitation from President
Nixon to tour the United States. It was the first time a Russian head of state
had been on U.S. soil. Khrushchev impressed the American public with his wit,
warmth, humanness and nerve, but he also confounded everyone by his insistence
that, above all, he wanted to visit Disneyland. Since it opened in July 1955, Disneyland in Anaheim, California, and its
later clone, Walt Disney World near Orlando, Florida, have been hosts to more
Americans, and probably to more human beings, than any other single
"event" in history. Each park boasts several "lands,"
scores of attractions, dozens of food facilities and more than fifty shops,
employs three to seven thousand people depending on the season, and entertains
about 10,000 people on an average day. Why was the premier of the Union of Soviet Socialists Republics
determined to see Disneyland? Because Disneyland is the American Dream, the
American Way, and when one has been there, one has experienced a unique
distillation of our values and our worldview. Disneyland is a gigantic sales
machine of American culture. And as Walt Disney himself explained to Lloyd
Shearer on a tour when Disneyland first opened in 1955, it sells just one product: What I'm trying to sell
here in Anaheim is what everyone wants, happiness. You can call it corn or
cotton candy or escape, or anything you want. But to me I'm selling happiness. Now, what's most
conducive to happiness? Simply a pleasant experience in the company of happy,
smiling, friendly people. ... If this park ever becomes successful, and
everyone tells me it's gonna fall flat on its face, it won't be because we keep
it clean and don't sell gum or because we provide great fun and games -- it will
be because our personnel sincerely sell happiness. Hell! That's what we all
want, isn't it? A little bit of happiness! 10
Every major civilization envisions some kind of utopia that it feels
constitutes the ideal life. The early Hebrews had the Garden of Eden. The
Greeks had Plato's Republic, and early Christendom had Augustine's City of God.
St. Francis, St. Dominic and St. Benedict proposed whole environments, monastic
orders that attempted to express the ideal living condition. In early America
several settlements, including as New Salem, the Shaker communities and the
early Mormon towns, were based on views of the ideal life. Today Disneyland performs the same function. Disneyland has become a
kind of utopia, a vision of the ideal life for twentieth-century Americans, a
place where pilgrims from every corner of the nation and world assemble,
bringing the whole family, a place to which they often return, again and again,
throughout their lifetime. Disneyland is divided into several "lands," all accessible
through Main Street, which provides an avenue of transition from the reality of
traffic jams, smog and vast car parks to the fantasies of clean, orderly and
non-threatening Adventureland, Tomorrowland, and Frontierland. But Main Street
is itself fantasy, as Walt Disney explains: It's not apparent at a
casual glance that this street is only a scale model. We had every brick and
shingle and gas lamp made seven-eighths size. This costs more, but made the
street a toy, and the imagination can play more freely with a toy. Besides,
people like to think their world is somehow more grown up than Papa's was. 11 Main Street leads to Tomorrowland, which boasts a vision of the future
as envisioned by "America's foremost men of science and industry,"
according to Disney. 12 The exhibits are in fact provided by some
of America's largest corporations -- General Electric, American Telephone and
Telegraph, Monsanto and so on -- and generally extol the virtues of
technological progress while familiarizing people with the latest gadgets
developed by industry. The constantly repeated message is: "technology is good
for you," and never mind the problems of environmental pollution, decaying
inner cities, homeless thousands or poverty-stricken millions. Fantasyland fulfills its name. It comes right out of Disney's film
productions, a place where we meet animated "real-life" versions of
goodness personified (Snow White, the third Little Pig, Dumbo, Pollyanna) and
the essence of evil (the Wicked Queen, the Big Bad Wolf) -- and thus learn to
divide the world into good and evil, watching goodness triumph with a smile and
a song. Frontierland is less childish. It is built around scenes of conquest --
-- conquest over the American frontier, the American Indian, and over nature
itself. But the stories of Davy Crockett, forts and Indian attacks bear little
resemblance to history and its real people. For example, culture analyst
Michael Real notes that "mechanically reconstructed animals and plants in
the Nature's Wonderland part of Frontierland stand out as an antithesis to the
sensitivity to nature maintained in real life by Native Americans." 13 While from an individual perspective Disneyland offers pure fantasy,
from a cultural perspective its mythmaking -- the stories and environmental
settings -- provide powerful indoctrination. In any culture, the most dangerous
communications are those that we do not take seriously. And if we add to the
equation the great technical skill which Disneyland's managers focus on every
aspect of our experience, we have awesome communication indeed. Michael Real
evaluates the overall "message" of Disneyland: Disney's ethical dramas
seem to serve the "civil religion" of America, which combines the
strains of the Puritan theocrats and the republican Founding Fathers. Disney
presentations lack the "ultimacy" necessary to be considered
religious. Nevertheless, to the rootless youth of southern California, Disney
becomes an important reality-adjusting mechanism: the Disney universe offers a
larger-than-life ground and source of beliefs about life and people and
society. 14 Khrushchev was right to visit Disneyland. What better place could one go
to understand American culture? And have fun at the same time? Merchandising the Moon Cultural myths and values are sold to us not through recreation alone;
they also are sold through information. Perhaps the most significant, and most
successful, information-selling process of the second half of our century was
the selling of science and technology through the American space program. "That's one small step for a man; one giant leap for mankind!"
