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A New World Order in Communication by William F. Fore William F. Fore received a B.D. from Yale Divinity School and Ph.D. from Columbia University. A minister in the United Methodist Church , he was Director of Visual Education for the United Methodist Board of Missions, then Executive Director of the Communication Commission of the National Council of Churches in New York City. From 1989 to 1995 he was Visiting Lecturer in Communication and Cultural Studies at Yale Divinity School.. His publications include Image and Impact (Friendship Press 1970), Television and Religion: the Shaping of Faith, Values and Culture (Augsburg 1987, currently reprinted by SBS Press, 409 Prospect St., New Haven, CT 06511), and Mythmakers: Gospel Culture and the Media (Friendship Press 1990). This article appeared in the Christian Century April 14, 1982 p. 442. Copyright by the Christian Century Foundation and used by permission. Current articles and subscription information can be found at www.christiancentury.org. This material was prepared for Religion Online by Ted & Winnie Brock.
The New York Times featured an
editorial titled “UNESCO as Censor.” Time magazine issued a full-page
editorial statement on “The Global First Amendment War.” Hundreds of newspapers
carried stories similar to Editor and Publisher’s “Press Groups Denounce
UNESCO Plan on Media.” During the past year and a half there has flowed a small
but steady stream of reports full of anger, fear and righteous indignation.
For, in these actions the press sees mortal threats to its freedom -- while
many Third World leaders see a chance for simple justice. At stake is a fundamental ingredient that
makes democracy possible: the flow of information -- without which people
cannot possibly govern themselves. But also at stake are power and profits on a
grand scale. The rich mixture of principle and self-interest in this debate
amply demonstrates the complexity of moral decision-making that the new
communications technology is forcing upon us. UNESCO’s new look at worldwide
communications has its roots in the formation of the Third World concept
itself. In 1956 the leaders of most of the former colonies met in Bandung and
organized a “nonaligned” movement. They understood their group as a third force
to act as a buffer between proponents of capitalism (First World) and those of
communism (Second World). This Third World group pressed immediately for a new
economic independence from both First and Second Worlds. The United Nations was
their forum. In May 1974 the UN General Assembly
adopted a Declaration of the Establishment of a New International Information
Order. At the same time, Third World leaders began pressing for similar action
in the areas of news and information. Mustapha Masmoudi, Tunisian secretary of
state for in-formation, issued a call for the development of a New
International Information Order (NIIO), asserting that the Western concept of a
“free flow” of information, like freedom of the seas, free markets and free
trade, in fact conceals the real nature of neoimperial control. In 1976 UNESCO’s Director General
Amadou-Mahtar M’Bow was authorized to appoint an International Commission for
the Study of Communication Problems. The commission, under the leadership of
Sean MacBride (former foreign minister of Ireland and recipient of both the Nobel
and Lenin Peace Prizes), completed its work in time for the General Conference
in Belgrade, October 1980. The report, Many Voices, One World (Unipub,
1980), supported the principles of free reporting of news, but it also
encouraged state regulation of the media and suggested that UNESCO give
priority to “the elaboration of international norms” in its communication
program. The Belgrade Assembly merely referred the
MacBride Commission report to its member governments, without endorsing any of
its conclusions. However, the assembly went on to produce its own shocks to the
West. The Group of 77, a bloc of more than 100 developing countries, had come
with a detailed description of a “New World Information Order.” After strenuous
negotiations, the sections that were most offensive to the West were removed.
These included “the right of peoples . . . to comprehensive and true
information,” “the right of each nation” to inform the world about its affairs,
and “the right of each nation to protect its cultural and social identity
against the false or distorted information which may cause harm.” In the end, however, all of the
participating nations for the first time accepted a document saying that it is
possible to define a new information order. Only the United Kingdom stated that
it would have opposed the resolution had it come to a vote (instead, it was
adopted by consensus). The U.K. objected to the very idea of defining the new
order; its position got no votes from other Western nations.
