Genetic and Coordinate Division Correlated
by Lewis S. Ford
Lewis S. Ford is Emeritus Professor at Old Dominion University, and founding editor of Process Studies Periodical (1971 - 1995). The following article appeared in Process Studies, pp. 199-209, Vol. 1, Number 3, Fall, 1971. Process Studies is published quarterly by the Center for Process Studies, 1325 N. College Ave., Claremont, CA 91711. Used by permission. This material was prepared for Religion Online by Ted and Winnie Brock.
Sensing many of the same difficulties Neville has raised against my temporalistic interpretation of genetic successiveness, John Cobb has proposed this constructive alternative:
In addition to temporal successiveness, Whitehead conceives of another order of successiveness, which he calls genetic or microcosmic. This is a successiveness that becomes real only when the succession is completed. But when completed it can be reconstructed analytically in terms of the dependence of the completed occasion on inclusions and exclusions of the past and of unrealized possibilities. The including and excluding jointly constitute a complex act of decision which is momentary but not instantaneous. An act of decision has a beginning in the settled past given for the occasion and an end in the satisfaction of the new occasion. Since beginning and end are both temporally separated and qualitatively different, and since it is possible to analyze what must take place for the qualitative difference to come into being, it is appropriate to speak of the act of decision as a process in spite of its indivisible unity. Its origin is temporally earlier than its outcome. The analysis of the unified act can discriminate what is closest to that origin in the order of dependence (i.e., what depends only on that origin and the new aim at actuality) and what depends on aspects of the decision itself. The terms prior and subsequent offer themselves as appropriate characterizations of this order of real dependence. But it must be repeatedly recalled that neither the term dependence nor the terms prior and subsequent are used identically with their use in describing the relations between successive occasions.
On the other hand, the meaning of these terms is not equivocal. To show this I will focus only on "dependence." In all cases, if A depends on B, then A would not be A apart from B. In this sense: (1) occasion A depends on earlier occasion B; (2) occasion A depends on every phase of its own becoming; (3) subsequent phases depend on prior ones; and (4) all phases depend on the completed occasion.
Ford has charged that my argument in the Southern Journal of Philosophy Whitehead issue (1:409-13) "invokes a symmetrical internal relatedness between part and whole, between prior and subsequent, which it had been Whitehead’s genius to avoid" (1:425). Yet as here explained, I do not think my position makes (a) the relation of part and whole and (b) the relation of prior to subsequent phases symmetrical. (a) All parts depend on the whole occasion for any actuality whatsoever. The whole depends on its parts to constitute it as it is. The whole includes the parts. The parts do not include the whole. (b) Subsequent phases depend on the earlier for their content. This relation is not reciprocal. But no phase comes into being except as part of the whole occasion.
With this added explanation, I agree I must retract that charge. The accent of my remark was on symmetrical internal relatedness such as we find in F. H. Bradley in contrast with Whitehead’s asymmetrical relations which are internal to (as constitutive of) the prehending subject only, being external to the prehended datum. Now it becomes clear that Cobb maintains this asymmetry with respect to relations of constitution: the prior is constitutive of the subsequent, the part of the whole, and never vice versa. Phases depend upon the completed occasion in the sense that they cannot come into being apart from the whole, but this does not mean that the phases are constituted as to their nature by their relationship to the satisfaction. It rather signifies the generic necessary interconnection of "many," "one," and "creativity" (PR 31f). The many cannot become one in the absence of a terminating unity.
Cobb’s recognition that the origin of the act of decision is temporally earlier than its outcome is most significant for it stands in contrast with the implicit tendency to treat concrescence as if it were temporally instantaneous. Since the occasion happens "all at once" and its becoming is not in physical time, it is possible to assume that all temporal designations refer exclusively to coordinate division of the satisfaction. Since there is a becoming of continuity, the spatiotemporal region occupied by one occasion’s satisfaction is immediately followed by the region of its successor. If it be denied that the outset of concrescence is temporally earlier than its outcome, it would seem that the whole of concrescence must be inserted into that instant between two successive occasions, since the being of the second occasion first depends upon its becoming. Concrescence would then be an instantaneous becoming.