When Neil Armstrong uttered this epigram and implanted the first footprint on
the moon in July 1969, the impression seen instantly by hundreds of millions of
persons was unforgettable. But that event, while dramatic, only crowned twelve
years of careful indoctrination managed by a remarkable marriage of two of the
most powerful forces in American society: the military-industrial complex,
which needed to generate a national fixation on the wonders of science and
technology in order to sell the Congress and public on ever-greater
expenditures; and the mass-media news and information complex, which needed the
drama and scope of a race to the moon to capture the millions of viewers
necessary to sell commercial time-slots to advertisers. It was a marriage made, if not in heaven, then surely in the USA,
because at the time these two institutions were uniquely American. Since the
development of the atomic bomb and its deployment at Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
1945, the United States had held undisputed worldwide dominance in both
military and industrial prowess. At the same time American advertising had
grown into the single most powerful element of the burgeoning American
production and consumption cycle. It was only natural that these two giants should find common interests.
In some ways the selling of technology, especially military technology, began
with the dropping of the first atom bomb. We now know that in 1945 the creation
of the image of the atomic bomb was as important to the decision makers
as its actual military effect. That summer, with Germany already defeated and
the cities of Japan in flames, the Target Committee appointed by President
Truman discussed whether or not to drop the bomb. In recommending a
"go" to the President they stressed "(1) obtaining the greatest
psychological effect against Japan and (2) making the initial use sufficiently
spectacular for the importance of the weapon to be internationally recognized
when publicity on it was released." 15 Here the government was beginning to
understand what the business community had long known: that it is just
important to sell the image of the device as the device itself. If the metaphor
is not too grisly a metaphor in this context, government was learning that when
it comes to the marketplace, you sell the sizzle, not the steak. In fact, selling the space race was not fundamentally different from
selling next year's new automobile. The automobile industry had learned a great
deal about selling during the first half of the century. When Henry Ford
merchandized his Model T shortly after World War I, advertising was based on
the assumption that the seller and buyer were equally accessible, equally
knowledgeable, equally powerful. So Henry advertised the intrinsic quality
of the product itself: his cars were relatively inexpensive, ran well, were
easy to fix, and lasted a long time. But as mass produced goods of all kinds continued to flood the market,
advertising began to change. Its objective became how to motivate people to buy
more and more of the impersonally produced, impersonally sold goods -- without
losing the "personal" touch. In 1919 Henry was selling Fords in a
society where 90 percent of the populace had never owned a car. But by 1923, he
face a radically new situation: 90 percent of his potential buyers already
owned a car. Yet the production-consumption cycle had to go on. The solution
arrived in the person of Alfred P. Sloan, president of General Motors. Sloan
recognized that advertising must take a radically new course. It must convince
people to identify who they are with what they own, to be
dissatisfied with what they have, and to believe that new is better. These were
the essential new myths. If the public bought these myths, could be sold
anything -- including a new car -- whether they needed it or not. Thus GM products,
using the new advertising approach, made great strides during the late 20s and
early 30s simply by changing the styling, adding push-buttons for windshield
wipers and ventilation, and giving the public a choice of colors and chrome
trim. In addition, advertising learned to deal with the fantasy life of its
audience. To stay with the automobile illustration, cars no longer were
merchandized as transportation machines but were sold primarily as extensions
of the self -- symbols of power, of sexual drive, of freedom, and
status. However, the machine aspect was still important, and advertising for
next year's models was filled with encouragement about horsepower, power
transmissions, overdrive, and other quasi-technical jargon -- all designed to
convince the potential owner that he (and most auto ads of the period were
blatantly sexist) was in charge of something powerful, something amenable to
his will and control. They sold the sizzle, not the steak. The conquest of space simply built upon these bedrock principles of the
emerging advertising industry. The mythmakers went to work. The space ship was
itself an example of man (sic) conquering the new frontier -- space itself. The
astronauts (a word coined for the occasion, and richly evocative of the sailors
and adventurers of Greek myths) were candidated and chosen amidst a blaze of
publicity. Out of all five hundred or so military pilots in the entire United
States, only a few dozen were selected for the final tests, and of those only
the famous Seven were chosen. All were white, from middle-American small towns,
and had typical "American" families. We soon got to know John Glenn,
Buzz Aldrin and Neil Armstrong better than most of the people living on our