1. elimination
of the imbalances and inequalities which characterize the present solution; 2. elimination
of the negative effects of certain monopolies, public or private, and excessive
concentrations; 3. removal of
the internal and external obstacles to a free flow and wider and better
balanced dissemination of information and ideas; 4. plurality of
sources and channels of information; 5. freedom of
the press and information; 6. the freedom
of journalists . . . a freedom inseparable from responsibility; 7. the capacity
of developing countries to achieve improvement of their own situations, notably
by providing their own equipment, by training their personnel, by improving
their infrastructures and by making their information and communication means
suitable to their needs and aspirations; 8. the sincere
will of developed countries to help them attain these objectives; 9. respect for
each people’s cultural identity and the right of each nation to inform the
world public about its interests, its aspirations and its social and cultural
values. The U.S. delegation response was ambivalent. According to “The U.S.
View on Belgrade,” a report of the State Department prepared under the
supervision of Sarah G. Power, “The resolution on the MacBride Report is
largely what we had sought. . . . It calls for widespread dissemination of the
Report, for study and reflection, but little concrete action as far as
implementation is concerned.” The U.S. also realized a major objective, the
establishment of an International Program for Development of Communication
(IPDC), a UNESCO-based information clearinghouse aimed at assisting the Third
World in the development of communication. But the U.S. delegation said that the
1981-83 UNESCO communication program and budget ranged “from unhelpful to
totally unacceptable.” Some of the programs most objectionable to the U.S. were
“studies and conferences on protection of journalists, journalistic standards,
freedom and responsibility in communication, international right of reply and
rectification, advertising content and management of media.” And while the State Department reacted with caution, the U.S. press
reacted with rage, panic and considerable bias. Joseph A. Mehan of UNESCO
charges that “with amazing uniformity, U S. newspapers have accused UNESCO of
encouraging censorship, state control of the press, licensing of journalists by
the state, and, in general, of being the archenemy of freedom of the press.” A. H. Raskin, former assistant editor of
the editorial page of the New York Times and currently associate
director of the National News Council in New York, conducted a study of some
448 news clippings and 206 editorials dealing with Belgrade, from newspapers in
all parts of the United States. He discovered that by far the most news
stories, 39 per cent, dealt with the debate over communications policy, and
that 88 per cent of the editorials were on this topic. Of these editorials, 87
per cent were strongly hostile -- so much so that 27 newspapers suggested U.S.
withdrawal from UNESCO if it persisted in moves seen as threatening press
freedom. Comments Raskin: “Not one story emanating
from the six-week conference dealt with any of the reports, speeches, or
resolutions on UNESCO’s basic activities in combating illiteracy, developing alternate
energy sources, protecting historic monuments, broadening educational programs
for scientists and engineers, or sponsoring basic research in food production,
ocean sciences and scores of other fields.” One might well ask whether the
press’s shoddy treatment of the Belgrade conference exemplifies the very
problems that prompted the New Information Order debate. And the heat is still on. In May 1981,
some 100 representatives of print and broadcast organizations from the U.S. and
20 other nations met in the French Alps, where they adopted the “Declaration of
Talloires,” calling on UNESCO to “abandon attempts to regulate news content and
formulate rules for the press.” In June, Elliott Abrams, assistant secretary of
state for international organization affairs, charged that UNESCO had “lent
itself to a massive assault on the free flow of information” and challenged
General Secretary M’Bow that if he did not remain “neutral” and avoid
confrontation on the issue, he faced a battle with the U.S. “This is a war
UNESCO cannot win,” Abrams declared.