This seems to be William A. Christian’s position:
Indeed the satisfaction contains, one might say, the whole of the temporal duration of the occasion. For the genetic process that produces the satisfaction is not itself in physical time. If we think of "taking time" as a matter of filling up the gaps between the earlier and later physical boundaries of occasions, then it is the satisfaction that "takes time." It is by producing their satisfactions that actual occasions produce the temporally extended world. (IWM 30)
The satisfaction as objectified "takes time" in the sense outlined here, but I question whether it "represents a pause in the midst of the flux" (IWM 29) if this is taken to mean that the occasion subjectively enjoys its satisfaction for the duration of the present moment. I understand all subjectivity to inhere in becoming, while the satisfaction is the attainment of being. Only as the completion of becoming can the satisfaction be subjectively enjoyed, but this is a fleeting instant. If on the other hand, the satisfaction subjectively occupies the entire duration of the present, then the concrescence must take no time at all, from which I can only infer that it must be instantaneous.
Instantaneous becoming is not an inherently implausible notion. Traditionally it has been a favorite way of conceiving divine creation. But I think it plays havoc with any theory of epochal becoming that claims temporal occasions to be irreducibly atomic in some sense. If an instantaneous becoming produces a duration of, say, one millisecond, why could not that same millisecond duration be produced by two instantaneous acts spaced half a millisecond apart, or by four acts spaced a fourth of a millisecond apart, etc.? In fact, if the acts are instantaneous, it would seem more plausible to assume that the durations they produce are, if not instantaneous, at least infinitesimal. There need be no fixed, finite duration for any event, no matter how small, if its being can equally well be accounted for in terms of a series of several acts of becoming. The arguments derived from Zeno’s paradoxes deny that any "act of becoming is divisible into earlier and later sections which are themselves acts of becoming" (PR 106). but this does not affect the divisibility of the being of events. Obviously, instantaneous becoming cannot be divided, but it can be multiplied. Its very instantaneousness permits any finite duration to be populated with an infinitely dense series of them. In his discussion of ‘Achilles and the Tortoise,’ Whitehead recognizes the logical possibility of an infinite series of acts of becoming within a single second (PR 107). Thus the atomic, finite duration of an occasion’s being, it would seem, can only be safeguarded by assigning its becoming an equally finite duration.
Cobb also recognizes that "the analysis of the unified act can discriminate what is closest to that origin in the order of dependence" and that this can be appropriately described in terms of prior and subsequent. Does this mean that initial phases of concrescence are literally earlier than subsequent phases? Apparently not, for Cobb emphasizes only the difference between the use of dependence and the terms prior and subsequent here and in the description of successive occasions. My position is that genetic phases are earlier and later than one another in exactly the same sense that successive occasions are earlier and later, but that whereas all occasions earlier than a given one lie in its past, and all occasions later than it lie in its future, this is not true of the genetic phases of a single occasion. Here earlier and later phases are all equally Co. present as constituting that occasion’s present becoming. The assumption that "earlier/later than" and "past, present, future" have the same denotative range for a given temporal locus designated as present must be given up if we are to penetrate Whitehead’s meaning. I think it is the chief source of confusion concerning the epochal theory of becoming. Cobb’s statement could be interpreted as affirming that prior phases are earlier than subsequent ones but do not lie in their past, but the impression he leaves is that this is not so.
Now it is clear that the subsequent depends on the prior in "this order of real dependence," but is it equally true that the order of dependence always runs from the subsequent to the prior? In that case the outcome of an occasion would be prior to its origin, even though the origin is temporally earlier, since like all other phases the initial phase depends upon the completed occasion But if this is not so, what is the additional meaning assigned to prior and subsequent which is not discoverable in the concept of an order of dependence? Could it be: earlier and later?
Now we can make the claim that some genetic phases are earlier than others more precise by correlating genetic and coordinate division as illustrated in the following matrix:
On this matrix both genetic and coordinate divisions are made in terms of 2/10ths of a unit occasion, forming a scale of identical temporal loci. The ratings within the matrix measure the determinateness of an occasion from complete indeterminateness (0.0) to complete determinateness (1.0). Thus at the instant 1.0 occasion A is completely determinate while occasion B at the outset of concrescence is half indeterminate. The assignment of 0.5 determinateness to the initial phase of these three occasions is arbitrary, for this can vary widely. A predominantly physical occasion merely reiterating its past may be .99999 determinate at the outset of its concrescence, while particular human occasions may be highly indeterminate at this juncture. The diagram also standardizes the temporal length of an occasion, which may be presumed to vary considerably, perhaps between 20 milliseconds (2 x 10-2 secs.) for a human occasion and 10-24 secs for subatomic occasions.1 Nor is any attempt made to allow for any possible "unevenness" in the genetic phases.