block, thanks to non-stop television coverage of their lives, families,
training, and successes and problems. Advertising well understood the
importance of personalizing the product, and the space race was no exception. Present, too, was the emphasis upon manned flight. While the
USSR's space program depended much more on automated flight, the U.S. program
emphasized control by humans -- even though in reality all John Glenn
could do was peer through a tiny window during most of his flight, while
computers and ground signals managed the actual controls. The space program
also depended upon another automobile innovation: the unveiling. Where new car
models had been carefully concealed to hype consumer interest and then unveiled
in a blaze of lights (or in carefully staged "spy" photos), the
latest rockets, boosters, and command capsules were unveiled at Cape Kennedy
amid even greater blazes of light and hype. Finally, NASA knew the importance of education along with ballyhoo, and
a huge Space Center was erected at Cape Kennedy (just a few miles from Disney
World) where families could see a super-wide-screen movie celebrating the
technological marvels of the space program, tour actual rockets and historic
space capsules, and on occasion even see a blast-off of one of the many space
launches. Added to this, of course, were millions of copies of various readers
made available to public schools for the edification of children, and Sunday
supplements with the same information, adult-style, for their parents. The
message of the selling of the moon was simply that technology is the most
powerful force in human affairs, and that the United States is "ahead in
the space race." The importance of Americans accepting this mythology can
scarcely be underestimated. It was the engine that moved Congress to allocate enormous
sums to maintain the wealth and power of the military-industrial complex. It
motivated a change in public school curriculum during the 1950s and beyond
toward science, mathematics and engineering at the expense of history,
communication skills and the liberal arts. It supplied the mythology that fed a
magical belief in the ultimate power of science, or rather, of scientism and
technology, which to many people amounted to the same thing. Culture changes as people try to orient themselves in their world and to
explain to themselves "what's going on." It changes even more under
the influence of a strong ideology. For most nations in the Western world in
our time, the prevailing economic ideology is capitalism. But capitalism
influences far more than economics; it profoundly influences the total culture.
Our culture, and its communication modes have changed more during the last
century and a half than in any other period in cultural history. In this time
of advanced capitalism the mass media sells etiquette books, interchangeable
jobs, packaged news, and everything from automobiles to satellites -- all to
meet the demands of technologies and worldviews that work best with
standardization and conformity. We have hinted at some of the values and worldviews embedded within this
culture in which we find ourselves. Let us explore these more directly, and see
how they compare and contrast with the values and worldview of people who call
themselves Christian -- those who try to relate to the values and worldview of
the gospel. REFERENCES 1. U.S. Department of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, "Census of
Manufacturers, Preliminary Report Industry Series," MC82-I-366-4(P) May
1984, p. 3. 2. John M. Staudenmaier, "The Influence of Communication
Technologies on Modern American Culture: A Framework for Analysis," paper
presented at the University of Dayton Conference on Religious
Telecommunications, Dayton, OH, September 26, 1988, p. 4. 3. Michael Schudson, Advertising, The Uneasy Persuasion: its Dubious
Impact on American Society (New York: Basic Books, Inc., 1986), p. 143. 4. Lydia E. White, Success in Society (Boston: James H. Earle,
1889), p. 188, cited in John F. Kasson, "Civility and Rudeness: Urban
Etiquette and the Bourgeois Social Order in Nineteenth-Century America," Prospects
9 (1984): 156, quoted in Staudenmaier, p. 6. 5. J.L. Larson, "A Systems Approach to the History of Technology:
An American Railroad Example," a paper read at the annual meeting of the
Society for the History of Technology, 1982, p. 17, quoted in Staudenmaier, p.
13. 6. A. Michael McMahon, "An American Courtship: Psychologists and
Advertising Theory in the Progressive Era," American Studies 13
(1972): 6, quoted in Staudenmaier, p. 14. 7. Ibid. 8. Task Force, p. 7. 9. Weaver, Sylvester, "Selling in a New Era," speech to the
Advertising Club of New Jersey, 24 May 1955, quoted in William Brody,
"Operation Frontal Lobes Versus the Living Room Toy: the Battle Over
Programme Control in Early Television," Media Culture and Society
(Beverly Hills: Sage) Vol. 9 (1987), p. 353. 10. Lloyd Shearer, "How Disney Sells Happiness," Parade,
March 26, 1972, p. 4, quoted in Michael R. Real, Mass-Mediated Culture
(Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1977), p. 51. 11. Richard Schickel, The Disney Version: The Life, Times, Art and
Commerce of Walt Disney (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1968) p. 323. 12. Disneyland Souvenir, p. 25, as quoted in Real, Mass-Mediated
Culture, 56. 13. Michael Real, Mass-mediated Culture (Englewood, NJ:
Prentice-Hall 1977), pp. 46-89. 14. Michael Real, Mass-mediated Culture, p. 77. 15. Martin J. Sherwin, A World Destroyed: the Atom
Bomb and the Grand Alliance (New York, 1977), p. 228. |