First Amendment guarantees of free press
and speech are among the most cherished U.S. rights, and for good reason. One
has only to live a few months in a country whose press is dominated by
government edict to recognize how stultifying it can be and how indispensable
the Western tradition of press freedom is to individual well-being and to the
democratic political process. In recent years, however, there has
arisen a kind of mystical attraction to the principle of free speech, an awe
and obeisance which society reserves for its objects of worship. It is as
though free speech were a kind of first principle -- self-evident,
self-validating, deserving unquestioning loyalty. But surely it is dangerous to
deify any ethical principle, even one so important as the idea that an
individual has a right to be heard. There are at least three reasons why it
is dangerous to absolutize the idea of free speech. One is that free speech is
in reality instrumental to a higher political good. Even James Madison insisted
that the right of people to speak and to listen is not an end in itself, but a
means of achieving “popular government”; that is, a democratic process in which
people have the opportunity to take part in the decisions which affect their
lives. In some cases, the absolute right to speak could actually subvert that
process, as illustrated by the “right” to shout “Fire!” in a crowded theater,
or the “right” of advertisers to misinform the public. We have laws that
proscribe these “rights.” Second, the right of free speech should
not be absolutized because it thus becomes sell-contradictory. Constitutional
lawyer Ronald Dworkin recently pointed out in the New York Review of Books (“Is
the Press Losing the First ‘Amendment?,” December 4, 1980) that every
extension of the First Amendment is, from the standpoint of democracy, a
double-edged sword. It enhances democracy because public information increases
the general power of the public. But it also contracts democracy because any
constitutional right disables the popularly elected legislature from enacting
some legislation it might otherwise wish to enact, and this decreases the
general power of the public. Dworkin argues that the support of free
speech as a requirement for democracy demands, by its own logic, “some
threshold line to be drawn between interpretations of the First Amendment that
would protect and those that would invade democracy.” This, he believes, is what the Supreme
Court does when it describes, in general terms, “what manner of invasion of the
powers of the press would so constrict the flow of information to the public as
to leave the public unable intelligently to decide whether to overturn (any
particular) limitation of the press by further legislation.” And finally, free speech ought not be
absolutized because the First Amendment basically protects not the right of the
press to speak, but the right of every citizen to listen. The courts
have made this distinction clear. For example, Warren E. Burger, in his opinion
in the landmark Red Lion case, stated that “it is the right of the viewers and
listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, which is paramount?’ Thus it can be argued that if a “free”
press were to become so economically or politically powerful that it could
actually withhold news and information to such an extent that citizens
no longer could participate as equals in the process of governing themselves,
then we should expect government, through the courts or the legislature, to
take steps to create new sources of news and information and to curb the
monopoly power of that “free” press. Clearly, even journalists and political
liberals must be careful not to invoke free speech as a sacrosanct and
inviolable principle in the creation of an international information order. This issue has been analyzed by Howard C.
Anawalt, a constitutional law professor, at the University of Santa Clara, in
an article titled “Is the Macbride Commission’s Approach Compatible with the
United States Constitution?” (Journal of Communication, Autumn 1981). He
concludes that it is. The
Commission approach offers both a physical foundation and a set of protective
principles for development of a worldwide communication freedom. It passes the
basic test of compatibility with United States constitutional norms. Informed
United States criticism should therefore take the tack of seeking to improve
the proposed new order, rather than rejecting it altogether.
Frank Campbell, information minister of
Guyana, has responded to Western charges that the new information order would
give UNESCO jurisdiction over news media: The
issue is not UNESCO controlling the media. The question is [how] to have a
basis of communication other than a purely commercial one and communication
ethics based on something other than ethnocentricity and historical arrogance.
We are not saying UNESCO should issue a license saying you must have so many
stories coming out of Guyana, Tanzania or India, and what these stories must
say. American First Amendment advocates must
face the fact that imposition of our highly industrialized model of big press
as a check against the excesses of big government has limited relevance to many
places in the Third World where there is little literacy and practically no
economic market for news. The insistence on absolute freedom or a
“free flow” of information is seen by the developing nations as the freedom of
the fox in the chicken coop. Campbell speaks eloquently for the Third World: By
a free press, in the West, you mean a press owned by a few people who have a
commercial monopoly, really a monopoly of the conscience of mankind. They are
“the good people” and they “know what is right.” A free press means, for you,
that the owner of the press is free to prevent whom he wants from being heard. You
don’t have a free press at all. You have a press imprisoned by commercial
interests. Our own late A. J. Liebling also said it:
“Freedom of the press is reserved for those who own one.” It is difficult for people in the U.S. to
understand that government can have a legitimate role in communication.
In Europe, however, almost every nation has a long tradition of
government-related news and information agencies, some of which are, highly
respected. The BBC is established by Parliament and depends on its levy of a
set tax. Severiges Radio in Sweden has a similar government tie. Broadcasting
in Germany is the creature of the individual Länder (states). And Japan
has a mix of commercial and noncommercial broadcasting: NHK, one of the most
respected news organizations in the world, was created and is sustained by
government edict. Of course, governmental dominance of news
and information too often has been the handmaiden of dictatorships, oligopolies
and generally repressive regimes. There is a great deal of hypocrisy among many
leaders of the Third World and the U.S.S.R. in calling for a free and balanced
flow of information at a time when there is a nonexistent flow of news and
information between the power elite and the masses in their own nations.