The past, being fully determinate, has the value of 1.0. The future is partially determined by the outcome of the present, and thus has been assigned for purposes of illustration the values 0.3, 0.4. Since the present becomes epochally, it will also shape the future epochally, with each successive occasion rendering it more determinate.
Those who reject temporal passage would assign the value of 1.0 to every position in this matrix, while recognizing that a mind-dependent awareness of the present (moving down the y-axis) would only perceive such determinateness as that which is registered to the left of the corresponding unit indicated on the x-axis. Those who hold the future to be completely indeterminate would assign the value of 0.0 to all the upper right-hand squares, perhaps also collapsing the boundary between past and future into a single diagonal line.
Coordinate division measures the being or the occurring of events. Since only that which is fully determinate has being, coordinate division can only measure that which has the value of 1.0. Thus at 1.8 only that which has come into being up to the instant 1.0 can be coordinately divided, while at 2.0 this jumps forward to 2.0. The coordinate division 1.8 indicates what is occurring at 1.8 as this is objectively available for prehending occasions at 2.0 and later. Moreover, for either 1.8 or 2.0 later instants such as 3.0 or 14.8 are perfectly meaningful abstract temporal loci, though nothing as yet has being at those loci (save on the "full future" theory) to be measured.
Traditional theory recognizes that substances come into being, but it may be questioned whether the coming into being of events has been adequately understood. Substances have being insofar as they endure, while events have being insofar as they occur. A substance comes into being by means of that event which establishes its essence, i.e., an enduring object comes into being by means of the initial member occasion of that society which first constitutes its defining characteristic. Thus the becoming of a substance is the being of an event. Confusion at this point tempts non-process thinkers to identify the coming into being and the occurring of an event on the grounds that both must mean its "becoming present,"2 and tempts process thinkers to suppose that the satisfaction of an occasion must have the static being of a substance.
Genetic division measures the becoming of occasions, the process whereby they become determinately actual. This involves not only the "earlier/later than" distinctions of McTaggart’s B-series, but also the passage from the future through the present to the past. Insofar as epochal becoming is ignored. it is possible to assume that everything earlier than the present instant (say, 1.6) lies in its past and everything later lies in its future. Precisely that is what is denied with respect to genetic phases. Thus 1.2 and 1.4 are genetically earlier than 1.6, but do not lie in its past (as do 0.2 or 1.0). nor do the later 1.8 and 2.0 lie in its future, for all these successive phases are equally co-present with one another. This is the celebrated "thickness" of the present which permits being sliced into successively later layers.
We may illustrate the distinction between becoming and occurring by regarding occasions A through C as the motion of a particle traversing 3 unit-lengths. According to coordinate division, analyzing the continuity of that which has become, at 1.6 (along the x-axis) the particle is situated at 1.6 unit-lengths from the origin. This is what is occurring at the instant 1.6. But 1.0 to 2.0 is a single occasion which comes into being as a whole, such that it is only at and after 2.0 that whatever is occurring at 1.6 becomes fully determinate. During 1.0 to 2.0, the character of the instant 1.6 is still indeterminate. Moreover, the indeterminacy of 0.8 at 1.6 during the process of concrescence applies to whatever is occurring between 1.0 and 2.0, not just to what is occurring at 1.6, since the occasion comes into being as a whole. Thus the becoming and the being (or occurring) of an occasion occupy exactly the same temporal extent, but differently. This is most strikingly apparent in the satisfaction. The completion of becoming is being, so the satisfaction is both the final termination of becoming and the being of the whole occasion. In terms of the subjectivity enjoyed by the concrescing occasion 1.0-2.0 the satisfaction is felt only at the instant 2.0. As objectified as a potential for later occasions, however, the satisfaction occupies the entire duration from 1.0 to 2.0, for it is during that span that the event has being or is occurring.