Certainly UNESCO must be as critical of political constraints as it is of
economic and cultural constraints on news flow, and the MacBride Report makes
these dangers abundantly clear. But to insist on rigidly applying our own
historically derived concept of press freedom to the Third World, and to reject
out of hand any possible role of government in ensuring the free flow of news
and information, is in fact unfaithful to the principle of democracy underlying
our own First Amendment.
Many Third World leaders have a strong
bias against free enterprise as the basis for maintaining the communication
process that undergirds their national destiny. This anticommercialism causes
the U.S. media to see red: they are certain that behind the bias lurks the long
arm of Soviet control or, at the very least, a tilt toward communism. And it is
true that for many years the U.S.S.R. has been using the communication issue to
alienate the Third World from the First. The nonaligned nations have seen what
commercial media have done to the flow of news and information both within the
United States and, to some degree, in their own nations. In the U.S. the broadcast
and print media have increasingly turned viewers and readers into a product to
be delivered to the real audience -- the sponsors. As a result, the mass
media’s primary objective has changed: its goal no longer is to inform or
enlighten or even to entertain, but rather to reach and hold the largest
possible audience, regardless of the damage done to other journalistic
objectives. In America the use of the sensational,
the shocking, the titillating, the celebrity cult and the stereotype have
become routine because news has become merely one more audience
attention-getter rather than a function justifiable on its own merits. And
since attention-getting is paramount, there is little information about
marginal people -- the poor, the elderly, the Third World. All of this comes naturally to a system
which deals with news and information as a means to a commercial end. But this
is also the reason that Third World nations have pressed hard for a document
stating a preference for “noncommercial forms of mass communication.” And
although the Belgrade statement makes no mention of anticommercialism, the
MacBride Report proposes in recommendation number 58 that “effective legal
measures should be designed to: limit the process of concentration and
monopolization; [and] . . . reduce the influence of advertising upon editorial
policy and broadcast programming.” The strong reaction of the U.S. delegation
to such proposals makes it abundantly clear what the real priorities of our
government are -- with regard to scope, balance, depth and fairness in news and
information on the one hand and profits for business on the other. In dealing with a subject so complex, and
played for such large stakes, what guiding principles might help us move toward
just and equitable worldwide communication? First, the
basic objective of public communication should be to enable people to
participate fully in their own development and that of their nation. A structure or
process which hinders that objective -- whether it be political, economic,
ideological or social -- should be reformed or rejected. Every individual has
the right to know; that is, every just society must create and maintain those
conditions in which each citizen is able to take part in politics intelligently
and as the equal of any other. People must have the technical means both to
speak and to listen if they are to participate in the process of governing
themselves. Second,
government has a role in maintaining the rights of citizenship. The question of
private versus state ownership and control must be secondary to the creation
and maintenance of communication structures that facilitate genuine
democratization. All forms of authoritarianism should be rejected,
including domination of the media by economic power groups and elites. Third, the
Third World nations should be allowed to develop their own collective
self-reliance in news, information and entertainment, progressing at a rate and
in a manner appropriate to their needs rather than in conformity to the
marketplace needs of the industrialized nations. In achieving these objectives we ought
consciously to reject the temptation to take communication models of the
developed nations and try to make them “fit” the Third World. Rather, whole new
forms of communication, appropriate for developing nations, need to be devised.
We must ask: What are the existing communication processes in the nation, and
how can they be improved and developed? Simple, inexpensive media, such as
radio, local telephones and newspapers, may suit the needs of a developing
nation far better than television, satellites and big-city newspapers. The
objective should be maximum participation and maximum sources and diversity of
information, not maximum profits for large communication conglomerates or
maximum political control for a tiny power elite. Just as there must come a new world
economic order, there must come a new world communication order. Its
goal must be to enable people everywhere to guide their own future. It will
take time, but it must come. We are living in a world in which, each moment, we
become increasingly interdependent, and in which exploitation becomes
increasingly self-destructive. Today there is no place we can run from
the consequences of our actions. If this new communication order is truly
coming, then we in the United States should be in the forefront, making it
happen. And even if it is not imminent, we should work toward making the
goal a reality. |