Theories that see no need to account for the coming into being of events may dispense with the genetic dimension of this matrix, limiting themselves to coordinate division. But if whatever has being (including events) must first have come into being, that coming into being must fit in somewhere. A theory of instantaneous becoming is ultimately indistinguishable from a theory of being without becoming, for at no time can there be any process of determination whereby becoming is possible. Assigning the becoming of an event to its earliest subevent simply invites the vicious regress indicated in Zeno’s paradoxes (PR 106f), while locating it in some prior event entails complete causal determinism. Confronted with these alternatives, Whitehead proposes that each occasion be an act of self-creation. Each occasion occupies a certain spatiotemporal region within which it occurs, and it utilizes this region for its own coming into being. This is possible because that which an occasion creates during its concrescence is itself, its own occurring. Epochal becoming thus presupposes for its own possibility self-creation, which is precisely what we should expect for Whitehead’s theories of epochal becoming and creativity to cohere with one another.
Our matrix is overly schematic with respect to genetic successiveness, suggesting that there are exactly five phases of concrescence, each lasting 1/5th the duration. We might be further tempted to suppose that the first fifth is devoted to the initial phase, the second fifth to conceptual valuation, etc. lt is extremely difficult to determine whether any phases of conceptual origination should be assigned temporal duration. Conceptual valuation is the derivation of a possibility (how that prehended occasion might fit into the coming satisfaction) from a prehended actuality, and I see no grounds for postulating any temporal distance between an actuality and its inherent possibilities. Thus while conceptual valuation depends upon physical feeling (in actual occasions.) according to the order of dependence, I question the propriety of assuming that the initial physical phase is earlier than supplemented phases of a purely conceptual nature. The concrescence, however, uses these conceptual phases for the sake of a gradual process of integration and re-integration until a determinate satisfaction is reached wherein all the simple physical feelings are fully integrated in terms of their objective data by means of one patterned contrast. It is these phases of integration and re-integration that are earlier or later than one another, and there can be any number of them. With each phase of integration some indeterminacy has been eliminated yielding greater determinateness, designated rather arbitrarily in our matrix as .6, .7, etc. It should be noted that this degree of determinateness applies to the occasion as a whole. It is conceivable that at, e.g., 0.2 during concrescence that what is occurring at 0.2 is .85 determinate while what is occurring at 0.3 is only .65 determinate or vice versa, while the occasion as a whole is only .6 determinate.
Each phase of integration endures until superseded by the next later one. Within each phase there is mutual sensitivity of feeling directed by the subjective end evolved for that phase (PR 342). In each instance there is a corresponding modification in subjective aim (1:422).
Now in terms of this extended explanation perhaps we can clarify some misunderstandings occasioned by my original article (1:421-25). For example, I am not proposing subdividing the occasion into a series of sub-events called genetic phases, each of which comes into being all at once with a particular temporal thickness. This would merely transpose the problem of analyzing epochal becoming to another level, not resolve it. This would mean, for instance, that at 2.6 in the concrescence of 2.0-3.0 that which is occurring at 2.0 to 2.6 is fully determinate, having come into being, while the indeterminacy of the genetic phase at 2.6 refers only to the indeterminacy of what is occurring from 2.6 to 3.0. But that which has being is no longer becoming, and therefore 2.0 to 2.6 could not belong to a process of concrescence extending to 3.0.
I think the problem occasioning this possible misinterpretation concerns the being to be assigned a genetic phase. Every entity must have some sort of being which we implicitly assume by talking about it, insofar as we intend its concept to have reference beyond itself. Now I reject the interpretation that genetic division is merely hypothetical reconstruction after the fact. It is that, to be sure, because we have no direct experiential evidence for the successive phases of concrescence, and cannot expect that they will suddenly emerge under the powerful gaze of some yet-to-be-invented scientific instrument. As Whitehead notes, "the selection of a subordinate prehension [in genetic division] from the satisfaction . . . involves a hypothetical, propositional point of view. The fact is the satisfaction as one" (PR 360). This does not mean, however, that what we have hypothetically reconstructed, the genetic phases, have only a hypothetical status. But to have more they must have some sort of being. The theory that each genetic phase comes into being on its own does have its way of providing each phase with its own being, but at an unacceptable cost.
A genetic phase in process of becoming cannot derive its being from the occasion of which it is a part, for that occasion has not yet come into being. Thus the genetic phase 2.6 has no being in terms of what is occurring at 2.6, for as yet 2.6 has no concrete being. Yet while being is the completion of becoming such that what is can no longer become, being can be ingredient in becoming. The being of an incomplete phase is dependent upon the being ingredient in becoming, namely, the past actual occasions physically prehended. To be sure, this being pertains not to a unity but to a multiplicity. But then an incomplete phase is not one thing, one feeling; it is many feelings seeking unity.
"An incomplete phase . . . has the unity of a proposition" (PR 342). As Cobb helpfully pointed out to me, I erroneously implied in my original discussion of this passage (1:424) that each phase was a propositional feeling, not a proposition. "In abstraction from the creative urge . . . this phase is merely a proposition about its component feelings and their ultimate superject" (PR 342). Cobb interprets this to mean that the logical subject of this proposition is the concrescing occasion itself, while the ideal entertained in thc subjective aim provides the predicative pattern (CNT 156). But this ignores Whitehead’s insistence that propositions must have actualities as their logical subjects, not possibilities, even though these possibilities may be on the way to becoming actualities; otherwise they could not be categorically distinguished from eternal objects (PR 391-93). I take the component feelings to provide the logical subjects, with the subjective ideal as the ultimate superject aimed at. This is "a proposition seeking truth" (PR 342) in the final satisfaction, where the subjective ideal no longer expresses a possibility sought but a goal attained in the specific nature of this concrete unity. Here "the mere potentiality of the proposition . . . is converted into the fully determinate actuality" (PR 342f).3 In abstraction from creativity, an incomplete phase is merely many feelings, but this likewise abstracts from the subject they aim at (PR 339). More concretely it is many feelings becoming one in the unity of their common subject.
As Neville correctly points out, an analysis in terms of genetic phases is more abstract than a division of the satisfaction into prehensions. Even genetic division is a division of the satisfaction (PR 359) "to be assigned, for its origination, to an earlier phase of the concrescence" (PR 337). Any division into prehensions abstracts from the unity of the subject, while an analysis of prehensions in phases also abstracts from the total career of a prehension, considering its activity in separate stages. I question, however, whether every prehension obtained by genetic division has all the features of an actual entity" except its own completed subjective form. This would not be applicable to conceptual prehensions. The passage Neville appeals to (PR 29) must have reference to prehensions obtained by coordinate division.
Incomplete phases, we have seen, have been hypothetically reconstructed for our understanding by this double abstraction. This is not to say, contra Neville, that that to which these phases refer is merely an abstraction from satisfaction. Again the problem turns on the being to be assigned that which is in becoming. These phases, Neville insists, "have no existence in themselves so as to be able to exist earlier than the satisfaction phase" and this is true insofar as becoming cannot yet possess the being it is seeking to bring about. But these phases do have the being of the past actual occasions prehended.
Neville’s interpretation of my position makes cogent reading on the assumption that I regard the being of an occasion to consist in its becoming. On such a view, which I do not hold, the occurrence of events would appear to be given not along the x-axis but along the y-axis of genetic division: "A series of phases punctuated by demarcations of discontinuity." some indeterminate, others determinate. This obviously has its difficulties, for it supposes that something indeterminate can occur, and it treats the satisfaction as if it were only one occurrence in the series of happenings constituting the occasion. Neville correctly argues that the satisfaction cannot be only one aspect of the occasion’s being, but embraces "the occasion as a whole." But the being of an occasion is not its becoming in concrescence. In discussing how the one decision effected by the concrescence as a whole is analyzable as a series of successive decisions (1:422f), I was not considering the occasion’s being, much less assuming that this was constituted by the set of genetic phases. Decision as causa sui is a function of becoming, not being.
While we thus agree that becoming does not share in the being which it terminates in, since this belongs wholly to the satisfaction, I claim that becoming nevertheless possesses some measure of being in terms of which there can be the growing together of feeling in earlier and later integrations and reintegrations before the final satisfaction. In this sense, a genetic phase exists before" the satisfaction, but this is not the existence of actuality, but of a multiplicity in propositional unity seeking concretion. Nor is this to say that the genetic phase either "occurs" or "comes into being" prior to satisfaction, since the former entails that genetic phases can be isolated by coordinate division, and the latter that we regard each genetic phase as an instance of epochal becoming. With these qualifications we can answer the question: What has being during concrescence? Feelings growing together. Neville denies this: nothing has being during concrescence, for there is only becoming. This is the issue that divides us.
Neville argues that the only reality ingredient in incomplete phases is that of past actualities, the rest is appearance. This is true with respect to all conceptual supplementation, and it is also true that whatever being appearance may have it is a dependent, derivative being (at least for actual occasions) and hence cannot ground the being of feelings in concrescence. But what about these past actualities present as prehensive data? The question finally turns on whether these have being for the concrescence or being in the concrescence. Neville stresses the former by maintaining the objective immortality of the datum as a potential for objectification. "In no sense does elimination cause the datum to perish as a potential." It remains as a datum for the occasion, even though in the end it is not objectifiable. The being of past actualities remains merely potential with respect to the concrescing occasion until it is converted into actuality in the satisfaction. In contrast I argue that as prehended the past provides being to concrescence.
Fortunately we can bypass the difficult question whether there can be any being apart from becoming. Whitehead clearly affirms the perishing of becoming in being; is there likewise any perishing of being in becoming? Is that which is objectively immortal exempt from perishing, as Neville claims, freed from the perils of undergoing a second death, or does the past perish insofar as it is not included within present prehending (cf. PR 517)? This is central to the question of the prehension of the distant past which Sherburne raises (PPCT 320-22). If the past is objectively immortal forevermore, then it is always prehendable, and direct prehension of the distant past is always a possibility, however slight. If, on the other hand, the past persists only insofar as it is taken up into intermediate occasions, then only that much of the past present in immediately contiguous occasions is prehendable. The texts appear to assign the imperishable being to past actualities that Neville champions, but if so, one may question the adequacy of such a position. Our problem here, however, is not to determine whether there is any being apart from becoming, but whether there is any being in becoming.
If the past as prehended has no being in concrescence but only being for concrescence as a potential for actualization, then actualization belongs solely to the satisfaction and not to the concrescence. This could mean that becoming is instantaneous, bringing about a satisfaction with a finite duration, subject to the problems noted above, or it could mean that the present concrescence still has temporal thickness. In that case, however, there would seem to be no essential difference between the present and the future. As a potential for objectification the past is being for the present and the future indifferently. It is only as the past is taken up into concrescence that the present emerges as different from the future.
At this point Neville may wish to argue that the present is not found in concrescence but in the newly achieved satisfaction. In that case I find no essential difference between the present and the past, for both are equally determinate. The strength of Whitehead’s position is that it allows us to distinguish between the indeterminateness of the future (partially determined by past actualities insofar as they are potentials for it), the process of determination which is the present, and the determinateness of the past. The process of actualization must have some being to rescue from the indeterminacy of the future, but it cannot yet have the complete being of the satisfaction without already being actual.
As prehended the past provides the being for present prehending. The newly emergent being in satisfaction is constituted out of the old beings prehended, but this is equally true for its becoming. In becoming this past is felt as a multiplicity gradually fusing itself into unity in the birth of a new being. Neville has many past actualities; he has a becoming; and he has a final unity in satisfaction; but he has no many becoming one. Before concrescence, there is only the many of past actualities which have exhausted their becoming. During concrescence there is becoming, but no being, hence no being for the entities which severally could make up a many becoming one. In satisfaction, there is the being of unity, but no more becoming. Only in incomplete phases of concrescence which are later than the settled past and earlier than the coming satisfaction can the many feelings seek the unity of their common subject.
CNT -- John B. Cobb, Jr., A Christian Natural Theology. Philadelphia: Westminster Press, 1965.
IWM -- William A. Christian, An Interpretation of Whitehead’s Metaphysics New Haven: Yale University Press, 1959.
PPCT -- Delwin Brown, Ralph E. James, Jr., and Gene Reeves, eds., Process Philosophy and Christian Thought. Indianapolis: Hobbs-Merrill, 1971.
1. The special Whitehead issue of the Southern Journal of Philosophy 7, 4 (Winter, 1969-70) for my article "On Genetic Successiveness," 421-25.
1See Milic Capek, "Bergson’s Theory of Matter and Modern Physics," p. 302 in P. A. Y. Gunter, ed., Bergson and the Evolution of Physics (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 1969).
2So Richard M. Gale. "Has the Present Any Duration?" Nous 5, 1 (February, 1971), 44f.
3As emended in the "Corrigenda for Process and Reality," p. 203 in George L. Kline, ed., Alfred North Whitehead: Essays on His Philosophy (Englewood Cliffs: Prentice-Hall, 1963).